Integrated Results Based Management In Botswana: Institutions, Documentation and Progress to Date

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ACRONYMS

DAC: Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
E-Gov: E-Government System
G2B: Government-to-Business
G2C: Government-to-Citizens
G2G: Government-to-Government
GICO: Government Implementation Coordination Office
GoB: Government of Botswana
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act
HIPC: Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative
HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HRD: Human Resource Development
HRM: Human Resource Management
ICT: Information and Communication Technology
IRBM: Integrated Results Based Management
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
MFDP: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MfDR: Managing for Development Results
MIS: Results Based Management Information System
MIST: Ministry of Infrastructure Science and Technology
NDP: National Development Plan
NSO: National Strategy Office
OBB: Outcomes-Based Budgeting
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OAG: Office of the Auditor General
OMB: Office of Management and Budget
PEAP: Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PMMP: Poverty Monitoring Master Plan
PPS: (Results Based) Personnel Performance System
RBB: Results Based Budgeting
TWGs: Thematic Working Groups
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
1. INTRODUCTION

National and international pressure on governments to provide tangible and demonstrable results for public action has become a major preoccupation of many governments and international donors (Kettl, 1997; Norman, 2002; Moynihan, 2006; Mayne, 2007). The Integrated Results Based Management (IRBM) system has been found to be a very powerful instrument for achieving this aim (World Bank, 2001; Koshy and Thomas, 2007; OECD, 2009).

This paper analyses Botswana’s efforts at implementing the IRBM system. IRBM is a way of reforming public sectors through helping governments focus on proper, well-timed achievement of relevant goals and objectives. Such reform is carried out through the utilisation of strategic planning, systematic implementation and resource usage, performance monitoring, measurement and reporting as well as systematic use of performance information to improve policy decision making and programme performance at all levels (Koshy and Thomas, 2007). IRBM is, therefore, a way of improving implementation by linking budgetary and human resources systems, and producing timely quality information that is linked through entire government organs.

The Government of Botswana introduced the IRBM in 2008 with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The stated aims of the reforms included ensuring that planning and financing national development are results focused and responsive to the needs of citizens, both in the short and long term (GoB/UNDP, 2009). However, the process has faced a number of challenges, resulting in less progress than was hoped for. Presently the National Strategy Office (NSO) is leading the process of reinvigorating IRBM and institutionalising it in the country.

A number of policy challenges warrant the implementation of IRBM in Botswana. These problems relate to the production of quality information for evidence based decision making, as well as the simplification of complex implementation challenges, which involve multiple actors in different sectors of the economy and levels of government.

Specific challenges include international pressure to show results of public sector initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index; as well as public programmes that are becoming increasingly prone to disjointedness calling for more coordination. The latter problem affects a number of areas, including the construction sector (MIST, 2012); poverty alleviation (Seleka et.al, 2007); or HIV/AIDS (Kaboyakgosi and Mpule, 2008). Other issues that justify the implementation of IRBM is the rising challenge of suboptimal implementation of public programmes, requiring greater accountability and better implementation across a number of sectors such as youth unemployment (Kenewendo, 2012), poverty alleviation (BIDPA/World Bank, 2013) or slow economic diversification (Vision Council, 2009).
Added to the foregoing are a number of top development priorities that require accurate, up-to-date information in order to be optimally implemented, including Vision 2016; the 10th National Development Plan (NDP 10); or Botswana’s privatisation programme. Such programmes also require multiple stakeholders to monitor and report progress to ensure greater transparency, accountability, and obtain and maintain public support. The paucity of performance information and data required to enable evidence based decision making in Botswana has been described as one of the major impediments to successful implementation of public programmes (Vision Council, 2009).

Given the potential for IRBM to reform government operations, this paper describes IRBM and analyses its strengths and weaknesses. It outlines its components and, in order to clarify its potential, gives accounts of a number of international experiences with IRBM systems, the challenges faced therein and the solutions often prescribed for such.

1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The objectives of this study are two-fold. Firstly the study will explain the IRBM concept, its uses and international experiences; and, secondly it will both outline Botswana’s experiences with IRBM to date, describe the challenges experienced, and then provide possible solutions to these.

1.2 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH

The study has three specific aims: (i) to describe IRBM and its uses (ii) to detail international experiences of IRBM; and (iii) to draw lessons for Botswana on how to successfully implement IRBM.

1.3 ORGANISATION OF THE PAPER

The rest of the working paper is organised as follows. The next section details the basic concepts of IRBM in improving public sector management. Thereafter the study describes international experiences of IRBM, in relation to the developed, middle and low income countries. Section 4 describes the institutional frameworks of IRBM in Botswana, including organisations and important documentation, while section 5 both concludes the paper, by restating major findings, and gives recommendations on how Botswana government can better implement IRBM.
2. THE INTEGRATED RESULTS BASED MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

As IRBM is part of a global public sector reform process known as Managing for Development Results (MfDR), this section describes IRBM by detailing its components, its relationship to MfDR, and gives an account of the strengths and weaknesses of the components of IRBM. MfDR focuses on using information on results to improve decision making, performance and public accountability (UNDP, 2009). Unlike traditional public administration which focuses on planning, staffing, budgeting, and related matters (inputs), MfDR focuses on actual outcomes and impacts of programmes, and not the inputs used or the outputs produced, emphasising the use of tools of strategic planning, risk management, progress monitoring, and outcome evaluation (OECD, 2009).

Table 1 shows the relationship between IRBM and MfDR. These components provide the essential framework for planning, implementing, monitoring and reporting on organizational performance and linking organizational performance to personnel performance (Koshy Thomas, 2007). IRBM consists of two primary components, namely, Results Based Budgeting (RBB) and Results Based Personnel Performance System (PPS). Its other components are the Integrated Results Based Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), Results Based Management Information System (MIS), and the E-Government (E-Gov) system.

The philosophy of the MfDR concept is based on the pillars of goal-orientation—which emphasizes the setting of clear goals and results to provide targets for change, and opportunities to assess whether change has occurred; the clarification of the causality or “results chain”—whereby demonstrating how the various inputs and activities in implementation are logically designed to produce desired outputs, outcomes, and impact; and continuous improvement—whereby those involved in implementation are required to periodically measure results as a means to provide the basis for tactical and strategic adjustment to keep programmes on track and maximize their outcomes (OECD, 2009).
Table 1: Linkages of MfDR Features and -IRBM Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUTTING MfDR INTO PRACTICE</th>
<th>COMPONENTS OF IRBM</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEATURE 1: SHARED GOALS AND STRATEGIES</td>
<td>KEY COMPONENTS OF IRBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on development outcomes with agreed indicators and time-bound targets</td>
<td>• Results Based Budgeting System (RBB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Broad agreement on goals and alignment of resources</td>
<td>• Results Based Personnel Performance System (PPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of results chains</td>
<td>COMPLEMENTARY COMPONENTS OF IRBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEATURE 2: PERFORMANCE-BASED BUDGETS</td>
<td>• Results Based Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (M&amp;E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Linked plans and budgets</td>
<td>• Results Based Management Information System (MIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Programme budgeting</td>
<td>• E-Government (EG) system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Predictable donor pledges and medium-term expenditure frameworks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Results-based statistics, performance monitoring systems and evaluation protocols</td>
<td>IRBM can be viewed as a set of tools or policy instruments which, in combination, can generate performance information, lead to budgets that are performance based (and not activity based) and, thus, connect government units - whether departments or levels of government. Thus, the MIS and E-Gov provide platforms on which the information produced can be shared easily between government units (departments/ministries/ intergovernmental agencies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Budgetary and operational flexibility</td>
<td>2.1 COMPONENTENETS AND USES OF IRBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Annual multi-stakeholder performance reviews</td>
<td>IRBM consists of a number of processes whose overall purpose is to join together government processes with the purpose of leading to greater cohesion, measurement, goal clarity, and continued improvement. These concepts emphasise properly linked budgets and plans at both sector and national level. Added to these are a need for credible data; robust statistics and evaluation procedures that will feed back into the budgeting and planning cycles (OECD, 2009; UNDP, 2009). To enhance</td>
</tr>
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accountability, this process also needs to be open and transparent with information shared about results and expenditures.

2.1.1 Results Based Budgeting

Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) is a strategic management tool that aims to improve resource management and public sector accountability. It focuses on performance measurement and its linkages to policy-making and resource management. Broadly defined, results based budgeting or performance budgeting is a type of public sector budgeting that:

...is designed to strengthen the linkage between funding and results (outputs and outcomes), through the systematic use of formal performance information with the objective of improving the allocative and technical efficiency of public expenditure. Performance information...refers...to...information on results achieved by public expenditure and...information on the costs of achieving those results (Robinson 2007, p.1.).

RBB has a strong focus on the results from operations of programmes and activities undertaken by government agencies using public finance. Results under RBB are classified under various performance components; inputs, processes, outputs, and impact.

2.1.2 Results Based Personnel Performance Systems (PPS)

The Results Based Personnel Performance System (PPS) is used to drive reform or new performance initiatives. Its primary role is to provide better grounding for the planning and implementation of Human Resource Development (HRD) and Human Resource Management (HRM). PPS is thus important in an environment which is driven by RBB especially in establishing and mandating the human resource accountability framework under RBM.

2.1.3 Results Based Monitoring and Evaluation (RBM&E)

A new emphasis in development thinking is to link developmental outcomes with public action, as a way of providing accountability, showing the worth of public programmes and garnering support for public programmes. Such linkages are provided through results based monitoring and evaluation, a continuous approach to assessing performance of developmental activities which emphasises the developmental outcomes over outputs (Morra-Imas and Rist, 2010).

Results based M&E can be contrasted with traditional or implementation monitoring and evaluation. The basic tenet of this performance measurement approach is to pose the question ‘did public officials do what we asked them to do? What were the outcomes or
impacts of such action(s)? In contrast, traditional or implementation monitoring and evaluation is used to track development indicators typically focusing on three aspects. These three factors are tracking inputs (finance, human and material resources), activities and outputs; secondly posing the question ‘how well the public projects, programmes or policies were implemented’ and finally making assessments of compliance with public work plans and budgets (Kusek and Rist, 2007).

In contrast, results based monitoring and evaluation emphasises continual collection of information on agreed indicators, with the aim of improving the performance of public sector organisations. As an instrument of public sector management, it is not an end in itself; rather, a means to an ends. In essence, three basic questions are raised by the results based M&E. These are: ‘what are the goals of the organisation; are these goals being achieved through implementation activities; and how can these achievements be proven’? (Rist and Morra-Imas, 2009; Kusek and Rist, 2007).

Results based monitoring and evaluation goes beyond answering the question of what outputs have been successfully realised or for how much. Instead, it seeks to link the completion of outputs to actual outcomes realised in implementing various public policies, programmes and projects (Kusek and Rist, 2007).

2.1.4 Electronic Government Systems - (E-Gov)

E-Government is an instrument that is increasingly being adopted by governments in order to assist them to ‘provide better accessibility, outreach, information, and services’ (Kusek and Rist, 2010, p. 148). It is the provision of government services in a new, interconnected electronic environment, where information may be obtained online, and certain transactions may be conducted online as well. Such activities as accounting, procurement, linkages to the private and other sectors of the economy may be carried out through e-Gov. Governments, through e-Gov, apply Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for delivering government services, exchange of information communication transactions, integration of various stand-alone systems and services between Government-to-Citizens (G2C), Government-to-Business (G2B), and Government-to-Government (G2G), as well as to back office processes and interactions within the entire government framework (Saugata and Masud, 2007).

2.1.5 Management Information Systems (MIS)

Management Information Systems or MIS works by identifying information needs at the different levels of government and systematically linking them. MIS raises the importance of management involving stakeholder’s commitment in relation to the generation of information needed for effective planning and decision making. The timing of the different kinds of information is to be defined. Both e-Gov and MIS provide an ICT based platform for performance measurement dimension to the strategic planning
framework by way of accurate, reliable and timely information. MIS and e-Gov link HRM; budgeting; implementation and; monitoring and evaluation. Such linkages lead to a more coordinated governance system.

2.2 SUMMARY: THE USES OF IRBM

A number of conclusions may be drawn about the IRBM concept:

i. IRBM consists of a number of instruments, which on their own may fulfil one or other aspect of measuring results of public sector action.

ii. By integrating budgeting, human resources development and planning with a transparent performance measurement framework, IRBM, when optimally implemented has immense potential for coordination and performance management in public sectors, including promoting accountability, making government work more transparent, monitoring and evaluation and linking government agencies and other organs, including in the private and not for profit sectors.

3. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

This section reviews international IRBM initiatives. The review is necessary to give a background of the reasons why countries may undertake IRBM; and the factors needed for successful implementation of reform as well as the common challenges experienced in doing so.

3.1 HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES EXPERIENCES

3.1.1 Australian Whole of Government Approach

Due to budgetary constraints that prompted the Australian government to ‘assess ways of achieving greater value for money’, the Australian ‘whole of government’ approach began in 1987, as a comprehensive effort of establishing monitoring and evaluation in the entire Australian public service. To ensure success, the finance department was mandated to carry out evaluations which were made mandatory. Even though it took two decades for the reform to take root in Australia, the country had a number of intrinsic advantages; a strong human and institutional base; a public service well known for integrity; a well developed financial, budgetary and accounting system; strong institutional support from the Department of Finance and the National Audit Office, and leadership commitment from the Office of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Australia’s political tradition of accountability, transparency and credible legitimate political leaders buttressed all these values to ensure that the ‘whole of government approach
was successful’. It took two decades of sustained policy innovation and implementation as well as the aforementioned political commitment for these changes to effectively take root. By 2007, the Australian public service was able to implement complex government programmes as well as connecting them across the entire government system, linking budget and other performance measurement across the whole government (Mackay, 2002:29; Morra-Imas and Rist, 2009).

3.1.2 USA and the Government Performance and Results Act

In order to enhance the generation of performance information for the federal government, the US Government came up with a Performance Management Framework based on the Government Performance and Results (GPRA) Act of 1993 and, lately, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2011. The GPRA of 1993 gave the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), legal backing to carry out its mandate. The mandate was broad enough to cover the majority of actors who came into contact directly or indirectly with public finance, to the extent that even sub-contractors of the government had to abide by expectations of measuring performance as a requirement for doing business with the US Government. The GPRA has a number of goals that include performance improvement in programmes, service delivery improvements, improving the accountability and effectiveness of programmes by focusing on results, service quality and customer satisfaction as well as improving the confidence of American people in the capability of the federal government.

3.1.3 South Korean Response to the Asian Economic Crisis

The Korean IRBM reform process was a response to the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s which called for changes in fiscal management practices (Lee, 2002). In the aftermath of the crisis, the newly elected Korean government determined that inefficiency in public sector management was the cause of the crisis, resulting in a period of ‘reinvention’ of the Korean government, which entailed instituting monitoring and evaluation systems, public satisfaction surveys of major government policies, programmes and projects. The new systems were also made to address poor cooperation and coordination between government departments, excessive centralization of policy analysis and evaluation and insufficient professional and skilled personnel. A major challenge experienced by the reforms, however, is that they were not legally binding, thereby making them less effective (Lee, 2002).

3.2 MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES EXPERIENCES

3.2.1 Malaysia and Vision 2020

Malaysia is one of the countries at the forefront of public administration reforms, especially in the area of budgeting and finance (Madhekeni, 2012). In line with the country’s
Vision 2020, which is a policy aimed at making Malaysia a developed country by the year 2020, the Malaysian government conducted a number of reforms to improve financial compliance, quality management, productivity and efficiency. To achieve the above mentioned objectives, Malaysia introduced the Outcomes-Based Budgeting (OBB), an IRBM oriented budgetary reform. This reform focuses on improved accountability and financial discipline among the various government agencies mandated to execute the socio-economic development plans for the country. Prior to this, the government adopted the Modified Budgeting System in 1990, which placed emphasis on outcomes and impacts of government programmes. According to the World Bank, this initiative demonstrates ‘foresight, innovativeness, dynamism and commitment to ensure value for money in the projects and programmes being implemented’ (World Bank, 2001).

3.3 LOW INCOME COUNTRIES EXPERIENCES

3.3.1 Uganda and the Poverty Eradication Action Plan

Among low income countries, Uganda underwent comprehensive economic reform, achieving macroeconomic stability in the process (Madhekeni, 2012). According to Hauge (2001) the recognition of effective service delivery as an imperative for national development is strong evidence of commitment to results by the Ugandan government. Uganda developed a Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and because of its commitment to results, Uganda became the first country to be declared eligible to benefit from the Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC). New measures for making the budget process more open and transparent to internal and external stakeholders were introduced. These initiatives included Uganda modernizing its fiscal systems, decentralizing planning, resource management and service delivery to localities. Whereas Hauge (2001) argues that the country still experiences issues of coordination and harmonization difficulties with respect to M&E and PEAP, it can also be argued that the PEAP’s impact was felt through building donor confidence to enable Uganda to become eligible to benefit through the HIPC.

3.3.2 Tanzania and the Poverty Monitoring Master Plan

Tanzanian experiences with IRBM demonstrate how IRBM can be used as an instrument for aid transparency and effectiveness. Following deteriorating relations between the Tanzanian government and its major donors, the government undertook an IRBM programme in order to comply with donor requirements for transparency and evidence based policymaking so as to aid both the Tanzanian government and aid donors to track the performance of development indicators. The Tanzanian system is a set of indicators that track the progress made in the donor funded Poverty Monitoring Master Plan (PMMP). The system also has capacity to review the information needs and indicators for poverty monitoring, generation of national and sub-national data to facilitate more consistent data production; and focusing on data producers at all levels of government and strengthening their capacities (White et al., 2006).
3.4 LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES EXPERIENCES

This review of international experiences with IRBM reveals the following:

i. For IRBM to succeed there ought to be a clear rationale or incentive for reform, for example, financial accountability; performance improvement; or coordination. Whereas such imperative may emanate from either internal or external pressures, in order to come up with appropriate response(s), it must be clear why IRBM is being undertaken.

ii. Clear linkages to public financial resources must be made through demonstrating benefits to the public budgeting system.

iii. For reforms to take root there needs to be clear mandate for such reform. Such mandate may include a law to support such reform, as well as appointing or setting up an institution to drive such reform.

iv. Political will for reform is imperative. As these reforms often take a decade or even longer to effectively take root, it is important that there is sustained support for reforms from cabinets and parliaments, office(s) of the prime minister or that of the president in order to ensure that reform take root, and is sustained.

4. IRBM IN BOTSWANA

This section reviews the major institutional frameworks underpinning Botswana’s attempts at IRBM thus far. This review is carried out with a view to understanding challenges that beset these earlier introductions of IRBM.

4.1 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF IRBM IN BOTSWANA

Nationally, NDP 10 envisaged a three pronged organisational approach to the introduction and management of IRBM. The earliest attempts were aimed at first, introducing monitoring and evaluation systems through government. As stated in the NDP 10:

...At the national level, M&E will be the responsibility of Vision 2016 Council and MFDP. The Vision 2016 Council will primarily monitor and evaluate progress at the macro level. MFDP’s emphasis will be on financial management. At the Sector/Ministry level, M&E will primarily be the responsibility of GICO, working with the Public Sector Reform Unit (PSRU) and Ministries/Departments. GICO will serve

---

1 Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
as a central agency to support the development and maintenance of an effective and sustainable M&E capability across Government. It would be an M&E centre within Government and will develop and manage the M&E system. PSRU will be responsible for public service performance (GoB 2009, p.356).

4.1.1 The Vision 2016 Council

Among its duties as prescribed by the Vision 2016 founding booklet, *A Long Term Vision for Botswana*, is that the Vision 2016 Council:

… must be set up to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Vision. The Council must have statutory authority to collect information, call authorities to account and to guide and monitor the policies during implementation (GoB 1996, p.75).

The Vision Council has since come up with numerous performance indicators cascading from global indicators called pillars, to key results areas and key performance indicators. The Council is made up of leaders from the economy, politics and civil society. It is supported by a secretariat of technical staff whose mandate is to carry out the day-to-day functions of the Council.

To date the Council has faced a number of challenges in relation to either engendering a results based culture or monitoring the implementation of the Vision 2016. Challenges with the Vision Council include being an ‘advisory’ organisation without the authority to enforce its mandate. Thus, contrary to the expectation in the booklet, *Towards Prosperity for All*, the Council was never made a ‘statutory’ organ (GoB, 1996).

An added challenge to the effectiveness of setting up a culture conducive to IRBM is that Vision 2016 Council took too long to begin the monitoring and evaluation processes that were to lead to increased use of M&E, let alone advocacy for M&E. Major outputs in this regard, the Botswana Performance Reports of 2009 and 2011, came a decade after the onset of Vision 2016.

4.1.2 The National Strategy Office

The predecessor to the National Strategy Office, the Government Implementation Coordination Office or (GICO) was formed to coordinate project implementation in Botswana, to ameliorate Botswana’s major public service challenge; and poor project implementation. The realisation, however, that development transcends just concerns with project management led to a change in the role of the GICO, which has since been renamed the National Strategy Office. The genesis of the GICO was to;

...create within the Office of the President an overarching ‘Implementation Coordination Unit’ to achieve effective policy and project implementation that should be assigned the
task and given the appropriate authority to oversee and drive forward Government’s
new diversification growth strategy, as well as coordinating function for all major
government projects (Kwelagobe, 2008).

The NSO commenced implementation of Project Motshwarateu, a project that was aimed
at capturing project implementation data and sharing it across government departments
during the drafting of the National Development Plan 10. The project aimed to achieve
the broad objectives of guiding, driving and coordinating the government programmes
and projects (UNDP, 2009). Though reasons for failure have not been advanced, the
project has not been successful in implementation.

Placing the NSO in the Office of the President ought to have given it sufficient authority
and prestige to call on other organisations to comply with the demands for implementing
RBM. Among the important functions of the NSO is the coordination of the Thematic
Working Groups, (TWGs).

There are four TWGs covering the four broad developmental themes. These are Economy
and Employment; Governance, Safety and Security; Social Upliftment; and Sustainable
Environment

The TWGs were to function under the guidance of Office of the President and the
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning; with the involvement of non
government actors such as Civil Society and the Private Sector to harmonise
and promote sectoral cooperation in monitoring and reporting, jointly monitor
the implementation of NDP 10 Programmes, review & develop key performance
indicators for the different levels (Pillar/KRA etc), and jointly submit quarterly reports
on progress and bottlenecks.
Figure 1 below shows how the TWG process was to link up with the rest of the public and other sectors.

**Figure 1: The TWGs Process**

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4.1.3 Challenges With The NSO Mandate

The challenges with the National Strategy Office include its legal form. The office lacks the capacity to enforce its mandate as it is merely an advisory body with no legal backing to facilitate its mandate; there is no obligation that government departments must comply with the demands made by the NSO.

Added to that, the Office is still relatively new in Botswana’s institutional landscape. Its impact will probably take a number of years to be felt, as even the technical capacity of its staff needs to be built to sufficient levels before they can deliver optimally.

4.1.4 Challenges With The TWGs Process

The convening of the TWGs process has been intermittent. Among the foremost shortcomings of the TWGs is a high rate of attrition in the leadership of the TWGs.
Whereas initially deputy permanent secretaries were the substantive chairpersons of these groups, their subsequent promotion(s), resignations or other redeployment left a gap in the membership. They were not replaced, and departed with the institutional memories, commitment, as well as know-how required to make the TWGs function optimally.

A later challenge to TWGs was a drift in strategy. Whereas TWGs were initially meant to provide strategic leadership to the NDP 10 processes, latterly they became too focused on issues of project management. Strategic focus was lost; meetings became erratic with an overall lack in strategic focus, with poor resourcing exacerbating the situation. Added to the foregoing, as TWGs gave the appearance of extra work for some officers, and as complying with the reporting requirements of the TWGs did not attract any incentives, compliance was de-emphasised leading to poor performance at TWGs level.

4.1.5 The Hubs

Under the coordinating role of the NSO, a number of organisations named ‘hubs’ were set up. Such hubs, essentially ‘centres of excellence’ that were set up to accelerate Botswana’s competitiveness, improve economic growth and excellence. These hubs are the Transport Hub, Agriculture Hub, Diamonds Hub, Education Hub, Health Hub, and Innovation Hub. While such ‘hubs’ may be organisationally located in a ministry with immediate relevance to their mandate, they were intended to be whole of sector coordination instruments. The challenge they face now is that their mandates have now been restricted to those of the ministries under which they are placed.

4.1.6 Challenges With The Hubs

Challenges facing the hubs are mainly two-fold, and they centre on loss of focus on ‘sector-wide’ strategy. The hubs became overly focused at ministry, and not strategic or sector level matters as initially planned. Structural challenges have also emerged as some of the hubs had challenges of a reporting nature with some of the ministries under which they were placed. Such challenges include resourcing and lack of clarity of mandate, as well as duplication of ministerial function.

4.1.7 The National Assembly and Its Committees

The National Assembly is the major actor when it comes to allocating budgets and assessing the performance of both the executive and the civil service. Parliament has the role of making laws, approving budgets and calling implementing agents to account for performance.

In particular, two committees of the national assembly may have impact in engendering a performance culture in the public service of Botswana. These are the Public Accounts
Committee and the Committee on Statutory Bodies. While the former provides oversight over the civil service, the latter committee provides such oversight over state owned corporations, regulatory authorities, government owned trusts and other non-regular civil service public bodies. By consistently calling for optimal performance of government functions and calling public servants to account, and demanding for evidence to that effect, and calling for the taking of corrective action, parliamentary committees would promote a results culture in Botswana.

While in other jurisdictions parliament has seen it necessary to legislate for beginning IRBM system, Botswana’s National Assembly has to date not provided for such a law to support the NSO’s mandate.

Challenges facing parliament include that it lacks the capacity to enforce the findings made by the Auditor General, or the parliamentary committees, as it relies on the executive to take action. The National Assembly would assist in engendering IRBM by insisting on up-to-date information on budgetary and other developmental processes, but is hamstrung by lack of research capacity, and limited financial resources (Marata, 2013). Its overreliance on the executive agencies to take action against underperformance perverts the mandate of parliament, as more often than not, it is the executive that the parliamentary committees find against.

4.1.8 The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and Statistics Botswana

The MFDP has historically played the role of coordinating development planning in Botswana. Most of the focus of development in Botswana was on outputs of the development process. The MFDP can change the orientation of public sector performance by refocusing ministries from outputs to outcomes in indicator monitoring. In terms of development performance monitoring, the Ministry plays an active role through the Performance Coordination Unit. Added to that, under the MFDP, is Statistics Botswana (formerly the Central Statistics Office) which is now an autonomous body. Statistics Botswana plays the role of collecting data on many of Botswana’s developmental indicators. Statistics Botswana has also historically assisted the Vision 2016 Council to monitor Botswana’s developmental performance under the auspices of Vision 2016.

4.1.9 Office of the Auditor General

An important stakeholder in the IRBM set up in Botswana is the Office of the Auditor General, (OAG). The OAG is a constitutionally mandated office whose duty is to audit and report on public accounts. The office has a strong legal mandate for investigation and reporting of abuses of public expenditures or departures from relevant laws on public expenditures. Once the OAG has conducted its assessments of public expenditures, it compiles a report, which is ultimately debated in parliament. The capacity of the OAG
to demand for performance information from government departments makes it a very important aspect of building a results monitoring culture in the public service of Botswana (Phirinyane, 2005).

4.1.10  The Ministry of Transport and Communications

Botswana has managed to adopt one component of IRBM, the e- Government, and the country has adopted the e-Government Strategy for 2011-2016. The strategy aims to “provide universal access to services through the use of appropriate strategies and technologies for efficient and effective delivery” (MTC, 2009).

The Government of Botswana’s e-Gov strategy is facilitated by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Its stated aims include the creation of a government data network (GDN); aiding in project implementation including coordination of projects; offering customer centric solutions; and leading to the creation of an integrated government system or the 1Gov principle (MTC, 2009).

A number of achievements have been made under the e-Gov strategy, including facilitation of some downloadable forms on the government portal for certain services, including customer requirements; the purchasing of government publications online; the e-Tax filing (whereby tax returns can be filed electronically); and the consolidation of ministry portals into the government portal, thus facilitating a single port of entry for the Government of Botswana.

4.1.11  Challenges Facing e-Gov

Notwithstanding the progress made, the e-Gov strategy is yet to be integrated with the other instruments of IRBM. According to the e-Gov office, the programme also faces a number of challenges including: incoherent performance measurement for the objectives of e-Government across government ministries and other agencies; human capacity challenges (understaffing at the e-Gov office and lack of appropriate skills across the public service) to effectively implement the e-Gov strategy; lack of monitoring and evaluation of interrelated projects and programmes in the public sector, and an unreliable information technology infrastructure (e-Gov Office, 2014).

Added to the foregoing challenges is the apparent lack of understanding by some public agencies about their role as the real implementers of the e-Gov strategy. Such a role is essentially one of coordinator. Without agencies providing the information required to place in the portal as is the case with some of the public agencies the objectives of the e-Gov strategy will be frustrated.
4.2 IMPORTANT DOCUMENTATION

Following below is a brief assessment of some of the documentation underpinning the development and implementation of the IRBM concept. These include the National Vision 2016 document, *Towards Prosperity for All*, and the NDP 10 document (MFDP, 2007). An assessment of these reveals that these were not thoroughly thought out, had unrealistic expectations, and did not receive periodic examinations for relevance.

4.3 VISION 2016

The Vision 2016 is the national developmental blueprint. Brought about in 1996 when Botswana celebrated 30 years of independence, it was intended that its overall objectives will be realised by 2016 when the nation celebrates its 50th independence. The Vision has seven broad goals reflecting national aspirations to be attained by 2016. These seven goals are An Educated and Informed Nation; A Prosperous, Productive and Innovative Nation; A Compassionate, Just and Caring Nation; A Safe and Secure Nation; An Open, Democratic and Accountable Nation; A Moral and Tolerant Nation; and A United and Proud Nation.

4.3.1 Challenges Facing Vision 2016—Towards Prosperity For All

The Vision is a Botswana initiative, which serves as a focal point for developmental, political, social and other changes. Challenges in relation to the Vision 2016 include that some of the Vision 2016 indicators were over-ambitious, as, for instance, the Vision booklet had a target of attaining full employment in Botswana by 2016, usually an impossible objective to attain.

Added to the foregoing, the Vision, by targeting a 41% investment rate as essential to realising the economic growth objectives was basically expecting that Botswana would not only attract, but absorb what is arguably the highest sustained rate of foreign direct investment in the world without necessarily making thorough assessments of how realistic this target was. Similarly unrealistic, though desirable, was the target of the country attaining zero HIV infections by 2016 (Vision Council 2009).

4.4 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 10

Botswana’s tenth National Development Plan (NDP 10) is the latest instalment in Botswana’s successful, bottom up planning system. For the purpose of this paper, NDP 10 holds two major points of significance. Firstly, the NDP represented the first time ever in the history of Botswana that a National Development Plan had been designed with the sole objective of realising the goals of Vision 2016. Secondly NDP 10 chapter 16 was dedicated to introducing IRBM to government. Chapter 16’s significance is that
it makes it clear that in order for the plan to be seen to be implemented optimally, RBM must be at the centre of the public sector management efforts.

The MFDP began the drafting of NDP 10 in July 2007 when it prepared the Macroeconomic Outline for the planning process, which included a number of stakeholders in the reference group. These stakeholders included Government Ministries and Departments, private sector representatives, civil society organizations, academics, development partners, and prominent individuals among others. NDP 10 emphasized economic growth, economic diversification, employment creation and private sector development.

The Plan envisaged an Integrated Results Based Management approach (Government of Botswana, 2008, p5) as the instrument with which role players could manage, and measure performance of the delivery of the plan. It had a number of goals including the improvement of strategic planning, coordination, and implementation of the NDP10; improvement of public policy results from the use of scarce resources through the budgetary process; improvement of the human resources capacity and performance for successful service delivery and development management; and improvement of the monitoring and evaluation system to provide timely, accurate, and reliable performance information to support and improve the policy and programme decision making.

A Macro Development Results Framework was later developed, referencing Vision 2016 goals. According to the NDP 10:

Using the Vision 2016 Pillars as a basis, a task team was set up by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), comprising of MFDP, the Vision Council, Government Implementation Coordination Office (GICO) and the Office of the President, to formulate the MDRF, which identified the KRAs and National Goals to be achieved during NDP 10. Based on the seven Vision 2016 Pillars, national level priorities were identified and defined as KRAs. There are 10 KRAs and 16 National Goals for NDP 10.

To bring further clarity to the process of implementing NDP 10, the MDRF gave a detailed breakdown of the Vision 2016 goals (see table 2) below. It linked and simplified the Vision 2016 goals into measurable development indicators.
### Table 2: Macro Development Results Framework—Vision 2016 and NDP 10

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<th>Vision 2016 Pillars</th>
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<th>NDP 10 Goals</th>
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Source: MFDP, 2007
Figure 2 below shows how these goals are cascaded into Vision 2016 goals. In essence, the figure shows the ideal approach to implementation, and how actors, and resources are to be applied to the attainment of Vision 2016.

**Figure 2: Cascading Vision 2016 into NDP 10**

Source: MFDP 2007

### 4.4.1 NDP 10 Challenges

Where the IRBM concept was concerned, there have been a number of challenges. One of these has been the lack of follow through to institutionalise the results based monitoring and evaluation concept as planned. Particularly negative to this objective was the lack of training required to carry this out, as initially the frontline agencies, including even the NSO did not have the (technical) capacity required to ably drive this programme. There was no prior systematic training for the data collectors, middle managers and top leadership to ensure they appreciated the use of IRBM in order to use it effectively. Overall guidance was also not forthcoming as the implementation arrangements for NDP 10 were never clearly articulated.

Another challenge was the duplication of mandates, and lack of clear, decisive delinking of the planning function from the MFDP. Whereas the Public Sector Reforms Unit in the Office of the President sought to lead in the planning aspect, MFDP retained a critical mass of the capacity for planning as it retained the professionals who had historically conducted this function. A lot of time was lost due to these misunderstandings which were also due to reallocation of duties between the two organisations.
Wider economic and policy changes also affected the introduction of the reform. Such changes include the shocks experienced by the Botswana economy due to the global financial crisis of 2007/8, forcing a revision of earlier assumptions in the NDP due to the effects of the crisis on diamond sales. The targets and measurements however did not receive systematic revision.

Processes were also problematic. Particularly important in this regard was what appears to have been suboptimal consultation prior to drafting the NDP 10, leading to poor buy in. Not only did IRBM then appear onerous and imposed, too many new concepts being introduced, which added to the responsibility of designing NDP 10 brought immense amounts of new responsibilities at the same time.

4.5 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

As a member of the global community of nations, Botswana is also a part of the MDGs process. The MDGs is a set of global individual commitments which participating governments must achieve. The MDGs are to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; universal primary education; Promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women; improvement of maternal mortality rates; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability and develop global partnership for development.

Where the MDGs process is concerned, the nation has achieved some of these (for example, access to health facilitates and access to clean water services). On the other hand government is lagging behind on others (for example, high incidences of maternal mortality, high incidences of infant mortality and increasing incidences of HIV infections) (Vision Council, 2009).

Challenges due to the MDGs largely reflect those faced under the Vision 2016 process.

4.6 SUMMARY

Botswana is amongst a number of countries that have attempted to implement the IRBM concept. Such efforts have, however, failed owing to a number of challenges.

Whereas government embarked on a number of IRBM related reforms, each of these appear to have been set up in isolation from others, with little appreciation that these were to form part of a whole. It also appears that the introduction of IRBM was beset by insufficient consultations with stakeholders particularly prior to its introduction leading to insufficient 'buy in'.

The Vision 2016 document, Towards Prosperity for All, had certain technical inadequacies that made performance monitoring difficult. These shortcomings, include unrealistic
goals such as full employment by 2016, zero HIV infections by 2016 or a 41% year on year investment rate from 1996 to 2016. A prevailing challenge is the lack of production of systematic data to monitor developmental outcomes in the country, making it difficult to institutionalise an evidence based policy making culture. The lack of detailing the targets of some of the goals also made it difficult to measure progress.

The most recent introduction of IRBM in Botswana, through the NDP 10 process had a number of flaws. The two most important ones are that there was no prior training of public servants to prepare them for this reform and, secondly crucial components of the reform such as PBB were introduced late, leading to insufficient linkages between the reforms and budget outcomes. The lack of training would have led to poor appreciation of their roles by the various levels of the public service.

Parliament, like other oversight institutions lacks sufficient data and information needed for evidence based decision making. Worryingly, the role that Parliament could play to enhance the building of a performance measurement culture in the country lags behind - it lacks the capacity to enforce the findings of the Office of the Auditor General.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section restates the major findings of the study and makes recommendations on how IRBM may be implemented in future.

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

i. Botswana’s need for development performance information (on implementation of important national projects, and international obligations) and the capacity to further coordinate or join up government services calls for the implementation of the IRBM system in the public services.

ii. Parliament and the Office of the Auditor General may assist in developing and entrenching a performance culture in the public services in the country. The OAG’s capacity to request for performance information from organisations, coupled with parliament’s oversight role can be used to support the NSO’s role as lead organisation in implementing IRBM in the country.

iii. Some of the performance indicators of Vision 2016 were overambitious as to be unachievable. Being stated in absolute terms, the aims of no HIV infections, or full employment by the year 2016 were as unrealistic as are unattainable.
iv. Initial attempts at IRBM were many and disjointed. While clearly NDP 10 envisaged an 'integrated' result based management system, implementation challenges derailed this notion. The result is a number of programmes which are essentially components of IRBM being implemented in isolation of each other, with little evidence that they were developed with a view on later ‘integrating’ them. While the various aspects of IRBM are being put in place, such efforts have been disparate, with little appearance that they are parts of whole.

v. Whereas the monitoring and evaluation of NDP 10 might have given impetus to IRBM, it was not piloted, nor was allocation of resources such as finance, IT capacity, and sufficiently trained human resources, given adequate attention. Such oversights have lead to implementation of the NDP 10 outstripping the implementation monitoring and evaluation.

vi. A lack of legal authority to the lead organisations is a possible reason for the capacity of reforms to take hold. Legal reforms to compel conformity to demands for information would have gone a long way to supporting reform.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

i. It is necessary to institute legal changes to empower lead agencies such as the NSO to ably lead in the reform for IRBM to take off sufficiently. It might be prudent to give the NSO some statutory power to enable it to enforce its mandate.

ii. In order to optimally realise the utility of IRBM, it is important to build capacity to implement it, amongst several levels of stakeholders. The training of data collectors, users, managers and policymakers to enable each of them to play their roles meaningfully is required.

iii. When designing performance indicators for such policies as Vision 2016, it is better to state these in incremental terms, rather than absolutes. For example, it could be better to aim at halving poverty rates in a given timeframes; or aim at creating certain employment levels in given timeframes; or increasing female political representation in certain electoral cycles.

iv. To further bolster the introduction of IRBM, government must consider instituting a freedom of information law. Such legislation would facilitate the provision of performance related data which would further enhance IRBM programmes in Botswana. Organisations such as the NSO would then have easier access to such information as well as the capacity to share it with other organisations.
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Integrated Results Based Management In Botswana: Institutions, Documentation and Progress to Date

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