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**ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS**

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## **Analyses**

- ▶ **Kenya: A new test case for the ICC**
- ▶ **Crafting foreign policy in a supranational organization: European Union lessons for the African Union**
- ▶ **The centrality of local peacebuilding methodologies in Kenya's Sotik/Borabu border**

## **News and Resources**

### **Kenya: A new test case for the ICC**

Kenya has had a relatively peaceful presidential election. The result has been confirmed by a full bench of the Supreme Court and Uhuru Kenyatta has been sworn in as president. A leading Kenyan opposition parliamentarian has observed, "Like it or not, Kenyatta has cobbled together a constituency, however tenuous, drawn from across Kenya's diverse population. This we accept."

Western journalists were sceptical as to whether Kenyatta could win. Some predicted a repeat of the violence that followed the 2007 election. Human rights activists asked whether a person facing an International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment for crimes against humanity, resulting from his alleged involvement in the 2007 violence, should become president and Western leaders have responded to his election with caution. Two things: Western analysts have less of a grasp on African politics than they realise, and Africa is increasingly ready to defy Western and international opinion.

Jomo Kenyatta, the father of Kenyan independence in 1963 and the country's first president remained in power until his death in 1978 when he was succeeded by his vice-president, Daniel arap Moi. By then Kenya was an established ally of the West, a *de facto* one-party state, and by the time Moi was constitutionally barred from running for re-election in 2002 he had elevated patronage and corruption to new levels of intensity. Desperate for change, the country elected Mwai Kibaki's opposition "National Rainbow Coalition" to power in 2002.

The controversial and disputed election in 2007 resulted in over a thousand people being killed in post-electoral violence, before a joint Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga government was installed as a result of international pressure. In the aftermath of these violent polls a number of institutions were established to deal with the past including a Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and a National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). A new Constitution was subsequently promulgated in 2011. An Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission prepared the way for the successful March 2013 elections.

Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta, is one of Kenya's richest business people and the Kenyatta family is among the largest landowners in the country. Kenyatta and his running mate, William Ruto, campaigned on a platform that combined populist inclusivity and ethnic mobilisation, dismissing the accusations of the ICC as further evidence of Western-driven interference in African affairs. The internal problems he faces are, however, substantial: al-Shabaab militants warn of a "long and gruesome" war if Kenya fails to withdraw Kenyan troops from southern Somalia.

The demands of the secessionist Mombasa Republican Council increase the risk of ethnic and religious-driven violence where ethnic divisions continue to undermine national integration. Consisting of 42 distinct ethnic communities, the dominant demographic breakdown of Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), Meru (6%), other groups (15%), and people largely of Indian origin (1%) demands huge political sensitivity. Deep economic disparities traceable back to post-colonial land and resource redistribution continue to locate wealth largely in the hands of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin elite, with the rural and urbanised poor who live on the fringes of the nations' cities having limited access to employment, shelter, education and health care.

The major international problem Kenya faces is the ICC charges against President Kenyatta. Following the precedent of Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials in the wake of the defeat of Nazism in 1945, the ICC was established in 2002. It requires those who bare major responsibility for certain forms of violence to be prosecuted. A point of African contention in this regard is that all 30 indictments issued by the ICC since its inception are against Africans, which has led some Africans and others asking why those alleged to bear major responsibility for atrocities in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Gaza, Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere are not being subjected to the same response from the UN Security Council and the ICC.

Tensions between the ICC and the African Union (AU) came to a head with the issuing of a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in March 2009, despite a formal request by the AU that the warrant be deferred in order to give Africans an opportunity to pursue a negotiated settlement to the Darfur crisis. This resulted in a subsequent refusal by some African countries to co-operate with the ICC in the arrest of al-Bashir. The AU had also appealed for a ceasefire in the Libyan conflict as a basis for a negotiated settlement, before Gaddafi was assassinated in the wake of the NATO-led invasion of the country.

Kenyatta is president and the ICC will need to ponder Kenya anew. It's a tough call, not entirely different from the South African transition in 1994 (which predated the institution and jurisdiction of the ICC), where a negotiated settlement would probably not have happened if apartheid leaders had faced Nuremberg-type prosecutions. Dullah Omar, the former and late South African Minister of Justice, responded to the criticism by international human rights' organisations of the amnesty clause in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), stating: "We are building a future for South Africans and where there is conflict between what the international community is saying and what is in the interests of the people of South Africa, then I think that we will have to live with that kind of conflict."

Kofi Annan, speaking during his tenure as UN Secretary-General, stressed that the purpose of the ICC is to intervene only where the state was unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction over perpetrators. "It is to ensure that mass murderers and other arch-criminals cannot shelter behind a state run by themselves or their cronies, or take advantage of a general breakdown of law and order. No one should imagine that this would apply to a case like South Africa's, where the regime and the conflict which caused the crimes have come to an end, and the victims have inherited power. It is inconceivable that in such a case the Court would seek to substitute its judgement for that of a whole nation which is seeking the best way to put a traumatic past behind it and build a better future."

The question is whether a democratic vote in favour of Kenyatta is akin to the vote by a democratically elected National Assembly in South Africa to grant conditional amnesty to those responsible for gross violations of human rights in South Africa? The Commission of Inquiry into the 2007 Post-Election Violence in Kenya recommended that the government set up a special tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the worst crimes. This was rejected by the National Assembly, although the Commission submitted names of the persons allegedly bearing major responsibility for the violence to the Pre-Trial Court of the ICC. Kenyatta's name was among them and his lawyers have since appealed for the case against their client to be dropped. Whatever the outcome of the Court decision, it will impact heavily on international politics.

Above all, it could impact on Kenyan stability. The alleged actions of Kenyatta are a matter of major concern to the global human rights community and to many human rights advocates in Kenya and the region. The question is how to deal with this concern? The United Nations' 2004 report on *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies* defines transitional justice as "Judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof." This inclusive understanding of transitional justice is frequently lost sight of by those determined to drag Omar al-Bashir, Joseph Kony, Robert Mugabe and other dubious characters before the ICC.

A warrant for the arrest of President Kenyatta could have serious implications for Kenya and a continent that is seeking to redeem itself in the wake of having experienced 87 successful and 149 unsuccessful coups since 1960. Kenya has acquired a sense of political stability since 2007 and has a projected real GDP growth rate of 5.7% for 2013. It is at the same time imperative that further infrastructure development take place – ranging from roads to telecommunications and mobile banking – for the informal sector to be integrated into the formal economy and for exploration of possible oil and mineral deposits to be facilitated. If the Kenyan economy collapses this is likely to have a disastrous impact on the East African Economic Community.

Kenyan stability requires human rights, the rule of law and a narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor. This cannot simply be imposed through the strike of the gavel in an ICC court. It could have the opposite effect. In the words of Albie Sachs, a retired South African Constitutional Court judge, "Human rights are not exported from one centre to the rest of the world. Rather they are the product of unabating struggle and shared idealism throughout the world. The international principles emerge as the distillation of a universal quest for human dignity." Without human rights principles that embrace the different values, experiences and perspectives of different countries and regions, as well as the memories, cultures and religions that define these countries, the legitimacy of what we call *universal* human rights will continue to be questioned to the detriment of all. Kenya provides a new opportunity to find political and judicial compatibility between international and national human rights law and self-preservation.

**Charles Villa-Vicencio** is a Visiting Professor in the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, South Africa. Prior to that, he served as the National Research Director in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and as Professor of Religion and Society at the University of Cape Town. Villa-Vicencio works largely in the area of transitional justice and social transformation in South Africa and on the African continent. He can be reached by e-mail at: [cevv@iafrica.com](mailto:cevv@iafrica.com)

## Crafting foreign policy in a supranational organization: European Union lessons for the African Union

While the role of supranational, regional institutions to enhance economic integration has long been accepted, its role in crafting foreign policy is still contested. It is understood that the sovereign state is responsible for developing its foreign policy in order to “achieve its goals in its relations with external entities.”<sup>1</sup> In practice, supranational organizations have been extending their operational scope to define foreign policy corresponding to the preferences of its member states. Thus rather than assuming the realist perspective that the primary goal of states is to preserve sovereignty,<sup>2</sup> states in fact have different preferences when achieving their foreign policy objectives.<sup>3</sup>

In this paper, two supranational institutions, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), are under examination. The two are compared as the AU structure reflects much of the EU model,<sup>4</sup> and both institutions were created to enhance the means towards achievement of common objectives of its member states. While they differ in their current power capabilities, the cases are worth comparing, as it is the end goal of developing foreign policy making capacity that is under inspection. Thus, the paper will focus on characteristics in a supranational organization that enhance the definition and achievement of foreign policy. This is done by comparing the EU’s trajectory and then drawing lessons for the AU, which is on the path to crafting a concerted foreign policy beyond its current security and defense policy.

In both the Unions, policies have been enacted to identify strategic interests and to define the broad terms under which these interests can be achieved. The EU’s Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), originally conceived in 1992, now serves as the guiding policy for its 27 member states. The CFSP provides principles and guidelines to set a general political direction, common strategies to achieve objectives, joint actions to be implemented in specific situations, and common positions to prescribe an approach to a situation.<sup>5</sup>

In the AU, the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) is a broader policy to serve as a “common understanding among African states about their defence and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to those challenges.”<sup>6</sup> The Peace and Security Council (PSC) created in 2004 is instrumental in implementing the CADSP, and it is likely that it will be the key agent in articulating the AU’s foreign policy in the future. It must be noted that foreign, security, and defence policies, while interrelated, are different in their nature. The focus here is on the capacity to develop foreign policy in a regional institution.

The first section of the paper examines two sets of factors that enhance cooperation between member states in a regional organization, which has allowed for the development of the CFSP in the EU. These factors are the economic interests, preference for regional governance, and identity of member states on the one hand, and the membership, decision-making process and socialization, and power autonomy in the institution itself on the other. Through the analysis, four lessons are drawn for the AU in the concluding section.

### Rationale for member states

#### *a. Economic interests*

The EU finds itself better positioned to pursue a common foreign policy for a number of reasons. First, its original initiation as a regional institution was to enhance economic integration between its member states, creating high mutual interdependencies internally in the process. The success of the EU as an economic bloc has allowed it to stake its presence in the international arena as an indispensable economic actor. This has allowed the EU to be engaged in an “incremental process of institution-building,” whereby “standard operating procedures” are developed, as well as a “collective view on some of the major issues of international politics.”<sup>7</sup> Together,

this allows the EU to have a range of capabilities, a viable operational structure, and a collective worldview to pursue a common foreign policy.

On the other hand, economic integration within the AU has yet to be strengthened. While the African Economic Community (AEC) is set out to promote “the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained development”<sup>8</sup> for AU member states, this goal has yet to be realized as widespread problems such as poverty continue to be a challenge. While economic integration within the AU is still weak, it is an ongoing process that will prove to be fruitful once realized.

#### *b. Preference for regional governance*

In Koenig-Archibugi’s study of why sovereign states would choose to merge their national security with other states within a larger governmental structure, he finds that “strong regional governance increases the probability that governments prefer a supranational foreign and security policy.”<sup>9</sup> Specifically, whether sovereignty is held as a concept in the constitution as a “unitary and indivisible attribute of a polity,” or if “public power can be distributed among multiple territorial levels” indicates a state’s preference for regional governance.<sup>10</sup>

While his case study was done specifically on the EU, this has wide implications for the AU and its success in developing a foreign policy. For African states, there is generally a more conservative attitude towards sovereignty, given the legacy of colonialism and the fear of foreign domination.<sup>11</sup> Colonialism left behind weak governmental structures incapable of exerting robust control over territories beyond the seat of central power in many states.<sup>12</sup> As such, there is a reluctance to devolve power to regional levels, which may hinder the willingness of member states to conform to the development of an AU foreign policy.

#### *c. Identity*

Where member states do not have strong regional governance, Koenig-Archibugi finds that “more Europeanized identities increase the probability that governments prefer a supranational foreign and security policy.”<sup>13</sup> When the AU was conceived, the backbone of the institution was based on the idea of pan-Africanism.<sup>14</sup> According to Emerson, pan-Africanism is the idea that “all Africans have a spiritual affinity with each other and that, having suffered together in the past, they must march together into a new and brighter future.”<sup>15</sup> The wide agreement of African leaders to shape the institution on pan-Africanism reflects an unwavering pan-African identity amongst its member states.

## **Institutional design**

#### *a. Membership*

When examining group behaviour, Olson’s theory on collective action serves as a good starting point.<sup>16</sup> Where a group is small enough in size, each member will have an incentive to contribute in order to attain the collective good in pursuit, or that a group is small enough that other members will notice if one member is not contributing.

In both the EU and the AU, the decision-making process involves groups that are small enough in size to incentivize each member state to contribute. The main decision-making bodies involve 27 of the EU member states. In comparison, the AU has 54 member states. However, a decision was made to create the PSC as a smaller committee, comprising an equal number of member states from each of Africa’s five regions. Overall, the formation of small-sized decision-making group enhances the likelihood of reaching their collective aim.

#### *b. Decision-making process and socialization*

When it comes to deciding on a policy, the EU and the AU differ on the requirement on consensus. While the EU allots veto power to each member state, in the AU’s

PSC majority rule by two-thirds is sufficient. Unanimity requirement, as displayed in the EU, may be more beneficial and has implications on the socialization effect. As Hurd states: “The key to successful and coherent foreign policy cooperation is persuading your partners of the force of your arguments, not resorting to the procedural means of a vote to overrule their point of view.”<sup>17</sup> The emphasis on finding common ground fosters dialogue between member states, increasing the level of socialization that can occur in the institution.

Socialization can be described as the interactive process in which different actors learn and adopt shared norms, which “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors.”<sup>18</sup> Williams finds that the AU is currently engaged in a process of norm localization<sup>19</sup>, in which agents are engaging in what Acharya describes as a process whereby “local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the agents’ cognitive priors and identities.”<sup>20</sup> Through increased interactions between member states in the AU, norms and principles of what is appropriate are becoming internalized in the institution. An adoption of the EU’s unanimity requirement may therefore further deepen this process, creating a set of institutional norms and a collective worldview that can enhance future cooperation in foreign-policy making.

### *c. Power autonomy*

Lastly, for a regional organization to be effective, it must be examined whether the organization can become a source of autonomous power, whereby the institution is autonomous from the member states that created the entity.<sup>21</sup> Once an organization is able to do so, they can “classify the world, creating categories of actors and action; they can fix meanings in the social world; and they can articulate and diffuse ideas, norms and principles around the globe.”<sup>22</sup> In order to achieve that goal, an organization must develop legitimacy and technocratic capabilities. It is then that the organization can become a significant player in world politics.

The EU has been able to achieve a level of power autonomy from its member states. For example, key individuals such as the High Representative, who is crucial in mediating discussion and fostering consensus, stand as personnel of the EU, rather than any one representative from a member state. Furthermore, the EU stands as a prestigious institution attracting high-skilled bureaucrats as employees.

In the AU, insufficient resources and commitment from its member states lessens its capability to develop autonomous power. The organization is underfunded, with the majority of contributions coming from non-AU partners abroad.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, there is a lack of an impartial individual, such as the High Representative of the EU, in the decision-making process. Creating AU-exclusive personnel with high power authority could enhance the capacity for the AU to develop power autonomy. In addition, the United Nations (UN) is given a substantive role in making a final decision over sanctioning an AU-led intervention, which may detract some independency from the AU in making decisions for Africa.

## **Conclusion**

The paper has examined the EU and the AU to shed light on how a supranational institution can craft a coherent foreign policy. It has highlighted, firstly, the rationale for member states, in particular economic interest, preference for regional governance, and identity of member states; and secondly, the characteristics of the institutions itself, namely membership, decision-making process and socialization, and the degree of power autonomy. Through this comparison, it is found that the AU has an advantage in its strong African identity and in the membership structure of its PSC. Nonetheless, four lessons for the AU can be drawn.

**To begin with**, the strong economic power of the EU, through tremendous efforts in deepening integration between its members, has built up its capacity to stand as a significant player in the international arena. This foundation has served as the base

on which the EU can utilize different tools at its disposal to develop a foreign policy. For the AU, the goal toward strengthening economic integration in Africa is essential before it can develop a robust foreign policy.

**Secondly**, as African states strengthen their governance, heads of states may be more comfortable in devolving some aspects of sovereignty to a supranational organization. While this is not a necessary condition, it will certainly increase the overall likelihood of support for the development of one unified African foreign policy.

**Thirdly**, the AU could benefit from adopting the EU's unanimity requirement in its decision-making process. This would allow for increased socialization between its member states, developing a common AU approach, norm and principles that are shared and internalized in the institution. With the development of an institutional norm, the likelihood of the formation of a coherent foreign policy is also increased.

**Lastly**, with increased investment and commitment of member states into the institution to create a cadre of AU technocrats, the capacity to shape the AU into a source of power autonomy is enhanced. The AU can become an organization independent from the UN with the ability to advance its own foreign policy to meet the objectives and interests of its member states.

All in all, the AU is on the path towards developing the capability to articulate a range of foreign policy for its member states. Although it will not be without its share of challenges, as the EU too faces hurdles in achieving consensus, the establishment of one unified African foreign policy will lend the continent a strengthened and assertive voice on the global platform. When that can be achieved, Africa will become a political and economic powerhouse in the international arena.

*Dr Ibrahim Farah is a lecturer at the University of Nairobi's Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS). His areas of interest include foreign policy analysis and conflict studies in Africa and the Middle East with emphasis on Somalia and the Horn of Africa sub-region.*

*Ms Jasmine Lam is the Director of Development at the Dr Hawa Abdi Foundation, Georgia, USA. She holds a BA Hons degree in political science and international development studies from McGill University in Canada. Her research interests include foreign policy analysis, particularly on policy impacts on IDPs, refugees, and post-conflict reconstruction and development.*

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## The centrality of local peacebuilding methodologies in Kenya's Sotik/Borabu border

There is growing recognition of the ubiquity and importance of locally led peacebuilding initiatives in conflict and post-conflict situations. Local peacebuilding intervention programmes are usually designed, as a matter of priority to include a clear understanding of the social, religious, cultural, philosophical, economic and political dynamics of the local communities. An understanding of these aspects informs the planning of intervention programmes and hence their sustainability. Local peacebuilding initiatives are usually relevant to the target population, score pressing needs, and not what is currently fashionable, are accorded high priority by citizens, and their investment may be more effective than intended if they build on what already exists. Locally led peacebuilding interventions foster mutual self-help, relevance, and sustainability.

Carolyn Hayman (2012) notes that, a "Local First" approach looks primarily for the capacity within the society and only brings in external assistance where no local capacity can be found. But, "Local First" does not mean local only – very often the most effective solution involves a partnership between local and external actors. Such partnerships, however, must be carefully crafted so that they do not destroy the local actors' capacities and instead build on already existing structures. This is key to both the effectiveness of the interventions themselves and of the partnerships with outside actors.

Local actors identify the needs, set the priorities as well as formulate the approach, though outside actors may facilitate and provide the required resources. Key aspects of a good partnership include involving the local actor(s) in conflict analysis and determination of the strategy; allowing them to lead, rather than treating them as subjects; ensuring that rewards to initiators of peacebuilding remain non-material; monitoring the mobilization of volunteer labour as a key indicator of the health of conflict de-escalation; and allowing other indicators of impact to be set by the communities affected by conflict. The non-material motivation meets the psychic need for self-actualization.

### The Sotik/Borabu border

The Sotik/Borabu border in South-Western Kenya serves as the boundary and administrative parting between Bomet and Nyamira counties, as well as the demarca-

tion between the Kipsigis-a Kalenjin sub-tribe living on the Sotik District of Bomet County, and the Abagusii – a Bantu sub-tribe, most commonly known as Kisii – on the Borabu District of Nyamira County. This is an area that has experienced simmering conflicts and insecurity, exacerbated by frequent cattle-rustling and the periodical cycle of political elections.

Despite an apparent show of calm and peace, complex pockets of conflicts are embedded in Kenya's territory and history. Such pockets of conflict, which are formed along ethnic lines, threaten the country's stability every other political electoral cycle. Although with different dialects, traditions and cultures, and historical cattle-rustling disputes, the Kipsigis and Abagusii of Sotik/Borabu border, have lived in relative harmony ever since. This however, changed after the 1992 general elections in which violence flared up across the country. This pattern was to be repeated again in subsequent general elections, culminating in the highest death toll in the 2007/2008 post-election violence. The violence came, with the contested outcome of the general elections that was followed by the announcement of Mwai Kibaki as President for yet another mandate. The two neighbouring tribes quickly directed their (real or imagined political) anger and frustration at each other, causing inter-tribal fighting. Property of innumerable value was destroyed as buildings, houses, homes, churches and schools were burnt, animals slaughtered, and many people killed. The violence highlighted and exposed weaknesses in governance, security systems and practices, and revealed the fragility of peace and stability in the country.

The end of violent conflict does not necessarily end the tension and division between warring groups, nor does it eliminate its psychological, economic, political, physical, social-cultural and religious repercussions to an area and its residents. Unresolved issues of violent conflict and identity in the past are reflected in every relationship in the present and possibly the future. Violent aggression and defensive hostility continue to exist for decades within the social fabric of people coming out of conflict, and many individuals who have suffered from violence continue to suffer socially, physically and mentally. It is on these realizations that the two rival communities, of the Abagusii and the Kipsigis, have joined hands in peacebuilding initiatives that are not only local, but locally led, locally owned, and locally delivered.

### **The roadmap to peace**

The picture of the region is different today; the physical violence has subsided and the tribes interact socially, culturally and economically, however underlying mistrust and hostility still lies unchecked. The area is thus a tinderbox of potential violence. Local initiatives to de-escalate the hostilities, particularly, targeting the stereotypes of the Kipsigis and Kisii, which brandish them as thieves and liars, respectively have been launched. These initiatives encourage the two communities to interact, partner and collaborate on several fronts so that they weave the ability to perceive cultural differences in largely non-stereotypical ways and to recognize the essential humanness of others. This cultural sensitivity requires the competency to experience one's beliefs, behaviours, and values as at least influenced by the particular context in which one is socialized, and recognise that there are alternatives to your culture. By discriminating and appreciating differences among cultures (including one's own), and by constructing a kind of self-reflexive perspective, people are able to experience others as different from themselves, but equally human. They are thus, competent to have positive attitudes towards other cultures and therefore, uphold equal humanity. A "critical mass" of information about another community's culture generates pressure for change in one's knowledge, attitudes, and/or skills.

These initiatives, for some part, have been driven by local youth seeking peace for their respective communities. The Borabu/Sotik Youth Peace Forum is one such group, composed of youths from both tribes, who meet and organise peacebuilding related activities. These encompass cross-border sports activities, such as soccer competitions and road peace races, as participants are encouraged to promote the

peaceful resolution of conflicts. The purpose and benefits of physical activities such as sports are innumerable. Physical activity and exercise contribute to increased psychological well-being, help combat stress and are therefore, used as a rehabilitative tool, which provides psychosocial support.

They also promote self-confidence and the development of various skills necessary for success in employment, relationships and other areas of life. Sports succour societal cohesion by promoting social integration, combating discrimination and promoting communication between different groups in a post-conflict environment. By so doing sports explicitly challenges violence, ethnicity, banditry, cattle rustling/raids, tribalism, social exclusion and even environmental degradation. Consequently, tremendous effect in the decrease of antagonisms and in the reduction in the intensity of negative attitudes and rebuilding relationships are recorded.

Sport is inextricably tied to development given that physical activities and mass sport, as MacClancy (1996) argues, have the unique ability to mark, create, construct, maintain and re-imagine national and ethnic identities. Sport is an important conduit for a sense of collective resentment and popular consciousness and therefore, functions as a way to promote the unity, coherence, and identity of not only the individuals in their communities but also as citizens.

Through sporting activities participants are encouraged to play a role in the development of their communities and become an important and powerful voice for peace. As peace is necessary for development, their participation in peace-building is essential for sustainable development. Perhaps the establishment of a high altitude athletics training camp in the area, is an example of how sports as a social change apparatus through which identities and conceptions of development activities are constructed, has created a more nuanced and therefore, more accurate understanding of development programmes. Through this training camp, youths from both communities polish their athletic skills, and are sponsored for major tournaments in and outside the country.

A portion of the proceeds from their participation are invested in community projects such as schools, vocational training centres, churches, hospitals, agricultural improvement and construction of infrastructures. This is quickly changing the development face and paradigm of the two border communities. Additionally, peace workshops and seminars are held to educate and desensitise young people on political manipulation, one of the main roots of the electoral violence. Due to the high unemployment rate, the youth are also trained on viable income generating activities, in an attempt to prevent them from engaging in activities deemed to be counter-productive for peace during their spare time.

Other key actors in the peacebuilding process in the region are women from both sides of the border. The Sotik/Borabu Women Peace Drive is a local initiative founded by women from both the Kipsigis and the Kisii in response to the intermittent violence. This initiative promotes the role of women in society and attempts to bring women together from either side of the border. The Women Peace Drive has found using radio talk shows particularly effective, as they broadcast on issues of female leadership and empowerment. Women's Peace Meetings is another forum that organises frequent peace meetings among and between women from both sides of the border. During these meetings women discuss security issues and propose activities that could promote peace between the tribes. Among the proposals so far advanced include:

- Women from both sides setting an example by interacting as 'one tribe'. This could be achieved through commerce and trade.
- Use of religious faith to enhance peace and promote dialogue by, for example, participating in cross-border church activities.
- Reporting to the group on what is not working.
- Enhance education and make schools inclusive for all children from both sides of the border.

- Start the peace process at home, by promoting peace education in one's family and therefore, advancing good behaviour within families.

The District Peace Committee, another component of the peacebuilding initiative, organises promotes and facilitates cross-border peace committees which constitute representatives elected from each community and the local provincial administration. The committees are created not only to improve on cross-border governance and security management through detailed border surveillance, but also to minimize conflicts. The committee acts as an arbiter for disputes between the rival tribes and groups, and provides a platform for cross-border community coordination and cooperation on security, governance and conflict management. The regular timing of the peace meetings allow relationships and friendships to develop, establishing a “constructive dependency” among individuals, the two communities, cultural leaders, administrators and political authorities that can be built upon for continued, and potentially more meaningful partnership, collaboration and cooperation. Their efforts help to restore and sustain peace.

Technological innovations in the modern era have also promoted and strengthened peacebuilding by giving peace actors the resources to challenge conflict and negative attitudes between the two neighbouring communities. Wider access to the internet, satellite, mobile phone networks, and the social media now permit the previously conflicting communities to interact, share and communicate their plight and mobilize support for a common cause peace. The mutual interaction and sharing of the two communities causes people to become more interculturally tolerant as they alter negative beliefs, attitudes and behaviours towards each other and therefore, become culturally competent. The challenge however, is how to address structural causes of violent conflict.

### Observations

Community members and local peace monitors have expressed the significant difference that these local peacebuilding initiatives have started to make along the common border. With mutual respect for diversity already in place, the communities organize around their shared predicament that generates positive change. The Sotik/Borabu border community makes the case that the most effective strategies of resolving conflicts are those that play upon cultural norms rather than importing new and unfamiliar techniques. Thus, the value and efficacy of traditional structures and mechanisms of governance and conflict resolution, such as customary institutions, elders' councils, religious leaders, age-sets, youth forums and women's networks must not only be considered for support but also be promoted.

Restoring customary governance institutions would enhance communities' capacities to mediate and resolve conflicts, and recognise the need to build on these structures. By recognizing the cultural primacy of inter-community bonding and partnerships over taking up arms, the Sotik/Borabu border community appear to have found an appropriate solution to a security problem that has eluded them over time. They make the case that persons/organisations working in conflict management should search for and build upon existing norms rather than simply bringing two parties in a conflict together. Such home-grown methodologies have proved to be very vital not only in preventing and resolving the inter-communal conflicts, but more significantly they have become instrumental means of reaching out to the other; bridging the divide and promoting peaceful inter-community interface and coexistence.

These initiatives inspire confidence on the viability of peace education. The interventions are designed to enable and develop people's constructive and peaceful skills, values and behaviours, and encourage them to live together and solve problems that arise in their communities through peaceful means. They are run in a fair and inclusive way and they cover many areas, from advocacy, education, to social and economic justice. The interventions disarm as they empower minds in the

promotion of tolerance, understanding and respect for cultural diversity and identity and therefore, need to be strengthened. This underscores the centrality of indigenous conflict management mechanisms.

### Important lessons

Peacebuilding policies must be sensitive to local conflict dynamics, particularly when intervention measures and strategies are being designed and implemented. Local communities are best placed to identify conflict causes, risks and potential solutions, and to provide feedback on the impact of interventions on conflict dynamics. Meaningful post-conflict transformation requires ‘bottom-up’ approaches that focus on traditional forms of peacebuilding, through cultural spaces such as the arts, sports, and education. The development of policy on conflict intervention strategies should therefore be informed by community participation at the grassroots-level. Failure to which, intervention strategies risk aggravating tensions and increasing the prospect of violent conflicts.

Women, men, youth and children experience violent conflict in different ways. Applying a desegregated “gender and age-set lens” to understand these differences can help to ensure that special needs are met and constructive roles are played when designing peacebuilding strategies in conflict zones. Peace actors should therefore recognize the different peacebuilding potential of each age and gender category in order to take full advantage of a range of conflict prevention and peacebuilding opportunities within them.

Violent conflicts destroy livelihoods and therefore, slow and/or reverse development. By encouraging the establishment, rehabilitation and development of income generating projects, – the resource-base, upon which livelihoods depend, – communities recover from conflict and the risk of reoccurrence is reduced. Developing alternative livelihood opportunities contributes to socio-economic independence and should be promoted and supported. Alternative economic opportunities build capacity, help secure livelihoods and enable people to become more open and accountable to each other. Diversified economic opportunities benefit more people rather than relying on rudimentary approaches, such cattle-rustling that only a select number of people can benefit from.

**Mokua Ombati**, an Ethno-Sociologist, is a candidate in sociology at Moi University and a resident of Sotik/Borabu Border. His research interests include peace education, citizen participation, gender, and child and youth issues. He can be reached at [keombe@gmail.com](mailto:keombe@gmail.com)

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### **Sudan and South Sudan instability**

Sudan has threatened to shut down South Sudan oil exports over the latter's alleged support of rebels seeking to topple the Khartoum governments causing fear of a return to armed hostility. It is alleged that South Sudan is providing logistical, financial and political support but not supply of weapons. Sudan has cancelled all the agreement with South Sudan including the flow of oil through its pipeline. Although Sudan maintains that it still committed to good relations with South Sudan, it has put on hold nine security and economic pacts but is willing to cooperate if the South Sudan stops to support the rebels. South Sudan had denied backing the rebels and has expressed fears over the security of Southerners living in Sudan especially after the serious deterioration of ties between the two countries.

*Source: Daily Nation*

### **New regional autonomy in Jubaland – Somalia**

500 delegates in the Jubaland conference held in Kismayu University endorsed the establishment of Jubaland and elected the regions President. Immediately after election, the new President appointed his deputy which was followed by a swearing in ceremony. Jubaland aims to become semi-autonomous meaning that it will remain affiliated with the Federal government but it will run its own affairs.

The newly created state comprises Middle Juba, Lower Juba and Gedo region which is the area that borders Kenya. The autonomous and semi-autonomous regions in the Northwest, that is, Somaliland and Puntland, recognized the newly created region and called on the Somali Federal Government, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the wider international community to recognize and cooperate with the newly created region.

There was speculation of estranged relationship between Kenya and Somalia after the creation of Jubaland but the Somalia President affirmed that relations between the two countries have not been affected. The two have in fact agreed to strengthen cooperation particularly of security of their citizens.

*Source: Daily Nation*

### **Kenya Truth Justice and Reconciliation report**

Kenya's Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission has presented the final report to Kenya's President.

The four volume report includes information gathered from statements, memoranda, individual and thematic hearings. It recommends investigations on those mentioned adversely and also gives an opportunity to those who want clear their names to do so. The court will pass judgement on those who will be taken to court.

The report highlighted past cases of assassinations, illegal land allocation, economic crimes, massacres and human rights violations. The report recommends that action should be taken against those responsible for the suffering and atrocities. Among those named in the report are 30 sitting and former Member of Parliament and senators who were allegedly accused of the 2007/8 post-election violence.

The full report can be accessed from <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf>

*Source: Daily Nation*

### **African churches celebrate fifty years of the All Africa Conference of Churches**

At the 50th Jubilee anniversary of the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), church leaders from more than forty African countries ask how they can rise up against the shackles of the colonial legacy, conflicts, poverty, class struggles and political upheavals, to unlock Africa's immense potential.

These questions were addressed by more than a thousand church representatives in Kampala, Uganda, at the AACC's 10th Assembly titled "God of life, lead Africa to peace, justice and dignity", 3 to 9 June.

The focus of the AACC assembly theme correlated with the theme of the World Council of Churches (WCC) upcoming assembly to be held from 30 October to 8 November in Busan, Republic of Korea. The WCC theme is "God of life, lead us to justice and peace." The Busan assembly will bring together churches from around the world, including Africa.

Speaking on the AACC's vision, Archbishop Valentine Mokiwa, its president, said the AACC was created in 1963 to translate "African spirituality into the social, political and moral transformation of this continent as it was emerging from the bondage of spiritual and mental imperialism and colonization."

He encouraged African churches to speak out against poverty, calling it a "sin". He said, "At this assembly we must mark the turning point for the Church in Africa to speak out and act against the sin of poverty. Starting now, the Church must fight poverty by naming and declaring the conditions of the poor as intolerable in our time. We must declare poverty the greatest scandal and sin of our time and age."

The WCC general secretary Rev. Dr Olav Fykse Tveit echoed these views, acknowledging and encouraging the strong role of the African churches in being "prophetic voices" speaking for justice and peace.

"We know that Africa is a continent rich in resources. Sadly, many of these resources have been exploited, offering little benefit to the sons and daughters of Africa in comparison. The struggle for economic justice for and within Africa must continue and be strongly supported by the global ecumenical movement."

"The world and the church need the influence of Africa's Christian voices, as we have been strengthened by examples of strong leadership, from women and men, coming from Africa. Neither you nor the world around you can afford to see Africa only as an object of aid. Africa's experiences of life from the inside are a great source of wisdom and guidance to find justice, peace and dignity," Tveit added.

Prof. P.L.O Lumumba, a presenter from Kenya, emphasized the vital contributions of youth and women in accomplishing the values of peace, justice and dignity. He said the change can occur only when churches in Africa play their rightful role in "re-awakening and re-energizing" of African youth.

"There is no doubt that youth can contribute to lasting peace in Africa, but only if they are at peace with themselves." Many young Africans have lost their self esteem and seek refuge elsewhere. He continued, a "good numbers of young people seek salvation by migrating from Africa, and many still find themselves enticed as child soldiers in countries such as Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and others."

Amidst these difficulties, he said, youth must be at the forefront of Africa's renewal, but they can play this role only if they are equipped with the "weapons of self-esteem, courage and dignity".

Speaking on African women, who constitute more than 50 percent of the regional population, Lumumba added that "if Africa is to know peace and justice her women must be treated with dignity and given the opportunity to serve."

Sekai M. Holland, co-minister of the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration in Zimbabwe, also shared her views on development in relation to the theme of the AACC assembly. She opined that there is no doubt that Africa is faced with enormous challenges, yet Africans have made extraordinary progress.

"Real changes for the better are occurring, democratic reforms have been put in place throughout sub-Saharan Africa, debt relief programmes are being discussed, and literacy levels are slowly rising. In the cultural and religious field, African churches have an increasing global voice," Holland said.

The AACC assembly was also addressed by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda on 8 June. Among other speakers were Archbishop Stanley Ntagali, Rev. Suzanne Matale, Prof. John Mbiti, Botshelo Moilwa, Dr Agnes Aboum, Rev. Dr Dietrich Werner, Anthony Kehinde Adebayo and Rev. Dr Konrad Raiser.

*Source: World Council of Churches, Geneva*

## South Sudan

**Improved accountability is the only path to sustainable peace**

In response to high levels of inter-communal and politically motivated violence, a new report by the South Sudan Law Society *Challenges of Accountability: An assessment of dispute resolution processes in rural South Sudan*, provides an empirical analysis of how justice systems in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile are attempting to meet the legal needs of rural populations caught up in vicious cycles of conflict.

In recent years, inter-communal and politically motivated violence has killed thousands of people in rural areas. The perpetrators of this violence are able to kill innocent people, loot livestock, destroy property, abduct women and children and commit acts of sexual violence with impunity.

According to the report, in areas surveyed in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile States:

- 20 percent of households reported having one or more household members killed in the past two years.
- 20 percent of households in Akobo and 10 percent of households in Pibor reported that one or more household members had been abducted in the past two years
- Nearly 40 percent of households reported having something stolen from them in the past two years
- 60 percent of these incidents involved the theft of cattle or other livestock.

The report found that the existing justice services are almost completely unable to hold the perpetrators of violence accountable. Key challenges arise in investigating and prosecuting these crimes and ensuring that governance institutions respect, protect and fulfil the rights provided for in the Transitional Constitution and other sources of law.

The report offers a series of detailed recommendations for how the government and its international partners can help to improve access to justice for rural populations.

The full report can be accessed from <http://www.namati.org/newsposts/south-sudan-law-society-improved-accountability-is-the-only-path-to-sustainable-peace/>

**New technology and the prevention of violence and conflict**

This report explores the ways in which ICTs and the data they generate can assist international actors, governments, and civil society organizations to more effectively prevent violence and conflict. It examines the contributions that cell phones, social media, crowd sourcing, crisis mapping, blogging, and big data analytics can make to short-term efforts to forestall crises and to long-term initiatives to address the root causes of violence.

Five case studies assess the use of such tools in a variety of regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America) experiencing different types of violence (criminal violence, election-related violence, armed conflict, short-term crisis) in different political contexts (restrictive and collaborative governments). The cases demonstrate clearly that employing new technologies for conflict prevention can produce very different results depending on the context in which they are applied and whether or not those using the technology take that context into account.

Find the report at: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf>

### **The Conflict Management System in Karamoja: An Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses**

The report, launched April 2013, explores the effectiveness of the conflict management system in northern Uganda's remote Karamoja region. It identifies formal government and customary actors responsible for managing conflict in Karamoja and the strengths and weakness in the way in which these actors work together to prevent, resolve, and respond to conflict.

Amongst other findings, the assessment found that conflict management is more effective where traditional leaders are engaged and where formal and customary authorities collaborate. However, this collaboration is frequently undermined by poor communication between conflict management actors, lack of knowledge of the roles that different actors play in managing conflict, and lack of respect for the value added by elders. The report concludes with specific recommendations to remedy these weaknesses.

*For the full report follow the link: <http://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Uganda%20Conflict%20Report%20FINAL%20PUBLIC.pdf>*

### **Somalilanders speak**

The November 2012 local elections were a key test of Somaliland's democratic development. Watched keenly by the international community, the elections were largely peaceful with an increased space provided for non-state actors to observe and review electoral procedures. The elections marked an important step forward, with more than 800,000 voters casting their ballots, watched by hundreds of domestic election observers. This report provides a synthesis and analysis of civil society organisations' observations, as well as highlighting the ways in which electoral procedures can be improved. The report provides key findings and recommendations for actors ranging from the government to CSOs to the media, with the intention that lessons can be learned to further improve the democratisation of Somaliland.

*Full report <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Somalilanders-speak---web-ready.pdf>*

### **Integrated Peacebuilding – new resource**

Integrated Peacebuilding – Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict by Dr. Craig Zelizer addresses the importance of weaving peacebuilding methods into diverse sectors including development, humanitarian assistance, gender, business, media, health, and the environment -areas where such work is needed the most. Incorporating peacebuilding approaches in these fields is critical for transforming today's protracted conflicts into tomorrow's sustainable peace.

Covering both theory and practice, the team of leading academics and practitioners present original essays discussing the infrastructure of the peacebuilding field – outlining key actors, donors, and underlying motivations – as well as the ethical dilemmas created by modern conflict. Exploring both the challenges and lessons to be found in this emerging field, Integrated Peacebuilding is perfect for courses on peacebuilding, conflict resolution, international development, and related fields.

*Find the book at Amazon.com or <http://www.westviewpress.com/book.php?isbn=9780813345093#>*

### **Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan: A Conversation for Justice and Stability**

Popular sentiment in South Sudan appears to favour a reconciliation process, but questions remain regarding what issues such a process would tackle, how it might be conducted, and who should carry it out.

This special report from June 2013 addresses concerns using information and opinions gathered from interviews with community leaders, youth, and women's

activists who are members of various civil society associations. In addition, ordinary citizens, government officials, prominent politicians, civic activists and religious leaders, were interviewed; people who were involved in previous localized peace and reconciliation efforts in different corners of the country before independence.

What these sources have revealed is the importance of building on these earlier initiatives and widening the consultations in order for the process to enjoy a wider buy-in from the citizens. The sources and interviews have also shown some of the approaches to reconciliation that the citizens believe would be more productive.

*Find the report at: <http://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/peace-and-reconciliation-in-south-sudan-a-conversation-for-justice-and-stability/>*

## Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 25, No. 3, May-June 2013

### Editorial information

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The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editor is Shamsia Ramadhan, [shamsia.ramadhan@life-peace.org](mailto:shamsia.ramadhan@life-peace.org).

For subscription matters contact: Tore Samuelsson, [tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org](mailto:tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org)

For a link to HAB and more information see [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

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### Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

