Planning for peace
Lessons from Mozambique’s peacebuilding process
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Summary
In the more than two decades since Mozambique’s civil war ended and its first multiparty elections were held, the country still faces persistent social, political, economical and developmental challenges. What have been some of the main drivers and threats to Mozambique’s peace? This paper examines the plans and processes that have been developed in the pursuit of national stability. It also highlights current and future challenges for continued consolidation of peace. By exploring key plans to address demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, economic and social development, decentralisation, justice, and natural resource investment, this paper puts forward seven key findings with implications for peacebuilding in Mozambique and for the field as a whole.

A LOOK AT conflict-resolution efforts throughout history shows that the signing of an agreement does not necessarily bring an end to all conflict dynamics. Once an agreement is reached, risks of relapsing into violence can remain, because causes of the conflict may not have been fully addressed and new challenges may emerge. Peacebuilding efforts – meaning processes that aim to reduce the risk of (re)lapses into conflict – are not a group of isolated activities. Rather, they are the broader connection of many processes to support a transition to sustainable peace.

The tendency for conflicts to re-emerge suggests a lack of clarity over how successful peacebuilding processes occur. Understanding the effectiveness of national and international responses to conflicts goes beyond understanding the overall implementation of specific programmes and activities. A crucial component in identifying effective peacebuilding responses relates to how plans are developed, what types of mechanisms are put in place, how they are connected and how they are implemented and monitored. But above all, it is important to assess their impact in context and on the conflict dynamics.

Mozambique is an illuminating case study in how peacebuilding strategies are designed and implemented over time, to what degree these plans and strategies respond to the realities on the ground, and how they contribute to sustainable peace. A superficial assessment of Mozambique’s
Planning for Peace: lessons from Mozambique’s Peacebuilding Process

Peacebuilding processes can show progress two decades after the signing of the 1992 Rome General Peace Agreement (GPA), which ended the civil war (1977–92). However, the incomplete implementation of some of its peacebuilding needs resulted in continuous recurrences of violence and threats to the overall stability of the country. Mozambique’s extended peacebuilding timeline (1992–present), which has involved a diverse array of stakeholders, offers insights into the complex interaction between actors and among strategic plans.

By exploring the peacebuilding processes in Mozambique over the past two decades, this study looks beyond the impact of emergency and short-term interventions to identify strategies that contribute to long-term sustainable peace. In this context, Mozambique provides the opportunity to analyse and draw lessons from how planning and implementation of systemic peacebuilding responses have been conducted, and to what extent these capacities have evolved over time. How did peacebuilding happen in Mozambique? Was it designed? Or did it happen by chance?

Objectives

The broad objective of this paper is to draw lessons from Mozambique that contribute to more effective peacebuilding responses elsewhere; in particular, by better understanding critical assumptions that drive the development of peacebuilding strategies, and how these contribute to achieving sustainable peace. This paper identifies peacebuilding strategies as those plans – often expressed through formal planning documents – that prioritise and sequence responses aimed at achieving sustainable peace.

While this paper recognises the importance of developing country-specific approaches and the problematic nature of ‘one-size-fits-all’ plans in the history of peacebuilding, there is nonetheless value in understanding the Mozambican experience as a case study in planning for peace. This paper highlights how processes were designed and implemented in Mozambique and provides lessons on how to improve the quality of future planning processes.

The importance and institutional context of plans that guided macro-level strategic planning in Mozambique were identified through interviews with a wide range of stakeholders in and outside of Mozambique, evaluation of official plans, data analysis, and an extensive literature review. This paper examines the plans that have contributed most – and continue to contribute – to Mozambique’s peacebuilding trajectory, to gather evidence and insight into the contribution of macro-level plans to peacebuilding efforts.

Key findings and implications for peacebuilding planning

- Time matters!
- Peacebuilding efforts in Mozambique occurred by design and also by chance, independent of a larger strategic plan.
- Peacebuilding plans have become more comprehensive and the planning capacity of the government has increased.
- Strategies for implementation and mechanisms for monitoring and accountability have yet to be further developed.
- Although long-term strategic planning has increased, the government’s ability to look beyond short-term political gains to initiatives that promote long-term stability remains unproven.
- External actors have had an important role in pushing initiatives and influencing agenda setting, although they have slowly moved away from direct peacebuilding support.
- Civil society has played a flexible and critical role in brokering peacebuilding responses.

Peacebuilding context

Peacebuilding is notoriously difficult to separate from a host of other processes and interventions that occur in conflict-affected areas. As a concept, peacebuilding has evolved considerably since the 1990s to reflect this complex reality. This changing way of thinking about peacebuilding requires a similar evolution in how researchers and practitioners analyse peacebuilding processes.

This study aims to contribute to this holistic understanding of peacebuilding by looking at strategic planning in areas such as social and economic development, decentralisation, and natural resource investment. In this way, it expects to better understand how these sectors are intertwined with and how they contribute to the overall reduced likelihood of (re)emerging conflict. Thus, while this study illuminates how these plans connect to the process of building peace, it also acknowledges that planning documents and discussion about these topics often make little explicit mention of peace. Understanding how the concept of peacebuilding has changed over time makes it clear why this broad approach to peacebuilding research is valuable.
In the 1990s, peacebuilding was considered to be part of a linear conflict-resolution process, seen as those activities with an exclusively post-conflict focus, undertaken on the ‘far side of conflict’ to support a particular peace process. Peacebuilding is now thought of as a far more comprehensive and sophisticated response that incorporates conflict prevention in addition to post-conflict activities. The aim is to identify and address root causes that lead the conflict to emerge initially or fuel its re-emergence. For example, the United Nations (UN) currently defines peacebuilding as:

a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies … should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.

As can be seen from this definition, there is a strong emphasis on the idea of prioritising and sequencing peacebuilding responses. Doing so necessitates clear planning aimed at achieving specific objectives.

There is a current shift away from understanding peacebuilding as simply part of an isolated, linear trajectory. The focus has moved from pursuing activities solely designed to enhance peace to embedding peacebuilding in post-conflict transition and development efforts. This way of thinking about peacebuilding still focuses heavily on the idea of planning, but also takes into account how peacebuilding can be embedded in strategic planning in areas that overlap with peacebuilding but do not explicitly or exclusively address peacebuilding, such as development, security and political institutions.

This ‘umbrella approach’ comprises different types of engagements in the conflict-management spectrum. For example, the 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architecture commissioned by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged the need for a more holistic approach to peacebuilding that focuses on the idea of sustaining peace efforts in a particular country. This review shows that it is necessary to see peacebuilding responses not only as a post-conflict type of response, but an umbrella approach that ranges from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction.

Alternative views to peacebuilding that have originated in Africa have also been important in ensuring that this debate is seen through different lenses, in particular with regard to process ownership. For example, the African Union (AU) has also engaged in the development of its guiding policy mechanism for peacebuilding, through its post-conflict reconstruction and development framework (PCRD). In 2006, the AU approved a framework to aid post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts with a view to addressing the root causes of conflict. In particular, AU approaches are designed to guide the development of strategies seeking to consolidate peace and prevent relapses into violence. Again, a critical component of the AU’s approach lies in long-term planning that supports countries in the process of achieving sustainable peace. However, it is a limited framework because it focuses on the post-conflict
situation, with less focus on conflict prevention as part of an integrated peacebuilding strategy. Furthermore, 10 years after the adoption of the framework, it still requires greater efforts towards effective implementation and fostering buy-in from member states.

This paper puts these evolving aspects of peacebuilding theory into practice by looking at how planning for peace – explicitly and implicitly – happens across sectors.

Key peacebuilding planning areas

The peacebuilding process in Mozambique can be characterised as the collection of plans across sectors that outline the post-conflict trajectory from 1992 until the present. At times, these plans were incorporated within wider national strategies; at others, they were limited in scope to a particular sector or priority. This study groups the plans into five planning areas to reflect thematic connections and the evolution of these planning areas over time.

To illustrate how plans were made and carried out, this paper focuses on case studies that show how specific strategies were developed and their contribution to the country’s overall peacebuilding trajectory. As an organising principle, looking at the different dimensions of peacebuilding, this paper uses five areas that are broadly inspired by the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs) from the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which was developed by the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding at Busan in 2011. This is an agreement among fragile and conflict-affected states, international donors, and civil society organisations to improve development policy in fragile states. While Mozambique is not a member of the New Deal, the framework still provides a useful tool for assessing different areas related to peacebuilding. The five areas are presented in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding and statebuilding goals</th>
<th>Specific case study</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic foundations</td>
<td>Economic and social development</td>
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<td>Inclusive politics</td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues and services</td>
<td>Natural resource investment</td>
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PSGs frequently overlap within planning areas and in specific case studies, and the table does not see them as exclusive to specific goals. Where appropriate, this study highlights connections between those different goals, showing the cross-cutting nature of plans and responses.

Consistent with an understanding of the New Deal, this research contends that progress happens across a spectrum, in a non-linear, two-directional fashion, and that progress towards resilience can be more advanced in some areas than others. Moreover, stages may look different depending on their country-specific context. The
use of this framework is by no means intended to suggest that Mozambique should be considered a fragile state, but rather that degrees of fragility exist in certain areas. It is used as a tool that allows for a holistic understanding of the incremental stages and overlapping dimensions of peacebuilding that occur during a transition from crisis to resilience.

To understand the full spectrum of influences on planning, implementing, and evaluating peacebuilding processes, this paper highlights the overlapping significance of five groups of actors that were found to relate directly to Mozambique’s peacebuilding process:

1. The ministries and institutions of the government
2. Opposition parties
3. Civil society
4. International donors and institutions
5. Private investors.

**History and background**

The civil conflict in Mozambique began in 1977, two years after the end of a 20-year war for independence that freed the country from Portuguese rule. The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) opposed the Marxist-Leninist single-party government of the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO). The violence had significant international dimensions. RENAMO received support from the Rhodesian government until 1984, and the US as part of Cold War proxy conflict dynamics. Conversely, FRELIMO was backed by the Soviet Union, Cuba and eventually President Robert Mugabe’s government in Zimbabwe after its ascension to power in 1979. While the conflict was largely contained to Mozambican territory, its geopolitical and regional dimensions were instrumental in its perpetuation.

Between 1987 and 1990 FRELIMO implemented a series of reforms, notably a structural adjustment programme and constitutional reforms, which moved Mozambique’s economic model away from hardline Marxism. This accommodated those who had opposed the previous style of government, and legitimised FRELIMO in the eyes of the West. By the end of the 1980s, it became clear that the political will to end the conflict existed on both sides. Current thinking about the conflict suggests that the presence of a common Mozambican identity supported the building of the trust necessary to bring peace. Through intensive diplomatic efforts, local, regional and international actors, as well as private interests, made the signing of the 1992 GPA possible.

In 1994, the first multi-party elections took place in Mozambique, which were widely considered to be a de facto referendum on the GPA. With the aid of international partners, RENAMO was converted into a political party, garnering support from central and northern regions of the country. FRELIMO won the election with 44% of the vote, primarily from the southern provinces, and Joaquim Chissano became president of Mozambique.

Since then there have been four rounds of elections. While RENAMO has frequently rejected election results and threatened violence, it has remained in the political system as the main opposition party, though not without friction. FRELIMO has won all of the national elections and there have been two handovers of leadership, most recently from Armando Guebuza (2005–15) to President Filipe Nyusi in 2015.

During Guebuza’s tenure, in contrast to the open dialogue Chissano had maintained, direct engagement between the government and RENAMO was limited. Interviewees expressed optimism that the most recent shift in administration could be an opportunity for increased dialogue between the government and RENAMO, which is still under the leadership of Alfonso Dhlakama.

**RENOAMO has remained in the political system as the main opposition party, though not without friction**

In 2013 and 2014, violence erupted between RENAMO and the authorities, as Dhlakama led a group of armed RENAMO men in raids against key transit routes. Many of those involved had refused to give up their arms as part of the country’s disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. Widely perceived inequalities in political and economic opportunity have been cited as reasons for the insurgency. Despite a peace agreement in September 2014, these grievances have yet to be fully resolved and low-level skirmishes in central Mozambique between RENAMO and military forces have continued.

Concerns over Mozambique’s stability have gained importance in light of the discovery of natural resources in the country and increased economic growth. In the past 10 years, Mozambique has become one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, with an expected GDP growth of over 8% in 2015, driven mostly by the construction, transportation and communications sectors. The extractive sector, especially coal, has performed more poorly than expected, but is still an important driver of economic growth. While this has been seen as an important component
of Mozambique’s peacebuilding trajectory, it has also raised concerns about the equitable distribution of the country’s newly anticipated wealth.

Just as multiple, overlapping actors were involved in supporting the pre-1992 peace process, so too have multiple actors been essential to planning for the consolidation of peace. The following sections outline the actions of the actors involved in planning for peace, and unpack the implications of their work in each of the five peacebuilding areas identified above: DDR, economic and social development, decentralisation, justice and natural resource investment.

**Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)**

In the years since the GPA, Mozambique’s peacebuilding process has been closely linked to issues of disarmament and reintegration of former combatants. Development of the DDR strategy remains tied to levels of instability in the country. DDR includes providing security as a key element, but is also directly related to other peacebuilding goals. This section explores how DDR in Mozambique has occurred by design and, when macro-level plans failed to adequately confront challenges to peace, by chance, through the mobilisation of civil society.


As the primary document outlining the terms for peace between RENAMO and FRELIMO, the signing of the GPA provided the framework to initiate Mozambique’s DDR process. While its 180-day timeline for demobilisation was ambitious, the GPA included valuable outlines for the inclusion of former warring parties, the UN and other relevant actors in decision making and implementation.

The GPA also outlined a series of commissions to operate until the first elections in 1994. These commissions were to run under the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC), and decisions that the CSC took had to be made by consensus between FRELIMO and RENAMO in an effort to foster political inclusivity. In addition, the GPA called on Italy, a major supporter of the agreement, to convene a donor conference to financially support the 1994 elections and the reintegration process of former soldiers and affected civilians. As a macro-level plan, the GPA involved key stakeholders domestically and internationally.

The UN played an important role in the DDR process. The UN Security Council established the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) on 16 December 1992 to support implementation of the GPA. The mission’s mandate was to verify the ceasefire; demobilise forces through the collection, storage, and destruction of weapons; and assist with the humanitarian needs of displaced people and demobilised soldiers, among other activities in support of the peace process.

In the three years following the GPA, the UN facilitated the collection of a reported 200,000 weapons and demobilisation of 80,000 troops. But while some physical disarmament occurred, the bulk of the disarmament process and the deeper, more thorough process of ‘disarming of minds’ were left to the Mozambicans themselves. ONUMOZ’s primary objective was to establish the necessary conditions for successful elections in 1994. Once this was completed, the mission departed, leaving a country team to support national development and help those whose lives the conflict had destroyed.

The UN’s failure to support follow-up procedures for their DDR activities contributed to a gap in the process, and a decade would pass before the government took on planning for DDR in a comprehensive way. When ONUMOZ left, Mozambique had a newly elected government, but its weak post-conflict capacity and lack of experience conducting DDR meant that its process was left incomplete and without clear plans beyond the continued collection of arms.

After 1995, the DDR process remained woefully incomplete. Many arms remained in the hands of Mozambicans and even less had been done to break down the militarised mentality of the population. Most notably, a core group of RENAMO fighters, who did not trust FRELIMO to honour the conditions of the peace deal, had refused to disarm. With the UN shrinking its presence, donor countries, including Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, stepped in to support post-conflict Mozambique. Many small and medium-sized grants were awarded to ground-level local actors to carry out peacebuilding activities.

**Mozambique’s peacebuilding process is closely linked to the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants**

Although money and training came from outside the country, Mozambican groups established ownership of their initiatives. Building on a perceived atmosphere of openness and dialogue under the Chissano government, civil-society groups emerged to fill the gaps in the DDR process the UN and the weak Mozambican state had left. Religious leaders, notably the Christian Council of Mozambique, had been key facilitators in the lead-up to the peace agreement in 1992; after 1995 they again saw an opportunity to support groups and activities working towards consolidating peace.
Civil-society engagement in the DDR process (1995–present)

Drawing its inspiration from the Biblical passage Micah 4:3–5, ‘They will beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks’, the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) recognised the need for further action to consolidate peace in Mozambique. Many people had retained their arms and people lacked non-violent problem-solving skills and frameworks to settle their disagreements. The Swords into Ploughshares programme offered subsidies and tools in exchange for weapons. While the CCM championed this programme, it also facilitated the development of similar but more focused peacebuilding organisations. Two of these groups were JustaPaz and Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reintegration (FOMICRES).

JustaPaz

Originating out of the CCM, JustaPaz focuses on psychological barriers to peace. It addresses the dynamics involved in reconciliation and reintegration, notably how to prepare people to deal with tensions and issues that may arise when perpetrators return to their communities. Since the 1990s, JustaPaz has worked in response to the needs of Mozambican society, from conflict resolution in primary and secondary schools, to the development of mediation skills in the judiciary, police and first responders. When international donors became fatigued with Mozambique in the 2000s, civil-society groups that had been engaged in DDR work struggled to maintain their operations. However, JustaPaz maintained its programmes by diversifying its funding and making strategic partnerships.

FOMICRES

Founded in 1995 by a group of former combatants, FOMICRES received support from the Secretary of Churches to help in the disarmament effort. Similar to the Swords into Ploughshares programme, Mozambicans were given the opportunity to exchange their weapons for something that would help them start a business or improve their livelihoods. Goods for exchange ranged from sewing machines to tin roofs. Between 1995 and 2006, FOMICRES collected and destroyed around 1 million weapons. The organisation also worked closely with Operation Rachel, a collaborative disarmament operation that the South African government had initiated in partnership with the Mozambican government to stop the illegal flow of arms in southeast Africa. In 2006, as donor support for disarmament decreased and in response to a call by the Mozambican government for crime-prevention initiatives, FOMICRES shifted its activities. While it continued to collect arms, it also carried out crime-prevention training of local governments, the judiciary and communities to break down militarised mentalities. Following outbreaks of violence in 2013–14, FOMICRES continued to be involved in arms collection.

Despite support from international donors, the actions of civil-society organisations were largely uncoordinated. The donor structure was partly responsible for this as different countries made choices about who and what they would support. But local groups’ seeming inability to commit to greater coordination mechanisms also played a role.
However, these groups were able to react dynamically to the needs of Mozambican society. As donors, in parallel with the Mozambican population, became weary of peacebuilding activities, civil-society groups were forced to shift their focus and guiding priorities toward economic development. A more coordinated civil-society sector could have further streamlined DDR activities, allowing for much-needed programmes to continue with less funding.

Between 1995 and the late 2000s the government’s DDR efforts did not extend further than arms-collection initiatives, such as Operation Rachel, as part of wider crime-management strategies. Nevertheless, NGOs collaborated with government ministries to enhance capacity and programme delivery. Mozambican actors and priorities continued to drive these activities, but the political nature of the DDR problems, and a lack of follow-up mechanisms and capacity means that demobilisation issues have continued up to the present day. A core group of RENAMO fighters close to Dhlakama have refused to disarm and demobilised combatants have become a political priority.

The government refocuses on DDR (2005–present)

Until 2005 there was no clear initiative for top-level government plans to reintegrate former combatants, nor to follow up with those who had already been demobilised. But in 2005 groups of former combatants began to pressure the government to address their lack of economic opportunities. In 2007–08, these groups began meeting with the government to express their concerns. Around 2010–11, the government defined a legal framework to support the reintegration of demilitarised combatants into the workforce, and eventually managed to reintegrate around 450 people. The reactive nature of this ongoing process 20 years after the completion of the UN mission highlights the need for comprehensive and continued approaches to DDR, which consider the need for long-term follow-up mechanisms. Programmes are still needed to support former combatants’ integration into the economy.

The Fund for Peace and National Reconciliation (FPNR or Peace Fund) developed out of the 2014 peace talks between RENAMO and the government. Designed to act as a follow-up support system for former combatants on both sides, its application seeks to remedy gaps in the government-led peacebuilding process that have existed since the signing of the GPA. In August 2015, the FPNR began taking applications from former combatants and widows of combatants to provide financial support for small and medium-sized enterprises, firstly in Cabo Delgado and Sofala provinces. These areas were chosen because of their high volume of former combatants. The hope is that local businesses can benefit from the wealth linked to natural resource investments in these areas. Starting with an investment from the government, the fund plans to expand with support from private businesses and other external actors. The new FPNR initiative is a hopeful peacebuilding initiative. However, previous funding programmes that were designed to provide money for decentralised economic initiatives have failed to adequately track the distribution or impact of funds. In acknowledgement of this, the FPNR plans to include sufficient monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms to ensure a greater proportion of the loans that it provides will be repaid.20 The responsible handling of funds is an opportunity for the government to prove to the people that it can address their concerns, and thus alleviate potential instability caused by frustrated and politically active former combatants.

**Plans that focus on economic and social development are vital to consolidating peace in Mozambique**

The FPNR’s General Assembly also engages with the private sector through the Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique (CIA), which is expected to build capacity at the board level.21 While support for former RENAMO combatants may be considered a concession by the government, it does not meet RENAMO’s demands to integrate their supporters into ranking positions in the military and police. While the FPNR has the potential to be a step in the right direction on following up on reintegration, it should not be considered a panacea for failures of the DDR process in Mozambique.

The DDR process began with firm plans under the GPA and ONUMOZ, but has lacked a coherent structure. At each stage of DDR efforts since the end of ONUMOZ’s mandate 1995, plans and programmes have been created by government in response to perceived needs, but only after the needs became problems. While initiatives such as the FPNR indicate increased government planning, this has been no less reactive. An understanding of Mozambique’s need for longer-term disarmament and reintegration plans from the beginning would have benefited the country. Taking into consideration Mozambique’s developmental capacity, all peacebuilding actors, from donors to civil society, should recognise and plan for longer time frames, and greater coordination. However, while arms remain widespread in Mozambique and political tensions over demobilised combatants continue, some of the most significant determinants of stability in the country stem from deficits in economic and social development.

**Economic and social development**

Development and peacebuilding are deeply intertwined. A common belief stakeholders express is that development cannot happen without peace, and peace cannot be solidified without development. Over 20 years after GPA, more than 14 million people in Mozambique live on under US$1.25 per day. Mozambique is near the bottom of many human development indicators,22 and social and political stability have become increasingly contingent on the availability of economic opportunity.23 Many believe that continuing hostilities are rooted in economic inequalities.

Plans that focus on economic and social development are vital to consolidating peace in Mozambique, especially considering the continuing potential for political violence. As the main opposition party to the FRELIMO government, one of RENAMO’s strategies to maximise political leverage is to take up arms and disrupt economic activities in the country. In 2013–14, a small band of armed RENAMO fighters used this tactic, disrupting the country’s main north–south transport route. With minimal men and arms, RENAMO cut off essential economic activity, in the process damaging tourism revenues and investor confidence. The violence eventually drove FRELIMO to the negotiating table, where RENAMO extracted concessions in peace negotiations in September 2014.

Not only does the threat of violence endanger economic development, but economic inequality also perpetuates conditions that have the potential to spark off renewed violence. The perception among the population that wealth is available to only a few and is conditional on loyalty to the governing party comes with risks to peace in the country. Those who feel that they have been left out of the country’s rising economic fortunes account for some of the surge in electoral support that RENAMO and other political parties have achieved in recent elections (see Table 2). RENAMO’s rhetoric of fighting for the economically disenfranchised has brought them additional support, and Mozambicans who are not benefiting economically have little to lose by supporting RENAMO’s disruption.

**Table 2: Number of seats won in Mozambique’s legislative elections, 1994–2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>RENAMO</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Planning for economic and social development cannot be separated from planning for peace. This connection between peace and development is well understood by government actors and external partners helping to shape policy in Mozambique and has been acknowledged to varying degrees in the strategic frameworks that have emerged to guide the country’s development.
Merging parallel development strategies to increase local ownership

The government identified poverty reduction as a priority in the early days of post-conflict planning, and launched two minimally effective poverty reduction plans in 1995 and 1999. A benchmark in strategic development planning came with the first Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty – PARPA I (2001–05), also referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. PARPA I, PARPA II (2006–10), and PARPA III (2011–14) were the primary documents that donors used to align their efforts with macro-level national strategy. Throughout the PARPAs, peace and political stability are explicitly acknowledged as necessary foundations for social and economic development.

The PARPA strategies were produced in consultation between the government and international development partners to support the country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies for growth and poverty reduction. However, the lack of local ownership of these documents in the eyes of local actors has undermined their usefulness. The PARPA plans were never subject to legislative approval and as a result some have viewed them as lacking broad legitimacy. This is particularly because the government also produced a parallel set of strategy documents, the five-year plans (PQGs), which were voted on in the legislature.

The government identified poverty reduction as a priority in the early days of post-conflict planning, and launched two minimally effective plans in 1995 and 1999

The PQGs have laid out the government’s priorities and vision since 1995. Every year, the government produces a social and economic plan to guide the implementation of the PQGs. Although the PQGs have always contained references to national unity and peace, the 2010–14 and 2015–19 plans placed more emphasis on these priorities. The renewed emphasis on peace in the rhetoric of the 2010 document coincided with increased pressure from demobilised combatants in the mid-to-late 2000s, and the flare-up of violence in 2013–14 directly pre-dated the current administration’s most recent PQG. This suggests that the planning process behind these documents was taking into account concurrent political events that were relevant to conflict dynamics in the country.

While the legislature approves the PQGs, giving them a greater degree of local legitimacy, external actors and commentators have criticised the various iterations of these documents for lacking guidelines and targets for implementation. But the PQGs have evolved over the past two decades to include more strategic planning, as well as indicators and targets. During this evolution, the PARPA plans were used to fill strategic gaps by providing more specifics for implementation that were still broadly in line with the priorities defined in the PQGs. In this sense, government PQGs and the PARPA plans worked in tandem, though the externally-driven PARPAs were always intended to eventually give way to the government PQGs.

The plan to merge these parallel strategic tracks into a single framework is moving forward under the full auspices of the government. After the expiration of the PARPA III in 2014, the government did not draft a new action plan. Instead, it is developing a strategy matrix in a similar fashion to the one included in PARPA III. This matrix will be attached to the PQGs for 2015-19, though it is unclear if the matrix will be subject
to legislative scrutiny.\textsuperscript{29} If this matrix can provide the guidance necessary to coordinate efforts, this single framework will serve as the coordinating mechanism for government and donor strategy.\textsuperscript{30}


The action plans, along with the PQGs and their various tools of implementation are the documents to which strategic actions on development are most clearly linked. However, two more documents, Agenda 2025 and the National Development Plan (2015–2035) (ENDE) – are intended to be more visionary in their approaches to reducing poverty, and developing a peaceful and stable society conducive to economic development.

Agenda 2025, which was published in 2003, was drafted through a participatory process meant to produce a document that articulated a vision to guide the future of national development in Mozambique. It was written with the involvement of local communities across the country, civil-society organisations, technical experts, and politicians from the government and opposition. In bringing together a wide array of stakeholders, the participatory drafting process of Agenda 2025 was in some ways a peacebuilding project in itself, involving participants in a collaborative effort and showing that compromise among groups with divergent political views was possible.\textsuperscript{31}

The melding of long-term vision with short-term objectives is absent from Mozambican development plans

The document, however, provided little strategic guidance on how to achieve the goals it identified. The consensus-building process that brought about Agenda 2025 resulted in a broad set of development objectives that were vague and aspirational enough to be unobjectionable to any party. After a drafting process lasting several years, the document received little attention on publication and was not widely distributed. Despite hopes that the document would serve as a guiding vision for the parties that were involved in its creation, Agenda 2025 has not been referred to with great frequency by the government, opposition, civil society or the media.\textsuperscript{32}

Similarly, when ENDE was finalised in 2014 it was meant to lay out a national vision for economic and social development, but it resulted in an aspirational document that does not outline a clear strategy to achieve its stated vision.\textsuperscript{33} The document stresses industrialisation plans for the country, in particular stemming from growth of the extractive sector. The Ministry of Planning and Development oversaw the plan’s creation, the same ministry that oversaw the drafting of the PQGs.

The melding of long-term vision with short-term strategic objectives remains absent from Mozambican development plans. Political constraints make achieving consensus on specific interventions challenging, but balancing these constraints with a locally owned strategy is key to effective planning.

Although these plans lack specific details on implementation, they clearly acknowledge the potential for conflict to re-emerge in Mozambique. Agenda 2025 states that ‘the possibility of conflicts, including armed conflicts, is always a threat to human capital and peace. Mozambique is not immune to this possibility.’ The document then goes on to list threats including ‘the ever-growing gap between rich and poor,’ ‘systemic corruption,’ and ‘partisan struggle and disputes for power.’\textsuperscript{34} Acknowledging the threat of conflict re-emerging indicates a clear understanding on the part of the creators of this document that development and peacebuilding considerations go hand in hand.

A shifting donor landscape

Member states from the G19 group of countries\textsuperscript{35} have been providing aid to Mozambique for over 40 years, though the nature of their involvement has shifted over time. General budget support through development aid for the government has been a key method of engagement. This direct support for the national budget comes on condition of regular consultative dialogue between donors and the government regarding allocation of resources. The annual review that occurs through this dialogue is one of the key monitoring mechanisms for implementing the priorities laid out in the strategy documents.\textsuperscript{36} That the budgetary support is contingent on this continued dialogue adds an additional level of transparency and accountability.

The landscape for international aid and investment in Mozambique is, however, changing. The arrival of investments from emerging countries – such as China, India, Brazil, Vietnam and Gulf countries – and the gradual reduction in support from historic donor countries has changed the equation for development funding. The government now has other sources of financing from external partners and the prospect of future resources, freeing them from a unilateral dependency on long-standing sources of aid.

The role of new sources of capital from emerging partners is expanding in the country.\textsuperscript{37} Their investments are rooted in
business interests independent of conditionality and transactions are often minimally transparent. Unlike long-standing donors, emerging partners do not provide direct budget support to the government, often providing a difficult point of comparison. Instead, the influx of money from this source comes in the form of loans and the arrival of foreign state-owned enterprises doing business in the country.

The nature of the financial engagements of emerging countries is in this way quite different from the engagement of historical donors, as are their relations with the government. Emerging investors do not engage in forums for donor-government relations, preferring instead to act bilaterally, and there is no forum or structure under which emerging funders coordinate priorities related to development. The government wishes to improve aid architecture, but at present there is no clear or unifying strategy for engaging with new investors.38

Emerging investors do not engage in forums for donor-government relations, preferring instead to act bilaterally

The implications of this shift in sources of external financing have the potential to significantly affect country’s path towards inclusive economic growth and thereby address the root causes of violence. A priority of the G19 and other long-standing donors is to boost the government’s capacity to self-monitor by putting in place institutions and frameworks that aid fiscal transparency. These institutions have proved sufficiently strong to bring to light corrupt practices that may otherwise have remained undetected.39 In anticipation of the influx of natural resource revenues, the G19’s priority of helping to create strong public finance management systems including taxation, budgeting, public investment, and fiscal risk management take on new importance. As the government moves away from historical funders towards open-market sources of revenue, external incentives to maintain and enhance the degree of transparency that long-standing donors advocate decreases. Recent corruption scandals show the continued potential for mismanagement of resources by high-level officials, and the potential to destabilise the country by fuelling discontent that incentivises RENAMO to take up arms.

Decentralisation

Decentralisation is a priority that the government has explicitly recognised in all iterations of the PARPAs and PQGs. It is also an important consideration in planning for peace. More specifically, decentralisation is linked to the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of political inclusiveness, economic foundations, and revenues and services.

Mozambique has a deeply embedded history of centralised administration, with planning and decision-making authority largely residing in the capital Maputo. However, the transfer of certain aspects of authority to local and provincial governments through a plan of decentralisation is viewed by development and peacebuilding practitioners as an important step towards decreasing economic inequality, improving and creating conditions for a more just and stable society. Successful decentralisation allows more voices to be involved in political decision making and gives individuals greater access
to local mechanisms of justice. Giving citizens greater decision-making powers has the potential to increase the likelihood that conflicts can be resolved through institutional means rather than violence.

Some degree of decentralisation has taken place in Mozambique. This has resulted in a parallel system of governance that empowers elected local municipal authorities. However, most decision-making powers remain with the central government or provincial governors and district administrators whom the central government appoints. The jurisdiction of elected municipal bodies and district governments often overlap, causing inefficiencies that result from competition for financial resources and political authority. The capacity of municipal governments has improved over time, but budget decisions are still highly centralised, which hinders the capacity of local governments to provide services or support local development.

**Who is driving priorities?**

After years of preliminary discussions, plans for decentralisation gained steam in the mid-1990s. Donors that were looking to work in local and rural areas realised there were no local development plans in which to situate their projects, nor any strategic thinking or objectives related to local development. UNDP and UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) rolled out the first pilot decentralisation programme in the northern province of Nampula in 1998. The programme was designed to enhance provincial and district administration and planning capacity, including the identification of domestic priorities, which could be funded with UNCDF support. Despite initial scepticism from the government, it approved the experiment in Nampula. The programme was then gradually scaled up to other provinces beginning in 2003. This incremental roll-out of decentralised planning programmes was necessary due to resource constraints that prohibited a more wide-reaching effort; but it also indicated the government’s preference for a ‘wait and see’ approach that matched its reluctance to clearly define a decentralisation roadmap. Nonetheless, the scaling-up of the programme happened relatively quickly, and the UN and the government deemed the gradual implementation sufficiently successful to warrant its continuation.

International donors’ desire for the government to define long-term objectives, however, has continued in talks over decentralisation. International partners view strategic planning by the government as essential to achieving the degree of local ownership that would make decentralisation efforts sustainable. Therefore, donors have used key moments in the decentralisation process to urge the government to define long-term objectives. Progress towards defining strategic goals has been slow, at least in part because the government has been reluctant to be held accountable to its own objectives.

International actors have driven implementation and strategic planning around decentralisation, but the government has also been an active, if cautious, participant in the process. The government unveiled a National Policy and Strategy for Decentralisation (PEND) in 2010, with a final version released in 2012. While international actors had long desired this strategic document, the final result was still quite broad, showing that although the government was generally willing to move ahead with decentralisation, it was also hesitant to lay out specific objectives. The document lacked policy objectives, resembling instead a local government capacity-building programme. Additionally, a 2012 evaluation of UNDP’s decentralisation and local development programme in Mozambique concluded that there had been little participation of civil-society organisations in implementing decentralisation priorities. The review noted that organisations lacked the capacity to function as effective partners or watchdogs over implementation. Strategic engagement on the part of UNDP with these actors had also been minimal.43

Donors looking to work in rural areas realised there were no domestic development plans for their projects. The private sector has also not been linked into the decentralisation process, because its engagement with the government is largely limited to the capital. This presents a potential challenge as investment in extractive industries increases; while natural resources are physically located in the provinces, citizens who live in those provinces have little say in how investment in their communities will be handled. Instead, the preferred method of engagement by the government and private businesses remains at the level of central government. Natural resource revenues are closely linked to the debate on decentralisation. Decentralisation matters because it has a direct impact on who will have the authority to direct resource revenues. Moving budgetary autonomy to the provinces would mean that provincial governments could reap direct benefits from the extractive companies operating in their territory, and potentially use these funds for local development. The use of local budgets for the benefit of local development is also
contingent on the development of norms and institutions at the local level because funds could be mismanaged, particularly if local capacity is underdeveloped.

Regardless of this, budgetary autonomy and local capacity would need to be bolstered for provincial actors to join conversations that at present are conducted exclusively between extractive companies and central government. Donors have identified building this capacity as a priority, but movement in this direction by the government has not been forthcoming.46

Decentralisation as a marker of political inclusivity

At its core, decentralisation is about political inclusivity. Although Mozambique’s macro-level strategies for development increasingly acknowledge its importance, inclusivity is still highly politicised. FRELIMO has remained at the helm of the central government since independence, and the party is synonymous with the state in the eyes of many Mozambicans. Decentralisation is a debate over FRELIMO’s willingness to relinquish aspects of control over state affairs. Election results reveal that opposition parties have enough support to win in certain parts of the country; therefore, granting increased authority to local government means including opposition voices in local administration.

RENAMO recognises this and decentralisation was among its central demands to the government in the wake of the 2014 presidential election. Dhlakama, seeing that RENAMO had achieved electoral majorities in several provinces, proposed that RENAMO should have greater autonomy in six northern and central provinces, a goal he has threatened to use force to achieve. The proposal also included Dhlakama’s being able to directly appoint the leadership of the provinces that would be under RENAMO administration. Given the economic and political significance of decentralisation in Mozambique, mismanagement of its application has a strong potential to fuel conflict dynamics in the country; for example, fighting between FRELIMO/government forces and RENAMO guerrillas in Tete province during 2015 and 2016 caused thousands of people to flee to Malawi.47

The political landscape and shifting demands on the part of RENAMO mean that immediate political realities facing the central government have the potential to come into conflict with long-term planning for decentralisation. Providing clear objectives would give the central government less political manoeuvrability in response to a dynamic political situation.

In this respect, the gradual implementation of decentralisation efforts even without clear long-term objectives has been effective in achieving progress. It has given the government the political space to gradually test aspects of decentralisation without tying it to commitments. On the other hand, this approach has allowed the government to move ahead with aspects of decentralisation without being held accountable to specific targets that would increase political inclusiveness.

The Local Initiative Investment Budget (OILL), known more commonly as the Seven Million Fund, is a concrete example of government action that aligns with the goals
of decentralisation on the surface, but in fact undermines meaningful progress towards those goals. The Seven Million Fund, which was established in 2006, was designed as an annual transfer of funds from the central government to each of the country’s 128 districts.

Initially, this fund was thought to be a mechanism that emulated the UNDP/UNCDF methodology of funding locally identified priority infrastructure projects. However, the fund was quickly politicised. With little justification, the administration changed the purpose of the money to support individuals and small businesses, which local governments lacked the capacity to administer effectively. There was no monitoring of the distribution of funds and it was initially unclear whether funds were a grant or a loan to be repaid.

As a result, the money was freely distributed with no oversight, and very little of the money has been paid back. However, the distribution of what was essentially free money earned FRELIMO political points in rural areas where funds were dispersed. Furthermore, and most damaging to the cause of decentralisation, the distribution of funds occurred through district-level consultative councils, which were created as part of the decentralisation process to facilitate community participation in local government. Previously, a seat on a consultative council accorded minimal personal benefit and was a space for civic involvement. After they became a forum for distributing money from the Seven Million Fund, council seats could be used for personal gain. Given that funds were believed to be available primarily to FRELIMO supporters, they came to dominate the consultative councils, which undermined their purpose as an inclusive space for local voices.

Decentralisation has the potential to pluralise political voices in Mozambique and in doing so reduce the impetus for renewed political violence. However, at present the process remains a winner-take-all system in which the central government, headed by FRELIMO, retains the power to appoint district governors and control budget allocations to local governments. Decentralisation has the potential to change this situation, but should power in the provinces become a prize over which party leaders in FRELIMO and RENAMO continue to battle, then the inclusivity and development gains of decentralisation are at risk.

Justice

Justice encompasses a multitude of issues essential to building sustainable peace. Seen as a critical peacebuilding goal, and with explicit links to the country’s various national development plans, justice is integral to supporting resilience in Mozambique. While macro-level plans for the justice sector exist, their ability to tackle challenges linked to instability remains unproven.

After the signing of the GPA, the government granted a blanket amnesty for crimes committed between 1979 and 1992. This amnesty was seen as politically expedient, and did not define any formal system of reconciliation or restorative justice for the population. While reconciliatory justice mechanisms were eventually developed out of traditional practices to reintegrate former combatants back into society, this occurred at community level and without direction from macro-level planning.

Before 2001, coordination on strategic planning among different institutions in the justice sector was minimal, which resulted in a lack of clear policy. The Coordinating Council for Legality and Justice (CCLJ) was created in 2001–02 and formalised by presidential decree in 2005 to be a coordinating body responsible for strategic planning in the justice sector. It included the participation of the Supreme Court, Administrative Court, Office of the Prosecutor-General and Ministry of Justice, and after 2005 the Ministry of Interior. The CCLJ was ruled unconstitutional by the country’s Constitutional Council on separation of powers grounds and disbanded in 2007. In its relatively brief existence, the CCLJ’s impact on planning coordination was minimal.

Decentralisation has the potential to pluralise political voices in Mozambique and reduce the impetus for renewed political violence.

After the CCLJ was disbanded, a new body was created to fulfil the same purpose, the Directorate for Administration of Justice (DNAJ). It has a similar mandate to that of the CCLJ and has had similar difficulty in facilitating coordination.

In practice, the DNAJ has been more of a bottleneck than a coordinating mechanism, which has caused difficulties for inter-institutional and donor-intuitional coordination in the justice sector.

The creation of the CCLJ in 2001 corresponded with the drafting of the first Joint Integrated Justice Sector Strategy (PEI), which governed the years 2002–06. The Ministry of Justice was the figurehead institution in the drafting of this document, though it was created with the participation of a broad spectrum of justice institutions. The process was also conducted with the assistance of international donors, in particular the Danish international development agency, Danida. An assessment by AfriMap, an Open Society Foundations initiative for governance monitoring and advocacy in Africa, found that while the first PEI was a step forward for sectoral planning, its strategic foresight was minimal and a lack of follow-through on the plan suggested limited commitment to joint planning in the sector.
The second iteration of the PEI covered the years 2009–14, representing a two-year gap between PEI I and PEI II. The success of PEI II in coordinating intended priorities and strategy in the justice sector has been minimal and the document has not received universal buy-in from all of the institutions it is intended to include.57

Despite PEI II’s term having expired in 2014, the government has given no indication that the drafting of a third iteration has begun,58 but it is anticipated at some point.59 The gaps in time between plans indicate that strategic decisions and budget priorities in the many institutions of the justice sector are not contingent on a direct link to the PEI. Instead, individual institutions have their own strategic plans and budget priorities. Coordination among institutions happens on an ad hoc basis and is highly dependent on personal relationships between individuals at the various institutions. Given the lack of unified budget priorities, the definition of which was an intended but unrealised objective of the DNAJ, there is competition for resources among different judicial institutions.60

Donor impact on justice planning

Strengthening the justice sector has been a key priority for international donors, particularly Danida and UNdP. After its involvement in the initial drafting of the PEI, Danida’s support for the plan’s implementation has remained a key programmatic area. A lack of local ownership over justice-sector reform has, however, potentially undermined the effectiveness of international donors’ involvement. The creation of the CCLJ was a highly donor-driven process, which may have contributed to the confusion around its purpose.61 Although the drafting of the PEI involved local actors, varying levels of commitment to the strategy among judicial institutions has made its implementation less effective than envisioned.62

Impartial and well-functioning justice institutions can strengthen relations between communities and the government, but corruption undermines this process

Priorities outlined in government strategies lead UNDP’s engagement in the justice sector, with a key focus on bringing formal justice to the decentralised level in Mozambique. Community level justice mechanisms are often still the only option available to rural Mozambicans. Building infrastructure for the judiciary at the local level, as well as developing the human capacity of formal justice providers is a priority in the PEI and therefore in donor engagement as well. Non-state, community level justice providers are acknowledged as important and appropriate in certain contexts, such as family or civil law. However, the hope is that bringing more people into contact with formal justice mechanisms will reduce alternatives that violate human rights.63

A 2010 case study by the collaborative learning NGO CDA provides interesting insight into a missed opportunity for peacebuilding to play a larger role in justice-sector reform in Mozambique.64 Their evaluation of UN engagement in Mozambique concluded that there was “little evidence that current programming includes contemporary peacebuilding, conflict resolution or conflict-sensitive development methodologies, beyond the typical peace-related rhetoric.”65 The evaluation went on to say that the UN’s focus on structural change left out methodologies that could incorporate peacebuilding mechanisms into the reform process. With specific reference to judicial reform, the report noted that UNDP’s justice programme did not coordinate with – and
was not even aware of – work that peacebuilding NGOs were doing to enhance local-level conflict resolution and mediation capacities.

For example, JustaPaz’s work to enhance police officers’ capacity as mediators of first recourse in areas where access to formal justice institutions was scarce enjoyed strong national ownership. However, UNDP was largely unaware of JustaPaz’s work, despite their related efforts to strengthen police capacity. The CDA report concluded that ‘lack of dialogue suggests there is no common vision of what justice reform should entail in the case of Mozambique and that a lack of coordination between the UN and peacebuilding NGOs has undermined the impact of judicial reform on peace consolidation.

The CDA’s critique of the UN’s engagement with peacebuilding NGOs is not to suggest that coordination with civil society on justice-sector planning does not happen. Civil-society participation is particularly high with regards to the inclusion of human rights in justice-sector planning. In particular, civil-society organisations were called on to work with government institutions and private business interests to develop a baseline study on Mozambican applications for the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The study was completed and presented to stakeholders in 2014, though the intended action plan for the implementation of the Guiding Principles has not yet emerged.

In general, human rights are gaining representation in Mozambique’s judicial intuitions. This is evidenced by the establishment of a Human Rights Commission in 2012 under the umbrella of the Ministry of Justice, in collaboration with civil society. The work of the commission is at least nominally tied to the priorities outlined in the PEI and PQGs. The initiative to increase the focus on human rights came from the government, with donor organisations providing technical support. Attempts to formulate a national plan for human rights are under way, though the change in administration at the end of 2014 essentially reset the process; a national plan originally intended to cover the years 2010–16 was scrapped in 2014 after it was unable to obtain the necessary input from the wide range of judicial institutions it had attempted to include in the drafting process. Plans to build on this experience to develop a new plan in line with the timeline of the government’s 2015–19 PQG are being discussed.

The importance of justice for peace

Plans that support ordinary Mozambicans’ access to justice institutions serve to strengthen less tangible peacebuilding ideals such as human rights and democracy. Impartial and well-functioning justice institutions can strengthen relations between communities and the government. However, corruption systematically undermines this process. In its approach to justice-sector reform, the state’s willingness and ability to tackle corruption lags behind its commitment to reform on other issues, such as human rights. The widespread perception of institutional corruption undermines the credibility of government efforts to strengthen justice mechanisms and fuels conflict dynamics. This occurs through the perpetuation of the belief that a politically connected elite is benefiting at the expense of the population as a whole.

For many Mozambicans, government corruption epitomises the rising inequalities in the country

Although Mozambique has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, neither convention has been implemented. The passage of an Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2006 aimed to present a comprehensive and cross-sectoral plan to combat corruption, but its success has been difficult to evaluate. Additionally, the Central Office for Combating Corruption has a mandate to investigate complaints of corruption; however, investigations and prosecutions have been limited. This is attributed to insufficient staff, underfunding and a lack of independence. The development of a comprehensive plan to tackle corruption in Mozambique is vital to the country’s peacebuilding efforts. For many Mozambicans, government corruption epitomises the rising inequalities in the country, which fuel dissatisfaction and the potential for renewed political violence.

Additionally, extractive projects are and will continue to have a negative impact on local communities. As international investment grows, Mozambique’s stability will also rely on the government’s ability to provide adequate justice mechanisms to the areas affected by extractive projects. Justice-sector planning that addresses the impact of extractive industries on the communities where they operate would be one step towards ensuring that affected populations have adequate institutional recourse.

Widespread access to effective justice mechanisms is essential to fostering a society-wide mentality that conflict can be resolved through institutional means instead of through violence, and also that the state can be a fair broker in adjudicating the concerns and demands of all sectors of society. Given the importance of justice for the consolidation of peace, these two ideas are not clearly linked at a strategic level. Recognition that justice-sector reforms are intimately
related to peacebuilding could reinforce the understanding that anti-corruption, human rights, and access to justice initiatives are imperative for Mozambique’s stability.

**Natural resources investment**

Anticipated natural resource extraction, notably of natural gas, is a significant factor in the future of Mozambique’s development and consolidation of peace. As a peacebuilding opportunity the management of revenues and investment is strongly linked to goals related to inclusive politics, economic foundations, and revenues and services. The administration of project development and the responsible and transparent use of economic gains from natural resource extraction are significant for fostering social and political resilience in the country. Conflict-sensitive investor behaviour and responsible management of finances could significantly contribute to a more stable and prosperous future for Mozambique.

**Expectations of Mozambique’s natural gas economy**

In 2010 and 2011, oil and gas exploration companies Anadarko and Eni discovered some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves off the Mozambican coast. According to the IMF, revenues from these discoveries are not expected until 2020, though the prospective gains have already caused a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) from global companies, attracting approximately US$4.9 billion in 2014. More specifically, the investment in liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure is also in the billions.

Natural gas revenues are expected to dramatically change the nature of Mozambique’s finances, and how these investments and revenues are handled will have a direct impact on levels of political and social stability and resilience in the country. At the same time as the natural gas discoveries, companies were investing heavily in extracting Mozambique’s massive coal reserves. But this industry has since collapsed in the face of falling commodity prices, inflated expectations and an infrastructure deficit. Mining companies have pulled out their investments, with negative consequences for the government’s economic plans. Mozambique’s experience with expectations of coal revenue should serve as a lesson on the need for long-term planning that benefits the population and supports diversification of the economy.

The handling of natural resource investments and revenues also has the potential to escalate continuing animosity between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The natural gas discoveries have raised the stakes of political power in Mozambique, and with it the intensity of competition between the rival factions for a share in the spoils. Where FRELIMO seeks to place its own members at the head of national resource companies, RENAMO is calling for equal distribution of these positions. This tension is exacerbated by corruption claims that reach the highest levels of government and serve to perpetuate pre-1992 RENAMO conflict narratives of FRELIMO’s exploitative and corrupt behaviour. Handling of community displacement resulting from these mega-projects will also affect the level of instability stemming from investment. Protest
and project sabotage could disrupt business, discourage investment and increase political tensions between the communities and the government.\textsuperscript{80} Notably, in November 2015, rioters attacked a Canadian owned mine causing millions of dollars in damage.\textsuperscript{81}

Since the GPA, Mozambicans’ expectations of their government have grown. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the economy was in complete collapse, yet there were no civil demonstrations or protests against the prevailing conditions.\textsuperscript{82} However, in 2008 and 2010 small price increases for basic goods such as bread caused intense public demonstrations; people burned cars and destroyed other symbols of increasing wealth from which they were not benefiting.\textsuperscript{83} Today, a greater number of Mozambicans expect the government to act in their interest and deliver benefits from the wealth that is expected from their country’s natural resources.\textsuperscript{84}

Stakeholders have repeatedly pointed to poverty as the largest cause of potential instability in the country. Mozambique is one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies, with continued real GDP growth of between 7\% and 8\% between 2016 and 2019.\textsuperscript{85} But this growth has not translated into day-to-day improvements in living standards for the population. Mining and gas projects generally do not generate significant employment opportunities for ordinary people. This means that increased opportunity is reliant on these massive investments spurring growth in other areas of the value chain, where employment is more likely for ordinary Mozambicans.\textsuperscript{86} Consequently, if revenues are not managed in a way that supports people’s increased employment and living standards, the perpetuation of inequality has the potential to lead to social instability.\textsuperscript{87}

**Mining and gas projects generally do not generate significant employment opportunities for ordinary people**

Mozambique’s social and political stability are vital for its continued growth. While investors are drawn by the potential for massive LNG profits, the country has seen the negative economic impact of even isolated instability on FDI and tourism revenues. In 2013–14 tourism plummeted with the outbreak of violence between RENAMO and government forces along main transit routes.\textsuperscript{88}

General instability has also contributed to coal-mining companies such as Rio Tinto pulling significant investments.\textsuperscript{89} Overall, instability sours the business environment, and with it the potential for growth and the further consolidation of peace that increasing economic prosperity could bring. It is therefore in the best interests of all parties to understand the sources of instability and work to address them productively. While good governance is an important aspect of this, as a UN high-level panel report noted in 2013, private companies are also significant development actors and should recognise the impact that their investment behaviour will have on peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{90}

Although macro-level development plans acknowledge the importance of the natural resource sector for Mozambique’s peace and economic growth, concerns remain about private investors’ capacity and willingness to engage in conflict-sensitive practices.

**Natural resource investment plans: the 2014 Gas Master Plan**

Planning for peace should include how Mozambique’s new gas wealth will be managed. While responsible use of increased investment in natural recourses also features in the PQGs, PARPAs and ENDE, the 2014 Gas Master Plan appears to be the most direct and comprehensive strategy for the handling of Mozambique’s LNG development. To be implemented under the purview of the Ministry of Mineral Resources, the Gas Master Plan presents a comprehensive outline for how sustainable investment in the LNG sector in Mozambique should take place, as well as what should be considered priorities for revenue use.

The plan specifically notes the significance of LNG development in creating employment and fighting poverty. It points to the opportunity to develop small and medium-sized enterprises and social opportunity, particularly in the provinces where investment projects are located. The plan also highlights the need to mitigate negative environmental and social impacts, including recognition of the need for responsible interaction between project development and local populations, notably in relation to resettlement. In these ways, the Gas Master Plan directly addresses the connection between gas development and national unity, peace and stability.

While the open discussion of the risks and challenges associated with resource industry investment in Mozambique is laudable, the ability to translate these ideas into action is still unfolding. Although plans acknowledge the social and political imperative of inclusive growth, they do not define a clear strategy to achieve this aim, nor do they outline a clear role for private-sector investors. At present conflict-sensitive engagement by private-sector actors remains ill defined in planning and strategy documents. Given that private companies are becoming increasingly important development actors, their thoughtful inclusion in macro-level peacebuilding plans becomes essential.
Mozambique’s looming debt crisis

The importance of translating the intentions of the Gas Master Plan into responsible action is even more imperative given the current state of national debt. Mozambique is one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most indebted countries, with public debt rising sharply since 2012 and projected to increase to above 60% of GDP. As a result of the mismanagement of loans that were arranged based on expected returns from coal and gas revenues, Mozambique may attempt to renegotiate its loans to reflect a longer timeline for expected LNG profits. As the IMF has noted, the potential gas profits will not affect short-term revenues, but could significantly improve debt stability in the longer-term in 30-40 years’ time.

A stable investment environment is important when considering Mozambique’s competition for liquefied natural gas markets on the continent

As Mozambique faces pressure to balance its books, the risk of agreeing to short-sighted investment terms that fail to take into account social and political implications may increase. Even as historic donors lend capacity support to public finance management, the reality is that developments in the business sector are closely linked with the political situation. Given that gas production is projected to contribute 20% of GDP by 2023, the country’s debt repayment strategy may be closely linked to its ability to get the gas to market in the time projected. Hence, a stable investment environment is even more important when considering Mozambique’s competition for LNG markets on the continent. As Tanzania’s gas reserves come online, and with new natural gas discoveries in Egypt, Mozambique cannot afford to dissuade investor confidence. However, as previously noted, resilience and stability is intrinsically linked to development.

With five years to go before significant gas revenues are expected, Mozambique’s potential remains untested. The country’s hopes for prosperity are linked to the hopes that President Nyusi’s promises of political inclusiveness and renewed stability will materialise in a way that enables the country to capitalise on investments. The Gas Master Plan identifies high-level priorities for the development of natural resource investment, but the ability to implement these plans and align private-sector engagement with the priorities they contain is in question. The handling of these deals and revenues will have serious implications for the country’s stability and FRELIMO’s electability. Concerns that the country will slide back into full-scale civil war are minimal, but the potential for targeted violence by RENAMO’s remaining armed supporters and government forces makes it imperative to address the potential for resource revenues to cause conflict.

**Key findings**

The above sections provide a comprehensive overview of different strategic planning processes that have developed in Mozambique over the past two decades. From these experiences, several findings can be drawn, and while specific to Mozambique, they may provide lessons for other actors in identifying effective responses for long-term challenges elsewhere. The following sections will further define these findings.
1. Time matters!

Some of the case studies above show that slow development in certain areas presented both a challenge and a benefit to sustaining peace. Acknowledging the time necessary to implement plans and responses allowed Mozambique to develop its own capacities in certain areas and acquire the necessary political buy-in and understanding from actors at different levels.

The decentralisation process is an important instance where additional time supported implementation. The processes slow pace has meant that, despite the strong push from international actors for Mozambique to implement further decentralisation and the government not achieved all of the expected outcomes, Mozambican actors have increasingly accepted the process and dealt with their political sensitivities. This process is ongoing.

Setbacks in peace consolidation, such as the political violence in 2013-14 and 2016, are often viewed as unequivocal failures of political actors and Mozambican society itself. In Mozambique, setbacks have offered space for the reconfiguring of political positions, understanding of process needs, and the fostering of increased buy-in from different actors. The value of setbacks should, however, be tempered by a reflection on how neglect of critical peacebuilding processes, such as the lack of comprehensive and consistent government support for DDR, can result in instability.

Civil-society groups built capacity, developed relations with international partners and gained legitimacy in the eyes of the population and the government

Time may also reveal alternative opportunities and initiatives from emerging actors; while delayed or absent planning can hinder the pursuit of stability and peace, it can also create opportunities for organic and locally owned solutions. For example, although Mozambique’s DDR process suffered from the lack of continuous strategic direction from a central authority, and weapons were likely not to have been collected as a result, the absence of central leadership made it necessary for civil society to step into the role of leading these efforts. In doing so, civil-society groups built capacity, developed relations with international partners and gained legitimacy and influence in the eyes of the population and the government.

The DDR process also shows the far-reaching time frame necessary to address any single area of peacebuilding. Despite work from civil society groups, the government has sought to implement more formal DDR efforts almost two decades after the completion of the ONUMOZ mission. This was because tension linked to incomplete DDR resurfaced, long after stakeholders believed the need for formal planning had passed. The current strength of Mozambique’s civil society comes at least in part from how it filled the space left by the UN and government DDR process.

2. Peacebuilding efforts in Mozambique occurred by design and by chance, independent of a larger strategic plan.

In Mozambique, peacebuilding occurred through both the deliberate and the indirect interlinking of several frameworks that aimed to address different challenges. Overall,
the analysis of specific plans shows that, while they were not part of one broad peacebuilding plan, their connections supported wider peacebuilding goals.

The planning examples highlighted in this report, notably DDR, social and economic development, decentralisation, and natural resource investment, were formulated to address specific demands in the country. However, their scope and impact were often far broader than the original areas for which they were developed. For instance, the DDR process has had a direct impact not only in terms of security, but can also be linked to wider developmental goals.

Mozambique would have benefited from stronger coherence among its different peacebuilding processes and priorities

Despite progress occurring without an overarching peacebuilding plan, Mozambique would still have benefited from stronger coherence among its different peacebuilding processes and priorities. It would also have benefited from plans that were less vague in their formulation. The PQGs, PARPAs, Agenda 2025 and ENDE may be seen as the broadest links between the strategic plans and peace in Mozambique. While efforts by the government show an intention to use these platforms to streamline Mozambique’s overall prioritisation of peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, opportunities remain to ensure that the required support is provided for sustained peace.

3. Peacebuilding plans have become more comprehensive and the planning capacity of the government has increased.

The government’s capacity to draft strategic plans across a wide range of sectors has increased over the past two decades. In the case of development plans, the intention for the nationally owned PQGs to replace the donor-driven PARPAs is moving forward as intended. The Gas Master Plan, various decentralisation plans, Agenda 2025, and ENDE all show that commitment to creative planning exists across sectors in Mozambique.

Many of these plans explicitly acknowledge the link between their priorities and a more stable and peaceful society. In the case of the PARPAs and PQGs, each new iteration has made the link between peace and development increasingly explicit. This recognition has increased in more recent plans and shows a movement towards the incorporation of peacebuilding priorities across sectors.

A notable exception to this increasing planning capacity is the case of the justice sector. Although PEI I and II were attempts to draft a strategic plan that governed the entire sector, their failure to gain buy-in from key justice institutions and a lack of local ownership has kept the plans from providing the strategic and sectoral guidance intended. Planning has instead been more piecemeal, and, at least in part, contributed to bottlenecks and competition for resources among judicial institutions. While initiatives on human rights, judicial system reform, and corruption have moved ahead, an accepted narrative that these initiatives are integral parts of peace consolidation in Mozambique is less apparent.

Planning in the justice sector shows how failing to connect specific development plans to larger conversations around peacebuilding may be a missed opportunity.
For example, the UN’s failure to connect its efforts on justice reform with other peacebuilding efforts, such as those of civil-society actor JustaPaz, which was already working in the justice arena, limited effectiveness. Justice-sector reform is a key component of peacebuilding, and considering compoundable efforts and tying justice to broader peacebuilding conversations is crucial.

4. Strategies for implementation and mechanisms for monitoring and accountability have yet to be fully developed.

Despite the increase in planning capacity in several sectors, effective implementation of plans and monitoring of their progress has not yet been achieved. Most plans identified in this paper have suffered from gaps in relation to monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Stakeholders familiar with Mozambique’s government plans said that this is a key area in which increased attention and capacity are needed.

A central concern in the phasing out of the PARPA in favour of the nationally owned PQGs is ensuring that future approaches have adequate detail and metrics to aid implementation. Donors like the G19 have a stated goal of consciously increasing monitoring and evaluation capacity. The current system, in which the most comprehensive monitoring and evaluation comes from the donor oversight associated with general budgetary support, is not viewed as sustainable.

In the case of Agenda 2025 and ENDE, as specifics for implementations were not included, these documents have become more macro-level visionary guides at the expense of practical applicability. Despite limiting these documents’ relevance, this trade-off was key to reaching broad political consensus. Planning documents, because they may outline aspirational visions for a more prosperous future, are easier to agree on than documents that include specifics on implementation, which often require measurable commitments to which parties can then be held accountable.

The UN’s failure to connect its efforts on justice reform with other peacebuilding efforts has limited their effectiveness

This is not to suggest that gaps in implementation and monitoring and evaluation are solely or even primarily due to a lack of political will. Technical capacity in these areas is still developing, and there has been a concerted effort on the part of various Mozambican ministries to dedicate resources to developing these abilities. The Ministry of Economy and Finance, for example, has its own national directorate of monitoring and evaluation, but its capacity is still developing and will need to continue to do so in order to ensure the accountability necessary for plans to be fully realised.

5. Although long-term strategic planning has increased, the government’s ability to look beyond short-term political gains in favour of priorities that promote long-term stability remains unclear.

The temptation of immediate political gains can undermine long-term peacebuilding. It is necessary to emphasise the role that anti-corruption efforts and political inclusion play in reinforcing peace and stability. Prioritisation becomes a critical element in
Mozambique’s peacebuilding process. While many of the above-discussed plans have provided an important long-term opportunity for Mozambique, short-term priorities have often challenged long-term achievements.

The FPNR is one example of this short-term/long-term dichotomy. The Peace Fund was designed in reaction to the violence in 2013–14. If well planned and administered, it may have the capacity to yield long-term results. The danger is, as in the case of the Seven Million Fund, that the fund could be hijacked for short-term political gain.

Although the Seven Million Fund was originally conceived as a long-term strategy to bolster decentralisation efforts for the sake of economic development and increased local decision making, the administration shifted the original funding away from locally identified priority projects and instead distributed the money for political gain with little oversight. By not fully supporting the original long-term objective, the government undermined the strategic peacebuilding potential the programme could have had.

More than two decades of peacebuilding have shown that there is no clear-cut way to ensure the sustainability of peace in Mozambique.

Looking ahead, Mozambique’s mismanaged debt has placed it in a precarious position. The government must balance the need to capitalise on LNG reserves for fiscal stability, and the importance of ensuring that extraction companies operate responsibly with broad economic gains that improve socioeconomic conditions for the population. With this in mind, the government and companies’ ability to follow on principles articulated in the Gas Master Plan, and recognise the risks of focusing on short-term gains may dictate the likelihood for political violence in the country.

6. External actors have had an important role in pushing priorities and influencing agenda setting, but they have slowly moved away from direct peacebuilding support.

External actors have had an important role in different phases of Mozambique’s peacebuilding process. Their role shows the complex interaction between local and external actors, in a constant push-and-pull process of defining priorities and agendas. In this context, while Mozambique’s peacebuilding responses did involve an increased degree of local ownership, external actors have been important in identifying areas in need of capacity development, such as decentralisation.

On the other hand, external actors have often shifted attention to specific issues. As seen above, certain donors refocused their attention and reduced funding to peacebuilding initiatives. This had an impact not only on the ability of civil-society groups to continue their peacebuilding work, but also on the types of processes that could be externally funded. As the attention of international donors has shifted, the ability for Mozambique to engage in coherent long-term strategies that benefit peacebuilding processes directly has been affected.

As donor countries proliferate beyond the G19 and powerful international corporations enter as major economic actors in Mozambique, the government’s ability to adequately manage peacebuilding priorities will be critical.
7. Civil society has played a flexible and critical role in brokering peacebuilding responses.

Civil society has taken advantage of periods of political openness to make gains that have given it a foothold in national conversations around peace. The development of civil society in Mozambique is essential for continued resilience in the country. The perception of civil society as an impartial broker working on behalf of the population – for example, in the role that religious leaders have played – was and continues to be a great asset for peace talks between RENAMO and the government. Political openness to civil society has been key to peacebuilding.

Those civil-society actors involved in peacebuilding that continued to receive support from international donors did so by shifting their narrative from peace to development as funding and government priorities changed and ‘peacebuilding fatigue’ set in. Donors, the government, and society in general wanted to focus more on building positively for the future (i.e. development) instead of continuing to focus on peace and dwelling on the past. Despite these pressures to change from peacebuilding to development-focused missions, civil society groups have successfully maintained focus on explicitly peace-related processes, such as DDR.

Conclusion

More than two decades of peacebuilding processes in Mozambique have shown that there is no clear-cut way to ensure the sustainability of peace in the country. It has also shown that opportunities and challenges may arise at any time that either support or hinder the country in the process of achieving sustainable peace.

The plans discussed above provide a useful snapshot of the complex exercise of building resilience in a country. These plans did not develop in a linear or comprehensive format, but rather through complex relations, gradual and incremental improvement, and with frequent setbacks. In this context, we can see that while advances have been made in Mozambique, this existing resilience has come in different degrees and different levels. There is still much that is yet to be completed. Therefore, if Mozambique is to continue on its path toward peace, it is critical that gains do not overshadow the need for sustained long-term engagement by all relevant actors.
Notes


5. Ibid.

6. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is a forum to bring together countries affected by conflict and fragility and their international partners to identify, agree and realise more effective ways of supporting transitions out of fragility and building peaceful states. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/internationaldialogueandpartnership.htm


11. Ibid.


13. Interview with civil society organisation, August 2015.

14. Interview with country expert, August 2015.

15. Interview with civil society organisation, August 2015.

16. Interview with religious leader, August 2015.

17. Interview with government actor, August 2015.

18. Interview with civil society organisation, August 2015.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


25. Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.

31. Ibid.


33. Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.

34. Mozambique Agenda 2025: The Nation’s Visions and Strategies, Committee of Counsellors, P. 32

35. G19 includes those countries that provide financial assistance to different national plans in the Mozambican government. It includes a variety of countries, namely Germany, Austria, the African Development Bank, World Bank, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, European Union, Belgium, Spain, United States, Netherlands, Japan and the United Nations are associated members.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Interview with country expert, August 2015.

40. Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.


45. Interview with academia, August 2015.

46. Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.


48. Ibid.

49. Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.


52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Interview with international stakeholder, September 2015.

55. Ibid.


57. Interview with international stakeholder, September 2015.

58. Ibid.

59. Interview with government actor, September 2015.

60. Ibid.

62 Interview with international stakeholder, September 2015.

63 Ibid.


65 Ibid., 25.

66 Interview with international stakeholder, September 2015.

67 Murdock and Zunguza, Ibid.

68 Interview with government actor, September 2015.

69 Interview with international stakeholder, September, 2015.

70 Interview with government actor, September 2015.

71 Interview with international stakeholder, September 2015.


73 Ibid.

74 Interview with international stakeholder, September 2015.


76 Interview with country expert, August 2015.


78 Interview with country expert, September 2015.

79 Ibid.

80 Interview with country expert, August 2015.


83 Interview with civil society organisation, September 2015.

84 Interview with country expert, August 2015.


86 Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.

87 Interview with civil society organisation, August 2015.

88 Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.

89 Interview with country expert, August 2015.


92 Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.


94 Interview with international stakeholder, August 2015.


96 Ibid.
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