Enhancing Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (PSOs) Capacities in Africa: Any Role for China?

A Joint Research Project between the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

By - DAWIT YOHANNES, YONAS TARIKU, DEREJE SEYOUM

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Preface

This work enmeshes two of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies’ longstanding areas of interest: supporting research related to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and contributing to a better understanding of China-Africa relations. This research contributes to this effort, particularly in the endeavour of having a functioning African Standby Force (ASF) and in enhancing our understanding of multidimensional peace support operations capabilities and the challenges faced during their implementation. The study also examined what China could contribute—within the framework of Africa’s needs and within the limits and context of China’s capacity and preference—and highlights pertinent recommendations.

This study was initiated by a call for proposals for the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in 2015. The Embassy of China in Ethiopia facilitated the call for proposals as part of eight measures launched by the Chinese government to strengthen China-Africa cooperation at the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2009. The Programme supports the exchange between Chinese and African academic institutions with a view to further strengthening research on China-Africa relations and African affairs. Out of the two proposals IPSS submitted, one proposal was awarded with a research grant that covered fieldwork in Nairobi, Abuja and Beijing as well as the publication costs of this final research report.

I would like to thank the individuals and institutions that contributed to the successful conclusion of the project. The lion’s share of thanks goes to IPSS’ three researchers, namely, Dr. Dawit Yohannes, Ato Yonas Tariku and Ato Dereje Seyoum, for executing the project while keeping the highest standards. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and China’s Embassy in Ethiopia deserve special thanks for providing the research grant, particularly Mr. Mu Xinyang and his predecessor Mr. He Chengqing for facilitating the grant.

I would also like to thank the AU Peace Support Operations Division (AU PSOD), the East African Standby Force (EASF) Secretariat, the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC-Kenya), the Nigerian Defense College, and the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) for availing their personnel for interviews that provided valuable inputs to the study. I am also grateful for Col. (Dr.) Ibrahim Mohammed (EASF Secretariat) and Dr. Yaya Habibu (ECOWAS Commission) who personally facilitated the work of the researchers in Nairobi and Abuja respectively. The IPSS editorial committee also contributed to ensuring the high quality of the report, particularly the significant roles of Ms. Michelle Ndiaye, Prof. Charles Ukeje, and Prof. Amr Abdalla. Michelle Mendi Muita was instrumental in proofreading and designing the report.

I am convinced that this work will be beneficial to students, researchers and policy makers alike who wish to contribute to the broader debate on China’s contribution to Africa’s peace and security in general and to supporting multidimensional African PSO capabilities in particular.

Kidane Kiros (PhD)
Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Addis Ababa University
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### Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises</td>
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<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African Support Mission to Mali</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>APSTA</td>
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<td>African Standby Capacity</td>
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<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AU PSD</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU PSOD</td>
<td>African Union Peace Support Operations Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>JFAJ</td>
<td>Joint Financing Agreement</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MITF</td>
<td>Mali Integrated Task Force</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>TAM</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOAU</td>
<td>United Nations Office to the African Union</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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The African Standby Force (ASF) is one of the African Union’s (AU) mechanisms for crisis and conflict management. The AU and its regions have been developing multidimensional peace support operation (PSO) capabilities since the mid-2000s - including integrating the military, the police and the civilian components - a major aspect of operationalising the force. Given the huge cost of implementing its wide-ranging structures and its operational relevance in preventing, managing and resolving crises, the ASF has been the locus of a number of external actors that provide financial and technical assistance. China, as one of the latest entrants into the African peace and security landscape, has joined the list of external actors that support the ASF.

Within the broad rubric of a burgeoning China-Africa cooperation in peace and security, this study examines the state of ongoing efforts of developing and enhancing, with China’s contribution, the multidimensional PSO capabilities in Africa. The study is based on an extensive analysis of official documents and academic works; it is also complemented by interviews with experts from the African Union, regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as with Chinese scholars in Beijing. The study argues that developing multidimensional PSO capabilities, and ultimately fully operationalising the ASF, is unlikely to succeed without full African ownership and commitment. As such, external support, including from China, must complement African efforts and reflect African priorities and demands. In the latter case, the study notes incongruity between African demands for external support and China’s preferences, or capabilities, in providing specific support modalities. Notwithstanding these limitations, the study underscores China’s potential in supporting ongoing efforts of developing multidimensional PSOs capability in Africa. To this end, the research offers the following key recommendations:

• There is a need to align China’s support modalities, and occasionally preferences, with the AU’s requirements in building multidimensional PSO capacities. To this end, China should maintain a range of flexible support mechanisms attuned to the strategic and operational demands of the AU comprising material, financial and technical support.

• With a view to tackling coordination-, communication- and integration-related challenges, China can support relevant trainings and workshops related to, for example, civil-military coordination in order to broaden existing understanding of PSOs in a more multidimensional sense (i.e. beyond the military).

• China can take a much more active role in various ASF-related training exercises by providing the requisite finance and logistics to ensure adequate representation of the civilian and police components. Furthermore, China can also support the AU in organising trainings required for PSOs to operate in Africa’s changing conflict environment.
• The AU has implemented a number of structures, as well as legal and institutional frameworks, aimed at supporting ASF mechanisms, which have not been fully and practically implemented. To this end, China can support the AU and the RECs/RMs to harmonise the various ASF-related structures and initiatives and to enhance the visibility of African actors to the same end.

• In order to enhance the role of the police and civilian components in PSOs, China can financially sustain certain positions related to the two components both at the level of the AU Peace Support Operations Division (AU PSOD) and the regional Planning Elements (PLANELEM).s.

• In order to better align its activities with other external actors in African peace and security, both broadly and in relation to ASF in particular, it is recommended that China join the Joint Financing Agreement (JFA) established by some of the major partners aimed at enabling the AUC in fulfilling its mandate in the area of peace and security in the continent.
Africa’s aspirations for greater self-sufficiency in the realm of peace and security took a decisive turn in the 21st Century, marked at least by two major developments. On the one hand, an emerging African “security regionalism” is gaining practical significance in light of the adoption and development of various pan-African collective peace and security structures. These structures are epitomised by the establishment of a comprehensive mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts - commonly referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In addition to a number of other components, APSA includes the African Standby Force (ASF), a mechanism tasked with undertaking peace support operations (PSOs) in the continent.¹

On the other hand, given the sheer complexity of a changing conflict environment as well as the potential for economic progress, the continent is also experiencing “a revival of external strategic attention”,² including in peace and security-related activities since the turn of the 21st century. Against a backdrop of historical and emerging contexts, a number of external actors continue to exercise significant influence over Africa’s peace and security landscape. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France are some of the major actors who have been involved in the continent since the early days of the continent’s decolonisation.³ More recently, the European Union (EU), along with some of its leading members such as Germany, has increased its engagements in the African peace and security sector. Although China also has historical ties with the continent that can be traced to the ancient times, and also to its shared struggle against colonialism and imperialism in the modern times, Beijing is a relatively new entrant in Africa’s peace and security environment. China has recently stepped up its peace and security-related activities on the continent, but in ways that are generating a number of questions about the motivations, modalities and impact of their engagements.

Within the broad rubric of a burgeoning China-Africa cooperation in peace and security, this study joins the debate around these two major developments and interrogates China’s contribution in enhancing Africa’s multidimensional PSO capabilities as part of its broader efforts of operationalising the ASF.⁴ In the context of actual African peace operations, and contrary to the initial aspiration of the ASF concept mentioned above, most of the current African PSOs are still considered to be heavy on the military side and lacking in terms of their civilian and police components. This is despite efforts made in the last 10 years to develop multidimensional PSO capabilities. The research examined China’s support to the ASF, extant and potential, based on an assessment of ongoing efforts at building multidimensional PSO capabilities as well as a critical analysis of China’s evolving role in Africa and its comparative advantage in international peacekeeping. In a broader sense, the research sought to address the central question of how China can assist African efforts towards building multidimensional PSO capabilities.

As one of its main findings, the study observes that ongoing efforts in building multidimensional PSO capabilities and ultimately, in fully operationalising the ASF, are unlikely to succeed without full African ownership and commitment. Whether driven by national interest considerations or underpinned by the concept of “partnership”, a range of bilateral and multilateral donors have lined up to support the ASF.⁵ Some of the major external actors providing financial and technical support to
the ASF mechanisms, both at the regional or national levels, include the US, Canada, France, the UK, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Japan, the EU and the United Nations (UN). As such, external support, including from China, must be one that complements African efforts and reflects African priorities and demands rather than one that seeks to replace or sideline them. In the latter sense, the research also noted incongruity between African demands for external support (in this case from China) and China’s preferences, and capabilities, for specific support modalities. For instance, this is clearly indicated by a mismatch between China’s preference to disburse its latest pledge of US$60 million in support of the ASF in the form of equipment and the AU’s request for direct financial disbursement of the pledge.

The study was based on an extensive review and analysis of official documents and academic works on ASF. It was also complemented with expert interviews conducted with Chinese scholars in Beijing, AU officials in Addis Ababa, as well as experts and scholars in Nairobi and Abuja as seats of the ASF’s regional standby forces for eastern and western Africa respectively.

In terms of its structure, this report is organised into four interlinked parts. The first part will look at the genesis of the ASF and briefly present the rationale as well as the legal frameworks that underscore its multidimensional aspects. The second part examines the status of developing multidimensional PSO capabilities and takes stock of the progress made so far, including shifts or expansion in the nature of mission mandates, the development of appropriate policy and institutional frameworks, and the enhancement of staff composition at missions as well as at various planning elements (PLANELMs).

Notwithstanding these achievements, this part also highlights a number of outstanding challenges related to building multidimensional PSO capacities such as the lack of political commitment by member states; financial constraints; coordination and communication between the AU and the regions; integration and collaboration of the different components (i.e. civilian, police and military); as well as other specific challenges related to the ASF civilian component. Part three analyses China’s emerging role in peace and security at the global level as well as in Africa. Departing from China’s comparative advantage in the realm of international peacekeeping and within the context of Beijing’s commitment to support African peace and security initiatives, the last part analyses China’s specific contribution to ongoing efforts in developing multidimensional PSO capabilities.
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE AND ITS MULTIDIMENSIONAL FEATURES

2. Brief overview of the African Standby Force and its multidimensional features

The onset of the 21st Century ushered in a new era of African agency in peace and security. One of the defining milestones of this era is the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a major transformative moment for re-energising Africa’s aspirations for greater ownership in the provision of peace, security and promotion of stability. This evolution was precipitated by a number of broader, structural factors. A changing conflict landscape in post-Cold War Africa proved to be a major stumbling block to the continent’s stability, prosperity and economic development. Further, the international community failed to execute its responsibility to ensure Africa’s peace and security, whether as a matter of indifference, neglect or inaction. At the same time, a number of political and institutional developments unfolded in the continent especially related to realising the continent’s integration. APSA emerged as a major institutional response to these factors encapsulating the establishment of new institutions as well as the endorsement of norms and rules that govern African states’ interaction on matters of peace, security and development.

As the implementation arm of the AU, APSA refers to a set of doctrines, mechanisms, norms and structures for the effective execution of “the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict management (peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building) and post-conflict reconstruction and development”. The last 14 years have witnessed the incremental operationalisation of different structures and underlying policy frameworks of APSA, often referred to as the APSA pillars. APSA is currently operationalised through the Panel of the Wise (PoW); the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to monitor the regional mechanisms with a view to anticipating conflicts; the African Standby Force (ASF); and the African Common Defense Policy. Out of these pillars, the ASF arguably stands out as one of the most widely used instrument to deal with conflicts in the continent, in light of the increasing need for peace operations in various crises in Africa. It is also considered by far the most robust component of the APSA.

Right from its inception, the ASF was conceived as a standby arrangement in which Africa’s five sub-regions would contribute one brigade each. The regions later assumed vital roles in implementing various policy and legal frameworks as well as institutional structures related to the ASF. To an extent, this arrangement attests to the practical realisation of the principle of subsidiarity between the AU and its regions - a principle which assigns roles and rights to lower levels of governance in order to act in congruence with the objectives and the principles of the higher ones.

The legal and political rationale for the establishment of the ASF can be found primarily in the protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Council as well as in various ASF policy documents. The ASF was conceived by the AU PSC Protocol as a mechanism that would perform a wide range of functions; including peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. Thus, the PSC Protocol envisioned the functions of PSOs in a comprehensive manner ranging from enforcing cessation of hostilities to attaining post-conflict stability and development. In essence, this broader conception underpinned the multidimensional nature of African peace operations. In line with this vision, Article 13(1) of the Protocol stipulates that the ASF is to be composed of multidisciplinary contingents including civilian and military components.
This composition enables the ASF to carry out its complex and multidimensional mandates as stipulated under Article 13(3) of the PSC Protocol. In terms of operational capabilities, the ASF was also expected to have the following multidimensional capacities:

1. A legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter.

2. A multidimensional strategic level management capability.

3. A mission HQ level multidimensional management capability.


The development of multidimensional African PSO capabilities embodied in the operationalisation of the ASF is part of the evolution of the broader international peacekeeping architecture, with UN peacekeeping missions at the forefront. Within the wider UN context, multidimensional peacekeeping is considered as the second generation of peacekeeping, following the earlier traditional peacekeeping operations, which had limited mandates of monitoring ceasefires between warring factions. Within these earlier contexts, the police and civilians had smaller roles, if any, given the nature of the missions’ mandates. What led to the evolution into complex multidimensional operations are primarily changes in the nature of conflicts and the corresponding additional demands to respond to violent intra-state conflicts and civil wars within weak or poorly governed states suffering from identity, resource and power struggles.

As missions increasingly became multifunctional to include security, humanitarian and political objectives, the imperative for a new multidimensional approach that includes more civilians and police as well as military participants, has grown in qualitative and quantitative terms. Clearly, the new approach combined tasks that were traditionally dichotomised as peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions. This had one evident relating consequence, namely the need for the military to work together in an integrated manner with the police and civilians to “build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars”.
In line with the above global and continental institutional developments, the importance of developing multidimensional African PSO capabilities has received greater impetus since 2005. The process of building multidimensional PSO capabilities has been an integral part of operationalising the ASF, which was guided by a number of successive policy instruments and mechanisms, notably the different ASF Roadmaps (I-III).

The first phase of the ASF development, steered by the ASF Roadmap I (2005-2008), aimed at putting in place core aspects of the ASF structures i.e. legal, policy and logistical frameworks as well as the required standard operating procedures. Within this first phase, the AU and RECs/RMs began the establishment of their respective standby forces, a process that broadly entailed making formal decisions such as on the location of the regional planning elements (PLANELM), and on the composition and organisational structures of the civilian, police and military components.

The second phase, broadly covering the period from 2008 to 2010, focused on training and exercising the pledged capacities in their respective regions/member states and integrating them through a series of map, command post, and field exercises first at regional and later at continental levels. The third phase focused on various issues relating to the development of the ASF, including “advocacy and outreach, structures and management capabilities, political decision-making and political processes, operational concepts, logistics and legal frameworks”. The third phase culminated with the AMANI AFRICA II Exercise conducted in Lohatla, South Africa, in November 2015.

A crucial corollary of this evolution has been developing multidimensional PSO capabilities at multiple levels i.e. enhancing the requisite composition of the military, police and civilian components within the ASF institutional framework. The ASF started off primarily with a focus on the military component, which was considered, perhaps deservedly, as a backbone of the standby arrangement. Since 2006, the AU and RECs/RMs have developed a number of policy and legal frameworks as well as institutional structures aimed at scaling-up the civilian and the police components. Evidently, as a result of these and other measures, significant progress has been achieved in developing these components although there are still many “proverbial rivers” to cross to fully operationalise the ASF in a multidimensional manner.

At the policy level, there has been a shift from the position held by most stakeholders that PSOs are merely military affairs to one that entails other dimensions, relating to civilian, police, and support components. This fundamental recognition had at least two major practical ramifications, especially in terms of the nature of mandates and in the composition of mission components. Reflecting the changing complexity of mission mandates as shown in the table below, successive AU missions were mandated with force matching the multidimensional and multifunctional tasks endowed to the missions.
TABLE 1: Overview of Mandates of AU Missions

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<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mandates</th>
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<tr>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Monitor and report the ceasefire agreement, assist the confidence building process, protect and create safe passage for IDPs, support in creating conducive environment for humanitarian activities, assist the effort to improve the security situation in in the entire region of Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Support dialogue and reconciliation process; assist the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization plan of the country; assist and facilitate humanitarian operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Assist the Malian government in rebuilding the Malian Defense and Security Force, assist in recovering areas in the north occupied by terrorist organisations, support the government in consolidating state authority, assist the government to create safe environment for humanitarian assistance.</td>
</tr>
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With a view to executing these mandated tasks, the number of civilians and police deployed in successive AU missions has also increased throughout the past decade. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) currently has 70 civilians. Similarly, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was authorised with 173 civilians and the African-led International Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) was authorised with 152 civilians. Reflecting a growing trend across the world, the role and number of police has increased across AU- and UN-led missions. According to statistics released by the UN, the number of police deployed in peacekeeping missions worldwide is on the rise from 1,677 in 1994 to 14,669 by 2010. As of February 2015, 12,015 police officers were deployed across 12 peacekeeping missions. Within this global trend of increasing deployment of police in peacekeeping missions, the number of police deployed in AU peace missions reached 2,156 in 2014.

At the level of the various PLANELMs, the staff composition, hitherto exclusively or dominated by the military, increasingly included more civilians and police, albeit insufficiently. In 2010, mid-way into the ASF Roadmap II, the number of civilians working on ASF-related issues across the continent was not more than five. This number increased to 20 by the end of 2015 with five civilians at the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), four in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); three in the Southern African Development Community (SADC); four in the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF); and four in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). On top of the civilian capacities, which exist at the level of the AU and the PLANELMs, the AU in collaboration with RECs/REMs, launched a civilian roster, known as the African Standby Capacity (ASC), as a repository of existing deployable civilian capacities. Admission into the ASC, which comprises 16 generic job profiles, is now open to...
all those with the requisite capabilities whether through “individual application or through members states nomination”.

Largely owing to the prevailing belief that PSOs were predominantly military endeavours, mission planning had been the exclusive domain of military planners. Consequently, civilians and police had a relatively smaller role in Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs) deployed before the commencement of missions. Since 2013, however, more civilians and police have been involved in such mission planning. For example, planning for the AU mission in Mali was undertaken in an integrated and multidimensional manner by the Mali Integrated Task Force (MITF), which was established in 2013 to deal with the Mali crisis. MITF was tasked with, inter alia, assisting the AU mission headquarters in the development of the AFISMA Mission Implementation Plan. MITF was composed of an integrated team including personnel from military, police and civilian backgrounds. The integrated planning for the deployment resulted in the development of a harmonised Concept of Operations (CONOPs) comprising clear functions and responsibilities for civilian, police and military personnel, as part of AFISMA.

Reflecting the multidimensional nature of the mission, the AFISMA CONOPs made provisions for a civilian Head of Mission, a Police Commissioner and a Military Force Commander as part of the Senior Mission Leadership (SML) at the mission headquarters. Likewise, and taking lessons from AFISMA, similar CONOPs were developed for other AU missions in the Central African Republic (CAR) and for AMISOM in Somalia. This is mainly because the conduct of peace operations was increasingly approached from a broader and holistic perspective assigning roles to the three components.

Furthermore, with a view to assessing and testing the operational readiness of various aspects of the ASF, including the status of the pledged capacities as well as its decision making processes, the AU and the regions have conducted a number of regular field exercises. These exercises are intended to gauge the ability of the AU and its regions to mandate, deploy, manage, sustain and liquidate complex and multidimensional peace operations. Within the context of these training exercises, with the AMANI AFRICA I and II training cycles being the most prominent ones, the participation of civilians and police have increased.

Notwithstanding these and other improvements, the aspiration for building multidimensional PSO capabilities has yet to be fully met, and most PSOs still remain military heavy. This is reflected, for example, in successive reviews on the implementation of APSA as well as in the Report of the Independent Panel of Experts Assessment of ASF (also known as the Gambari Report). The 2014 APSA Assessment pointed out that African PSOs are still failing to execute their multidimensional functions due to, among other things, a “mandate-resource gap” which constrained missions from executing their wide-ranging functions including peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding.

Furthermore, the capabilities required to fully meet these functions have not been fully developed, not least due to the uneven status among the different regions in terms of building multidimensional PSO capabilities. This is attributable, in part, to “the lesser attention” given to the civilian and police capabilities when compared to military capacities. Despite gradual enhancement of police and civilian capacities in planning and conducting PSOs mandated by the AU, the number of police and civilians who participated in various training
exercises was not as high as required.\textsuperscript{41} The existing imbalance or disproportionate attention to military PSO capabilities can be ascribed to a number of challenges:

The prevailing perception of PSOs as military affairs: In their earlier conceptions, peacekeeping missions or peace operations were broadly considered the exclusive preserve of the military. This perception appears to have changed in the late 1990s, albeit slowly, due to the changing nature of conflicts and the increasing complexity of mission mandates and tasks which require the skills and competencies of the civilians and the police, in addition to their military counterparts. Notwithstanding these changes, existing conflict contexts characterised by asymmetric threats and indiscriminate attacks, are still not conducive for civilians and, to some extent, even for the police. The nature of the operating environment thus undercuts their active participation in dynamic PSO environments, and contributes towards making it a near exclusive enterprise of the military. This is illustrated for example by the case of Somalia wherein AMISOM’s civilians, and to a lesser extent its police component, could not operate as they should, mainly due to deadly attacks from Al-Shabaab. The persistence of militaristic conceptions of PSOs is further reflected in key aspects of developing PSOs capability, such as field training and exercises, which are still dominated by technical concepts and jargons inherited from the military such as Command Post Exercises (CPX), Field Training Exercises (FTX), Map Exercises (MAPEX), Logistic Exercises (LOGEX), etc.

Given the origin and evolution of PSOs in which the development of civilian and police capacities only began very recently, it is understandable that the military component gained a significant lead over the other two. As such, non-military components, especially civilians, have to “play catch up” with the military component not only in terms of developing their standby capacities but also in familiarising themselves with how to operate in military-dominated contexts.\textsuperscript{42}

The politics of developing PSO capability: Peacekeeping has its own politics, often complicated and murky not least due to the interests of those involved (such as RECs and member states). In specific terms, political considerations play a key role in mandating, planning, deploying, managing, and liquidating peace operations. For the major part, member states’ (political) interests, as well as the occasional competing interests between RECs/RMs and the AU, is one of the dominant factors guiding the course of any peacekeeping mission.

Just as it is elsewhere, politics undergirds operational and technical level efforts to develop multidimensional PSO capabilities in the African context as well. The ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) have emerged as “competing” continental mechanisms for undertaking rapid intervention, each hinging on the political commitment of member states for their success. Some states, such as Nigeria and Cameroon, were critical of the ACIRC initiative, considered “a parallel process that would distract the AU from efforts to ensure Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the ASF Rapid Deployment Capability”.\textsuperscript{43} The ASF-ACIRC dilemma has reduced the momentum to fully operationalise the ASF just as it is adversely impacting efforts to develop multidimensional PSO capacities. Political considerations are also at play in terms of building regional and continental PSO capabilities in a more multidimensional manner. The lack of political will to implement ASF-related agreements including in honouring pledges to regional PSO capabilities is one practical illustration.\textsuperscript{44}
Challenges with sustainable financing: Sustainable financing is perhaps the most perennial challenge to develop African capacity for rapid intervention and response to crisis. Increasing donor dependence, especially in the broader area of peace and security, has become a serious concern, prompting various initiatives aimed at finding sustainable financing for various peace operations conducted by the AU. In the specific case of developing multidimensional PSO capabilities, the lack of sufficient funds has a number of implications. Financial constraints often hamstring continuous training of pledged and individual capabilities; some of the PLANELMs could not sustain certain civilian-related positions - especially those in charge of populating the civilian roster - mainly due to lack of funds. In the context of some of the actual PSOs, lack of finances has been a major challenge in preventing the civilian mission components from executing their functions, particularly in the implementation of various Quick Impact Projects (digging water wells, provision of basic health services, etc.) in local communities within the missions’ Areas of Responsibility (AOR).

Civil-military coordination and perception-related issues: Over and above the issue of having equitable representation of the military, the police and the civilian components, multidimensional PSO capacity development requires efficient integration and positive working relations among the various components. Generally speaking, the role of the civilian and the police components in the context of AU PSOs has been duly recognised through time. The success of any PSOs within the framework of any of the ASF’s six mission scenarios (Table 2 below) requires the efficient engagement of the three components. Integration of the three components in an approach where they function together, however, remains a major challenge to surmount. There is also lack of clarity on the role of civilians in some of the ASF scenarios, including in Scenario 6, which requires the AU’s intervention within 14 days in case of genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly, or in some of the high intensity AU PSOs in general.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment time frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/regional military advice to a political mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Standalone AU/regional observer mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (peacebuilding)</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission, including those involving low-level spoilers</td>
<td>90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention e.g. in genocide situations, where the international community does not act promptly</td>
<td>14 days, with robust military force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: De Coning and Kasumba: 2010, p. 15
Moreover, in most PSOs, the military is typically deployed first to stabilise the conflict environment as a matter of urgency followed by the other components. Such sequential deployment of the different components (i.e. the military coming first and the other components coming later) may skew the balance in favour of the military. Besides, differences in terms of orientation and working cultures between uniformed and non-uniformed (or civilian) personnel often adversely affect their working relations prior to and upon deployment. Arguably, the military is perceived to be more disciplined given their clear and hierarchical chain of command and line of reporting, which facilitates effective coordination between supervisors and subordinates. As such, this partly contributes to a prevalent perception that the military is more fit and apt for the highly volatile and dynamic PSO operating environment. Coupled with the prevailing belief that conceives PSOs as predominantly military affairs as discussed earlier, such perception-related issues are to some extent responsible for the dearth of efficient and sustained civil-military coordination in some of the actual sites of PSOs.

**Civilian-related challenges:** Out of the three, the civilian component is considered to be “the least-developed component of the ASF” in spite of a number of measures already undertaken to enhance the capability of this component. Some of the most notable measures include: the implementation of a continent-wide Civilian Policy Framework which was already adopted by some of the RECs; the launch of a continental civilian roster called the African Standby Capacity (ASC) as well as the conduct of a number of civilian-related trainings at different levels. Despite these efforts, the civilian component still continues to face a number of challenges. For one, it has received disproportionately less resources than the military component, which typically receives between 40-45% of the total budget allotted to the PSOs. This has created a situation in which not all the required civilian positions both at the level of PLANELM and at the AU PSOD have been fully filled. The uncertainty of future employment often adversely affects morale and commitment as well as leads to high staff turnover.

Civilian capacities are generated through the continental roster or ASC, which is currently being populated with the help of the civilian components at the RECs/RMs. Yet, two major issues confront the actual implementation of the roster. Firstly, some question whether, and how, the roster will be fully utilised by the AU Human Resources Department to recruit personnel for PSOs. Secondly, the different approaches to sourcing civilians need to be fully harmonised; some regions, such as SADC, prefer recruitment through member states, while the AU favours direct individual application and recruitment to theASC.

Unlike the military and the police, civilians who served in PSOs are not likely to go back to their former positions after finishing their tour of duty as their employers are not compelled to keep positions for them. Furthermore, the time they spent on these missions does not always contribute to their career advancement, in contrast to their military and police counterparts who may even receive promotions upon returning from missions.

Civilians serve a wide range of functions in PSOs categorised under 16 generic job families. These job families are broadly classified into substantive and mission administration/mission support categories. The substantive job families
include nine positions, namely: civil affairs, political affairs, legal affairs, human rights, gender, humanitarian liaison, protection of civilians, public information, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). The mission administration/mission support includes seven positions, namely: human resources, conduct and discipline, logistics, procurement, finance, mission security, and information, communications and technology. Again, unlike the military and the police, these job families are scattered across different ministries and departments within the bureaucracies of member states, and this results in difficulties in continuous training, information sharing, mobilisation and coordination.

Certainly, there is also a lack of qualified civilian personnel with the right competencies for some of the civilian functions, partly because member states seldom send their most qualified staff to serve in PSOs, largely focusing on mere national representation instead. A recently published analysis indicated that the “political buy-in and commitment of the member states and the RECs and RMs is particularly key for the enhancement of the capacities of the civilian component in the area of rostering, staffing and eventual deployment”.

**Issues related to coordination and communication:** The ASF framework for generating capabilities is elaborate and involves a number of mechanisms and structures. At the continental level, the AU PSOD serves as the strategic headquarters while at the regions, the PLANELMs serve as multi-national and multidimensional full-time planning headquarters for the regional standby forces. In addition, member states generate the pledged multidimensional capabilities (including the military, civilian and police), which need continuous training, exercising and verification. Such an elaborate structure naturally requires streamlined communication and coordination among the different elements. Nonetheless, the relationship among the staff in these structures is considered to be less systematic as there is “no day-to-day interaction and regular flow of information”.

As some respondents interviewed for this study pointed out, beyond trainings and exercises, the interaction between the AU and the RECs was very static rather than “organic”, which entails robust interaction in the form of staff exchanges and other mechanisms of enhancing communication and coordination. These respondents compared the AU’s interaction with the regions vis-a-vis that of the AU’s relation with the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and considered the latter to be more advanced. Respondents from the AU would not fully agree with this argument, alluding to how the various regional focal persons interact with each other as well as with their counterparts at the AU in matters related to training or ASC. They also alluded to different success stories including setting up a Civilian Strategic Support Group and the Police Strategic Support Group. To the extent that there are some coordination and communication-related challenges, respondents from the AU argue that these challenges are not structural or systemic and could be surmounted with the right level of commitment and leadership.

**Training-related issues:** Continuous training has been a key dimension of developing multidimensional African PSO capabilities. So far, a number of trainings have been conducted with a view to operationalise the ASF, with the AU PSOD taking a lead role in training and preparing personnel earmarked for deployment in an AU mission or for the ASF. Given the number of actors involved (such as training centers, PLANELMs, member states, and the
AU PSOD to mention just a few), PSO-related training activities need to be better coordinated and harmonised in order to develop the requisite capabilities for the ASF. As a result of the lack of resources from within Africa, however, most of the required trainings are offered with the help of external actors or donors, which often comes with their own interest and priorities. For example, some external donors focus only on training for civilians while others focus on military or police-related trainings, albeit with little holistic coordination among the various trainings. With changes in the security landscape, there is now an urgent imperative for new and/or more contextualised trainings to cope with the emerging threats (such as counter-terrorism training, desert warfare, dealing with trauma, etc.).
China’s relations with Africa have been in the limelight, drawing significant attention in media, policy and academic circles in the last two decades; with keen emphasis on Beijing’s underlying motivations for greater involvement in Africa as well as on the modality and impacts of its engagement. In many ways, China’s evolving role in African peace and security is an extension of the broader China-Africa relations set against the backdrop of growing economic and political ties with the continent. In modern times, China’s engagement with Africa can be historically traced back to the mutual support between China and Africa in their shared struggle against colonialism and imperialism.\footnote{61}

Beyond these ideological and military aspects that characterised past relationships, China’s engagement with Africa has expanded to encompass economic, political, diplomatic, social and cultural interactions. This growing trend is evidenced, for instance, by the ever increasing economic and business ties between the two. China’s overall trade volume surpassed US$200 billion in 2012, totalling US$220 billion in 2014,\footnote{62} with an evident imbalance in favour of China.\footnote{63} A deepening engagement between the two is also manifested in several ongoing mega infrastructure construction projects across Africa, in which the Chinese typically provide the much needed finances and expertise to African countries often in return for the supply of energy resources and other raw materials.

Within this broader context, Beijing’s emerging role in African peace and security is a response to, at least, two major demands. On the one hand, the ever-changing security landscape continuously exposes China to challenges and risks that it was not fully prepared to contend with. According to Chris Alden, post-Cold War African realities present China with different types of risks, including risks faced by its citizens and businesses operating in unstable African environments.\footnote{64} China has sought to respond to these challenges by engaging its African partners at the bilateral, regional and continental levels. Besides, China is also reacting to the need to reinvent itself as a global actor of reckoning, deriving from its status as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as its considerable economic success across the world.\footnote{65} These factors are placing pressure on Beijing to contribute to global problem solving; including solving some of the world’s pressing peace and security problems, several of which are located in Africa.\footnote{66}

The spike in academic interest spurred by China’s growing involvement in Africa could be broadly categorised into two major variants: paranoia or naiveté.\footnote{67} According to the first body of literature, China’s interest in Africa is solely to consume African natural resources; whereas the latter perspective views the Chinese as “Africa’s saviour”. Both views are based on specific interests and prejudices. The first, mainly harboured by western writers, considers China’s relation with Africa to be asymmetric, whereby Chinese companies exploit African resources in return for the unconditional support China accords to authoritarian states in Africa. The second one, which is mainly dominant within the circles of African political elites, considers China as a reliable partner that does not meddle in the internal affairs of African states and one that is always ready to respond to the continent’s needs.\footnote{68}

For a critical observer, nevertheless, both views have merits. At the intersection of both views is the fact that China, unlike many of Africa’s western partners, does not impose political or human
rights-related preconditions in its dealings with African states; perhaps with the exception of the diplomatic or otherwise recognition of Taiwan as encapsulated in the “One China” policy. Most importantly, however, China is proving to be an indispensable trading and development partner to a growing number of African states. Hence, whatever role and position China has in regards to peace and security in Africa; it should mainly be seen as an extension of the broader China-Africa relations, be it through FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) or the China-AU Strategic Dialogue.

Within the emerging China-Africa literature, however, the impact of China’s engagement is equally debated especially in terms of its long-term implication for Africa’s peace and security as well as to Beijing’s foreign and security policy orientations. For the most part, the extant debate features two diametrically opposite views in regards to China’s role in African peace and security. The first suggests that China will maintain a conservative stance in African security affairs and will adapt to the changing and unstable situation in Africa rather than try to reshape it. The opposite view argues that China constructs a new paradigm of peacebuilding and plays an increasing role in peace and security affairs in Africa.69 As Wang Xuejun argues, the latter is shaped by China’s own experience of “developmental peace”, as opposed to the liberal peace. As such, it is argued that China has already introduced a new paradigm of developmental peace and its peculiar role in African peace and security.70

The policy dimensions and ramifications of China’s intensifying relations with African actors have also come under close scrutiny. As some argue, China’s increasing engagement in peace and security in Africa marks a departure from Beijing’s earlier policy stance. It is in this vein that Harry Verhoeven states that China’s deepening interactions in Africa is also changing Chinese actors so much so that “China is slowly but surely giving up its controversial policy of non-interference.”71

Changes in Beijing’s African peace and security policy orientations have at least four major dimensions as stated by Wang Xuejun. First, there is “sectoral expansion”, ranging from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in African countries. Second, China is considered as a norm-maker rather than just a norm-complier, reflecting the fact that it has its own normative approaches to African peace and security issues. Third, there is diversification in terms of the type of actors involved in the policy discussions encompassing the participation of the state and/or government as well as enterprises and civil society organisations. Lastly, China mostly participates in peace and security affairs in Africa through multilateral initiatives, although it maintains bilateral arrangements with a number of African countries. The latter implies that despite several new imperatives, China still prefers to address issues of peace and security in Africa through the UN, the AU and other relevant regional organisations.72

At the level of the UN, China has leveraged its position as a permanent member of the UNSC behind key decisions on international peace and security, especially those focusing on African issues. Arguably, for instance, it played a key role in convincing the Sudanese government to accept the deployment of the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007. Furthermore, it has been providing political support mainly by aligning its position with Africa in major international fora such as the UNSC (as in the case of voting against sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2008).

In addition, China has increased its participation in UN peacekeeping missions, the majority of which are deployed in Africa. As of 30 April 2016, China has contributed a total of 3,042 peacekeepers, of which 171 are police officers,
38 are military experts on mission, and 2,833 are troops. In terms of gender composition, while 2,962 of the Chinese peacekeepers are men, 80 of them are women. Currently, China is ranked seventh in the world for its police and troop contributions to UN operations, including being the largest troop/police contributing country among the ‘P5’ and participating in 10 peacekeeping missions (see the table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Experts on Mission</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Contingent Troops</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Experts on Mission</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contingent Troops</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Contingent Troops</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Individual Police</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>Contingent Troops</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Individual Police</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formed Police Units</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts on Mission</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contingent Troops</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>Individual Police</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts on Mission</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contingent Troops</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Experts on Mission</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>Experts on Mission</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: De Coning and Kasumba, 2010, p. 1575

China’s growing participation in international peacekeeping comes as a result of what could be considered a major policy shift. In the past couple of decades, China moved from a staunch opponent of interventions to one that sends peacekeeping troops as a ‘responsible power’, in order to safeguard global peace and security.74 Indeed, China has not only increased its troop contribution to UN peacekeeping missions but also increased its budgetary contributions, though it is still way behind that of the United States.75

Of late, the AU has become the central locus of China’s support to African peace and security. Since 2012/3, China has elevated the AU’s status from an observer into a full member in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a joint platform for enhancing relations with African countries through consultation and dialogue. This evolution appears to stem from the belief in Beijing that African regional organisations, such as the AU, are better placed (more than any other international actor) to make judgments on the sovereignty and internal affairs of its member states.76 China’s support to the AU also emanates from a recognition of the latter’s role in safeguarding peace and stability, promoting the development of Africa, and advancing the integration of Africa.77 As China often claims, its support to the AU is in line with: first, its commitment to multilateralism (as opposed to the unilateral approach of some dominant western powers); second, its participation in international fora such as the
UN; and third, is an integral part of China’s growing quest to execute its responsibilities for international peace and security as an emerging global economic power.

Reflecting the above political rhetoric, China’s support to the AU in peace and security has been on the rise. Between 2006 and 2011, China provided financial and logistical support to various AU peacekeeping missions.78 In 2012, China pledged US$100 million to the AU over three years for different projects including enhancing peace and security in Africa. In September 2015, China announced at the UN General Assembly that it would provide the AU with US$100 million in military assistance for peacekeeping missions over a five year period.79 And, in the latest edition of FOCAC held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in December 2015, China further pledged to “…provide the AU with US$60 million, free military assistance over the next three years, and support the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, including towards the operationalisation of the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis and the African Standby Force”.80 This means that over the next three years China will commit itself to providing the AU with US$20 million worth of military assistance annually to enhance the AU’s capacity to rapidly respond during times of crisis.

China has forged multifaceted engagements on African peace and security issues as evidenced by the above-mentioned illustrations. Nonetheless, such evolving exchanges with Africa have been a subject of major criticism, not least for the fact that China’s support to peace and security was considered long overdue. So far, most of the support was ad hoc, not through specific programmes, such as the EU African Peace Facility, the US Global Peace Operations Initiative, or Germany’s support to operationalising APSA.81 China’s assistance is given in the form of grants to support specific mediation or peacekeeping initiatives. As acknowledged by both African and Chinese respondents, there is also a mismatch between China’s preferred support modalities, often in-kind or equipment support, and the AU’s demands for financial resources.83 As some Chinese respondents highlighted, there is also unease among some Chinese policy makers regarding the AU’s increasing military interventions in Africa (especially as the latter does not have the requisite resources to execute these interventions on its own). To an extent, China is also apprehensive of the still-prevailing western powers’ influence in Africa - a factor which lessens China’s appetite to work in concert with others in building African capacities for crises and conflict responses.
5. **What role for China in supporting the development of multidimensional African PSO capabilities?**

As shown in the previous section, China has gradually emerged as one of the major external actors in African peace and security. Its engagement in the realm of African peace and security has increasingly featured both bilateral engagements with African countries as well as in supporting continental and regional institutions. Its evolving engagement is driven by two major interconnected factors. First, continuously changing African security dynamics portend serious challenges to China and its interests on the continent. Second, China is also compelled to play a balancing act, in which it must adjust to the imperatives of both a changing African security landscape and to its own emergent role as a responsible global player in the making.

In combination, these two elements, which could be conceived as “structural factors and ad-hoc solutions” are significantly shaping Sino-African cooperation in peace and security. Owing largely to a growing profile of Chinese economic and business interests, recent calls for more Chinese engagement in the African peace and security landscape have intensified. There is a growing expectation that burgeoning Sino-African peace and security cooperation would translate into more practical engagements in building a viable continental peace and security framework, including the ASF.

It is, however, one of the central propositions of this study that China’s role in African peace and security affairs is not without a caveat. While China is a global economic powerhouse, it still needs to fully address a plethora of social and economic challenges at home; including the widening domestic income inequality and inadequate delivery of services to its large population. It is unlikely that China will continually deploy its resources to address Africa’s myriad peace and security challenges without triggering domestic discontent. This concern points to an important dimension in Sino-African cooperation in peace and security which was succinctly captured by Zhang Chun as “the expectation-capacity gap”: the expectation by African actors on China to deliver more and the limited capacity of the latter to do so.

Departing from this “expectation-capacity gap”, it is important to underscore the need to critically engage with the issue of selectively matching China’s capabilities to enhancing Africa’s continental capacities in the area of peace and security.

On another note, the point was made in the previous sections that the AU and the regions have made substantial progress in developing multidimensional PSO capabilities but also continue to face a number of challenges. Two of the most outstanding strategic challenges are lack of sustainable financing and the constraining political processes required to utilise already existing ASF structures and capabilities to respond to crises. From an operational or technical point of view, and despite years and resources spent on them, the different guidelines and structures put in place as part of the ASF framework have not been fully utilised in real life situations. While significant headway has been made in developing the capability of the three components (i.e. military, police and civilian), a lot still needs to be done to fully integrate these different components; whether at the level of the PLANELMs or during mission planning and implementation. The same also applies to the coordination and communication among the different structures involved in building PSOs capability; for instance between the AU PSOD and the PLANELEMIs and between PLANELEMIs and member states.

Looking closely into these challenges, one major conclusion is that the key to developing
multidimensional African PSO capabilities ultimately lies in the hands of African actors - not in that of external interlocutors like China. Evidently, no amount of external support supplants African ownership and commitment, which still needs to translate practically, inter alia, into more financial contributions and political buy-in to operationalise the ASF in a multidimensional manner. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the study recognises that external players, in this case China, play a crucial role in supporting African efforts and initiatives to the same end. The next section will conclude with a note on specific recommendations on what China can do to support ongoing efforts aimed at developing multidimensional PSOs capability in Africa. It is important, by way of a caveat, to acknowledge that these different recommendations speak to operational aspects of developing multidimensional PSO capabilities - leaving out other issues such as mandating and political decision making on different missions.
6. Recommendations

6.1. Tackling coordination, communication and integration-related challenges

Coordination, communication and integration challenges have different dimensions. At the strategic level, coordination and communication need to be enhanced between and among structures at the continental, regional and national levels dedicated to enhancing multidimensional ASF capabilities. To this end, China could support convening annual regular retreats of the AU and RECs/RMs personnel aimed at improving coordination and communication among various institutions. On a more technical or operational level, there is a need to support further integration among the three components. Further, capacities within the context of individual components have been developed through policies, trainings and exercises but, these components have not been operating in a full and cohesive manner as integral components of a single machinery. With a view to dealing with these challenges, China can sponsor specific trainings related to, for example, civil-military coordination, which can broaden existing understanding of PSOs in a more multidimensional sense. Furthermore, it can take a much more active role in various exercises through the provision of the requisite finance and logistics support to ensure the adequate representation of the civilian and police components.

6.2. Further utilization of existing structures, policies, guidelines and directives

Owing to efforts made since the mid-2000s, notable achievements have been made in terms of implementing relevant structures, and legal and institutional frameworks, including policies, guidelines and standard operating procedures. The full utilisation of these instruments, however, remains a challenge. To this end, China can support initiatives aimed at streamlining the various initiatives to harmonise and coordinate training as well as in enhancing the visibility of the AU and the RECs/REMs.

6.3. Financially sustaining civilian- and police-related positions

In contrast to the military component, the role of civilians and to some extent the police needs to be enhanced in several key aspects. One way of achieving this could be ensuring that financial sustainment of certain positions is sustainably well resourced. As a matter of priority, therefore, certain positions related to the two components should be given precedence: such as civilians in charge of the (civilian) roster in some of the PLANELEMs, Senior Civilian or Police Advisors at the AU, or any other similar position required to bolster the institutional structures at the level of the PLANELM or at the AU.

6.4. Training and other related issues

There are two prevailing assumptions when it comes to trainings related to building multidimensional PSO capabilities in Africa. On the one hand, it is believed that there is no shortage, if not a profusion, of PSO-related trainings in Africa. On the other hand, some allude to the need for continuous training including offering refresher courses as well as in conducting tailor-made trainings required for enabling personnel to operate in high intensity PSOs. China can assist in the latter regard. Over and above the challenges and
recommendations highlighted above, a number of other recommendations are made, with a goal of improving the capability of the different components in the conduct of actual missions. For example, China could provide logistical support in the form of mission start-up kits and airlift capabilities or financial assistance in implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

Since the ultimate objective of any form of Chinese support should be to enhance African (multidimensional) capabilities, Beijing’s support should stem from a critical analysis of what African actors themselves identify as priorities, rather than what China perceives is needed or required. Typically, there is a subtle - but serious disconnect - between the two that oft is raised as one of the challenges of the Sino-AU relations. Two recommendations are made in this regard.

At the conclusion of the last FOCAC Summit, China announced it would provide US$60 million to support the ASF. This news was warmly welcomed in Africa. Many respondents interviewed for this study suggested that rather than meeting its pledges through in-kind contributions, this money should be disbursed to finance various ASF capability development projects at the level of the AU PSOD, the RECs/RMs or the training centres. Given the lack of financial resources from African sources, a number of external actors are supporting the ASF and other structures related to APSA, each with their own priorities and preferences. With a view to aligning its activities with other external actors, it is one of the key recommendations of the study that China joins the Joint Financing Agreement (JFA) established by major partners such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the EU to streamline PSO interventions by external actors to avoid duplication and the attendant waste of scarce resources.
1 APSA also includes structures for political decision-making (the Peace and Security Council), the gathering and analysis of information (the Continental Early Warning System), mediation and advisory capacity (the Panel of the Wise).


4 Developing multidimensional PSOs capabilities has been an integral component of operationalizing the African Standby Force (ASF) which also included, *inter alia* developing legal and policy frameworks; establishing various regional standby forces, as well as conducting training and exercises aimed at upgrading the capabilities of personnel and assessing the efficacy of decision making structures.


6 Ibid.


8 Ibid.


15 The ASF mandates include conducting observation and monitoring missions, interventions in member states in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act; preventive deployments; peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; humanitarian assistance; as well as any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly (AU PSC, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the AU PSC, 2002, Article 13(3)).

17 The earliest peacekeeping missions were “fair witnesses” monitoring cease fires between Dutch and Indonesian forces in Java in 1947 and later to monitor the Armistice Treaty between Arab and Israeli forces in April 1948 (See William Durch and M.L. England, “The Purpose of Peace Operations”, in Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force, Center on International Cooperation, 2009, 40).


19 Ibid.


23 Ibid.


26 Interview with AU informant 1, September 1, 2016, Addis Ababa.


28 Akpasom, What roles for the civilian and police, 2016, 121


32 Interview with former AU PSOD staff, 17 August 2016, Abuja.

34 Akpasom, What roles for the civilian and police, 2016.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
42 Interview with AU PSOD staff, 1 September, 2016, Addis Ababa
44 Interview with EASF Staff, August 9 2016, Nairobi.
46 Interview with ESF Staff, 17 August 2016, Abuja.
47 Due to finance and logistic related challenges, most of African PSOs have limitations in providing the required amount of mission start-up kits, airlift capabilities for transporting mission personnel and equipment.
48 Interview with ESF Staff, 17 August 2016, Abuja.
50 Interview with ESF Staff, 17 August 2016, Abuja.
52 Interview with AU PSOD staff, 1 September, Addis Ababa.
54 Interview with former AU PSOD staff, 17 August 2016, Abuja.
57 Interview with former AU PSOD staff, 17 August 2016, Abuja, op. cit.
In order to do so, the AU prepared a Training Directive in May 2015 which indicates a comprehensive training framework and shared levels of responsibilities at different levels notably the AU Commission; RECs/RMs, missions, member states, Centers of Excellence and Training Institutions. Based on a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) conducted by a team of experts, the Training Directive also identified the following three broad categories of training, namely, Foundation Training Courses; Specialized Training Courses; and Integrated Mission Management Training Courses. As such, the Directive broadly addressed the training needs of all the three components.


China plans to increase its budgetary contribution for peacekeeping from just over 3% to 6%. See Garima Mohan and Olivia Gippner, “Theoretical Approaches to China and India in Peacekeeping Operations,” NFG Working Paper No. 5., 2013, 58.


Interview with Chinese scholars, 14 September 2016, Beijing.


The JFA is one joint mechanism of supporting coherent and predictable funding by different partners, namely; by the European Union (EU), Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) aimed to enable the AUC fulfill its mandate in the area of peace and security in the continent. See “African Union Commission and International Partners sign two MoUs to strengthen Peace and Security efforts on the Continent, “AU website, accessed on 15 November 2016 http://dcpaau.ac.int/fr/content/african-union-commission-and-international-partners-sign-two-mous-strengthen-peace-and-secur.