South Africa -
Defence Transformation
and New Security
Progress and Prospects

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South Africa — Defence Transformation and 'New Security': Progress and Prospects
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An African National Congress-led (ANC) government will sharply reduce the size of the country’s armed forces to end any threat to other African countries... this will release resources for the development of South Africa.

Aziz Pahad (before becoming Deputy Foreign Minister)

Introduction: Defence Transformation From 1994

Following the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa, the defence establishment initiated a broad programme of defence transformation. This process was motivated by a changed global environment following the end of the Cold War; a new internal situation following democratic elections and the consequent reorientation of government policy priorities; and an altered regional situation. However, although the process of defence transformation has been a central feature of most military forces in response to the new post-Cold War environment, the form it takes has been specific to every country because of different perceptions and circumstances. South Africa’s Defence White Paper, which was completed in 1996, broadly outlined the country’s response to the new security environment, and

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identified long-term goals for transformation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). These were:

- integration and representivity;
- civil control over defence;
- improved international and regional defence co-operation; and
- the provision of a modern, effective, affordable and accountable defence.\(^3\)

At the same time, the White Paper emphasised that ‘the absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat (my emphasis) provides considerable space to rationalise, redesign and “rightsize” the SANDF. The details of this process will be spelt out in the Defence Review.’\(^4\)

Consequently, significant changes in doctrine, force design size and posture were widely expected.

Arguably, the transformation aims should have included not only ‘modern’, ‘effective’, ‘affordable’ and ‘accountable’, but also ‘appropriate’ defence. Thus the issue of appropriate or relevant defence preparation will be added to the list of objectives discussed. This paper seeks to assess the efforts of the Department of Defence (DoD) to achieve the objectives of defence transformation within the ‘new security thinking’ framework which was adopted as South Africa’s guiding security philosophy in the 1996 Defence White Paper. Prospects for the ongoing transformation of the SANDF and possible new defence roles and functions will also be considered.

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‘New Security’ and the Defence White Paper

In terms of Chapter Two of the Defence White Paper, defence transformation in South Africa was to be guided by a broader definition of security which was defined as ‘an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being’. Moreover, it was recognised that ‘the greatest threats to the South African people are socio-economic problems such as poverty, unemployment, poor education, the lack of housing, the absence of adequate social services, as well as the high level of crime and violence’.

The Bill of Rights, enshrined in Chapter Two of the constitution, and section 198 (a) of the constitution, gives priority to human security over the more traditional interpretations of military security.

In adopting a new and broader security concept, South Africa’s defence establishment indicated a commitment to developing a defence policy within the framework of post-Cold War security thinking and moving away from the traditional approach based on external threat. Security thinking in the post-Cold War era has been influenced by numerous strategic thinkers, most of whom were inspired by Barry Buzan’s seminal study People, States and Fear — An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Their central concern has been to broaden the concept of security and to move away from an approach based purely on military threat. The Cold War preoccupation with the possibility of a sudden globally devastating nuclear war had prevented a more coherent analysis of other threats to human survival, but the end of superpower ideological rivalry opened the door to a new approach to security.

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5 White Paper on Defence, ibid, p.5.
In this context, theorists have proposed a broad and at times unmanageable security agenda, which is set to inform and guide defence policy making and state conduct. A summary of the key concerns of the so-called new security includes the following:

- Security is seen as a holistic phenomenon which includes political, social, economic and environmental issues along with traditional military concerns.
- Security threats include poverty, oppression, social injustice and ecological degradation in addition to Cold War-style challenges to state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- The use of military force to advance foreign policy objectives is unacceptable, while military instruments may be used only in defence against aggression.
- Security is promoted by adopting defensive doctrines and postures which minimise offensive capabilities.
- Regional security is advanced via the principles of common security, non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes.\(^6\)
- The guiding principles for promoting state security are collective security (in terms of the UN Charter); common security (a commitment to joint survival, rather than security at the expense of other states) and comprehensive security (confidence-building, defence co-operation, transparency, disarmament, conversion, demobilisation and demilitarisation).
- Human security implies a people-centred approach (as outlined in the *Human Development Report 1994*) which advances beyond the protection of states and borders to include the protection of people, in contrast to an approach which favours protection of the state at the expense of its people.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) See Mills G, 'A 21st century security agenda: The end of 'defence' as we know it?' in Singh J, *South Africa — India Strategic Partnership*. Delhi: Institute for Defence
While the 21st century's international environment is not expected to be free from conflict, post-Cold War trends point towards low intensity and largely intra-state confrontations. (In the present international system 27 states, mostly micro-states in the Pacific Ocean, but also Iceland, Panama and Costa Rica, have no military capability; but the vast majority of states retain a military force.) With few exceptions, fundamental alterations in interstate relations have reduced the possibility of large scale conventional engagements. Consequently, states have the opportunity to reform their defence policies to meet the new security requirements. In the final chapter of his book, Buzan alludes to the difficulty of using traditional military instruments in response to the new security agenda, but decides to leave the 'hard thinking about real policies to others'.

Various governments have responded differently to the requirements of the new security agenda. Their reactions have ranged from complete disregard to a major restructuring of policy and posture. Most states have been slow to adjust their policies and procurement programmes, preferring instead to maintain a traditional military capability even without clearly defined clear and present threat from external forces. Others have resorted to 'threat inflation' to turn minor opponents into major security concerns, as in the US approach to classifying North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Lybia and Cuba as 'rogue states'.

South Africa's response to the new perceptions of security threat has been accompanied by the immediate requirement of transforming its armed forces into an integrated body capable not only of representing all of South Africa's citizens but playing a role in regional security.

8 See http://www.demilitarisation.org/eng.htm
9 Buzan B, op. cit., p.375.
Integration and Representivity

The integration of the former non-statutory forces along with the former South African Defence Force (SADF) has been largely completed. The process was far slower than originally anticipated, and was characterised by a range of disputes, including suggestions that former SADF officers were manipulating the process.\(^\text{10}\) The September 1999 incident at Tempe army base, and the Phalaborwa and Simonstown incidents\(^\text{11}\) pointed to serious tensions in the integration process. The Selati Commission of enquiry suggested that issues surrounding affirmative action, representivity, resistance to change, racism, discrimination and political tension were hampering cohesion and harmony within the SANDF. However, overall defence integration must be considered largely a success, given the difficulties under which the process began. At the start of the exercise, many observers suggested that the plan to transform seven hostile military formations into a loyal, unified defence force, serving all South Africans equally, was impossible. Despite these pessimistic forecasts, and despite the inevitable difficulties and setbacks during the process, a single integrated SANDF has been created.

While representivity in the various military units differs, on the whole the process of bringing the SANDF into line with national demographics has been significantly advanced. (Also, personnel have been reduced from 104,000 to the present 78,724.) In 1994 the ratio of whites to Africans, Asians and coloureds was 45% to 55%. By October 2001 the corresponding figures were 26% (19,393 white) to 74%, (46,696 African) signalling a major achievement in advancing the goal of greater representivity. On the question of gender equality, women

\(^{10}\) See Wa Ka Ngobeni W, 'Integration rigged by old-order elements,' \textit{Mail & Guardian}, 22 February 2002.

\(^{11}\) In September 1999, six white officers and one civilian were gunned down by a black lieutenant at Tempe base near Bloemfontein. In July 2000 in Phalaborwa, a white officer was shot dead by his black subordinate. A similar shooting took place at the Simonstown military base.
now make up approximately 20% (7,265 female officers) of the DoD. The vast majority of privates and corporals in the SANDF are black, but middle management remains predominantly white and male. At the more senior levels of DoD management, white former SADF officers continue to dominate the ranks. Of the 207 generals in the SANDF, only 77 are black. Nevertheless, given the time required to train and prepare a military officer for senior command this is not surprising. The representivity imbalance is thus expected to alter over time, in line with overall ratios.

Civil Control Over Defence

In the period following the 1994 democratic elections, civil control over defence has been manifested via the Defence Secretariat, established in August 1994, and an expansion of parliamentary control through a dedicated Joint Standing Committee on Defence. In a democracy the test for civilian control is whether civilians can exercise authority over military policy and decision-making, that is, frame alternatives, define the policy debate and make the final choices. The concept of civilian control is simple: all governmental decisions, including those relating to national security, are made by elected office-holders, or their official appointees. No decision may be made or action carried out by the military, unless delegated to it by the civilian leadership. Thus governments must develop systems and mobilise public support in order to establish and maintain authority over their armed forces.

In August 1997, the Mail & Guardian suggested that three years after the establishment of the Defence Secretariat, 'the government's attempts to establish civil control of the defence force are floundering'. The then Defence Secretary, Pierre Steyn, himself

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suggested that the Defence Minister was 'not in control', because his budget did not match his policy commitments. The report concluded that Steyn and his small civilian component were 'waging a turf war inside the Defence Ministry, against the old-fashioned, uniformed military bureaucracy.' Steyn confirmed that he was failing to establish civilian control because he had insufficient capacity, and his staff lacked the skills and experience to exercise such control effectively. Current Defence Secretary January Masilela identified lacks in career development, labour relations, grievance channels and the development of human resources as key problems within the DoD generally. He was clearly arguing in favour of a strengthened and more effective Secretariat that was better able to carry out its mission.

In many developing countries, governments have not managed to develop the tools or the procedures to establish and maintain civilian control over their armed forces. Such tools and procedures should include a defence secretariat or civil decision-making body with the following characteristics.

- **Sufficient capacity.** In the British Ministry of Defence (MOD), for example, 43% of Defence Headquarters personnel are civilian: the same is not true for South Africa. Former military personnel serving out of uniform in a Ministry of Defence undermine the principle of civil control, because they bring with them a 'military mind-set'.

- **Adequately skilled and experienced personnel.** Time and training are needed to equip civilians to serve on such a body.

- **Clarity on the roles and functions of the civil authorities.** In cases such as financial controls and determining policy, the military should advise the civilians so that they can represent the needs of the armed forces inside the government, but should not advocate

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14 Quoted in Vuthela N, 'The secretary for defence tells how it is,' SA Soldier, August 2002, p.15.
military interests or perspectives in a way which undermines or circumscribes civilian authority. The recently approved Defence Act is expected to elucidate the role and function of the Defence Secretariat and strengthen its position.\textsuperscript{15}

Uniformed leaders can and should be consulted on national security issues, but the military cannot define their own mission, function, or purpose.\textsuperscript{16} On the other hand, without sufficient capacity, no civilian defence authority can hope to exercise effective control over the military.

Section 228 of the constitution in effect gives the elected legislature the power to veto, or approve of, any foreign military actions initiated by the executive. Parliament must also approve the annual defence budget and oversee the activities of the DoD. Via the Joint Standing Committee on Defence parliament has been an active participant in the defence policymaking and budgetary process. The DoD makes regular and detailed reports to parliament. However, according to the findings of the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA), parliament has not performed its oversight role as strongly. MPs are elected via the system of party nominations rather than as direct representatives of statutory geographical constituencies. Consequently, MPs follow the direction of their parties (who decide their political futures), rather than that of the voters. There is thus a broad reluctance for MPs representing the ruling party to oppose executive decisions energetically. Opposition parties in South Africa lack the power at present to challenge government effectively. Parliament should do more than ‘monitor’ the military: the legislature should support the existence of the military (by appropriating money for the defence sector); make policy on the size and character of the armed forces; oversee their activities (including formal investigations.

\textsuperscript{15} See ‘Assembly passes defence bill,’ at http://www.news24.com/News24/Politics.

where required); and approve actions taken by the executive. The liberal-democratic ideal of a strong independent parliament willing and able to challenge the executive thus remains unfulfilled. Moreover, IDASA has pointed out that parliament did not specifically approve the current arms package (to be discussed in detail below) when the Defence Review was concluded in 1998. The Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD) conducted a ‘fact finding mission’ to SANDF bases during July 2002. Such visits should be regular, comprehensive and openly conducted. The Committee should report on its findings in the interests of advancing public confidence in the SANDF and civilian control of the military. Parliament should be empowered to advance effective and interventionist civil control.

**Improved International and Regional Defence Co-operation**

In the context of improved international defence co-operation, the DoD has made good progress. Recent agreements include Joint Permanent Commissions on Defence and Security with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Namibia; Germany’s undertaking to provide equipment for defence headquarters; Norway’s support for the Burundi peace mission; and ongoing interaction with the Chinese armed forces. Since 1994, the DoD has signed protocols and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with 25 other countries to confirm expanded international defence co-operation. The Minister of Defence, Secretary for Defence and Chief of the Defence Force have undertaken a number of visits to African countries in the interest of advancing collaboration. Recent military exercises with other countries include Operation Lariat (interception of fishing vessels in co-operation with Australia), Exercise Tanzanite (peacekeeping with

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Kenya and Tanzania, co-organised by Tanzania and France) and Exercise Atlasur (with the combined navies of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and South Africa). The Higher Commanders' Peace Support Operations Course to improve peacekeeping management skills, conducted in Benoni during February 2002 brought together military officers from 10 Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.

In response to a UN request, South Africa deployed a SANDF Specialist Contingent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in terms of the United Nations Mission to the DRC (MONUC II). Troops have also been deployed in Burundi to support negotiations towards a lasting settlement in that country. SANDF observers are represented in the UN missions in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Algeria and the Comores. In total, approximately 930 SANDF personnel are deployed performing various peace support tasks in Africa. Minister Lekota has confirmed that the SANDF has prioritised the improvement of peacekeeping capacity with a view to more active engagement on the African continent. The UN currently has 18 peace missions (observer, peacekeeping, peace-building and combined peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations) in various parts of the world. An additional 30 multilateral peace missions are being conducted by regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU)/Western European Union (WEU), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Given the size of the SANDF (presently 78,000 troops) and the peace-promoting focus of South Africa's foreign policy, more military personnel could be involved in peacekeeping missions in the future. Argentina, for example, with a total armed force of 72,000, has over the last 10 years sent 9,485 soldiers to participate in various peacekeeping operations.

The DoD is active in the Inter State Defence and Security Council (ISDSC), particularly in supporting the drive to develop a regional security partnership within SADC. The ISDSC is widely regarded as
one of SADC’s most successful areas of functional co-operation.\(^{19}\)

Proposals for a regional security pact include a commitment to collective defence, a common defence policy, defence co-operation and movement towards compatibility in defence equipment and systems. However, the operation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security has been stalled by technical difficulties, thus preventing regional military forces from effectively co-operating in regional security initiatives.

**Providing a Modern, Effective, Affordable and Accountable Defence Force**

The 1996 White Paper on Defence was widely interpreted as an agenda for demilitarisation, reduction of the defence force, and significant budget cuts. However, the 1998 Defence Review in advancing the ‘self-defence function’ and ideal ‘force design,’ produced an agenda for rearmament, increased defence budgets and preparation for conventional war. In many ways the Defence Review was a progressive, innovative and imaginative document. It was based on an extensive consultative programme, in terms of which all interested parties were invited to participate, and produced a significant shift from a traditional Cold War security approach. New thinking was evident in its coverage of the areas of peace support operations, support for the South African Police Service, human resource development and collateral utility.

**Modern**

South Africa is in the process of purchasing some of the most modern and technologically advanced combat platforms available. The

package includes four corvettes, three submarines, 30 light utility helicopters, 24 Hawk lead-in fighter trainers and 28 Gripen advanced light fighter trainers. The Gripen, for example, is widely regarded as a state-of-the-art fighter aircraft. Over the next 10 years, the SANDF will thus be involved in a comprehensive modernisation programme to develop the most technologically advanced military force in sub-Saharan Africa.

Effective

The effectiveness of any military force can arguably be convincingly determined only by the success or failure of a military operation. (Preparing an effective military force has a different emphasis for different commanders — for Montgomery, organisation was the key, while Shaka emphasised rigorous training and conditioning.) In January 2001 the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) suggested that the SANDF was weakened by a 'lack of cohesion', while the logistics system was 'in complete disarray' and morale was 'rock-bottom.' The SANDF responded to this criticism by pointing to a number of its achievements, its ongoing transformation process and the training programmes designed to address shortcomings.

Arguably, a reasonably accurate assessment of military effectiveness could be made by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of that military force. In this context, the SANDF's present weaknesses include the following:

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24 Pepani C (Major-General), 'Counterstrike by maligned SANDF,' *Saturday Star*, 10 February 2001.
• There are discipline problems (constantly being addressed, according to the Chief of the SANDF).\textsuperscript{25}

• Morale is low (partly a result of planned personnel cuts from the present 78,000 to 69,000 by the year 2004).\textsuperscript{26}

• Racial tensions are endemic (64.3% of respondents in the SANDF's 2001 Equal Opportunities and Affirmative Action Climate Survey identified 'racial tensions' as an issue).\textsuperscript{27}

• There is a perception that standards of training and assessment have declined.

• The pace of promotion is slow, and there is a general perception that the old-guard SA Defence Force is still in control.

• Troops have grievances relating to salaries, overtime, promotion policies, courts martial and retrenchment plans, which are handled by the SA National Defence Force Union (Sandu).

• The structure of the SANDF is top-heavy — one general for every 250 troops (compared to the international norm of one general for every 1,500 to 2,000 troops).

• The average age of combat troops is 32 years, much older than the average in other countries.

• According to some reports, 53% of the SANDF personnel are either too old or unfit for combat deployment.\textsuperscript{28}

• Defence Minister Lekota has indicated that 22% of the defence force are believed to be HIV-positive. This estimate is based on SA Military Health Service investigations. Independent reports suggest far higher figures of between 40-50%. In some African countries where the virus has been present for more than 10 years, armed


\textsuperscript{26} Ngqiyaza B, 'Defence Force union will challenge personnel cuts,' \textit{Business Day}, 9 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{27} Van Rensburg A, 'Equal opportunities and affirmative action climate survey,' \textit{The Soldier}, June 2001, pp.15–17.

\textsuperscript{28} Msimang T, 'One general for every 250 troops,' \textit{The Citizen}, 10 July 2002.
forces report HIV/AIDS infection figures of between 60–80%. For example, 77.5% of 1 SA Infantry Battalion have been classified as ‘unfit’.  

- There is an apparent lack of operational readiness, given reports in July 2002 that only a small fraction of the 150 Olifant tanks and 200 Rooikat armoured cars possessed by the SANDF were available. The SANDF gave the reassurance that 30 tanks and 18 armoured cars were immediately available. However, more funding would be required to provide additional armour.  

- The SANDF claims that it is unable to prepare pilots adequately due to an insufficient budget (which allows for only 67% of the required flying hours) and that there is a shortage of fighter and helicopter pilots (63 pilots left the South African Air Force — SAAF — last year). Other problems include a lack of funds to keep ships at sea; and the army’s having been forced to put battle tanks into storage. The SANDF has also declared it cannot undertake border protection duties because of a lack of funding.  

- Personnel costs consume 34% of the DoD’s budget. In the army this figure is 70%, leaving little funding available for training and operations.  

- The SANDF’s Lesotho peace-enforcement operation (Operation Boleas) suggested major weaknesses in intelligence (limited resistance was expected); operational planning (the initial intervention force of 600 was too small); media liaison; and adequate force protection. SANDF casualties and costs (R49.23 million) were far higher than expected. The SANDF should have

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planned for and implemented a far more robust operation, such as the Australian intervention in East Timor in September 1999.  

- Defence Minister Lekota has identified the following problems which undoubtedly hamper the SANDF’s effectiveness: lack of internal communications; suppression of complaints; alleged theft of allowances; ongoing loyalty to ‘formations of the past’; lack of a common language; unfair treatment of members; and a lack of a common military culture.  

There are indications that efforts are under way to address the problem of combat effectiveness. These include recruiting younger soldiers; strengthening the reserve force; dealing with morale issues; and advancing the DoD’s ‘code of conduct’. Despite the obvious problems, Defence Minister Lekota is confident that the defence force will be able to respond adequately to any threat.  

Affordable  

Current global military expenditure is estimated to be close to $850 billion, and to account for 2.6% of world gross domestic product (GDP). The world average expenditure on defence is $137 per capita per annum. After a decline in military expenditure from 1987–98 following the end of the Cold War, outlay on the military has begun to increase across the world at an average rate of 2–3% per annum.  

In a UN report on Africa released in April 1998, entitled The Causes of Conflict and Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on all African nations to freeze defence expenditure for a period of 10 years. Concerned at the increasing number of armed conflicts in Africa, Annan also urged

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governments in Africa to reduce defence expenditure to below 1.5% of annual GDP.

John Kenneth Galbraith, the seasoned peace campaigner, has claimed that in ‘poor countries the military’s claim on resources is the greatest economic scandal and the greatest political tragedy of our time’. In the developing world, soldiers claim resources that could be better used to address the needs of society and provide the essentials for economic development. Arms sales to developing countries simply perpetuate the narrow, simplistic Cold War mentality which reduces inter-state interaction to a military competition. Moreover, weapons transfers to developing countries do little to advance security. Instead they promote insecurity and amplify threat perceptions. The results of studies of the economic effects of military spending in developing countries vary depending on methodological differences, theoretical frameworks and empirical sampling. Most surveys, conducted largely within the Keynesian framework, suggest that relatively high military expenditures have at best no impact on economic growth, but at worst are likely to have a negative impact. A number of studies which have investigated the statistical connection between military spending and economic growth have reached no clear result. There is no evidence of increased defence expenditure having a positive impact on economic growth.

The ‘guns versus butter’ debate in South Africa has been a heated discussion between three groups. These are the military leadership and defence industry (which has an annual turnover of approximately R6.59 billion and employs 26,000 people), arguing in support of a significant modernisation and rearment programme (the ‘military-industrial complex’), the middle of the road group who see the need to retain an effective military force, but at reduced cost; and the disarmament activists, who call for an immediate termination

of the rearmament programme and a significant downsizing of military capability. The military leadership/defence industry group argue that South Africa needs a 'core force' that is able to meet its commitment to defend South Africa, because a defence capacity remains important even in the absence of war. Maintaining a strong military posture enables South Africa to play a key role in building peace in Africa. With a coastline of over 3,000 km, South African needs to be able to protect its important maritime resources. Defence Minister Lekota has also stressed the deterrent value of a modernised military force. Moreover, the national industrial participation (NIP) projects linked to the arms purchases will stimulate economic growth and employment. Unverified figures suggest that 45% of the NIP programmes have already been completed. The government has estimated that the value of approved civilian offset projects and exports arising from the defence package will be worth R60 billion by the end of 2004, R20 billion more than the original target. Total obligations over the next 11 years amount to approximately R130 billion.

The disarmament activists (such as Cease Fire, the South African National NGO Coalition, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the Coalition for Defence Alternatives, Southern African Centre for Defence Information and the South African Council of Churches) have questioned South Africa's need for a military capability, arguing that the arms package should be replaced with an equivalent expenditure on poverty relief and increased social spending. They argue that the programme is driven by an old-fashioned Cold War mind-set and reject the suggestion that the arms package will generate R110 billion in offsets and create an estimated 64,165 new jobs. They contend that the armaments industry is capital-

38 Quoted in Fraser J, 'Lekota and Erwin discuss rise in defence spending,' The Star, 22 April 2002.
intensive rather than labour intensive, and thus a poor creator of jobs, especially at the less skilled level. They point out that North American and European countries prohibit the use of offsets in arms sales agreements with each other, on the grounds that they distort markets and encourage corruption. Moreover, the armaments industry is heavily subsidised, which again diverts public funds away from socio-economic programmes. The Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (EAAR) have campaigned against new weapons purchases, suggesting they are ‘strategically, economically and financially irrational,’ and impede social development. They contend that major expenditure on armaments in preparation for war against an ‘imaginary enemy’ are unacceptable, given the pressing socio-economic needs faced by the government. Moreover, arms build-ups tend to provoke a response from neighbours, leading to a wasteful and unnecessary regional arms race. By containing defence expenditure, a country makes others feel more secure, resulting in improved security at far lower cost. The EAAR have called for the abandonment of the arms deal and the redirection of state funds into sustainable social investment which will enhance human security over the long term.

The middle of the road group recognises the need for a defence capacity, but on a limited scale and at more manageable costs. (In democratic countries, citizens are ever mindful of how defence costs affect social security spending.) The price tag for South Africa’s new weapons started off at R29.7 billion, but more recent estimates suggest that between R40-R60 billion will be the final cost when the procurement process is completed in 2012. This group stresses that the South African government is fully exposed to the continuing depreciation of the rand against foreign currencies, which may account for approximately 75% of the total purchase price.

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Independent investigations suggest that the estimates used in making the decision to purchase new weapons took an over-optimistic view of the exchange rate, while no high-risk currency fluctuations were factored into the calculations. With the rand depreciating at approximately 15% per year, the arms package becomes less and less affordable. Some worst-case scenarios predict a deteriorating exchange rate reaching R26 to the dollar within 10 years, with serious consequences for payment schedules. This might force government to borrow money to pay for the weapons. Given the absence of an immediate conventional military threat, critics claim that the defence packages are essentially designed to strengthen South Africa’s defence industries through offset alliances with European weapons manufacturers.

Another source of concern is that full operational and maintenance costs were not included in the original estimates, and will lead to a further increase in the defence budget at a later stage. South Africa’s 2002/03 defence budget was set at R18.41 billion, a 16.5% increase on the previous year’s figures and 9.4% more than was originally planned. A key component of the increase was additional funding allocated for strategic defence packages. At the same time, Defence Minister Lekota has indicated that because of a lack of pilots, fuel and technicians, the SANDF will not be in operational readiness for the new systems. With regard to monitoring the implementation of industrial participation (IP) programmes, there is growing doubt that this can be done effectively, given the requirements of commercial confidentiality and a lack of capacity. Another concern is that there is no clarity on how job creation linked to the arms deal is to be monitored and verified.


## Accountable

The South African constitution contains many references to accountability and openness. Article 41(1)(b) states that ‘[a]ll spheres of government and organs of the state within each sphere must provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole’. Accountability must be exemplified through institutions such as the legislature, judiciary and the media. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Defence are active in calling on the military leadership to account for expenditure and operational activities. However, as discussed above, parliamentary control remains insufficiently robust. The DoD’s information system via its official web site is active and

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responsive, but dated. Efforts to inform the public through the media are largely defensive and responsive to criticism. However, compared to the pre-1994 situation, the DoD's activities are far more open and accountable than they were, as a result of the 1996–98 Defence Review process, which included a wide-ranging and open consultative process, providing for an unprecedented level of transparency. The maintenance of a high level of openness is vital to maintain public support.

Appropriate

While the SANDF has set itself the task of providing a modern, effective, affordable and accountable defence capability, the key issue missed in this process so far is the question of relevance. In other words, is the SANDF's defence preparation and planning appropriate to the prevailing regional and global conditions? The key to answering this question would be to consider the threats South Africa is likely to face over the next five to 10 years.

In 2001 there were 24 major armed conflicts in 22 locations throughout the world. The global trend is towards a reduction of international conflict. Since 1990, all but three of the world's major conflicts were civil wars. In Africa recent trends suggest a decline in the number of conflicts, all of which are defined as internal.46 The Defence White Paper concluded that there was no current military threat to South Africa from any neighbouring state or external power. However, the Defence Review did not include a comprehensive assessment of threats to South Africa over the medium to long term. The ambit of the Review was largely restricted by a vaguely defined notion of external threat. Given recent trends in Africa and Southern Africa, such as the establishment of the African Union (AU); the launching and UN endorsement of the New Partnership for Africa's

Development (Nepad); significant progress towards closer co-operation in SADC; and considerable moves towards lasting peace settlements in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), long-term forecasts would suggest a more peaceful and less threatening regional environment.

An analysis of the regional and extra-regional strategic environment would suggest there is no possibility of a conventional military threat to South Africa in the foreseeable future (five to 10 years), even using a worst-case scenario. Factors which support this conclusion include:

- the effectiveness of most sub-Saharan military forces is declining;
- military projection capabilities are minimal;
- the high cost of new military equipment is preventing regional rearmament;
- growing economic and socio-economic problems are preventing governments from maintaining expensive armed forces; and
- most recent developments in the SADC region suggest an accelerated trend towards the resolution of conflict via negotiation.

Looking further afield, South Africa is unlikely to be directly affected by the USA’s ‘war on terrorism’, so called fourth-generation warfare (4GW).  

However, using broader definitions of security and threats, as defined in the Defence White Paper, South Africa’s and Southern Africa’s immediate security concerns would include the following:

- **Poverty/lack of economic growth.** Poverty is widely considered to constitute the most significant threat to South Africa’s security. In terms of the absolute poverty line of US$1 per day, 17% of South

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47 Fourth generation warfare (4GW) is the US name for war against terrorism. As South Africa is far removed from the Middle East and other centres of terrorism, the South African military have no urgent need to prepare extensively for this form of warfare. The terrorism presently occurring in South Africa is largely limited to the Western Cape and is a police concern.
Africa’s population are living in absolute poverty. An estimated 45–50% of sub-Saharan Africans live below this line. To create sustainable growth and enable Africa to escape from this situation, a 6% aggregate growth per annum is required for a period of at least 10 years.

- **Disease.** Disease and infant mortality are considered to be serious threats to South Africa’s human security. The most prevalent diseases are malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS (the government’s AIDS budget for 2003 is R1.8 billion). The World Health Organisation (WHO) *World Health Report 2000* notes that South Africa has one of the poorest health systems in the world. Millions of South Africans are expected to die from AIDS over the next 10 years. The World Bank estimates that AIDS will reduce GDP by up to 20% in some countries over the next decade.

- **Unemployment.** The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) estimates unemployment in South Africa to be 33.9%, and this is unlikely to improve in the near future.

- **Domestic and transnational crime.** In 2000 the SANDF apprehended 519 criminals and recovered 412 stolen vehicles. During the period April–September 2001, the SANDF spent R8.8 million on operations to assist the South African Police Services (SAPS). Although the SAPS 2001/02 annual report suggests a stabilisation of 17 of the 20 prioritised crime trends, overall crime statistics remain high: 149 rapes, 59 people murdered and 835 housebreaks per day. Common assault has increased by 64.6% and drug-related crimes are up by 32.3%. 48

- **Illegal migration.** Undocumented migrants have a potentially detrimental effect on the socio-economic structure, place a burden on administration and infrastructure, and undermine economic development. The average cost for the apprehension and processing of each illegal immigrant is R16,000.

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• **Famine.** The UN World Food Programme now estimates that between 12–15 million people in Southern Africa are facing famine. By 2010, one in every three people in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to suffer from ‘food insecurity’.

• **Social decay.** The unskilled labour force in South Africa ranks 94th in the world with regard to human development, but 45th in terms of GDP per capita. The SADC Regional Human Development Report 2000 indicates that human development (the three basic components of which are longevity, education levels and standard of living) has declined sharply over the last five years.

• **Economic marginalisation.** The developing world now spends $13 on debt repayment for every $1 it receives in grants, while a few hundred millionaires now own as much as the world’s poorest 2.5 billion people. Approximately 7 million children die each year as a result of funds being spent on debt repayment instead of social relief.

• **Natural disasters.** Africa is particularly vulnerable to floods, cyclones and drought. Most of the major rivers in Africa are highly sensitive to climate variation.

• **Ecological degradation.** South Africa’s natural resources need to be protected so as to ensure sustainable development. Water availability is expected to decrease, with a concomitant increase in desertification, because South Africa’s conventional water resources will be completely utilised by 2030.

• **Spill-over from regional intra-state conflict.** Over the last 20 years, African conflicts have resulted in over 9.5 million refugees from Southern and central Africa.49

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At a media briefing on 16 February 2001, Defence Minister Lekota said that 'contrary to the previous dispensation, [South Africa’s] defence posture is defensive as opposed to offensive.' However, South Africa retains an impressive war-fighting capability and has begun to implement a very significant modernisation programme which will maintain and in many ways enhance it. However, this capability is of limited value at present, and is likely to become increasingly unimportant as threats to human security become more pressing than conventional ones. As South Africa fine-tunes its war-fighting capability over the next 10 years, the SANDF is likely to come under increasing pressure and criticism as threats to human security escalate.

During the Defence Review process, the SANDF vehemently opposed the idea of equipping itself for collateral activities, for example purchasing weapons which could be used to assist with policing. SANDF thinking was dominated by preparation for its core function, war-fighting. Its proponents argued that maintaining an effective modern fighting force would enable the SANDF to use its military equipment to carry out secondary tasks while maintaining its primary function. In other words, submarines can be used for conventional naval defence as well as peacekeeping. However, given the present threats to South Africa, the SANDF needs to become far more active in collateral activities and less focused on preparing for a conventional war in Southern Africa. Thus the SANDF needs to retain a limited and appropriate war-fighting ability, while at the same time expanding and augmenting its collateral utility. While the SANDF obviously cannot directly and effectively respond to all human security threats, arguably it can be effective in the following areas.

- **Contribution to fighting domestic crime.** The SANDF could offer increased support for the SAPS. During 2001, an average of 895 soldiers per day were deployed to assist the SAPS. In 2001 no funds

were allocated to enable the SANDF to assist the SAPS. The budget allocation for the SANDF’s assistance to the SAPS for 2002 is R131 million.\footnote{The total defence budget is R18.41 billion. Information provided by DoD Corporate Communication.}

- **Illegal migration and transnational crime.** The SANDF could supply enhanced border protection. In 2000 the SANDF apprehended 47,419 illegal immigrants, and 47,440 in 2001. At the same time, the Army estimates that there are at least 1.5 million illegal immigrants in South Africa. Currently, the SANDF deploys an average of 1,742 soldiers and approximately three aircraft at any given time along South Africa’s borders.\footnote{Regional Joint Task Force North: ‘Border protection and undocumented migrants,’ *SA Soldier*, August 2002, pp.16–17.}

- **Expanded humanitarian relief activities.** The SANDF could help to provide emergency food supplies, casualty evacuation and medical support.

- **Disaster relief.** South Africa’s current disaster relief capacity could be expanded with the assistance of the SANDF. Previous interventions by the SANDF were the March 2000 Mozambique rescue mission (Operation Litchi), where 14,500 lives were saved, and South Africa’s response to Cyclone Eline in February 2000.

- **Regional conflict prevention.** The SANDF could be more fully involved in peacekeeping designed specifically to advance subregional security. The SANDF has indicated that all soldiers in the Army are undergoing basic peacekeeping training, but only one peacekeeping exercise (Blue Crane 1999) has been conducted. No funds are currently allocated for peacekeeping, but R314 million has been earmarked for that purpose in the 2002/3 financial year. The SAAF has confirmed that 53 transport aircraft along with 149 pilots are available for peacekeeping or diplomatic transport assistance.\footnote{Information provided by DoD Corporate Communications.}
While the SANDF already makes a contribution to these activities, the emphasis should be on expanding these functions rather than reducing support for the SAPS (which has been suggested), or withdrawing from border protection duties. Humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping capabilities could be further developed by increasing the capacity of air transport (C-130s), for example.

To repeat, the defence modernisation programme is not ideally suited for an adequate response to the new security threats. The defence package is designed for the SANDF’s primary function, conventional war-fighting, and has very limited collateral utility.

The defence package consists of a number of technically advanced combat platforms:
- three submarines;
- four corvettes;
- 30 utility helicopters;
- 24 fighter trainer aircraft; and
- 24 fighter aircraft.

In addition, the SANDF has over the last few years been engaged in a modernisation programme based on acquiring domestically produced, or upgraded equipment, including:
- 36 Rooivalk attack helicopters;
- Raptor 1 Stand-off glide bombs;
- 586 Mamba armoured personnel carriers;
- 35 mm artillery systems;
- 188 Rooikat armoured cars; and
- 42 G-6 self propelled artillery.

These systems are also largely designed for the primary function, and have little collateral utility.
The naval acquisitions programme is based on 4 Patrol Corvettes (MEKO A200-SAN class),\textsuperscript{54} which will provide the following services:

- protect South Africa's (and the SADC's) coastline and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of more than 1 million square kilometres;
- counter illegal fishing,\textsuperscript{55} drug and gun smuggling, pollution and piracy (of which there were 10 incidents in 2001);
- assist rescues at sea;
- evacuate South African civilian personnel who are under physical threat in other countries;
- provide disaster relief;
- show the flag (maritime diplomacy); and
- support peacekeeping operations (by transporting personnel and equipment).

These corvettes will each be equipped with:

- 76 mm, 35 mm and 20 mm guns;
- eight surface-to-surface missiles;
- 16 surface-to-air missiles;
- surveillance and target acquisition radar;
- a sonar system;
- an electro-optical and radar trackers;
- an electronic warfare system;
- naval communications systems; and
- one helicopter.

In addition, the navy will deploy 3 new submarines (Type 209/1400 MOD diesel-electric). These have little utility in peacetime, their primary activity being to discourage hostile intervention in South African waters and to support surface ship naval patrols. Other tasks

\textsuperscript{54} See Honiball T (Commodore), 'An alternative to the SA Navy's Corvettes,' \textit{IDP Papers}, 11 October 1996.

\textsuperscript{55} Of South Africa's GDP, 0.5% is derived from fishing (27,000 jobs).
for which submarines can be used include: territorial defence, deterrence, special forces insertion, and support for peacekeeping and intelligence gathering. (During World War II submarines were used primarily for the sinking of merchant ships, enemy warships and submarines.)

In addition the navy is updating the six Warrior Class Strike craft it already possesses. Six second-hand minesweepers have been purchased from the German navy. The naval acquisitions are essentially combat platforms designed for battle-space dominance. Arguably, South Africa really needs a coast guard rather than a naval combat fleet. The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) has recently announced a decision to spend R500 million on four fishery-protection vessels. These will protect South Africa’s fishing waters, assisted by the South African Navy and Air Force (SAAF).56

The SAAF’s ‘core fighter force’ for the longer term will be based essentially on 52 Hawk 100 Mk 120 and SAAB JAS-39 Gripen combat aircraft. A technological ‘edge’ is to be maintained by the utilisation of ‘smart’ along with a range of modern air-to-air, weapons. Most of the smart bombs (developed in South Africa) will be integrated into the Gripen. The SAAF expects to contract from a high of 300 in 1990 to a force of 52 fighters by 2005.

The Army, which is expecting to receive funding for re-equipment after 2010, has begun plans for a major equipment modernisation programme which includes the following: ground-based air defence system (G-bads); person-portable air-defence systems; and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)57


Other items on the equipment wish-list include: upgrading its C-130 Hercules aircraft; upgrading its C-47TP coastal patrol aircraft; acquiring new coastal patrol aircraft; upgrading SAAF surveillance radars; expanding its transport force; replacing the tanker fleet; upgrading the Orynx utility helicopter; acquiring more unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); providing artillery target-engagement systems; replacing or upgrading the Cactus SAM; acquiring new short-range Anti-Aircraft Missiles; purchasing a new generation of smart weapons; and buying rapid response vehicles for the Special Forces Brigade.

The defence modernisation programme is thus expected to continue after the completion of the strategic packages presently on order, with the aim of further enhancing South Africa’s war-fighting capability.

**Prospects**

The chief of the SANDF, General Nyanda, has argued that the defence budget remains ‘too small’ to enable the military to conduct effective training, maintain and replace key equipment, continue border and police support operations and take on a greater regional security role. By implication, this means that the decision to modernise war-fighting capability and prepare for a future conventional war against an as yet unidentified opponent is preventing the SANDF from effectively performing any collateral functions. Ongoing modernisation will require increased training costs and escalating equipment maintenance bills, making the SANDF progressively less affordable to South Africa. Defence budgets are set to keep growing, making them unsustainable over the longer term.

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The SANDF has completed a medium-term plan to address a number of outstanding issues. The new Human Resource Strategy 2010 plans to ensure annual personnel intakes (3,000 in 2004 and 10,000 a year thereafter) to boost capacity. Other positive trends include the introduction in February 2000 of a code of conduct; the establishment of the ‘National War College’ at Thaba Tshwane, and the ‘Landward Institute’ to enhance management and related skills; new rank insignia and the development of a new corporate identity; new land and environmental management systems; the establishment of military unions and a mechanism to address complaints relating to unfair treatment; efforts to develop sound labour relations; the destruction of more than 260,000 obsolete small arms and all anti-personnel land mines; the Civic Education Programme aimed at transforming cultures in the SANDF; Masibambisane, the Army’s anti-AIDS campaign; and the equal opportunities programme.

Future problems confronting the SANDF are likely to be:

- the need to improve communication with South African citizens;
- the need to defend the escalating costs connected to the defence buildup;
- the difficulties that are likely to be encountered in absorbing the new technology, which will need to be met through additional training;
- the increasing problem of aging, unhealthy personnel who are expensive to maintain;
- declining public support related to the perception that the SANDF is not doing its job properly; and
- a lack of credibility stemming from increasingly inappropriate preparation/operational capability.
Conclusion: Suggestions

Overall the SANDF has made good progress on integration and representivity. Civil control is likely to be strengthened as a result of new legislation, and there are clear signs of improved regional and defence co-operation. The force is being extensively modernised. Increasingly effectiveness will depend on the SANDF’s success in addressing present problems. Its affordability will be debated for some time to come. In terms of South Africa’s constitution, the SANDF’s main function is to defend and protect the country, its territorial integrity and its people. However, in times of peace the SANDF and all armed forces are required to carry out other functions in order to maintain credibility and public support. The concept of security defined in South Africa’s constitution goes beyond territorial defence. It includes the security of persons and the environment. Therefore whether or not defence equipment and preparation is considered appropriate, under present circumstances, will depend on the successful demonstration of collateral utility. The SANDF must equip and train for non-core functions in addition to maintaining an appropriate combat capability. The longer-term objective is for South Africa to develop and advance a ‘soft security’ framework, rather than the present ‘hard security’ system. The following recommendations relate to the promotion of greater regional security.

Expand warning intelligence capacity

By designing systems that alert decision-makers to emerging security threats, the SANDF can assist the government to develop timely and appropriate responses. (For example, Australia relies on intelligence early warning systems to compensate for its small military manpower pool and to reduce defence costs.) Early-warning intelligence also allows the military forces to prepare for any future contingency. Improving this capacity would include developing strategic intelligence and predictive-estimate intelligence analysis, creating a
regional strategic intelligence matrix and enhancing information source multipliers (Signals Intelligence — SIGINT, Human Intelligence — HUMINT, and Image Intelligence — IMINT). 59

**Develop a non-offensive defence (NOD) posture**

This refers to a strategy which is based on defensive strength but lacks offensive capabilities. An NOD strategy implies the deployment of forces and development of doctrines based on a ‘non-provocative defence’ philosophy. This approach is justified by the argument that it is counterproductive to seek to advance a country’s security at an adversary’s expense, because this will only encourage rivalries, tensions and possibly an arms race. The result is likely to be an unimproved security situation. 60 NOD includes the development of ‘denial forces’, which implies a military but not a long-range offensive capability. In advancing this approach, the Japanese Self Defence Forces, for example, ensure that combat aircraft have no in-flight refuelling capacity and are not geared to drop bombs.

**Increase collateral utility**

The use of military forces and material for collateral tasks can be achieved through adaptations in training and preparation, along with modification of equipment. Without an increased contribution to collateral activities, the SANDF is likely to be perceived increasingly as an expensive but ineffective organisation. (The role and function of the French *Gendarmerie* and Italian *Carabinieri* provide useful models in this regard in that both France and Italy deploy significant paramilitary forces to combat crime in support of the police. However, in

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South Africa, despite the high crime rate, we have no specific paramilitary force which can assist the police.\textsuperscript{61} 'The South African soldier of the future will have to be versatile and multi-skilled. He/she must be capable of participating in different types of operations'.\textsuperscript{62}

**Develop a co-operative or inclusive security philosophy**

Collaboration with the armed forces of other countries in the region would provide a framework for regional common security. This could be advanced through greater transparency, more effective communications and regular interaction via an integrated regional defence dialogue. This would be similar to that of the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has been effective in promoting greater stability in South East Asia. The goals of a co-operative security framework include maintaining peace and stability within a common space; mutual protection against outside aggression; and the active promotion of stability in areas which could threaten their shared security, using diplomatic, economic and military means if necessary. Such a framework is built on active dialogue and the pursuit of common interests in a spirit of flexibility and compromise. The system seeks to develop common goals over time. The development of a co-operative security framework would serve as a good foundation for any SADC defence pact, or related, more formal, agreements.

**Generate support for Nepad and the AU**

South Africa is expected to play a role commensurate with its strength as the major economic power south of the Sahara. That role includes 'creating peace, security and stability and democratic governance, without which it would be impossible to engage in meaningful


\textsuperscript{62} Ramasodi RS (Lt Col.), 'Force preparation,' *SA Soldier*, August 2002, p.15.
economic activity'. The continual sharpening and fine-tuning of war-fighting capability is out of step with Africa's new reality. In support of Nepad's and the AU's goals of promoting peace and co-operation in Africa, the SANDF should prioritise the following activities:

- More effort should be allocated to peacekeeping, peace support operations training, and preparation, including the expansion of air transport and intelligence capacity (as well as providing support for preventative diplomacy). The proposal to send an additional 1,500 SANDF troops to support peace in the DRC (as part of the MONUC Observer Mission) is in line with advancing the objectives of the AU and Nepad. The SANDF could advance this objective by developing best-practice guidelines for peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

- A robust rapid reaction force should be created that is capable of joining an AU peacekeeping contingent to support complex interventions or providing active support for regional stability initiatives, humanitarian emergencies and preventative diplomacy. In terms of the AU's proposed Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU will be able to request intervention to restore peace. Member states will be encouraged to maintain 'pre-positioned' forces available for rapid deployment.63

- Regional confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) should be developed. These would include exchanging information with other SADC members on defence expenditure; giving advance warning of military purchases and exercises; inviting the participation of regional observers in exercises; reporting fully to the UN Register of Conventional Arms; and exchanging information on organisation, size, structure and composition of armed forces.

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