AFRICAN JOURNAL ON

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

African Journal on Conflict Resolution

The *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* is a peer-reviewed journal published by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) for the multidisciplinary subject field of conflict resolution. There are two regular issues per year, and occasionally also a special issue on a particular theme. It appears on the list of journals accredited by the Department of Higher Education and Training. ACCORD is a non-governmental, non-aligned conflict resolution organisation based in Durban, South Africa. ACCORD is constituted as an education trust.

The journal seeks to publish articles and book reviews on subjects relating to conflict, its management and resolution, as well as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa. It aims to be a conduit between theory and practice.

Views expressed in this journal are not necessarily those of ACCORD. While every attempt is made to ensure that the information published here is accurate, no responsibility is accepted for any loss or damage that may arise out of the reliance of any person upon any of the information this journal contains.

Articles and book reviews may be submitted by e-mail, as Microsoft Word attachments, to the Managing Editor of the journal at malanj@accord.org.za, with a copy to ajcr@accord.org.za.

Articles should be of good academic quality, and should be between 6 000 and 8 000 words in length. An abstract of between 100 and 200 words and a few lines about the author should be included. Book reviews should be between 1 000 and 1 500 words.

All references, according to the Harvard method, should be included. As far as possible, in-text references should include the page numbers of the sections of sources referred to. In the case of a direct quotation, the exact page number is absolutely necessary. For the purpose of adding extra details, comments or references which may distract attention from the argument in the text, footnotes may be used sparingly. For more information about the referencing system, please see the excerpt from ACCORD's Style Guide, which is available at <http://www.accord.org.za>.

Readers may subscribe to receive e-mail alerts or copies of ACCORD's publications by sending an e-mail to publications@accord.org.za.

Lay-out by Keegan Thumberan.

Contents

Dr Alioune Sall
Executive Director, African Futures Institute, Pretoria

Dr Helen Scanlon
Senior Lecturer, African Gender Institute, University of Cape Town, Cape Town

Dr Meena Singh
Research Associate of the Common Security Forum, Cambridge

Foreword

Jannie Malan

As we were editing the articles for this issue, it was my privilege to attend the dialogue- and peace-oriented conference of the Sant'Egidio Community in Antwerp. 'PEACE is the FUTURE' was the conference theme, and dialogue was the style of the proceedings. In what panellists and participants shared in the various sessions, one could discern experiences, understandings and insights that can change the tone and the outcome of talks between an aggrieved party and a grievance-inflicting party. One was also reminded, however, that there are factors which can complicate or even bedevil a getting together to talk things out. There may, for instance, be so many sides that the 'dialogue' could become an unmanageable multilogue. Or, an attempted dialogue may be stifled or even deadlocked by monologues entrenched in 'non-negotiable' positions.

Returning from such a meaningful but also warningful conference, I couldn't help being on the lookout for signs of dialogic moves or inclinations when I was editing the articles. And by contrast, of course, I was also looking for monologic phenomena or tendencies. My little exercise started simply and superficially, but led me into some surprising thinking. I discovered what I thought I had known: that the difference between monologue and dialogue was much more than a numerical one. It is so that we use several words in which the prefix 'mono-' means 'one' or 'single'. For instance, 'monarchy' and 'monogamy'. Then, we tend to think that 'dia' means 'two' or 'double'. (There happens to be a word based upon this misunderstanding: 'diarchy'.) What 'dia' means in compounds, however, is usually one of the following: 'through' or 'across' ('diagonal', 'diameter'), 'between' ('diagnosis', as the knowledge arrived at by distinguishing

between symptoms). Its root meaning of 'right through' appears to function in several of the Greek words which fill nine dictionary pages in a typical Greek Lexicon. There are, for instance, words used for cleansing thoroughly, sifting thoroughly, toiling with perseverance, and changing completely from enmity to friendship. The particular Greek verb from which our 'dialogue' was derived, was used for *considering fully*.

After my semantic excursion, therefore, my bifocal reading gave me a clearer picture of the contrast between the captivity in self-ness or alone-ness and the liberation into together-ness. It led me to distinguish between what may be called singular and plural modes of monologue – the first expressing individual self-centredness and the second the multiplied self-centredness of a group. It also made me realise to what extent *isms* in general, and *isms* as culturism, religionism and ethnicism in particular, are based on some form of mono-mindedness.

Problems discussed in this issue offer examples of leaders and/or groups who are stuck in some kind of monologic thinking, talking, acting and even combating. One can imagine how they are driven by well-excused aspirations and/or well-intended visions, which prevent them from detecting antagonistic trends lurking in their personalities and/or cultures. What can also be found in these articles, however, are potentially problem-solving suggestions on the wavelength of dialogue – ideas about talking through, considering thoroughly, changing attitudes completely (diametrically) and implementing solutions properly.

When I share my post-conference way of reading, I am of course not suggesting that our readers have to read in the same way. Each article should as usual be read in light of its approach and purpose, and note should be taken of all its findings and recommendations. One may, however, also experiment with some between-the-line exploring of motives, attitudes and orientations. There are the pages where corruption, fanaticism, belligerence and other fixed mindsets are described and discussed, and where the reader can be overwhelmed by feelings of helplessness and hopelessness. Nevertheless, there is definitely enough in these articles to strengthen our dedication to talking things out – talking *right through* our problems or differences. Cultural, religious and ethnic differences

are human realities, but mutual understanding, problem solving and consensus are possibilities that are always and everywhere present – in the South and North, East and West.

We trust that what we are passing on to readers with this issue will be valuable on the way towards a future in which thoroughgoing dialogue will indeed contribute to PEACE writ large.

Tribute to Prof John Daniel

Daniel Forti
Junior researcher, ACCORD

In this issue of our journal, ACCORD wishes to pay its deepest respects to former Advisory Panel member Professor John Daniel, who passed away in July of this year. Over the course of seven decades, Professor Daniel made immense contributions to South Africa as a political activist, academic, researcher, lecturer, editor, and mentor. However, it was the warmth, joviality, and inspirational passion through which he wore all of these different hats that will be remembered most fondly.

As president of the National Union of South African Students in 1966, John Daniel was instrumental in arranging US Senator Robert Kennedy's tour to South Africa, which included an unprecedented tour of Soweto and a personal meeting with African National Congress President Chief Albert Luthuli in Groutville, KwaZulu-Natal. Professor Daniel spent close to two decades living in exile from South Africa. After completing his Ph.D. in 1975 in the USA, he lectured in Swaziland for close to ten years. From 1985 to 1991, he served as the Southern African editor for Zed Publishing in London. Upon his return to South Africa in 1991, he was appointed as a senior lecturer, first at Rhodes University and later at the University of Durban-Westville. Crucially, Professor Daniel was seconded to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission from 1997 to 1999, where he played an important role in drafting the Commission's final report. From 2001 to 2006, Professor Daniel served as the Research Director for the South African Human Sciences Research Council, and from 2007 to 2010 he directed the School for International Training's exchange programme for American students in Durban.

Beyond the details on his C.V., Professor Daniel's impact remains immeasurable. Throughout his life, he held firm to his convictions on social justice, integrity, and political accountability. His critical and rigorous writings helped anchor progressive academia throughout the anti-apartheid struggle, and were instrumental in defining the political sciences field in the new South Africa. His passion for learning and mentorship shaped the worldviews of thousands of students who passed through his classroom doors. His legacies, captured by both his academic work and by the unbreakable and inspiring relationships he built, will resonate for many years to come.

Security regionalism and flaws of externally forged peace in Sudan: The IGAD peace process and its aftermath

Aleksi Ylönen*

Abstract

During 1983-2005 Sudan hosted one of Africa's longest insurgencies. Throughout the conflict a number of competing peace initiatives coincided, but a process under the mediation authority of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) prevailed. However, although initiated in 1993, the IGAD process only accelerated after the September 2001 attacks on the United States (US) and was consequently finalised through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in less than four years' time. Although it was presented as IGAD's success as a conflict resolution body, in reality the organisation's role in the making of peace in Sudan was to a large extent conditioned by the involvement of a narrow selection of Western stakeholders.

This article examines the IGAD peace process in Sudan, highlighting the dynamics and relative roles of the principal actors involved. It argues that although the negotiations were portrayed as inherently sub-regional, and adhering to the idea of 'African solutions for African problems', a closer analysis reveals that the peace process was dominated by external protagonists. This resulted in the interests of

---

*   Aleksi Ylönen is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Political Science and Contemporary History, University of Turku, Finland. His research focuses on politics and security issues in the greater Horn of Africa, and his works have been published in various journals, edited volumes and online.

Western actors, particularly the US, playing a prominent role in the negotiated agreement, consequences of which are currently experienced both in Sudan and South Sudan.

1. Introduction

Since the Cold War, the notion of regional integration has grown considerably in importance in relations between proximate states. Regionalism has come to be perceived as particularly attractive for Sub-Saharan Africa, where various leaderships have interpreted it as necessary for advancing peace and development, as well as for strengthening Africa's role in the current international order.

Although regionalism opens ways for cooperation beyond the narrow state-specific view of international relations, possibly its most important challenge in Africa is internally and externally contested borders. Secessionism, irredentism and territorial claims between states remain commonplace and are often found at the heart of armed conflicts. In those parts of Africa where a large part of armed conflicts continue to occur, security often tends to be prioritised over other sectors, and, as Cilliers and Schünemann (2013) point out, it is erroneous to believe that the decline of large-scale violent conflicts in Africa is a sign of movement towards political stability. A stable security environment, in turn, arguably frees government resources from maintaining internal and external security, allowing them be used for other purposes such as the promotion of amicable regional relations.

The intimate relationship between violent conflict and development (Duffield 2001, 2007; Stewart 2004) may be affected by the advancing regional cooperation. For instance, intra-regional cooperation and development can lessen the individual states' dependence on powerful patron states and decrease the need to make foreign policy compromises with them. As a result, it is plausible to argue that a salient feature of the most successful attempts of advancing regionalism in Africa, such as in the case of the African Union, has been the combination of promoting security with economic cooperation for increasing stability and development.

This article presents a case study of the promotion of security regionalism in the Horn of Africa. Based on the author's ongoing research initiated in 2004, it examines the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process in Sudan and exposes its major dynamics. Specifically, the article unveils the actors that dominated the peace initiative to show that although portrayed as an example of 'African solutions to African problems', the IGAD process was largely externally controlled. This largely externally imposed peace has had repercussions, which are currently experienced in South Sudan and Sudan.

The article is organised in the following manner. Section 2 embarks on a brief theoretical review of the links between globalisation, regionalism and security. Section 3 follows with an analysis of the agendas of local actors and IGAD's role in the making of peace in Sudan, and section 4 engages in a discussion on the external actors' involvement in the process. The fifth section discusses the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) produced by the IGAD process and the sixth section provides a concluding discussion.

2. Globalisation, regionalism and security

Globalisation of the post-Cold War international order is a necessary starting point for examining security aspects of contemporary regionalism. Although the relationship between global norms and state interests (Clark 1997:201-202), as well as globalisation and regionalism (Grant and Söderbaum 2003:1-20), has been much debated, there is little consensus over whether there is movement towards a more global society or towards regional political, security and economic blocs which regional powers tend to dominate. For instance, Väyrynen (2003:44-45) has argued that regionalisation has emerged as one consequence of globalism after the Cold War in an attempt to moderate the impact of global external interference on regional dynamics and individual states. Regionalism is seen to emerge from the post-Cold War international order in which regional powers have emerged to gain power over their respective geographical neighbourhoods (Rosecrance 1992). As a result, regionalism can be considered as a strategy to rebuff direct involvement of powerful states in less powerful regions and to an extent as an expression of the aspirations of regional powers.

Aleksi Ylönen

Regionalism and security in Africa and Sudan

A number of studies during and after the Cold War have pointed out the role dominant states have played in regional crises.[1] Some have highlighted strategies of regional powers,[2] and have, in the case of Africa, dealt directly with their interventions.[3] To an extent, the security paradigm originating from the most powerful states has penetrated security dynamics elsewhere, and promoted international objectives over regional ones.[4]

New regionalism (Grant and Söderbaum 2003), arising after the Cold War, has pointed out the relationship between regionalisms, armed conflicts and peace-making. In terms of security, concepts such as 'regional conflict formations' (Väyrynen 1984), 'regional conflict complexes' (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998) and 'regional security complexes' (Buzan and Wæver 2003:40-89) have become consolidated. This has had deep implications in terms of action and impact because it has inspired regional strategies and approaches to local, regional and international security.

The concept of 'security regionalism' emerges from the assertion that the complex 'regionalised' and 'internationalised' nature of wars in Africa requires a regional approach. Whereas conventional understandings of security can be seen to fall short of addressing conflicts and terrorism, a regional approach to security may offer an attractive possibility. Thus, 'security regionalism' has advocated the importance of a regional, rather than a national or global, starting point for analysing armed conflicts (Buzan and Wæver 2003:43-44), and emphasised the critical importance of non-state actors particularly in Africa (Shaw et. al. 2003:4-5).

At the policy level, in the context of Afro-pessimism following the Rwandan genocide and the failed external intervention in Somalia, Western states had by the mid-1990s become increasingly inclined to reduce spending on international

---

1   See, for instance, Binder 1958, Brecher 1963, Zartman 1967, Cantori and Spiegel 1970 and Katzenstein 2005.

2   Among these are Destradi 2008 and Deyermond 2009.

3   See Lemarchand (1988) for Libya and Prys (2008) for South Africa.

4   Miller and Stefanova (2007) have pointed out the repercussions of the United States' War on Terror in different world regions.

peacekeeping missions in Africa. This put growing pressure on African regional and sub-regional organisations to assume responsibility for regional security. In part due to this, the popular notion 'African solutions to African problems' emerged in the context of founding the African Union. As a result, the concept can be viewed partly as an attempt to push responsibility of managing armed conflicts increasingly to African institutions. The African Peace and Security Architecture, still to be completed (Karock 2014:1), is a direct outgrowth of this development although the African Union and African sub-regional organisations have already assumed this responsibility.[5]

However, until today, regional approaches to security have largely been pursued along the lines of conventional security, and separately from economic development. This has been the case particularly in Africa during its first two decades of progressing new regionalism. Yet, it has become increasingly apparent that the conventional view, based on an attempt to establish a state's monopoly over violence through the imposition of a security apparatus, has been largely inadequate in addressing political instability and low-level insurgencies mostly occurring in the borderlands of African states. It has, in fact, at times been counter-productive in terms of promoting human rights and human security in such areas.[6]

The IGAD peace process in Sudan analysed below illustrates some of the shortcomings of security regionalism in the Horn of Africa. The case of the CPA shows how sub-regional institutions and mechanisms have been subjected to the influence and strategies of external, internationally powerful, state actors. The CPA in itself was contradictory, with largely incompatible aims of immediately ending the armed conflict and causing democratisation. In seeking to end large-scale violence, the CPA effected power sharing which allowed

---

5   The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has engaged in joint
     sub-regional security promotion since the 1980s. Other sub-regional components of the
     overall architecture include the East Africa Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM), the
     Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central
     African States (ECCAS) and the North African Regional Capability (NARC).

6   Some reported examples of this are Sudan's (HRW 2003), South Sudan's (HRW 2013) and
     Ethiopia's (HRW 2008) policies in parts of their respective state peripheries.

continuity of the coercive power of the two protagonists, which in turn hindered democratisation (Aalen 2013:174) and maintained grievances behind the armed violence. In fact, the CPA's top-level power sharing perpetuated the exclusive concentration of political and economic power among sections of ruling elites both in Sudan and South Sudan, who continued to provoke instability and armed conflict (Ylönen 2013:20-21).

3. Local protagonists and IGAD's Sudan peace process

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was first established in 1986 as a sub-regional organisation in the Horn of Africa. Its initial main objective was to manage issues related to drought and desertification. At first, IGADD members included Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, which were joined by Eritrea after its independence.[7] In the early 1990s, largely motivated by the ongoing regionally destabilising war in Sudan, the IGADD members decided to expand the organisation's mandate to conflict prevention and subsequently (in 1996) changed its name to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

By the early 1990s, the protracted civil war in southern Sudan had raged for almost a decade. Although a series of failed peace initiatives had resulted in a degree of pessimism towards finding a resolution to the armed conflict in Sudan, an attempt to end the war emerged. This initiative was inspired by Sudan's IGADD neighbours' suffering from the destabilising regional effects of the conflict. For instance, Uganda continued to experience the destabilising effects of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in its northern regions, and this was portrayed as a threat to Yoweri Museveni's regime in Kampala. The LRA having converted into a proxy force supported by Khartoum, which had strengthened it considerably, pushed Museveni to boost his aid to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the main rebel organisation in southern Sudan led by his close 'revolutionary' comrade John Garang.

---

7   Eritrea suspended its IGAD membership in 2007, and South Sudan joined the organisation after its independence in 2011.

Similarly, the war in Sudan had destabilised Ethiopia's Gambella region, which had served as the sanctuary for the SPLM/A and southern refugees since the beginning of the conflict. However, after the collapse of the Mengistu regime in May 1991 the new government in Ethiopia, of which constituent Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) had been backed by Khartoum, decided to expel the Sudanese rebels. Following this, the ruling TPLF in Ethiopia focused on internal politics in an attempt to keep the state together and extend its power over Ethiopia's other regions. Similarly, Eritrea was entangled in the internal politics of Ethiopia in its attempt to secure independence. Yet, both, having been indirectly involved in the war in Sudan previously, were inclined to seek external alliances in the protracted conflict between them by supporting the peace initiative (Adar 2000:47).

Moreover, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and to an extent Eritrea, had common interest in curbing the growing Islamism emanating from Khartoum. The National Islamic Front's Islamist project had potential for regional expansion, particularly in the neighbouring states with considerable Muslim minorities. These states feared that Khartoum's attempts to assume a leading role as the centre of Islamic revival and presumably harbouring violent extremists could lead to violence, mobilisation and political instability in their respective territories.

In September 1993 the then IGADD took up the initiative. It founded a Peace Committee under the chairmanship of Kenyan President Arap Moi, which was joined by the heads of state of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda (Hoile 2002:48). A Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers of the member states was put in charge of the mediation and was endorsed by the Friends of IGADD (later IGAD Partners Forum, IPF), which included a number of European states along with Japan and the United States (US) (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 2010). Thus, the regional dynamics of the civil war in Sudan were largely responsible for IGADD adopting a conflict resolution stature and activating a mediation agenda.

In March 1994 the peace negotiations to resolve the Sudanese civil war commenced in Nairobi. IGADD presented a Declaration of Principles (DoP) that recognised the South's right to self-determination if Khartoum failed to

democratise and promote secularism, along with social and political equality (Declaration of Principles 1994:2). The two SPLM/A factions, the SPLM/A-Mainstream and SPLM/A-United, which had split earlier when the SPLM/A had lost Ethiopian support after the fall of the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, were in favour of the proposal and signed it largely because their respective leaderships agreed that in spite of their differences they were both mainly fighting the oppressive 'Arab-Muslim' Government of Sudan (GoS).[8] This overcoming of earlier divergent positions between the two factions surprised the GoS, and it decided to withdraw from the negotiations largely because of the fear of having to commit to unforeseen compromises.

In addition, at this point the GoS' favourable military position provided it with leverage over the southern rebels. As a sign of its strength, some leaders of its dominant force, the National Islamic Front (NIF) (later the National Congress Party, NCP), were still hoping to convert Khartoum into a centre of international Islamism through the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference;[9] a plan that would have been undermined by concessions to the principally non-Muslim southern rebels. The NCP's project was aimed at completing its 'revolution for national salvation' by imposition of Arab culture and Islam on all Sudan.[10] It included support of extremist elements, including hosting Osama bin Laden (1991-6) and allegedly supporting Hamas, Hezbollah and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). On 26 February 1993, a bomb was detonated at the World Trade Centre in New York, and in the ensuing investigation Washington decided that Khartoum had been involved, which resulted in Sudan's inclusion in the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in August 1993 (Woodward 2006:53; Bhattacharji 2008).

---

8   While SPLM/A-United was mainly supported by Khartoum in its activities against the SPLM/A-Mainstream, the latter sought to increase its regional external support by signing the DoP, also because it found the propositions desirable with respect to its weak military position.

9   See, for instance, Ortega Rodrigo 2005.

10 In the context of the civil war, this led to an orchestrated attempt to eradicate cultures of minority ethnic groups by imposing Islam and Arab culture, such as in the case of the Nuba in South Kordofan (Ylönen 2009a).

By the mid-1990s, Khartoum's international position began to weaken. Domestically, the SPLM/A had regained external support and was re-strengthening its position in southern Sudan. Also, the NCP's reluctance towards the peace process led the SPLM/A to take the war northwards. In 1995 the SPLM/A signed the Asmara Declaration to found a National Democratic Alliance with a number of other armed and non-armed opposition parties in order to strengthen its national appeal and pressure Khartoum. Moreover, the SPLM/A was somewhat successful in courting neighbouring states and the US, which increased its support from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda who all faced domestic opposition supported by Khartoum (Rolandsen 2005:125-126).[11]

In June 1995, the EIJ made an attempt to assassinate the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak. The alleged involvement of agents of the Sudanese government led to wider international condemnation of Sudan's perceived support of violent Islamist extremism. By 1997, facing growing international isolation and military intervention in support of Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) armed opposition,[12] Khartoum was under increasing pressure to show that it was interested in peace. In May 1998 it formally agreed to the DoP, including self-determination of southern Sudan, as the foundation for future negotiations, but the peace process stagnated due to the outbreak of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Following this, US-Sudan relations reached a low point after the bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998, which also were initially suspected to have been linked to Sudan.[13]

---

11 Since 1991, Uganda had replaced Ethiopia as its main supporter, which was facilitated by the close SPLM/A-Kampala leadership ties but also the latter's interest to weaken Khartoum that supported the LRA.

12 See, for instance, Deng et al. 1996:161-162. Active Eritrean, Ethiopian and Ugandan support for the SAF opposition resulted in rebel occupation of a number of towns and heightened military pressure on Khartoum. The SAF were also in contact with academic turned politician, Taisier Ali, and the US National Security Adviser on Africa, John Prendergast, regarding direct 'potential support of the US to armed interventions by Northern Sudanese factions that could lead to the destabilisation of the government in Khartoum' (Hassan 2009).

13 Based on communication with a former US Ambassador. The attacks were later attributed to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

4. External actors and influences in the peace process

By the mid-1990s, the economic and security climate in the Horn of Africa had converted the US into the most powerful external actor towards Sudan. Following the 1989 coup which brought the Islamist NIF into power in Khartoum, the curbing of growing Islamism and its regional ramifications became the main US foreign policy concern towards Sudan (Woodward 2006:43-45). In this context, the US-SPLM/A partnership could be viewed as a remedy to weaken the NCP and Islamism by forging a kind of peace in the country that would either grant the SPLM/A close to an equal standing in national politics with the NCP or allow southern Sudan to become independent which would deprive Sudan of resources and weaken it considerably. Thus, the US approach to Sudan was principally security oriented, with an attempt to deter Islamism and promote regional stability.

Meanwhile, other relevant external players were active in Sudan. In the early 1990s the most important of these had been a selection of Asian states (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and China), all with major commercial interests in Sudan. Amongst these actors, China emerged as the most significant. Although it had sold weapons to Sudan previously, by the mid-1990s Chinese arms sales accelerated in the midst of the continuing civil war (Human Rights Watch 2003:456-457). In December 1996, Western civil society pressure had forced the Canadian oil company, Arakis to sell its share of the greater Nile Petroleum Company and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which had already been a considerable player in oil business in Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2003:458). The CNPC then went on to participate in the construction of a 1 500 kilometre pipeline to facilitate oil exports, and China became the main beneficiary when Sudan began exporting oil in 1999. By the turn of the millennium, China had become a major player in Sudan and the most important commercial ally of Khartoum. Any weakening or possible deposing of the Sudanese government would endanger arms sales, and oil and infrastructure contracts, and was therefore against Chinese interests, which explains China's reluctance to actively seek a negotiated end to the armed conflict. Consequently, China preferred to maintain a neutral position in international institutions,

although providing Khartoum some limited support. The effect of China's strict non-intervention policy was that it left the US as the main external player, with a security-focused approach, in search for a negotiated settlement to the conflict in southern Sudan.

The attempts to deal with growing Islamism, Sudan's alleged connection to terrorism, and their possible regional ramifications were among the main factors that prompted the US to lobby for Sudan's international isolation. In 1993 Washington added Sudan to its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and in 1996 the US passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. In the same year, it made a decision to apply indirect military pressure on Khartoum and in 1997 it imposed economic, trade and financial sanctions upon Sudan. After deciding to support Sudanese armed opposition indirectly, Washington provided over USD 20 million in non-lethal military aid to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda to aid the SAF overthrow of the GoS (Hassan 2009). However, although the outbreak of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in May 1998 (Connell 2005) ended the armed opposition advance, the concerted attempt to depose the Sudanese government shows the extent to which the US allies' regional relations reflected the American foreign policy in the Horn of Africa.

In August 1998, bombs destroyed the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Allegedly perpetrated by elements of the EIJ, also accused of the 1995 assassination attempt on the Egyptian president, the attacks prompted US retaliation by a missile strike on al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum that according to erroneous US intelligence produced chemical weapons (Astill 2001). In October, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, met with the SPLM/A and National Democratic Alliance[14] leaderships in Kampala and affirmed the Clinton Administration's commitment to support them in an

---

14 In addition to the rebels in southern Sudan the GoS faced opposition in northern Sudan and had been fighting various smaller armed factions there, both grouped together under the loose umbrella organisation, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In the course of 1994-5 the SPLM/A became one of the founding members of NDA, and became the leading armed force within the organisation.

effort to effect regime change in Khartoum (Young 2007:10).[15] In parallel, the US worked behind the scenes to push the IGAD peace process[16] and support the Sudanese opposition, while the GoS remained resistant to peace negotiations, deeming that any outcome would require concessions that would weaken the NCP's exclusive control of the state and political and economic power.[17]

In these circumstances, in which it appeared that the IGAD initiative had reached a deadlock, Egypt and Libya devised a competing peace initiative. It was immediately endorsed by the GoS but rejected by the SPLM/A and the Western stakeholders. The initiative, largely motivated by Egypt's preoccupation about control of Nile waters after a possible secession of southern Sudan, and Libya's interest in extending its influence in Sub-Saharan Africa,[18] along with the desire to include northern Sudanese opposition in the talks that centred on NCP and SPLM/A, was aimed at countering the largely Western-supported IGAD process with an inherently 'Arab'-led initiative. At this juncture, also troubled by the exclusive nature of the IGAD initiative, Eritrea and Nigeria pushed their alternative fora for negotiations, which sought to include parties of the NDA in the peace process (Young 2007:11). However, strongly in favour of the IGAD efforts that they were able to manipulate as the main financiers and diplomatic actors, the interested Western states endorsed neither one of these initiatives.

After the millennium, the US administration began experiencing unprecedented domestic pressure to achieve peace in Sudan. Interest groups, including the Black

15 According to Adar (2003:48), the US government agencies and associated organisations, such as USAID Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP), Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (FDA), Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR), and Office of Food for Peace (FFP), and the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), and others, were active in pushing the IGAD peace initiative.

16 This was characterised by the attempt to engage both protagonists by the interested parties, including the US, other IPF states, and relief, non-governmental and civil society organisations.

17 See, for instance, Ylönen (2009b) for the exclusive economic and political power and instability and armed conflict in Africa.

18 Perceiving the Nile as its lifeline, Egypt feared that the secession of southern Sudan would lead to the establishment of yet another riparian state interested in using the Nile water for its own development and decrease Egypt's share. Libya, in turn, was largely interested in expanding its own and 'Arab' influence in the Sahelian states and beyond.

Caucus, the Christian Right, human rights activists and NGOs (Sidahmed 2012; Young 2007:41), as well as approximately a dozen motivated congressmen, pushed the US administration to act.[19] In early September 2001, the Bush Administration appointed a Special Envoy, John Danforth, with a mandate to inquire about the interest of the Sudanese protagonists, the GoS and the SPLM/A, in peace (The White House 2001). Five days afterwards the 11 September attacks occurred, and bin Laden's and al-Qaeda's alleged masterminding of them put Khartoum again in the spotlight in US foreign policy. The US being the most influential external actor in Sudan, this drastically increased the momentum for peace in Sudan.

The War on Terror made the prior US Horn of Africa policy more explicit. The US became open about its agenda of curbing Islamist influences, and pushed IGAD member states to take measures to the same end. In this context, the slogan 'African solutions to African problems', describing the need to strengthen African regional security institutions, gained strength in US Africa policy (Fomunyoh 2005). In December 2001, the US published its first 'terrorism exclusion list' under the Patriot Act in which it listed 39 'terrorist' organisations, a number of them active in the Horn of Africa, while pressuring the GoS to cooperate on intelligence material on Islamist groups, pushing Kenya to step up IGAD mediation and pressing Egypt to drop its competing initiative with Libya (Young 2007:13, 14; Abdelaty 2001).

In this context, Khartoum faced unprecedented pressure to cooperate with the US and engage actively in the IGAD process. The external pressure coincided with, and was not isolated from, the rift in the GoS leadership between President Omar al-Bashir and the Muslim Brotherhood's politico-Islamist ideologue Hassan al-Turabi that led to the side-lining of al-Turabi. Finally, faced with overwhelming pressure, Khartoum agreed to co-operate with Washington on terrorism intelligence and succumbed to promoting the IGAD process as long as it was confined to narrowly focused negotiations along GoS-SPLM/A,

---

19   Based on communication with a former US Ambassador. He also disclosed that this was
       a rather unprecedented occasion in US foreign policy in which the executive was forced
       to comply with pressure from special interest groups backed by a handful of particularly
       active congressmen.

north-south, lines. This presented the GoS the least undesirable option, as it provided escape from having to submit to wider political power and wealth sharing, while establishing a working relationship with Washington on terrorism. (Young 2007:13).

Khartoum's decision to collaborate broke the deadlock. This led to the re-launching of negotiations in May 2002 in which the US, the United Kingdom and Norway (Troika) played a particularly active role (Johnson 2011). On 20 July 2002, the process brought a breakthrough mediated by the IGAD chief mediator Lazarus Sumbeiywo's team, which culminated in the signing of the Machakos Protocol by the leader of the GoS negotiating team, Ghazi Salahdien, and his SPLM/A counterpart, Salva Kiir. The protocol contained a call for a negotiated end to the conflict 'within the Unity of Sudan' (Machakos Protocol 2002:preamble), more equal distribution of power and wealth at national level and freedom of religion, while the parties also committed to a self-determination referendum after a six-year interim period in which southern Sudanese would vote either for continued unity of Sudan or for the southern region's secession from it (Machakos Protocol 2002:par. 2.5). On 15 October 2002, parties signed the agreement on cessation of hostilities, which was reinforced by another agreement in February 2003 that established a Verification Monitoring Team supervising the ceasefire. The GoS eagerness to sign an agreement ending hostilities was in part due to the deteriorating situation in Darfur, and its unwillingness to include that region in the peace treaty. On the other hand, the SPLM/A was pressured by its Western supporters on which it relied heavily for diplomatic and technical support, while also a large part of its constituency in southern Sudan was growing tired of the war.

However, the external actors sought higher level face-to-face engagement from both parties to further consolidate the process. Consequently, the Troika pushed for the Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, who was considered to hold considerable power in the GoS, and the supreme SPLM/A leader John Garang, for increasing personal engagement.[20] The US assured Taha secretly that the

---

20 This relationship had not played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the signing of the Machakos Protocol in 2002 because the head of each delegation had been changed several times (Hussein 2006:19).

conclusion of the peace agreement would improve US-Sudan relations, while it had more leverage on Garang in part due to the SPLM/A's lower negotiation capacity. Whereas Garang sought to maintain close ties with Washington for support in the negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction, the US engagement was a sign that the US had given up the plan for regime change in Khartoum and rather recognised Sudan's willingness to work for peace and against terrorism. There was hope among the NCP leadership that cooperation would improve the relationship with Washington, which was seen as a powerful ally of the armed opposition.

As a result, the US role in the process was paramount. Washington put its weight behind Garang, whose agenda for 'new Sudan' it viewed as a key to Sudan's democratic transformation in spite of SPLM/A's own authoritarianism, but it simultaneously promoted an exclusive IGAD process that paradoxically excluded other political forces (Young 2005:535-536). In this situation, a Norwegian mediator, the international development minister Hilde Johnson, became the main link between the two figures, and her personal influence and support of the SPLM/A made Norway a major player in mediation.[21]

Yet, the US continued to be the most powerful party pushing the IGAD process towards its conclusion. American diplomats worked behind the scenes with direct channels of communication to both parties. The US attention to Sudan was related in part to the deepening Darfur crisis, in spite of the Iraq war requiring its foreign policy focus. Concluding a peace treaty in Sudan before the 2004 presidential election was considered by some to provide a boost for the George W. Bush re-election campaign. The drive to conclude the process was useful for Bush in securing support of the conservative, Christian and race-focused special interest groups. Similarly, in the course of 2003-2004 the GoS had become increasingly concerned about the situation in Darfur[22] and decided to favour the concluding of peace with the SPLM/A to avoid a two-front war

---

21 In her account, *Waging Peace in Sudan*, Johnson (2011) describes her view on the mediation process leading to the finalisation of the peace agreement.

22 From 2003 onwards the main Darfur rebel groups called for an end to Darfur's political and economic marginalisation similarly to what the SPLM/A had demanded in the case of southern Sudan. Their inclusion in the peace process would have undermined the chance of reaching a quick settlement. The Western actors and the NCP preferred an exclusive two-party process between the two protagonists.

or more complex peace negotiations in which it would potentially lose more. The finalising of the process was also in the interest of the SPLM/A, which sought to maintain the north-south image of the war that gave it leverage and recognition over other opposition groups in Sudan.

Eventually, in 2004, the final agreements were signed. On 7 January 2004 the parties signed the protocol on wealth-sharing, followed by the 26 May power-sharing and three-areas protocols (Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile), which were summarised in the Nairobi declarations in June. The US was also particularly active in proposing a solution to the Abyei problem, and pushed Abyei's self-determination provision through although it meant having to settle for a later date for Abyei than the south. The breaking of the Abyei deadlock was followed by the final agreement on the security provisions in September 2004, the Implementation Protocol on 31 December, and the signing of the final CPA on 9 January 2005; a 260-page document that consisted of the earlier agreed protocols (CPA 2005).

Finally, it was predominantly the US influence that shaped the IGAD initiative into a narrow two-way process, excluding other domestic actors for a more straightforward and potentially quicker resolution. Washington, along with US experts and think-thanks, played a prominent role in working towards the final agreement. The influence of these actors in the process ' . . . had the effect of side-lining the negotiating teams . . . [while] . . . The role of [IGAD] Special Envoy Sumbeiywo and the mediation team also declined' (Young 2007:21, 22). However, once the CPA was concluded, the external pressure on the protagonists quickly evaporated, leaving the implementation of the treaty largely to the uneasy cooperation between the two former foes.

5. The CPA aftermath

The CPA's contradictions became apparent during the six-year interim period following the final agreement. Principally a power-sharing treaty, relying on the contentious partnership between the former enemies, the NCP and the SPLM/A, the CPA enjoyed little external supervision and international guarantees. Although it was celebrated as a great achievement particularly among a selection

of diplomats from the Western countries, the agreement was clearly a beginning of a process which sought to maintain the unity of Sudan when the unity was made 'attractive' enough to the southerners. The referendum for self-determination provided an exit option for southern Sudan, and together with external pressure, it was to serve as a mechanism to push the NCP to share power sufficiently to maintain southern Sudan as part of the country. This was the more convenient option in terms of international politics in which recognition of new states remains generally rare and contentious.

The political power sharing was executed by allocating the SPLM/A and other parties proportional representation in the national political institutions, the Government of National Unity and the National Assembly.[23] In addition, the CPA stipulated the establishing of a southern regional government and a regional assembly in which the SPLM/A held majority.[24] These proportional representations were effective until presidential and general elections would take place in 2009. The main provision of the wealth-sharing protocol of the CPA featured an agreement to share net oil revenues between the NCP-controlled national government and the newly formed SPLM/A-dominated Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) on a 50-50 basis (CPA 2005:54).

However, one of the main problems of the CPA was that it relied heavily on the NCP's goodwill in sharing power at the national level. This was widely seen as the only way to prevent southern Sudan from seceding after the self-determination referendum projected for 2011. In addition, maintaining the unity of Sudan depended to an extent on the SPLM/A's national reach. This in turn relied on the SPLM/A's revolutionary power centre around the movement's supreme leader John Garang, which advocated a 'new Sudan' under socially

---

23 The CPA ensured the NCP a majority position in the national executive and legislative with 52% representation and allowed the SPLM to enter in these institutions with 28% minority representation ahead of other northern parties and southern political forces with 14% and 6%, respectively (CPA 2005:24).

24 In Southern Sudanese political institutions, the power relations were reversed with the SPLM holding 70% majority representation, followed by the NCP and other southern parties with 15%. In the northern and southern states each party was to have 70% representation (CPA 2005:32).

just democratic governance.[25] Garang, who became southern Sudan regional president and national second vice-president after the CPA, was popular also in northern Sudan, and as a skilful statesman able to forge ties with sections of the northern political elite. In the early months after the signing of the CPA his appeal appeared to push southern Sudan closer to the rest of the country, reflecting an image that continued unity of the Sudanese state was possible.

However, Garang's death in a helicopter accident in July 2005 exposed the vulnerability of the CPA relying on the goodwill of a few key individuals. The coming to power of one of Garang's staunchest aides, Salva Kiir, largely unknown in northern Sudan and a recognised secessionist, set back the momentum of the SPLM/A popularity Garang had managed among northerners. Soon after Kiir succeeded Garang, SPLM/A's influence in northern Sudan waned as it began concentrating its efforts to further consolidate its rule in southern Sudan. This, in turn, allowed the NCP to take a harder stand on the SPLM/A and to focus on maintaining a firm grip on *de facto* political and economic power. As a result, a direct political confrontation emerged between the parties, with the SPLM/A demanding its rightful share of national oil resources and increase in the sharing of political power. In October 2007, the SPLM/A suspended its participation in the national political institutions due to its exclusion from the management of the oil industry (Curless and Rodt 2013:108), in which it suspected the NCP of foul play, but the US convinced the SPLM to return (Ylönen 2013:25). However, in November 2009 the SPLM again staged a boycott of the National Assembly because it considered the NCP to be deliberately delaying the preparation for general and presidential elections stipulated by the CPA for the same year.[26]

The first years after the CPA the pressure from the main external actors diminished. Occupied elsewhere, the US and its allies appear to have viewed the treaty as an end in itself instead of a roadmap for more sustainable peace. However, the key Western actors continued mainly to back the SPLM/A, a long

---

25   See more on Garang's 'new Sudan' ideology in Gibia (2008).

26   The SPLM demanded laws and procedures to be passed to diminish the NCP's ability to manipulate the elections.

term ally of the US, which in the context of its 'war on terror' appeared as the most adequate counterforce to the Islamist NCP government.[27] However the decrease of the US focus on Sudan was crucial in facilitating the slowdown of CPA implementation, and hampering the chance of it becoming a transforming force to the prevailing political reality in Sudan. The CPA lagged behind schedule throughout, as the NCP's intransigence and the SPLM/A's concentration on southern Sudan, undermined the process (Ylönen 2013:24-27).

In April 2010 the parliamentary and presidential elections in Sudan finally took place. By this time, the secessionist agenda in the SPLM/A's leadership had become increasingly clear. In the elections, the NCP and the SPLM/A agreed not to contest each other's dominant position in northern and southern Sudan, respectively. As a result, Kiir endorsed al-Bashir as the national president by withdrawing the main rival, the official SPLM/A candidate Yasir Arman, from the race, while the NCP withheld an endorsement for Kiir's main rival Lam Akol for the regional presidency in southern Sudan (Ylönen 2013:25). The elections, which registered irregularities, intimidation and harassment, confirmed the dominant positions of each party in their respective parts of the country. While al-Bashir renewed national presidency with 68.24% of the total vote and the NCP gained 323 of 450 seats in the National Assembly, Kiir's regional presidency in southern Sudan was confirmed with 92.99% of the total vote and the SPLM/A gained 160 of 170 seats in the regional Legislative Assembly (African Elections Database 2014a, 2014b).

Throughout the CPA implementation, the NCP's and the SPLM/A's respective regional coercive power was the main guarantee of dominant position and exclusive political and economic power. While the NCP leadership's control of political institutions and the security apparatus in northern Sudan continued to ensure its hegemony over the region, the SPLM/A's coercive strength prevented the GoS from encroaching on the limited southern autonomy and allowed it to push for the completion of the CPA. Like the NCP had done since, and prior to,

---

27 The SPLM/A's role as a major armed opposition party had been elevated to match that of the NCP in order to reach the exclusive peace agreement. This came at the expense of looking for a truly comprehensive solution that would have included other opposition forces, including those from Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, in the negotiation process.

coming to power in 1989, the SPLM/A asserted its dominance over the southern political landscape by converting it into a *de facto* one-party system. Political liberties were limited on the pretext of maintaining security and preventing the NCP from meddling in southern affairs. By the time the self-determination referendum came, the SPLM/A was not prepared to allow a chance for the unity of Sudan to prevail. It tightened security and engaged in active campaigning for separation, harassing critics and intimidating members of the minority that were likely to vote for the continued unity of the Sudanese state.[28] Unsurprisingly, under tight SPLM/A control the January 2011 referendum brought an overwhelming 98.83% result for separation with 97.59% turnout of registered voters (Southern Sudan Referendum Commission 2011).

The CPA had no mechanism for addressing the authoritarianisation of politics revolving around the two protagonists in northern and southern Sudan, respectively. This was problematic because it generated armed resistance due to the lack of possibility to conduct effective politics within the state's political institutions. Armed responses against the NCP continued in Darfur, and re-emerged in remote areas such as South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile. In southern Sudan, following the elections, local insurgencies strengthened and new factions emerged particularly from the ranks of disgruntled SPLA commanders who had not been able obtain political positions. While during 2010-2012 the GoS continued to be able to prevent rebel groups in northern Sudan from seriously challenging its position, southern Sudan's security apparatus enjoyed some success in neutralising factional groups fighting the GoSS.

In July 2011 South Sudan gained independence, but the relationship between Khartoum and Juba soon deteriorated. The contested resource-rich border areas continued to experience conflict. After Sudan confiscated South Sudan's oil meant for export in early 2012, quoting unpaid transit fees of the oil piped through its territory, South Sudan suspended its oil production and entered a period of austerity measures. This move by Sudan prompted a crisis between the two countries which led to a military confrontation in the oil-rich Heglig along the disputed border between the two states in April (Ylönen 2012), and was only

---

28   Based on the author's fieldwork conducted in southern Sudan in 2010-2011.

resolved later in the year, enabling South Sudanese oil exports to resume in 2013. Within this context of confrontation between the two states, both continued to experience armed opposition which in the case of South Sudan was potentially more destabilising largely due to the strength of the armed groups relative to the state.

Since the independence of South Sudan, both Khartoum and Juba have continued to use their respective security forces to quell demonstrations and insurgencies. The Sudanese government has been relatively successful in containing the rebellions in Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, and repressing dissent and demonstrations caused primarily by the worsened economic situation. Meanwhile, a potent armed opposition in the Greater Upper Nile region, which comprises roughly one-third of the country's territory, has remained the main threat to Juba particularly after a SPLM/A leadership crisis in 2013 that led to a war between the forces siding either with the incumbent President Salva Kiir or the former Vice-President Riek Machar.[29]

The current situation within and between the Sudans shows how the CPA was unable to end armed violence. One of its main flaws was that it was principally externally imposed, largely by Western actors who sought to advance their security interests in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Although these interests were to an extent compatible with Sudan's neighbours, the remedies taken and the resources involved to achieve the objectives were to a large extent provided by the interested Western states. This led to the exclusive agreement, which, as was hoped, could under the best circumstances provide a platform for future peace between the two signatories. However, it was precisely the exclusive nature of the CPA, which ignored other armed oppositions within Sudan, and the future South Sudan, which prevented it from producing increasingly peaceful conditions in the Sudans. The current ongoing conflicts in both states continue to provide opportunities for those not interested in peace, while they continue to hinder political opening and democratic development.

---

29   See Ylönen (2014) for the events leading to the current crisis in South Sudan.

6. Concluding discussion

Following the end of the Cold War, regionalism developed in the context of transformation of the international order. At the same time, the promotion of regional security, particularly to cater for the need to resolve armed conflicts in Africa, came to be seen as essential for cultivating peace, stability and development. However, in the course of the late 1990s, the claimed 'indigenous' management of regional security, or the so-called 'African solutions to African problems', remained little more than a half-empty slogan under the global security paradigm dominated by powerful states pursuing their security agendas within regions.

As this article has shown, IGAD's security function emerged from the need for promoting regional security particularly in relation to war in Sudan. Yet, its weakness and dependence on the support of a number of Western states allowed IGAD to be used as a shell to promote external interests of powerful states, as in the case of the narrow and exclusive Sudan peace process. Arguably, this promoted dependency in the sub-region and prevented the emergence of fully-fledged regionalism capable of rebuffing external interference.

A closer look at the dynamics at play in the Sudan peace process and its aftermath shatters IGAD's positive international image promoted by the Western protagonists. As the article has pointed out, although IGAD provided the façade for the peace process in Sudan and its member states were truly concerned about the destabilising effect of Sudan's war, it was stakeholders other than the IGAD members that were crucial in the making of the peace agreement. The international pressure on the protagonists, and especially the leverage that the US held over the GoS and the SPLM/A, was significant for concluding the treaty. The Western interest in isolating the southern insurgency from the national problem in Sudan coincided with the approach of the Sudanese government, and the pursuance of a piecemeal solution was largely due to their willingness to support the SPLM/A, the long-term ally of the US, over other opposition parties and seek a quick negotiated end to the large-scale violence in southern Sudan in the context of a closing window for an isolated peace agreement largely due to

the deepening crisis in Darfur. Thus, excluding Darfur and other troubled areas, and avoiding a truly comprehensive solution, enabled the pushing through of a favourable treaty for the Western actors and the SPLM/A.

Still, in spite of hopes for democratisation, exclusive power sharing through the CPA maintained an authoritarian political system in Sudan. Although it allowed the SPLM/A former rebel leadership equal status with the northern Sudanese political elite, this did not advance political opening in the country. Rather, the CPA generated a wrangle for political and economic power between the NCP and the SPLM/A elites without more general democratisation. This continues to be one of the main grievances among armed and non-armed opposition, both in northern and southern Sudan. The culmination of the CPA in southern independence in 2011 also did little to curb repression, instability and violent conflict, with both Sudans maintaining authoritarian political order backed by the coercive power of each ruling party and their respective security apparatuses.

The flaws of the largely externally imposed CPA, and its violent aftermath, put into question IGAD's independent capacity to forge peace in the Horn of Africa. Although it is true that Sumbeiywo's mediation played an important role in Machakos, even he was aware that the agreement would not have been possible without the intense involvement of the international actors, and particularly the US-led Troika. In the end, the process was largely reduced to individuals, Taha and Garang, and the mediators Johnson and Sumbeiywo, who were acting in a context heavily influenced by the main external stakeholders and particularly the US. This focus on the leading figures continued to feature in the post-war CPA implementation and conditioned its outcome.

Finally, the fact that IGAD, and especially Sumbeiywo, were given credit for the CPA, and the role of the Troika was highlighted much less, shows how the international actors were interested in portraying the process as a successful example of African regionalism. Thus, it can be argued that IGAD's reorientation from an organisation designed to tackle food crises and development challenges to a sub-regional security promotion body, offering an 'African solution for an African problem', was largely due to the interests of the involved international

actors. It can be perceived as a façade to veil their direct, and mainly self-interested, intervention in the greater Horn of Africa security affairs. The case of the CPA and its aftermath in the Sudans is a tragic example of this involvement.

Sources

Aalen, Lovise 2013. Making unity unattractive: The conflicting aims of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement. *Civil Wars* 15 (2), pp. 173-191.

Abdelaty, Soha 2001. Testing the waters. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 22-28 November. Available from: <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/561/eg3.htm> [Accessed 20 April 2014].

Adar, Korwa G. 2000. Conflict resolution in a turbulent region: The case of the inter-governmental authority on development (IGAD) in Sudan. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 1 (2), pp. 39-66.

African Elections Database 2014a. Elections in Sudan. Available from: <http://africanelections.tripod.com/sd.html> [Accessed 23 April 2014].

African Elections Database 2014b. Elections in South Sudan. Available from: <http://africanelections.tripod.com/ssd.html> [Accessed 23 April 2014].

Astill, James 2001. Strike one. *The Guardian*, 2 October. Available from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/02/afghanistan.terrorism3> [Accessed 29 November 2013].

Bhattacharji, Preeti 2008. State sponsors: Sudan. *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2 April. Available from: <http://www.cfr.org/sudan/state-sponsors-sudan/p9367> [Accessed 25 September 2013].

Binder, Leonard 1958. The Middle East as a subordinate international system. *World Politics* 10 (3), pp. 408-429.

Brecher, Michael 1963. International Relations and Asian Studies: The subordinate state system of Southern Asia. *World Politics* 15 (2), pp. 213-235.

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver 2003. *Regions and powers: The structure of international security.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Cantori, Louis J. and Steven L. Spiegel 1970. *The international politics of regions.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.

Cilliers, Jakkie and Julia Schünemann 2013. The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace? ISS paper 246, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper246.pdf> [Accessed 2 June 2014].

Clark, Ian 1997. *Globalization and fragmentation: International Relations in the twentieth century.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Connell, Dan 2005. Eritrea/Ethiopia war looms. *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 2 October. Available from: <http://fpif.org/eritreaethiopia_war_looms/> [Accessed 12 September 2014].

CPA 2005. *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army.* Nairobi, Kenya, 9 January.

Curless, Gareth and Annemarie Peen Rodt 2013. Sudan and the not so comprehensive peace. *Civil Wars* 15 (2), pp. 101-117.

Declaration of Principles 1994. IGAD peace initiative: Declaration of Principles. Nairobi, 20 July.

Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and I. William Zartman 1996. *Sovereignty as responsibility: Conflict management in Africa*. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution.

Destradi, Sandra 2008. Empire, hegemony, and leadership: developing a research framework for the study of regional powers. Working Paper 79. German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany. Available from: <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download. php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp79_destradi.pdf> [Accessed 20 May 2014].

Deyermond, Ruth 2009. Matrioshka hegemony? Multi-levelled hegemonic competition and security in post-Soviet Central Asia. *Review of International Studies,* 35 (1), pp. 151-173.

Duffield, Mark 2001. *Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and security*. London, Zed Books.

Duffield, Mark 2007. *Development, security, and unending war: Governing the world of peoples*. Cambridge, Polity.

Fomunyoh, Chris 2005. African solutions to African problems: A slogan whose time has passed. *allAfrica*, 9 February. Available from: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200502090005.html> [Accessed 29 January 2014].

Gibia, Roba 2008. John Garang and the vision of New Sudan. Toronto, Key Publishing.

Grant, J. Andrew and Fredrik Söderbaum eds. 2003. *The New Regionalism in Africa*. Aldershot, Ashgate.

Grant, J. Andrew and Fredrik Söderbaum 2003. Introduction: The New Regionalism in Africa. In: Grant and Söderbaum eds. 2003, pp. 1-20.

Hassan, Ahmed 2009. The rise and fall of Sudan Alliance Forces (1). African Arguments, 8 October. Available from: <http://africanarguments.org/2009/10/08/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-sudan-alliance-forces-1/> [Accessed 21 August 2013].

Hoile, David 2002. *The search for peace in the Sudan: A chronology of the Sudanese peace process*. London, The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council.

HRW (Human Rights Watch) 2003. Sudan, oil, and Human Rights. HRW. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/sudanprint.pdf> [Accessed 12 September 2014].

HRW (Human Rights Watch) 2008. Collective punishment: War crimes and crimes against humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Region. HRW, 12 June. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/ethiopia0608/index.htm > [Accessed 12 September 2014].

HRW (Human Rights Watch) 2013. 'They are killing us'. Abuses against civilians in South Sudan's Pibor County. HRW, September. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/09/12/they-are-killing-us> [Accessed 12 September 2014].

Hussein, Mohamed el-Mukhtar 2006. Negotiating peace: The road to Naivasha. In: Simmons Mark and P. Dixon eds. *Peace by piece: Addressing Sudan's conflicts*, Accord 18, pp. 18-19.

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 2010. About us – IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). 9 January. Available from: <http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=124&limitstart=5> [Accessed 27 September 2013].

Johnson, Hilde F. 2011. *Waging peace in Sudan: The inside story of the negotiations that ended Africa's longest civil war*. Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press.

Karock, Ulrich 2014. The African Peace and Security Architecture: Still under construction. European Parliament, Briefing DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_47, 14 March.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 2005. *A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.

Lemarchand, René 1988. *The green and the black: Qadhafi's policies in Africa*. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press.

Machakos Protocol 2002. Machakos Protocol. IGAD Secretariat on Peace in the Sudan, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, Machakos 20 July.

Miller, Mark J. and Boyka Stefanova eds. 2007. *The war on terror in comparative perspective: US security and foreign policy after 9/11*. Basingstoke, UK, Palgrave MacMillan.

Ortega Rodrigo, Rafael 2005. *El islám político en Sudán*. Granada, University of Granada Press.

Prys, Miriam 2008. Developing contextually relevant concept of regional hegemony: The case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and 'quiet diplomacy'. Working Paper 77. German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany. Available from: <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp77_prys.pdf> [Accessed 23 May 2014].

Rolandsen, Øystein 2005. *Guerrilla government: Political changes in southern Sudan during the 1990s*. Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute.

Rosecrance, Richard 1992. A new concert of powers. *Foreign Affairs,* 71 (2), pp. 64-82.

Shaw, Timothy M., Frederik Söderbaum, Julius E. Nyang'oro and J. Andrew Grant 2003. The future of New Regionalism in Africa: Regional governance, human security/development and beyond. In: Grant, J. Andrew and Fredrik Söderbaum eds. *The New Regionalism in Africa*. Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 192-206.

Sidahmed, Alsir 2012. Influence of interest groups on American policy-making. *Arab News*, 8 August. Available from: <http://www.arabnews.com/influence-interest-groups-american-policy-making> [Accessed 12 September 2013].

Southern Sudan Referendum Commission 2011. Southern Sudan Referendum Final Results Report. Khartoum, 7 February.

Stewart, Frances 2004. Development and security. *Conflict, Security & Development,* 4 (3), pp. 261-288.

The White House 2001. President appoints Danforth as Special Envoy to the Sudan. Office of the Press Secretary, 6 September. Available from: <http://georgebush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010906-3.html> [Accessed 10 October 2013].

Väyrynen, Raimo 1984. Regional conflict formations: An intractable problem of International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research,* 21 (4), pp. 337-359.

Väyrynen, Raimo 2003. Regionalism: Old and new. *International Studies Review,* 5 (1), pp. 25-51.

Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg 1998. Armed conflict and regional conflict complexes, 1989-97. *Journal of Peace Research,* 35 (5), pp. 621-634.

Woodward, Peter 2006. *US foreign policy and the Horn of Africa.* Aldershot, Ashgate.

Ylönen, Aleksi 2009a. Marginalisation and violence: Considering origins of insurgency and peace implementation in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan. Paper 201, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/P201.pdf> [Accessed 2 February 2014].

Ylönen, Aleksi 2009b. On sources of political violence in Africa: The case of 'Marginalizing State' in Sudan. *Política y Cultura,* 32 (Fall), pp. 37-59.

Ylönen, Aleksi 2012. The Sudan - South Sudan military escalation in Heglig: Shifting attention from domestic challenges. *Conflict Trends,* 4, pp. 11-19.

Ylönen, Aleksi 2013. Building a state without the nation? 'Peace-through-statebuilding' in Southern Sudan, 2005-2011. *UNISCI Discussion Papers* 33 (October), pp. 13-34.

Ylönen, Aleksi 2014. Dwindling but surviving: South Sudan and external involvement in the current crisis. *Review of African Political Economy,* 41 (141), pp. 1-8.

Young, John 2005. John Garang's legacy to the peace process, the SPLM/A & the South. *Review of African Political Economy,* 32 (106), pp. 535-548.

Young, John 2007. Sudan IGAD peace process: an evaluation. *Sudan Tribune*, 30 May. Available from: <http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Igad_in_Sudan_Peace_Process.pdf> [Accessed 10 June 2012].

Zartman, I. William 1967. Africa as a subordinate state system in International Relations. *International Organization,* 21 (03), pp. 545-564.

Formal and informal land tenure systems in Afar region, Ethiopia: Perceptions, attitudes and implications for land use disputes

Kelemework Tafere Reda*

Abstract

Land is a contentious resource in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia. Traditional pastoralism, which is both a mode of production and a cultural way of life, dictates communal ownership of grazing land on which individually owned livestock graze. Pastoral land in Afar has traditionally been administered by the local communities themselves. However, with a gradual incorporation of the pastoralists into the Ethiopian modern polity, there have been competitive interests over issues of land administration between local communities and the state which often led to conflict and instability. Government land administration policies often contravene the age-old pastoral customary institutions; and stakeholder relations have taken a bitter course following the expansion of commercial agriculture, land investments and development projects. Using data obtained through Qualitative Interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) this paper analyses land administration trajectories and dynamics in Afar region. It assesses how contradictions between statutory and customary tenure systems shape relations between multiple resource users including the state, investors, local communities, and neighbouring cultural groups. It also examines the impact of multi-stakeholder land disputes on land resource management, thereby identifying appropriate policy options for effective land administration practices in the pastoral areas.

---

*   Dr Kelemework Tafere Reda is a Visiting Researcher at the Institute of Dispute Resolution in Africa (IDRA), University of South Africa (UNISA).

Introduction

Pastoralism with livestock husbandry as its main feature has existed for many centuries in the Horn of Africa region and East Africa as a whole. Ethiopia is home to ten million pastoralists who occupy over 61 per cent of the country's land mass. They are found in seven of the twelve regional states in Ethiopia and occupy the most inhospitable arid and semi-arid environments characterised by high temperature and low and erratic rainfall patterns (Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia 2010), often with an annual rainfall of less than 500-750 mm (Markakis 2004:4). At present, pastoralists find it difficult to make efficient use of their land resources due to internal and external factors pertinent to land tenure and use. Development policies of the 1970s and 1980s have actually failed to recognise customary rights of pastoralists to land (Cotula et al. 2004:23).

The Afar, who belong to two groups of distinct descent (Getachew 2001), are one of the largest pastoral groups in the Horn of Africa. They are found in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. Their population in Ethiopia is 1 390 273 and they occupy an area of 96 707 square kilometres (Central Statistical Authority 2008). In terms of Ethnic composition, the majority (i.e. over 90%) are Afar; but there are also settlers from other ethnic groups. These include Amhara, 5.22%; Argoba, 1.55%; Tigrayans, 1.15%; Oromo, 0.61%; Welayta, 0.59%; and Hadya, 0.18% (CSA 2008).

The Afar region is one of the poorest, drought-affected and least developed regions of Ethiopia, and is neglected by national development initiatives (Guinand 2000; Piguet 2002). It is only in recent years that efforts have been undertaken to provide basic infrastructure such as roads and administrative buildings as well as education and basic health services. However, despite these positive developments, pastoralists in Ethiopia are facing the problem of land grabbing and the new agrarian colonialism (Galaty 2011:6).

Research question and methodology

The study upon which this report is based employed qualitative approaches of data collection with ethnography as the principal research method. The fundamental research question was: How do the dynamics in land tenure

and land governance shape relations between stakeholders in the Afar region? Hence the specific objectives were 1) to examine the formal and informal land tenure systems in Afar region, 2) to analyse the dynamics in land use and land administration from the point of view of local communities, 3) to examine government attitudes and policies on land use and administration, 4) to examine emerging disputes among stakeholders as a result of changes in land use and administration practices.

Fieldwork was conducted on a sample of nine districts of the Afar region. These were Awash, Assayta, Dubti, Chifra, Kuneba, Ab'ala, Amibara, Gewane and Ewa. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with forty five knowledgeable key informants selected from the nine districts. A total of eighteen Focus Group Discussions (two FGDs in each district) were also conducted to ascertain community views and practices. Each focus group was composed of eight to ten participants representing the different sections of the community in terms of age, gender and socio-economic status. There was also a total of nine informants from the local *Woreda*[1] administrations in order to understand the government's perspectives. The findings of the study are presented below in the form of descriptive narratives. The quotations presented in the text emanated from the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and key-informant interviews and are representative of the overall feedback obtained from respondents during the fieldwork period.

---

1   *Woreda* is an administrative unit below the region and zone structures. For the sake of convenience the term 'district' has also been used in this paper to denote the same political unit.

Map 2: Location of conflict prone areas involving Afar and other groups.
The Issa clan of a Somali ethnic group are pastoralists while those across the regional borders are farmers belonging to Tigray, Amhara and Orom ethnic groups in Federal Ethiopia (Source: Hassan 2008).

The formal and informal tenure systems

According to informants, water, grazing land and forests are key resources in the Afar lowlands. Land is particularly perceived by the Afar pastoralists as the most indispensable asset, as it, together with livestock, plays an indispensible role in times of life and death, conflict and peace, happiness, misery and sadness.

There are typically two types of land tenure systems that have crystallised over the course of time. The first is the formal system which is based on policies, laws and proclamations put in place by the federal and regional governments. The second relates to informal tenure, in which land boundaries and rules of resource use and administration are traditionally defined on the basis of clan-based social organisation. The latter operates in accordance with existing customary norms and value systems.

The formal tenure systems are more recent and are an extension of the government's experience with agrarian societies in the highland parts of Ethiopia. As Helland (2006) points out, the fact that pastoral land tenure received less attention in the country's constitution and overall public policy is indicative of the fact that pastoralists have been socially and politically marginalised.

In the context of the Afar, the customary and government tenure systems are in frequent interaction with one another and have been subject to the influence of various socio-economic, cultural and political factors. The informal tenure system has hitherto been dominant and has not been in concurrence with government tenure approaches that place emphasis on harmonised national level land use rights to households. Except in the case of land taken by the government for development projects and specific plots apportioned for investors (which for the most part still remains in the custody of clan heads), most other land is communally administered and is predominantly used for communal livestock grazing. Grazing land and forest reserves have long been governed by the sultanate[2] or/and clan-based institutions. Each clan and sub-clan has its own territory and access by others is subject to prior mutual consent.

---

2   The sultanate is a hereditary spiritual leadership structure. Sultan Ali Mirah and his son Hamfrey Ali Mirah are considered the most influential spiritual leaders among the Afar especially in the Ausa area of Zone 1 administration.

Formal and informal tenure systems have their own strengths and weaknesses. For example, although land is deemed to be communally owned under the traditional pastoral tenure system, there is often a problem of equitability. The customary institutions are mainly based on a clan system in which clan territories provide the framework for land resource utilisation, management and administration. This kind of clan-based territorial land resource use and administration can potentially have a negative impact on fair and sustainable resource distribution, use and management in the region. In the customary arrangement, only members of a clan have the right to claim land found within the clan territory. The implication is that in situations where irrigation is proposed as a food security intervention, people who live in the same administrative unit (or neighbouring areas) but belonging to other clans may be denied access to land under the customary rules. As adequately explained by informants in Amibara *Woreda* of Zone 3 administration, this exclusionist trend in the customary institutions may infringe upon the government's efforts to ensure food security in the region. It also triggers conflict among different clans or territorial groups within Afar.

Besides, despite their strength in the sphere of resource and conflict management, customary institutions generally disenfranchise certain vulnerable groups and tend to be gender insensitive. They fail to protect some of the crucial rights of women. This violates the constitutional rights of women to access land and defies one of the major principles of the regional land policy.

The government tenure system comes under severe criticism owing to its biased understanding of the pastoral mode of production. The notion that depicts pastoralism as less productive and environment unfriendly has affected the mind-sets of governments in East Africa (Øygard et al. 1999). The Ethiopian case is no exception. The government has, as a matter of policy, tried to be inclusive, empowering pastoralists in decision making on issues pertinent to their local conditions and indeed in other political matters as well.[3] However, in reality, the

---

3   There are groups that reflect pastoralists' concerns at higher levels of decision making. For example, the Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee addresses the demands, interests and priorities of Ethiopian pastoralists and brings them to the attention of policy makers in the parliament.

government's presence in the lowland peripheries is generally limited. The formal institutions required for the implementation of appropriate land tenure, land administration and land resources management are far from strong. Where the formal land governance structures existed, they often contravened the age-old customary institutions of natural resource management by introducing practices that were alien to community norms. Instead of supporting and providing adequate operational space to the already effective indigenous institutions, the formal machineries tend to disenfranchise and replace community-based structures. This has led to tremendous loss of land resources in recent decades. An old man in Gewane complained, '*Now that we are side-lined, we sit back and watch as our resources are degraded and the trees are cut down and taken away by day-time robbers*' (Key-informant interview conducted on 26 August 2013).

Land use dynamics and governance: Local views and practices

During the time of the Emperors and earlier, the Afar relied on 'nomadic' pastoralism in which multi-species livestock husbandry formed the crux of their livelihood. Afar pastoralism is founded on the philosophy of individual ownership of livestock in communal land, which enabled pastoralists to move freely in the different ecological sub-zones. Seasonal mobility guaranteed optimum use of temporally and spatially variable resources.

In times of drought, there are often consultations between neighbouring clans on joint pastoral land use which also entails harmonisation of customary rules on natural resource use to accommodate the interests of multiple resource users. Many neighbouring sedentary agriculturalists, however, often perceived the communal pastoral land as 'no-man's land' since communal land use right is often confused with open access to resources. A highland farmer who came down to Ab'ala market in Afar commented, '*Lowland resource is like holy water, free for everyone to use at will. You can just help yourself to it at your convenient time*'.[4] These attitudes have contributed to deforestation and misuse of resources in the pastoral areas. Many of the indigenous tree species have been destroyed

---

4   Informant perspectives quoted throughout the paper are the author's own translations from Amharic or Tigrigna languages which the Afar people speak reasonably well.

on a massive scale for charcoal and firewood production by highlanders (Focus Group Discussions conducted in zones 2, 3 and 4 of Afar region, 24 August to 7 September 2013).

Recently, the land use pattern in the study area has exhibited a significant change owing to ecological and demographic factors as well as a shift in state policy. The frequency of drought has increased over the past few decades, compelling the Afar to look for alternative livelihood strategies including trade, wage labour migration and crop cultivation. Moreover, the Afar people have also experienced population pressure, expansion from neighbouring cultivators and pastoralists (such as the Issa Somali) and invasive weeds such as *Prosopis juliflora*, locally called *Woyane or Dergihara*.[5]

The Ausaareas (particularly in the Asayta and Afambo districts) have better experience in farming. Traditionally land has been allocated by customary land administrators, based on orders from the sultan via clan leaders (*Kedo-aba*). The apportionment of river water among users follows a similar trajectory. Traditional land administrators make reports on problems and achievements through the same structure. In parts of southern Afar, agriculture as a mode of livelihood is a relatively recent development dating back to the 1970s. However, informants in the northern part of the Afar region argued that they started farming as early as the 1960s albeit much of it was based on share cropping with highlanders. Still in other areas around the Middle Awash Valley (such as Amibara, Gewane, Chifra) informants indicated that they started crop cultivation only after the 1990s with the coming to power of the incumbent government and the subsequent pressure from the political administration. Whenever agreements with the regional government were reached on the allocation of agricultural land for cultivation, emphasis was often placed on the need to respect already existing clan-based boundaries in order to avoid conflict and inter-clan feuds (Interview with local elders in Amibara and Gewane districts, 25-27 August 2013).

In some areas, especially along the Awash River, a good deal of land has also been assigned to investors on the basis of a contractual agreement with clan heads. As part of the agreement, investors share about 30-40 per cent of their produce

---

5   Named after the dominant political parties of the last two governments in Ethiopia.

with clan chiefs (*kedo Aba*) who in turn are expected to distribute the proceeds to member households. Clan heads, for their part, are expected to take care of the agricultural fields by preventing animal and human encroachments into the farms.

Despite such changes, local people still perceive pastoralism as the most viable mode of production in the arid and semi-arid areas that characterise their environment. The increased inclination to agriculture is generally the result of the pastoralists' frantic efforts to deal with the challenges of persistent drought and resource depletion. The inclination has also resulted from the government's subsequent campaigns to convince herders to become sedentary farmers. Regardless of such ecological and political pressures, restocking and returning to the old 'purely' pastoral mode of life have always constituted the priority concern of communities. Speaking of the relative advantage of pastoralism over agriculture, a well-known community leader stated:

> '*We live in an environment where the pattern of rainfall is irregular and unpredictable. In drier seasons, we move with our animals in search of grass and water elsewhere. If we were to depend on crop cultivation for our livelihood, we would be in trouble because we cannot possibly move the land to where there is adequate water when the rains fail in our place*' (Interview with clan elders in Amibara district, 24 August 2013).

The romantic connection to traditional pastoralism and the values associated with it are still solidly grounded despite gradual fragmentation of the traditional institutions over the last few decades. With the diffusion of Western value systems, urbanisation and the expansion of technological gadgets (such as modern communication and transportation facilities), the younger generation has become reluctant to sustain local culture. They consider traditional institutions as archaic and primitive and call for radical change in the socio-cultural set-up. As a result generational conflict has become evident.   An informant in Assayta district described the steady loss of tradition as follows:

> *The power of the sultan which had political and judicial functions is now being diluted. The clan leaders which were the main actors in reconciliation are made powerless too; and they are now replaced by the modern courts. Even*

the camel, our most cherished animal, has been replaced with motor vehicles; and there are modern drugs instead of our traditional medicine. We don't know where we are heading (Key informant interview in Assayta district, 5 September 2013).

Clan leaders still command respect but traditional administration of pastoral land is based on consensus building involving ordinary clan members including women. The perception (by non-Afar) that supreme power is vested in clan leaders is no longer correct. Decisions on how pastoral land should be used and administered, including the delineation of boundaries and assignment of land for grazing and settlement purposes, are made collectively. This is not to undermine the role played by clan heads in leadership, nor to deny their active roles in gauging the behaviour of clan members, but to underline the fact that clan headship is not hereditary and hence clan leaders do not possess veto rights on community matters.[6]

The focus group discussions conducted in all the study sites revealed that little has changed over the past several decades regarding local people's perceptions and views on how land should be administered. Land and water resources are largely considered God's gifts and in principle all people have the right to use them. Local pastoralists believe land belongs to the specific clans. This is a traditional view that descended down across generations since time immemorial. In connection with this, a key informant in Assayta district stated: '*We [the Afar] don't joke about four assets: religion, women, land and livestock*' (Interview with Afar elders in Gewane district, 25 August 2013).

Similarly, informants in the Amibara district supported this view through their proverbs about a malignant fear of an uncertain future if their communal tenure system is derailed. One proverb from the northern part of the Afar region states, '*Ada-Habiniki-Adewi-konegera*' literally translated as: '*Once you lose your original trail of tradition, the enemy takes advantage of your resources*'.

Community members are generally of the view that clans should be further empowered to deal with land use, administration and management.

---

6   In fact, informants have made it clear during the discussions that clan leaders may be replaced by others if they misbehave or act against the interest of the community.

They believe that land is an indispensable asset of the Afar and that no land is free to be used for any other purpose than livestock husbandry. Clan-based tenure has always demonstrated its strength and the role of the formal administrative units (such as *Woreda* and *Kebelle*[7] administration, agricultural and pastoral development offices) has been limited to the provision of technical backstopping to facilitate pastoral/agro-pastoral development. According to informants, the formal structures are almost entirely engulfed by the customary institutions. In its present state, the administration finds it useful to soothe community interests to some extent and does not often use vehement force to bring about radical changes to the status quo with regard to land administration matters.

On issues of resource governance, land administration and conflict management, what local people perceived as an appropriate role for government institutions is supervision and the provision of consistent technical and financial support to customary institutions. This could be done though training, assignment of incentives/remuneration for individuals or groups taking care of resources in the clan-based structures, experience sharing, and provision of logistical support. Government authorities were also advised to continue encouraging restorative justice by channelling disputes into appropriate local structures and assisting elders in enforcing sanctions when deemed necessary. In relation to this, the pastoral Afar often say '*God and the state should rule from above*'.

As poverty was perceived to be a proximate factor in conflict, elders also advised the government to proceed with its infrastructure development (schools, roads, clinics, expansion of pastoral and agro-pastoral extension systems, telecommunication and communication facilities) in order to facilitate inter-cultural contact and dialogue among various groups.

Generally the following conditions currently play an inhibiting role on proper land administration and judicious management of range land resources in the Afar region.

---

7   *Kebelle* is the smallest administrative unit in the government administrative structure. The organisation of *Woredas* and *Kebelles* in Afar do not necessarily follow traditional grazing systems.

First and foremost, there is a lack of participatory bottom-up approaches in policy planning and implementation: people often complain about blueprint approaches that usually descend down to the villages from either the federal or the regional government without prior consultations with local communities. There have been problems with consensus building because of the lack of commitment by those responsible to influence change. Often, there is a communication gap and misunderstanding leading to disparity between government plans and intentions and local people's perceptions and knowledge of policies, programmes and strategies. Government authorities not only lack the capacity to impact change in the minds and hearts of pastoral people, they also lack the determination and stamina to challenge traditional pastoral values because of stiff resistance from communities.

Secondly, the functional integration between various interventions is very weak. Different programmes facilitating the move towards sedentary agriculture and the subsequent change in land administration lack proper coordination and integration. There is also lack of adequate government financial support for alternative livelihood and income generation in the lowlands. Some Afar informants asserted that communities may consider dropping the traditional pastoral philosophy on land administration only in the presence of a well demonstrated viable alternative to pastoralism which they find difficult to discern presently.

Furthermore, mapping of land resources is not well developed in Afar. This puts appropriate land use planning at risk. Currently little is known about the potential for agriculture and the areas identified for settlements have not been selected in concurrence with local people's needs and priorities.

Policy and legal framework

As Helland (2006:9) states, government interest in the lowlands was observed during the imperial regime as early as the 1950s due to the high irrigation potential of the land. The 1955 Constitution of Ethiopia stated that '*all property not held and possessed in the name of any person, natural or judicial, including … all grazing lands… are State Domain*' (Helland 2006*)*. Although the feudal tenure system was abolished, the 1975 land reform retained the sole constitutional right of the State to own rural land. For the first time in modern history, Ethiopian

farmers enjoyed land use rights enabling them to be the masters of their own produce. According to current rural land laws, communities are granted not only usufruct rights but also the right to inherit, transfer and lease land. However, sale of land is prohibited by law. All rural land (whether agricultural or pastoral) belongs to the state. Generally, the pastoral areas have until recently remained largely unaddressed in national land policies, laws and proclamations. In fact, the notion of 'land' has been predominantly discussed in the context of the agrarian mode of production.

The federal rural land administration and land use proclamation ratified in 2005 (Proclamation 456/2005) grants regional governments the mandate to draft their own detailed land administration laws, proclamations and guidelines that are suitable to local contexts in the respective regions. The Afar region was among the first to initiate a policy of pastoral land use and land administration in 2008. This was followed by the ratification of Proclamation 49/2009, along with specific regulations and guidelines for implementation that were issued in 2011. However, the new land use policies were not supported by appropriate governing institutions for efficient utilisation and management of resources, which led to deforestation and land mismanagement.

With regard to land tenure policies, people felt that the different regional states in federal Ethiopia should have been treated differently as they are historically and culturally different. Others believed traditional and statutory tenure systems can be harmonised to become mutually supportive. The biggest problem for them was the marginalisation of communities in land administration discourses. A prominent key informant in Ewa district said the following:

> *The government wants to bring change to our tenure system which we may welcome if convincing, but how is this possible if we are not consulted in the decision-making process? Some administrators say our times [the rule of traditional people] are gone but they rush back to us whenever there are resource-based conflicts across the region* (Interview with a clan leader, Amibara district, 23 August 2013).[8]

---

8   The Afar people have traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that are effective. Experience has shown that conflict cases that were handled by the formal courts have ended up without a satisfactory solution. Hence, the local administration now encourages resolution of disputes by local elders using customary approaches.

According to informants, the Afar are ready to make concessions in a way that will accommodate major government concerns and demands on condition that local institutions are recognised and the noble mandate of administering land is given to the traditional system. Pastoralists tend to be particularly uncomfortable with the idea of destocking because livestock are the most indispensable assets with economic, social and cultural value. In connection with this, one of the key informants stated: '*They (government officials) asked us to reduce the number of our animals; in response, we asked them to reduce the amount of money they have in the bank first*'. Livestock are a source of insurance for the Afar. Animal husbandry is not only a source of income but also the foundation upon which social prestige and honour are based.

Villagisation and resettlement programmes

Two major government activities have curtailed pastoralist mobility in the middle and lower Awash Valley of the Afar region: villagisation and resettlement. Both significantly affect pastoral tenure and resource governance.

According to government authorities, voluntary settlements of pastoral communities are being initiated in order to supply people with basic infrastructure such as potable water, schools and health services, and agricultural inputs. The ultimate goal is to reduce their vulnerability to climate change impacts. Pastoralists are advised to combine quality-based animal husbandry with irrigation-dependent crop cultivation to ensure household food security (Focus group discussion with government officials in Amibara and Gewane districts, 24 and 26 August 2013). Successive governments in Ethiopia believed the sentimental attachments of pastoralists to their cattle should be replaced with a new, 'modern' attitude that curbs mobility. In ordinary discourses officials usually maintained the view that '*pastoralists need not always follow the tails of their cattle to earn livelihoods*'. The formal land use and land administration policies were therefore intended to guide pastoral settlements, land distribution and certification activities. In principle, the regional government recognises the customary rights of pastoralists to grazing land. Nevertheless, on the ground, more work is being done to encourage pastoralists to lead what is often termed as 'undisturbed life'.

Local administrators believe that change of community attitudes has been successfully achieved through awareness campaigns. As pointed out earlier in this paper, the more progressive younger generations and those in government administration think there is a need for drastic change in the pastoral way of life including the traditional land use and land administration trajectory: a total shift from the pastoral communal mode to one of predominantly government-owned, equitably distributed, cultivable land. They argue that pastoralism is no longer resilient given the ecological problems, loss of livestock, population growth and other pressures. Therefore they feel it is high time to distribute communal land to individual households for agricultural purposes based on the experience in the highlands (Interviews in Ab'ala, Kuneba and Ewa districts, September 2013).

Consequently, the government redistributed land which was previously occupied by investors. Those who voluntarily settled were provided with a hectare of land per household to start with. These government-sponsored pastoralist settlement programmes have taken root in several areas of the Lower and Middle Awash Valleys of the Afar region. Up to 20% of the land previously assigned to investors has been reclaimed for this purpose.[9] The programme is currently being implemented in 9 districts, viz., Afambo (seven centres), Assayta (eleven centres), Dubti (eleven centres), Gewane (five centres), Amibara (five centres), Awash (one centre), Ewa (eight centres), Mille (four centres), and Burmodayto (four centres). According to the information obtained from the administration, the specific settlement centres were selected on the basis of some criteria such as proximity to perennial rivers, ground water potential, and proneness to flood risks, to mention just a few. Key opinion leaders were approached to convince people about the importance of villagisation. Some clan leaders were also instrumental in the diffusion of regional land laws and identification of beneficiaries to promote fair and equitable distribution of land resources. Efforts were made to ensure that such a scheme was acceptable by all or the majority of the people (Interview with *Woreda* officials in Dubti district, 30 August 2013).

---

9   During the Derg regime, large tracts of pastoral land around the Awash River were taken by state farms, much of which was returned to the community after the EPRDF came to power. Instead of developing the land themselves, clan leaders then decided to rent out the land to investors on behalf of the community for a 30-40% profit share.

There were, however, some challenges. Informants argued that the modality and conditions for such programmes often lacked clarity and have not been properly communicated to rural communities in advance. The principles and modes of action as well as intended target outcomes generally remained vague or obscure to the local population. These packages often came down to the region from the federal level policy makers in the form of orders. The lack of adequate grassroots participation has been reported as government authorities exhibited excessive dependence on clan leaders during consultations. The government has recently adopted a strategy of co-opting clan leaders[10] into the formal government administrative structures in order to communicate its policy, facilitate easy diffusion of its plans, and ensure speedy implementation. Those who occupy key positions in the regional administration also tend to be sons and daughters of the clan leaders with divided loyalties to government interests on one hand and the demands of local community members on the other hand. The villagisation scheme also lacked consistent follow up and monitoring. It was highly centralised with very weak institutional linkages at various levels of decision making. Informants argued that it is a mirage (*Bekerbeker*) to try to improve pastoralist living conditions through sedentarisation. One of the clan leaders interviewed during the study elucidated the situation as follows:

> *The idea of pastoralist settlement with all the social and economic requirements met to our satisfaction is like driving in the desert. From a distance, you perceive as if there is a lake in the middle of the road and as you go closer the lake goes farther and farther away until you finally realize that it was only an illusion* (Interview with clan leaders in Gewane district, 25 August 2013).

In general, the pastoralist Afar have always considered crop cultivation inferior to pastoralism. An informant in Amibara district, for example, enquired:

> '*Why does the government want us to settle and start agriculture while everybody knows that our neighbouring cultivators are much poorer than us? They are the ones who always depended on food aid for survival*'.

---

10   In many of the districts we visited, clan leaders or their close associates assumed important government positions either as administrators or as counsellors, but they often find themselves in difficult positions reconciling state trajectories and pastoralist interests (which they themselves inherently hold as traditional leaders).

Pastoralist resettlement schemes of the government also posed another challenge to traditional pastoral mobility in southern Afar. Article 40 of the 1994 Ethiopian constitution states: '*Ethiopian pastoralists have the right not to be displaced from their own lands. The implementation shall be specified by* law'. Subsequent land appropriation and compensation laws granted pastoralists the right to obtain compensation for pastoral land appropriated by government for development projects such as sugar cane investments (although valuation of pastoral communal land has never been easy). Compensation for resettled communities[11] is paid in the form of cash, provision of alternative farm lands as well as improved access to basic services. Regrettably, promises were often broken in some areas and expectations surpassed actual achievements on the ground. The proposed socio-economic support (schools, potable water supply, and clinics, to mention a few) were not largely fulfilled to the satisfaction of local communities.

Informants argued that settlement/resettlement plans were not well thought through before implementation. The areas identified for permanent relocation were not carefully selected and were found to be unsustainable due to increased proneness to more environmental risks such as drought, floods, excessive heat and human and animal disease. Clan leaders complained about double standards as they also lost benefits from informal land deals with investors in their place of origin besides the lack of appropriate infrastructure at resettlement destinations.

Tenure changes and conflict

In many instances, communal access to resources in the Afar gave way to private ownership, land grabbing and the replacement of customary tenure with modern systems. However, changes in the land use and land tenure were not accompanied by appropriate and implementable policies and laws. Besides, the institutional structures that safeguard property rights and good governance remained weak. Even the regional policies and laws that were established in recent years have remained too theoretical. These 'tenure gaps' created a breeding ground for disputes between local communities and the state.

---

11 Government-run large scale development projects (such as the Tendaho sugar cane project) have displaced pastoralists from their dry season grazing land near the Awash river (the biggest perennial river in the Afar region).

Tenure conflict between the formal and informal systems dates back to as early as the 1950s and 1960s when irrigation schemes along major rivers challenged the communal, pastoral land use system. During the subsequent years, the government's interest in the lowlands increased and more and more land use forms were introduced (e.g. in the form of national parks, sugar cane and cotton farming). During those early years, the traditional pastoral tenure did not easily succumb to the new situation owing to the relatively better social, economic and ecological conditions. At present, the pastoralist Afar tend to be confused with an overlap of two rather fragile land tenure systems. The traditional pastoral system is eroding; but the formal laws on land use and land administration have not been strong enough either. In a situation where neither is working effectively land resource management is put at stake. Weak land administration leads to competitive interests among stakeholders that are causing massive shrinkage of land resources in Afar. The Afar have lost a large amount of land due to expansion from neighbouring highland cultivators and Issa Somali pastoralists; expansion of commercial agriculture by local investors; development projects run by the state, as well as the spread of invasive trees. These developments create frustrations among Afar pastoralists and ultimately lead to conflict among various resource users both within and outside the Afar territory. A change in tenure from communal land use to a more private cultivation-based practice further complicated these conflicts since the new tenure automatically excluded other users who have had secondary access rights over grazing land. With the advent of the new ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, resource-based conflicts have since been compounded with the quest for political supremacy and issues of territoriality raised by various ethnic groups.[12] The Afar people who remained largely fragmented and divided along clan structures in the past now perceive themselves as a unified political unit enabling them to defend their land collectively. However, it must also be noted that when resource-based conflicts between various communities erupt, the customary institutions are called in to amicably settle the disputes and subsequently resolve violent conflicts. Elders that are perceived as wise, impartial and honest act as mediators. They conduct a series of dispute-processing gatherings until negotiated settlements are finally

---

12 Prior to the 1994 constitution which gave ethnic groups their own regional administration, the Afar were part of different provincial administrations which currently fall under the Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regional states.

reached in line with the culture of forgiveness, transfer of compensations and respect for traditional law. In as much as customary institutions put heavy emphasis on sustainable peacebuilding through restoration of community relations, they are much more effective than the government judiciary structures whose main role is to serve justice through formal litigation based on a fixed code of law. The informal system, on the other hand, is more flexible, transparent and participatory because it is based on local traditions, shared norms and value systems that are well known to community members since time immemorial.

The federal arrangement no doubt brought socio-economic transformation, the right to self-administration and relative political stability in the region. This is widely seen as a positive sign in the wake of a history of confrontation between Afar pastoralists and the previous repressive regimes who invaded their land. Afar informants acknowledge that state-community relations have generally improved following federalism. An Afar informant in the Middle Awash Valley said:

> *In the previous regimes who pursued a totalitarian political rule, we fought against our largely non-Afar administers and waged war against the national army who sometimes used helicopter gunships to attack us. Now, we don't dare to kill our blood and flesh as the administrators are our sons and cousins* (Interview with clan elders in Gewane district, 25 August 2013).

However, these developments by no means reduce the significance of incidents of clan-based violence and aggressive moves against local authorities over issues pertinent to land use and land administration. Disputes are still prevalent in the region because the rights of pastoralists are vague with regard to resource use and access under the government tenure system. As long as the state dictates various land use forms in the pastoral areas using a top-down approach, pastoralists feel the spasm of tenure insecurity that often leads to conflict.

Another outcome of the tenure gap concerns relations between state and private investors. State-investor relations were generally marred by feelings of mistrust and suspicion. For example, government officials often accuse investors of spreading rumours about government intentions to confiscate pastoral land for some other purposes while harbouring the ulterior motive of triggering

local resistance.[13] The investors in turn blame the regional government for being inefficient and inconsistent with its land administration plans. It is not at all uncommon to witness contradictory pastoral development schemes. For example, in 2013, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture initiated a five-year USAID-supported[14] project called Land Administration to Nurture Development (LAND) which among other things focuses on protecting the rights of pastoralists to communal land. The overall objective was to improve tenure security of pastoralists through land registration and certification. While this was welcomed by a great majority of traditional pastoralists, it was not clear how such a programme would be synchronised with other seemingly contradictory government packages, such as the establishment of sedentary agriculture-based economy in the pastoral areas.

Conclusion

Land is still the basis of livelihood for the Afar pastoralists no matter how scarce it has become at present. Apart from the ecological and demographic factors, the widespread depletion of land resources may also be attributed to problems of land use and land administration as well as conflicting tenure systems.

It appears that relations between the formal and informal tenure systems are characterised by a state of tension and conflict with far-reaching political impacts. Land tenure transitions have increased the vulnerability of pastoralists as more and more of their grazing land is grabbed by other stakeholders. Moreover, traditional pastoralism is challenged by other land use forms. The dominance of the agrarian economy, the privatised form of land ownership, and encroachments by third parties have curtailed pastoralist access to grazing land and water. This has resulted in tenure insecurity that has ultimately culminated in poverty and destitution.

---

13 There were occasions where investors made land deals directly with clan heads without prior permission and clearance from the government, which often resulted in land administration problems.

14 United States Agency for International Development.

The way forward is one that recognises the traditional structures and promotes their integration with formal tenure systems. This may take two forms: incorporating the indigenous system into government laws and policies, or allowing both tenure systems to operate side by side. When operating in parallel, each institution (formal or informal) should assume a clear mandate, role and responsibility on issues related to natural resource governance, land use and administration, and conflict management. The customary institutions should be empowered to take a leading role in managing land and resolving conflicts based on local norms and value systems. Awareness campaigns could then be organised by the government on issues related to equitability and fair distribution of resources, gender issues and inclusive decision making to mention just a few. As pastoralist systems have unique features distinct from that of agrarian based economies, there is a need to institute context-based approaches of land tenure and land administration that take into account differences in economic, socio-cultural and political contexts.

Sources

Central Statistical Authority 2008. Summary and statistical report of the 2007 population and housing census of Ethiopia: Population size by age and sex. Addis Ababa, Population Census Commission.

Cotula, Lorenzo, Camilla Toulmin and Ced Hesse 2004. *Land tenure and administration in Africa: Lessons of experience and emerging issues.* London, International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED).

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2005. Rural land administration and land use proclamation No 456/2005. Addis Ababa, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Galaty, John 2011. The modern motility of pastoral land rights: Tenure transitions and land-grabbing in East Africa. Paper presented at the international conference on global land grabbing, 6-8 April 2011, at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Sussex.

Getachew, Kassa 2001. *Tradition, continuity and socio-economic change among the pastoral Afar in Ethiopia.* Utrecht, International Books.

Guinand, Yves 2000 *Afar pastoralists face consequences of poor rains.* UNDP-UEU. Available from: <http://search.yahoo.com/search?p=Afar++Pastoralists+Face+Consequences+of+Drought&sm=Yahoo%21+Search&fr=FP-tab-web-t&toggle=1&ei=UTF-8> [Accessed 15 September 2013].

Hassan, Ali 2008. Vulnerability to drought risk and famine: Local responses and external interventions among the Afar of Ethiopia. A study on the Aghini pastoral community. Available from: <http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CDkQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fopus4.kobv.de%2Fopus4-ubbayreuth%2Ffiles%2F364%2FAli_Hassen_web_low_version.pdf&ei=pmE_VMKaO-He7AbKtIH4Bw&usg=AFQjCNHwDJxd8v0w7Eo6WPI0kUVrMUdKdw&bvm=bv.77648437,d.d2s> [Accessed 16 March 2014].

Helland, Johan 2006. Pastoral land tenure in Ethiopia. Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. Available from: <https://www.mpl.ird.fr/colloque_foncier/Communications/PDF/Helland.pdf> [Accessed 12 March 2014].

Markakis, John 2004. Ensuring the sustainability of pastoralism in East Africa. Minority Rights Group (MRG). Available from: <http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/Pdf/MRG-PastorialistsRpt.pdf> [Accessed 21 March 2014]

Øygard, Ragnar, Trond Vedeld and Jens Aune 1999. Good practices in drylands management. Noragric Agricultural University of Norway, As, Norway.

Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia 2010. Pastoralism and land: Land tenure, administration and use in pastoral areas of Ethiopia. International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, Nairobi, Kenya.

Piguet, Francis 2002. Afar region: A deeper crisis looms. Assessment Mission: 10-19 October 2002. United Nations Development Programme Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2000. Afar pastoralists face consequences of poor rains. Rapid Assessment Mission: 19–24 April 2000. United Nations Development Programme Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia.

The Nigerian State as an equilibrium of violence: An explanation of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria

Emmanuel Ikechi Onah*

Abstract

This paper argues that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is a religious crisis that is flowing directly from the country's political system. It is the political system in Nigeria that has brought about the present realities of corruption, poverty, and underdevelopment throughout the country. Religion has only served, especially in northern Nigeria, to ignite these realities into a violent flame. Boko Haram is the latest in the long list of religiously inspired violence that has flared up in Nigeria on account of deficiencies in the political system. For as long as these systemic deficiencies exist, religious disturbances such as the Boko Haram violence will continue to be there. Such violence has served fundamentalist entrepreneurs or groups and other such champions to call attention to the plight of their people. However, such violence most often only provokes the government into counter-violence. The cycle of violence and counter-violence then enables the government to keep the people in check, even without addressing their demands, and, to dominate and exploit society without hindrance. What the state must do to sustainably tackle this systemic violence is to use a combination of poverty reduction strategies, anti-corruption drives, development efforts, law enforcement and military engagement (where necessary), and dialogue to try and bring about lasting peace, particularly in northern Nigeria, but also throughout the whole country.

---

*   Dr Emmanuel Ikechi Onah is Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria.

1. Introduction

Despite the state of emergency that has been in operation in three states of the northeastern part of Nigeria for almost a year, the violent campaign embarked upon by the Boko Haram Islamic sect has refused to die down. In fact, the violence seems to be escalating, especially in its toll on human lives and property. There are continuing reports of violent activities by Boko Haram, in which dozens of lives are usually lost. Overall, it is estimated that the conflict has consumed several thousands of lives, while properties worth millions of dollars have been lost. In 2012 alone, Boko Haram accounted for 1386 deaths in 546 attacks, and in 2013 the group was involved in 213 attacks with over 1000 deaths (START 2013). The Boko Haram conflict is the latest in the long list of such conflicts to afflict Nigeria in recent times. Until the period when this conflict arose, the country has witnessed the Niger Delta conflict, which pitted militants of the Niger Delta area against the government of the country over the poor and inequitable utilisation of the revenues accruing to the country from the oil produced in that region (Sklar and Whitaker Jr. 1995; Mudiaga-Odje 2008).

Oil production in the Niger Delta has brought significant wealth to the Nigerian government but this has only translated into little more than a degraded environment and large scale poverty for the people. In response, militants arose and have been taking up arms against the Nigerian government for many years, a conflict that has only now ebbed after an all-out onslaught by the country's security forces against the militants, and the subsequent granting of amnesty to erstwhile militants (Thom-Otuya and Eremie 2011). This ebbing of the Niger Delta crisis happened shortly after the assumption of the presidency by Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan is an indigene of the Niger Delta region and the first from the region to become Nigeria's president in the country's history. But just as violence in the Niger Delta was dying down, the Boko Haram violence in the North was flaring up.

This also coincided with the loss of the presidency of the country by the north following the death in office of President Musa Yar' Adua in 2009. According to the existing arrangements at the time within the ruling party in Nigeria, another candidate of northern origin was stated to be selected as a replacement. But citing

the precarious situation of the country at the time, a 'doctrine of necessity' was formulated by the country's leaders to enable the then Vice-President Jonathan to take over as President (Adeniyi 2011). It is believed that dominant northern interests have not been comfortable with this arrangement ever since, fuelling suspicions that the Boko Haram phenomenon is an invention of the northern establishment for the pursuit of their political and sectional interests (Suleiman 2012:20-26). This, however, has never been substantiated. Meanwhile, the Boko Haram violence has continued to increase in intensity, and the country, especially the North, has continued to groan under the impact. It is this phenomenon that this paper seeks to study.

2. Explanatory perspective

In the face of the Boko Haram phenomenon, one question that has been asked is whether the crisis is actually religious or political. Many have argued that the crisis occasioned by the activities of the Boko Haram group is religious only to the point that the group is a religious sect, but that beyond this, the sect is only using religion as a cover to force the rest of Nigeria to return to the North the political power that had been 'unfairly' taken away from the region. The argument here is that the Boko Haram group is a cover used by the elite and politicians of the North to fight their political agenda. The thinking in this regard is that it was not a mere coincidence that the emergence of Boko Haram in 2002 occurred shortly after the Southwest took the presidency of Nigeria in 1999; just as it was not also a coincidence that Boko Haram violence increased significantly after the presidency of the country was moved from the North to the South South geopolitical zone in 2010 (Adeyemo 2012:48-55). Some have therefore argued that Boko Haram is a tool in the hands of the North for the purposes of the 2015 presidential contest in Nigeria. The view here is that either the North is using Boko Haram to distract President Jonathan so that by the end of his term the President would not have done enough to merit a second term in office in 2015, or, that Boko Haram is a bargaining tool in the hands of the North to force the President not to seek re-election in 2015 (Ogbonnaya 2011).

The above arguments are reinforced by the government's attitude and even pronouncements concerning the Boko Haram phenomenon in the recent past.

Government has several times maintained that Boko Haram has 'sponsors' who are only out to intimidate or blackmail the government. Government however, has not been able to establish a conclusive link between Boko Haram and any individual(s) or political group(s) (Oladeji and Agbaji 2011; Olalekan 2014:7), nor has Boko Haram ever made an overtly political demand especially as regards northern Nigeria. In this light, it does seem that the above (southern) views and (government) position are counter-blackmail to force the North to accept the political realities of a southern, Jonathan presidency in Nigeria beyond 2015 (Babalola 2014:9). This may be why prominent Northerners, while denying their involvement with the Boko Haram sect, have maintained that government has deliberately not done enough to curb the Boko Haram menace as a way of punishing the region for its opposition to the Jonathan presidency (Odebode et al. 2014:3).

This paper holds that the Boko Haram conflict is a religious crisis that has arisen from the political process and has also been reinforced by it. The nature of politics in Nigeria is such that when religious (and other such) crises emerge, they soon dovetail into politics and both become mutually reinforcing. Religion, particularly, has proved divisive in the country, and the North has been the theatre of many religious crises. The reason for this can be found in the political system and goes back to the country's history. A combination of colonial and post-colonial policies in the North imbued Islam with the colouration of a state religion. In the pre-colonial time, Usman dan Fodio had conquered the area under the banner of Islam, which subsequently became the religion of state in the empire that he established (Dudley 1968). This was the situation when the colonialists came to the area. Although the British conquered the emirates, they largely left the emirs and their administrations intact in a system of indirect rule – which enabled the emirs to continue as religious and political leaders (Kirk-Greene 1965). Islam thus continued to be the basis of government throughout the colonial period. The British, at independence, again handed over power to the Northern feudalists, and politics and administration continued largely to be mixed with religion as before, with the Sharia still prominent in the scheme of things (Whitaker Jr. 1970).

In the years since independence, political leadership in the North has therefore continued to be closely associated with religious leadership. The result has been that the Muslim faithful have largely not been able to distinguish between corruption among the political leadership and religious corruption.

These faithful, especially those of a more fundamentalist bent, have therefore seen it as their duty to oppose all such corruption, including that in the political arena. In this light the various cases of religious violence that have gripped the country can be clearly understood more accurately as political violence. In fact, most episodes of political violence in Nigeria have presented themselves as religious violence. But in actual fact, these are instances of political violence. The nature of politics in Nigeria has enabled such variables as religion (and also ethnicity and communal issues) to intrude into political violence. This is true especially if we accept the arguments of Masoti and Bowren (1968) that the decisive denominator of incidents of violent political behaviour is that they arise because the perpetrators are for some reason dissatisfied, disenchanted or alienated from the civil order.

It is in the context of the political system that dissatisfaction, disenchantment or alienation can be understood. This is as LaPalombara (1974:378) points out – that political violence includes all existing injustice, deprivations, and other conditions harmful to a nation that its government created or could not prevent. When a political system is deficient in meeting the needs of the people, it is ultimately initiating or aggravating violence. As such, every unacceptable condition created or permitted by a political system amounts to political violence. And when a people feels short-changed by the political system, or disadvantaged within it or disappointed by it, they usually hit out either directly at the political system and its symbols, or indirectly at those they see as favoured by the system and hence, its representatives or beneficiaries. It can then be understood why outbursts of political violence usually target government officials, buildings and other infrastructure, or religious or ethnic or communal rivals.

3. Background to the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria

The religiously inspired political violence that has arisen in the northern part of Nigeria in recent times started with the Maitatsine Riots of 1980-87

(Lubeck 1986). These riots, which broke out in Kano in 1980 before spreading to cities like Jimeta, Gombe, and Funtua between 1982 and 1987, were led by the fundamentalist cleric, Mohammed Marwa. The riots themselves derived their name from the curse which Marwa placed on corrupt leaders who would not listen to his preaching (Maitatsine – followers of him who curses). In the end, the Maitatsine movement was crushed, but it is significant that the disturbance reached its height in the early 1980s when there was widespread disillusionment over the corruption in the country's Second Republic. From 1996 to 1997, it was the turn of the Shiite attacks, led by Ibrahim El Zak-Zaky (Udoidem 1997:153). The Shiite movement also preached against political corruption. It is significant that this occurred during the period when political corruption under the military was at its height with General Abacha as Head of State.

The Fourth Republic took off in 1999 with high expectations and hopes. It was not long, however, before it became apparent that corruption in the country had not only continued to be business as usual, but that it was becoming intractable. In fact, notwithstanding the return to democracy in 1999, Nigeria was still placed last among the 90 countries surveyed by Transparency International in their Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2000. Even when the number of countries surveyed increased to well over 100, Nigeria moved up by only one spot to second last just before Bangladesh in the CPI for 2001, 2002 and 2003 (Transparency International 2013). For the Muslim faithful, the situation was only possible because thieving officials could not be held accountable in any meaningful way by the existing common laws of the land. When several state governments in the North introduced the Sharia laws between 2000 and 2002, they were actually only pre-empting the widespread disappointment of the people with the corrupt practices of the emergent civilian dispensation. But despite the immense popularity of these laws, it could not stem the tide of corruption in government. The riots that followed the 2002 Sharia laws, therefore reflected the misplaced hopes of a majority of the people that politics would finally be run according to divine injunctions (Harunah 2002).

The Boko Haram phenomenon was the direct result of these misplaced hopes. The group known as Boko Haram was formed in 2002 in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State in northern Nigeria by Mohammed Yusuf, a Muslim cleric who had been associated with radical Islamic youth movements in the 1990s (Sergie

and Johnson 2013). The group took as its official name, the Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad or Jamaat Ahl as-sunnah lid-da'wa wal-Jihad, but it is generally known by the Hausa nickname of Boko Haram, which literally means 'Western education is sin'. The average pious Northern Muslim views Christianity and its Western education with suspicion and sees both as purveyors of corruption or sinfulness. The group's base at the time of founding was a religious complex in Maiduguri that housed a mosque and a koranic school, to which many underprivileged families sent their children for instruction (Chothia 2012). The aims of the group included the establishment of the Sharia as the supreme law of the society; putting an end to political and religious corruption, and abolishing all Western cultural influences, including those of the Western educational system.

In 2004, the group's headquarters complex was relocated to Yusuf's home town of Kanamma in Yobe State. It was around this time also that Yusuf started speaking out against government highhandedness and political corruption, which served to attract numerous unemployed youth to his fold (Guttschuss 2012). Increasingly, Yusuf's preaching attacked the northern Muslim establishment and government officials for their un-Islamic corrupt practices. This was even more so after the widespread rigging of the 2007 general elections in the country (Herskovitz 2007). Then in 2009, a new law was brought into effect by the Bauchi State government compelling all users of motorbikes in the state to wear helmets for their safety. This law was rejected by the Boko Haram group. Attempts by the state government in July of that year to enforce the law finally brought members of the group face to face with the police. The disturbance was quickly suppressed by the police, but the highhandedness of the police in handling this matter soon led to an armed uprising by the group (Sergie and Johnson 2013). The uprising quickly spread to the neighbouring states of Borno, Yobe and Kano. The uprising was finally quelled by the army, but not before more than 800 people (by official account) had died. Hundreds of Boko Haram members, including several leaders of the sect, were arrested and detained at police headquarters in Maiduguri. About 17 of these leaders, including Yusuf himself and his father-in-law, were subsequently killed by the police in the full glare of television cameras (Katsina 2011).

4. Boko Haram: Violence as protest

It was in the aftermath of the 2009 uprising that the Boko Haram sect blossomed into a full-fledged armed insurrection in the country. Following Yusuf's death, Abubakar Shekau took over as leader. In the face of a continuing crackdown by government, the group eventually reassessed its position and apparently adopted violence as a means of pursuing its objectives. Boko Haram violence was thus the culmination of the group's grievances against the Nigerian state and its organs and officials (Sergie and Johnson 2013). These grievances included poor governance and increasing corruption of government officials (as reflected in their preaching), as well as the group's harsh treatment in the hands of government agencies, particularly the police. This reality tallies with our theoretical position that violence is derived from the political system. According to Anifowose (1982), people engage in political violence either as a way to demand or attain a preferred political condition or as a way to shift attention to their political demands, especially when other means of achieving these goals have either been closed to them or have proved ineffective.

In the case of Boko Haram, the crackdown of 2009 apparently proved to the members that their concerns had fallen on deaf ears. Left with no other options then, the group embarked on violence. The first violent act by the group was carried out on 7 September 2010 when it staged a prison break in Bauchi in which over seven hundred inmates were freed. In December of that same year, a market in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, was bombed by the Boko Haram sect, killing several people. This violence has continued in several guises ever since. The violence has taken the forms of the bombing of churches, government buildings, police stations, and the United Nations building in Abuja; prison breaks, assassinations, shootings and hostage taking. Whole villages have been attacked and several people killed. Recently, the group has added attacks on schools, which have led to numerous killings and abductions of school children (Sergie and Johnson 2013).

Government reaction to the Boko Haram challenge has not been swift. At first, government adopted an attitude of dismissal. As the president asserted at the time, the Boko Haram phenomenon was a phase in the nation's life that will soon pass away. When the sect apparently refused to disappear, the government

promised to wipe them out in a short while. The government then made some feeble efforts to combat the violence, which ultimately did not produce much. Since then, government has tried other means, including attempts at dialogue, and hints at the granting of amnesty to members of the group, in the hope that they would give up arms. It was when all the above failed that government finally took the offensive. On 14 May 2013, the president declared a state of emergency in the three most affected states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, and government then assembled a Joint Task Force (JTF) of military personnel to engage the Boko Haram in full combat (Sergie and Johnson 2013). The JTF was very effective at first, and soon drove the sect out of the cities. The group however subsequently apparently entrenched themselves in the rural areas, from where they could not easily be dislodged by the government forces.

Both the government and Boko Haram have been claiming to have the upper hand ever since (Ross 2013; Abrak 2013). However, the audacity of recent violence carried out by the Boko Haram group seems to confirm that the insurgency is not anywhere near its end. In their attack on a federal government secondary school in Buni Yadi, Yobe State, the operatives of the group were reported to have come in eighteen buses and spent more than 7 hours, killing more than 50 persons and burning down the entire school without any challenge whatsoever from security forces (Zounmenou and Kane 2014). Presently, the over 200 school girls abducted from the Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, in Borno state on the night of 14-15 April 2014 by the same group have not been rescued more than seven months after their abduction. The girls were reportedly loaded into two trucks and transported away unchallenged, after the school buildings were burnt down (BBC 2014). Life in the parts of northern Nigeria where the group is most active has come to a standstill since then. In fact, the group is reputed now to move in convoys while conducting their operations. Furthermore on such occasions, members of security agencies who happened to be in their paths are reported to have scampered away for safety (Zounmenou and Kane 2014).

5. The State, Boko Haram and the equilibrium of violence in Nigeria

Observers seem to agree that the sect may prove impossible to overwhelm, based on the realities on the ground, which suggest that government does not hold

much advantage in terms of morale or strategy or even fire power (Zounmenou and Kane 2014). But beyond this, there are also doubts about government's capability to win the war on the field if the root causes of conflict are not effectively addressed. Analysts have pointed out that the real causes of the Boko Haram phenomenon are not to be located in religion or electoral politics, but in the socio-economic conditions of the North occasioned by the failure of governance in the country. It is the people's disenchantment with the lack of inclusive governance in the country, coupled with extreme poverty (particularly in the North), that is at the root of the Boko Haram menace (The Punch 2014). Grievances over this unacceptable situation have enabled Boko Haram and other extremists to promote the idea that Sharia law will enable a more just and equitable political order.

It was this idea, reinforced by pervasive police brutality against members of the sect, that actually drove the sect into taking up arms. Lack of inclusiveness, and violence, have reflected the very nature and character of the state in Nigeria, even from the very beginnings. The Nigerian state was founded on violence and maintained by colonialism through violent means (Afigbo 1966:539-559). Throughout colonial rule, the state was divorced from the people and violence was the major language the government used or heard. As Ake (1996:22-32) observed, this character of the Nigerian state, even after independence, remained much as it was in the colonial era. The state in Nigeria represented itself as an apparatus of violence, had a narrow social base, and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority. In more recent times, the Nigerian state has become even more removed from the people. The state has become, literally, the property of only the small percentage of the population that controls its apparatuses, and the rest have wallowed in poverty, the levels of which have now risen astronomically.

The greater majority of the people are thus removed from the political system, and they cannot easily see any tangible benefit accruing to them by virtue of their being members of the state. This is even as the state is always making demands on the people – for taxes, fees, etc. Not being able to address the people's problems or satisfy their demands, yet demanding so much from the people, the state is then viewed with suspicion by the people, who also see it as a hostage of privileged groups. Those groups that are disadvantaged within the political system therefore

see the state as partial. They see it as sanctioning a system that guarantees privileges to others but denies the same to them. It is this feeling that has often made the relations of the state with the people very antagonistic, which antagonism then eventually leads to violence. When political violence in the country is conceived in this way, it is not difficult to understand why observers feel that violence is part and parcel of the Nigerian political system.

The Nigerian state is thus a system of violence. In this system, violence can emanate from either side – from the people when they feel that they are left out of the scheme of things and can only call attention to their plight by violence; or, from the state whenever it wants to assert control or project power. It is thus no wonder that incidents of violence pervade parts of the country. In the 1980s, the country witnessed the Maitatsine Riots in the North. In addition, a number of communal violence incidents also reared their ugly heads around the country within the period (Albert 2001). In the 1990s, the Niger Delta violence made its entry into the country's political firmament. Within this period also, a spate of religious riots gripped many cities in the North. The Shiite Riots also occurred in this decade. The 2000s can rightly be called the decade of violence for the sheer volume, magnitude and spread of violent activities in the country within the period. In the first few years of that decade, the city of Jos in the middle belt of the country suddenly exploded in violence. This hitherto serene city has not only remained in the grip of violence ever since, but this crisis has now spread to other parts of Plateau state and neighbouring states (Otumu 2010). It was also in the early years of the millennium that ethnic militias arose around the country and became involved in widespread violence (Anifowose 2004). This was also when the Tiv-Junkun crisis flared up once more (Anifowose 2003). The Niger Delta violence reached its height in this period, just as the Boko Haram group embarked on their own violence before the end of the decade.

It is noteworthy that all the above crises lasted their full course despite government assurances that they will be contained within a short time. In the end, government has had to marshal its full force before a crisis would come to its end. This only goes to prove our earlier contention that because the state is often seen as partial by the people, it is difficult for the state to successfully mediate conflicts in the country. Because the people see the state as favouring one side

or the other to a conflict, such conflict resolution strategies as dialogue or even ceasefires or amnesty hardly work. There is usually deep mistrust between the sides to the conflict. In the end, government has been left with few options other than force to resolve the issues. This is why residues of ill-feeling continue to linger within both sides to a conflict long after the conflict was supposed to have been resolved. Which is also why many of these conflicts have continued to flare up intermittently even after formal resolution. In fact, in the system of violence that exists in Nigeria, violence is an ever-present reality. Most existing violent situations remain so for a long time, while new ones emerge even before the old ones go away.

This situation of ever-present violence in Nigeria is due to the role that violence has played in the country's political system. Violence has served both the state and the people, as a tool for pursuing, or protecting, their interests. For the people, violence becomes the tool to force attention on their demands. But most often, the state is not ready to do anything about these demands that brought about the violence in the first place. Instead, the state matches the violence of the people with its own counter-violence. It is in this way that the Nigerian political system can be described as an equilibrium of violence. In this equilibrium, what the people want from the state is equal to what the state does not want to or cannot give to them. The violence the state is ready to marshal in defence of its position is therefore equal to the violence the people have unleashed in pursuit of their demands. This state of equilibrium will also hold if the violence were to be initiated by the state, in which case, the people will also counter with their own violence.

The history of violence in Nigeria shows clearly that this equilibrium of violence has been beneficial to all sides to conflict. For the people, it is often the only assurance that their demands will at least remain on the front burner even if they are not addressed. For the state (and its organs and officials), this equilibrium of violence enables it to keep the people in check even if it does not do anything else for these people. The equilibrium of violence in Nigeria has further incited the various groups and regions in the country to compete with each other in the use of violence as a means of protest and agitation. At the beginning of the present democratic dispensation in 1999, it was ethnic militia that took the centre stage

of violence in the country. The Odua Peoples Congress (OPC) was the first to start the orgy of violence in the Southwest of the country. In protest against the apparent sidelining of the Yoruba ethnic group from power in the country by the last military regime, elements of the OPC took up arms against other groups and the state in violence that lasted for the most part of the first four years of the Fourth Republic. Then, just as the OPC violence was waning, it became the turn of the Bakassi Boys to mount a violent demand for an end to the marginalisation of the Igbo in the Southeast from the commanding heights of the Nigerian state (Onah 2005). It was while this was going on that the Niger Delta militants also took up arms to demand a fair share of the oil wealth that was accruing to the country from their South South region.

The equilibrium of violence has also served another major purpose for the Nigerian state. The equilibrium of violence with its guarantee of ever-present violence in the country has enabled the Nigerian state to dominate and exploit society. A typical elaboration of this contention is the Niger Delta crisis. Although the people of the Niger Delta region complained of neglect for a very long time, the Nigerian state did practically nothing about it, which was why the people eventually took up arms. But instead of addressing the underlying problems squarely, the state only matched the violence of the militants with its own violence. For as long as this violence lasted, government had a free run on the country's resources earmarked for security. Large resources were budgeted to fight the Niger Delta violence, but the dire security situation made it literally impossible or even 'unnecessary' to account for these funds. Statutorily, funds that come under the heading of 'security vote' are not required by Nigerian laws to be accounted for. Even a number of administrative devices put in place to help ameliorate the plight of the people of the region, such as the setting up of a new development commission and even a new federal ministry concerned with Niger Delta affairs, soon became avenues for frittering away huge sums of monies into the pockets of government officials and contractors, under the cover of security votes.

It is the lack of developmental progress that has fostered the widespread feeling that government may not really be genuinely interested in ending some of these conflicts, especially if no new conflict is in the offing. Even now that the Niger

Delta crisis is supposed to have ended, the President of Nigeria was recently reported to have said that his government has earmarked several millions of dollars to 'fight' oil pipeline vandals in the Niger Delta region. This is in spite of large amounts of money already being spent as contract sums to erstwhile militants for the protection of the pipelines (Odivwri 2014). Continuing conflicts only provide justification for the government to continue to channel national resources into private coffers. This is substantiated by the recent seizure in South Africa of $9.3 million belonging to the Nigerian government. Officials of the South African government investigating the case have raised serious doubts concerning the Nigerian government's explanation that the money was meant for the procurement of arms to fight Boko Haram, saying that the agents of the Nigerian government 'might have been in the process of laundering the money before it was intercepted' (Ibekwe 2014). And as if to prove that government may not be disposed to letting the crisis end anytime soon, leaders of the northeast region of the country only recently accused the government JTF of actually using Nigerian Army helicopters to drop food and ammunition for Boko Haram in their hideout locations (Odebode et al. 2014).

6. Recommendations and conclusion

The situation on the ground definitely shows that the Boko Haram crisis is far from over. Both the government and the Boko Haram sect continue to claim victories in the field and neither side seems to be on the retreat. The recommendation for ending this crisis must therefore start by addressing the root causes of the violence. The first thing to be done is for government to embark on a massive poverty reduction drive in the North alongside a development agenda that will be seen to be transforming the development situation of the northern region of Nigeria. Although all these steps are also necessary for the rest of the country, it is important that for the purpose of ending the Boko Haram violence, people of the North will see that government is doing something tangible and fast, and that it is not business as usual.

In addition, there must be a new impetus to deal with government and public officials caught in corrupt practices. This is important, especially at the local

levels, where local government officials and councillors are known to become wealthy overnight without any repercussions whatsoever. All such officials, and others at state and federal levels must now be brought to book, as this is usually the major issue that provokes the emergence and sustenance of fiery Islamic preachers and movements. If political corruption is seen to be addressed, it will remove the major justification for the Boko Haram and similar other religious bodies to operate.

In the meantime, the Nigerian government must empower the JTF to continue to be able to engage Boko Haram militarily from a position of strength. In this regard, no expense should be spared in the procurement of arms and ammunitions meant to prosecute the counter rebellion. Government must take extra precaution to ensure that corruption does not permeate the JTF. All the weapons must always be accounted for in order to prevent ammunitions from getting into the hands of Boko Haram members. It is also important that all the remunerations of JTF personnel are paid promptly while generous allowances are regularly approved for them. Then, all personnel of the JTF must be regularly reposted so that no appreciable number of these personnel will stay for so long on a posting as to contemplate sabotage.

Lastly, the government of Nigeria must be ready to tap international competence in tackling the Boko Haram menace. The experience of France is very relevant here, especially considering the swiftness with which France has tackled recent similar situations, particularly in Mali. So, while continuing to consolidate on existing collaborations with the United States and other world powers like Britain on the matter, a collaboration between the Nigerian government and France will go a long way in giving the JTF a quick victory over Boko Haram. And while not relenting in their military engagement with Boko Haram, the government of Nigeria must continue to be open to dialogue and negotiation with the group. Ultimately, it must be a combination of poverty reduction strategies, development efforts, military engagement and dialogue that will bring about lasting peace, not only in northern Nigeria but also in the entire country.

Sources

Abrak, Isaac 2013. Boko Haram rebels say Nigerian military offensive is failing. *Reuters*. Available from: <http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/05/29/620130529> [Accessed 7 July 2013].

Adeniyi, Olusegun 2011. *Power, politics and death: A front-row account of Nigeria under the late President Yar'Adua*. Lagos, Kachifo.

Adeyemo, Wole 2011. How to tackle Boko Haram. *Tell*, 26 September, pp. 48-55.

Afigbo, Adiele 1966. Revolution and reaction in eastern Nigeria, 1900–1929: The background to the Women's Riot of 1929. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 3, pp. 539-559.

Ake, Claude 1996. The political question. In: Oyediran, Oyeleye ed. *Governance and development in Nigeria*. Ibadan, Oyediran Consult International.

Albert, Isaac O. 2001. Ife-Modakeke Crisis. In: Otite, Onigu and Isaac O. Albert eds. *Community conflicts in Nigeria: Management, resolution and transformation*. Ibadan, Spectrum Books, pp. 142-183.

Anifowose, Remi 1982. *Violence and politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba experience*. Enugu, Nok Publishers.

Anifowose, Remi 2003. The changing nature of ethnic conflicts: Reflections on the Tiv–Junkun situation. In: Babawale, Tunde ed. *Urban violence: Ethnic militias and the challenge of democratic consolidation in Nigeria*. Lagos, Malthouse.

Anifowose, Remi 2004. Urban violence in Nigeria: The case of the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) militia. In: Adejugbe M.O.A. ed. *Industrialization, urbanization and development in Nigeria, 1950-1999*. Lagos, Concept Publications.

Babalola, Ademola 2014. Boko Haram: Politicians stoking insurgency, says Okonjo Iwuala. *The Punch,* 29 April, p. 9.

Chibok Abductions in Nigeria: More than 230 seized. *BBC News*. Available from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk.news/world-africa> [Accessed 25 April 2014].

Chothia, Farouk 2012. Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? *BBC News*. Available from: <http:www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501> [Accessed 5 February 2012].

Dudley, B. J. 1968. *Parties and politics in northern Nigeria*. London, Frank Cass.

Guttschuss, Eric 2012. Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals. Available from: <http://www.itinnes.org/Report/9325.html> [Accessed 20 June 2012].

Harunah, Hakeem B. 2002. *Shariah under Western democracy in contemporary Nigeria: Contradictions, crisis and the way forward*. Lagos, Perfect Printers.

Herskovitz, Jean 2007. Nigeria's rigged democracy. *Foreign Affairs,* July/August. Available from: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62650/jean-herskovits/nigerias-rigged-democracy> [Accessed 20 June 2012].

Ibekwe, Nicholas 2014. Seized $9.3 million: Nigerian government's explanations flawed - South Africa. Available from: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/168306. [Accessed 3 December 2014].

Katsina, Aliyu Muktar 2011. Boko Haram, Nigeria and sub-regional security. *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, 3 (37), pp. 17-38.

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. 1965. *Principles of native administration in Nigeria: Select documents, 1900-1947*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

LaPalombara, J. 1974. *Politics within nations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall.

Lubeck, Paul 1986. *Islam and urban labour in Northern Nigeria: The making of a Muslim working class*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Masoti, L.R. and D.R. Bowen eds. 1968. *Riots and rebellion: Civil violence in the urban community*. Beverly Hills, Sage.

Mudiaga-Odje, Akpo 2008. *Niger Delta and the politics of oil*. Warri, Nigeria, Jenique International Company Ltd.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2013. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, 2013*. Washington, D.C., US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

Odebode, Niyi John Alechenu, Chukwudi Akasike and Oziora Ubabukoh 2014. Presidency is arrogant, confused, Nyako insists. *The Punch*, 21 April, p. 3.

Odebode, Niyi, Fidelis Sorewei, John Alechenu and Godwin Isenyo 2014. B'Haram collaborators: Prove your allegations, Military dares N'East leaders. *The Punch*, 3 April, p. 7.

Odivwri, Eddy 2014. Oil theft: So why was Tompolo paid N15 billion? *Thisday*. Available from: <http://www.thisdaylive.com> [Accessed 17 May 2014].

Ogbonnaya, Obinna 2011. Boko Haram is Battle for 2015, says Chukwumereije. *The Nation*, 29 September. Available from: <http://www.thenationalineng.net/2011/index.php/news/21270.html> [Accessed 20 September 2011].

Oladeji, Bayo and George Agbaji 2011. Smoke out Boko Haram sponsors, Jonathan orders security chiefs. *allAfrica*, 30 December. Available from: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201112300822.html> [Accessed 5 January 2012].

Olalekan, Adetayo 2014. World leaders must identify terror sponsors – Jonathan. *The Punch*, 3 April, p. 7.

Onah, Emmanuel Ikechi 2005. Ethnic militia and the future of democracy in Nigeria. *Nigerian Forum*, 26 (9-10), pp. 291-304.

Otumu, George E. 2010. Jos crisis: The face of religious terrorism. *The Punch*, 7 February.

Ross, Will 2013. Nigeria: Boko Haram in disarray, says Army. *BBC News*. Available from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22587901> [Accessed 7 July 2013].

Sergie, Mohammed Aly and Toni Johnson 2013. US Council on Foreign Relations. Available from: <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739> [Accessed 20 March 2014].

Sklar, Richard L. and C.S. Whitaker Jr. 1995. Nigeria: Rivers of oil, trails of blood, prospects for unity and democracy. *CSIS Africa Notes*, 179, 31.

Suleiman, Tajudeen 2012. A conspiracy of silence. *Tell*, 25 June–2 July, pp. 20-26.

The Punch 2014. FG not supporting Northern Gov's development efforts – US. *The Punch*, 2 May, p. 3.

Thom-Otuya, Ben and V.T. Eremie 2011. Amnesty to Niger-Delta militants: Challenges and opportunities for future peace missions. *Sophia*, 13.

Transparency International, 2014. *Corruption Perceptions Index, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003.* Available from: <http://archive transperency.org/policy-research/survey-indices/cpi/2000-2003> [Accessed 18 May 2014].

Udoidem, S.I. 1997. Religion and politics in Nigeria: A survey of religious-related crises in Nigeria since independence. In: Okafor, F. U. ed. *New strategies for curbing ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria.* Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publication.

Whitaker, C.S. Jr. 1970. *The politics of tradition: Continuity and change in Northern Nigeria, 1946–1966.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Zounmenou, David and Mouhamadou Kane 2014. Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram: How can France help? *ISS Today*, 11 March. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/html> [Accessed 20 March 2014].

Pastoral conflict in Kenya: Transforming mimetic violence to mimetic blessings between Turkana and Pokot communities

Ryan Triche*

Abstract

Livestock raiding has been a source of conflict amongst and between pastoral societies in Africa for hundreds of years. However, more recently, these raids have become more violent and have triggered much more organised retaliations. Many times raids themselves are perceived as motivated by ethnic dimensions. The following paper looks at tensions and conflict between Turkana and Pokot communities in rural Kenya. The paper first traces the historical context of cattle rustling and livestock raiding between pastoral communities within Kenya. It then identifies contemporary factors driving exacerbated tensions: access to resources, profiteering, and weapons proliferation. The paper further explores the systemic nature of the conflict through analysing livestock raiding as a conflict spiral dictated by negative reciprocal actions. The spiral is ultimately maintained due to mimetic violence structures that are in place. It then offers prescriptions and potential solutions to the conflict, which are centred on transcending the relationship from mimetic violence to mimetic peace and reconciliation. Ultimately, by empowering local pastoral communities in the

*   Ryan Triche is an African regional specialist focusing on governance, conflict mediation, human rights, and the responsibility to protect. He is currently undertaking graduate studies at Seton Hall University's School of Diplomacy in New Jersey, where he is concentrating in post-conflict reconstruction and sustainability. He received his B.A. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2013.

form of multi-ethnic coalitions, and promoting broad-based interest groups, cultural transcendence can reverse the conflict spiral into a relationship of mutual reciprocity and mimetic peace.

Introduction

While the terms 'cattle rustling' or 'livestock raiding' may conjure up images of a grand, romanticised period of American history and the Wild West, today these terms have a much more imminent, destructive, and abhorrent connotation to pastoralist societies within Kenya. The practice of cattle rustling has been a part of pastoralist society in Kenya for generations; however, in recent years, livestock theft has become increasingly violent and infused with more dangerous weapons (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010:7). Perhaps the biggest testimony to the escalating violence of livestock conflict is the event which occurred in Suguta Valley, Samburu District, in November 2012, when forty-two Kenyan police officers were killed in conflict with suspected rustlers (Greiner 2013:216). In such a turbulent region, where small, internal conflicts can quickly expand to state and regional strife, it is important to understand the history, context, and driving causes behind pastoralist clashes.

This paper explores the context of pastoralist clashes in Kenya by focusing on the situation between two ethnic groups which are oftentimes involved in violent conflict with one another along their respective land borders: the Turkana and Pokot peoples. The rest of this piece is divided into three main sections. The first explores the historical context of livestock raiding within Kenya, spanning from pre-colonialism and continuing through independence. The second section analyses developments as well as previous attempts at peacemaking. Finally, by identifying several issues of contention between the parties, I offer several potential solutions which could alleviate the situation, manage ongoing conflict, and ultimately restore peace to these communities and rural Kenya as a whole.

Historical evolution: From *rungus* to AK-47s

Pastoralist communities in East Africa have traditionally been built upon nomadic peoples, migrating along with their respective herds in search of lands to graze. Pastoralist communities are often credited with the increased

movement of people southward throughout African history (Iliffe 1995:16). It is noted that on many occasions, pastoral warfare and cattle rustling served mainly as a tool for resource and land expansion by these societies. There were often institutions in place to curb widespread violence. Typical weapons were *rungus*, wooden clubs commonly found in East Africa, and bows. There were also laws of conflict declared by clan and community elders which prohibited phenomena such as violence against women and children, and contained peace mechanisms. During early periods, these conflicts were often seen as a form of redistribution and balancing of wealth between communities, in which one community would take cattle from another when they were short on livestock, and vice-versa; it was reciprocal in nature (PRAGYA n.d.).

Following independence, pastoralist communities in Kenya saw increasingly violent conflict with one another, and the spread of modern weapon technology contributed to more deadly conflicts. Many African scholars pinpoint as a cause of these recurring conflicts the fact that colonial administrators were pushing these ethnic communities out of their historical homelands to make room for farmland (Murunga and Nasong'o 2007; Kanyinga 2009). These communities now found themselves clamouring for new territories in strange lands, where they were often at odds with the previous inhabitants. Notably, the Turkana and Pokot communities adapted to these colonial policies by adopting 'transhumance forms of pastoralism' in which they generally abandoned a nomadic lifestyle for themselves, but maintained nomadic herding of cattle (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010:11). This adaptation shifted the battlegrounds from the communities themselves to the grasslands on which the cattle were grazed; the rustling of livestock thus increased.

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a trend of democratisation sweep across the African continent. A change occurred in the nature of East African cattle rustling – the raids became commercialised. Previously, stolen livestock had been utilised for bride wealth or redistribution of herds; however, beginning in this era, livestock raiding became incentivised for monetary gain and organised crime syndicates arose (Greiner 2013:220). Similarly, during this period, clashes between communities became increasingly politicised. The democratic movement that had swept across much of Africa had caused a response by the

party-in-power at the time to turn to *Majimboism*, a form of federal regionalism which disguised ethnic mobilisation and party support under territorial claims (Greiner 2013:221–222). The previously localised raids and clashes were now often seen as blossoming into full-scale ethnic conflicts. A conflict spiral of cattle rustling became embedded in which one ethnic group would respond to another's raids with their own, in an endless conflict spiral.

Contextualising the conflict

The parties involved

The Turkana people number roughly 800 000 within Kenya, occupying about twenty-four territorial sections. They constitute around 2 percent of the entire population (African Studies Center n.d.). Being pastoralists, their primary commodities are livestock, including cattle, goats, camels, and sheep. They thus rely heavily on following the rains and tend to migrate around temporary camps or villages within a somewhat fixed area. It is important to note that oftentimes the herdsmen also migrate to other territories with permission of the Turkana hosts concerned. Age is a key factor in the organisational structure of Turkana society, and commonly there is a generational structure of leadership, with elders taking the helm in mediating disputes and directing trade defence. Authority is generally decentralised, and while there are clan leaders, small communities generally decide collectively on actions to take. For defence purposes, enforcement is generally granted to village warriors and their age-mates (Mathew and Boyd 2014:59). It is important to note that although there has historically been a warrior sect of Turkana society, increasingly this role has become voluntary for purposes of raiding, and is generally a large-scale community effort.

The Pokot community is organised in similar fashion to the Turkana. Pokot society is based on patrilineal heritage and is organised around a clan entity living in a village-style setting. They are pastoralists similar to the Turkana community, and thus rely heavily on livestock and migratory patterns. Again, age is an important organisational structure and a generational top-down approach is manifested in many aspects. However, scholars such as Michael Bollig

(2000) note the evolution of lineage in economic matters. Issues such as trade (including livestock) have deviated from this organisational structure and are now characterised as decentralised, and more individualised—an outcropping of a free market society. No one individual seems to dominate authority, and actors are generally free to decide their own affairs (Bollig 2000:358–359). This trend seems to parallel what is seen within the Turkana community.

Multi-dimensional factors of conflict: Profiteering, resources, and small arms

Recently, scholars and other external actors have begun to identify access to resources as a legitimate issue of dispute between the two communities and pastoral societies as a whole (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010; Cheserek et al. 2012; Boone 2013; Gleditsch 2013). The region in which the Turkana and the Pokot reside is semi-arid, receiving little overall rainfall. Thus, the groups must jostle for access to limited watering holes that are available to graze their cattle. Quantitative analysis actually suggests that violent raids increase during rainy seasons, as actors compete over newly discovered aquifers. Data over time indicate that the frequency of raids and their level of violence increase with rainy seasons and recede with drought-like conditions (Witsenburg and Adano 2009:520). These results support the notion that pastoralist communities find themselves in disputes over limited availability of resources with which to graze their cattle and support their own well-being. Perhaps even more alarming is the discovery of oil deposits in the Turkana region close to the border of the Pokot community. Both regions laid claim to the deposits, and another point of conflict about access to limited resources is therefore identifying itself (PRAGYA n.d.:30). Oil could prove profitable to the community which takes advantage of land-leasing arrangements, and thus there is a lot at stake for both Turkana and Pokot.

A significant issue which has led to further deterioration of stability within the pastoralist region has been the influx of modern weaponry. Most of the illegal weaponry originates from border areas of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia. It then reaches these pastoralist communities often through criminal gangs, and this further fuels the regional violence (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010:26).

Thus, cattle rustling becomes profitable for these illegal arms traders, and leads to an extension of conflict throughout the region. The interconnected nature of Turkana-Pokot conflict can clearly be exhibited with the nature of profiteering through illegal weapons. As the conflict has evolved over time from small-scale conflicts fought with basic clubs and bows and arrows to more retaliatory, full-scale assaults undertaken with advanced small arms, the conflict spiral has become more and more evident between these communities. If a herdsman purchases illegal arms to protect his livestock, opposing factions will do the same, fearing his actions are aggressive in nature. I find striking similarities between the build-up of arms of pastoralist communities and the nature of Soviet-US relations in the past. The main difference is that these actions lead to physical violence between pastoralist communities, thus a 'hot' war.

The underlying issue of reciprocity: Mimetic violence

Though factors driving pastoral conflict within Kenya have long been identified, sustainable peacemaking has been absent, and continues to appear distant from the contemporary situation. I argue that the main impediment to peacemaking is the notion of reciprocity, in this case negative reciprocity. There remains within the conflict an embedded situation of negative responses to negative actions. Each response builds upon the last, and a conflict spiral erupts. What began simply as a cultural raiding practice has blossomed into increased armament, contestation over resources, and ultimately violence itself.

Historically, pastoral communities within East Africa operated on communal grazing lands rather peacefully. Because grazing lands could only be used for several months of the year, arrangements on land sharing had to be made between nomadic peoples and other communities. Reciprocal institutional arrangements were born in which some communities allowed grazing on their lands during certain periods in return for grazing rights in neighbouring regions (Ngaido 2005:[1]). In fact, reciprocity was the key mechanism which enabled collective action in traditional societies. However, with the onset of colonial land policies and the encroachment on pastoral grazing lands by administrative policies, reciprocity was interrupted. There could no longer be an internal guarantee of reciprocity. Similarly, cattle were previously a cornerstone of reciprocal

relationships in pastoral societies. Cattle would be traded for bridewealth, which would strengthen kinship and communal bonds because of future interactions; however, the commercialisation of livestock has eroded potential reciprocal arrangements involving cattle. Cattle raided for markets cannot be entered back into a reciprocal market (Krätli and Swift 1999:9).

The conflict situation in pastoral Kenya today revolves around the notion of negative reciprocity. Turkana and Pokot societies respond negatively to one another's actions – violence begets violence. Cattle were indeed raided throughout the history of East African pastoral societies. However, these raids were more of a form of wealth redistribution through cattle. There were customary rules in which cattle raids were limited to times of need, were small in number, and generally characterised by little violence. However, as rules began to be increasingly violated during the 20th century, these raids escalated in intensity (Krätli and Swift 1999). Victims responded with raids of increased intensity, and the conflict spiral was born. Krätli and Swift (1999:21–22) note:

> Ultimately, escalation is prompted by one group's perception that the raiding practices of the other group have become 'excessive', a fuzzy and subjective notion which may change according to a number of variables….Inter-tribal co-operation ceases and daily social life and economic routines are disrupted. Such escalation can be interrupted only when both parties feel that the balance of power has been re-established, that is when the peace process is not seen as a sign of weakness of one of the parties…

Clearly, group perception has been co-opted by the effects of livestock raiding. Each group perceives the other's actions as increasingly hostile and as aimed at cultural and social targets rather than commercial livestock targets alone. What is essentially a financial conflict erupts into full-scale ethnic war. The contention between Turkana and Pokot communities goes beyond a simple conflict spiral. According to the Structural Change Model (Pruitt et al. 2003), any refraining from an escalated response is generally perceived as weakness, and groups fear that failing to respond will invite further encroachment and aggression (Pruitt et al. 2003:97).

In this model, the emphasis is on the transformative effect that the actions of one party have on another within a conflict. Of particular emphasis in this case are the psychological and group change effects that the Structural Change Model elicits within its application. The Model notes four emotions specific to psychological changes: blame, anger, fear, and image threats. While these emotions can indeed cause a condition to deteriorate, they are not permanent structures. Rather, these emotions are temporary and only exist so long as the Model is applicable and present. These emotions often have a negative effect on groups by reducing caution, diminishing empathy, creating the perception that relations are a zero-sum game, and ultimately making it easier to scapegoat the other through reduced communication and negative perceptions.

Both studied communities have indeed undergone psychological changes. Blame and anger are typical community mobilisers for an aggressive response. Each community tends to become polarised around emotional responses to livestock raiding, which they see as a direct attack on their economic well-being, their security, and ultimately their community. However, fear is also an emotional factor driving conflict escalation. When raiding communities increase their armaments, nearby communities respond with a reciprocal increase in the capacity of their own weapons. This act of defence is seen by the initial party as an act of aggression, and thus a security dilemma is born. Finally, hostile perceptions of the other continue to erode the situation in rural Kenya. Each community identifies the actions of the other as stemming from some innate, negative identity trait of that party. These perceptions are what shifted the conflict from individual levels to communal levels. One act of greed by a raider or group of raiders becomes equated to communal aggression. The victims respond by coalescing their own community members around the notion of ethnic identity. The situation is reciprocated continuously with each instance of livestock raiding.

While previous scholars tended to identify the factors contributing to pastoral conflict as related to profiteering, access to resources, and small arms proliferation, I state instead that these are symptoms of a much larger Structural Change Model of conflict. This situation within the conflict has essentially embedded negative reciprocity as a norm. Communal actions are gauged by exogenous

factors rather than internal decisions. These actions have consequences of their own which contribute to similar effects on the receiving end. One community's hostile actions are mimicked on the receiving end, in a never-ending cycle.

Within situations of these communal patterns of violence, in which negative reciprocity changes the structure of beliefs and perceptions of the others, the situation can, and must, be further defined. René Girard delves into the topic of violence throughout humankind. He notes that what was once unanimous violence (erupting for a cause of desire which spent itself) can, over time, lead to the same desire of the victim group. Thus, rather than a desire as the root cause of conflict and competition, the cause becomes the violence itself, which paradoxically, is not a rational desire (Girard and Gregory 2005:160-162). In this instance, I will implement the term mimetic violence as it fits the mould of Girard's theory. While cattle rustling between communities originally occurred out of wants and desires to simply increase resources through illicit means, the reciprocal actions have continued to transform. Armed responses to incursions are no longer driven for a reciprocal desire for cattle, but rather for a mimetic desire of 'violence begetting violence'. Any actions of the other groups in these cases are viewed with a biased lens that is often influenced by the notion of mimetic violence. Understanding the nature of mimetic violence is vital in order to implement prescriptions; however, so too are understanding past attempts at mediation to identify what factors, if any, can be applied within the framework of the Structural Change Model relating to mimetic violence.

Past attempts at peacemaking

Previous peacemaking efforts have been concentrated on the surface factors driving the conflict between Turkana and Pokot communities, which I argue are actually symptoms of a much more systemic conflict model. One attempt at peacemaking focused on the communities themselves. The focus was placed within pastoral communities to forbid raided livestock from being retained by the actors conducting the raid. Furthermore, women stolen during raids could not be taken on as brides of the raiders (Krätli and Swift 1999:32). On one hand, the approach was successful in that it was effective in removing the raiders from physical ownership incentives of raiding. The grassroots approach provided

local agency in which cattle rustlers were much more likely to obey their own group's instructions than to endure exogenously imposed sanctions. On the other hand, however, the project led to unforeseen consequences. Raided cattle were allowed to be given to elders or sold for weapons. Essentially, what occurred was the militarisation of raiding in which village elders became patrons of raids; they would support large-scale assaults for benefits. Furthermore, raiders sold cattle that were raided on the market and purchased weapons for themselves to conduct future raids. Thus, I argue that because the effort failed to remedy the systemic nature of cattle rustling, alleviating one factor of conflict shifted resources to others.

Another peacemaking effort aimed specifically at community solutions to Turkana conflicts enjoyed some successes. However again, Grahn and Akabwai (2005:21-22) note that communal solutions are not effective at solving systemic problems within a conflict.

Peacemaking efforts at the macro-level have encountered problems as well. One author explains that state-led peacemaking initiatives often fail due to corruption, lack of legitimacy, low resources, and ultimately institutional weakness. In a government in which ethnic politics are deeply embedded, attempts at mediating ethnic conflict disputes tend to exacerbate social tensions (Mahmoud 2011:159-161). Groups see government action as a continuation of ethnic biases and thus respond to mediation attempts in the same way as they do livestock raids – by polarising defence along their own communal identity.

Attempts at reducing access to small arms have often similarly failed in the past. Kenya itself has a regionally strong stance against small arms proliferation. These weapons are largely outlawed within the state. However, the local incentive to maintain weapons trade exists due to pastoral conflict. Thus, weapons are purchased from neighbouring states with more lenient weapons policies. The Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) has already sponsored the destruction of over 100 000 small weapons (Lamb and Dye 2009:79). The effectiveness of such projects is often questioned, however. High costs of undertaking such large efforts mean that the destruction of weapons themselves is often dependent upon external sources of funding. In this situation, the government is not a stakeholder and thus has little incentive

to partake. Scholars note the continuing spiral of an influx of illicit arms and the ensuing destruction (Lamb and Dye 2009; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs 2011; Mkutu 2008).

Previous attempts have all fallen short on their mandate to instil sustainable peacemaking efforts. I argue that these attempts have failed due to the fact that they focus on *symptoms* of negative reciprocity rather than trying to interrupt the conflict spiral. Similarly, initiatives have often focused only on one track of diplomacy, such as the local or state level. By narrowing the scope to one track, the negative pull of the conflict model simply gains traction in other areas which are not being focused upon. These past attempts seem to point to the need to instil both multi-track diplomacy initiatives as well as some sort of peacemaking which involves reducing negative reciprocity.

Integrative solutions and mimetic blessing

Pruitt et al. (2003) offer several types of integrative solutions, two of which I find are directly applicable to the conflict situation between Turkana and Pokot communities. Pastoral conflict in Kenya indeed maintains conflict symptoms due to access to resources. One posited solution is 'expanding the pie' (Pruitt et al. 2003:194). In this scenario, the total access to resources to both parties is increased. If access to a consistent water supply, grazing lands, or oil revenues were increased, contention over resources would diminish as a conflict driver. I thus posit that there must be local capacity-building efforts to improve local infrastructure as well as reach revenue-sharing agreements between the governments over newly discovered oil sources. These revenues must be shared not only with the government of Kenya, but between pastoral communities themselves. By implementing these reciprocal institutional arrangements, mimetic blessings can return to govern pastoral society as was previously the norm before colonisation.

While the recognition of communal land rights in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya was a step in the right direction, there is yet to be seen any legal respect for practical reciprocity. Past colonial and early independence allocations of land cannot be undone. However, both the government and pastoralist communities themselves must evolve in order to balance communal access to

resources with respect to physical land boundaries and revenue points. I suggest that communal lands and pastoral grazing spots must be officially demarcated by the government in order to form a quantifiable and measurable regional territory. Communal grazing lands would enable the continuation of a pastoral lifestyle while reducing issues of contention along cross-border raids and cattle rustling. Thus, any instances of livestock raiding would no longer be viewed as an ethnic, group-based conflict, but rather as an individual property violation. Judicial courts would be more able to provide effective remedies and arbitration. These remedies would similarly apply to disputes over resources. Claims to access could successfully be justified through the judicial system. I also argue that arbitration should entertain the idea of implementing profit sharing of resources between the communities in dispute. The exact share would be determined through legal procedures.

As Wily (2011:752-753) criticises, legal mechanisms are useless when they are not enforced in practice. Turkana and Pokot communities themselves must force the hand of the government in recognising legal access to communal lands. I posit that in order to successfully push for rule of law, these communities themselves must coalesce around unions based on non-sociological variables. For instance, Turkana and Pokot businessmen could form a coalition or interest group around cattle herding, agricultural trade, or any number of relevant markets. These unions have the added benefit of requiring levels of reconciliation and mimetic blessings in order for individuals to effectively engage with one another across social boundaries. As has been evidenced countless times in democratic, market-based economies – money talks. While elites may be able to ignore pressure from broad ethnic communities with varying interests – communities in conflict with one another – they cannot ignore the influence of a concentrated lobbying group with a significant amount of market share. Just as Kameri-Mbote (2013:2) notes the need to provide local communities with tools to manage a legal framework, I argue a bottom-up approach of dissemination of legal information and advocacy could provide local agency. NGOs could prove paramount in providing agency as well as facilitating the cessation of mimetic violence through mutual blessings and increased interconnectedness.

Paired with this solution is that of 'cost cutting'. Here, parties concede on issues when costs in doing so are reduced, often due to compensation (Pruitt

et al. 2003:197). I argue that Turkana and Pokot members can agree to install mutual land-sharing arrangements during set periods in return for more internal enforcement against cattle raiding. Though land sharing may incur costs for original communities grazing herds at these locations, overall costs are reduced because internal sanctions decrease cattle raiding, and thus costs to defend against raids lower the cost of grazing in general. One study found that in pastoral societies, internal sanctioning against raid violators is essentially a public good. When sanctions and enforcement are initiated from within a community, societal costs of 'shirking' on norms are increased (Mathew and Boyd 2014:61-64). Cattle raiders not only face economic costs but social costs such as loss of bridewealth and communal respect. Thus, internal sanctions are a notion which I argue should be implemented in order to increase the cost of livestock raiding and reduce the cost of positive reciprocity.

At a macro-level, the proliferation of illicit small arms in Kenya is both a product of porous borders and of market incentives. While at first the task may seem monumental, reducing the costs of arms regulation is indeed achievable through both communal and state cooperation. I first conclude that Kenyan law enforcement can no longer be absent from the region. The police must increase their presence within rural pastoral grazing lands as well as along the borders between neighbouring states, especially Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. While allocating funding to this mammoth task may initially seem daunting, evidence indicates that indeed it is actually less costly in the long-run to harden borders and increase the costs of illegal arms trade than continuously destroying armaments and dealing with the aftermath of deadly pastoral rivalries (Mkutu 2008). Along with a physical police presence, I contend for a strict training regimen for border officers in order to ensure that the rule of law and respect for individual rights are respected.

The least costly means of addressing illegal arms proliferation within pastoral communities of Kenya is simply to dis-incentivise the trade altogether. The fact that Kenya's strict weapons policy is so unusual in the region creates market mechanisms in which illegal arms are smuggled into the nation. High demand drives high prices, and smugglers are more willing to risk their livelihoods to transport and propagate arms. Here, I propose regional integration and

participation in small arms limitations. Kenya's policy towards arms sets a precedent for neighbouring states. However, unless these nations adopt similar policies, arms trade will only increase the more Kenya solidifies its position. East Africa must harmonise a policy framework aimed at reducing illegal small arms. The African Union and East African Community, I argue, could provide viable forums from which to launch these initiatives. A uniform regional approach to dissuading illicit arms trade is necessary in order to effectively diminish market incentives for trade to begin with. The local effects would be a decrease in violent conflicts between pastoral communities. Even if all other factors remain constant, conflict between Turkana and Pokot societies will be less organised, more slow to develop, and ultimately less deadly.

For both internal sanctioning and external arms agreements to be effective, overarching cooperation must be facilitated at first through ushering in a norm of mutual reciprocity. A local community's decision to sanction cattle rustlers internally is only legitimate if that community expects neighbouring communities to do the same. The historical lack of authority and accountability of the Kenyan government within pastoral regions has infused a sense of impunity to livestock raiders. By simply increasing the presence of authority within rural communities, the government can signal a reversal in trends, garnering legitimacy in the perceptions of locals and commencing a new trend of mutual reciprocity in that the government will protect livestock in return for local communities also dis-incentivising raiding. Again, this relationship is mutually beneficial – costs are reduced at both a communal level and the state level. Finally, for regional cost-reduction of arms control to occur, states must signal to one another the legitimate intentions of their stance on weapons trade. Kenya's difficulty has arisen because illegal weapons trade is more profitable due to the vacuum created. There is no system of reciprocity in the region, and neighbouring states have done little to harmonise arms control. It seems as if mutual relationships must be built from the communal level so as to bypass governments and instil a cross-border relationship. By bridging gaps locally, these communities can influence domestic policies to fall in line with the aspirations of regional communities as a whole. Cooperation must stem from community-based cooperation, reconciliation, and ultimately a cultural shift away from past mimetic violence.

Many anthropologists and sociologists note the difficulties present when local communities undergo cultural shifts (Lee 2004; Bobo 1988; Moreland and Levine 1982)). Oftentimes, a schism erupts between younger and older generations. Intra-group conflict can occur, especially when pressures of cultural norm shifts are exogenous. The external pressure of these norms is felt within the pastoralist communities themselves. With such a powerful external force, a solution must come from within.

Girard himself illustrates mimesis with a pessimistic view. For him, mimetic violence exists as a long-term response to the natural desires which contribute to unanimous violence. I find a fault with the fact that a natural response can lead to the paradox of these desires being replaced simply with the desire of violence or vengeance. I thus offer that indeed there exists an ability to transcend the conflict and implement mimetic blessing. Imitation of violence drives the conflict spiral to reach this mimetic pinnacle, but if instead of violence, actors imitated and reciprocated rational behaviour and good intentions, the cycle can indeed be broken. Furthermore, when mimesis of rationality replaces mimesis of violence, conflict itself is no longer a desire of communities. It is thus less likely that isolated violent behaviour would be perceived as an attack of identity. I therefore draw emphasis on this possibility, and focus on the actual transcendence of mimetic violence and the shift to mimetic blessing.

How could the transformation of mimetic violence to mimetic blessings be facilitated in the context of pastoral communities who have such a long and contentious history? Elizabeth Cole notes that history education and a pedagogy that takes history seriously are vital in order to promote progressive learning of the past. She explains:

> What is critical here is not only the effect that these approaches to history can have on the formation of actively engaged, critically thinking citizens, but what they can offer to post-conflict settings where the history of the recent conflict is simply too sensitive and politically difficult to discuss openly… (Cole 2012:237).

Cole and others offer education as a way to bridge a gap from the past to current generations and to successfully construct progressive and mutual reciprocity between contentious groups. Education regarding cultural history

can tread lightly where the government and official mediation cannot. Bekerman and Zembylas (2014:57) note that in conflict settings, teachers must move away from the epistemological setting induced by the state and into a more critical, ontological perspective. The state and nationhood, they argue, pre-determine the identity of instruction teachers take. Grassroots approaches successfully enshrine shifting critical assessments to peace education, and can enable education to shift away from an identity created by the state (Lahai and Ware 2013).

While Cole explained that educational approaches and history teachings are vital to reconciling and transcending conflicts between communities, I wish to take her recommendations one step further. In a developing multi-ethnic nation such as Kenya, which lacks funding for educational reform and overhauls, and also has a history of a politically polarising ethnic force, attempting to implement a new practice could prove ineffective or even disastrous. An education policy focusing on negative emotions and 'ethnic tragedies' could prove destructive to the tensions between Pokot and Turkana communities. An ethnic-based education policy without proper institutions or plans in place can degrade already tense emotions between various groups. This ethnic pedagogy is deemed by scholars to have contributed to a large part of Balkanisation and ensuing violence in Assam, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka (Lange 2011).

There must be implementation of multi-track diplomacy in order to increase the capacity of the state to both enforce rule of law and increase local access to remedies. A multi-faceted coalition would ensure that dissemination of information and education policies are balanced. I suggest providing local NGOs with state-sponsored resources to disseminate information to local communities and elders. Still, the state has the largest potential for capacity to oversee access to resources and aid in curbing weapons proliferation. For this reason, the state is still a stakeholder and thus must serve a role in this coalition of reconciliation. Finally, I assert that these grassroots organisations should provide classroom instructors. Local schools could offer optional classes related to ethnic history which emphasise the connections and relationships shared by *all* pastoralist communities. Where the government fails to transcend ethnic boundaries in mediating conflict resolution, empowered local organisations can

combine with education in order to bridge social gaps and promote mediation, reconciliation, and ultimately a peaceful and respectful pastoral environment.

Can empowering local organisations in such a way actually alleviate systemic ethnic politicisation in Kenya? By conditioning the allocation of resources to multi-ethnic coalitions and NGOs which respect ethnic diversity, donors begin to set a bottom-up precedent of interest-based coalitions formed around ethnic unions and based upon participation rather than contention. The ultimate goal of conditioning aid to groups who promote these values is to create an environment in which multi-ethnic coalitions of unity, paired with interest-group participation in policy advocacy, become the norm. By institutionalising broad, cross-cultural relationships, mutual reciprocity is introduced into the system, which also has the effect of dis-incentivising violence. As Boehmke and Bowen (2010:667-668) note, interest-based advocacy correlates with an increase of democratic values. Bienen and Herbst (1996:27-28) also support this analysis regarding Africa and note a decrease in ethnic politics and rent-seeking. By providing agency to local organisations, not only can ethnic tensions between pastoral communities be reduced, but also the systemic ethnic politicisation in Kenya itself. The catalyst in this case is the transformative nature that local cooperation can have in promoting mutual reciprocity and ultimately mimetic blessings.

Reconciliation is vital to shifting the spiral among Turkana and Pokot communities from mimetic violence to mimetic blessings. Scholars such as Vamik Volkan (1998) argue that by reconciling differences between parties, all the results of the violence cannot be undone, and that the situation cannot be exactly the same as it was before the violence. Vern Redekop (2011), however, asserts that pairing spiritual reconciliation with focusing on personal connections may contribute to emergent creativity, which can indeed transform previous relationships among parties. Similarly, the multitrack peacemaking initiatives I posit, by pairing local and state-sponsored efforts, allow for the emergence of new principles in reconciliation. New norms emerge from multitrack approaches of reconciliation. Meta-requisites like implementing education to bridge cultural gaps as well as internal enforcement mechanisms of justice promote emergent creativity. The conflict spiral between the feuding pastoral communities is not only terminated, it is transformed into a spiral of mimetic blessings. With these

blessings in place, a positive peace can ultimately be reached, which can erode negative reciprocity and transform the situation into one of mutual reciprocity and blessings.

This analysis thus seeks to expand upon mimesis within the realm of conflict. I have attempted to steer discussions away from the notion of the 'inevitability' of mimetic violence within a conflict spiral, and rather to raise questions as to how these conflict situations can be changed into relationships of mimetic blessing. Mimetic violence with its reciprocal behaviour that occurs not so much for material desires or resources, but simply for the desire of vengeance itself, has to be counteracted. How can the desire of violence and vengeance be a rational response within any one society? Thus, this study aims to provide evidence for the fact that not only is mimetic blessing possible within society, but it can serve as a means to end conflict through a natural state of rationality. The dehumanisation that occurs due to mimetic violence, alongside the other psychological and group factors that drive pastoral conflict within Kenya, can indeed be reversed when the conflict environment is transformed.

Conclusions and a way forward

The factors driving the pastoral conflict between the Pokot and Turkana communities in Kenya are related to profiteering, small arms proliferation, and access to resources. I have illustrated that these conflict drivers are actually inherent symptoms of a much larger systemic nature to the conflict. Livestock raiding between these communities is based on an age-old custom of reciprocity. Whereas, long ago, reciprocity was a beneficial tool for maintaining resources through institutions, the onset of colonial policies diminished access to land and decreased incentives for land-sharing arrangements. The practice of livestock raiding was transformed from a reciprocal tool of wealth distribution to a reciprocal vice of profiteering. Negative reciprocity was officially embedded within the system and maintained through structural change in psychological tendencies and perceptions of the 'other'. A conflict spiral and security dilemma developed in which raids dictated an escalated armed response along communal identities. The situation continues today and is cyclical in nature.

The solution advanced within this article is to implement multitrack peacemaking efforts. Internal enforcement, cross-cultural cooperation, and increased state accountability can contribute to a positive peace. Simultaneously, cooperation is important at both a communal and a regional level. The geopolitics of state cooperation in East Africa cannot be discounted. In order for mutual relationships to occur, a bottom-up approach must evolve which is driven by eroding the cycle of negative reciprocity and replacing it with a transformative structure based upon healing, inclusiveness, learning from the past, and overall cultural openness.

Education can be implemented as a tool to instil a sense of reconciliation. This reconciliation itself, which may be brought forth by a coalition of grassroots as well as state organisations, may lead to the emergence of creativity. Transcendence between communities can occur as the result of new norms emerging which fundamentally alter the conflict and become irreversible. Ultimately, emergent creativity can transcend conflict norms and transform the situation from a conflict spiral of negative reciprocity to a positive peace building upon mimetic blessings. Increased cooperation between pastoral communities as well as increased state capacity will raise the welfare of all the parties involved. Emergent creativity paired with mutual reciprocity is paramount to constructing an environment of mimetic peace and ultimately spearheading peacemaking efforts between the Pokot and Turkana communities. With spiritual and cultural reconciliation, these communities can arm themselves not with defensive mechanisms against perceived aggression, but rather with tools of cohesion, understanding, and ultimately a sustainable peace.

Sources

African Studies Center n.d. Kenya - Ethnic groups. *East Africa Living Encyclopedia*, University of Pennsylvania. Available from: <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kethnic.htm> [Accessed 2 March 2014].

Bartoli, Andrea, Zachariah C. Mampilly and Susan A. Nan 2011. *Peacemaking: From practice to theory*. Santa Barbara, CA, Praeger Security International.

Bekerman, Zvi and Michalinos Zembylas 2014. Some reflections on the links between teacher education and peace education: Interrogating the ontology of normative epistemological premises. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 41, pp. 52–59.

Ryan Triche

Bienen, Henry and Jeffrey Herbst 1996. The relationship between political and economic reform in Africa. *Comparative Politics*, (1) 23.

Bobo, Lawrence 1988. Group conflict, prejudice, and the paradox of contemporary racial attitudes. In: Katz, P. and D. Taylor eds. *Eliminating racism: Profiles in controversy*. New York, Plenum Press.

Bollig, Michael 2000. Staging Social Structures: Ritual and Social Organisation in an Egalitarian Society. The Pastoral Pokot of Northern Kenya. *Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology*, 65 (3), 341–365.

Boone, Catherine 2013. Land conflict and distributive politics in Kenya. *African Studies Review,* 55 (1), pp. 75–103.

Cheserek, Grace J., Paul Omondi and Victor A.O. Odenyo 2012. Nature and causes of cattle rustling among some pastoral communities in Kenya. *Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS),* 3 (2), pp. 173–179.

Cole, Elizabeth 2012. *Teaching about the past*. Doha, Qatar: Education Above All, Available from: <http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/files/resources/EAA_Education_for_Global_ Citizenship.pdf.> [Accessed 10 May 2014].

Girard, René and Patrick Gregory 2005. *Violence and the sacred*. Continuum Impacts. London, Continuum.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter 2013. Climate change, environmental stress, and conflict. In: Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall eds. *Conflict management and global governance in an age of awakening*. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press.

Grahn, Richard and Darlington Akabwai 2005. *Lessons learned from conflict management work in the Karimojong Cluster*. International institute for environment and development (IIED). Drylands programme, Available from: <http://pubs.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/12501IIED.pdf> [Accessed 11 May 2014].

Greiner, Clemens 2013. Guns, land, and votes: Cattle rustling and the politics of boundary (re)making in Northern Kenya. *African Affairs*, 112 (447), pp. 216–237.

Iliffe, John 1995. *Africans: The history of a continent*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kameri-Mbote, Patricia 2013. Preface: Securing the land and resource rights of pastoral peoples in East Africa. *Nomadic Peoples*, 17 (1), pp. 1–4.

Kanyinga, Karuti 2009. The legacy of the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 election violence in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27 (3), pp. 325–344.

Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010. *Morans no more – The changing face of cattle-rustling in Kenya*. Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission.

Krätli, Saverio and Jeremy Swift 1999. *Understanding and managing pastoral conflict in Kenya: A literature review*. Brighton, Institute of Development Studies

Lahai, John I. and Helen Ware 2013. Educating for peace: The sociocultural dimensions of grassroots Peace Education as a tool for national reconciliation and social forgetting in Sierra Leone. *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, 3 (2), pp. 69–90.

Lamb, Guy and Dominique Dye 2009. African solutions to an international problem: Arms control and disarmament in Africa. *Journal of International Affairs*, 62 (2), pp. 69–83.

Lange, Matthew 2011. Social welfare and ethnic warfare: Exploring the impact of education on ethnic violence. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 46 (4), pp. 372–396.

Lee, Yueh-Ting 2004. *The psychology of ethnic and cultural conflict?: Psychological dimensions to war and peace.* Westport, CT, Praeger.

Mahmoud, Hussein A. 2011. Conflict and constraints to peace among pastoralists in Northern Kenya. In: Baregu, Mwesiga ed. *Understanding obstacles to peace: Actors, interests, and strategies in Africa's Great Lakes region,* International Development Research Centre. Kampala, Fountain Publishers, pp. 146–168.

Mathew, Sarah and Robert Boyd 2014. The cost of cowardice: Punitive sentiments towards free riders in Turkana raids. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 35 (1), pp. 58–64.

Mkutu, Kennedy 2008. Disarmament in Karamoja, Northern Uganda: Is this a solution for localised violent inter and intra-communal conflict? *Round Table*, 97 (394), pp. 99–120.

Moreland, Richard L. and John Levine 1982. Socialization in small groups: Temporal changes in individual group relations. In: Berkowitz, L. ed. *Advances in experimental social psychology*. Vol. 15. New York, Academic Press.

Murunga, Godwin R. and Shadrack W. Nasong'o 2007. *Kenya: The struggle for democracy*. 1st ed. New York, Zed Books Ltd.

Ngaido, Tidiane 2005. Can pastoral institutions perform without access options? Collective action and property rights for sustainable rangeland management. CAPRi (Collective Action and Property Rights) Research Brief. Available from: <http://www.capri.cgiar.org/ wp/..%5Cpdf%5Cbrief_dryl.pdf#page=10> [Accessed 11 May 2014].

PRAGYA n.d. *Conflict assessment: Northern Kenya.* PRAGYA. Available from: <http://www. pragya.org/doc/Conflict_Assessment_Report.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2014].

Pruitt, Dean G., Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Sung Hee Kim 2003. *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement*. 3rd edition. Boston, McGraw-Hill.

Redekop, Vern 2011. Spirituality, emergent creativity, and reconciliation. In: Bartoli et al. eds. 2011, pp. 585-600.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. *Regulating small arms brokering in Eastern Africa*. Lome, Togo: United Nations, August 2011. Available from: <http://unrec.org/docs/ Small%20Arms%20Brokering%20in%20Eastern%20Africa.pdf> [Accessed 11 May 2014].

Volkan, Vamik 1998. *Bloodlines: From ethnic pride to ethnic terror*. Boulder, CO, Westview.

Wily, Liz A. 2011. 'The law is to blame': The vulnerable status of common property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Development and Change*, 42 (3), pp. 733–757.

Witsenburg, Karen M. and Wario R. Adano 2009. Of rain and raids: Violent livestock raiding in Northern Kenya. *Civil Wars*, 11 (4), pp. 514–538.

Terrorism and governance crisis: The Boko Haram experience in Nigeria

Efehi Raymond Okoro*

Abstract

Terrorist acts by Boko Haram have attracted enormous scholarly attention in recent years. A majority of the studies have implicated Islam in the emergence and dynamics of the uprising. In contrast to this popular view, this article argues that, despite the strategic role played by Islamic religion in the uprising, terrorism and its security threats in northern Nigeria are more a product of a governance crisis including pervasive corruption, growing youth unemployment and poverty. It further argues that if good governance concurrently with development is not employed as a remedial strategy, the Nigerian State will further create a much more enabling environment for the growth of resistance from below. Thus, it concludes that good governance and credible leadership practices are antidotes to terrorism in Nigeria.

---

*   Mr Efehi Raymond Okoro is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria.

Introduction

Nigeria has played host to a terrorist scourge in recent years. Prior to the implementation of the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta, the oil hub was ravaged by a youth rebellion aimed at attracting more federal government presence and development to the oil-producing area of Nigeria. The militancy was also fuelled by the clamour for environmental security of the region whose ecosystem and livelihoods had been substantially undermined by nefarious oil extractive activities. But as relative peace returned to the Niger Delta, the Boko Haram (henceforth BH) rebellion broke out in the northern region of the country, dashing the hope of Nigeria's return to sustainable peace in the post-amnesty era.

The BH uprising has proved more ferocious than the Niger Delta militancy, deploying the lethal strategy of suicide bombing – hitherto unknown in the country. Thousands of people have been killed and property worth millions of dollars has been destroyed since 2009 when BH first appeared. Most analysts of the conflict contend that Islamic fundamentalism is at the root of the rebellion; a few scholars blame the emergence on elite violent political competition between northern and southern Nigeria, especially after Goodluck Jonathan emerged as president; yet a handful of analysts attribute the political violence to external influences, including the influx of illegal aliens into the country.

This article unravels the weaknesses in these explanations and demonstrates that the BH insurgency is a fall-out of a governance crisis, especially in northern Nigeria where the growing incidence of poverty has led to frustration and recourse to violence among the people, particularly the youth. The article is divided into six sections: immediately following this introduction is the second segment which conceptualises the terms 'governance' and 'terrorism'. The third part is on the theory of state fragility, while the fourth part examines the evolution and dynamics of BH insurgency. The fifth section explains why violent conflict is pervasive in northern Nigeria. The sixth and final segment concludes the article.

Governance and terrorism: A conceptualisation

In a broad sense, the concept 'governance' refers to the process of exercising political power to manage the affairs of a nation or society. Governance entails the process of making decisions and implementing them as based on considerations such as popular participation, respect for the rule of law, observance of human rights, transparency, free access to information, prompt responses to human needs, accommodation of diverse interests, equity, inclusiveness, effective results and accountability (UNICEF 2002). Focusing on outputs and outcomes of policy, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation sees governance as the provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that a citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens (IIAG 2013:6).

The core elements of governance include (1) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens' fundamental rights (Santiso 2009). Thus, the concept translates into: initiating, directing and managing public resources, organising people, directing subordinates to put in their best to achieve positive results in a given assignment (Lawal et al. 2012:187). On the other hand, governance crisis simply connotes those problems that emanate from the misapplication of the key elements of the concept in a society. This often spurs resentment or rejectionist behaviour from its citizens who are expected to be loyal and law-abiding.

Various attempts have been made to conceptualise terrorism, but none has been universally accepted. Little wonder the term 'terrorism' is classified as one of the most contentious concepts in recent political parlance. The contentious nature of the concept is understandable, given the complex nature of the term, particularly if one draws from the ideological interpretations of 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter', which has become a justification for the violent acts of both state and non-state actors in a bid to contrast one side's legitimate killing to another side's illegitimate killing and also blur the distinctions between acts of non-state terrorism and state terrorism (Hough 2008:66; English 2009:4).

From a subjective perspective, this right of legitimate killing(s) is considered a right of state(s), since in international law state violence is viewed through the prism of legality whereas violence from non-state actors is viewed or perceived illegal in its totality (Hough 2008:66). From this point of view, the term 'terror' is something that can be inflicted upon people either by governments (state terrorism) or by groups (groups like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram). Therefore it is hardly surprising that the concept terrorism is derived from the Latin word 'terrere' meaning to frighten, terrify, deter, or scare away (English 2009:5). Indeed a terrorist act can involve all of (but is not limited to) these elements sketched out above.

Thus, terrorism is a particular species of political violence involving a threat of violence against non-combatants or property in order to gain a political, ideological, or religious goal through fear and intimidation. Usually symbolic in nature, the act is crafted to have an impact on an audience that differs from the immediate target of the violence. Hence terrorism is a strategy employed by actors (state and non-state actors) with widely differing goals they intend to achieve and constituencies they intend to reach (Post 2007:3; Enders and Sandler 2012:4).

Theorising state fragility

In the modern political sensibility, the concept of state fragility (as that of the countries of the 'bottom billion') is highly contentious (Collier 2007:7). This is because of the complex and diverse nature of states which are referred to as fragile. Despite this contention, several scholars and development agencies define state fragility principally as a fundamental failure of the state to perform functions necessary to meet citizens' basic needs and expectations through the political process (Mcloughlin 2012:9). Theoretically, state fragility can be understood as a composite measure of all aspects of state performance, such as authority, service delivery and legitimacy, that characterise the state (Brown 2009, cited in European Report on Development 2009:16).

Although there are different levels of state(s) ranking in the global arena, some are strong while others are either fragile or collapsed (Zartman 1995:1; Reno

2002:843). However, if these states are placed on a continuum based on their ranking, a fragile state will be one which has not been able to perform its core duties as a centralised organisational structure, is unable to exercise its sovereign rights and is incapable of making binding decisions on its citizens, and lacks an effective engine of growth and appreciable development. Thus, a sovereign state which has lost total control of its duties or has failed to perform these duties is thus referred to as failed or collapsed (Carment 2003:409-410; Osaghae 2007:692).

However, a fragile state as opposed to a collapsed or a failed state may be defined most simply as a distressed state that lacks the key elements necessary to function effectively. According to Osaghae (2007:692-693), fragile states are specifically characterised by one or more of the following:

(1) Weak, ineffective, and unstable political institutions and bad governance, conducive to loss of state autonomy; informalisation; privatisation of state, personal and exclusionary rule; neo-patrimonialism; and prebendal politics.

(2) Inability to exercise effective jurisdiction over its territory, leading to the recent concept of 'ungoverned territories'.

(3) A legitimacy crisis, occasioned by problematic national cohesion, contested citizenship, violent contestation for state power, perennial challenges to the validity and viability of the state, and massive loss and exit of citizens through internal displacement, refugee flows, separatist agitation, civil war and the like.

(4) Unstable and divided population, suffering from a torn social fabric, minimum social control, and pervasive strife that encourage exit from rather than loyalty to the state.

(5) Underdeveloped institutions of conflict management and resolution, including credible judicial structures, which pave the way for recourse to conflict-ridden, violent, non-systemic and extra-constitutional ways in which to articulate grievances and seek redress.

(6) Pervasive corruption, poverty, and low levels of economic growth and development, leading to lack of fiscal capacity to discharge basic functions of statehood, including, most importantly, obligations to citizens such as protection from diseases like AIDS and guarantees of overall human security.

It is based on these characteristics and theoretical underpinnings that it becomes appropriate to classify Nigeria as a fragile state because a majority of the characteristics sketched out above are clear features in the country. Thus, one finds a link between Nigeria's weakness and the emergence and dynamics of terrorist operations in the country, especially from the BH group in the troubled north.

Boko Haram: Anatomy of a rebellion

The code name 'Boko Haram' (BH) was formed out of two separate words 'Boko' and 'Haram'. The term 'Boko' is the Hausa name for western education, while 'Haram' is an Arabic word which figuratively means 'sin' but literally means 'forbidden'. When these words are used together in the Hausa language, it denotes strongly that western education is forbidden (Adesoji 2010:100; Johnson 2011). However, the name BH is strongly rejected by the group who prefers to be officially called 'Jama 'atu Ahlis Sunna awati wal-jihad' ('People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad', or, more literally translated, 'Association of Sunnas for the Propagation of Islam and for 'Holy War') (see Sani 2011:24; Osumah 2013:541).

The exact date of BH's origin is mired in controversy, but most Nigerian sources agree on the parallel – if not direct connection in terms of individuals involved – with the Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s, which was apparently one of the first attempts at imposing a religious ideology on a secular and independent Nigeria (Isichei 1987:194-208; Pham 2011:2). Despite all this, it is agreed by scholars that in 2002, a Muslim cleric, Ustaz (Teacher) Mohammed Yusuf, established a religious complex with a mosque and an Islamic boarding school in Maiduguri, Borno State. Thus the foundation of the BH group was established (Johnson 2011; Chothia 2012). The introduction of Islamic Law (Sharia) in 12 northern states since 1999 was deemed insufficient by those represented by Yusuf and his die-hard followers, who clearly argued that the country's ruling class in its entirety was marred by corruption and even Muslim northern leaders were irredeemably tainted by 'western-style' ambitions. To them, a 'pure' Sharia state would ostensibly be more transparent and just than the existing order (Forest 2012:62-63; Pham 2012:2).

The group BH has a membership composition which includes: disaffected northern youths, professionals, unemployed graduates, Islamic clerics, ex-almajirai

(children who constantly migrate for the purpose of acquiring Quranic education in the Hausa language), drop-outs from universities, plus some members of the Nigerian political elite. It also includes some members of the state security agencies who thus assist the group with training and useful intelligence reports. The sect claims to have over 40 000 members altogether in Nigeria and some neighbouring African states including Chad, Benin, and Niger (Onuoha 2010:57-58; Chris 2011; Forest 2012:62-63).

BH like several other militant groups keeps its membership diffuse; it does not publish full details of its hierarchies, structure, or manifesto. But a closer look at the group displays some forms of hierarchical structure, even though few details are known about its inner operations. Its first known leader was the Late Mohammed Yusuf (1979-2009), after whom Mallam Sani Umaru became the acting leader of the group. And since then several other members have claimed to be the leader of the group at different times (Campbell 2012). Currently Imam Abu Muhammed Abubakar aka Shekau is the group's Commander-in-Chief (Amir ul-Aam), with Kabiru Sokoto and Mallam Abu Qaqa as deputies (Na'ib Amir ul-Aam 1 and 2) (Waldek and Jayasekara 2013:171; Zenn 2012:3).

Figure 1: Potential Leadership hierarchy of the BH Group

Source: Waldek and Jayasekara 2013:172

Interestingly, members of the militant group pay daily levies to their leaders, thus providing a financial base for BH in addition to loot from attacks on banks, ransoms from kidnapping and donations from political sponsors and other organisations within and outside Nigeria. For example, in 2007 Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagun were arraigned in a Federal High Court at the Federal Capital Territory Abuja for receiving monies from Al-Qaeda operatives. It was alleged that Damagun for his part received a total of US$300 000 from Al-Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism. Similarly, Yusuf reportedly received monies from Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to recruit terrorists who would attack the residences of foreigners, particularly Americans living in Nigeria (Onuoha 2010:56-57; Adesoji 2010:101; Campbell 2012).

The BH group is a security threat to Nigeria. Its first known violent attack, in which approximately 30 people were killed, was on local government installations, police stations as well as public buildings in Yobe State on 24 December 2003 (Pham 2011:1; Aghedo and Osumah 2012:859). In a bid to stop these attacks on police stations and other government buildings, the government of Nigeria in July 2009 launched a counter-attack against the insurgents which resulted in at least 700 deaths, mostly members of the group, and including the group leader Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed while in police custody (Ploch 2011:1-2).

Despite this government crackdown, the group which appeared to have gone into hibernation re-emerged in a much more deadly and highly militarised form, orchestrating a large scale prison break in September 2010 that saw the release of 700 prisoners, including over 100 of its own members (Alechenu and Makinde 2011). The group's attacks have since increased substantially in frequency, reach and lethality, and are now occurring almost daily in a majority of northern states in Nigeria. They now periodically reach as far as the capital city of Abuja (Ploch 2013:12).

However, the implications of violent terrorist attacks are manifest in economic disintegration, and in wanton destruction of lives and properties in the troubled zone of the country. BH has since 2009 carried out sophisticated attacks on mainly police stations, army barracks, prisons, religious centres, schools, and

banks as well as some other government institutions, and upon prominent personalities. These, plus the heavy-handed counter-insurgency operation against the group have caused an estimated 3 000 deaths, the destruction of property and significant displacement of people (HRW 2012; Murdock 2013). (See table 1 below for a sample list of attacks). Although the incidents listed in table 1 are neither exhaustive nor terminal, it is obvious that terrorist attacks in the country have surged rather than ebbed – an indication that the group's activities have been expanding progressively in terms of scope, severity and targets from 2009 to the present time.

Table 1: A sample of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria from July 2009 to September 2013

S/N	Date	Incidents (Nature and Location)	Casualty Figures
1.	July 26, 2009	BH attacked police station in Bauchi triggering a five day uprising that spread to Maiduguri.	Over 40 sect members were killed and over 200 arrested.
2.	September 7, 2010	BH attacked a prison in Bauchi and freed 700 inmates former sect members inclusive	5 guards killed
3.	December 24, 2010	Bomb attack in Jos	8 people killed instantly
4.	December 28, 2010	BH claims responsibility for the Christmas eve bombing in Jos	38 people killed
5.	May 29, 2011	Bombing of Army Barracks in Bauchi and Maiduguri	15 people killed
6.	June 26, 2011	Bomb attack on a bar in Maiduguri	25 people killed
7.	August 16, 2011	Bombing of the United Nations office complex in Abuja	Over 34 people killed

8.	December 25, 2011	Bombing of St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla	Over 46 people killed
9.	January 21, 2012	Multiple bomb blasts rocked Kano city	Over 185 people killed
10.	February 15, 2012	Attack on Koton Karfe prison, Kogi State, in which 119 prisoners were freed	1 warder killed
11.	February 19, 2012	Bomb blast near Christ Embassy Church in Suleija, Niger State	5 people killed
12.	February 26, 2012	Bombing of Church of Christ of Nigeria, in Jos	2 people killed and 38 injured
13.	March 8, 2012	An Italian-Franco Lamolinara, and a Briton Christopher McManus, expatriate staff of Stabilim Visioni construction company, abducted since mid-2011, were killed by a splinter group of BH	2 people killed
14.	March 11, 2012	Bombing of St. Finbarr's Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos	11 people killed and many injured
15.	April 26, 2012	Bombing of three media houses: (a) This Day, Abuja (b) This Day; The Sun and the Moments, Kaduna	5 people killed and 13 injured in Abuja 3 people killed and many injured in Kaduna
16.	April 29, 2012	Attack on Bayero University, Kano	16 people killed and many injured
17.	April 30, 2012	Bomb explosion in Jalingo	11 people killed and several others wounded

18.	September 23, 2012	A suicide bomber attacked St. John's Catholic Church in Bauchi	2 persons killed and over 48 injured
19.	December 5, 2012	Attack in Kano City on policemen at a roundabout and civilians in a bus	2 policemen killed and several others injured
20.	March 23, 2013	Attack in Kano, Adamawa, Borno. Banks, police station and a prison torched	28 killed and several others injured
21.	April 12, 2013	Attack in Yobe police station	4 policemen and 5 sect members killed
22.	June 22, 2013	Attack in Yobe in Bama town	40 police men, 13 prison warders, 3 soldiers and several other civilians killed
23.	September 29, 2013	Attack in Yobe State College of Agriculture in Gijba	78 Students killed

Sources: Ajayi, 2012:106; Onuoha 2010:59; Muhammad, Marama and Yusuf 2013; Bello and Musa 2013:1; BBC Africa 2012; Marama 2013; Vanguard 2013.

The increased militarisation of the BH group, resulting in frequent attacks on both civilians and foreign nationals in Nigeria, has also caused a large dent to the nation's image. Indeed, its citizens and the international communities now interact with the state in an extremely cautious manner. Also, no investor would want to invest in a terrorist-prone zone where the watchword is insecurity. Thus, creating a generalised sense of insecurity in the country and beyond due to acts of terrorism (like Farauk Umar Abdulmurtallab who attempted to bomb an American airliner with over 289 people on board) is still fresh in the minds of everyone. This case and several others have lent credence to fears that Nigeria is a fertile ground for Al-Qaeda recruitment and consequently an emerging exporter of international terrorism (Olaosebikan and Nmeribeh 2010; Johnson 2011).

Sadly, the strategic importance of a nation's image re-branding cannot be over-emphasised as this, according to Ham and Jun (2008), enhances those socio-political and economic factors as well as values that are crucial to the harmonious working relations of states in the international community. Nation branding can attract both tangible and intangible benefits, including tourism revenue, investment capital, and foreign aid; and can boost its cultural and political influence in the global arena. However, the increased terrorist threats from the BH militants in the country have all clearly undermined the government's Nation's Image Re-branding policy aimed at achieving a positive image turnaround (Ojo and Aghedo 2013:82).

Bringing governance into the crisis: Explaining the BH uprising

The emergence of the BH sect in Nigeria has triggered widely divergent views on the real instigator of the group's emergence, growth and agenda. And, since then, available literature on the propellant of the group's construction has been coloured with mixed motives, ranging from political, religious and external to socio-economic ones. A majority of scholarly authors shares the view that political ideology is the key propellant of the emergence and growth of the recent terrorist acts from the BH sect. It is their argument that the current form of terrorism is fuelled by the recent political shift of power from the hands of the northern political elites to their southern counterparts as exemplified by the Jonathan Presidency (Ahokegh 2012:47; Maiangwa and Uzodike 2012:3).

Thus, the Nigerian political space became over-heated when President Umar Musa Yar'Adua died, and as a result of the Nigerian Constitution the Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan became the substantive President with an alleged signed agreement to only complete the remaining one year of the erstwhile president, as based on the People's Democratic Party's (PDP) principle of zoning. President Jonathan, however, vigorously contested such an agreement, and has consistently denied signing any agreement. Others argue that zoning is not a constitutional matter but a 'gentleman's agreement'. The implication of the thesis supporting this political motive is hinged on the logic that the BH group was constructed by some northern political elites who had lost face in the

April 2011 presidential election and as such were bent on making the country ungovernable for President Jonathan who is a Christian minority southerner. Seen this way, the BH becomes a child of political rascality (Osuni 2012; Forest 2012:27; Nwanegbo and Odigbo 2013).

It is true that a majority of Nigerian politicians are intoxicated with politics since the premium placed on political power is quite high, but it is completely illogical to hinge the BH uprising on politics alone. This is because the BH had long been in existence before the alleged flagrant disregard of the PDP's principle of zoning in 2011. The group first came into prominence under President Musa Yar'Adua who was a northern Muslim.

Despite this political thinking, there exists another dimension in the interpretation of the emergence and growth of the terrorist sect. Some scholars have argued that the recent form of terrorism from the BH group is an outgrowth of the Maitatsine Movement and riots of the 1980s during which the first major uprisings of fundamentalist Islam in Nigeria appeared with the stated goal of purifying Islam. The reason for this interpretation is that some of the key actors of the Maitatsine crisis were also implicated in the recent BH formation, thus creating a link between the same old objectives of the Islamic crisis of the 1980s with that of the recent acts of terrorism (Adesoji 2010:96-97).

Advocates of a link between Maitatsine and BH argue that the main enabling factor to the evolution of BH was the partial implementation and adoption of the contested Sharia law in 12 Northern states in the country starting from 2000, which many religious faithful of Islam have been trying to turn into full implementation ever since the time of the Maitatsine riots. To them, even the name BH speaks to such experiences when interpreted in the local Hausa language (Boas 2012:1-4). According to this view BH's origins and activity in recent time is a clear display and means of venting their anger regarding the way the government of Nigeria has handled the implementation of the long awaited Sharia law (Buah and Adelakun 2009:40). Thus, the recent acts of terrorism carried out by the BH group have a fundamentalist jihadist aspect to them. Indeed, Islamic religion has played a very significant role in the emergence and growth of the BH group. This is as a result of the fact that members of the group

use religion to rationalise their acts and as such indoctrinate foot soldiers that the uprising is a fight for Allah and therefore a huge reward awaits its members.

However, despite this very important role played by religion in the evolution of the group, the relationship between Islam and the dynamic character of BH terror remains tenuous. This is because proponents of this ideology fail to note the fact that religious beliefs in Nigeria are normally pushed to rationalise conflict by groups such as BH, but that they are more of a smoke screen for the real ends served by violence. Therefore, even though the narratives of the insurgents have been religiously driven, especially in pursuit of jihadism (in order to fully implement Sharia law), the membership profile of the group indicates very strongly that poverty and economic inequality are at its roots. In addition, the group which claims to be focused on achieving an all-encompassing Islamic state unleashes terror even on those it is supposedly fighting for – fellow Islamic faithful.

There is an opposing argument from scholars which places the key elements of the outset of the BH uprising in an external context, insisting that the recent forms of terrorism from the group are to a large extent alien to the Nigerian people and as such implicates an external dimension to the sect's origin and agenda. This analytical model gained momentum when in 2011 the United Nations House in Abuja fell victim to a vehicle-borne improvised exploding device (V-IED) launched by a member of the BH group (Connell 2012:87; Ajayi 2012:105).

The thrust of the external dimension argument is hinged on the ideology that foreign terrorist organisations are responsible for the recent terror attacks in the country. This is because of the fact that there is a significant increase in the involvement of illegal aliens in the BH attacks. Chadians, Nigeriens, Malians, among others, have all been identified in the nation's recent security challenges in which the new tactic of suicide bombing has been used. It is argued that a true Nigerian will not commit suicide for the sake of achieving a particular goal. The Nigerian government has deported a significant number of illegal aliens in its hope to avert terrorist attacks. For example, in Lagos well over 50 illegal aliens were handed over to the immigration for screening and onward deportation to their countries (Ugbodaga 2013).

However, this analytical model is deficient because the major actors fingered in the construction of the BH group were clearly identified as citizens of Nigeria, drawn primarily from the Kanuri ethnic group (concentrated in the north-east region, especially Bauchi and Borno), but also from the entire northern region of the country (Chris 2011; Forest 2012:1). Therefore, it is instructive to note that this analytical tool for understanding the BH uprising is not cogent enough and thus lacks merit. Scholars and researchers have often overlooked the core motive for the group's origin, objectives and growth as an up-shoot of a governance crisis, rising unemployment, mass poverty, and rampant corruption. My point here is that the weak nature of governance in Nigeria serves a wider function in the emergence and growth of terrorist groups such as BH.

It is a fact that after fifty four years since gaining independence (1960-2014), a majority of Nigerians still cannot meet their basic human and socio-economic needs. A large percentage of the youth lacks access to food, a quality educational system, effective healthcare service delivery, pipe-borne water, proper shelter, and employment opportunities. Yet in the face of these deprivations, the political elites embezzle public funds and engage in ostentatious living. The inability of the government to bring about good and effective governance for its citizens particularly in the northern region has created what Omede (2011:93) referred to as a 'frustration of rising expectations' which has in turn resulted in all forms of violence in the region, including such crimes as kidnapping, armed robberies and most importantly terrorism which has reached its acme.

Though governmental corruption and its attendant mass poverty are rampant throughout the country, the rate of poverty in the northern region is higher than the national average (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Zonal incidence of poverty in Nigeria

Source: Rogers 2012:3

Indeed, several studies conducted with a focus on poverty incidence in the region clearly indicate that about 75 per cent of Northerners live in poverty compared to 27 per cent of Southerners (Pothuraju 2012:3). Similarly a study on national poverty levels from the Central Bank of Nigeria also concluded that ten states with the highest level of poverty are all located in the northern region, conversely ten states with the lowest level of poverty are all southern states, and as a result 70 per cent of the people living in the north live on below $1 per day (US$1 = N150) (Lukman 2007). See Table 2 for incidence of poverty in Nigeria.

Table 2: Poverty by region, Nigeria

	1980	**1985**	**1992**	**1996**	**2004**	**2010**
Nationwide	28.1	46.3	42.7	65.6	54.4	69.0
Sector						
Urban	17.2	37.8	37.5	58.2	43.2	61.8
Rural	28.3	51.4	66.0	69.3	63.3	73.2

Geopolitical zone						
South-South	13.2	45.7	40.8	58.2	35.1	63.8
South-East	12.9	30.4	41.0	53.5	26.7	67.0
South-West	13.4	38.6	43.1	60.9	43.0	59.1
North-Central	**32.2**	**50.8**	**46.0**	**64.7**	**67.0**	**67.5**
North-East	**35.6**	**54.9**	**54.0**	**70.1**	**72.2**	**76.3**
North-West	**37.7**	**52.1**	**36.5**	**77.2**	**71.2**	**77.7**

Source: Ojo and Aghedo 2013:95

Sadly, the above data paint a pretty dismal picture of the socio-economic situation in Nigeria, thus reinforcing the argument of this article that citizens were repulsed by the government's weakness or failure to provide the basic human needs, and instigated by the example of Niger Delta militants who utilised violence as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions from the government, as well as by the failure of non-violent strategies – such as protests or negotiations. All of these factors, strengthened by the youth's disillusionment, made them ready armies in the hands of extremists like Yusuf.

Even the borders of the Nigerian state have not been spared from the dire consequences of its fragility. This is manifest in the poor management of the nation's borders. The recent disclosure by Nigeria's Minister of Interior, Abba Moro, that there are over 1 497 irregular (illegal) and 84 regular (legal) officially identified entry routes into Nigeria, confirms the very porous state of these borders which permits illicit transnational arms trafficking in the country (Abbah and Igidi 2013; Onuoha 2013:4). It is thus not surprising that terrorist groups take advantage of the poorly managed borders for smuggling sophisticated weapons into the country. This is evidenced by BH's sophistication in heavy fire power such as anti-aircraft weapons mounted on four-wheel-drive vehicles, and by their access to arms smuggled out of Libya which are now used by the insurgents to resist government forces (Alli and Ogunwale 2013; Gambrell 2013).

The fragility of public institutions and the state security apparatus makes terrorist groups such as BH more radicalised in both tactics and targets. This is because these security agencies have failed to strictly abide by the rules of engagement in tackling perpetrators of terrorist acts when they respond to these in Nigeria. It is a fact that terrorist groups such as BH conducted their operations and campaigns in a more or less peaceful manner during their infant stage (Cook 2011:8). But this changed due to the state's brutal suppression leading to the deaths of over 700 members of the group including the group's leader Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (Nwankwo and Falola 2009). This strengthened the hands of the BH insurgents who, taking advantage of the widespread impoverishment of the northern people, radicalised them on the pretext that Islamic religion was under threat (IDMC-NRC 2013:4).

Perhaps the poor management of victims of terrorism by the state is also a manifestation of fragility. Both insurgent and counter-insurgent activities have triggered a significant displacement of citizens both internal (internally displaced persons - IDPs) and external (externally displaced persons - EDPs). For example, on 2 May 2013 President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. Both insurgent and counter-insurgent efforts at the time resulted in the displacement of over 9 000 Nigerians to Niger, Cameroon and Chad (UNHCR 2013). Furthermore, Nigeria suffers a shortage of humanitarian aid to cushion the negative impacts of displacement on victims (IDMC-NRC 2013:6). Nigeria's growing weakness in the fight against terrorism is further exacerbated by government security forces' human rights abuses.

Despite the fact that the Nigerian constitution guarantees that every person has the 'right to life', 'personal liberty' and 'respect for the dignity of his person', and shall not be arbitrarily deprived of these rights, including the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2011: sections 33, 34(1)(a) and 35), government security forces, comprising military, police, and intelligence personnel (known as the Joint Military Task Force, JTF), have arbitrarily executed, arrested or beaten civilians, burned houses and cars, illegally detained civilians, and have subjected some to torture or other physical abuse (HRW 2012). For example,

as many as 950 people with suspected BH links have died in military detention centres in the first six months of 2013 alone, according to an estimate of Amnesty International (2013).

The great expectations of the people that these social ills would ebb with Nigeria's return to a democratic government have nearly been dashed owing to successive bad governance from its leaders to date. Just recently Nigeria ranked 41st out of Africa's 52 nations in safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development according to the statistical measure of governance performance in African countries (IIAG 2013:9). The above-mentioned cases of institutional decay plus the high levels of youth unemployment, poverty and developmental challenges in the northern regions have influenced terrorist groups in Nigeria. These factors, combined with weak governance, rampant corruption, inadequate public service delivery, and increased human rights violations have contributed to widespread disaffection and are the major propellant of terrorism in the area.

However, contemporary history has come to recognise that the Nigerian state is unable to discharge many of its statutory functions, including those ensuring development, guaranteeing welfare, minimising corruption, and regulating peoples' monopoly of violence. The implication of these contradictions and social pathologies arising from the fragility of the Nigerian state is that if good governance concurrent with development is not employed as curative to past government ills, the Nigerian State will further create a much more enabling environment for the growth of more terrorist groups other than the BH sect. It is not only that these stark realities have not been taken into account by the leaders of Nigeria's counter-terrorism committee, but also that they have not hesitated to do so at the expense of peace and have thus left the strategy of counter-terrorism grappling with symptoms rather than tackling the menace.

Concluding remarks

The article has argued that the phenomenon of the BH uprising is driven more by poor governance and illegitimate leadership practices than the religious variables analysts and authors have strongly emphasised. It has

been demonstrated that the rates of mass poverty in the northern region are higher than the national average, with the result that many people have become disaffected, frustrated and pushed to rebellion. Though jihadist rhetoric is often stated by the insurgents as the core motivation of the terrorism, this narrative is more of a legitimising and mobilising tool than a precipitant. The religious twist to the uprising cannot be ignored, however; this is because, as mentioned in the article, Islam had played a crucial role in at least providing the group with more members who are willing to die for the cause which the group seeks to promote. In light of this religious dimension, however, proper monitoring of the teachings of various religious groups in the country is important in a bid to prevent any group from using religion as a spring-board for the actualisation of their economic benefits in Nigeria.

There is also a strong need in Nigeria for an accountable, legitimate and transparent governance that will bring about popular participation through inclusiveness but not alienation and exclusion, which will ultimately result in people-centred development. In this sense the government of Nigeria should be sensitive, fair and just in the discharge of its duties, decisions and policies in a way that will positively affect the lives of the general public instead of continuously serving the interests of the political elites. This will make the government a peace generator rather than a conflict escalator. On the economic front there is need for proper macro-economic management aimed at poverty alleviation and drastic reduction in the levels of inequality and unemployment. This is because there can be no good governance without a viable economic base.

Finally, rather than continually using brutal force as conflict management strategy, the government should work more on strengthening the governance system in Nigeria and should focus, with the help of international donors, on developmental projects aimed at reducing poverty, unemployment and corruption. This may help to contain the insurgency, because BH 'writ large' is a movement of grassroots anger among northern people at the continuing depravation, poverty and economic inequality which have been the direct result of bad governance in the north and the country at large. These measures should depopulate the pool of foot soldiers from which the violent elites draw.

Sources

Abbah, Theophilus and Terkula Igidi 2013. We'll build physical fences at illegal routes into Nigeria – Abba Moro. *Sunday Trust*. Available from: <http://www.sundaytrust.com.ng/index.php/interview/12387-we-ll-build-physical-fences-at-illegal-routes-into-nigeria-abba-moro> [Accessed 17 March 2013].

Adesoji, Abimbola 2010. The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria. *African Spectrum*, 45 (2), pp. 95-108.

Aghedo, Iro and Oarhe Osumah 2012. The Boko Haram uprising: How should Nigeria respond? *Third World Quarterly*, 33 (5), pp. 853-869.

Ahokegh, Akaayar 2012. Boko Haram: A 21st century challenge in Nigeria. *European Scientific Journal*, 8 (21), pp. 46-55.

Ajayi, Adegboyega 2012. Boko Haram and terrorism in Nigeria: Exploratory and explanatory notes. *Global Advanced Research Journal of History, Political Science and International Relations,* 1 (5), pp. 103-107.

Alechenu, John and Femi Makinde 2011 Government arrested, released UN bombing suspects in 2007. *The Punch*, 2 September.

Alli, Yusuf and Gbade Ogunwale 2013. Boko Haram fighters resist troops with Libyan arms. *The Nation*. Available from: <http://issuu.com/thenation/docs/may_22__2013> [Accessed 12 December 2013].

Amnesty International 2013. Nigeria: Deaths of hundreds of Boko Haram suspects in custody requires investigation. Available from: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/nigeria-deaths-hundreds-boko-haram-suspects-custody-requires-investigation-2013-10-15> [Accessed 12 November 2013].

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Africa 2012. Nigerian church bombed in Bauchi, Boko Haram flashpoint. Available from: <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-Africa-19691781> [Accessed 11 September 2012].

Bello, Niyi and Njadvara Musa 2013. Boko Haram rejects proposed amnesty, denies wrongdoing. *The Guardian*, 29 April.

Boas, Morten 2012. Violent Islamic uprising in northern Nigeria: From the 'Taliban' to Boko Haram II. Norwegian Resource Peacebuilding Centre (NOREF) article.

Buah, Juliet and Abimbola Adelakun 2009. The Boko Haram tragedy and other issues. *The Punch,* 6 August.

Campbell, John 2012. Nigeria's insistent insurrection, *The New York Times*. Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26opinion/nigeria-insistent-insurrection.html?> [Accessed 25 January 2013].

Carment, David 2003. Assessing state failure: Implications for theory and policy. *Third World Quarterly*, 24 (3), pp. 407-411. Available from: <http://http-server.carleton.ca/~dcarment/papers/assessingstatefailure.pdf> [Accessed 20 August 2013].

Chothia, Farouk 2012. Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? *BBC News*. Available from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501> [Accessed 11 January 2013].

Chris, Ajaero 2011. A thorn in the flesh of the nation. *Newswatch*, 21 November, pp.12-19.

Collier, Paul 2007. *The bottom billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Connell, Shannon 2012. To be or not to be: Is Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization? *Global Security Studies,* 3 (3), pp. 87-93.

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Amended) 2011. Available from: http://www. nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm#Chapter_1 [Accessed 29 November 2013].

Cook, David 2011. *Boko Haram: A prognosis.* James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University. Available from: <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/files/735/> [Accessed 15 May 2012].

Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler 2012. *The political economy of terrorism.* 2nd Edition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

English, Richard 2009. *Terrorism: How to respond.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

European Report on Development 2009. *Overcoming fragility in Africa.* Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. Available from: <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/research-development/ documents/erd_report_2009_en.pdf> [Accessed 20 October 2013].

Forest, James 2012. Confronting the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. *JSOU* (Joint Special Operations University) *Report*, 2 (5), pp. 1-178.

Gambrell, Jon 2013. Boko Haram's weapons of war spilling innocent blood in Nigeria. *Associated Press.* Available from: <http://www.cananusa.org/index.php/campaigns/ news/349-boko-haram-s-weapons-of-war-spilling-innocent-blood-in-nigeria.html> [Accessed 20 October 2013].

Ham, Chang D. and Jong W. Jun 2008. Cultural factors influencing country images: The case of American college students' attitude towards South Korea. *Journal of Mass Communication,* 2 (3), pp. 1-22.

Hough, Peter 2008. *Understanding global security*. 2nd edition. London and New York, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

HRW (Human Rights Watch) 2012. Spiralling violence: Boko Haram attacks and security forces abuses in Nigeria. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ nigeria1012webwcover.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2013].

IDMC-NRC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – Norwegian Refugee Council) 2013. *Fragmented response to internal displacement amid Boko Haram attacks and flood season.* Available from: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/ (httpCountries)/19D5FDB3E4AF4D1D802570A7004B613E?OpenDocument> [Accessed 16 November 2013].

IIAG (Ibrahim Index of African Governance) 2013. *2013 Ibrahim index of African governance: Summary.* Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Available from: <http://www.moibrahimfoundation. org/downloads/2013/2013-IIAG-summary-report.pdf> [Accessed 26 November 2013].

Isichei, Elizabeth 1987. The Maitatsine risings in Nigeria, 1980-1985: A revolt of the disinherited. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, xvii (3), pp. 194-208.

Johnson, Toni 2011. Backgrounder: Boko Haram, Council on Foreign Relations. Available from: <http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739> [Accessed 27 January 2013].

Lawal, Tolu, Kayode Imokhuede and Ilepe Johnson 2012. Governance crisis and the crisis of leadership in Nigeria. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 2 (7).

Lukman, Salihu M. 2007. Nigeria: The north and poverty phenomenon. Available from: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200702060158.html> [Accessed 18 September 2012].

Maiangwa, Benjamin and Ufo Uzodike 2012. The changing dynamics of Boko Haram terrorism. Report, Aljazeera Centre for Studies, pp. 1-6.

Marama, Ndahi 2013. Boko Haram re-groups, invades Borno towns. *Vanguard*, Vol. 24, 23 June.

Mcloughlin, Claire 2012. Topic guide on fragile states. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. University of Birmingham, UK. Available from: <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON86.pdf> [Accessed 18 July 2013].

Muhammad, Abdusalam, Ndahi Marama and Umar Yusuf 2013. As 28 are killed in terror attacks … Insurgents hit bank, police station, prisons. *Vanguard*, 24 March. Available from: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/03/as-28-are-killed-in-terror-attacks-insurgents-hit-bank-police-station-prisons/> [Accessed 19 November 2013].

Murdock, Heather E. 2013. In army fight against militants, Nigerian civilians trust no one. *Global post*. Available from: <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/nigeria/130521/africa-nigeria-boko-haram-al-qaeda-military> [Accessed 14 October 2013].

Nwanegbo, Jaja and Jude Odigbo 2013. Security and national development in Nigeria: The threat of Boko Haram. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3 (4), pp. 285-291.

Nwankwo, Chiawo and Francis Falola 2009. Boko Haram: Another 140 kids, women rescued, 780 killed in Maiduguri alone - Red Cross victims given mass burial. *The Punch,* 3 August.

Ojo, Uyi and Iro Aghedo 2013. Image re-branding in a fragile state: The case of Nigeria. *The Korean Journal of Policy Studies*, 28 (2), pp. 81-107.

Olaosebikan, O. and M. Nmeribeh 2010. The making of a bomber. *The NEWS*, 11 January.

Omede, Adedoyin 2011. Nigeria: Analysing the security challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan administration. *Canadian Social Science*, 7 (5), pp. 90-102.

Onuoha, Freedom C. 2010. The Islamist challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis explained. *African Security Review*, 19 (2), pp. 54-67.

Onuoha, Freedom C. 2013. Porous borders and Boko Haram's arms smuggling operations in Nigeria. Report, Aljazeera Centre for Studies.

Osaghae, Eghosa E. 2007. Fragile states. *Development in Practice*, 17 (4), pp. 691-699.

Osumah, Oarhe 2013. Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal insecurity. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 24 (3), pp. 536-560.

Osuni, P. 2012. Azazi blames PDP for security problems. *Saturday Sun*, 28 April.

Pham, J. Peter 2011. Paper on 'Boko Haram – Emerging threat to the U.S. Homeland' presented before the Committee on Homeland Security: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Hearing. Congressional Research Service, 30 November. Available from: <https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-boko-haram-emerging-threat-us-homeland> [Accessed 23 June 2013].

Pham, J. Peter 2012. Boko Haram's evolving threat. *Africa Security Brief*, 20, pp. 1-7.

Ploch, Lauren C. 2011. Paper on 'Boko Haram – Emerging threat to the U.S. Homeland' presented before the Committee on Homeland Security: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Hearing Congressional Research Service, November 30. Available from: <https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-boko-haram-emerging-threat-us-homeland> [Accessed 23 June 2013].

Ploch, Lauren C. 2013. Nigeria: Current issues and U.S. policy. Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.

Post, Jerrold M. 2007. *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Pothuraju, Babjee 2012. Boko Haram's persistent threat in Nigeria. IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and analyses) Backgrounder. Available from: <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/threatinnigeria_babjepothuraju.pdf> [Accessed 23 October 2013].

Reno, William 2002. The politics of insurgency in collapsing states. *Development and Change*, 33 (5), pp. 837-858. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.

Rogers, Paul 2012. Nigeria: The generic context of the Boko Haram violence. Oxford Research Group Monthly Global Security Briefing, April 30.

Sani, Shehu 2011. Boko Haram: History, ideas and revolt. *The Constitution*, 11 (4). Journal of the Centre for Constitutionalism and Demilitarisation (CENCOD), Ikeja, Nigeria. Lagos, Panaf Press.

Santiso, Carlos 2009. Good governance and aid effectiveness: The World Bank and conditionality. *The Georgetown Public Policy Review*, 7 (1). Available from: <http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdfs/swap/swap108.pdf> [Accessed 18 June 2013].

Ugbodaga, Kazeem 2013. Fear of Boko Haram: Mass deportation of illegal aliens. *P.M. News* Available from: <http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2013/03/26/fear-of-boko-haram-mass-deportation-of-illegal-aliens/> [Accessed 15 June 2013].

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 2013. NE Nigeria insecurity sees refugee outflows spreading to Cameroon. Briefing Notes. Available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/51c036549.html> [Accessed 11 December 2013].

UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) 2002. Poverty and exclusion among urban children. New York, UNICEF. Available from: <http://www.unicefirc.org/publications/pdf/digest10e.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2013].

Vanguard 2013. Gunmen massacre 78 students in Yobe. Available from: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/gunmen-massacre-78-students-yobe/> [Accessed 3 October 2013].

Waldek, Lise and Shankara Jayasekara 2013. Boko Haram: The evolution of Islamist extremism in Nigeria. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 6 (2), pp. 168-178.

Zartman, I. William 1995. *Collapsed states: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority*. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner.

Zenn, Jacob 2012. Boko Haram's dangerous expansion into Northwest Nigeria. *CTC* (Combating Terrorism Center) *Sentinel*, 5 (10), pp. 1-5. Journal of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, New York.

Book review

Towards an African Peace and Security regime: Continental embeddedness, transnational linkages, strategic relevance

Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto eds. 2013

Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 257 pages.
ISBN 9780754676041

Reviewed by Candice Moore

The anticipated establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) in 2015 and the interim African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), in the midst of new and continuing conflicts, have sparked renewed interest in the underpinnings of, and prospects for, the African Peace and Security Architecture. The unique African security environment, consisting of a revived continental organisation working to implement its policies through the capacities of eight recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECs), in the context of extensive external security sector involvement, presents questions for the sustainability and efficiency of this network of actors and their continued engagement. Answering these questions is the subject of this book.

The volume examines the incipient African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with a view to providing 'informed and critical reflection on the adequacy of the emerging African peace and security architecture … to [the] short, medium and long-term challenges and ensuing opportunities for conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa' (p. 1). It also seeks to probe more deeply conceptual questions of the 'embeddedness' of norms, values and processes among African states, especially the AU and the RECs; to examine transnational linkages that draw together major continental and international actors in the field of security provision; and, to engage questions on 'the long-term adequacy and relevance of the APSA itself' (p. 2).

This is a solid volume of 11 essays edited by two experts and practitioners in the field, Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, and bringing together the knowledge of a number of authors with expertise on the African Peace and Security Architecture, from the African continent and beyond. As noted by the subtitle, the book is divided into 3 main parts, Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, and Strategic Relevance.

Part I deals with the key issue of norm transference on the African continent. Two authors tackle the question of how norms become embedded among the key security actors on the African continent, with shared norms seen as the central underpinning to a well-functioning peace and security architecture. The arguments of 'norm contestation' and 'paradigm shift', are marshalled by Antonia Witt and Martin Welz, respectively, to explain the varying acceptance of the non-indifference norm among African states, and between African RECs and the AU, for example. A third chapter by Rodrigo Tavares and Tânia Felício examines the coordination and cooperation of regional organisations with global organisations such as the UN in the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

Part II deals with transnational linkages, and considers the unique 'multi-level logic' of security cooperation in Africa (chapter by Benedikt Franke), examining how Africa's RECs cooperate with the AU to provide capacity and substance to the ideal of 'African solutions to African problems'. This approach is extended to two empirical examples, those of ECOWAS in West Africa (chapter by Emma

Birikorang) and SADC (chapter by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk) in Southern Africa, as well as the example of COMWARN, the early warning mechanism of COMESA (chapter by João Gomes Porto). These three chapters help to provide a clear understanding of how the RECs interact with the AU in the provision of security and in the prevention of conflict. Each argues for a recognition of the benefit that can be derived from the 'organised complementarity' (Franke, p. 74) that the AU and its RECs enjoy. Franke adds the key point that allowing RECs to maintain their autonomy actually *revitalised* continental governance, and allows for the adaptability that managing conflicts on the continent demands (p. 74 and p. 81).

Part III of the volume takes a longer view, examining the long-term relevance and adequacy of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Here, the contribution to security outcomes by peacekeepers is problematised by Andreas Mehler. The importance of cooperation on intelligence gathering and use (chapter by Lauren Hutton), and capacity-building (chapter by Markus Koerner and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot) is highlighted. Finally a closer look at the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is afforded by Kwesi Aning.

This is by no means the first book on the African Peace and Security Architecture. A number of other edited volumes have charted this course before. What this volume does is to bring into conceptual focus, through the examination of key empirical cases, the sticky issues that affect the efficiency of the APSA. These include questions about the extent to which norms, values and processes are embedded among African security actors; how African actors work together, and with external actors, in pursuit of Africa's security goals; and, the long-term adequacy and effectiveness of these arrangements. There is a growing academic concern with African 'agency', or how African states, regional and continental bodies are able to project their influence on the contexts they inhabit. Without the term 'agency' being engaged explicitly in the book, this volume addresses the issue of African agency by providing a clear analysis of the instruments available to implement the African Peace and Security Architecture, and thus makes a valuable contribution to those debates.

While the fit between the three key themes of the book, though appearing to be obvious, is sometimes tenuous, the volume is an important contribution to thinking about the African peace and security landscape and the actors who populate it. Just as a discipline – not quite Political Science and not quite International Relations – has emerged around the study of European Union politics, this book shows that there is much to be gained from studying the unique way in which the African Union, the RECs, African states, and external actors work – or do not work – together to achieve a more peaceful African continent.

A discussion that is absent in this volume is the Libyan crisis of 2011, and its impact on APSA. This may be more due to the timing of the production process than an oversight of the authors, however. A discussion of this crisis would be a welcome addition to a future volume. By way of lending coherence to the volume, the editors might have shared how the volume came into being, and what drew the various contributors together, writing on the subjects they have selected. This is important because it would have provided a stronger conceptual – and perhaps even theoretical – hinge to the volume. On a similar note, while the term 'regime' appears in the title of the volume, there is not much by way of explanation of or engagement with it – something that might have provided a number of insights into how the entire APSA system currently hangs together. One definition of 'regimes' sees them as 'principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area' (Krasner 1982). While this may not be the meaning intended by the editors, it is not clear which meaning is conveyed by the use of this term in the title of the book.

Lastly, while a comprehensive chapter by one of the editors, João Gomes Porto, is dedicated to early warning, all of the pillars of the APSA, namely the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise (PoW) and the Africa Peace Fund (APF) do not enjoy balanced attention.

Notwithstanding, this book is a key contribution to the study, not only of the instruments for maintaining peace and security on the African continent, and Africa's international relations, but most importantly, to the illumination of

how African continental conflict management modestly works and, in places, succeeds. It will be useful to any scholar of Africa, as well as to those conducting comparative research on peace and security architectures across a number of regions. It will be useful to university students of African continental politics and established scholars alike.

ACCORD

THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES