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Jan Smuts Herdenkingslesing



Jan Smuts Memorial Lecture

THE
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THE WORLD
SINCE SMUTS

ROBERT BLAKE

THE JAN SMUTS MEMORIAL LECTURE programme was established in 1984 to commemorate General J.C. Smuts as a statesman of international stature and is intended to focus on current world concerns by means of lectures delivered by speakers who are themselves of international reputation.

The first Jan Smuts Memorial Lecture was given by SIR LAURENS VAN DER POST in Pretoria on 24 May 1984 on *The Importance of Smuts in the Future of the Afrikaner*.

The second Jan Smuts Memorial Lecture was given by PROFESSOR JAMES BARBER at Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg, on 15 January 1987 on the question, *Is there a South African Nation?*

This third Jan Smuts Memorial Lecture was delivered by LORD BLAKE at Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg, on 8 November 1988.

LORD BLAKE, born Robert Blake in 1916, completed his education at Magdalen College, Oxford. After war service with the Royal Artillery, he embarked on a distinguished academic career at Oxford. He is also a Rhodes Trustee, and was created Baron Blake with a life peerage in 1971.

He has published widely in history and politics, including the following: *Disraeli* (1966), *The Office of Prime Minister* (1975), *A History of Rhodesia* (1977), *The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher* (1985), and *The Decline of Power* (1985).

It should be noted that any opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author and not of the Institute.

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ISBN: 0-908371-72-1

May 1989

The South African Institute
of International Affairs
Jan Smuts House
PO Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, South Africa

THE WORLD SINCE SMUTS

It is a great honour to be invited by the South African Institute of International Affairs to give the third Smuts Memorial Lecture. Jan Smuts was one of the most remarkable figures ever to emerge from Africa onto the world stage. Apart from anything else, his role in two world wars was an extraordinary achievement for the Prime Minister of a small country remote from the main centre of events. It was wisdom rather than political power which made him count. It is something of an achievement that he became the trusted counsellor of the two greatest British Prime Ministers of the 20th century - perhaps of all centuries. David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill greatly valued his friendship and his advice in the very different conditions of the two great struggles which dominated the first half of the 20th century. Their tributes to him are heartfelt and sincere.

What gave Smuts his strength and persuasiveness was his capacity to escape the parochialism of South African politics. In the end, this was his undoing. A world statesman needs a base other than the world. Smuts neglected his home base and in 1948 paid the price. But his greatness as an international figure lay in his ability to take a global view. I think, therefore, that it is reasonable and appropriate for the third lecture in this series to try, however defectively, to do the same. Hence the sweeping and perhaps rather pretentious title which I have chosen. I like to think that Smuts himself would not have disapproved of the theme, whatever he would have thought of the speaker and his treatment of it.

Smuts died on 11 September 1950. By then, much of the pattern of the post-war world had been set. The 'Cold War' began before the hot war ended. There was much naive wishful thinking in Britain - even in America - about the goodwill of the Soviet Union, but actions spoke louder than words. I had the honour in 1986 to give the Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture in Fulton, Missouri. This prompted me to read the full text of the great

man's Fulton address. It was remarkably moderate. To describe it as provocative is absurd, though many people did so. But it was realistic, the first clear declaration by a person whose voice counted that the world was divided: 'From Stettin in the Baltic ... to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient States of Central and Eastern Europe.' Forty years later, the situation is exactly the same.

Could the Cold War have been avoided? There is a so-called 'revisionist' school of history, largely composed of bleeding-heart and breast-beating American 'liberals', who maintain that it was their country's fault. It is argued that American provocation fuelled Stalin's suspicions, that American policy, shaped by fanatical anti-communism and the temporary monopoly of the atomic bomb, forced Stalin to preserve his security with a *cordon sanitaire* of satellite East European states. It is even suggested that Marshall Aid was offered in such a way as to make acceptance by the Soviet Union impossible.

This can only be characterised by Jeremy Bentham's expression: not merely nonsense but 'nonsense on stilts'. The slightest sense of chronology tells one that Stalin's paranoiac suspicions and expansionist aims long preceded any signs of American hostility, if indeed hostility is the right word, for it was, rather, a belated sense of self-preservation against a great power as potentially aggressive as Nazi Germany. The only way of avoiding the Cold War would have been for Britain and France, after Munich, to have allowed Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe to fight it out with the Soviet Union. The result might well have been an even worse world than we got after 1945, whichever side won.

By 1950, the worst threats of the USSR towards Western Europe seemed to have been contained. Marshall Aid had resulted in a notable setback to the communist parties of France and Italy. The Berlin Blockade had been broken. The mark had been

stabilised. The West German Republic had come into being in May 1949, only a few weeks after the creation of NATO in April. The signing of that treaty is one of the great watersheds of the post-war world. Meanwhile, Stalin had crushed the last semi-independent country east of the Iron Curtain. For forty years since then, a grinding, frigid, monolithic tyranny has dominated Czechoslovakia, broken only temporarily by the 'Prague Spring' of 1968. The pattern of Europe has changed little, if at all, politically since that day. The east has declined economically, both in relative and in absolute terms, and is rapidly going downhill today. But the boundaries and the official creed, the geographical and ideological configuration of Europe are unchanged, although there are some signs that the situation may not last forever.

There were, however, startling alterations in the balance of power outside Europe. India and Pakistan became independent countries within the Commonwealth in 1947, and were not necessarily allies of the West. An even more drastic revolution occurred in China in 1949. The communist armies of Mao Tse Tung finally routed the forces of Chiang Kai Shek. The whole of China, so it seemed, had thus fallen into the Marxist-Leninist orbit. At a stroke, the country with the largest population in the world was ranged on the side of this aggressive challenge to all the values of western democracy. The triumph of Mao set the alarm bells ringing in the USA, which had been Chiang Kai Shek's patron and had a large moral and psychological investment in his regime. The worst fears seemed justified when in June 1950, on a flimsy pretext, North Korean forces with Russian arms and Chinese backing invaded South Korea.

Since the Russians had boycotted the Security Council of the United Nations and could not exercise their veto, the Americans, aided by Commonwealth contingents, were able to act on behalf of the UNO - ostensibly, but they would have acted anyway. In the end, after immense Korean and Chinese casualties, the war terminated in a stalemate. Korea remained divided at the 38th parallel and is a marvellous object lesson in the economic

success of capitalism compared with socialism, for South Korea is one of the most prosperous countries in the Pacific Basin, whereas the repressive poverty of the North is only rivalled by Albania, Ethiopia and Cuba.

The global prospect in the 1950s seemed to offer an indefinite period of confrontation between two major groupings, both capable of a nuclear exchange which could blow up the world. They were divided - and still are, despite *glasnost* and *perestroika* - by a vast gap of ideas, understanding, attitudes, and of course, standard of living. This division was more significant, more pervasive, more dominating than any other on the world scene. Of course, there were and are any number of conflicts. From 1945 to this day, there has never been a year in which war or wars were not being fought in some part of the globe; and this goes for most of human history.

By 1950, however, there was an important difference in the balance of power compared with the world before 1939 or before 1914. In the jargon of those who write about international affairs, it is the difference between a *bipolar* and a *multipolar* situation. In the 19th century, there were at least five 'Great Powers' - Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia, with America also a burgeoning power but aloof from Europe, the continent which counted. After 1919, the Austrian Empire vanished, Germany and the USSR were temporarily - but only temporarily - in the doldrums. America still remained on the sidelines, while Japan loomed ominously on the eastern horizon. Britain, France and Italy were the great powers of Europe, soon to be rejoined by Germany and Russia.

After 1945, the situation was quite different. There was no longer a plurality of power centres. A bipolar world had succeeded the multipolar pre-war world. There are today some signs that multipolarity may be returning. But from 1950, when Smuts died, bipolarity has prevailed till very recently. What this means is that there were only two power groupings which,

along with their allies and satellites, have been confronting each other - the USA and the USSR - and doing so with a complicated mixture of fear, suspicion and hostility. Moreover, the clash has not been simply one of competition for territory or material resources. It has also been a profound ideological, quasi-religious gulf. It is the gap between the creeds of libertarian democracy and Marxist-Leninism, between those who believe in freedom of thought, expression and economic enterprise, and those who believe in state control, state direction, state omni-competence in every field of human endeavour.

The nearest past parallels to this combination of conflicting creeds and territorial ambitions are the confrontation of the Catholic Hapsburg Empire with the Ottoman Turks in the 16th century, and, 200 years later, the struggle between Britain and Napoleon. Such comparisons are never exact, but the division of Europe - and it is Europe that mattered from 1500 to 1945 or longer - did have some resemblance to our current situation. Beliefs as well as greed divided the Hapsburg Emperors and the Sultans. Napoleon did not merely embody French national ambition; he represented a revolutionary ideology which transcended the boundaries of states and nations - an ideology deeply repugnant to the English Establishment, and to hereditary monarchies everywhere. Rebellious radicals acclaimed him even as their descendants were to acclaim Stalin. Charles James Fox and Bernard Shaw were birds of a feather.

To Smuts in 1950, the stark dichotomy between the USA and the USSR was softened by the British Commonwealth. Not softened in the sense that he thought there ought to be any doubt on which side the Commonwealth stood in the great divide, though as events turned out, the situation was ambivalent and obscure. Rather, Smuts (and many like him) hoped that the Commonwealth could play a mediatory role between America and Europe. He thought of the Commonwealth in 1943 as one of the Big Three, along with the USA and the USSR. He even hoped that the democratic countries of Europe might join the Commonwealth, and

that the Commonwealth would help to ease relations between the two superpowers. It is far from clear how this could come about. In any case, Smuts and those who shared his view were travelling on a dead-end road.

There was no real future for the Commonwealth as a third force in the world, for two reasons. First, it was nothing unless it had a centre strong enough to sustain it. This had been possible in the inter-war years, but only just. By 1950 it was not. A few very simple figures serve to explain. In that year, the total Gross National Product of the USA was (in 1964 dollars), \$381 billion, the USSR's was \$126 billion, and the UK's \$71 billion. Along with the other West European powers - France (\$50 billion), West Germany (\$48 billion), Italy (\$29 billion)¹ - Britain was eclipsed by the superpowers, and even if it had been able to lead a united Commonwealth, it would still have lagged far behind. Britain was in fact suffering from what Professor Kennedy, in his perceptive book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (on which I have based much of this lecture), calls 'imperial over extension'. This is the process whereby a great power which has expanded its effective 'empire' runs the risk that the benefits may be outweighed by the sheer expense of it all. The problem becomes particularly acute in a period of economic decline, and Britain had been suffering from this at least since 1919, and, arguably, since the 1890s.

Apart from this consideration, there was little inclination among the Commonwealth countries to rally to any move towards centralisation. Dominion nationalism had been the order of the day since the Statute of Westminster of 1931, and colonial nationalism was to be its successor in the 1950s and 1960s. Smuts himself perceived this before he died. He had great misgivings about the Commonwealth's ability to find room for India as a republic. Eire had, logically, seceded - which he regretted but understood. As he wrote:

My personal view is that there is no middle course between the Crown and the Republic, between in and out of the Commonwealth. ... If in some nebulous or muddled way you can be both in and out of it, the whole concept of Commonwealth goes, and what remains is a mere name without substance, the grin without the cat of *Alice in Wonderland*.²

Like the Holy Roman Empire, of which it was said, even before it was extinguished by Napoleon, that it was neither holy, Roman nor an empire, so too it has been said of the Commonwealth that it has nothing in common and very little wealth. Whatever sentimental or symbolic significance it may still possess, it has never been the third force in the world that some had hoped. It has been too weak and too divided, and many of its component parts have been non-aligned or even pro-Russian.

The moment of truth over the Commonwealth arrived with the Suez Crisis of 1956. This revealed the weakness of Britain, the 'anti-colonialism' of the USA, and the divisions within the Commonwealth itself. It was not long before Harold Macmillan pulled out of Britain's African colonies and opted for Europe rather than the Commonwealth as Britain's future hope. Of course, the decision was never spelt out in so many words. Lip service was duly paid to the Commonwealth concept. But it has been basically irrelevant in terms of power politics ever since - a forum for Commonwealth Games and for bashing South Africa, but not much else.

The most important change in the world balance of power since 1950 has been the open break between the USSR and China. It became public and obvious in 1964, though in retrospect, one can see earlier signs. At the time, scarcely any western observers did so. The world outside the two great communist states was taken completely by surprise. Some of the reasons for the schism are still obscure, and analysis is made no easier by the esoteric language of Marxist-Leninist theology in which the dispute was conducted. One would have to go back to the heresy hunts of the early Christian Church to find similar jargon. But it is pretty clear that the basic cause was not a sudden

difference in the interpretation of Leninist texts. It is, rather, a revival of an old and deeply rooted clash of national interests. China - weak and divided - had been for over a century the victim of Russian territorial claims. Whatever the language used, Mao was representing, not just an allegedly purer form of communism, but a resurgence of Chinese national interests.

Ideology no doubt aggravated the struggle just as it did the bitterness of Tito's relations with Stalin after 1948. In regimes which claim infallibility for their leaders, there can be no ideological compromise when they fall out. True doctrine to one is heresy to another. To pious communists, the spectacle of the rival 'Popes' of Moscow and Peking hurling anathemas at each other was as disturbing as the rival claims of the Popes of Rome and Avignon were to the Catholic faithful. In both cases, what underlay the ideological schism was power politics, rather than credal differences.

Precisely because communism was regarded in Moscow - at this time and long afterwards - as a religious creed which could brook no dissent, Stalin and his successors were deeply suspicious of communist regimes which did not owe their existence to the Red Army. Neither Tito (who was much less important) nor Mao were beholden to Moscow other than marginally. The East European countries, apart from Yugoslavia, were governed by regimes which were established by Russian military force and would soon vanish if there were freedom of choice - only then can the Kremlin dictate its terms. This would be far harder in Belgrade and impossible in Peking without a major war.

The new development, though puzzling to western statesmen, was welcome. It lifted the threat of a monolithic communist take-over of Asia and perhaps even Africa, and it had important strategic implications. In 1967, the USSR had fifteen divisions on the Chinese frontier. By 1970, the figure had doubled,³ and today the Soviet forces are believed to amount to fifty divisions and 13,000 tanks,⁴ though there must be a good deal

of guesswork in the estimate. The Kremlin authorities were clearly perturbed and their anxiety cannot have been diminished with the news in 1964 that China had exploded an atomic bomb.

Mao's split with Khrushchev did not betoken any move towards western democracy. On the contrary, he denounced Moscow for being too 'soft' toward the West and for pursuing a policy of *détente*. He criticised the Russian leader for watering down the true wine - or, should we say, Vodka - of Leninist orthodoxy, when he said that there were 'separate roads to socialism'. Mao declared there was only one - and that of course was his. But ideology is seldom as strong as power politics. It was not long before Nixon was being welcomed in Peking and the long frost which had covered Sino-American relations began to thaw. My enemy's enemy soon becomes my friend.

The Chinese repudiation of Russian leadership was the most striking manifestation of a development which has dominated the world scene from the 1950s onwards. This is nationalism - the drive to create and strengthen nation states. Of course, it is not new. It was the dominant force in Europe and the Americas in the 19th century. But the idealists who founded the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation hoped that the nation state would be replaced by world government of a humane, liberal and democratic nature. Stalin also hoped for world government, though not of a humane, liberal nature, and believed it inevitable that communism would everywhere be victorious.

In fact, there is no sign whatever that either of these possibilities will be realised. On the contrary, the drive towards nation statehood has been the most powerful political force in the world since 1945, first in Asia, then in Africa. In one sense of the word, there is anarchy to the extent that few people acknowledge any greater authority than the nation state, though they may differ bitterly and violently about its boundaries and racial composition in any particular case - Ireland and Sri Lanka, for instance, to take just two of many examples.

The effect of nationalism on bipolar confrontation is not confined to shaking communist solidarity. It had repercussions on the NATO Alliance as well. De Gaulle withdrew from NATO and expelled American troops from France. He went ahead with independent nuclear weapons. To cap this apparent anti-Americanism, he played with the idea of a Europe standing on its own feet and rejecting both American suzerainty in the West and Russian in the East - a new Europe led by France and excluding Britain. This dream foundered on two hard realities: 1) Bonn could never afford to sever its close ties with Washington and France could do nothing without West German support; and 2) the USSR would never permit secession by any, let alone all, the Warsaw Pact countries. De Gaulle was making a gesture. When it comes to a crunch, France is in reality a part of NATO. The story of Peking's relations with Moscow has been very different.

The most formidable example of the drive towards a nation state was Vietnam. It was coupled with anti-colonialism just as China's self-assertion after 1949 was largely a revolt against its informal colonisation by Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was anti-colonialism far more than communism that drove North Vietnam onwards in a war which the USA should never have undertaken without the will to win. The famous domino effect did not occur when the Americans left. The lack of solidarity with Chinese communism was soon shown by a short but bloody war in 1979, which the Chinese lost. The USSR now seems to be pulling out. Almost all the assumptions on which American policy was predicated proved erroneous. The damage to US morale was enormous. Moreover, a combination of the cost of the war and Lyndon Johnson's expenditure on 'The Great Society' gave the USSR an opportunity to close the nuclear gap, which they naturally took.

One should not exaggerate the long-term effect of Vietnam, however. America may not now have the military superiority it had in the 1950s but the balance is still heavily in its favour. If I may summarise the figures given in the tables in Professor

Kennedy's book: 1) the USSR and the USA are about equal in nuclear weapons, though the USSR has to take account of a rapidly developing independent British and French capability, which could soon be very formidable indeed. Moreover, if China develops an intercontinental ballistic missile system and a long-range submarine system, the balance would become adverse to the USSR. 2) The naval superiority of NATO to the Warsaw Pact countries is overwhelming - over 2:1 in major surface warships. The US has or soon will have fifteen aircraft carrier task forces which the Soviet Navy has no chance of rivalling. 3) The ground force superiority of the Warsaw Pact is far less than the alarmists claim. An easy, quick win in a 'conventional war' is very unlikely. A total of 12 million to 14 million men is balanced by superior NATO weapons, the Chinese threat and the unreliability of many of the non-Russian armies of the Pact.

Here perhaps one can make a further point about nationalism. The USSR is the last great non-nationalist empire to survive. It has to reconcile not only the sovereign East European countries which it rules by force, but also the fourteen non-Russian republics within the USSR itself. To legitimise its external and internal empires is going to be an ever more delicate matter. The breakup, if it comes, is not necessarily going to help the West to preserve the peace. Indeed, one of the most important and difficult tasks of western diplomacy in the future may be to do what it can - very little, I fear - to ease a transition which is going to tax all Mr Gorbachev's ingenuity and resourcefulness.

I do not believe that there will be a war, nuclear or conventional, between the superpowers. NATO will not start it, nor will the USSR. The Warsaw Pact countries are weaker in relative terms than they were in the 1950s when the danger of a communist pre-emptive strike seemed greatest. They did not risk it then. The nuclear aspect no doubt played its part. It is unlikely that the USSR will risk it now when so many economic and military problems point the other way. The danger is paranoia. In 1983, if the revelations of Gordievski, a notable

Russian defector, are correct, the Kremlin interpreted a US practice nuclear alert intended to test systems, as a US first strike threat. Perhaps Gordievski's information helped to stop the language about the 'Evil Empire', and - more important - persuaded the Pentagon that military manoeuvres must be seen unequivocally as what they are and cannot be interpreted as something more sinister. The episode occurred in the last months of Mr Brezhnev's life. Let us hope that Mr Gorbachev will, as the representative of the modern side of the generation gap, look at these situations more realistically and coolly.

What is the future prospect of the world balance of power? The two superpowers remain the only ones capable of a conflict that could blow up the whole world. I do not believe they will do it. Nor do I believe that more minor powers which acquire nuclear capacity - and many have done so already - will launch a nuclear strike against enemies, however much hated. The superpowers will remain 'super' for a long while.

Nevertheless, the world is moving into a different power structure from the configuration when Smuts died. It has become or it is becoming multipolar rather than bipolar. One only has to look at the economic balance of power to see how great the change has been over the last forty years. Perhaps at the risk of boring you with statistics yet again, I could elaborate on those I gave you a moment ago. In 1960, Japan's proportion of world GNP was 4,5%. By 1980, it had doubled to 9%. In 1960, China had 3,1%. Twenty years later, it was half again as big at 4,5%. The US proportion had fallen in that period from 26% to 21,5%, and the EC from the same proportion to 22,5%. The USSR had fallen from 12,5% to 11,4%. In absolute terms, the American GNP was \$2,600 billion in 1980, that of the EC \$2,900, the USSR \$1,209, and Japan \$1,157. China's GNP was only \$441 but is growing rapidly.

It is clear that President Nixon was right when, as early as 1971, he identified five centres of economic strength - Western Europe, Japan and China, in addition to the USA and the USSR. The last seventeen years have only emphasised this change.

It is not necessarily a bad thing. Henry Kissinger, making the same point in 1973, welcomed it. A world in which there was a multipolar balance of power between five nations or groups of nations might be a safer world than one in which two powers confronted each other and a gain for one was regarded as an absolute loss for the other. After all, the Americans and nations on the same side still have an enormous lead over the USSR. If we set aside Japan, the USA and its allies command four and a half times as much economic power as the USSR - which is not a great change from 1950, when they had five times as much. Japan, the new economic giant, is certainly no friend of the USSR. If, as I believe, political power and prestige go with economic strength, then it is pretty clear which way the world is heading.

I end, therefore, on a note of qualified optimism. The USSR still needs to be treated with caution. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* clearly mean something. I greatly look forward to learning more about both on my forthcoming visit to lecture in Moscow on British *perestroika*. But it is at least questionable whether the West should extend subsidies or lines of credit to help Mr Gorbachev to escape his central dilemma - guns or butter. This is a dilemma which, given the colossal rise in the cost of armament since 1945, faces all major nations. It is far harder to solve in a declining economy where the non-military consumers, i.e. the vast majority, are descending rapidly into Third World conditions. Having said that, I do not believe that the USSR is likely to provoke a third world war.

Undoubtedly, there will still be wars. The drive towards nationalism and the competing claims of nation states and minorities within those states make universal peace very unlikely. As I said earlier, the arrival of an international authority capable of preserving peace is remote. I believe that such conflicts will be local and limited, even if very expensive and bloody like the Iran-Iraq war. I do not believe that there is now any real danger of these wars escalating into a worldwide ideological conflict.

The reason is simple. Communism is no longer a crusading cause. State socialism is a proven economic disaster. Mrs Thatcher recently declared in Poland that a state-planned economy is a contradiction in terms. Both Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan have said things about socialism that are ringing bells in the socialist countries themselves. Look at the condition of those East European slums - Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. Look at Cuba. Look at those Black African states which have actually practised, as opposed to preaching, Marxism. Above all, look at the USSR itself. By their fruits ye shall know them. Those fruits are all too often fruits of the Dead Sea.

I have said very little about Africa. This is not accidental. This continent is not the place where the balance of power is being determined, nor does it contain any of the five major power centres which may be replacing the bipolar situation of the last forty years. There is, however, one question which is puzzling about African nationalism. Why is it that movements to establish nation states in Africa are so often correlated with efforts to establish socialist states? Everywhere else, socialism is in retreat or, at best, static. It may be that Africa, like (allegedly) Oxford, is a home for lost causes. It may be that the talk is largely rhetoric. I do not know the answer. I merely note the phenomenon, which seems to be a backward eddy in the general current - or some sort of belated throwback to the ideas of an earlier generation of western intellectuals.

In the 1930s, many idealistic young men and women believed in a Marxist Utopia, and some of them were prepared to act as spies or agents for the USSR - Philby, Burgess, Mclean, Blunt. I doubt whether any such conversions have been made in recent times. Venality, blackmail and fear may have had an effect, not idealism or conviction. On the contrary, idealism has worked the other way. It is the USSR which has cause to fear for the loyalty and security of some of its most trusted officers, who have rebelled against the corruption, tyranny and incompetence

of the oppressive system under which they live, and have defected to the West.

Mr Chairman, I do not want to sound like Dr Pangloss in *Candide* or to argue that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. The international scene is fraught with many dangers and unexpected squalls - even hurricanes - can blow up. Nevertheless, I hope I have given you some reasons for believing that all is not doom and gloom, that a nuclear war is not very probable, and that the values of western democracy have a better chance of success than the outmoded authoritarian doctrines of Marx and Lenin.

It is a great pleasure to have had the opportunity to give this address and to enjoy the generous hospitality of the South African Institute of International Affairs. Thank you very much for your kindness and attention.

NOTES

1. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York: Random House, 1987, p.369.
2. Quoted in Sir W. Keith Hancock, *Smuts*, Vol. 2, *The Fields of Force 1919-1950*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p.521.
3. Kennedy, *op cit*, p.399.
4. *Ibid*, p.510.

Printed by:
Central Printing Unit
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
1 Jan Smuts Avenue, Johannesburg