RHODESIA - AFTER THE TIGER

by

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Much of the confusion which attended the failure of the Talks on the Tiger in December last, and the subsequent rejection by the Rhodesian Government of the terms of the draft memorandum for a settlement, was due to the attempt to deal in one document with two quite separate problems: the principles of a new Constitution for Rhodesia, which, if accepted by the Rhodesian Government, would be followed by action by the British Parliament to grant Rhodesian independence, and the arrangements for the so-called return to legality, the ending of the rebellion. Neither would have presented insuperable difficulties had they been kept separate and had the two Governments been prepared to trust each other. Because they were combined, Mr. Wilson was able to argue that Mr. Smith had himself accepted the substance of the memorandum, the constitutional provisions, but had subsequently been compelled by his unreasonable colleagues to reject the whole because of their dislike of the procedure for ending the rebellion. And Mr. Smith, reluctant at first to say that he could not trust Mr. Wilson to observe the spirit as well as the letter of the procedure for ending the rebellion was obliged to concentrate on what was, in fact, the real weakness of the Rhodesian position, the difficulty of finding some impartial test of Rhodesian opinion as a whole which would produce a verdict in favour of independence prior to majority rule. As Mr. Paget, the Labour M.P. who voted against Mr. Wilson in the Parliamentary debate on the discussions, remarked, the tragedy was Mr. Wilson's talent for getting himself distrusted.

It was Sir Edgar Whitehead, the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, with his devastating capacity for analysis, who put his finger on the real difficulty. In an article in the Rhodesia Herald of 15th December he wrote: "The proposed amendments to the 1961 Constitution set forth in Mr. Wilson's working document would, if implemented, have the effect of greatly postponing the possible date of African majority rule, almost certainly beyond the end of the century, as against a probable date of about 1977 which I gave publicly in Rhodesia, as a possible date, during the general election of 1962. Under the 1961 Constitution with 15 B.Roll seats where Africans were in a large majority, it was only necessary for them to win 18 of the 50 A.Roll seats to secure a bare majority in Parliament. Under the proposed amendments — with 17 seats reserved for the B.Roll, and 17 reserved for Europeans — Africans would need to win more than half of the 33 ordinary A.Roll seats to get a bare majority." He pointed out that "in the Tiger working document" approval by "appropriate democratic means is converted (by clause 17) into a Royal

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Commission," and concluded that, "Mr. Smith could certainly have
got the Europeans to accept the constitutional proposals as he
had already secured an overwhelming majority for independence on
the basis of the 1961 Constitution at a referendum in 1965."

Sir Edgar continued: "the snag from Salisbury's
point of view is that it would have been very difficult to find
the personnel for a Royal Commission which would report that the
Africans considered the 1961 Constitution was much too generous
to their political ambitions and that a far slower rate of pro-
gress to majority rule would be their wish. ... The Rhodesians
therefore faced the threat that, having returned to constitut-
ional rule for the better part of four months they would then
be told that the Constitutional proposals have been proved to
be unacceptable to the great mass of the people and that if
they did a second U.D.I. military forces would be used. ... It
is utterly ridiculous, when the Commonwealth communiqué and
the Tiger working document are read together to talk about a
breakdown of negotiations on a point of procedure." In fact,
the key paragraphs in the Tiger memorandum were the 11th and
14th, which provided:

(1) firstly, that the existing Parliament should be dissolved,
and that the Governor should have power to legislate with
the advice of his ministers (not the present Cabinet) in
matters of internal administration, or with the advice, in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, of
a Defence and Security Council, comprising the responsible
Ministers only (i.e. not the Cabinet), together with the
heads of the Defence Forces, the Chief of Police, and a
representative of the British Government.

This would have deprived the voters temporarily of any say
in the Government through their M.P.'s, the Prime Minister
of the choice of ministers, and the Cabinet of control of
internal security or external defence; and

(2) secondly, that, during the interim period of Governor's rule,
that there should be an impartial judicial tribunal with
powers to release any person from detention who had not
committed or incited to the commission of acts of violence
or intimidation; negotiations with Britain for a consti-
tutional settlement; and, if these were completed, legis-
lation in Britain to grant independence.

By omission the document would appear, if the terms
of a constitutional settlement could not be agreed within four
months, to leave power in the hands of the Governor until, pre-
sumably, the British terms were accepted. His control of all
security and defence forces would, as Sir Edgar pointed out,
enable him during this time to ensure the defeat of any second
attempt at U.D.I.

There is no doubt that Mr. Wilson, for his part,
had realised on the Tiger that it was touch and go. The build-
up had been meticulous. The sustained emphasis, for two months
after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting, that time was

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running out; the last minute offer of a meeting; the stress on Mr. Smith coming with full powers; the long flight from Salisbury to Gibraltar; the waiting cruiser; the deliberate honours accorded to Sir Humphrey Gibbs when boarding it, and the absence of any for Mr. Smith; the differentiation between the accommodation given to the British and Rhodesian delegates; the immediate light session with weary men; the Russian tactics of confronting your unchanging opponents with teams of fresh officials, and with documents purporting to represent points of agreement which have never been seen or agreed; the offer of telegraphic facilities for consultation of ministers in Salisbury in cyphers to which the British cypher experts on board possessed the keys; the demand at the end for acceptance and signature; the refusal for three hours to let the Rhodesian party leave the ship; the deadline of acceptance by midday on the Monday (scarce-ly 12 hours after Mr. Smith's return); even the subsequent night meeting of the British Cabinet and the arrangement for Mr. Wilson to address Parliament the next afternoon, were unprecedented, and, in the event, self-destructive. The salesmanship was just too high-pressure, and Mr. Smith, predictably, dug his toes in. His so-called cryptic statement that before convincing his Cabinet he would have to convince himself indicated the frame of mind in which he left the ship. The deliberate interruptions of the Cabinet talks at Salisbury, to which I drew attention in December, showed that his own mind had been made up before his arrival, and that the Rhodesian ministers had been mainly concerned with the most effective presentation of their case for rejecting the terms. Perhaps the unkindest cut was that it was the Rhodesian Information Service which scooped the British: the Rhodesian statement was was out first, the Rhodesian White Paper was out first, and the British therefore came as something of an anti-climax.

Mr. Wilson's astonishment and annoyance at the rejection of the Tiger terms by the Rhodesian Cabinet was obvious. He had expected to return with an agreement in his pocket. He had staked his prestige on his skill as a negotiator. And he had failed, as the world press was not slow to point out. The Washington Post commented caustically that "the Rhodesian debacle had confirmed Britain's status as a fading power," and 'La Nation', Paris, proclaimed it "a defeat for Mr. Wilson" personally. Characteristically he reacted violently. His disappointment was shown by the language used by him and by some of his ministers. He referred bitterly to Mr. Smith's "twistings and turnings on the Tiger," to his giving the appearance of acting on instructions and to his final surrender to the "evil men" among his colleagues. Britain would never negotiate again with the rebel government, would go to the U.N. to ask for selective mandatory sanctions, and, as events were to show, to a pledge not to grant independence until there was majority government in Rhodesia.

Why had Mr. Wilson supposed that the terms would be accepted? Here one enters the realm of speculation. He may have been wrongly advised about the effects of the existing voluntary sanctions and the British blockade; he may have thought that the British threat to ask the U.N. to impose mandatory sanctions had already broken or would break the will to resist of the Rhodesian

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Government and people; or he may have gone beyond this and deluded himself into believing that if the Security Council were to impose selective mandatory sanctions, Portugal and South Africa would hesitate to oppose them, and that Rhodesia would therefore be forced to surrender. All three considerations may have been present in his mind, but he may also have thought that he had gone so far in concessions to Mr. Smith, about the future constitution of Rhodesia, that he had to have the dramatic quid pro quo of the restoration of legality, the admission of rebellion, and guarantees against its repetition, if he was to have any hope of selling that constitution to the Labour Party, to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, or to the United Nations.

Mr. Smith gave the impression at first of also being in a state of shock. He proclaimed that "the fight goes on," but he kept coming back to what he knew to be the most vulnerable point in the Rhodesian case. The weakness of his position had always been the need to find some alternative to the vote as a way to test the opinion of the Africans in Rhodesia towards U.D.I. He had secured the approval of the chiefs but had failed to convince any of Rhodesia's critics that the chiefs really represented African opinion, and particularly urban and educated African opinion. He immediately announced his readiness to set up an unbiased Royal Commission to test whether the constitutional proposals were acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole, but when this received an "icy reception in Whitehall," he asked the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand to appoint representatives to test opinion. Mr. Holt thankfully side-stepped the offer by explaining that the "representatives would not produce findings acceptable to a multiracial Commonwealth," that is, the non-white members of the Commonwealth would not accept the opinion of a white Australian and a white New Zealander as to the state of African opinion in Rhodesia. Mr. Smith steadied as it became clear that, whatever concessions he might offer, action was going to be taken against Rhodesia, not only by Britain, but by the Commonwealth and by the U.N. When the sanctions resolution was passed it was clear that the time for compromise was over and he accepted the challenge. "There would be no one man, one vote in Rhodesia, either in his life time or in Mr. Wilson's ... Through Britain's action at the U.N. Rhodesia was probably already a Republic and out of the Commonwealth ... He would not negotiate with Britain again while Mr. Wilson was Prime Minister. ... Mr. Wilson had perfected a technique of lying his way out of a corner."

So we come to sanctions. By appealing to the U.N. Mr. Wilson has, to a considerable extent, removed the Commonwealth from the foreground of the struggle. The three participants are, for the time being, to be Britain, the United Nations and Rhodesia. All three are vulnerable at one point or another.

Mr. Sandys and Mr. Maudling (Mr. Heath has throughout been singularly ineffective over Rhodesia) have pointed out the weaknesses in the British position. Mr. Sandys has hammered at the high cost to Britain of her sanctions policy, at a time when she has been trying desperately to bring her external payments into balance, and he has accused Mr. Wilson of deliberately misleading the House of Commons about the cost. Instead of the figure of £16 million...
million, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said to be the cost to the Treasury. Mr. Sandys has quoted the total cost to Britain of £100 million, a sum which, he has said, was Mr. Wilson's own estimate given to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and mentioned in a Conference document. This appears to have included such sums as £30 million for loss of exports to Rhodesia, £24 million in special aid given or offered to Zambia, and £20 million as the higher cost of tobacco to be purchased to replace Rhodesian tobacco. The charge stung Mr. Wilson into two ill-judged retorts: that Rhodesia House had sought in September to bribe junior Commonwealth officials to give them Conference papers, and that Mr. Sandys had got his information from Rhodesia House. The first charge was at once denied from Rhodesia House, and the second by Mr. Sandys, who said that he had had no contact with them. If I may make a personal comment: one of the present editors of the London Times once informed me that his forecasts of the agenda of Commonwealth Prime Ministers meetings were so accurate because he was always given by the office of one or other of the Commonwealth High Commissioners an early sight of the confidential document circulated; if the Times is shown confidential papers circulated for and to meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, I am sure that summaries of such documents are always available somewhere in London and that it is intelligence, and not bribes, that is needed to know where to obtain them. Mr. Maudling bluntly charged that both the Government and the House of Commons were burying their heads in the sand; the success of sanctions would depend on the co-operation of South Africa and "co-operation from South Africa is even less likely now because they have an immense interest in seeing that mandatory sanctions do not bring down the Government of Rhodesia because once this weapon has been shown to be successful, it will be turned on them next time." Mr. Jo Grimmond, the then leader of the Liberal Party, rubbed in the salt: "if we have reached a position that, when South Africa says 'shut up', we shut up, then the British Government had better take off their superman clothes and get back to a humbler station in life." So much for the British position.

The weakness of the U.N. position was both legal and practical. For the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia, both the intentions and the wording of the Charter had to be ignored; no reference could be allowed to the International Court for an advisory opinion, and action had to be ordered which was certain to be flouted by some members of the U.N., and could not be enforced without military, naval and air action, not only against Rhodesia, but against one or more members of the U.N. itself. To proscribe sanctions, with, to say the least, an excellent prospect of their proving futile was to put the whole future of the U.N. at stake. The intention of the Charter had, briefly, been that the provisions in it for keeping the peace, were to be invoked only in the event of a breach of the peace, or a threat to the peace, and against the aggressor. No one has seriously suggested that Rhodesia is threatening the peace of the world, and, indeed, the only threats have come from those appealing for U.N. action; the similarity to Hitler's tactics before World War II, against Austria and Czechoslovakia is deadly. Article 2(7) of the Charter forbids interference in /the domestic ...
the domestic concerns of member states, and Mr. Wilson had himself, repeatedly argued against those wishing to press for U.N. action, that the relations of Britain and Rhodesia were a domestic matter which Britain should be allowed to settle. Mr. Paget, the Labour M.P. and barrister whom I have already quoted, said flatly that "the founders of the U.N. did not design the organisation as an instrument to enable a colonial power to enforce its rule upon a rebellious colony." Here it is only necessary to remember the support given by the U.N. to rebellious Indonesia against Holland. Mr. Dean Acheson, one of the drafters of the Charter, and a former U.S. Secretary of State, expressed immediately in the American press his doubts about the legality of the Security Council's action. Lord Harlech, former British Ambassador to the U.S., and close personal friend of President Kennedy, said in the House of Lords that "it was wrong for Britain to take the lead in urging on the members of the Security Council such a grotesque interpretation of the Charter." Lord Salisbury, leader of the British delegation to the San Francisco Conference, said that "Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter was never meant to deal with a situation like this ... the Government had blunted Article 39 as a weapon of justice and made it merely a weapon of political expediency." And the best which Mr. Goldberg, the U.S. representative, could do was to produce the far-fetched argument that "as far as the U.N. is concerned the administering authority (i.e. Britain) has always had international responsibility to the world body, and it is precisely this responsibility that the Smith regime has sought to frustrate and obstruct."

Apart entirely from the legality of the Security Council's proceedings, its procedure was also open to question. In the first place any country which is concerned by proposed sanctions (and which could be more concerned than Rhodesia?) has a right under the Charter to be heard. The Rhodesian Government telegraphed to the Secretary-General and asked to be heard, but no mention was made to the Council of the request. On the 19th December Mrs. Eirene White, Minister of State at the British Foreign Office, stated that the U.N. Secretariat had no knowledge of such a telegram. On the 29th December the U.N. Secretariat told the British Mission to the U.N. that they had found the telegram "which had evidently been mislaid in the Secretariat." It was circulated to Security Council members (well after the crucial meetings). The British Foreign Secretary passed on this information on 31st January in a letter to a Conservative M.P. in answer to specific representations by him. Mr. Fletcher Cooke subsequently commented that "this shows a state of inefficiency in the office of the Secretary-General which is beyond belief. Either the telegram was deliberately suppressed until it was too late or the whole department should be cleaned out and the Secretary-General should publicly apologise to the Security Council." The credibility of the use of the word mislaid can perhaps be best assessed in the light of the Secretary-General's own decision some months earlier, not to acknowledge, or give any publicity to, a similar request from Rhodesia to the Council. In the second place both the General Assembly and the Security Council have the right, when the legality of any action is questioned, to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court; there could scarcely be any issue upon which the legality of U.N. action is more important than in the imposition of sanctions,

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and it could scarcely be urged that the delay involved would have been likely to lead, on the part of Rhodesia, to a breach of the peace. There was both the need and the opportunity to seek the views of the Judges who remain always available for just such emergencies. The advice was not sought, for political reasons, because the legality of the proposed action was more than doubtful and because the Council might then have felt obliged to postpone the action which it was proposing to take, pending the opinion of the Court. In the third place both France and Russia abstained from the vote imposing the sanctions, consistently with their previous opposition to sanctions, and although the Russian representative has subsequently asserted that, of course, Russia will participate in their observance on this occasion, Portugal has already questioned whether their abstention does not mean that the concurring votes of the five Permanent Members were not in fact cast in favour of sanctions and therefore that it is incorrect for the vote to have been counted as approval. Here again reference to the Court would have been an obvious course.

The weakness of Rhodesia is that a total of a quarter of a million white men, women and children, who have already the major task of running a country the size of Germany and controlling an African population of 4,000,000, are now facing 1,000,000,000 who are determined to force them to surrender. The selective mandatory sanctions imposed by the U.N. include prohibiting the importation of almost all of Rhodesia's principal exports, tobacco, chrome, iron ore, asbestos, copper, sugar and meat—coal was excepted because it was essential to keep the Zambian copper mines working—or the supply to Rhodesia of arms and ammunition, motor vehicles or their components, and petroleum products. Their principal port of entry or exit, Beira, is blockaded by five British warships; their Reserve Bank has been put under a British Board of Directors in London, and their assets outside Rhodesia frozen—60% of their last tobacco crop is said to be still stored, unsaleable, in Rhodesia—and most of the independent African states are committed to trying to overthrow the regime by force, and have for some time been infiltrating trained saboteurs. More serious—there was a loss of over 10,000 Rhodesians by emigration in 1965 and nearly half as many in 1966. There were, of course a number of immigrants, but although the Minister of Finance has stated that immigration and the natural increase has still enabled a net gain to be registered, the adults who have left must be assumed to have been much more useful props of the economy than the infants who have replaced most of them.

It is against this sombre background that the effect of voluntary sanctions so far, and the potential effect of selective compulsory sanctions have to be considered. Voluntary sanctions were generally agreed at the end of 1966 to have reduced Rhodesia's exports from a total of about £135 million to about £60-85 million, a reduction of about 35-40%. Selective mandatory sanctions are expected to reduce the total by a further £20 million. The tobacco farmers received two-thirds of the normal price for a limited quantity of tobacco in 1966 and have been promised a similar price in 1967; but if 60% is again to remain unsold it is hard to see how a 1968 crop could be either stored /or paid for...
or paid for. The acreage under sugar is this year being reduced from 300,000 to 170,000, but perhaps an increase may be possible in view of the destruction by recent floods of much of Mozambique's crop. Meat has sold well to South Africa, where there had been a drought, but the prospect of agriculture in Rhodesia, if sanctions continue, is for concentration on what can be consumed in Rhodesia or sold within the open competitive markets of Southern Africa.

With more and more countries refusing to purchase minerals last year's success in keeping up exports is unlikely to be achieved - there is almost bound to be some decrease - and Zambia, the main outlet for Wankie coal, hopes to produce 60,000 tons a month from her own new mines by May. Beira and the pipe line to Umtali remain closed to petroleum products, and, in spite of intensified search, the only oil likely to be discovered in Rhodesia, at least in time to be useful, will be in 40 gallon drums. So far as local products can be used manufacturing industries have shown resource and perseverance, and have helped to keep unemployment low, but success in finding export markets only tends to make Rhodesian goods competitive in neighbouring markets with those of the countries concerned, with whom Rhodesia is seeking to co-operate, not compete.

Fortunately for Rhodesia the circle is not closed. Mozambique and South Africa have continued and expanded normal trade, and there have been both refusal overseas to participate in voluntary sanctions, and, already, indications that some useful channels will remain open to Rhodesian exports even under mandatory sanctions.

Without Mozambique and South Africa Rhodesian resistance would probably already have collapsed; in particular, all the petroleum needed to keep the economy going has been provided via the road route through Beit Bridge and the railway from Lourenço Marques through Malvernia. It has recently been reported that 18 storage tanks, each with a capacity of 150,000 gallons have been built in the Putenga Valley, 50 miles from the South African border, at a cost of R700,000. The tanks have been strategically situated near the junction of the main road from Beit Bridge and the railway from Lourenço Marques. Extra storage tanks have been built in the cities and towns. A large depot has also been built in the Transvaal near Messina from which Rhodesia is said to be drawing 700,000 gallons a week. Twenty 8,000 gallon rail-tankers arrive there daily. A natural gas well at Buzi, 20 miles from Beira, may supply Rhodesia with another source of power, via the now unused oil pipe-line, but the plan to produce petrol from the gas would be both long-term and expensive. Since South Africa is also expanding as rapidly as possible its own supplies and storage facilities for oil to a two-year minimum, Rhodesia's oil supplies would seem to be assured for the probable duration of sanctions. Indeed, it is Zambia which has recently been experiencing such shortages that motorists have been crossing into Rhodesia at Livingstone in order to fill up their cars with Rhodesian petrol!

The other major break-through for Rhodesia has been the decision of the West German Government to omit existing contracts from the operation of sanctions. In 1965 exports from Rhodesia to West Germany were valued at £13 million (as against /imports ...
imports of only £5 million) of which tobacco accounted for £7 million, copper for £3 million and asbestos for £1 million. Five-year contracts for copper and two-year contracts for asbestos were signed in November 1966 and tobacco is also believed to have been the subject of a long-term contract. "The base-metal industry now has a most valuable trade pipe-line for raw materials through the sanctions ring." Switzerland has also refused to apply sanctions, and although limiting imports to 1964-6 levels, and stating that it will not be used as a staging post, will certainly afford the Harry Limes a second convenient base. M. Boussac in France has shown the possibility of barter deals; he has sold £2 million of textiles to Rhodesia, and his agents are said to be flogging to third parties large quantities of tobacco supplied at the cut-price of 1/- a lb. in exchange. Forged certificates of origin, and the mingling of Rhodesian products with those of neighbouring countries both offer possibilities to the Third Man. If Congolese border officials have had to hold up Zambia's copper exports via the Lobito Bay Railway because of the impossibility of distinguishing them from their own Katanga copper exports, on which they wished to keep their hands during the recent negotiations with the Union Miniere; and if Rhodesian citrus simply continues to be exported under the Outspan label, the difficulties of controlling determined exporters can be appreciated.

Conclusion

Rhodesia is likely, in fact, to be able to carry on for as long as South Africa is prepared to help her to do so. What are the prospects of South Africa continuing to do so? There is no doubt that South African Ministers would have welcomed an agreement on the Tiger. The Star reported that "intense disappointment characterised the first South African Government reactions to the failure of Mr. Ian Smith and Mr. Harold Wilson to agree on a settlement." Mr. Vorster said that "the Government did not believe it impossible, even at this late hour, for an agreement to be reached between Britain and Rhodesia if conditions were not insisted upon which made such a settlement impossible," and he continued that "the matter was now being referred to the U.N, only because agreement could not be reached on certain matters of procedure ... the dispute was a domestic matter and should be solved as such ... it should in no circumstances be cast into the emotional arena of the U.N." The Star commented bitterly that "Mr. Wilson appears to us to have thrown away the substance of a workable agreement for the shadow of a constitutional form." Mr. Schoeman called on Britain and Rhodesia to make an eleventh hour attempt to avert tragedy in Southern Africa. "Otherwise there could be a second Congo." There could be no doubt about the danger which South African ministers foresaw.

But equally they were also not to be moved from the policy which they had consistently followed. Mr. Schoeman, in another statement, said that "mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia will in no way change South Africa's position as a trading partner of Rhodesia." Dr. Diedrichs was even more explicit: "we do not believe in boycotting countries. We have been boycotted our-
selves but we have never boycotted another country." But "his Government (he was speaking in Austria) had no intention of helping Rhodesia to frustrate U.N. mandatory sanctions by setting up triangular trade channels via South Africa. ... our trade with Rhodesia develops within the normal pattern. We do not intend to prevent - or support - the U.N. boycott." Three weeks later Dr. Carel de Wet was less bleak: "South Africa will not be a party to bringing hardship, unemployment and famine to four million people ... a neighbour with whom we have to live for 100 or 200 years." ... "We in South Africa will certainly not have a Treaty of Rome ... We will keep it to pure economics." ... But "we in South Africa are very aware of the fact that we must provide stability for this economic co-operation." Normal trade through normal channels, the maintenance of stability, but no supranational organisation.

This line has satisfied most but not all shades of opinion in South Africa. Die Burger has been critical of the risk involved in this support of a government which, in spite of its dependence on South Africa, continues to proclaim that Rhodesia is multi-racial. Some of Mr. Smith's more recent statements would seem to imply that he is aware of this criticism and anxious to meet it as far as he can. The instructions to the Commission which was set up at the end of February to plan a new Constitution for Rhodesia contained two key phrases: "the one "the sovereign independent status of Rhodesia," the other "to guarantee the right and freedoms of all persons and committees in Rhodesia, and to ensure the harmonious development of Rhodesia's plural society." I am quoting from the Rand Daily Mail and "committees" must, I think, be a careless printing of "communities" (i.e. "all persons and communities in Rhodesia.") In mid-February he had mentioned that "the evidence I have from Africans is that they prefer to live according to their own customs, to live in their own way, as the European does. What they wish to have is equal opportunity." But Mr. Smith is always cautious and careful never to be too far ahead of public opinion. At Cape Town last week he said; "it is easy to use these catch-phrases like separate development. Ever since we have had our country we have had separate development." Neither South Africa nor Rhodesia would seem to want to go much further. At present, South Africa has put up a marker, Mr. Smith has made the right noises and continuing economic co-operation in face of a world hostile to both can be left to lead to closer approximation of their social and political systems.

It is an irony of the problem of land-locked Rhodesia that the most important developments seem to be taking place on board ship. First the Tiger, now the Oranje, for it is almost beyond belief that no discussions will take place between Rhodesia and South Africa before Mr. Smith disembarks at Cape Town and gets into his aircraft for the return voyage to Salisbury.

In the end morale will probably be the decisive factor in deciding whether or not Rhodesia will hold out. It is perhaps fortunate that, after three months of crisis and tension, Rhodesians have been given the chance to laugh. Mrs. Judith Hart, Junior Minister at the Commonwealth Office, in a dramatic speech to a /Labour ...
Labour Party gathering, said that Rhodesians no longer had swimming pools, cars or servants, and effete capitalists as they were, would soon crack under the strain. The Rhodesia Herald, not one of the pillars of U.D.I., pointed out that one firm had excavated three pools a week since U.D.I., another a total of 115, that there was petrol for all essential needs and for quite a bit of pleasure driving, and that British-induced unemployment among Africans had made the supply of servants larger than usual, so that there were still one or two to a household! The British representative in Rhodesia said that he could only hope that Mrs. Hart had been misquoted. Mr. Smith said: "I don't think I have to worry to boost the morale of Rhodesians for several months." As President Kaunda said of Mrs. Hart on an earlier occasion: "the poor girl just hasn't a clue." But she has at least been God's gift to Rhodesia in February 1967.