Societies caught in the conflict trap

Regional research findings

Chad, Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan
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Specifically, Vanessa Dupont, Kristin Seljeflot, Seid Sultane, Stephen Wani, Yolande Ngbodo Ssenkali Mulundo. On administrative support we wish to thank Wilkister Oluoich and Grace Ndege. From CCFD, special thanks go to their Africa team, Philippe Mayol, Bruno Angsthelm and Christophe Heraudeau who clarified the elements of the terms of reference and CCFD’s needs. The vocation and commitment by CCFD to deeply understand the roots of conflict and flexibility and creativity in response through their programs is much appreciated.

The openness with which beneficiaries, officials, partners and ACORD staff shared information was welcome and very valuable.

Given the short time available for this broad research study there are bound to be some factual errors and some degree of subjectivity, especially in arriving at conclusions. The author takes responsibility for these and welcomes suggestion for minimizing factual errors and improving the quality and reliability of this document.

Louise Khabure
Nairobi (Kenya), 2013
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADH</td>
<td>Association des Droits de l’Homme</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFJT</td>
<td>Association des Femmes Juristes au Tchad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMASOT</td>
<td>Association pour le Marketing Social au Tchad</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Association des Professionnels de la Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASTBEF</td>
<td>Association Tchadienne pour le Bien-être Familial</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAD</td>
<td>Banque Africaine de Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELACD</td>
<td>Bureau d’Etude et de Liaison des Actions Caritatives pour le Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDEF</td>
<td>Convention sur l’Elimination de toutes les Formes de Discriminations à l’Egard de la Femme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELIAF</td>
<td>Cellule de Liaison et d’Information des Associations et groupements Féminins</td>
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<tr>
<td>CILONG</td>
<td>Cellule d’information et de liaison des ONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIONGCA</td>
<td>Cercle d’information des ONG centrafricaines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFPR</td>
<td>Centre de Formation pour la Promotion Rurale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAPR</td>
<td>Comité de suivi et de l’Appel à la Paix et la Réconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEAFPR</td>
<td>Direction de l’Enseignement Agricole, Formations et de la Promotion Rurale</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSIT</td>
<td>Enquête sur la Consommation et le Secteur Informel au Tchad</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Fonds Alimentaire Mondial</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCC</td>
<td>Haut Conseil de Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Information – Education – Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFD</td>
<td>Intégration de la Femme au Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Indice de Prix à la Consommation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IST</td>
<td>Infections Sexuellement Transmissibles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTDDH</td>
<td>Ligue tchadienne des droits de l’homme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OANET</td>
<td>Organisation des Acteurs Non Etatiques du Tchad</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONG</td>
<td>Organisation non gouvernementale</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>Organisation de la société civile</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCC</td>
<td>New Sudan Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSAOP</td>
<td>Projet de Soutien et d’Appui aux Organisations Pastorales</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROADEL</td>
<td>Projet d’Appui au développement Local</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Popular Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNUD</td>
<td>Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNLS</td>
<td>Programme National de lutte contre le Sida</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTME</td>
<td>Projet de protection contre la Transmission Mère Enfant</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPPD</td>
<td>Réseau des Parlementaires en Population et Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCBRC</td>
<td>Sudan Catholic Bishops Regional Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUNDE</td>
<td>Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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Foreword

This study was carried out in response to a request from ACORD (Nairobi) and CCDF-Terre Solidaire (Paris).

ACORD and CCDF – Terre Solidaire both have a long experience of partnerships based on a vision of social justice. This partnership has developed through several levels (country programs, regional programs and Pan African program). The two organisations are in agreement on the fact that strengthening the voice of the poor and the marginalized in order to empower them to change the conditions that prevent social justice and development is the way towards sustainable development in Africa.

Initially the partnership was based on local actions and practices and circumscribed by issues relating to improving the system of agricultural production. As a result of institutional developments in each of the two organisations, the partnership has become based primarily on more strategic issues. These include in particular the challenges of rebuilding social and inter-community links in post-conflict zones, the introduction of a rights-based approach as a tool of social and political change, the approach to local development as a tool for positioning local actors in a context of intended decentralization.

Within the framework of this research, ACORD and CCDF – Terre Solidaire are particularly interested in the links and inter-relations which generate conflicts between Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan (North and South). The research highlights the linkages between the three countries, including trans-border trade of all kinds (food, primary resources, arms, etc.), trans-border mobility and population movements (shepherds, refugees and displaced peoples).

It also illustrates the linkages at the more macro level between the three countries, for instance the political issues and conflicts of interest as well as the influences on the evolution of the political situation of one country on the others.

The following were the research objectives:

1. To assess the political history of the CAR, Sudan and Chad with a specific emphasis on regional geopolitics, particularly on the inter-relations between the three countries. The idea is to highlight the key moments that constitute the framework and the causes of current crystallizations (conflicts, blocked political systems, elements perpetuating and degenerating conflicts, etc.) and not to write a monographic history of each country.
2. To identify the causes of conflicts in each country and in the region and draw out the most significant social/societal and economic issues as well as the community dynamics which appear to be remarkable, particularly from the point of view of conflict resolution. To determine the points of convergence between the three countries.
3. To identify and analyze the role of all parties involved (state, individuals/specific leaders, businesses, governments in the region and/or at international level, etc.) which assist or interfere with the present situations and crystallizations.
4. To identify the role of civil society actors (local, provincial, national for the three countries and sub-regions) in dealing with conflict issues. To analyze their motivations, objectives, positioning as well as their interactions (among themselves and with the political/religious/community/traditional authorities).
5. To analyse existing traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution that safeguard the survival of populations and that could be adopted in programming responses.
This analysis should also serve as a basis for strategic discussions between ACORD and CCFD to set up a civil society support programme in the region for the construction of sustainable peace and reconciliation between communities. The document "A Sub-Regional Strategy for Peace: Chad, CAR, Sudan and South Sudan Peace Programme 2012-2022, an ACORD-CCFD partnership" outlines the findings of this study and captures the strategies put in place.

This study was conducted by Louise Khabure. For parts on Chad, she was assisted by Saad Adoum, a conflict expert in Chad, and Augustin Ladiba Gondeu, an anthropologist dealing with identity, religious and cultural issues. For CAR, in addition to Saad Adoum, Roland Marchal, a researcher at the CERI/Sciences-Po in Paris, helped us better understand CAR issues and agreed to let us reproduce parts of his articles on ethnic, religious and political divisions in CAR. Many ACORD and CCFD partners were involved at one time or another in the compilation of this study. These include CSAPR and CADH who allowed us to use their political analyses on Chad; and APAD for their information on youth issues in Chad. When the study was released, updated information was added by the editors, mostly as footnotes.

The coordination of this research and the editing of this study were led by Vanessa Dupont (ACORD, London), Seid Sultane (ACORD-NDjamena), Salome Zuriel (ACORD, Nairobi) and Bruno Angsthelm (CCFD-Paris).

Nairobi, Paris, October 2013

1. www.acordinternational.org / ccfd-terresolidaire.org
2. Also Crisis Group senior analyst for Chad
Executive Summary

Ethnic and religious tensions and totalitarianism are direct threats to the future survival of thousands, if not millions of people in both Sudan countries, Chad and CAR. Rebel activities in CAR and Chad have attracted the attention of the international community on the political crises in the two countries and the relations between these countries and Sudan. Although South Sudan gained independence on July 1, 2011, it has not yet resolved, with Northern Sudan, several outstanding issues that are potentially explosive.

REGIONAL CONTEXT

In Sudan, the years 2010-11 were marked by the referendum process and the proclamation of the independence of South Sudan on July 14, 2011 even though the problems that have historically plagued the two countries remained. New forms of conflicts affect both countries on different ways.

Politics in Sudan has been dominated by the major Arab and Muslim political parties and was marked by the marginalization of other groups. Ethnic, classes and religions issues are very complex, and affected not only the south, but other marginalized groups in Darfur and eastern Sudan. This process of systematic marginalization has touched all aspects of Sudanese society and political governance. The situation is characterized by a multitude of violations of human rights: violent repression, proxy wars, military campaigns, and targeted extrajudicial executions, starvation caused by the war.... This culminated in the indictment by the ICC of the current President al-Bashir for war crimes in March 2009.

Sudan is in a difficult situation because it has lost its southern part and therefore significant oil revenues. The image of the NCP, the party in power, stood reduced, causing multiple rebellions in Darfur, eastern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains area. On the political front, former members of the SPLM and other key opposition groups in Khartoum challenged the NCP, and mobilized with other marginalized groups seeking to overthrow it. The central government has refused to back down and tightened its leading position in many military operations in South Kordofan and the Nubba Mountains.

South Sudan is a very young nation, which is forced to face many challenges but also has several post-conflict opportunities. Many complex issues will take time to be resolved. The main post-referendum issues are the oil which 80-90% is produced in South Sudan, but the country is landlocked and transit fees must be negotiated to reach the pipelines through the north; borders with five areas must be negotiated, for example Abyei Kafia Kingi, etc. and all are rich in natural resources; nationalities, especially for southern Sudanese living in the North, debts and assets, as in any divorce, must be discussed, international agreements, most of which were signed by the North, which raises the question of their validity in the South and security, mainly with regard to the joint integrated units and southerners in the Sudanese armed forces.

Southern Sudan has the usual challenges of a young nation. It must establish a governmental system, in all its dimensions, the executive, the judiciary, the legislature, the public, the army... The country will have to develop infrastructure, expand services to the population, the rule of law and good governance, the country will basically have to start all over again, through a process which will be marked by tensions, abuses and successes.
Chad and CAR

The two countries have much in common: a violent political history, bloody dictatorships, a democratization process which started in 1990 but does not work. Many common issues are: the problem of the coexistence of identities including religion which is used to divide Muslims and Christians, ethnic problems, poverty, the weak economy and the capacity of public services, and especially ongoing violent struggle for power.

They have two central powers based on the clan system with low social support. Governance problems are related to the weakness of the state to meet the needs of the population, poor economic management, increased corruption and mismanagement of natural resources, and in particular a lack of transparency in the exploitation of oil, diamonds, forest...

In both countries, agricultural production, the main source of income for the people, is destabilized by conflict and fuels the conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. Chad has a strong military capacity, financial resources through oil exploitation and strong external support, especially from France which provides its military support and influence in favor of international decisions.

Conflicts are generated by political, ethnic and religious issues. Management of natural resources (land, water, forests) is a local issue while the management of mineral resources is a national problem. Conflicts take a national dimension when the main political actors use communities to meet their electoral ambition.

Regional issues

In this region many common problems and real conflict regional dynamics exist. We observe in particular that:

- The state and politics are controlled in the four countries by a party, the NCP in Sudan, the SPLM in South Sudan, the MPS in Chad and the KNK in CAR.

- Issues of identity are common: the role of Islam, the culture and the Arabic language, the divide farmers/pastoralists ... as well as natives and non-natives along the border in southern Sudan between South Sudan and the CAR, the DRC, Uganda, and also the issue of returnees from North to South Sudan.

- The armed groups are present in all regions in southern Sudan, in the north of Sudan, in Darfur, in Nubba’s mountains, in CAR and in Chad...

The interactions between those countries are numerous: political and armed groups at the borders, the interference of neighboring countries (Sudan, Libya, DRC) and between them, frequent interventions of the Chadian army in CAR, border ethnic groups ... Many armed groups cross this region. The LRA has created a lawless area in southeastern CAR and extend their activities in Sudan. Several rebel groups from Chad and Darfur are based in Central African Republic, others are based in Darfur and destabilize eastern Chad, Libya and Chad.

The links between these four countries are inevitable. Population flows between Chad and the CAR, Chad and Sudan, Sudan and South Sudan have increased instability within each country and along borders. There are ethnic ties and trade between the peoples of the north-eastern CAR and Sudan, and the number of Sudanese refugees in CAR has reached 14,000, many of them came during the civil war in southern Sudan. Many more refugees from Darfur are in camps in eastern Chad.
The crisis in Darfur, Chad and CAR are closely related, while the situation in South Sudan remains concerned about Sudan and its political future. The instability in Darfur somehow creates an environment conducive to conflict in CAR.

**Between Sudan and South Sudan.** Several factors fuel conflicts between the two countries: the domination of NCP and political marginalization, and its desire to destabilize the South, as previously mentioned economic problems arising from the loss of oil revenues, the issue of borders North / South the demarcation of the five border, military campaigns against Nubba mountain people and of the Southern Kordofan (bordering the South and are ideologically aligned to South Sudan), issues of movement of people between the north and south, armed militias whose former members have not been integrated into the army, and other groups that have not been disarmed (nine groups fighting against the government), is widespread and cross-border cattle theft. Trade between Sudan and South Sudan has been reduced after the referendum, mainly to counteract the gain of self-determination. The south remains dependent of the north to export oil.

But also **between South Sudan and other countries.** It is indeed noted border problems between South Sudan, with Uganda (Nimule), with Ethiopia and Kenya in the triangle Ilemi. Coexistence between communities of different ethnic groups and between returnees and indigenous populations pose problems.

South trade with Kenya and Uganda is booming, South Sudan is considered as a new market. Many Kenyan, Ugandan, Ethiopian and Eritrean are in southern Sudan to do business, which did not fail to raise a sense of xenophobia among the most vulnerable populations. In CAR and DRC, many regions trade more among themselves and with their distant capital. At the international level, all the countries (United States, Russia, China, Egypt, Israel, etc.) courting South Sudan for its economic opportunities.

**Between Chad and Sudan:** Chad served as a rear base for some Darfur rebel movements for several years, the armed forces and their supporters living along the border with Sudan. In exchange for accommodation, equipment, materials, money and uniforms, Darfur rebel groups have acted as supporters of Chad, strengthening the military capacity of the National Army of Chad to fight against the Chadian rebels backed by Sudan. They helped Chad to push Chadian rebels during the various attacks from 2006 to 2009.

As a result, eastern Chad has suffered the most during this period of instability because it was subject to the effects of the internal crisis and those of the Darfur crisis. The interconnection between these two crises led to an undeclared war between Chad and Sudan, with several regional and international implications. In order to prevent regional destabilization which may born from this situation, the international community intervened at two levels: upstream to help mediation between the parties involved Chadian on one hand, and between Chad and Sudan on the other part. The international community has also taken downstream through operations peacekeeping in Darfur, in eastern Chad and in the northern part of the Central African Republic.

In CAR, besides rebel activities and abuse of their own security service, people suffer from attacks by other armed actors in the region, each year, large groups of heavily armed poachers from Sudan come into CAR to plunder its wildlife. From the DRC, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) regularly conducts violent raids in the south-eastern CAR. From Chad and Sudan, armed bands of pastoralists cross national boundaries to graze their herds. They clashed repeatedly with the local population and, in their wake, armed banditry grows.

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1. The moment when we release this study (October 2013), the example of the SELEKA shows again interactions between the different countries of the region. Rebel movements coming from Muslim regions at the north of the country, supported by Chad, who recruit mercenaries of Chadian Ouaddai of Darfur take the power which imply the semi disappearance of what remains of a state and an Centrafrican army, a conflict which generates serious tensions between Christians and Muslims.
CONFLICT CAUSES

The main drivers of conflict have been identified as relating to questions of identity and poor governance. While elsewhere in Africa ethnic politics is the main crisis of identity, in these four states, there is an intermingling of ethnic, religious, class and national identities. This further complicates the possible policy interventions for the region. Une part importante des conflits est aussi liée à la compétition sur les ressources naturelles.

• The question of identity is at the heart of conflicts in this sub-region: in this period of conflict, people are recognized initially on the basis of their ethnic identity and community, but also on the basis of their "legitimacy" of their territory (aboriginal, immigrant but also farmers / pastoralists). The inter-religious tensions are also very strong in the four countries. This is both natural in the regional context but also a product of political strategies (French colonization in Chad, Libya's influence in Sudan, political game, evangelical sects...); we also observed logical ethnic domination in 4 countries: Zaghawa and BET in Chad, Arab Nile in Sudan, Dinka in South Sudan and Yakomas in CAR. Today facing this culture of rejection of the other, we observe progressively the extension of this notion of identity to the concept of citizenship; national identity, secularism, and greater participation of women in community life...
Young people and women are the flame of this evolution.

We can therefore identify five identity problems in the region: the issue of ethnic groups, that is to say when people identify themselves and are defined by this aspect, then the competition, the rejection of others and domination are exacerbated by another and can cause conflicts at local, national and regional; religion, especially where state affairs are intertwined with religion and are not separated. Religion is used as a tool of discrimination and bullying the issue of indigenous, which generally favors the exploitation and discrimination of poor and marginalized; instrumentalization of citizenship when the state abuses of its power to remove the rights and duties of specific groups, and cultural practices (such as dia, the weapon bearing...) that can propagate violence, unfair practices and isolation from others, such as cattle rustling.

Religion: The question of religion takes different forms in different states but the most prevalent manifestation is that of Islam versus Christianity or Islam versus traditional religion. The question of religion can be responded at a national level with a constitution and administrative structures that recognize and accommodate the different religions being practiced in the region. For example, in Sudan, the practice of Sharia law discriminates against the people of the Nuba Mountains. In the CAR, administrative and governance structures need to have laws in place that recognize the religious diversity of the nation irrespective of the historical religious divisions. The instrumentalization of terrorism to discriminate against Muslims further hardens the religious divisions thus creating a security vacuum that further engenders insecurity in the region.

Ethnic domination: The issue of ethnicity and religion was at the centre of the second Sudanese civil war that ended with the secession of South Sudan. Currently, the question of ethnic domination as a conflict driver is best demonstrated in the Darfur conflict. While there is a religious commonality in the name of Islam, ethnic differences are exploited to shape national politics. While the people of Darfur are black African Muslims they are recognized as inferior to the Arab Muslims of the North. The ethnic divisions then have a spillover effect across borders into South Sudan and Chad with consequences of insecurity. Thus Darfur has become the theatre of a proxy war as rebels supported by South Sudan against Khartoum along with rebels against the Chadian government transverse the region supporting their principal causes while also lending support to secondary alliances.
• **Political bad governance** stands as a crucial source of conflicts in these four countries. The sub-region is marked by political regimes that do not seem to serve the people as a whole but rather in the logic of resource capture and possible redistribution to their communities. This results in the use of public funds to the massive arms purchases, a very high level of corruption of the ruling elites, lack of truly representative political system... The traditional control systems are obsolete, legal systems are weakened civil society are seen as a new form of political opposition... people do not feel well represented, have no confidence in the political system (political parties, elections …) and does not have impact on internal and cross-border conflicts.

State issues are common in Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and CAR. Internal conflicts are mainly due to poor political and economic governance, which had as its main impact communal tensions or sometimes very bloody popular uprisings. The violent repression of the uprisings in Sudan, for example by the central authorities led to armed rebellion, and if nothing is done, they will also occur in southern Sudan. In the four countries, these tensions and divisions are still crystallized around confessional, regional, tribal, linguistic or clan issues. The lack of democratic space results in a monolithic, tribal and one-party system, in addition to a weak civil society controlled by the State, which prevent prospects civil mobilization or political organization from facing it. The proliferation of armed groups in a country leads to its militarization, often at the expense of the civilian population. “Civilians” and ”military” are sometimes confused, many people claiming to have one or the other status according to the situation. The government uses the military for their own protection, but also as a part of their duties and an instrument of coercion.

• **On the contentious situation related to competition over resources**, the study highlights the relationship problems between farmers and pastoralists, the difficulty of developing a local economy in a difficult agro-ecological context, violent competition between local grassroots for access to water and land, tensions related to the exploitation of mineral resources... This conflict may also extend to a much broader level of territory as the conflict in Darfur with the Janjaweed claiming the access to the land and raises the broader question of the sustainability of pastoral model in a region turning into a desert and whose population is steadily increasing. We can identify four resource issues that cause conflicts in the region: the economic problems in the displacement of rural populations to urban centers, such as RCA, competition for scarce resources such as water, land, pastures, livestock, for example in South Sudan, the impact of conflict (resource-related) which come from neighboring countries and border regions (eg: the Darfur crisis) and the presence of national natural resources highly profitable as oil, diamonds (eg: oil in Chad, Sudan and South Sudan).

**CIVIL SOCIETY**

In Sudan, the situation is very complex and there is no real civil society. In this country, the players must give guarantees to the government to work with them. The main actors of civil society, those who can work on conflict prevention, governance and the peace building are suppressed, treated with suspicion and are constantly monitored. This forced them to move to Kampala in Uganda where they can operate more efficiently. For their part, aid workers are also constantly monitored and must seek approval from the government in the recruitment of their senior executive.

**In South Sudan**, the scope of activities is very wide but the civil society today lack of capacity, as executive seniors have been co-opted into the government and administration after the independence. The active voices for peace and mobilization, such as women of Sudan (SWAN), have seen the majority of their members join the ministries and commissions. Thus, most of the groups and networks lack leaders and capacities.
The rest are scattered in the country and working in very difficult conditions since there is little infrastructure. Several organizations have been trained to respond quickly to the needs of the electoral process and referendum, but the priorities may change depending on the influence of donors. Locally, these are community based organizations that work better and truly meet the needs of populations. The church and the SPLM remain the main points of entry for international aid.

During the war, CSOs were active in promoting a peaceful solution and a response to the humanitarian crisis caused by the civil war. Today, there is little development actors working in the field of conflict. In addition, the electoral process and mechanisms for resolving existing conflicts are often misused as related to politics, religion or ethnicity. However, many NGOs are working on improving the lives of people. There are several organizations working in both north and south of the awareness issues in the negotiations on post-crisis (independence, Darfur ...); They are major international players and they have an influence on the north and the southern government, donor governments, the Security Council, the African Union, the EU, the USA etc.

In Chad, the civil society has developed since 1990, it is involved in the control of the state, the defense of human rights and there are many grassroots organizations on the ground.

Because of the context of the conflict in Chad, the relationship between government and the emerging civil society have been, from the beginning, marked by mutual suspicion and mistrust. Governments have never really acknowledged the presence of civil society that they perceived as an ally of the political opposition; ready to denounce bad governance and human rights violations. On the other hand, civil society suspected the government of trying to hinder its activities. The period of relative calm (1990-2003) that followed the introduction of a multiparty political system and the Sovereign National Conference have allowed civil society in Chad to be very active on the ground and become an important component of society. The government has sought to divide the main components of civil society in promoting the emergence of an alternative civil society that defends the government's position. Civil society is also stuck between the government and the rebels. The strength of the Chadian civil society lies in its intervention to solve problems beyond the division between north and south, Christians and Muslims, ranchers and farmers, etc. The social and political crises that the country faces equally affect the vast majority of Chadians. The diagnosis made by the Chadian civil society has a large membership of national opinion and a part of the international opinion.

In CAR, the main civil society organizations constituting the Central African Republic were essentially associations of Human Rights (ADH), the Catholic Church and the workers' union. The influence of ADH is the result of the legitimacy they have developed through their participation in the struggle for democracy. On the Catholic Church, its influence is explained by the role it played in the formation of state elites. With ADH, unions played a political role, introduced or supported the democratic demands, were strongly against the government's attempts to question the freedom of association, pluralism and freedom of association, consequently representing a real counter-power.

As Chad, civil society in CAR has experienced a period of reflux after the euphoria of the 1990s. This is also due to the loss of enthusiasm for participation in non- response to the deteriorating political situation in the country. Central African civil society is at the country's image: damaged and without financial means. Less organized than civil society of Chad and Cameroon, for example, civil society also faces competition from international NGOs who have invested in the country after the collapse of the state.
MAIN CONCLUSIONS

Regional approach: The region of Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and CAR is characterized by shared conflict drivers that spill over the countries’ porous borders. Save for the African Union which has all the countries as registered members; there is no other regional body that accommodates all the four countries. Chad and Central African Republic belong to The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. Sudan is a member of the Arab League and has applied for membership of the East African community. South Sudan is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGAD) and has a pending application for the East African Community as well. Therefore in terms of intervention, the countries are best placed to have bilateral solutions supervised by the African Union. The other disadvantage is that the central geographical location of the states makes its cross border conflict interactions to be very extensive, excluding any other regional body from intervention, other than that with a continental reach i.e. the African Union. The African Union is the umbrella under which the states, individually and under the auspices of their regional bodies can come together to resolve the cross border conflict.

While nationalism in itself is a good practice especially where it overrides ethnic-nationalism, it becomes a threat when it fosters frosty relations with other states. For instance, the perception of insecurity faced by CAR with respect to her neighbours hinders her from developing regional infrastructural cooperation necessary for her landlocked markets. Moreover, regional cooperation would help her deal with some conflicts such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) menace that calls for inter-state cooperation. The answer to this is regional cooperation and there are two possible solutions here. The first solution is for the states in question to form a regional cooperation body that has a membership of at least the four states and their crucial neighbours with respect to the regional conflict problems. The other option is for the states to join an already existing regional bloc whose mandate and framework will allow the states to resolve their conflict issues as well as pave way for cooperation.

The pathway chosen should avoid the temptation to follow the European model of aiming for economic integration without addressing the primary problems within the states i.e. problems of governance and cohesion. Rather the regional bloc should aim at establishing cross country frameworks with the platforms and jurisdictions that take into account cross border identities and cross border criminal activities. These should include joint security frameworks to resolve conflict in the area and to avoid the possibility of rebel groups playing off the political actors of different countries against each other. Any economic goals envisaged should have a direct linkage with the elimination of threats to the respective states. Only then can the fears generated by nationalism be addressed. To this end, the element of regionalism should be the platform upon which regional integration takes place. Existing similarities in language, culture, religion and trade associations can go a long way in fostering a peaceful environment at grassroots level while the states develop cooperation mechanisms at the state-to-state level.

From a regional perspective, in the absence of a common regional body, it falls onto the African Union to foster cooperation among the existing regional cooperation bodies that these countries belong to. Notably, IGAD, MENAC, and ICGLR which cover the four states and most of the countries involved in the cross border conflicts. The AU should provide the audience for these bodies to discuss the instability in these four states. Additionally it can midwife the process of either creating a new regional body discussed above or ensure subscription by the four countries into one of the existing regional bodies. Only when the four countries have meaningful reform shall the regional instability come to an end.
The realization of stability in some countries without others will be counterproductive as the porous borders make the countries vulnerable to conflict contagion from their neighbours. While governance and security sector reforms are carried out by each state, the AU should monitor the process of these reforms to ensure congruency and the realization of potential synergies.

**Governance** is a central problem in all the countries in the study. Solutions to problems of governance must find expression from the state itself. The regional blocs will act as a watch dog for implementation of proper governance principles. However, the solutions generated must take into consideration the negative practices in each country. Each state should have constitutional, legislative and administrative frameworks to address its governance concerns. Equally important is the role of traditional and religious codes of practice. These are especially useful in cross border conflict where legal - political jurisdiction is hindered by the presence of borders and the notion of state sovereignty. Here, traditional mechanisms become a handy tool in complementing legal jurisdiction especially in the absence of a joint country mechanism.

It is unrealistic to imagine a state with no elite or elite interests. However, the economic and ruling elite (who happen to be one and the same thing) should exercise visionary leadership that not only furthers their interest but more importantly, that of the whole nation. Pursuit of a win-win situation over the win-lose elite practice in CAR, South Sudan and Chad would resolve the governance crisis that has held these states hostage. Legislation that spells out proper resource allocation procedures discourages bad practices such as corruption as well as legislated procedures for the organization of political parties would help streamline the political processes in these countries and check selfish elite interests. Save for Sudan (Khartoum) where religion plays the main role in politics, in all the other three countries, the problem of governance is best explained by the ethnicization of politics. The association between ethnicity and access to economic gains forms the cornerstone of the conflict in these countries. This presents a continuous fight for supremacy between ethnic identity and national identity. Once again the solution to the politics of ethnicity lies in the implementation of proper governance frameworks. At the centre of this is the equitable allocation of resources within states. The equitability has to take into account historical elements that have disadvantaged or further advantaged some regions over others. Moreover, it should also accommodate the systematically disadvantaged demographics such as women youth and children. The de-linking of political power from the enrichment of one ethnic community over the others is the key to reducing ethnic animosities in the respective states.

**Civil Society** is an essential part of any democratic society, playing a key role of mediator between the political class and the population. It is a crucial avenue through which societal concerns are filtered and articulated to the government for proper policy direction and solution. Moreover, they are also avenues through which the government and other non-state actors such as development partners can disseminate information and services to the people. For civil society to be functional however, it must address itself to societal concerns and not just the whims of the donor. Civil society should have the capacity to effectively agitate and articulate its grievances. At the same time, civil society should aim towards weaning itself off donor aid. Only then can it be truly independent and articulate its issues free of interference.

In these countries, the electoral processes are important sources of conflict, and yet, even if they exacerbate conflict, political parties are important for the future of these countries. Civil society should try to influence them to play their role in building social cohesion beyond the divide. Unfortunately, divide to conquer and take advantage of the sources of conflict is common practices of political parties. Civil society must play its role to balance against it.
Introduction

There is no doubt that civil war arising from ethnic, religious differences and totalitarianism constitutes a direct threat to the future survival of many thousands, if not millions of people in Sudan, Chad and CAR. The primary challenge is to apply inventiveness and ingenuity in making peace and in solving the economic, social, and political problems in these countries. Rebel activities in CAR and Chad have called international attention to political crises within both countries as well as relationships between these countries and Sudan. South Sudan despite having achieved independence on July 1st 2011 still has to finalize several outstanding and potentially explosive problems with Sudan. Darfur has common borders with three countries: Libya in the North, where the Sahara Desert acted as a barrier against active tribal intermixing. On the western and southwestern side, there are the common borders with Chad and Central African Republic respectively. In the western side, political borders cannot restrict ethnic and linguistic ties nor do they limit the peoples and tribes of the region from extending across borders. They all belong to the same origin in the neighbouring regions of Chad and Darfur. Examples of these are the Zaghawa, Massaleit, Mahameed, Mahirya, Salamat and Haimad (the Ta’aisha of Sudan).

There are 2.5 million people displaced in Sudan, mainly from within Darfur. Others are faced with harassment from the central government and government backed militia, Janjaweed, the armed Arab militia or “armed horsemen who have a legacy of attacking, raping and killing civilians, looting NGO supply warehouses and vehicles, and launching cross-border raids into Chad. Fighting in Darfur, where a UN-African Union peacekeeping mission is deployed, has died down since 2006 - but the region is still extremely insecure. While all rebel groups in Darfur oppose the Sudanese government, existing divisions within them hinder any united or coherent political agenda. Reports indicate that Darfur’s rebel groups forcibly recruit civilians living in Chad’s refugee camps. The new Darfur Regional Authority, formed as part of a deal to end the war, was set up in February 2012 to share power and wealth with the central government, compensate those affected by the nine-year war and help the return of displaced people. Considering it was signed by one of Darfur’s weaker rebel movements it will need close monitoring.

Chad has had a long history of rebellion, with groups coming in and out of existence in the north, the east, and the south of the country. The three most significant rebel groups are the United Front for Democratic Change (FUDC), the Arab-dominated Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), and the Zaghawa dissident group the Rally of Democratic Forces (RaFD). All three groups aim to overthrow Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno, but their leaders - all from different ethnic groups - refuse to join forces and subordinate themselves to any one leader. Information seemed to point out a rebel force in southern Chad and, in the east various rebel groups continue to challenge President Idriss Deby's authority. The Darfur-Chad borders are the longest of Sudan’s borders with all its neighbours. Those between Chad and Sudan amount to over (1300) kilometers in length. They extend from North of Kutum to South of Wadi Salih covering on the Chadian side the distance along the Chadian commissions of Baltin, Waddai and Salamat. This area is characterized by ethnic, and tribal diversity as well as diversity in climate and resources. This has affected the conflict and political behavior between the leaders and the people of these two countries. This explains why the Chadian government has tried to portray the current conflicts in the country, notably in the eastern part as a completely Darfur-related problem.

The Chad government has asserted that security in the area would be regained if the refugee camps were simply moved away from the border. However, the root causes also lie within Chad – with a government resistant to change, a broken judicial and administrative system which allows for impunity and corruption, and inter-ethnic tensions that are stoked and instrumentalized. The 15 January 2010 agreement between Chad and Sudan has turned the situation in Darfur gradually to normal. However, the government has not been able to reconcile the communities, despite the improved regional security context following the progressive normalization with Sudan. This political manipulation is likely to awaken old resentments and aggravate local inter-communal grievances.
The continuous decline of the local traditional justice systems and environmental degradation contribute to the precarious stability of the country. Instead of implementing a sustainable development policy, the authorities make empty promises and prolong the old colonial mode of governance, based on tight regional control through traditional leaders and security forces.

The links between these four countries are unavoidable. The population flows between Chad and CAR, Chad and Sudan, Sudan and southern Sudan have intensified the instability within each country and along borders. The crises in Darfur, Chad, and CAR are intimately linked while the situation in Southern Sudan still continues to preoccupy Sudan and its political future. The instability in Darfur somehow creates an enabling environment for conflict in CAR. There are ethnic and trade linkages between populations in northeast CAR and Sudan and there are 14,000 Sudanese refugees in CAR, many of whom came during the civil war from Southern Sudan. However the role of Sudan in CAR’s rebellion is unclear.

Central Africa Republic (CAR) is a vast under populated country that is marred with antagonism from three rebel groups. The L’Armée Populaire pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie (APRD) controls two contiguous areas in the Northwest and North of the country although it is not strong enough to challenge the incumbent government in Bangui. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) that operates in the Northeast CAR and the third rebel group with a military presence in the CAR is the Democratic Front for the People of the Central African Republic (FDPC). Besides rebel activity, the population suffers from aggression by a wide array of other armed actors including their own security services. The Central African Republic (FACA) army, which has a terrible human rights record, has a history of providing problems and not security for the population. There is also violence committed by foreigners; each year large groups of heavily armed poachers from Sudan enter CAR to plunder her wildlife resources. From the DRC, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) carries violent raids in the Southeast of the CAR for several weeks, resulting in more than 100 abducted. From Chad and Sudan, armed bands of cattle herders cross the country borders to pasture their herds. They often clash on several occasions with the local population and in their wake, armed banditry thrives. These armed bandits, generally referred to as coupeurs de route or zaraguinas, are probably the biggest security problem in CAR. They disrupt the limited road traffic that exists in CAR, including commercial transporters and they often take hostages during their armed attacks.
1. Historical background

This section on major issues and their impacts presents a full breakdown of the current political, social and economic situation in Chad, CAR, Sudan and South Sudan. It derives its content from field visits and an in-depth desk study on the genesis of situations prevailing in Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic. An analysis of the main factors of conflicts, including the security status in these regions will be presented. Naturally there are distinct differences. The societies in the four different countries form a sort of political, religious, ethnic and cultural mosaic. Because of this mixture, causes of conflicts do not always originate from political factors, but they result from livelihood issues, ethnic differences, religious influences, identity factors and competition for resources. These elements contribute to exacerbating natural and positive differences and disrupt traditional mechanisms for conflict management. Some parallel and common characteristics shall be established based on respective contexts in the four countries.

1.1 CHAD

Chad covers an area of 1,284,000 square kilometers, with a population of 11,274,1063. The country which has a remarkable geographic, social and cultural diversity is at the crossroads of Black and North Africa, West and Eastern Sahel. Since its independence in 1960, systemic and chronic bad governance from successive governments exacerbated the social and institutional problems, and deepened the differences between communities. This bad governance at state level is the basis of Chadian difficulties. Several decades after independence, political institutions and the administration in general still seem to be used and manipulated against the citizenry to the benefit of specific groups. For long stretches, when travelling around the country it is quite distressing to see very few public facilities available to the population, rural or urban, all bear the label of a foreign institution for example “well dug by the European Union,” "road funded by the World Bank" or charity or NGO development "library supplied by Caritas", "clinic renovated by Médecins Sans Frontières". In the eyes of Chadians, the State is absent in the development and social sphere where it should normally base its legitimacy and recognition. State institutions are considered exclusive areas of those who head them. The concept of ‘public institutions serving the community’ simply does not exist.

Decades of militarization of the society have fuelled daily violence as well as the sense of impunity by groups holding instruments of state power; militarization has hindered peaceful coexistence between communities and increased poverty. Chad has experienced a series of internal conflicts, but has also found itself in a situation of belligerence with some of her neighbours - Libya, Sudan, Nigeria, and Central African Republic. Its internal conflicts are intensified by the regional context. Chad is also notorious in recreating its internal cohesion by orchestrating wars against some of its neighbours mainly in Sudan and Libya.

A light at the end of the tunnel was in 1990-2000, during the period of calm that fostered an opportunity for political dialogue amongst the political class. This put an end to the bad governance – for a time and a modern State was established. Multi-partyism was introduced and new political parties were formed. A sovereign national conference was held during which the political class unanimously committed to abandon armed struggle as a means of doing politics and subscribed to the holding of the first pluralistic elections. However this period of calm was short-lived ending at the beginning of 2000. The ‘democratic project’ had failed, and armed struggle returned culminating in the intensification of conflicts in the country and generalized insecurity in 2003 and in 2005 to 2009.

3. According to figures from the second general census of population and habitat conducted in 2009.
1.1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE CHAOS

1.1.1.1 After independence, 30 years of war

The French have inhabited Chad since 1900 and in 1920 it became part of French Equatorial Africa. In 1946 elected Chadian representatives sat in the French National Assembly but without real effects on politics in Chad. Power was still vested in the colonialists and governmental administration was still dependent on France. The Chadian Democratic Union which was the dominant political force in Chad was largely dominated by European members. Chad became an autonomous republic under French community on 28 September 1958 under the leadership of Francois Tombalbaye as the First President. In 1960 Chad was granted independence and the French departed leaving the country in disarray. Tombalbaye attempted to create national unity which culminated in the creation of the Union for Progress of Chad, followed by the banning of opposition groups in 1962.

The people were frustrated about government mismanagement and tax collection abuses. In addition to what Tombalaye himself called “maladministration” and which produced local conflicts in muslim areas, the country’s Arab speaking neighbours incited rebellion in northern and central regions of Chad (black Muslim herders) against the Christians or pagan communities of the South of the country. Numerous self styled rebellions arose. The National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) which was founded in Sudan in 1966 to mainly oust the regime became the most prominent of the insurgent groups. Meanwhile the French had gotten involved in counterinsurgency efforts upon request from the incumbent regime.

The Chad uprisings were however disorganized and uncoordinated. In 1971 the leaders’ philosophical and ethnic differences also led to the fragmentation of FROLINAT. One faction moved to Khartoum and others to Algiers and Tripoli. Tombalbaye, claiming to have quashed a coup involving some recently amnestied Chadians with the support from former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, ceased relations with Libya and invited anti-Gaddafi elements to establish bases in Chad. In retaliation, Gaddafi recognized FROLINAT, and for the first time formally offered an operational base in Tripoli and increased the flow of supplies to the Chadian rebels. The need to create a citizens league around his power led Tombalbaye to become the champion of authenticity and to establish the National Movement for the cultural and social revolution (Mouvement national pour la révolution culturelle et sociale). Tribe cadres were forced to the mandatory practice of Sara Yondo (a model of male initiation ceremonies found in Chad); other communities were invited to reactivates their initiation rites; cities and individuals changed their names. To create space around himself, political, civil and military figures were imprisoned.

On 13 April 1975, Tombalbaye’s regime tragically ended through a military coup. The following years, were characterised by several volatile national union governments established through many negotiations conducted in Khartoum, Sudan, in Kano and then Lagos, Nigeria. These were without much success, as the security situation deteriorated until the departure of Libyans late 1981 and the victory of Habré and his FAN in June 1982. Habré ruled Chad from 1982 until he was deposed in 1990 by Idriss Déby and fled to Senegal. Habré’s one party regime was characterized by widespread human rights abuses and atrocities. Habré’s government periodically engaged in ethnic cleansing against groups such as the tribes from the south of the country (Sara, Ngambaye…), Hadjerai and the Zaghawa, killing and arresting group members en masse when their leaders were perceived to be posing a threat to the regime. Following his rise to power, Habré created a secret police force known as the Documentation and Security Directorate (DDS), under which opponents of Habré were tortured and executed. Some methods of torture commonly used by the DDS included; burning with incandescent objects, spraying of gas into the eyes, ears, and nose; forced swallowing of water, and forcing the mouths of detainees around the exhaust pipes of running cars with hands and feet tied to their backs (arbatachar).

It is estimated that 40,000 Chadians nationwide either died in detention or were executed under Habré, and that over 200,000 were subjected to torture. Human Rights Watch later dubbed Habré “Africa’s Pinochet and in September 2005 he was indicted for crimes against humanity, torture, war crimes and other human rights violations. He has since lived in Dakar for 17 years under nominal house arrest where he might not be judged before 2013.

1.1.1.2 Deby: between democratic illusion, political tensions and rebellions

On 1 December 1990, Idriss Deby took power by force of arms, in the same way as his predecessor. He promised Chadians who were - traumatized by the brutal and dictatorial Habré regime - to establish a multiparty democracy, to liberalize domestic politics, establish republican institutions and a framework for the promotion and protection of rights and freedoms in the country. This provided the background for the organisation of the Sovereign National Conference (Conférence Nationale Souveraine) in 1993. A fundamental Law was adopted in 1996, and new institutions were put in place: the National Assembly, the Constitutional Council, the High Court of Justice, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the High Council on Communication (HCC), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council.

It was also against this background that many so-called "democratic opposition" political parties were born and began to occupy the political space, to play an active role in national politics and to contribute to strengthening the democratic process. Several civil society organisations, including human rights groups, were created in the same period. However, Chadians became quickly disillusioned as the ‘beautiful’ resolutions of the Sovereign National Conference in 1993 were later ignored. Despite the emergence of political and civil society organizations, the regime quickly confiscated political power and restricted political party and civil society activities.

The real national reconciliation based on unity of all “sons of the country” and the rebuilding of the state did not take place. Tribal management of power, corruption and impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of misappropriation of public funds, quickly became the norm in public service management. Hopes for peace, democracy, justice and development, cherished by Chadians, vanished with the first presidential election of the democratic era, in 1996, organized and won by the ruling party. These elections, which were widely disputed by the political opposition and the civil society, announced the end of the democratic illusion. In response to criticisms, the regime hardened and restricted further political space and freedom of opinion, of assembly, of speech and of the press.

Divisions emerged within the political class, and armed rebellions were formed in an effort to overthrow Idriss Deby’s government. In 2001, President Idriss Deby was re-elected president of the Republic after an election strongly contested by the political opposition and the civil society, which led to the total breakdown of dialogue between the opposition and the regime. President Deby’s plan to amend the constitution to be able to stand again for the next presidential election triggered a major political crisis. The 2004 legislative elections and the 2006 presidential election were boycotted by the major opposition parties.

1.1.1.3 The Darfur crisis

Decades of neglect, civil war and regional instability underlie the humanitarian crisis which was finally triggered in 2003, when a quarter of a million refugees from Darfur and CAR fled to Chad only to find themselves trapped in another conflict area. Internal fighting led 180,000 other IDPs to flee their homes and livelihoods. While large-scale fighting ended in mid-2007, the complex situation has continued to exert enormous pressure on the already deeply impoverished country, whose population is facing malnutrition, water scarcity and ecological deterioration. The threat of a new conflict persists because the population concentration has exceeded available resources. Numerous conflict incidents and skirmishes have been reported between local farmers and nomads.
1.1.1.4 The 2005-2010 crisis

The political crisis arising from the announcement of a constitutional amendment allowing Deby Itno to run for the presidency caused divisions within the regime, with senior officials positioning themselves to gain access to power and to resources expected from oil exploitation. This crisis led to the reactivation of several politico-military rebel movements.

This period was marked by a series of violent events. In 2005, an attempted coup was organized by the Erdimi brothers (nephews of the President), followed by the creation of a new rebel movement - the "Rally of Forces for Change (RFC: Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement)" that brought together disenchanted members from the ruling clan. Another movement, also created at this time - the Union of Forces for Change (UFC: Union des Forces du Changement), unsuccessfully attacked the capital on 13 April 2006 just before the presidential election. It was the first time since 1991 that a rebel movement reached the capital. A few months later, in early February 2008, a second attack, which was much more violent and led by many allied movements, was unsuccessful by a narrow margin, with heavy fighting lasting several days in the city. The failure of this attack was caused by divisions between the politico-military groups but also by Deby’s surprising determination to remain in power.

War "through rebellion" between Chad and Sudan contributed to strengthening the regional dimension of this crisis. Chad supported Sudanese rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), while Khartoum did the same for Chadian rebels. The Darfur crisis has destabilized the entire region bordering Sudan.

In Chad, UFC’s first attack in 2006 forced the international community to respond. From June 2006, France, for example, reconnected with the political opposition. Several peace mechanisms were put in place: the deployment of UN/AU forces in Darfur, the deployment of a European force (EUFOR) along the border between Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic, expected to close the border and secure the area, and a process of political dialogue between the political parties of the majority and the opposition, which culminated in the signing of the political agreement for strengthening democracy in Chad called the "Agreement of 13 August 2007". This political agreement aimed at strengthening the democratic process and ensuring the organization of free, democratic and transparent presidential, legislative and municipal elections. In November 2007, another peace agreement was signed with several rebel movements in Sirte, Libya but it had no effect on the political situation.

1.1.1.5 The Agreement of 13 August 2007

This agreement was described as "significant progress on the political front, as the most important document after the Bible, the Koran and the Constitution" by the President of the Republic. It was meant to clean up the political environment and address the lack of political dialogue. The agreement was also aimed at depoliticizing and demilitarizing the territorial administration and at implementing the resolutions of the general assembly of armed forces.

Rebel movements who were not involved in the dialogue nor signatories to the agreement, repeatedly attacked the Chadian territory over the following two years. In this tense situation, the government responded harshly, arresting political opponents, amending Act 001 on oil revenues management, which severed relationships with the World Bank and the IMF, the massive purchase of weapons, the recruitment of child soldiers and mercenaries ... In short, the regime chose war over dialogue.

In the mid-2008, several political opposition parties joined the MPS and its allies in a government of national unity. Despite the policy framework provided by the agreement of 13 August, the opposition coalition considered this as a unilateral rallying.

From mid-2009, since the rebels no longer represented a direct threat to power, the President of the Republic multiplied actions to improve his democratic image and regain credibility on the national and international scene. He tried to move forward the process established by the 13 August Agreement, while the opposition was very weak and divided, but also constrained to extreme caution, not willing to take the risk to suffer the same fate as Mr. Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh.
1.1.1.6 The peace agreement Chad-Sudan

An end to the crisis seemed a distant hope in 2008 and 2009, when a coalition of Chadian armed groups, the Union of Resistance Forces (Union des forces de la résistance, UFR), attacked government troops. The failed offensives, however, gave rise to three factors that contributed to stability. First, the Chad government’s decision to prioritize the military option in countering the rebel groups by better equipping, reorganizing and re-motivating the army, tilted the balance of power in its favor. Secondly, in the wake of their failure, divisions grew between the rebel factions. Some have called for negotiations with the government, while others remain committed to bringing down the regime by force. The feuding factions have accused each other of treachery, and the government has taken the opportunity to buy off some of the protagonists. Thirdly, after the failed offensives, some influential circles in Khartoum began to doubt the utility of an alliance with the Chadian armed opposition and considered a rapprochement with N’Djamena more useful. Consequently, on 15 January 2010 Chad and Sudan signed a peace agreement to secure their common border.

1.1.1.7 The electoral cycle

On the political front, all the attention of political actors was focused on the electoral process. For two years, debates were focused on the technical aspects of the election process: mode of census, voter registration card, membership of the national CENI and CELIs... Many tensions appeared on specific issues such as the right or not of the political "nomads". Sometimes, decisions of the follow-up Committee on the 13 August Agreement were modified by the government and presented to parliament in another form.

On the eve of elections, various political actors and international observers noted significant progress on legal and policy instruments designed to ensure transparent elections: establishment of a joint Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI: Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante), creation of a standing technical body responsible for updating the voter list, and a follow-up and Support Committee on the Agreement, organization of general and electoral censuses, adoption of a Charter of political parties, of a text on the status of the opposition, etc...

It was in this calm climate that parliamentary and presidential elections were organized in the first half of 2011. Yet many malfunctions pushed the major opposition candidates to once again boycott the presidential election. Thus the results of legislative elections and thereafter the municipal elections in January 2012 were widely contested.
1.1.2 DRIVERS OF CONFLICTS

1.1.2.1 Religious, ethnic and cultural differences:

Cultural, ethnic and religious issues in Chad consist of a combination of prejudices, false ideas contained in books, reproduced and owned by both researchers and Chadians. This deception wants to project in the North and in the South respectively races of lords and slaves; groups that are opposed in everything and having nothing to do together other than considering themselves as being in conflict, while one finds in the North cultural habits similar to those of many people in the South. There exists in Chad a dualistic literature drawing on culturalist data to essentialize differences, while what is urgent is to build bridges to bring these people together. Here, as in many former colonies, the colonial library is yet to be visited and disassembled in the minds of those who eagerly digested it.

1.1.2.1.1 Military, political and religious domination of Sahelian kingdoms over the South, an enduring myth

Throughout history, groups of people forming present-day Chad certainly met and then separated before taking existing spaces. Islam, introduced by Arab traders, the Turks and the Peuls, helped to consolidate the various kingdoms therein. The populations of the current southern part had developed trade relations (ivory, gold ...) with Cameroon and Nigeria, which provided them with salt, kola, cattle and horses amongst other goods. For example the draperies at the Royal Court of Moundang in Lere were provided by weavers from Kano and Maiduguri and Yola, Nigeria. As for empires and sultanates located at the edge of the Sahara Desert, they were open to the Arab-Muslim world, without really being Islamized. They had also established diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Turks from whom they had acquired firearms, which allowed them not only to expand and consolidate their territorial spaces but also to integrate into the trans-Saharan slave trade.

Slavery seems to be an ancient practice in the Chadian Basin which is commonly attributed by Chadians to potentates from the North against populations in the South. The current research studies demonstrate a more complex reality. First, islamized kingdoms in the North did not need to go far to get slaves because they always had in their vicinity non-islamized masses. The kingdom of Ouaidâï, which dominated the country in late 19th century, was itself involved in the trafficking of slaves to other Muslim communities of dominated kingdoms. Furthermore, going to the south was difficult because it was recognized that the southern part of the country was made up of trap areas for these kingdoms; their real penetration only occurred in the mid 19th century. But slavery actually involved nearly all communities in the country. For example, the kingdom of Mondang provided slaves from neighbouring communities to the Peuls, the lamidats of Ray Boubâ and Yola in Cameroon. Sahelian kingdoms generally traded slaves to Egypt, Libya and the Middle East in general. Saying that slavery resulted from the historical dominance of the North over the South is based on ideology and is disproved by research. The religious dimension involved only the Mayo Kebbi close to Cameroon, with attempted forced islamisation. However, the Peul Jihad did not last long enough in Chad to justify a sense of fear vis-à-vis "Muslims". In Chad, in fact, it was more of a court Islam rather than Islam en masse, which explains the domination of an economic nature over other communities through the control of human trafficking by a religious domination. At the beginning of the 20th century, we can say that there was indeed a relationship of economic, political and military domination of the South by northern kingdoms, but with no religious dimension.

For southern people, ignorant of the realities of a slave trade well shared among all communities in the country, the sense of a homogeneous North oppressing the South was probably already built at the time. In contrast, there still exists a widespread theory among some people in the North/South justified by a relationship of slave/master historical domination. From this point of view, speaking about a continuous and exclusive domination of one part of the country by another is based on an ideological vision.

5. This part reproduces an article by Augustin Ladiba GONDEU, researcher in political anthropology. In the process of publication.
1.1.2.1.2 Colonisation, two separate worlds in a single territory

In the North, the colonial administration respected existing political structures, sometimes replacing the most recalcitrant or hostile leaders, but the privileges enjoyed by monarchs (taxes, justice, taxes on livestock or markets, etc.) were maintained. And where they had just been removed, compensation was paid to them. Some privileges were granted to Muslim sultans about legal pluralism and respect for custom or rights derived from the Koran.

The regions situated in the south were led by many land leaders or religious leaders ("initiation leaders") with no centralized political or religious power structure. Colonisation replaced these traditional leaders with canton chiefs who became helpers of the colonial administration for tighter control of territories. This disrupted deeply social relations among southern people. In the north, the elites resisted Western culture, and especially refused the modern school: As the teaching of Islam developed in the region, and relations with enemy Arab tribes (Islamized) improved, northern communities sought not only to imitate the Arab model advocated by Islam, but they also identified with Arabs. In the South, with the rapid acceptance of the colonial order and formal education, a civil administration was quickly put in place. The region developed economically through cotton farming and quickly became the “useful Chad”. Through indigenization policy, trained Southerners became teachers, administration clerks or colonial guards. This education was facilitated by the introduction of Christianity in the region between 1929 and 1947.

Politically, the colonial administration implemented a policy of containment between the North and the South; it did not care about fairness in the management of these territories. Clearly, the type of management implemented was aimed at differentiating these two spaces. Faced with hostility in the north, France developed a military administration. She tried promoting traditional elites, usually sons of chiefs or their dignitaries. This attitude is further explained by the geostrategic importance of this part of the country in the eyes of France. The South, at least from the 1930’s when Chad’s territorial space acquired its current form, was considered as the useful Chad because of cotton fibre farming, but also due to the recruitment of slave labor (porters, colonial troops, building of Congo-Ocean railway, etc.). France made sure Christianity was contained, to prevent its spread to other parts of the country. Furthermore, colonial administrators advocated primary anticlericalism. This double standards policy, meant to make these two worlds evolve separately, prevented the building of a sense of joint belonging, created a reality, that is to say, a dichotomy that seemed to be marked between ethnic/cultural groups of the South and the North.

At independence, in addition to the binary structuring, the country also inherited the effects of imbalance in the training of administrative, military and then political elites, more in favor of southern elites, and of course, the responsibility was devolved to them to lead the nation’s destiny: “Frustrated by the power they thought would accrue to them (because of their tradition of centralized power), traders, chiefs and conservative cadres (of Muslim North) held a negative view of the state dominated by Southern officials (Christian)”.

1.1.2.1.3 Political parties, both religious and cultural trajectories

The local political life took off after the 1946 Brazzaville Conference. Two major movements quickly appeared. A nationalist, anti-colonial and unitary movement, conveyed through the Republican and Progressive Union of Chad (URPT: l’Union républicaine et progressiste du Tchad), which became the Chadian Progressive Party (PPT: Parti progressiste tchadien). The PPT-RDA was mainly composed of people from the South, who were treated as revolutionaries and communists by the colonial governor. An anti-Western movement gradually gathered to its side a set of small parties of the North led by traditional leaders or Islamized cadres. The following movements were successively created: the African Socialist Movement (MSA: Mouvement Socialiste Africain), the Association of Chadian Youth (AJT) created by young Muslims who had returned from Arab countries, a Chadian National Union prompted by the Muslim Brotherhood, to break with French imperialism. The anti-Western trend derived from a Muslim brotherhood movement and an Arab revolutionary socialist movement.
These two movements born in the pre-independence period permanently structured Chadian politics and helped reinforce this North/South dichotomy in Chad. On the one hand, the PPT gave rise to Tombalbaye’s single party which held power until 1975, and later to a large part of southern Democrats movements from 1990 onwards. On the other hand, the UNT gave rise to the armed movement FROLINAT, then to UNIR of Hissène Habré and finally to the current ruling MPS. The political landscape of Chad could thus be summarized as a clash of two world views or two environments: one in the south, sometimes Christian, intellectual and democrat, which emerged from classic pro-independence and anti-colonial African elites, and the other in the north, based on Muslim faith, a product of fundamentalist groups influenced by Arab countries, including Algeria, Sudan, Egypt and, Saudi Arabia.

1.1.2.1.4 The persistence of divisions
While at independence the foundations of a political and cultural (and/or religious) antagonism were laid, culturalist drifts of the first Chadian President - Tombalbaye, the civil war of 1979, the beginning of tribalism and state violence with Habré and then ethnic confiscation of power by Déby, gradually strengthened the feeling of the North/South and Muslim/Christian divide in Chad. While Déby gave the impression of largely opening the political space by advocating freedom of opinion and of the press and by organizing elections, it was actually a tribal apparatus in which key and strategic positions were in the hands of tribal allies. It was under these regimes that Chadians increasingly began to differentiate themselves, based on their religious, regional and ethnic backgrounds. The lifting of the presidential term limits in 2005 partly explains the quarrel within this group in which a number of cadres saw themselves as having a presidential destiny; the wars from 2006 to 2009 were its direct consequences.

1.1.2.1.5 Two worlds, two visions of the state?
The PPT, despite its totalitarian drift after independence, was a national party with a national vision. The army, which consisted of some colonial auxiliaries, was based on the respect of Republic and national values. Until its breakup in 1979, it remained a national army. Three aspects distorted power relations between northern and southern Chadians: namely the manipulation by the colonial administration which opposed Muslim leaders and preferred those of the Christian south, the willingness of some Muslim leaders who found in southern power an ideological alibi to mobilize their community, but mostly the amateurism that characterized Tombalbaye’s daily management. The closure of the political space created an atmosphere conducive to the outbreak of armed rebellion embodied by FROLINAT. Although this North/South tension is expressed differently today, we can see that the defense of collective interests or what might be called political and civil society has long been the exclusive field of southern Chadians. It is the same with the production of ideas and non-partisan criticism. In contrast, the economic and military field and that of political violence seems to have been largely dominated by northern Chadians.
Both groups consider each other as usurpers, invaders, impostors and illegitimate. Does this dual segmentation of the Chadian political field translate into two opposing and distancing concepts of coexistence? To answer this question, one needs to know the perception that each party has of the state, national unity and the values promoted by the Republic. The legitimate questions that could be asked are as follows: If the single party had not been introduced, would there still be a civil war? Why did Muslim elites refuse a single party? While several Muslim parties supported the PPT in the 1958 vote, and while there were Muslims in the single party governing bodies in the National Assembly, in the Government and also in the Chadian army. The answers to these questions will certainly be found in the ideological base involved in the structuring of relations between communities of the North and South. This is expressed in a few statements purposely conveyed in a number of colonial literature, that northern Chad has had centuries of political governance experienced through kingdoms compared to the South which consisted of headless and fragmented tribes, with no vision of state management, because of undefined hierarchy; so it is the northern Muslims who should have the duty and privilege of managing state affairs.
1.1.2.2 Generational divide: the youth refuses divisions

Young Chadians do not find in the family, the school or the workplace the references needed by a young person to grow into a citizen. The school is affected by the decline in the level of education, violence, corruption, improperly trained teachers over the past years, and outdated curricula which is slow to evolve and adapt to the educational needs of today’s youth. The school participates in the reproduction of social and ethnic divisions, while it should be a place of containment of social inequalities and injustices.

The new generation born in the 90’s has not experienced civil war or Hissène Habré’s dictatorship and his political police. These young people do not want to follow the example of their parents because the previous generation does not represent for them a solid foundation to help them prepare their future. For them, the generation of their parents is the generation of civil war, death, rebellions, the North-South divide, Christians against Muslims, it is a generation that has failed to foster democracy and engage in development. Regarding the North-South divide, young people want to get rid of the words, insults and representations of other communities that their parents have instilled into them.

Furthermore, to young people today, the previous generation failed to build democracy, which prevents them from emerging and bringing about change. Elders refuse to give way to the younger generation. To young people, the elders ‘eat’ money meant for development and for youth education, and prevent them from being better educated in order that they can take up leadership roles.

Young people are creating associations so that they can meet and talk about their problems: weak educational level, latent conflicts threatening peace, unemployment, disease, insecurity, their need for leisure and culture, global change etc... Whatever the subjects, youth associations are places where young people try to think about social problems, and therefore foster accountability.

1.1.2.3 Between rebellions and peace negotiations, the political deadlock

In 2007, the coalition of Chadian rebel groups, under pressure from Sudan, Libya and the African Union embarked on talks with the Chadian government in Tripoli. These talks at first stalled, with the rebel movements demanding an all-inclusive dialogue (including the political opposition. Neither the Chadian government nor the rebel groups seemed to be particularly committed to the talks. For the rebels, the timing of the talks coincided with the rainy season, when neither side could expect to be conducting any real offensives. For the Chadian government, pressure from the international community to regulate the internal Chadian crisis, and the warming of relations with Sudan predisposed it (the government) to go along with the talks. Eventually on 15 January 2010, a peace agreement to secure their common border was signed between the two countries.

Whereas several small rebel groups signed peace agreements with the government, at the same time, under the auspices of the European Union, talks between the Chadian government and the political opposition coalition of the Coordination des Partis politiques pour la Défense de la Constitution (CPDC) over the upcoming country legislative elections finally resulted in agreement in August 2007. While the agreement calmed the situation between the CPDC and the government, it did not include the armed movements. The drafters had included a provision in the agreement allowing room for the rebels to join the dialogue process, but the armed movements seemed more interested in directly negotiating with the government via their own agreements.

6 Sources : Emilie Rivollier, APAD, 2011.
While the international community supported these regional peace initiatives, insufficient attention has been given to Chad’s domestic crisis, which fuels poverty, impunity and undermines peace. By opting in August 13, 2007, for this political agreement to strengthen the democratic process in Chad, the political parties of the opposition and the majority (signatories), the Head of State (guarantor) and the European Union (partner), had chosen a way out of crisis through representative democracy, mainly centred on political parties. The Syrte agreement signed in November 2007 was dealing with the problem of political-military movements. The use of elections as a way out of the crisis had been ruling out all other solutions including those of the United Nations, the African Union or by the Chadian civil society, in contrast, who advocated for a more comprehensive approach to peace, through an inclusive dialogue.

The Monitoring Committee of the call for peace and reconciliation (CSAPR), a group of civil society organisations (see 2.1.1.9.5) showed the total gap between "the world of political parties" and Chadian society. It showed that the Chadian political parties had in reality no political message, no means but above all virtually no popular support. It demonstrated how parties were little known by Chadian citizens throughout the territory, and, by dint of coalition with the ruling party, how they lost all credibility.

This very principle of representative democracy is challenged in Chad. Weaknesses of the various political parties severely limit their ability to gain power through the ballot box, which presents a major threat to peace. The recent uprisings in the Arab world have alerted international opinion on the risks of democracy without alternation. In a country like Chad, whose history is marked by repeated rebellions, the risk of reactivation of the armed opposition remains vivid in case of closure of the political game7.

Finally, the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2011 did not portend better governance nor guarantee future stability.

1.1.2.4 “Darfurisation” of Eastern Chad

The fighting across the borders of western Sudan, eastern Chad and in Central African Republic (CAR) known as the Darfur conflict has received world attention and the violence has evolved into a ‘regional conflict system’ where separate crises have become interconnected and the space in which armed conflict is taking place transcends state boundaries. The chronic processes of environmental degradation and the loss of traditional environmental governance have been greatly accelerated during this crisis, as a result of massive displacement and by the war itself.

Darfur and East of Chad lie on the edge of a desert in an area that suffers both from an overall paucity of resources and a high degree of variability in the availability of resources. This scarcity and variability have required a high level of community management, given that different groups use resources in different ways for their livelihoods. The environmental aspect of the conflict therefore must be analyzed with reference to governance and livelihoods.

The unprecedented densities of the population in the Darfur area have caused localised resource depletion. For instance, in Abu Shouk and Al Salaam camps, 20% of the boreholes have run dry. IDP camps are generally located on the outskirts of market towns, resulting in the destruction of shelter belts, forestry and farmland. In addition to displacement, several actions are causing severe environmental degradation: Uncontrolled deforestation, in the context of a breakdown of governance and fuelled by the role of timber and fuel wood in the war economy; destruction of natural and physical assets as a consequence of the war – farmers’ crops are grazed by pastoralists’ livestock, rangeland is burnt to prevent grazing and hand pumps are destroyed; short term crisis livelihood strategies, undermining the natural resource base; blocking of migration routes leading to overgrazing in areas where livestock is concentrated.

The debate over the environment in Darfur illustrates the complexity of a conflict that has numerous levels. The lowest level of conflict, between neighbouring tribes and villages, displays the environmental aspect of the conflict most acutely, as different livelihood groups seek to adapt their ways of life to increasing resource scarcity. This is happening in a context where traditional rules of environmental management have been weakened, and in some places they’ve been rejected altogether. The conflict between different tribes which are further complicated at all levels by ethnicity, has both local dimensions, over control of resources, and higher-level political dimensions. These local conflicts over resources have become a dimension of the wider conflict between Darfur and central Sudan, relating to long-term issues of political and economic marginalisation, amid regional tensions relating particularly to Chad. The interaction of these different levels of conflict is one of the defining complexities of the Darfur crisis. Thus, while resource scarcity is not solely responsible for conflict at the tribal level, it is a major driver, and must be seen in the context of wider political and economic marginalisation.

Compounding the Chad situation is total impunity and a breakdown of law-and-order which has permitted violence and organised banditry to flourish. The backdrop to this banditry and inter-communal violence was the conflict between Chad, Sudan and their proxy opposition groups. Recent discussions on enhancing joint-border security, aimed at controlling armed opposition groups and movements through the use of static monitoring bases, the inter-communal conflict diminished significantly, although there was large internal displacement. The remaining zones became ethnically homogenous or void of large sedentary communities after the initial IDP movements. However the threat of renewed conflict remains due to high population densities that outstrip the resources available to them. Numerous incidents of conflicts and skirmishes between local farmers and nomads have been reported.

However despite this improvement, Chad’s fragile justice system and porous border have left populations in a perilous security vacuum dominated by impunity. All civilians, including local villagers, refugees, IDPs, have been victims of aggressive robberies, physical attacks and intimidation. Victims consistently describe bandits as unidentified individuals wearing military uniforms or carrying automatic machine guns. The true level of banditry is difficult to assess, especially the impact this has had on women and girls. Social taboos, the lack of reliable information and the sheer size of the country limit observers from knowing the real extent of the problem.

The United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) had pledged full responsibility for protecting civilians on its territory. Insecurity in eastern Chad, where the vast majority of the UN troops were based, certainly diminished in 2010. This was a result of a January 2010 rapprochement between Chad and Sudan leading to the deployment of a joint border force, subsequently ceasing the proxy war between the two countries. MINURCAT completed its mandate on 31 December 2010, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1923 (2010) and at the request of the Chadian Government.

Chad’s successive regimes have failed to ensure the well-being and security of the population in the country, thereby fuelling mistrust of the central government. In order to counter armed opposition groups, the successive regimes have used a divide-and-conquer strategy, pitting ethnic groups against one another and aggravating pre-existing inter-ethnic confrontations.

1.1.2.5 Poor Governance and Corruption

Corruption and poor governance are directly linked to instability; they undermine state capacity and legitimacy, exacerbate poverty and aggravate grievances linked to armed conflict. The government of Chad continues to receive oil export revenues, exceeding $10 billion since 2004. Unfortunately the money is neither helping the government in carrying out services for the citizenry nor is it bolstering development. World Bank Good Governance indicators show that from 1996 to 2008, Chad’s track records on accountability, effectiveness, rule of law and corruption have significantly worsened.
Transparency International regularly rates Chad as the 5th most corrupt country in the world. Chadian civil society has stated that the biggest obstacle to reform is the lack of political will. The population has lost confidence in the government’s capacity to follow through on its commitments.

This "performance" in 2011 is to be credited to the creation of the Ministry of 'Public Expenditure Control and Promotion of Good Governance which has been cracking down on the embezzlers of public funds. Transparency International states in its 2011 report that several factors may contribute to the perceived level of corruption in Chad and discredit the actions of the Government: i.e. the arrest and prosecution of several high personalities for violation of procedures and Constitutional provisions (arrests which seem more of revenge rather than a political fight against corruption or embezzlement) and also the merging of the Ministry of 'Public Expenditure Control' and that of Justice into one ministry, making the Minister both a judge and a defendant. Since the beginning of the development of its oil fields, oil extraction is a major financial windfall for Chad.

From less than $300 billion in 2003, the country’s budget revenues were projected at FCFA 1 034.380 billion in 2010. Donors, led by the World Bank, had also thought this money was a great opportunity to invest in health and education sectors and strengthen good governance in order to promote economic and social development of the country.

An innovative law that remained rhetoric

It was in this perspective that the Doba oil resource development project was supported by the World Bank. The 001/PR/99 Act of 11 January 1999 on the management of oil revenues also illustrates the willingness to use oil funds for social purposes by defining a strict distribution of income. 10% of direct income should be deposited in a Savings Account opened in an international financial institution for the benefit of future generations, in accordance with the regulations of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC Article 9). 80% should benefit priority areas: public health, social affairs, education, infrastructure, rural development through agriculture and livestock projects, environment and water resources sectors. 15% were also intended to cover operating expenses and capital investment of the State, for a period of five years from the date of production, and the remaining 5% were to be returned to decentralized communities in the producing region.

While this innovative legislation would have enabled significant progress in the area of development if it had been enforced, it remained a good rhetoric. Very quickly President Déby diverted the allocation of oil resources originally intended for future generations and for priority social sectors to military and security expenditure. "The good consciences may continue to feel outraged, but I cannot keep money for future generations with a risk of leaving to them a dismembered country occupied by rebel factions. I bought arms and I continue to buy them with oil money ", he said.

The adoption, on 29 December 2005, of Act No. 002/PR/2006 revising Act 001 was evidence of the failure of the previous strategy: it removed savings for future generations, or 10% of oil revenues, equivalent to FCFA 20 billion. In addition, the share of income paid directly to the public Treasury was doubled from 15% to 30% and the notion of “priority sectors” was expanded to include security, justice and the administration of the territory. These priority areas were assigned 65% of direct revenue.

Many observers and civil society actors concluded from this that oil money provides arms but does not develop the country. In an August 2009 report, International Crisis Group highlighted this reality thus; "A lot of resources are allocated to the war effort and re-equipment of the national army." Indeed, "according to various reports on state budget execution from 2000 to 2009, annual military spending rose from FCFA 6.5 billion to FCFA 147 billion. While this increase was due to intensified armed conflict in the country from 2004, it mainly reflected the use of oil revenues in the war effort of the government.”

This was confirmed by the local press: "Our oil resources, which were supposed to be used in the fight against poverty, have been used to purchase arms and other military equipment to destroy Chadians. From the oil windfall paid on 24 October 2006 by Petronas and Chevron, 6 billion were withdrawn for the purchase of fuel for the military.”

Unfulfilled commitments

International statistics illustrate in a concrete way the choices made by the Chadian government in favour of defence spending. They cast doubts as to the intention to strike a balance between funds allocated to security and those allocated to development. Despite an increase in global official development assistance (ODA) worldwide, GDP per capita remained stable between 2004 and 2010.

Comparative evolution of the ODA to Chad, of its GDP and the sale of French weapons in millions of dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Total ODA</th>
<th>ODA for APC countries</th>
<th>ODA from France</th>
<th>Deliveries of weapons from France</th>
<th>Orders of weapons to France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1413</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>282</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1337</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>15.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11.75</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>12.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defence expenditure strains Chad’s resources, and takes up amounts that should be invested in health and education. Since 2005, the defence budget continues to be one of the largest budget items as was echoed by UNICEF: “The allocation of public spending is not aligned with policy commitments made in the NSPR (National Strategy for Poverty Reduction). The budget preparation prioritizes expenditure on security and general services at the expense of social sectors.”

The calculations made by Gilbert Maoudonodji, coordinator of GRAMP/TC (Groupe de Recherches Alternatives et de Monitoring du projet Pétrole Tchad/Cameroun), based on figures provided by the Oil revenues control and monitoring Board - CCSRP (Collège de Contrôle et de surveillance des Revenus Pétroliers) during the period 2004-2007, confirm UNICEF’s analyses: the military expenditure / allocations to priority sectors ratio was largely in favour of the defence sector during the entire period, as shown in the table below.
Gilbert Maoudonodji’s analysis differs from the one by the government as mentioned in the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction No 2. According to authorities, the share of GDP devoted to social sectors is greater than the one allocated to defence. However, the government seems the only one to believe this analysis. Continued arms imports since 2008 show that Chadian authorities have not actually done any rebalancing of budgetary expenditure. In 2008, Chad used 4.2% of GDP to purchase arms, ranking the country in 27th place worldwide. In 2010, with a budget of FCFA 108,621 billion, the Ministry of Defence was the second ministry to have the largest share of the budget after the Ministry of Infrastructure.

Although still largely insufficient, there was an increase in budgets of the Ministries of National Education (FCFA 78,978 billion) and Public Health (FCFA 56,658 billion). However, experts argue that during peace time - since January 15, 2010, Chad and Sudan have formally committed not to engage in war through rebel groups – therefore, income allocated to social sectors should have been higher. According to the CIA Word Factbook, the defence budget should not exceed 3% of the overall budget, and 12% of GDP. However, these figures were far exceeded in 2010 and 2011, with shares of 14.2% and 14.1% of GDP respectively.

In economic terms, despite the oil exploitation which began in early 2000, Chad is at the back of the pack internationally in terms of development indicators. Although the oil royalties allowed to launch several projects and to improve the country’s infrastructure, they also brought along many adverse effects such as the increase in commodity prices, the generalization of corruption, the widening divide between rich and poor, among other challenges. The promises of development were followed by a period of generalized disenchantment marked by political tensions in the country. Admittedly, the oil royalties brought about an improvement of the gross domestic product and economic growth, but they, at the same time, strengthened the social inequality and painted a more negative image of the leaders in the eyes of the population.

The « renaissance » of Chad promised by the leaders during the celebrations of the 50 years of independence in 2011 is likely to remain a vague promise if its concrete effects are not felt by the population. To this disenchantment are added the political uncertainties linked to the internal crisis and a changing regional environment that is the Libyan crisis, Islamic phenomenon in the Sahel and instability in Central African Republic.

Following the end of the proxy war between Chad and Sudan, and decreased activity of the rebels in the east, the Chadian government indicated it would be able to begin reinvesting in priority areas. It remains to be seen if it will actually refocus its policy.
1.1.2.6 Arms Proliferation

According to Chad’s Ministry of Home affairs, more than a million guns of all sizes circulate in the country. Chad is one of the most heavily armed countries in Sahel Africa. Several studies concluded that in N’Djamena there was on average 12 gun-related incidents per day, and it is estimated that the ratio of small arms to persons is eight to one. The presence of arms, combined with intensive poverty has caused banditry to turn into an economic livelihood strategy.

The magnitude of the issue of possession of military weapons by civilians became more evident with the establishment of the National Commission on Disarmament (CND), created after the 2008 events, with the mission to “recover all weapons and military assets illegally held by people”. In its two years of existence, the CND consistently presented to the public the weapon collected. On 9 October 2009, the CND presented 665 arms and 18,620 ammunitions, including 80 mm mortars, 106 mm cannons, AKMs, Famas, Bazookas, 12mm calibres, loaders. On 15 January 2010, the Commission presented 1,222 weapons of all calibres and a considerable amount of ammunitions. The list, published in an article in the newspaper Le Progrès, includes grenades, 60 mm mortars, 80 mm mortars, French Bazookas, anti iron rocket launchers (LRAF), Bazookas of Russian brand, bazooka shells, Pang, Grégonet, Belgian light automatic rifles (FAL), M14 (assault rifle of the U.S. Army), PMs, over 200 homemade weapons called Gourloum, 12 and 5/5 loaders, more than 500 AKMs, Famas, more than 100 Mas 36, SKS (Soviet semi-automatic rifle), SIG (Swiss Army assault rifle), G3 (German assault rifles), ancient weapons of Italian brand, etc. Regarding ammunitions, there were 23 cases of 23 mm and 19 of 12.7 mm. In April 2010, more than 8400 arms of all calibres were displayed at N’Djamena Independence Square.

In addition to the lack of control and weak national legislation, this circulation of arms is also explained by the particular geographical situation of the country. Episodes of violence and conflict agitating Chad’s neighbouring countries avail on its borders a large stock of arms. This promotes the circulation of weapons in a region where borders are porous. Large Sahelian areas are prone to poorly controlled trafficking of all kinds. Another factor is the clan-like organization of power, which is concentrated around President Déby and his first circle.

“Unidentified armed individuals in military attire” is a recurrent description of perpetrators of violations ranging from theft to kidnapping, and even murder. This makes the identification of assailants difficult and causes many victims to forego justice. Several testimonies and stories leave no doubt of the fact that guns are often distributed without any control and on a clan or ethnic basis. Sonia Rolley, a correspondent of Radio France Internationale (RFI) in Chad from 2006 to 2008, stated she witnessed a strange scene upon her arrival in the country. While in a taxi near the Office of the President, she saw men enter a building adjacent to the Office and come out with weapons. Surprised, she asked her taxi driver, who explained that the men belonged to the President’s ethnic group, Zaghawas, and that arms were distributed to them to ensure the security of the city in case of a rebel attack. The Zaghawas enjoy privileges that the rest of the population does not have. These "untouchables" who always practise ‘the law of the strongest’ by means of arms availed to them, enjoy total impunity.

In April 2008, the Chadian government adopted a Strategy Paper for Growth and Poverty Reduction covering the years 2008 to 2011, which recognizes the link between insecurity and underdevelopment. Authorities recognize that the "proliferation of warfare weapons" provided to the civilian population (by armed groups) transforms economic and social conflict into violent clashes between some communities. The document particularly emphasizes the conflicts between farmers and herders who threaten civil peace.

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11 Le Progrès n°2824, February 2010, p.17.
12. This fact is explained by the researcher Marielle DEBOS in her article “Limits of the accumulation of arms. Best of ex-combatants in Chad”, published in an issue of the Revue Politique africaine.
1.1.2.7 External Actors

1.1.2.7.1 France

France has continued to be involved in the Chadian crises to date. During the first thirty years of the 1900s France was unable to effectively centralize the government and eliminate regionalism and tribalism in part because it lacked the administrative machinery to exercise its central colonial administration. France failed to recognize the influence and importance of tribal chiefs and sultans in northern and central Chad, termed them as mere figure heads. The north was often neglected while the south and west got French influence largely because of economic factors – French cotton came from southern farms and secondly was due to the nature of the people from the south. They are less tied to tribes and chiefs and thus the populace more readily adapted to the western governmental way of life and French offers of modern existence.

France has maintained links with the different regimes and remained committed even when sometimes the French government is wary of the person in power. Several factors including the historical French military success against the rebels, fears of anarchy and threats to national interests affect French policy towards Chad.

After independence, Chad joined former AEF members Central African Republic, Gabon, and Congo in a multilateral military assistance agreement with France. The agreement provided France with use of a major military base outside N’Djamena (then called Fort-Lamy), as well as with automatic transit and over flight rights. In return, France not only was to provide defense against external threats but also was to assist in maintaining internal security in the four countries. Under this clause, Chad or any other signatory could automatically request direct French intervention to ensure the security of its government in the face of insurgency or coup attempts. The French government, however, had the right to honor or refuse requests as it saw fit. Chad also signed a bilateral military technical assistance agreement under which France continued to provide equipment, training, and French advisers in Chadian uniforms. Fort-Lamy continued to serve as a combined army and air-base and was one of the main French installations in Africa from which troops and aircraft could be rapidly deployed to any of the former French African colonies.

President Tombalbaye had sought French intervention to help restore order when there was a rebellion in 1965. From April 1969 until September 1972, the Foreign Legion and other French units supplied 2,500 soldiers, who joined in operations against the rebels. After Tombalbaye, France’s disagreements with the new Malloum government resulted in withdrawal of the remaining French combat forces, although more than 300 advisers to the ground and air forces remained. But in 1978 Malloum requested French help in stabilizing his regime against the revitalized FROLINAT. Despite reluctance in mid-1983 during Hissén Habré’s regime, the French launched Operation Manta, a military task force. On 21 June 1983, GUNT coalition forces, leading important units of the Libyan armed forces crossed the Chadian border and embarked on a journey across the desert. Their goal was N’Djamena, the capital of a country torn by twenty years of civil war. The Opération Manta, at the request of President Habré, was intended to prevent Libyan interference. This led to the division of the country into two, up to the 16th parallel, to separate Chadian and Libyan belligerents.

More recently, France’s main political objective in Chad has been and is to keep President Déby in power. In both attempted coups in April 2006 and February 2008, Déby’s victory was owed to French support. In 2008, France’s President Sarkozy stated publicly that the French military contracts would either end or be renegotiated.

France wanted to be a major player in ending the conflict in Darfur and embarked on both bilateral and multilateral initiatives to mediate the conflict. The appointment of the founder of Doctors without Borders (MSF), Bernard Kouchner, as Minister of Foreign Affairs showed its desire to be an important international humanitarian power.

To the frustration of the US, France refused to label the atrocities committed in Darfur as “genocide” and also worked actively within the UN to block sanctions against the regime in Sudan. However, France lobbied for a UN-mandated European peacekeeping force to be established in eastern Chad. In October 2007, the Council of the European Union (EU) approved the European Union Force Chad/ Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR) operation in 2008. One year later, on 15 March 2009, EUFOR was replaced by the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), which had a similar mandate. As a former colonial power, France also wants to maintain its cultural influence in Africa. In Chad, the French language has been under threat since 1979 when Arabic was added as an official language. French development aid to Chad is also important. Since 2008, however, relations with France have deteriorated and Deby has become more confident that he has total control of the country without France’s support.

1.1.2.6.2 Libya

Internal crises in Chad and Libya have strained relations between the two countries since the 1960’s. On the one hand in Chad, firstly the Toubou who fled Tombalbaye’s repression and sought refuge in Libya, and secondly the birth of the National Front for the Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT). On the other hand, after the overthrow of King Idris by Gaddafi, the king was received in Chad and accommodated in Sarh, and Tombalbaye helped him to put up the first African Islamic Legion to fight Gaddafi. Until 1994, Libya has had a consistent policy in Chad aimed at the recognition of Libya’s claims to the Aouozou strip - land in northern Chad which lies along the border with Libya, extending south to a depth of about 100 kilometres into Chad’s Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Region for an area of 114,000 km. This area was claimed by Libya, which invaded it in 1973 and annexed it in 1976, before it was re-conquered by Chad in 1987, during the Chadian-Libyan conflict. The region has played a significant role in the Chadian-Libyan conflict, besides the establishment of a weak central government in Chad under the control of Tripoli. Libya has given support to many rebels and rebel groups who were challenging any central government in Chad. For example Goukouni Oueddei, a well recognized oppositionist, a member of Armed Forces of the North (FAN), and a northerner, who was head of state from 1979 to 1982 and is currently in exile in Gabon. United States policy has always been in opposition to Libya’s involvement. Hissene Habre who was consistently anti-Libya was favoured by the US who also encouraged Sudan’s and Egyptian’s support for Habre. They did the same with the French. In 1994 a framework agreement, established by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, validated Chad’s sovereignty and stated that the Libyan army should leave the Aouozou band. Regarding political aspects, Libya continued to be the mediator in crises opposing the Deby regime in various rebellions in the East. Although sometimes the concluded agreements ended in a bloodbath, Gaddafi did not want to show his warrior face: he became a man of peace whose aim was not to resolve the crisis in Chad but to reconcile Chadians among themselves. Politically, Gaddafi fully played this role, and President Idriss Deby himself was very grateful to him. Economically, Libya invested heavily in Chad. These were investments of the Gaddafi family, such as the 10,000 hectares of Bongor, Kempinski hotel, Sotel and Zam Zam among others.

1.1.2.6.3 Sudan

Chad has served as a home base for some Darfur rebel movements for several years with forces up and down along the Sudan/Chad border. Chad was naturally a rear base for the rebels and also many of their supporters who live along the border. In return for lodging, equipment, material, money, and uniforms, the Darfur rebel groups have acted as Chadian supporters, boosting the Chad national army military capacity to fight against the Chadian rebel groups backed by Sudan. They assisted the Chad national army in repelling Chadian rebels during various attacks from 2006 to 2009. While the Darfur groups understand the importance of currying favour with Chad for their support, they – and Darfurians – have been critical of those who spend too much time fighting Chad’s wars instead of Darfur’s wars.

16 cf. situation of Abbas Koti, Mahamat Nour, Soubiane Assabala, etc.
As a result, the east of the country suffered the most during this period of instability as it was subject to the effects of the internal crisis as well as to those of the crisis in Darfur. The interconnection between these two crises led to a latent war between Chad and Sudan with several regional and international repercussions. In order to prevent a regional destabilization, the international community intervened at two levels: upstream to assist the mediations between the Chadian stakeholders on the one hand and Chad and Sudan on the other hand. The international community also intervened downstream with peacekeeping operations in Darfur, in eastern Chad as well as in the northern part of the Central African Republic.

1.2 CENTRAL AFRICA REPUBLIC

A landlocked country at the heart of the African continent, the Central African Republic has had a troubled history due to dictatorships, coups d’
états, military mutinies and external interventions. It endured both the failure of its political class, as well as the effects of an unstable regional environment (wars in Sudan, Chad and in the Democratic Republic of Congo). The instability in the neighbouring countries is a destabilizing factor adding to Chad’s structural weaknesses and has led to the collapse of the State and the fragmentation of the society.

There is an impression that CAR is a country perpetually expecting a total collapse. The vulnerability affects mostly the civil populations, particularly, women and children. The rebellion has aggravated the humanitarian situation, and caused the displacement of numerous civil populations. The number of Central Africans who have fled violence is estimated at over 300,000; of which 200,000 are internally displaced living in deplorable and precarious conditions. About 100,000 are refugees in neighbouring countries (Chad, Cameroon and the Sudan).

After years of colonial, neo colonial and regional domination, the ‘State’ of CAR has never really been constructed, its politics is highly militarized and the ethnic exclusiveness of successive governments further aggravates its instability.

1.2.1 Historical background

1.2.1.1 The independence

CAR (formerly Oubangui Chari) became a French colony in 1903. It was mainly a basis for spreading the dream of a French Africa, which would stretch from the Gulf of Guinea to the Indian Ocean. CAR was used as platform for this colonisation and was a cul-de-sac in the region; it was also of a source of gum Arabic (rubber) and free labor. The extent of this ‘use’ of CAR was so high that between 1890-1940 half the population of CAR perished from disease and colonial violence. An example of this violence was the killing of the father of one of the former Presidents, Jean Bedel Bokassa, who claimed that they stuck a nail in his father’s head, thus implying that the French considered bullets too precious to waste on a native. These injustices continued, and it is reported that Bokassa’s own mother committed suicide, a rare occurrence in local culture.

David Dacko succeeded Barthelemy Boganda (the founding president of the RCA who died in an accident in 1959) and was supported by the French colonialists. He came into power after CAR independence in 1960 and his first action was to place his rival, Alex Goumba under house arrest and ban his party. These actions resulted in the creation of an authoritarian regime which dissolved political parties, trade unions and associations. Paris, the former colonial master was complicit through this. However, Dacko soon faced difficulties in running the country and he slowly succumbed to depression. He thought of handing over power to his friend Colonel Jean Izamo, however Izamo was beaten to it by Jean Bedel Bokassa, who became the next president. It is believed that Bokassa killed Izamo with his bare hands, by stabbing his repeatedly but he spared Dacko. Most Central Africans welcomed the Bokassa junta when it announced it will eradicate poverty, corruption, and will bring the country back to work.
However, the authoritarian nature of leadership was soon to resume. In 1976 Bokassa changed the constitution without dialogue and proclaimed himself Emperor the following year. He continued to be more repressive and this resulted in more and more deaths of opponents. He also converted to Islam to please Libya's Colonel Gaddafi so as to obtain a few grants from Libya. He had squabbled with France, which was beginning to show displeasure with his regime. Resistance to Bokassa and to France, which increasingly ignored the crisis in CAR was started by Ange Felix Patasse, the Prime minister at the time. He proceeded to start, the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African Peoples (MPLC) in 1979. Around this time, still under Bokassa's rulership, there were demonstrations held by students which ended up in eventual death of around 250 young people. This was dubbed the 'Ngara prison massacre', and resulted in an inquiry by African jurists who blamed Bokassa for the death of the children. France soon imposed a quarantine on this leader and ceased to cooperate with him. He sought refuge from Gaddafi and eventually ended up in exile in Ivory Coast after he was overthrown by the French military in Operation Barracuda. Up until the fall of Bokassa, the coexistence between different ethnic groups in CAR was peaceful. Thereafter, the country began to experience numerous divisions along ethnic, religious, regional and community lines.

1.2.1.2 Tribalism and authoritarian regimes

When President Dacko handed over power in 1981 to André Koldingba, or rather freely consented to a coup, a military committee – Military Committee For National Recovery (CMRN) was formed to govern the country. The French continued to have a key role, under Jean Claude Mantion, who was the de facto ruler of CAR for thirteen years and a member of the French secret service. CMRN was run by General Kolingba, but he had delegated all power to the French Mantion, and was instead focusing on enriching his ethnic group, the Yakoma. The French had little understanding of this situation. After thirteen years during which they ruled from behind the scenes, the Yakoma had infiltrated the military and were holding the majority of senior positions in the military Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA. This was the onset of the use of ethnicity for political ends in a country that was previously united and where the ethnic origin of the people was not important.

By 1983, military officers from other tribes began to fear for their own chances of promotion and attempted a coup, which was foiled by Mantion. This coup was headed by Felix Patasse, who was later exiled to Togo and two brigadiers, Francois Bozize, a Gabay, who is CAR’s current president, and who fled to Togo to exile at the time and Alphonse Mbaikoua, whose home village is Markounda along the Chadian border. The coup resulted in a bloody and punitive campaign against the rebel’s homes and strongholds in the northwest of the country.

At the beginning of 1990, oppositional forces from all parts joined together in an effective coalition with the aim of democratizing the country. They went on strike and coupled with international pressure managed to reintroduce multi-party politics in 1991. Following this an election was held in 1993, in the the wave of democratization under the opposition and with Patasse and the MPLC emerging as victors. For the first time since independence the will of the people was freely expressed. Patasse’s victory was a democratic change of government. It broke with the tradition of sham elections during the cold war, that had left strongmen in the presidency, men who would only leave when forced to, as victims coups. The only problem was that Patasse inherited a tribal army which was hostile to him.

The tribal situation within the military had its own dynamics. The presidential guard that Patasse used to guarantee his personal security was largely constituted of the Sara-kaba tribe from the north and the Gbaya - his tribe. The army was mostly Yakoma, and this resulted in discontentment within other ranks for preferential treatment. The rivalry between the presidential guard and the other troops from FACA resulted in mutinies that continued the destruction of CAR’s economy. This mutiny led to the deployment of French troops and to negotiations with the government to institute a government of national unity (GNU), to respond to these challenges. Even with a new GNU in place, led by Jean Paul Ngoupande, the mutinies did not stop. In response, the Security Council of the United Nations approved a mission for peace; MINURCA, in 1998, made up of 1,350 African soldiers.
The mutinies greatly increased the tension between "northerners" and "southerners" and polarized society more than before. In the presidential election of September 1999, Patassé won easily, defeating former presidents Kolingba and Dacko. Opposition leaders accused the winners of having rigged the elections. During his second term, Patassé, whose rule had always been erratic and arbitrary, became increasingly unpopular. There were more failed coup attempts against him in 2001 and 2002, which he suspected Andre Kolingba and/or General François Bozizé were involved in, but when Patassé attempted to have Bozizé arrested, the general left the country for Chad with military forces who were loyal to him. With backing from Chad, Bozize took over power in a coup that saw little action from the international community apart from condemning it. This introduced CAR’s dependance on Chad for their internal political equation and this scenario has been perpetuated to date.

In 2003, Bozizé was welcomed as a liberator. The first results of the new government in 2003-04 were positive: broader political base and national consensus, payment of salaries, stated willingness to clean up the timber and diamonds sectors. The Central African population had regained hope. One year later, in 2005, the record was different: insecurity, violations of human rights, worsened social situation, lack of political consensus ahead of elections and suspicion of embezzlement. The government was unable to revive the country. Confidence and hope were gone. Although he had announced, when he took over, that he would step down upon CAR's regaining of normal institutional life, General Bozizé stood for the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections with a coalition named Patriotic Convergence. The elections went reasonably well, which allowed the return to institutional legality, paving the way for the normalization of political life and a resumption of international cooperation. Unfortunately, the Parliament could not play its oversight role, leaving the regime with no real opposition. The regime gradually withdrew in its shell, around one clan and more specifically around the president's family. People close to the President, including those who prepared and supported his coup were dismissed, like Karim Meckassoua, former Special Advisor to the President and unofficial representative of the Muslim community.

1.2.1.3 Insecurity and rebellions

The status of human rights in the Central African Republic became very worrying due to widespread insecurity. In 2005, two years after the takeover of power by Bozizé, many armed actors were beyond the control of the state: former elements of Jean Pierre Bemba (called Banyamulengé) still present in neighbouring areas in DRC, former presidential guards of Patassé who fled to the southwest of the country had became active again on the Carnot-Berberati axis, Chadian and Central African 'liberators' involved in banditry acts on the roads and in villages in the centre and the north, and finally bandits commonly called ‘road cutters’ (nicknamed zaraguinas) operated in rural areas between major roads. Besides the ex-liberators who were the main obstacles to the country's security, Bozizé also had to deal with the situation of his former comrades-in-arms who helped him seize power. Soldiers from FAC, irregular Chadians (mainly Zaghawa), Habré's former soldiers, highway robbers, adventurers, were also expecting rewards and respect for their victory.

In 2007 impunity still seemed to be a serious problem as several well-documented cases of abuses and crimes committed by men in uniform remained completely unpunished or only gave rise to window-dressing disciplinary measures. The culture of impunity also took the form of threats against judges, lawyers, human rights activists and independent journalists, sometimes turning into violence or even murder. According to reports, the police and, to a lesser extent, the gendarmerie was also guilty of violations of human rights.

The conflict in the north of the Central African Republic resulted in massive violations of fundamental rights of the local population. Government troops, particularly the Presidential Guard, were largely held accountable for reprisals against inhabitants of the region, whom they accused of supporting the rebels; they (government troops) had burned down entire villages. Rebels were also allegedly guilty of violations against civilian populations.

17. François Bozizé has been ousted in March 2013
Human Rights Watch published a report in September 2007, summarizing much of the atrocities committed by the FACA but especially by the Presidential Guard. The report merely repeated what Central African Human Rights Associations had already made public, but gave it resulted in much better visibility, especially in its assertion that the international community must address the CAR case. The report estimated that more than 10,000 houses were burned by security forces and reported that more than 200,000 people had left their homes to seek refuge either in the bush or in other regions. A large number of dead and injured people were also specified. Faced with political tensions, insecurity across the national territory, and pressured by the international community, Bozizé was forced, in 2006, to implement a national dialogue, which, just one year after a very successful election cycle, was a clear confession of political failure. The Government and the rebel group - Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR: Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement) began direct talks in February and March, which eventually led to a peace agreement on 13 April 2007.

The Inclusive Political Dialogue, held on 8 to 20 December 2008 in Bangui, was the most important attempt to overcome the CAR’s recurrent instability. The talks were to be both a culmination of efforts to end rebellions in the north and an opportunity for all political forces, armed and unarmed opposition, to agree through compromise and consensus on a shared vision for the country’s future. In the short term, a plan was needed for dismantling the rebel groups and preparing legislative and presidential elections. In the longer term, the dialogue aimed at creating a reform agenda that would prevent new rebellions by improving governance and boosting development. The participants included representatives of six national entities: the presidential majority in the national assembly, rebel movements, opposition parties, non-aligned parties, the civil service and civil society. Also in attendance were national and international observers, representatives of the country’s major religions and other CAR personalities. This inclusiveness was crucial to guard against potential spoilers.

Former Burundi President Pierre Buyoya presided over the plenary sessions. Behind the scenes, the mediation of the then president of Gabon, Omar Bongo Ondimba, made sure the event went relatively smoothly. Participants agreed on a broad set of recommendations that constituted a road map for better governance, improved security, revitalised economic growth and fair legislative and presidential elections in 2010. The dialogue endorsed a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for ending the rebellions in the north, but the self-interested demands of rebel leaders have delayed implementation and raised frustration among fighters on the ground. All parties to the talks agreed that extensive security sector reform (SSR) is needed to give the state the means to protect rather than endanger the population.

Despite the official discourse that tends to present the Central African Republic as a post-conflict country, several hotbeds of tension in the country remain relatively rife. Banditry and armed political movements are at the heart of the insecurity inside the country. Tensions between government forces, rebel groups and the populations have eroded the population’s trust in the nation’s security and defence forces. The incursions of armed groups from neighbouring countries who use the Central African territory as a rear base or entry point, contribute also to a number of violent acts on that territory.

In a large part of the country, the Zaraguinas or road blockers still represent a threat to the population. In addition to the confrontations opposing government forces to armed rebellion (Central African and foreigners), government forces to unidentified armed forces, different factions of Central African rebellion amongst themselves and finally the Central African rebel forces against foreign rebels, there are several hotbeds of tension, including :

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18. In 2012, a new coalition was formed against the Central African Government. SELEKA is a diverse coalition of factions of the opposition and former rebels (the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, the Patriotic Convention for salvation wa Kodro and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace), with no real clear and consistent policy line, but which expressed some specific claims, including “the disarmament and integration of all former belligerents into the CAR army.” Within a few months, it controlled almost the entire country, forcing the regime to reopen a dialogue in Libreville and establish a national unity government led by the opposition leader and comprising members of rebel movements. President Bozizé had to promise not to run for presidency at the end of his term and could not position representatives into strategic ministries. Eventually, he was ousted in March 2013.
The South East, spared for a long time by violence, the following ethnic groups have, over the last five years, been repeatedly attacked by the LRA (Lord Resistance Army) and other armed groups from Sudan. These are the: Zandé, Nzakara, Kpatéré, Yakoma, Langba, Ngbougou. This region is home to a problematic cohabitation between the Peul pastoralists and the indigenous population. In the Central East, this region is home to three rebel groups, namely the LRA, UFDR (Union des forces démocratiques républicaines – Union of Democratic Republican Forces) and the CPIJP (Convention des Patriotes pour la paix et la justice” – Convention of Patriots for Peace and Justice). Armed attacks by the road blockers “Zaraguinas” and other armed groups are also frequent. The North-East, region is filled with CPIJP, UFDR as well as Chadian and Sudanese armed groups from Darfur. The region is also home to ethnic tensions between the Gula and the Runga. In the North-West, populated by Kaba, Taley, Souma, Mandja, Gbaya, Vallé, Litos, the region is the area of operation of APDR (the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy - “armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie”). Incursions by armed assailants from Chad and Cameroon are numerous. Finally in Bangui Town, numerous conflicts have taken place here (military mutinies, coups d’états, interventions by armed troops from Congo and Chad). The result is generalized trauma: raped women, enlisted children, mutilated adults and old people, and, destruction of property. There are sporadic clashes between the resident population and immigrants, especially those originally from Chad.

1.2.2 Drivers of conflicts in CAR

1.2.2.1 Lack of political will

CAR’s sociopolitical context is that of a very fragile state; it is amongst the most vulnerable in the sub-region. The country is economically weak and unable to provide the basic minimum to its citizens. The rare resources of the state are embezzled by a corrupt class of leaders and are used to buy the allegiance of armed forces whose number has significantly increased over the years. The state’s authority is mainly concentrated in the capital, its surroundings and some main towns. State services are quite weak and almost absent outside of Bangui.

The lack of genuine political will to implement existing political, judicial and army reforms is the root cause of the current conflict in CAR. The absence of a holistic and country-wide Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategy led by the Government and backed by international support prevent a political dialogue between CAR protagonists to end the crisis. The fact that all institutions protecting safety and the rule of law and agencies responsible for law enforcement and for democratic and civilian monitoring of the armed forces were not involved in the political dialogue weakened the implementation of its resolutions. CAR soldiers civilians have perpetrated repeated violations of civilians human rights. Furthermore certain ethnic groups continue to believe they are above the law, above communal needs and above peace because of their political connections with the central government. Ethnic discrimination and impunity are key elements in CAR’s crisis.

1.2.2.2 Regional Dynamic

Rebellions do not all have the same origins and political trajectory.

In the North East, conflicts have three main sources: First, the province of Vakaga which is sparsely populated with a Muslim majority is an arid area that has always looked to Abeche in Chad and Nyala, in South Darfur for guidance. These two places are seen as spiritual centres and seats of power from which local chiefs get their allegiance from the population. The armed struggle in this area is the work of dissidents of the new regime, who took up arms after they were pushed out by Bozize after he came to power. Finally, the fallout from the conflict in neighbouring Darfur (and the hand of Khartoum) has further complicated the Chad-CAR dynamics and these areas in particular. This region is also totally cut off from Bangui because for half a year during the rainy season it is inaccessible and the central administration is reduced to nothing. Civil servants have not been paid in months if not years.
CAR has a 1200km border with Sudan but these are unmanned and porous apart from two borders posts in Bambouti and Am-Dafok. In the 1980s thousands of rebels from southern Sudan, during their war years crossed through Yakaga to attack Khartoum’s army from the rear. More recently the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group which has links with Khartoum is operating in this very region. The co-existence of sedentary peasants and nomadic pastoralist communities between Central Africa and Sudan increasingly poses problems in the context of a failed state, precarious resources and severe environmental conditions. At the regional level, the conflicts in CAR have also been perpetuated by regional problems that neighbouring states cannot overcome on their own. The lucrative trade in weapons involving both international and regional actors has been the lifeblood for rebel groups and bandits alike. Rebellions in the CAR have been fuelled with guns easily acquired across the border in Chad and Sudan. Likewise, cross-border criminality has been a perennial threat to the security and livelihoods of civilians. Bandits operating in the Cameroon-CAR-Chad border have put civilian lives at risk and severely held back economic activity. An examination of a map of this region reveals deceptively clear state boundaries that are challenged by the reality of porous borders, which allow goods and people to travel between states, contributing to the patchwork nature of this region. Such fluidity has much significance as problems and events often reverberate across state boundaries.

While Sudan and Chad each had intense conflicts that became increasingly interconnected, CAR also became a player in this regional conflict system as its northern region offered a largely ungoverned territory for transit and refuge. While much of CAR’s conflict remains internal, Chad’s influence on CAR’s central government as well as Chadian and Sudanese rebels’ use of the north-eastern region as a maelstrom of political and criminal activity has generated a regional dynamic. Not only are Chadians involved with local rebel groups and criminal gangs throughout northern CAR, but on the government’s side the inner circle of Bozizé’s personal security, in particular the presidential guard, consists of Chadian soldiers. In addition, Chadian troops have been involved in key peacekeeping missions, such as the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad and the more recently established regional peacekeeping mission Force multinationale en Centrafrique. In summary, the conflict dynamics in CAR reveal a web of state and non-state actors that strategically use regional alliances and fluid borders to obtain or maintain power.

1.2.2.3 Ethnicity, religion and identity

1.2.2.3.1 Politics and identity

The ethnic dimension of the Central African politics has varied considerably since independence. Under General Kolingba (1979-1993) one ethnic group, the Yakomas, was specifically favoured. The overrepresentation of this group in the military and security agencies was the real or apparent trigger of serious unrest which broke out in the capital in 1996 and 1997. Patassé, on his part, put into practice a mode of political management where ethnic logic played a secondary role. Under Bozizé, especially after 2008, when the peace agreement was signed in Libreville, the political management of the state was changed and there was an accelerated ethnicization of politics which became very entrenched after the elections of January 2011. This was due to the assurance of a regime that rewarded its ‘own’ people but also because of the distrust of a dictator who surrounded himself with his ethnic group. But how far can we have an ethnic reading of power management? Bozizé’s supporters come from the Gbay group, which is an important ethnic group in RCA, but to be more specific, it is only those from a small group of villages near Bossangoa that actually benefited from the sinecures of the regime. The presidency contributed by giving this community easier access to the possession of arms but not much more. Generally, Central African elites are very limited in number, with a very narrow social base, and the country’s poverty does not allow a large redistribution of public wealth. According to Roland Marchal, "more than the narrowness of the elite, it is the fact that they reproduce themselves with no cooptation of ‘marginalized ethnic groups’ but through family dynasties involved in politics since independence and the Bokassa period. Instruments of promotion have basically remained the same: student networks abroad or classes of war schools in France but also increasingly in Africa."
1.2.2.3.2 Rejection of Muslims

Since the 19th century, the Central African population has had a very negative historical view of Islam linked to slave trade. Many historical accounts attest to violent attacks suffered by peoples like Sara in southern Chad and Banda or Manza in present-day Central African Republic. The impact of these raids left marks which are still visible today, given the low settlement level in the north of Central African Republic, with a large part of the population having fled to avoid falling into the clutches of Muslim war lords. French colonization also encouraged a hostile view of Islam to avoid anti-colonial uprising and to put up a bulwark against its enemies in Senoussia and Ouadai.

After their settlement in northern Cameroon, in the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Peul, which is a group of Muslim nomadic pastoralists, settled in the twentieth century in the sparsely populated agricultural areas. This was the case for the Bororo Peul, who peacefully arrived in large numbers in the north-west of Central Africa during that period. Then in the 1970’s-80’s, the gradual descent of several Peul and Arab groups from the Sahel region towards the south of Chad, as well as the (more) recent arrival in Central Africa of cattle breeders from Sudan and eastern Chad, increased the risk of conflict.

In 1990, many Gorane fighters from a large Muslim community in northern Chad, fled Chad after the ousting of Hissene Habré, and settled in CAR. A network of traffic in small arms was formed by the heads of various Chadian communities in order to buy back all the weapons and to resell some of them to Chadian opposition movements and to cattle herders transiting between Chad and the Central African Republic for their protection against Central African farmers. Various demobilization campaigns in Chad resulted in some members of the Chadian military becoming cattle herders who came to Central Africa to sell arms and some of them joined opposition movements. Others opted for poaching in game reserves in Central African Republic.

From the 1950’s, African migrants, including Senegalese, Malians, Chadians and Cameroonian, came to invest in small retail trade and diamonds. Chadians are ubiquitous in the area of small distribution and livestock, Cameroonian in services and particularly in transport where they are able to coexist with the notorious Lebanese. Today, the Lebanese community appears in popular perceptions as the mainstay of the country's economy because they are very active in trade, services, transportation and diamonds. All this adds to a feeling against ‘foreign traders’, but especially against “Muslim traders”. More recently, owing to the recent conflicts in Chad and Darfur, Muslims in northern CAR have become more irresolute vis-à-vis those in power in Bangui, especially because they had access to military means and to expertise in this field thanks to members of dormant Chadian and Sudanese armed groups.

“Central Africans have never learned trading and entrepreneurship: they let others do it in their place”, as frequently expressed by a certain elite of Bangui. For her, this can be explained by "their love of appearance, family solidarity, magnificence of success, difficulties to remain in the workforce. As for the "others" often called "Muslims", they could have learned from previous generations, do not drink (as much) and are less after girls, they work and save money”. But accusations are also numerous: “their solidarity is aimed primarily at eliminating non-Muslims rather than practising religious worship; they do everything to not promote Central Africans and thus condemn them to poverty, they resort to an immoderate use of magic to cause their competitors to fail”.

Since 2011 the central government has politically developed an anti-Muslim discourse. They have repeatedly referred to the presence of Sudanese "Janjaweds" and other Chadian "Islamists" in rebel movements and the SELEKA coalition. Bozizé also appointed to the Ministry of Youth and Sports supporters enamoured of the Ivorian "Young Patriots" model; and numerous arrests of Muslims and northerners have increased in Bangui.

In fact, according to Roland Marchal, "the regime discourse on Islamic even jihadist threat reflects the reluctance of many Central Africans to recognize that their national identity can neither be defined by religion (the ultra-majority Christianity in a large part of the country is a minority in areas bordering Chad) nor by language (Sango, which is a vernacular language, is not spoken everywhere)." The researcher also notes the persistence of a fundamentalist discourse by Churches against Islam for 30 years, churches to which many cadres of Bozizé regime belong.
1.2.2.3 The fear of invasion

Central Africans often fear invasion by hordes of foreigners: slave raids have depopulated this country. French colonizers were particularly brutal with hard labour being imposed on the population, the regimes that followed independence have been described as a descent into hell or increasing buffoonery, to which are added, according to Roland Marchal, the takeover of power by General Bozizé at the price of an agreement with Chadian mercenaries who terrorized the population and looted Bangui. An episode preceded by fighting in which Jean-Pierre Bemba’s troops and Libyan soldiers committed mass crimes. In addition to this, people fear a Praetorian Guard of the regime composed mainly of Chadians, road cutters who are often Chadian soldiers on leave, pastoralists who often appear as Cameroonian and Chadians. “Il y a donc une peur des étrangers qui n’est pas simplement la frayeur d’une population centrafricaine peu unifiée, dispersée sur un territoire plus grand que la France face aux infortunes militaires de la région. This fear involves another, also recurrent in social discourse and, increasingly, political: the fear that CAR will be looted, that the poor will be deprived of the little they are left with in order to destroy the country”. For Roland Marchal, while such discourse is not uncommon in other African countries, in CAR it is echoed by all sections of the population and has nothing to do with any particular political affiliation.

1.2.2.4 Natural Resources

CAR has rich but largely unexploited natural resources in the form of diamonds, gold, uranium, and other minerals. Diamonds, mainly uncut ones, constitute the most important export of the CAR, frequently accounting for 40% of export, but an estimated 30-50% of the diamonds produced each year are lost through illicit trade transactions. There are petroleum deposits along the country’s northern border with Chad (Two billion barrels of oil are present in private estimates). Diamonds are the only mineral resources currently being developed. Industry contributes less than 20% of the country’s GDP, with artesian diamond mining, breweries, and sawmills making up the bulk of the sector. Services currently account for 24% of GDP, largely because of the oversized government bureaucracy and high transportation costs arising from the country’s landlocked position.

There are 5.4 million hectares of forest, but exploitable forests, all in the south in the regions bordering the DRC cover 2.6 million hectares. Transportation bottlenecks on rivers and lack of rail connections are serious hindrances to commercial exploitation. Abuse and illegal logging is quite rampant and most timber is shipped down the Ubangi and Zaire rivers and then on the Congo railway to the Atlantic. Natural resources have not been proven yet as a key driver of conflict apart from the impact of heavily armed illegal poachers of ivory. However, possible oil reserves in the North of CAR and exploitation of uranium in the South are potential future drivers of insecurity and conflict.

1.2.2.5 Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists19

CAR is constantly plagued by recurring crises between farmers and cattle herders in which conflicts on access to natural resources (water, grazing space, agricultural land and transhumance corridors) are a major challenge to peaceful coexistence between different communities. Nomadic or transhumance herders penetrated the Sudanese area in various ways depending on countries and regions. In Chad, while the descent of the Peuls and Dakara Arabs in the 1970’s – 80’s had led to peaceful negotiations on the sharing of resources, the establishment of new groups, particularly the Missirié Arabs, has been a major source of conflicts between pastoralists and farmers for two decades.

These conflicts can be explained in the light of the national geopolitical context: against a background of North/South conflict, the arrival of these herders coincided with the establishment, in the south of the country, of administrative staff dominated by northerners accused of encouraging provocation of breeders due to bias in the settlement of disputes. In North Cameroon, however, conflicts arise more in the context of rapid population growth, increased agricultural pressure on spaces reserved for livestock since the Peul conquest. In Central Africa, the settlement of Bororo Peuls occurred without major clashes. These early pastoralist herders allegedly entered the territory in the 1920’s from neighbouring Cameroon. In 1930, they extended their route to Bossembélé in the Centre of the country. In 1937, 200,000 heads of cattle were counted. At that time, the presence of Bororo Peul herders in Ubangi-Shari territory was challenged with major health problems (trypanosomiasis, rinderpest) that colonial livestock services tried to address, especially by confining farmers to specific areas and stopping their progress eastwards. In the 50’s, the main settlements of Bororo farmers were confined on the plateau between Bouar and Bocaranga on the one hand, and in the Bambari region on the other hand. It was not until the 70s and 80s that farmers spread to other parts of the country. Only inhabited savannas of the greater East of the country remained for a long time at the margin of the herders’ progress.

New groups of actors have emerged, among which "agro-farmers", combining in different proportions, the two activities. This group is composed of herders of Peul origin, but also of farmers who gradually acquired some livestock, a phenomenon particularly observed in the West of the country (Nana Mambéré and Ouham). The inability to live only on livestock products from a herd under 30 heads per family pushes herders to diversify their activities. In general, they fall back on agriculture. In central and western regions, farmers in the strict sense accounted for only 28% in 2002, against 35.5% in 1997. A significant proportion of old farmers currently has no animals, and lives in indigenous villages. Others become employed as shepherds, herders, etc. "Herders-traders" are also taking on increasing importance. Livestock trade and diamond trade are another way of alleviating the destocking of herds. In 2001, the farmers-traders category accounted for 12% of the rural population in Central and Western regions, against 5.9% in 1997. While there is among them a large proportion of people who could be described as "small time hustlers", there are also large livestock owners who entrust their herds to hired shepherds. The proportion of these herds compared to the national herd is not known but the massive destocking of livestock herds suggests an important process of transfer of ownership in favour of this category of actors.

Along with these major changes in CAR’s farming society, the country has seen a sharp increase in annual penetration by transhumance herders from Chad and Sudan, whose importance in terms of numbers and sizes of herds seems to be very significant. Those coming from Chad who cross the center and west of the country consist mostly of Peuls commonly referred to as "Anagambas." Their terminal is increasingly in Lobaye, in forest areas in the south, where their presence is fraught with serious conflicts with indigenous people. The growth of pioneer fronts and the development of previously vacant spaces have greatly contributed to the gradual arrival of herders in the area. This descent of nomadic or transhumant herders induced by successive droughts in 1972-73 and 1983-84 was in fact made possible by the decreased parasitic pressure resulting from clearings for agriculture as well as the massive use of trypanocidal drugs. These regions have very recently experienced a large influx of farmers fleeing the problems encountered on their former settlements (e.g. conflict in Darfur). During every dry season herders and farmers clash. The latter accuse the former of destroying their fields with their herds of cattle. These problems often end up in human casualties because Chadian transhumance herders are usually armed. In 2012, this conflict resulted in the displacement of some 4000 Central African people, the destruction of many villages and significant losses of human lives in Ouham. In connection with these recurring conflicts between the two communities, UNHCR initiated in 2012 cross-border consultations for better coexistence between Chadian herders and farmers. These consultations between Chadian and CAR authorities were held in Batangafo, a sub-prefecture of Ouham, to try to curb the recurrent conflict between Chadian herders and farmers. Unfortunately, this initiative was not extended to other prefectures of Ouham where regular conflicts occur between farmer and herder communities.
The livestock world was one of the best structured in Central Africa. The organization of herders began in 1974 with the creation of the National Association of Central African herders (ANEC: l’Association Nationale des Eleveurs Centrafricains), formed to supplement the technical livestock services weakened by the 1970 land reform. In 1986, the association became the National Federation of Central African herders (FNEC: Fédération Nationale des Eleveurs Centrafricains). There are local Federations of pastoral Interest Groups (FELGIP), which are based at grassroots level; Pastoral Interest Groups (GIP: Groupements d’Intérêt Pastoral). Very recently, Regional Federations of Central African Herders (FERGEC: Fédérations Régionales des Eleveurs Centrafricains) have been established. It should be noted that rural structures currently in place in CAR are often “empty shells”, with very little ownership by local actors. This ownership needs first the creation of spaces of reflection and consultation, to bring about local initiatives which are often hindered by the social context within village communities.

1.3 SUDAN (covers Pre-Secession Sudan)

The name Sudan is derived from Arabic Bilad as-Sudan (land of blacks) and was used to mean Black Africa. There were two Sudan’s during the colonial era: the French Soudan which is present day Mali, and the Anglo Egyptian Sudan. They stood at the two opposite ends of a cultural continuum stretching from Northern Nigeria to Kordofan. Before the split between North and South, Sudan was the largest country in Africa. Its farthest boundaries straddle the Islamic Arabic North with Chad, Libya and Egypt as neighbours and Christian African south neighbouring Central Africa Republic (CAR), Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. Islam and Christianity are the two main religious groupings. The North is Islamic while the South is predominantly Christian. According to the much referred to census of 1955/56, the main ethnic groups are Arabs (39%), Southerners (30%), West Darfur (9%), Beja (6%), West Africans (6%), Nuba (6%), Nubia (3%) and Funj (1.7 %). Other accounts of the ethnic composition of Sudan classify these groups in terms of 19 main nationalities (Majmoua’a Gawmiyya) and 597 ethnic groups (Majmouaa Aigiyiya). The history of internal Sudanese conflict and with its neighbours like Chad has been shaped by the country’s geographical setting, social diversity and poor governance. These themes are unfortunately a familiar litany of confrontation between leaders, tribes, regions, races and religions, of nomad against farmer, of cultivator against city dweller. For instance, Chad and Sudan, (CAR to a lesser extent) have been historically susceptible to drought, insect infestation and indigenous farming. The area of this triangle is a vast geographic region of desert, equatorial forests, steppe, savannah which affects the nature of livelihoods, culture and way of being of over 597 ethnic groups.

In Sudan public policies are as varied as the political structures, constitutions and institutions of governance that have risen and fallen. History reveals that the socio-political structure is dominated by the struggle for power and rights between the centre and periphery. Political disharmony, ethnic distrust, economic and educational disparity have been the norm in Sudanese society. These factors have contributed to weak political institutions, which could not withstand the challenges of national cohesion and democracy. It is from this background that the ideology of marginalization has gained strength in the Sudanese political landscape. Sudan was ruled jointly by Britain and Egypt from 1899 until it achieved independence as a parliamentary republic at the beginning of 1956. Since then Sudan has been ruled by a succession of unstable civilian and military governments.

1.3.1 Historical background

1.3.1.1 Civil War in South Sudan

The country has been in a state of conflict for many years. Previous and current regimes have practised pork barrel politics that has been extremely discouraging to the Sudanese public which had high expectations from independence. Failure by the British colonisers to ensure equity for both the north and the south would create lasting effects and laid a foundation of war and marginalisation. The Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by Southern troops mainly in the Equatoria Province. Feeling disenfranchised and cheated, these Southerners began an initially low-intensity civil war aimed at establishing an independent South. This war would last seventeen years, from 1955 to 1972.
In August 1955, members of the British-administered Sudan Defense Force Equatorial Corps, mutinied in Torit, Juba, Yei, and Maridi. The immediate causes of the mutiny were the trial of a southern member of the national assembly and an allegedly false telegram urging northern administrators in the South to oppress Southerners. The mutinies were suppressed, though survivors fled the towns and began an uncoordinated insurgency in rural areas. Poorly armed and ill-organized, they were little threat to the outgoing colonial power or the newly formed Sudanese government. However, the insurgents gradually developed into a secessionist movement composed of the 1955 mutineers and southern students. These groups formed the Anyanya guerrilla army. (Anyanya is also known as Anyanya 1 in comparison to Anyanya 2 which began with the 1974 mutiny of the military garrison in Akobo). Starting from Equatoria, between 1963 and 1969 Anyanya spread throughout the other two southern provinces: Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal. The separatist movement was however crippled by internal ethnic divisions. In 1971, former army lieutenant Joseph Lagu gathered all the guerilla bands under his Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). This was the first time in the history of the war that the separatist movement had a unified command structure to fulfill the objectives of secession and the formation of an independent state in South Sudan. It was also the first organization that could claim to speak for, and negotiate on behalf of, the entire south.

Mediation between the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), both of which spent years building up trust with the combatants, eventually led to the Addis Ababa Agreement of March 1972 ending the conflict. In exchange for ending their armed uprising, southerners were granted a single southern administrative region with various defined powers. The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) signed a peace agreement with the Nimeiry government in 1972. There was a brief respite in fighting between 1972 and 1983 although it was more than an armed truce than a resolution to the tragic cultural confrontation between combatants. Peace was doomed from the start though, because the foundation necessary for a pluralistic, democratic society was not there. Policies forcing the south to adopt Arab culture, Arab language, and the religion of Islam only intensified as Nimeiry strengthened Sudan's ties to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. When reserves of strategic minerals and petroleum were discovered in the south, Nimeiry's government thought it had found the solution to Sudan's troubles. Nevertheless, internal unrest over bad economic policies was growing. The declaration of the so-called 'September Laws' accompanied serious violations of the 1972 peace agreement with the SSLM and had been revised to bring them into conformity with Shariia, or Islamic Law. The government in Khartoum clearly intended to exploit the south's natural resources at any cost. Civil war broke out again. The southern forces, backed this time by the Soviet Union's surrogate in Ethiopia, had reorganized in 1983 as the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). This civil war took on a religious tone that had not characterized the previous struggle.

In 1986, a coup d'état forced Nimeiry out of power. The coalition government of northern political parties that replaced him was, in turn, overthrown in 1989 by General Omar al-Bashir and the charismatic fundamentalist leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), Hassan al-Turabi. The NIF outlawed all other political parties and transformed Sudan into an Islamic dictatorship. In response, the northern parties formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which included the SPLA. Peace talks between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan continually stumbled over the south's right to self-determination and over the relationship between state and religion. In 1991, the SPLA split into factions. The south was virtually destroyed by the in-fighting that followed the split, but the SPLA survived. International intervention enabled both the armed resistance to the north and the peace talks to continue. By 1994, a significant grassroots peace movement began to emerge in the south. In 1996, several southern rebel factions signed a peace charter with the Government of Sudan. That charter, while never approved by the SPLA, became the basis for subsequent peace talks. A breakthrough in the peace process came in April 1997, when the Government of Sudan agreed to allow a referendum on self-determination for the south. The referendum would give the southern people the option of either unity or independence.

20. www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm
This North and South war, spurned 22 years claimed an estimated two million lives and displaced more than four million people. Scorched earth tactics and divide-and-conquer strategies created a massive humanitarian catastrophe where famine was an instrument of war and civilians became either expendable pawns or heavily armed proxies. The government’s pursuit of a radical Islamic and overtly racist political agenda were major catalysts for the conflict, but the underlying cause lay in the concentration of power and privilege among a narrow stratum of northern elites who viewed the state as a means to extract resources and accumulate control over the sprawling resource-rich periphery like southern Sudan and other marginalized areas in Darfur and the East.

1.3.1.2 Darfour

Darfur has been a long road to disaster. Successive governments in Khartoum, and as far back as the British, had never really cared for Darfur. Obsessed with class interests and the problem of war in South Sudan, Darfur suffered bad treatment also because it added passive incitement to racial hatred and active support for community confrontation to the neglect shown by successive regimes. Chadian problems dovetailing into Libya subversion and politics of the dominant Al Madhi’s Umma party, had completed a picture of social, political and finally military rejection by the centre. The rise in the 1940s of the nationalist movement and of Sudan’s two major northern political parties further excluded the voice of South Sudan. Both parties played into the power struggle between Egyptian and British interests. One of the two parties, the Umma Party representing the Mahdi sect (Madhist), demanded independence from Egypt. The other party, the National Unionist Party (Unionist), had the support of al-Mirghani, head of another powerful Muslim sect, and called for a union between Egypt and Sudan. For Darfur, the independence did not mark a watershed either. The Umma party which won the first post-independence elections had established its political base among regional elite, rewarded it by giving positions at the Centre and abandoned popular electorate of the periphery such as in Darfur to its own devices. This move caused the remote and unsophisticated Darfur to rankle.

Darfur was a time bomb waiting to explode since 1985. In the late nineties Darfur, was an increasingly marginalized, violent and frustrated place. But its woes remained far from the national consciousness at the centre and far from government preoccupation, even if complex political agendas kept lingering in the shadows. Darfur is located in Western Sudan, covering one-fifth of the country and is home to approximately six million people. The major tribes are the fur, masalit and zaghawa who are black and the Arabic tribes Misseriya and Rizeigat who are nomads. The current conflict in Darfur pits the Janjaweed militia (armed and funded by the Khartoum government) against various ethnic rebel groups (SLA, JEM,) who have been angered by underdevelopment of their areas. The tribes in Darfur launched their rebellions in 2003 to protest unemployment, lack of basic infrastructures like schools, hospitals, and water services. They were partly inspired by the success of the SPLA in the south in pushing for the CPA agreement that gave them access to 49% of the oil. They were also angered by the Khartoum government for failing to develop Darfur using the proceeds of oil from the region. The Arab tribe was armed by the Khartoum government to help quell the rebellion; the janjaweed militia would move on horse back and orchestrate mass displacement, murder, pillage and rape in order to exterminate communities that were sympathetic to the rebel groups and also to secure land for oil exploration. Three factors encapsulate the Darfur conflict: ethnicity, oil and desertification. It is believed that in the last 40 years the Saharan desert has extended in Darfur by several Kilometers. This has meant that farmers and herders do not have enough basic resources i.e. water, farming/grazing land. Historically in Darfur there existed social structures for conflict resolution that ensured that the herders and farmers resolved their disputes amicably. However in view of the rise in desertification, tensions have been exacerbated by limited resources and consequently conflict resolution mechanisms that were previously valid no longer apply. The proceeds of oil have also bolstered the Khartoum army weapon arsenal. Most of their deadly weapons are being purchased from China which is the recipient of 70% of Sudanese oil.

22. Gerard Prunier, Darfur The Ambiguous Genocide, pp 36-37, Hurst, 2006
In order to adequately address the Darfur grievous challenges (i.e. ethnicity, oil, and desertification) dynamic progress towards a holistic strategy should be developed that encompasses all stakeholders. Development of scientifically backed solutions to reverse desertification in the Horn of Africa is an ambitious project that requires global support. The terrible ethnicity and hatred requires a long term dialogue process and possibly a truth justice and reconciliation process.

Thirdly, external forces need to be convinced that the continued supply of arms to the Khartoum government or rebel groups is an anathema to peace and actually sets back their political interest since it further fuels the conflict. Multilateral approaches have to be developed to contain the storm that has capitulated from the three factors.

1.3.1.3 Other conflicts

A renewed liberation fight is emerging in the transitional areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, along with Darfur, the East and other marginal areas who have been alienated for decades. The process of Popular Consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile which will facilitate people’s perspectives on political arrangements under the CPA is in flux. The NCP has failed to tackle these problems and Sudan risks more violence and disintegration. There has been no political solution on any front. The Khartoum government is still smarting over the loss of the south. There has been a withdrawal of both armies in Abyei, that is the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation army (SPLA) who have been replaced by Ethiopian troops who number 4200 strong.

Although placing foreign troops on the ground does not necessarily resolve the standoff. In addition, the troops are drawn from one country, thus making UN control difficult and raises suspicions. A brutal military campaign, approved by President Bashir, is ongoing in southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. This involves former SPLM units previously based in the North before secession and those of the newly formed, Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), who were part of this southern Sudan movement before secession. This onslaught stems from various reasons. One is exerting control at state level, where element of SPLA have influence and are therefore a potential threat, and two is demonstrating power so that other constituencies and groups think twice about defying Khartoum.

The UN Human Rights reported that the traditionally marginalised Nuba people, who had been allied to southern Sudan, were targeted by the SAF and paramilitary forces. Extra judicial killings, aerial bombardment, indiscriminate killings and forced displacement have been witnessed. Despite this a UN Security Council (UNSC) council statement proposed by the US was watered down by China and Russia. Meanwhile things aren’t any better in Darfur. The military campaigns continue there as well. The talks (Doha talks) hang in the balance and the opposition have limited peaceful options. This whole situation has created an intense scenario filled with accusations by both Sudan and South Sudan that the other is supporting its rival insurgents.

At the same time, Sudan’s vice-president Ali Osman Mohamed Taha has accused the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni of seeking to change the regime in Khartoum as part of his broader agenda to halt Arab advances in Africa. This accusation was made because Museveni is believed to have spoken about a movement by the marginalized regions in Sudan to change the center of power in Khartoum on the pretext of neglect and inequality in development. He stressed that the problem in Sudan was that some groups were trying to run the state as an Arab country and disregard Africans while Sudan was an Afro-Arab country.

23. The Khartoum government is very suspicious of the Ethiopians, because their troops are mainly drawn from the Anyuaks- a luo tribe from Ethiopia, who are very closely linked to the dinka and Nuer and other luo tribes of southern sudan, Interview, Nhial Bol, Senior Editor, Citizen Newspaper Sudan
Sudan’s relationship with Uganda has been defined by veiled animosity over Kampala’s support for South Sudan’s secession and the fact that some rebel leaders from Sudan’s western region of Darfur have recently moved their bases to Uganda. Khartoum’s alleged support in the past for the Ugandan rebels Lord Resistance Army (LRA) has also cast a shadow of mistrust between the neighbours. Civil society groups believed to be anti NCP government have also been expelled and are finding their way outside the country mainly into Uganda.

1.3.1.4 Main peace agreements

1.3.1.4.1 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The CPA is the most important political framework in Sudan for ensuring a legitimate and inclusive government in north or south Sudan. It also sets out a mechanism to deal with internal grievances of marginalized groups outside the centre i.e. Darfur, the east and the transitional areas of southern Kordofan, the Blue Nile, Abyei and opposition groups. In July 2002 the war between north and south Sudan ended and a historic agreement called the Machakos Protocol was signed. This set the framework for the role of state and religion and the right of southern Sudan to self-determination and concluded the first round of peace talks between the North and South. It was mediated by retired Kenyan Lieutenant General (Rtd) Lazaro Sumbeiywo and sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). 2003 saw more progress on agreements on power, security and wealth sharing and the three contested areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and southern Kordofan and in 2004, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a declaration committing themselves to conclude a final Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was later formally signed on 9th January 2005 and witnessed by the international community. Though it is touted as a complicated and ambitious document because through an array of processes mandated over the course of a six-year interim period, the CPA seeks to remold the skewed state and promote a political partnership between the NCP and SPLM, while offering the south a clear exit strategy via a referendum process if these terms are not met. The CPA established new benchmarks on the resolution of long standing, intractable conflicts. It then culminated into the referendum process held on January 8th 2010 where southerners were able to determine their right to independence and self rule which they did. On July 8th 2011, southern Sudan was declared an independent state.

1.3.1.4.2 The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA)

Eastern Sudan, comprising the three states of Kassala, Red Sea, and Gedarif, is, according to many accounts, among the most marginalized regions in Sudan. There are few international humanitarian agencies in the region, and information on social and economic conditions is scarce. The extent of eastern Sudan’s marginalization led to the creation of the Beja Congress, an armed and political movement in 1958 and the development of a low-intensity conflict in 1997. In 2005, the Beja Congress joined forces with the Rashaida Free Lions, a rebel group, and other small groups to form the Eastern Front. Often referred to as the forgotten conflict, the situation in Eastern Sudan has for several decades presented serious challenges to the population in the area, with violent confrontations between government forces and rebel movements. On the 14th of October 2006, the Sudanese government and the Eastern Front signed a peace agreement that was supported by Norway.

In October 2006, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Eastern Front (comprised of Beja Congress and Rashaida Free Lions) reached a peace agreement after intensive consultations. The negotiations were led by the Eritrean government, and the peace talks were held in the Eritrean capital Asmara. The international community was not allowed to participate in these negotiations. The ESPA lays down a framework for rehabilitation and development of this marginalized region, focusing on capacity building, strengthening of infrastructure, poverty eradication and a return of refugees and IDPs. The agreement further requires that members of the Eastern Front are represented in GoNU.

24 Nairobi Interview, Senior Editor, Sudan Tribune
The ESPA also stipulates the establishment of a “Joint Implementation Committee”, comprised of members from the Parties, to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

1.3.1.4.3 Darfur Peace Agreement

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) started in May 2006 has failed to bring peace, leading instead to an intensification of conflict in the region. The rebel groups have splintered further. The international community has spent years trying unsuccessfully to persuade the regime in Khartoum to accept deployment of a UN force to take over from the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS). After failing to implement the Security Council Resolution 1706, which authorized the UN force, the AU and UN instead proposed a three-phase transition culminating in the deployment of an AU/UN “hybrid” force.

In May 2004, the AU assumed leadership of the process and through its mediation, the government of Sudan and the rebels signed an "Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and Deployment of Observers". This agreement formed the basis for the establishment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which, in July 2004 was converted into a full-fledged peacekeeping force by the AU.

After the Addis Ababa agreement, direct negotiations between the government and the rebels began in Abuja, in August 2004, under the mediation of the then AU chairman, former Nigerian president Obasanjo. Despite the fact that the two sides signed a protocol on security and the humanitarian situation in November 2004, the Sudanese government’s refusal to meet its security obligations significantly strained the negotiations that followed. Finally, in December 2004, the rebels suspended their participation in the negotiations due to a full-scale offensive by the government forces.

The peace talks did not resume until June 2005. The spectacular failure of the Abuja Peace Process was due to the different State actors in the region backing different groups. Of the initial 3 rebel groups only 1 signed the peace agreement and its leader Mini Minawi was incorporated into the Khartoum administration as an advisor to President Omar al Bashir. Mini Minawi has since fallen out of favour with his militia group. His people accuse him of betrayal since little progress in terms of development has come out of the agreement. The failure of the Abuja Peace Process is further highlighted by the continued endless splintering of rebel groups in Darfur from an initial three to now over five rebel groups operating in Darfur.

The African union peace process led by Djibril Basole started on a high note but has since faltered with the Joint Peace Mediator Djibril Bassolé receiving criticism from quarters such as the African Union itself. The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) strongly support a plan to end Darfur conflict through dialogue among Darfur tribal and civil society forces.

The Council however accuses Bassolé of ignoring its directives to coordinate his action in Doha with the head of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan, Thabo Mbeki. What is clear is that there are several processes towards peace in Darfur currently in operation. The limitations of these processes are that they are uncoordinated and each actor seems to be representing specific interests in Darfur.

The level of suspicion is also alarming and the acrimony and accusations being leveled against each other are worrying. Darfur’s woes are primarily a result of the Sudanese center-periphery dysfunction. Political redress should be based first on an analysis of what specifically is required in Darfur to restore normalcy, and second on what should be part of a greater renegotiation of the Sudanese political compact. For the moment the two are conflated, confusing peacemaking efforts in Darfur and distracting attention from the necessary comprehensive process.
1.3.2 Drivers of conflicts in North Sudan

There is a wide range of reasons behind the tensions in North Sudan. The clearest one is the aspect of religion and culture that is Islam and Arabism. However there are several other sources of conflict as outlined below.

1.3.2.1 Arab and Islam Factors

A Sudanese intellectual, summarized Sudan as follows, it is an Arab country, but its Arabism is not like that of Syria; it is a Muslim country, but Islam in Sudan is not like Islam in Saudi Arabia; and it is an African country, but its African character is not similar to that of Kenya. The Sudan conflict is a complex web but one thing stands out; the union of religion and identity has shaped the course of Sudan’s institutions, international relations, and internal problems. In what is now Sudan there occurred over the centuries a process of ta’rib, or Arabization, entailing the gradual spread of both Arab identity and the Arabic language among northern peoples. In the colonial era, the British colonisers favoured a narrow elite, from within ‘Arab’ communities who went on to develop a conception of a Sudanese Arabic national identity adapting the term ‘Sudanese’ (sudani), which is derived from an Arabic word for blackness and previously had servile connotations. At decolonization in the 1950s, these nationalists turned ta’rib, into an official policy that sought to propagate Arabic quickly throughout a territory where scores of languages were spoken. Far from spreading Arabness, Arabization policy sharpened non-Arab and, in some cases, self-consciously ‘African’ (implying culturally pluralist) identities. Arabization policy also accompanied, in some quarters, the growth of an ideology of Arab cultural and racial supremacy that is now most evident in Darfur. Another serious consequence was the 1984 declaration of Sharia law. This is what transformed the civil war with Southern Sudan into a jihad, throwing the full weight of northern religious passion and identity behind the political struggle. It also kept the people and resources of the south under tight northern control.

The perception of a kind of Islamic consciousness was also one of the political manifestations of a broader split in the ranks of the Muslim majority in Northern Sudan along ethnic and regional lines. Distortions on how the central and northern Sudan perceived the western, southern and eastern Sudan under the umbrella of an Islamic and Arabic culture began manifesting. When discussing the type of constitution suitable for Sudan, there was a push for an Islamic one, which was not only rejected by the Southerners who preferred a secular one, but also people from Darfur, Nuba mountains and the Red Sea because although Muslims they regarded an Islamic constitution as a ploy for consolidating power for the hegemony in the north and central and to perpetuate the marginalization of the rest. Civilian or military, the men in power in Khartoum hardly paid attention to these other constituencies.

In Sudan, the ethnic factor intertwines with non-ethnic factors (education, wealth, and occupation, status) to produce a complex stratification matrix. The system is a class-determined one in which ethnicity (or religion) is infused by class and status. The stratification system approximates a pyramid with the upper triangle dominated by Arab-Muslim (jallaba) ruling classes and groups, together with a tiny fraction of Westerners and Southerners who were able to assimilate or come closer to this class in terms of economic wealth, social status, language, education and values. The jallaba rank highest on all social, economic and political aspects, with their positions and privileges protected and legitimized as such by state ideology, national chauvinism and manipulation of cultural boundaries (i.e. religion). The middle layers of the social pyramid are likewise occupied by a predominantly Arab-Muslim intermediary stratum of middle classes. This did not result from numerical strength, if any, but is a consequence of colonial and post-colonial transformation in education and employment. Peasants, artisans and urban workers in the North are congregated in the lower layers of the pyramid, but these layers are overwhelmingly dominated by nomads, poor peasants and marginalized groups of Westerners and Southerners, for example. The latter are typically incorporated into positions with the least status and material reward in the national labor market.
As such, the identity crisis within Sudan is particularly acute due to the fact that the policies of the various governments since independence have tried to fashion the entire country on the basis of Arab-Islamic identity. This explains why the constitution in Sudan has remained a big issue and is reflective of the Arab/Islam dynamics. Despite strong opposition from Southern Sudanese, who are Christian and the Muslim fur from the West, a new constitution was presented to Sudan’s constituent assembly in January 1968. It proposed changes from a presidential to a parliamentary system to the obvious advantage of the riverine Arabs. Article 1 of the draft stated that ‘the Sudan is a Democratic Socialist Republic founded on Islamic faith’. Thus the controversy over an Islamic constitution has never been resolved and debate continues.

The two key leaders behind the Islamic and Arab doctrine have been Sadiq al-Mahdi, heir to the throne of Mahdism, and Hassan-al-Turabi who was keen on the twentieth century revival of Islam. Though political rivals, Turabi married al-Mahdi’s sister. Both educated in the west at Oxford and The Sorbonne respectively, had come of age in the euphoria of a Sudan independent from British, Christian and alien rule and were both determined to lead the nation into a new age untrammled by an imperial past, whether European or Egyptian. In addition, Mahdism itself had similar objectives to Turabi’s Islamism. Sadiq was the leader in charge of the Sudanese government while Turabi operated under the Islamic Charter Front whose conservative patriarchs hoped that the historic traditions founded by the Mahdi would be fused with the modern, militant Islamic message from the Islamists known as the Muslim brotherhood led by Turabi. These groups have dominated politics at Sudan’s centre.

The ascendency of the Arab-Islamic hegemony has negatively affected the building of a viable united Sudanese nation. Al Mahdi once stated that they were not willing to abandon their Arab Islamic culture for a mirage, referring to indigenous non-Arab-Islamic culture. For its part, the hegemonic centre has always believed that only by promoting its culture can the unity of Sudan be maintained. Submitting to the will of the centre, or to put it in mild terms, conformity with the value system of the centre by different groups is taken as a prerequisite for Sudanese unity and identity. On the other hand, emphasizing the particularity and cultural individuality of groups in the peripheries is perceived as a threat to the unity of Sudanese society as a whole.

The rationale for the centre and their philosophy of beliefs is based upon extending and universalizing its “superior” culture (religion) over other cultures and groups and belief that this will ensure unity, and resisting this imposition of culture and religion for the sake of unity is seen as fermenting disunity. As far as the Islamic part of the variant concept is concerned, its perspective of unity-disunity is essentially derived from Islam. Sudan’s unity and identity are both reduced to nurturing and evolving a particular version of Islam: ‘It is imperative to promote and develop the culture of the centre for it is this (Islamic) culture which unites the nation and gives it its distinct features and attributes. Without this Islamic factor Sudan would have never existed.

25. Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, Francis Manding Deng
26. According to Islam, the final times will be a period close to the Day of Judgment when the morality of the Qur’an spreads widely and people turn to live by it. In the first stage of the final times, a number of ideologies that deny the existence of Allah will give rise to great world degeneration. People will move away from the purpose behind their creation, and consequently suffer a great spiritual and moral collapse. There will be terrible disasters, wars and suffering, and people will seek an answer to the question “How can we be saved?” This period of the final times will also be one in which religion is corrupted. Islam will have been diverted from its true form by a number of superstitions incorporated into it. Some people, who cloak their hypocrisy and conservatism under a mask of piety, will try to spread these superstitions even wider and to prevent the understanding of the proper morality that lies at the heart of Islam. During the terrible chaos of the final times, Allah will use a servant having superior morality known as the Mahdi (the guide to the truth), to invite humanity back to the right path. The Mahdi’s first task will be to wage a war of ideas within the Islamic world and to turn those Muslims who have moved away from Islam’s true essence back to true belief and morality.
The stratification of the society by the Arab rule has created plenty of challenges (see below table).

### 1.3.2.2 Political issues / Governance

At the heart of the north’s problem is the National Congress Party (NCP) and its poor governance. The inability to open up political space and to create an environment to tackle serious conflict issues plus an openly Arab-racist mentality has made the post referendum period even worse. The north is facing a myriad of security, political, social and economic challenges and there is no clear way forward. Security hardliners see these as minor issues, not imminent threats to their survival, and remain committed to a military solution to chronic instability. Others, on the other hand, are calling for internal party reform to tackle the NCP’s problems. The party has mobilized its security apparatus to suppress any revolts. It has decided to end the debate about Sudan’s diversity and identity and remains committed to an Arab-Islamic identity for all Sudanese under Sharia.

There is no accountability so the party leadership enjoys absolute freedom and has institutionalized corruption to its benefit. In the process it is rewarding political barons who can deliver their constituencies by giving them lucrative government positions to maintain their loyalty. The governors of each state run their own patronage network within their respective regions. Ad-hoc decisions continue to set the stage for violence that may not be containable and could lead to further fragmentation of the country. Power is now increasingly centralized in a small clique around President Bashir. The relationship with the west is also a shambles because despite what Khartoum sees as cooperation, in ensuring a peaceful referendum in southern Sudan, the concessions they were hoping for are yet to be realized.

The rage against the NCP regime of Omar El Bashir is being channelled through the Broad National Front (BNF), a new opposition coalition, revived in October 2010 after years of inactivity of the National Democratic Alliance which attempted to work with the NCP regime but which failed to impress local, western, Arab or African supporters as a viable alternative. The BNF might be the spearhead of a reinvigorated opposition but it may also sink without a trace. There is a conviction amongst them that the present regime is the cause of all the miseries in Sudan and that it cannot be improved. To the extreme, BNF’s leader Ali Mahmoud Hassanain openly suggests overthrowing them. These sentiments on the frustrations in dealing with NCP also echo widespread popular complaints by interlocutors ranging from former Prime Minister El Sadig Sideeg el Mahdi and the former US Special Envoy Scott Gration to Western and UN officials.

Although SPLM has long been the dominant voice of Southern Sudanese, it had a significant presence in North Sudan. After independence this wing is now called SPLM-North. This is the newest player in north Sudan politics. This group has denounced many of the policies of North Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP). The SPLM-N push is geared towards a balance between Khartoum and the regions, with states and regions gaining a greater say in North Sudan’s affairs and calls for “real democratization,” including constitutional reform and free and fair elections. They believe that the South Sudanese secession will help resolve some of Sudan’s political tensions and that underlying issues such as populations in south Darfur and states like Blue Nile and South Kordofan comprise “the new South of the North,” and if Khartoum does not listen to their desires, there will be conflict. The SPLM-N has serious political ambitions in North Sudan: they have begun a process of “delinking” themselves from the SPLM in the South (though a common political and intellectual vision endures), and they hope to position their party as the major opposition to the NCP.

SPLM-N has a considerable army in Southern Kordofan plus new found alliances with the Darfur opposition groups. In addition to pledged support from the SPLM in southern Sudan. Although this joint support may not have capacity to kick out the ruling party, it is certainly causing a headache for the NCP. The ongoing military campaign in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile will provide avenues for advocacy and negative exposure of the ills of the current regime. And, if these campaigns are to be conducted in the same way that the SPLM campaign for self determination, were done then it is likely that the SPLM-N will gain momentum. Already international chapters had been formed in key capitals just as was seen in the SPLM struggle. The situation in South Kordofan and Nuba Mountains has continued to deteriorate from June 2011. Challenges for North Sudan are the upcoming gubernatorial contest in South Kordofan State which will also test the strength of the SPLM-N and shed some light on the future of political pluralism and governance in the new North Sudan.  

The NCP’s fear that aggrieved political forces in the north might coalesce has come true, and it is wary that Southern Sudan might support SPLM-N or even other forces in Darfur. The party’s political future is threatened by economic vulnerability, because a majority share of the country’s oil – Sudan’s most profitable resource – was lost to an independent south. Darfur rebels continue to present a problem to the government, formerly aligned constituencies feel betrayed, and northern opposition parties somewhat blame the NCP for the partition of Sudan and capitalize on this failure accordingly.

1.3.2.3 Economic Problems

After secession, the Government of Sudan is losing 50 per cent of its oil revenue. The social issues are equally complex. There are 1.5 million southerners with their families living in the north, while six million northern nomads spend eight months in a year in southern Sudan in search of pastures and water for their livestock. Large numbers of south Sudanese regularly travel to the north for medical treatment. There are a large number of northern traders in the south. Northern Sudan needs south Sudanese labor in the construction sector and other productive industries. At least 50 per cent of the academic staff in southern universities is comprised of northerners. Transmission of oil, which is done through a pipeline in the north (Port Sudan), and its sale is controlled by the north. Thereafter, ninety-eight per cent of the revenue of the GoS comes from oil revenue. The economic implications of secession are worrying, as the inter-dependencies between the north and south are complex.

Sudan is hoping that transit fees charged to the South for using oil pipelines in the North will help cushion the impact of secession. However the two sides have yet to agree on how much should be charged for using the North’s infrastructure. Because of US sanctions as well as Sudan’s heavy debt, borrowing options for the East African nation are severely limited. President Omer Hassan al-Bashir approved an economic emergency programme for the next three years that is mainly focused on austerity measures aimed at expenditure cuts. The economy, as reported by the IMF is deteriorating.

30. Interview, Susan Jambo, External Affairs Spokesperson, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)
Economic indicators in Sudan will require the government to undertake major changes to fiscal, monetary and exchange policies. Apart from the impact of the global financial crisis, Sudan’s economy is generally doing poorly. There was a sharp drop in Sudan’s foreign exchange reserves across the years from $2 billion in mid-2008 to $300 million in March 2009, which covers only 2 weeks of imports for the East African nation. There is a blockage on trade and the movement of people between North and South Sudan. This has caused a dramatic increase in food prices and resulted in shortages. The prices of basic commodities have increased. The government in Khartoum has closed the supplying routes along the borderline states and it is getting harder to get food. There has been an absence of community level input on the ongoing high-level negotiations between South Sudan’s SPLM and Khartoum’s National Congress Party (NCP). Most of the oil wealth of the two countries lies in the border areas. Border demarcation will ease administration and governance. 

There has been a fall in oil prices, which is Sudan’s main export, and subsequent “heavy” intervention by the central bank to sustain the exchange rate. The depreciation of the Sudanese pound against the US dollar has led to increase in prices of imports and this has affected the cost of living and inflation rates. However, the IMF downplayed such impact saying that the declining trend in world food prices and the slower growth in domestic demand should help reduce the inflation concerns associated with greater exchange rate flexibility. Money is the key thing needed to fuel the patronage system that exists at state and national level. With the current situation, Khartoum is increasingly spiralling out of the regime’s control.

### 1.3.2.4 North-South Border Conflicts

The question of borders has deep roots. During a speech on March 3rd 1984, John Garang emphasized this problem. He complained that the Nimeiry government tried to change boundaries of the Southern region through the 1980 People’s Regional Government Act. The aim, according to Garang, was to deprive the South of mineral resources and prime agricultural land for example in Hofrat el Nhas, Kafia Kingi, Northern Upper Nile, and Bentiu. Demarcating the border between North and South will be essential in building a sustainable peace between the two countries. The biggest challenge so far for communities on either side of international borders has been the lack of trade. This is because since South Sudan became independent, North Sudan has restricted the flow of goods southwards to its new neighbour. The border areas are also awash with small arms and light weapons in the possession of the armies (SPLM and SAF) and other militia. The communities that co-exist along these borders are also at risk of fighting. The demarcation of the North – South boundary in Sudan is stipulated by the 2005 CPA. The international boundaries covered by this demarcation are CAR, DRC, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. Anticipation over this boundary settlement as per the CPA is causing tensions and fears. Demarcation is compounded by problems of land use and rights plus an ethnically defined sense of territory. Conflict at national level also feeds into the competition at the local level.

The contested areas which are also potential flashpoints are as follows:
- Abyei - which is the creation of a new boundary
- The Malwal-Rizeigat boundary between southern Darfur and Northern Bahr-El-Ghazal states- which is the confirmation of an existing boundary
- Kafia Kingi and Hofrat en-Nahas area of southern Darfur and Western bahr-El-Ghazal states- which is the restoration of an old boundary, currently administrated as part of northern state of southern Darfur due to be returned to Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state in southern Sudan
- The oil fields of Unity and Southern Kordofan States
- The mechanized farming areas along the Upper Nile state boundaries with Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states
- The Chali El-Fil area of Blue Nile states which was part of Upper Nile before independence
- The northern boundary line of Upper Nile State

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Unity, southern Kordofan states have common features with Abyei and Northern Bahr-el Ghazal. They experience regular movements across the border on both sides. These are mainly pastoralists coming to graze or hunt, usually seasonally and, outward movements of migrant labour moving from north to south. Mechanised farming especially in the Nuba mountains area has not only eroded grazing areas but the area has been sensitive to other developments. There has been displacement during the war, Sudanese were forced off their lands by the army and armed militias in order to pave way for oil exploitation. It is from these fields that Sudan draws most of it revenues. The multiplicity of problems, i.e. complementary and competing demands for land, seasonal movements of indigenous and neighbouring people plus economic interests have made delineation and demarcation of boundaries politically and economically sensitive. Khartoum is bound to continue its practice of brinkmanship in not only resolving its internal problems but also those that affect its neighbours particularly in South Sudan and Chad.

1.4 South Sudan

1.4.1 Birth of a new State

On January 9th 2011, South Sudan participated in a referendum exercise that determined their independence and the country was declared a new republic separate from North Sudan and it can now chart its own destiny. However, there still remains post referendum/independence negotiations with North Sudan which entail discussions on reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement on Abyei; crafting a multi-year revenue sharing agreement; demarcation of 80 per cent of the border and the demarcation of the outstanding 20 per cent to international arbitration; and to create meaningful protection for minority groups with consideration for joint citizenship for certain populations backed by significant consequences if southerners in the north are attacked or vice versa. The new government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has so far made progress in establishing government ministries, adopting legislation and initiating key reforms in education curricular and the public sector. The government is faced with innumerable demands and tangible peace dividends are minimal. Government revenue does not trickle down to state or county level in a sustained, effective manner. Security is weak and concrete gains in the development agenda are non-existent. Oft-cited complaints include corruption, pervasive tribalism and nepotism at all levels of government, the civil service, and the army, delays in payment of public sector salaries, ill-treatment by under resourced and sometimes predatory security forces and lack of popular consultation by government representatives. Some progress has been made on security, but forcible disarmament campaigns, cattle rustling and ethnic tensions that fuel cycles of internal violence has increased disappointment and mistrust in the government. The Juba-based government has a mixed track record such that grievances and disenfranchisement of average citizens remain.

Internal and border security has been declared the number one priority for the New Sudan Republic. Pockets of insecurity in south Sudan are widespread although security incident appears to be selective. Heavily reported areas tend to be from the bigger tribes like the Dinkas and Nuer, and yet other smaller tribes suffer equally deadly (but often unreported) conflicts for example Kyara in Torit, Kapoeta. In terms of defense, the DDR process of over 90,000 people needs to take place. Reliable alternatives are needed for the uneducated, disabled and children. So far there are incidences of extensive abuse and harassment by security officers. Lower cadre foreigners particularly Kenyans and Ugandans are often subject to harassment by these organs and if these problems go unchecked animosities between people and security forces will grow. A new recruitment and training campaign of police and other security organs will help tackle security challenges, although careful vetting of such exercises is needed. The population is largely illiterate.

34. Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan, Crisis Group Africa Report N°172, 4 April 2011
1.4.2 Drivers of conflicts in South Sudan

As the newest republic in the world and the fifty fourth African Union state, South Sudan is faced with several complex and competing challenges. Ravaged by years of war, poor infrastructures, deep internal divisions, border and tribal problems and a poor population to name but a few, it is difficult to see light at the end of the tunnel on whether this new nation will survive. There is however plenty of goodwill from its neighbours and the international community at large. The following problems if not dealt with quickly could be a powder keg for renewed tensions in Southern Sudan.

1.4.2.1 Governance

At the political level, SPLM domination and constraints on political space remain sources of long-simmering discontent. Opposition voices, although still very weak, complain that the CPA unduly elevated the SPLM and inadvertently sowed the seeds for one-party rule. They argue that the accord’s power-sharing formulas – which mandated 70 per cent SPLM control of the executive and legislative branches at both state and GoSS level – unfairly anointed it and undermined the development of multi-party democracy. The power-sharing provisions were intended to last until CPA-mandated elections midway through the agreement’s interim period. But delays pushed the polls to April 2010, in effect ensuring SPLM control for most of the interim period. Because the Executive arm of government is so strong in this young nation and because the SPLM enjoyed “partner” status in the CPA, many argue its control was even greater than it appeared on paper. Opposition parties accuse the SPLM of abusing its special position on negotiations with Khartoum so as to assert its continued control of the South, a tactic they fear may be employed even after independence.

South Sudan is currently governed by a transitional constitution. Some quarters of civil society feel that this document was not subjected to a referendum nor was critical information like that relating to the bill of rights, land rights, citizenship rights and human rights shared with the population. For instance the women have been allocated 25% representation within government. However, this aspect of the law has not been followed, encouraged nor enforced. Public service and defence appointments will also come under scrutiny. Apart from the appointments of those who are unqualified for jobs and those with fake certification, there is need to ensure a good balance and representation of key groups and communities. The resent cabinet appointments have been lauded as an effort to ensure regional and gender balance. However, when carefully assessed it is more tactical and strategic towards ensuring the consolidation of power by President Salva Kiir. The appointments range from paying others for their loyalties, bringing dissenters to closer proximity, regional balance particularly for the Equatorians who are seen as a critical group and to deal with leadership wrangles at various levels. It remains to be seen how other factors will affect the problems of governance.

1.4.2.2 Outstanding Negotiation with North Sudan (Post Referendum Issues)

There are several post referendum issues that are unresolved. If not handled well they could well cause renewed tensions. These are, Borders –Five major border areas are in dispute as outlined in the North Sudan drivers of conflict; oil - An estimated 82–95 percent of the oil fields are in the south (depending on where the border is drawn). Oil revenues account for 98 percent of Southern Sudan’s government revenue, and 60 percent of the national budget (according to 2008 figures). The sole export route for the landlocked south is a pipeline running to the north to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. They will have to negotiate how to share oil revenue, as well as any user fees levied against the south for using the pipeline and refineries. The two parties must also negotiate how to honor current oil contracts; Water - Under a 1929 agreement commonly known as the Nile Water Treaty, between Egypt (which had control over Sudan) and Britain, and a 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan, Egypt’s control up to 90 percent of the water. Will Southern Sudan recognize these old treaties, or will it work with Nile basin countries in eastern Africa to work towards a “fair” accord.

35. National Legislative Assembly Approves New Cabinet, allAfrica.com/stories/201109010130.html
If it honours the colonial pacts, as it has indicated to the Egyptians, the south must then negotiate with Khartoum over what percentage of the 18.5 billion cubic meters of water designated to Sudan it can claim; Nationality - The fate of southerners living in the north and northerners living in the south has to be negotiated. Questions of citizenship and rights will have to be addressed, as well as ease of travel between the two countries. Egypt and Sudan have signed a “Four Freedoms” agreement, granting Egyptians and Sudanese free movement, residence, work, and ownership in either of the two countries. Something is needed between the north and south. Security - The two parties must agree on what happens to key aspects of national security. They will have to decide how to demobilize the Joint Integrated Units and what would happen to the southern portion of Sudan’s national intelligence apparatus.

1.4.2.3 Khartoum - A Tropical Ulcer for South Sudan

Despite having achieved independence, most Southern Sudanese including its leadership, widely believe that Khartoum will remain a problem and affect South Sudan’s stability particularly along the borders. Sudan experts suggest that Khartoum would much prefer a weak South Sudan state largely because this will help their negotiations with other fighting groups in the North. Having lost the constituency in the south, they have to show that the South is unable to function without the North and that it would have been better off not seceding. Tightening movement of goods and people along the borders is a case in point. This is aimed at maliciously paralyzing operations in the South particularly now when local oil prices have gone up and South which has no infrastructure still relies on the North. Khartoum’s age hold practice of sponsorship of local southern militia as a divide and rule tactic is bound to continue. In September 2010, the SPLM/A embarked on serious military and political efforts to quell internal dissent within the South. Senior Southern leaders made multiple attempts to engage the insurrection leaders, and offered an amnesty in late September (from Southern president Salva Kiir) to two key figures - George Athor and Gatluak Gai - in exchange for a ceasefire and a commitment to (re)join the SPLM/A. The amnesty also extended to Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan ("Tang-Ginye"), a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) major-general whose Southern militia, with assistance from Khartoum, fought the SPLA in the civil war. It is widely believed that these armed groups still get some support from Khartoum.

1.4.2.4 Armed Groups and Militia

Southern armed groups and militias continue to overshadow South Sudan’s post-independence period, causing fear and instability. Among the largest threats are insurrectionist forces in the oil-producing Greater Upper Nile region. These forces claim to seek systemic changes to the Southern government - or to overthrow it. This is fuelled by complaints of rampant corruption, nepotism and tribalism by the government. In October 2010, the SPLM/A started a string campaign through military and political efforts to quell internal dissent within the South. Senior Southern leaders made multiple attempts to engage the insurrection leaders, including with an amnesty offer in late September to two key figures - George Athor and Gatluak Gai - in exchange for a ceasefire and a commitment to (re)join the SPLM/A. He was however killed under mysterious circumstances, shortly after South Sudan acquired independence. The amnesty also extended to Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan ("Tang-Ginye"), who is currently in military detention, a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) major-general whose Southern militia, with assistance from Khartoum, fought the SPLA in the civil war. After the January 2011 referendum, a permanent ceasefire deal signed with George Athor, the most important of the dissidents, collapsed. Fighting erupted between George’s men and various Southern security forces on 9-10 February in Fangak county, Jonglei state, which Southern authorities say claimed more than 200 lives (mainly civilians). Elsewhere, in the oil-producing border states of Upper Nile and Unity, forces loyal to commander Peter Gadet, as well as separate groups composed of angry members of the minority Shilluk tribe, have remained active threats to the government’s authority. There seems to be peaceful progress with David Yauyau of Pibor County in Jonglei state. Although so far kept quiet, the amnesty and integration process with the SPLA, which brought him to Juba, is ongoing. Athor and Gadet remain the most powerful commanders; they haven’t accepted the amnesty offer and the capacities of the SPLA and the Southern government to overcome them militarily remains uncertain.
1.4.2.5 Self Determination Conflicts - Case of Abyei

As part of the CPA, the Abyei region was due to vote on whether to join South Sudan or remain north of the border. The vote did not go ahead. The CPA stipulates that voting rights should be given to the Ngok Dinka and 'other Sudanese residing in the area'. It maintained that the Missiriya – transhumance cattle herdiers who spend up to six months of the year in Abyei - should be considered residents. The SPLM held that the Missiriya are only in Abyei for a short period each year and thus should not be granted this status. Without the referendum, the status of the territory and its peoples remains uncertain, causing deep tensions at the local level. Following a military assault between forces on the two sides, more than 100,000 people fled the assault and remain displaced in the villages south of Abyei. On 20 June 2011 the SPLM and the Government of Sudan (GoS) agreed in Addis Ababa to demilitarize Abyei, and authorized an Ethiopian force to maintain security in the area. On 27 June 2011 the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution endorsing the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei. However, deployment of the battalion-strong force has been slow, hampered by difficult rainy season conditions. The area is now depopulated. There is a growing internal crisis in North Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan is facing its own multiple challenges. As such, a solution to the Abyei crisis looks as far away as ever.

1.4.2.6 Cattle Rustling

Cattle rustling/raiding is practised in Eastern Equatorial, Unity, Warrap, Jonglei and Lakes states. It is accompanied by bitter tribal revenge killings, competition for resources, fights over boundaries and the presence of guns and ammunition. It has corrupted Sudanese youth who haven’t attended school for many generations. The slow process of DDR, the absence of service delivery by government, absence of youth programs, lack of legislation, and lack of security at an operational level has hindered prospects of curbing cattle rustling. The arms complicate and bloody the conflict. The arms flows are from Khartoum, others were acquired during the civil war, and others from the border regions of Kenya, Uganda, Somalia and Ethiopia who are also caught up in this raiding dilemma. During decades of the north-south war, tribes allied themselves with different sides and this has become a defining factor in relations between tribes, infusing old hostilities over land and water scarcity with a new political dimension.

Cattle amongst these rustling communities are seen as a sign of wealth, source of pride and income and are used in the payment of bride price. The extent of the premium placed on cattle goes far. There are also deep commercial links in cattle rustling which can be traced to international criminal networks dealing with livestock extending as far as slaughterhouses in the Arab world to the Gulf and in Nairobi, Kenya. The cultural aspects of cattle rustling are so entrenched amongst these communities that even though there is an understanding of the role of education, most family members send half the kids to school and the other half goes raiding. This is done to ensure that the family is enriched both ways. In some cases the raiders pay for the school going family members and both the rustlers and the educated co exist. Raiding results in revenge raids and counter raids. This is complicated by the politicization of local problems by leaders and tribal chiefs. This situation is further capitalized on by the regime in the North. For example in Warrap State, which is President Salva Kiir’s state, the feuding goes beyond rustling and is largely political. In Jonglei state, the conflict is between the Dinkas, Murles and Nuer. Beyond the tribal aspects, the Murle are known to have been previously aligned to the Khartoum regime and to SAF. These militias are linked to national politics and to local conflicts over both cattle and water. The inter and intra-tribal violence is aggravated by drought, food shortages and migration conflicts between pastoralist groups and between pastoralists and agriculturalists.

The government is constrained by a multitude of factors and is unable to respond robustly. The lack of service provision by government has consistently invalidated mitigating efforts against cattle rustling. In Eastern Equatoria, for instance, the Toposa and Didinga place a higher value on cattle than human life. They have a firm cultural belief that all the cows in the world belong to them and they will stop at nothing to get more cows. A Toposa is an excellent marksman and it said that they don’t waste bullets! Efforts towards alternative livelihoods have not yielded results and yet, most of the land in some of these areas is arable.
Geophysical surveys show that this area is mineral rich and may have gold and uranium deposits. On the other hand, pastoralist people across borders and/or tribal affiliations have managed to negotiate access to shared resources through intermarriage and exchange, independently of, or in the absence of government intervention. A well oiled regional framework that incorporates the phenomenon of peacebuilding and dialogue alongside a robust military intervention would help mitigate the problems of resource-related conflict.

1.4.2.7 Problem of Borders

The redefinition of boundaries has also fed into older internal boundary making projects in Southern Sudan. This has generated ethnicised territorial claims. Ethnic territorial borders were part of the project of the old system (colonial) of native administration for managing shared resources especially along tribal frontiers. Prior to the negotiations leading to the CPA signing, the NCP government project of ethnic boundary making was in part related to the political security of that regime and to an attempt by local communities either to validate changes that occurred during the civil war, or restore the pre war order in anticipation of the referendum on self determination. These boundary disputes over states; counties etc. were related to securing control over administrative resources and creating constituencies particularly during the 2009 elections. Other disputes have taken longer and are historical in nature.

Territorial naming is also another source of dispute and is ethnically motivated. For instance the Lopit and Pari of Eastern Equatoria, or the Bari and Acholi along the Nimule - Juba road in Central Equatoria state. Naming is an intense political contest, as the choice of language in which a county is named implies ownership or predominance. In the Nuba mountains, a different situation exists, where territory is divided between farmers and pastoralists, former antagonists in the war, and between SPLM and Government of Sudan (GoS) administrations. The Nuba identity is closely linked to territorial attachment.

Border movements have fuelled suspicions across the three countries with claims that the presence of refugees and dissidents would enable reorganisation or renewed conflict aimed at toppling the regimes of their countries of origin sometimes with military and logistical support from host countries. These claims, allegations and fears have in some cases been found true while in other cases they have been baseless. For instance when Congolese refugees were refugees in Uganda in 1960s, the Government of Congo claimed that the Milton Obote 1 regime was supporting the Simba rebels to overthrow Mobutu’s Government. This led to a series of conflicts between Congo and Uganda (The Goli and Vurra battles at Aru town in Congo and Arua town in Uganda during the late 1960s).

In addition to this there are specific areas of the international borders of Southern Sudan that are problematic. These were established by international treaties (mainly colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries) and reaffirmed in 1956 at the time of Sudan’s independence. These areas are the Gambela, Baro and Pibor river areas on the Ethiopian border with Jonglei State; the Ilemi triangle of Eastern Equatoria state and Kenya; the central Equatoria state and Uganda boundary; and the Nile Congo watershed separating Western and Eastern Equatoria states between CAR and the DRC.

In the past, border issues and relations were channelled through the central government in Khartoum. With an independent south, the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has taken a more direct role in managing its borders than was possible during the war times. In effect they need to institute a principle of good neighbourliness. South Sudan is landlocked, and its outlets to the wider world and particularly to international markets lie in northern Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and to a lesser extent Ethiopia.

1.4.2.8 Co-Existence

There are tensions between the returnees and those who remained. Socially, coexistence will take time because each group carries has different habits. There is a very weak social framework to deal with these challenges of co-existence between returnees and others. Some have acquired an Arab culture arising from living in North Sudan or Egypt. While other returnees lived in East Africa and have no understanding or appreciation of Arab ways. Others are from further afield in the western world and have a completely western outlook. Differences exist in simple patterns such as eating habits and differences in language to more complex behaviour like dependency on relief for those who bore the brunt of war to a spirit of self reliance and industriousness for those who left and lived as refugees in countries like Kenya and Uganda. Amongst the elite and ruling class there isn’t a unanimous voice either. Some believe they are owed by the country because they fought on the frontline and remained during the war time while others were abroad fundraising and raising the profile of the conflict. In the absence of an appreciation that each part played a significant role in bringing peace and independence to Southern Sudan - whether on the frontline at home, behind the scenes or in advocacy, fundraising or coordination, the problems in South Sudan will appear daunting.

1.4.2.9 New Money and Corruption

Those benefitting from corruption are leaders in South Sudan who are mainly former guerrilla commanders along with their families and associates. They live a conspicuously privileged life. It is not uncommon to see top of the range Special Utility Vehicles (SUV’s) some of which are custom-made and shipped in by air. Corruption money comes through various sources such as government contracts, oil sales, and arms sales in the region following the massive disarmament campaigns. For instance South Sudan sold its first oil in July 2011 to Chinese buyer China oil, a subsidiary of Petro china. North Sudan lost 75 percent so the sale was worth around $110 million under current prices.

The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has twenty-four ministries, twenty commissions and ten states, all requiring several millions to function and is devoting most of its resources to setting up public institutions and to infrastructural development. Unfortunately, these institutions operate in an environment that lacks trained personnel and an absence of properly constituted oversight and accountability systems. The mismanagement of public funds is therefore extremely rampant. A late 2006 investigation into mismanagement of public resources and abuse of authority resulted in the dismissal of senior officials. The government instituted an in depth review of all government contracts in order to establish the extent of corruption in government institutions with the view that corrective actions could be put in place. However, government officials still continued to award contracts irregularly and there still is no policy framework for awarding both local and foreign contracts. In addition, some dealings are conducted on a cash basis making them difficult to track. The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission has presented claims of investigations of up to 60 corruption cases and the recovery of more than SSP 120 million (approx. $20 million) that was swindled through corruption. In addition, the US government has a list of thirteen of the most corrupt people in southern Sudan.

1.4.2.10 Ethnic domination

With the independence of South Sudan from Sudan (Khartoum), the emergent conflict driver within the power sharing structure was the fear of dominance by the Dinka community over the rest of South Sudan. While having over 60 ethnic groups, the Dinka, the Nuer and the Shilluk are the three main communities. Ethnic disagreements often arise as a result of elite disagreements over power sharing by the leaders of these three communities. The Dinka account for 25% of the population of South Sudan; which make them a demographic minority but still large enough to influence the political climate of the country. The SPLA/SPLM rebel leadership and subsequent independent government is Dinka dominated. The SPLA leader and Vice President under the CPA, Dr. John Garang came from the Dinka community. His successor and first President of the independent republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir comes from the same community. The current vice president, Riak Machar hails from the second most populous community, the Nuer.
With the SPLA convention coming up in 2014, the President has reduced the Vice-President’s powers in a move that has been viewed in some quarters as a pre-emptive action to curtail the rise of a Nuer to the presidency. The SPLA is the dominant party in South Sudan and the individual who secures the party leadership at the national convention is pretty much the de facto President of the country. National general elections are a mere rubber stamping formality. Salva Kiir’s government has been accused of ethnic bias in favour of the Dinka with regards to ministerial and diplomatic appointments. 43% of the appointees of the post-independent cabinet named on 26 August 2011 came from the Dinka community. Moreover the Chief Justice of the South Sudan Supreme Court, Chief of Security and the Governor of the central bank of South Sudan were Dinka as well and hailed from Kiir’s Warrap State. The appointment of ambassadors saw the Dinka community getting 53% of all appointments, once again pointing to Dinka dominance in leadership spaces of South Sudan’s economic and political space spheres. Perhaps the best illustration of the fear of Dinka dominance lies in the location of the South Sudan capital. The current capital Juba is located in Central Equatorial state, and sits on community land of the Bari minority community. The community has expressed reluctance to the idea of the national capital being on their land, fearing they will be overrun by the more economically and politically dominant Dinka. This has led to the planned relocation of the capital of South Sudan to Ramciel in Lakes state. Ramciel unlike Juba is centrally located and has room for growth and expansion. Moreover, the Lakes state was the home state for John Garang. While infrastructural considerations were the official reasons given for the planned capital shift, the reluctance by the Bari minority to accept a capital city dominated by Dinka was the main reason for the shift.

2 Typology of Civil Societies in Sudan, Chad and CAR

This section will follow-up on the status of civil society, in particular, the civil society situation, motives, capacity and operating environments. In some cases specific responses will be outlined. The range of existing civil society responses will be assessed including the role of traditional leaders and other movements. Each country situation will be outlined separately.

2.1 Chad Civil Society

Far from being homogeneous, Chadian civil society is characterized by its diversity. This diversity is not only based on the country’s numerous spheres of action, but also on the diverse typology of its civic organizations, and the multiplicity of political actors and strategies. Because of this diverse situation, to consider the Chadian civil society as a uniform reality would be misleading. Within the framework of this study, we base our discussion on the assumption that there is a multiplicity of actors in civil society who, under the guise of defending general public interest, pursue proper, sometimes contradictory objectives to one another. That said, some of these actors do not understand their role as civil society, while others consider themselves more legitimate than their colleagues in the defense of the interest of the population. The ambiguities and rivalries which ensue from this situation make it difficult to provide a uniform analysis of Chadian civil society.

2.1.1 Components of the Chadian civil society

2.1.1.1 Emergence of civil society

The emergence of civil society as a major actor of Chadian political society is a recent phenomenon. It started during the 1990-2000 decade which saw the authorization of political pluralism and groupings of citizens defending particular interests or intervening in a specific area of social life. Before this authorization, these groupings were simply tolerated; the few which existed were the creation of monolithic political systems within the framework of their projects or recruitment within society. Consequently, civil society as citizens’ organizations intervening in the social field and independent from political structures is a recent phenomenon in Chad. The decade 1990-2000 indicates a real break as it witnessed the multiplication of these organizations.
Since 1962, a decree established the freedom of association in Chad, a decree which would later be completed by other texts but it was not until 1990, with the advent of an official democratic regime that organizations of civil society were born by the thousands. These organizations, with an essentially non-economic purpose, were set up in the defence of the interests and rights of the populations, the improvement of living conditions, environmental protection, etc. They are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), associations, groupings, labor unions (syndicates), etc. The debate on the role of these actors, their relations, their proximity or lack of with the government, etc. remains controversial in the context of Chad. Nevertheless, the request for the designation “organizations of the civil society” (OSC) remains an element of consensus for the various tendencies.

Due to the conflict context in Chad, relations between the government and the emerging civil society were, from the beginning, marked by mutual suspicion and mistrust. Public authorities never really acknowledged the presence of the civil society which they perceived as a proxy of the political opposition bent on denouncing bad governance and human rights violations. On the other hand, Chadian civil society suspected the government of trying to hinder their activities. The period of relative calm (1990-2003) which followed the introduction of a multiparty political system and the sovereign national conference allowed civil society in Chad to be very active and to become a significant societal component. Several groups and associations were created demonstrating the citizens’ desire to express themselves and to participate directly in the life of their communities after years of being quasi-muzzled. The State was initially favorable to this dynamism by facilitating the procedures for creating associations and NGOs. The State did not oppose the participation of civil society in the preliminary discussions for the Development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (DPRS) in Chad. Civil society national platforms and networks were also involved in the development of a national strategy for good governance and have participated in the drafting of the national strategy paper on the ACP-EC cooperation within the Cotonou Partnership Agreement framework. However, while the regime consented to such a participation of the civil society; they, at the same time, hindered civil society initiatives in the areas of human rights or public denunciation of bad governance.

2.1.1.2 Development NGOs

In terms of social development, there are many important NGOs in a large part of the territory: ACORD and SECADEV in the Sahelian zone, BELACD network in all the dioceses of the South. The Pan-African NGO - INADES and a large Chadian NGO based in Moundou: ASAILD. These NGOs all combine a high level of expertise and a strong capacity to mobilize funds from their partners in the North, which gives them a high operational capacity for the benefit of people. Traditionally, they have remained relatively discrete on “political” issues, but have started to implement support programs for local institutions and communities as part of preparations for decentralization. This is their entry point to address the challenge of social mobilization, advocacy for community rights and construction of democracy. ASAILD, for example, spearheaded the formulation of the Local Development Plan in the oil zone under Act 001, which granted them 5% of oil revenues.

2.1.1.3 Human Rights Organizations (HRO)

The ADHs (Human Rights Groups) have been at the forefront of the demands of Chadian civil society. They are characterized by their political stance on issues concerning freedom, citizenship and political violence thereby rendering their relations with Government difficult. As is the case in other African countries they suffer repression by law enforcement agencies and regularly have to deal with their members being harassed or even detained. In some cases members have been murdered as happened in 1992 to Joseph Behidi, the former President of the Chadian League of Human Rights (LTDH).

The LTDH, and Chadian Association for the promotion of human rights (ATPDH, which is the Chadian section of the Christian Association for the abolition of torture (ACAT-T) are among the oldest ADHs, the most widely spread in the country and consequently the most active.
However, there are several other ADHs. Most of them are organized in a collective called CADH (Group of human rights organizations) with the objective of expressing a common view on national issues at the political, economic as well as social level. Next to the ADHs which broadly defend human rights, are ad hoc associations such as the Association of the Victims of the Crimes of Hissène Habré (ACVRP), the Victims Association against Political Repression (AVRP) centered mainly on advocacy to bring to trial the ex-leader Hissène Habré. The ADH has also set up a common radio station, radio FM Freedom for public awareness, advocacy, information, rights awareness, education and advocacy on issues relating to citizenship.

With the launch of the Chadian oil project, HRO (Human Rights Organizations) worked in partnership with populations from the oil producing areas to generate international focus on their fight for the defense of their rights and for the good governance of oil income. With the escalation of political tension in the country from 2003, the HRO has advocated for a ceasefire between the government and armed groups and lobbied hard for the involvement of civil society on issues of national reconciliation and political dialogue. Although the ADH collaborates closely with other OSCs, their relations are sometimes ambiguous. For instance, some NGOs blame the HRO for aspiring to take over the leadership of civil society and being too politicized. For their part, the HROs are sometimes critical towards other civil society associations and the community of NGOs, the functioning of which is sometimes against the ideals of fundamental rights. In 2007, the CADH withdrew from the Organization of Non-state Actors (OANET) and justified its decision on the fact that the CADH already provided a framework of permanent dialogue on human rights and that it would be illogical for it to be diluted in a superstructure such as the OANET.

Implicit in this withdrawal, it is also necessary to understand the conflicts of legitimacy which occasionally place the ADHs/HROs against other constituents of the civil society – with the former blaming the latter of being the creation of individuals pursuing personal objectives under the pretense of defending public interest. The ADH is also suspicious of attempts by Government to manipulate NGOs through satellite organizations created to infiltrate the civil society.

2.1.1.4 Organizations intervening in the oil sector

The actions of the CSOs vis-à-vis the oil project were deployed at three levels: international, national and local. These CSO founded their interventions on the disastrous experiences for the environment and the community rights in the context of oil exploitation in other African countries (Nigeria, Angola, Congo Brazzaville, Sudan) and on the already tainted Chadian record in the area of human rights and good governance. From the beginning of the project negotiations, the organizations mobilized to prevent a similar situation in Chad. Their intervention was not a radical opposition to the project but specific grievances on some of its aspects. They doubted the capacity of regulatory bodies to enforce the applicable norms to oil industries, to defend the populations’ interests at the exploitation sites, and, to guarantee transparency on the utilization of oil revenues.

International NGOs got involved alongside the national and local civil society. These are amongst others Swissaid (Switzerland), Intermon (Spain), Catholique Relief Service (CRS, USA), Brotfür die Welt (BfDW, Germany) and CORDAID (Holland). All these international NGOs developed a multiform support for the Chadian civil society to carry out information-sensitization and lobbying activities around oil exploitation that is committed to the respect of human dignity and the protection of the environment. They also carried out lobbying activities in their respective countries and international institutions. In Germany for example, about twenty NGOs created a network called ArbeitsgruppeTschar (Chad working group) since 1997. The objective of this network is to reflect, along with Chadians stakeholders, on the oil issue and to carry out advocacy actions targeting oil exploitation that is concerned with social and environmental issues. The anti-corruption Commission in South Sudan investigated 60 corruption cases and managed to recover 120 million SSP (US$20 million). The American government has published a list of the 13 most corrupt people in South Sudan. At the national level, civil society organizations were structured in commissions and networks.
Hence, la Commission Permanente Pétrole National - ‘The National Permanent Oil Commission’ (CPPN, N’Djamena), la Commission Permanente Pétrole Locale – ‘The Local Permanent Oil Commission’ - (CPPL, Moundou), le Réseau de Suivi des Activités Pétrolières au Moyen-Chari – ‘The Monitoring Network for Oil Activities in Moyen-Chari’-(RESAP/MC, Sarh), Réseau de Suivi des Activités Pétrolières du Bassin de Bongor- ‘The Monitoring Network for Oil Activities in Bongor Bassin’ (RESUP/BB, Bongor), etc. were created.

Organizations that are specialized in the monitoring of oil exploitation such as the Groupe de Monitoring Alternatif du Projet Chad-Cameroun - ‘Alternative Monitoring Group of the Chad-Cameroon Project’ (GRAMP/TC) were also created. These structures would translate the concepts of human rights, protection of the environment, social justice, etc espoused by their technical and financial partners in the West to the local reality.

In addition to advocacy and monitoring of the project from its inception, CSOs also carried out sensitization campaigns through different channels to inform the populations on the dangers of the oil project for the environment and the socio-economic survival of the communities. The objective was to persuade the national and international public opinion, through the communities that oil exploitation as planned in Chad would not benefit the populations. On the contrary, it would lead to land grabbing of their agricultural land, pollution of the environment in which they live, non-respect of their rights, etc. It was therefore necessary to mobilize and to organize in order to validate their rights and interests, even at the community level in the oil region where the associative mode was the leading approach. Organizations such as ‘l’Association pour la Défense des Intérêts du Canton Miandoum - Association for the defense of the Canton Miandoum interests - (ADICAM), ‘le Cadre de Concertation pour le Développement du Logone Oriental’ – the consultative framework for the development of Oriental Logone (CACODELOR), l’Entente des Populations de la Zone Pétrole – the association of the populations in the oil region- (EPOZOP), etc. were created to amplify the discussion at the local level.

In order to give weight to the arguments of the CSOs on the risks associated with the project, an exchange visit with Ogoniland in Nigeria was organized in 1999 by the ‘Association d’Appui aux Initiatives Locales de Développement’- Associations for the support of local development initiatives (ASSAILD) – so that some residents of the oil region witnessed with their own eyes the extent of the disaster. As exemplified by Ogoniland, oil, contrary to the presentations by the government and the consortium, far from being the dream with happy endings, would be the nightmare with a rude awakening for the populations.

2.1.1.5 Women organizations

There is a multitude of women organizations in Chad which are organized into a Liaison Unit of Women Organizations (CELIAF). CELIAF is a highly representative women organization collective at national, regional and local levels. According to its president, CELIAF brings together 314 national organizations mainly located in the South of Chad. Their preferred fields of intervention are in rural zones where women rights are most at stake and where awareness is at its lowest.

It helps to raise awareness of women around concrete issues such as violence against women, female genital mutilation, the fight against early marriage which leads to increased fistulas among younger women, etc. CELIAF does a lot to enable women to gain rights and independence (especially legal, intellectual and economic). CELIAF has taken the lead in studying, lobbying and creating awareness about issues relating to the empowerment of women. It has also facilitated several national discussions on strategies for women development. CELIAF has more recently involved itself in the debate on the elaboration of reforms required in the family laws of Chad. CELIAF has tried to introduce articles on the Chadian women rights laws relative to succession including the right to divorce, and in so doing it has come into conflict with religious groups. The main criticism levelled against CELIAF is that it is led and organized by urban women who have little or no contact with the rural areas. Furthermore, the Northern or Arab speaking membership in the network is low which causes the organization to be perceived as a “Southern” structure remote from the realities of Muslim women.
2.1.1.6 Trade Unions

In the late 1990s to 2000, trade unions gave rise to numerous social movements and helped articulate tangible demands such as increase in salaries, improvements in working conditions for teachers, etc. There are several labour unions which focus on defending the various socio-professional groups organized within two confederations: the Union of the Chadian Syndicates (UST) and the Free Confederation of Chadian workers (CLTT).

If at first the UST seemed more committed than the CLTT, these two groups launched together several strikes ‘journées villes mortes’ (no work days). The UST sometimes joined the ADHs to address political issues and denounce bad governance. Its relationships with public authorities were sometimes tense, the latter blaming the former for exceeding its role and mandate. In the early 2000s, the strategy of the Chadian government was to divide unionist action by infiltrating the main trade unions and corrupting them. The objective of the government was to prevent trade unions from intervening too vigorously in the oil industry. Thus, trade unions were unable to prevent oil companies from negotiating contractual clauses unfavourable to Chadian employees. Despite various forms of intimidation deployed against them, trade unions played an important role in the defence of employees. It can nevertheless be noted that their presence is weak outside of the main cities of the country.

2.1.1.7 Faith based organisations

Christian diocesan organizations have gradually progressed in the areas of health, education, agriculture, credit, and have long been able to offer services exceeding those of the state in much of the country. Examples include the Catholic network BELACD and SECADEV. This model is now partly fatigued due to the drastic decline in funding by Catholic NGOs from the North and the complex management of associative structures employing thousands of employees. SECADEV bankruptcy in the 2000’s illustrates the limitations of this model of development today.

On the Muslim side, traditional sectarian organizations remain strong and fight against Islamic revival movements. Like mission churches, Islamist movements strongly penetrate the social sphere thanks to funding from Arab countries (construction of hospitals, schools, roads, award of scholarships, construction of religious buildings, etc.) through Arab banks, Muslim associations, foundations or NGOs.

Several Islamic non-governmental organizations supported by Libya, Sudan or Saudi Arabia have appeared in Chad since early 1990’s. Larger organizations have developed: the Islamic Dawa Organization (ODI: Organisation de la Dawa Islamique) and the Islamic African Relief Service (IARA) are of Sudanese origin. ODI is the largest Islamic organization in Chad and is specialized in Islamic preaching in non-Muslim and non-Arab areas, where it intends to fight against “the atheist invasion and Christian crusades”. UCMT (Union of Muslims executives in Chad) is an endogenous movement which is seen in Chad as a relay of expression of the Muslim community at the religious and social level. UCMT has been very active in discussions on the new Personal and Family Code and has hardened its position in fighting the project on the grounds that it contains externally imposed rules contrary to Islam. Some wheeling and dealing has developed through the emergence of Islamic organizations in Chad. Generally it is Muslim Chadians who did all or part of their studies in Islamic countries who initiate these projects strongly supported by organizations from Sudan. Thus, mosques are built overnight in Christianized parts of the country. Preaching and conversion campaigns have been organised without much success in rural areas in southern Chad. This has begun to disappear with the reduced funding that followed the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States of America.

It is difficult today to speak of national Islamic humanitarian organizations. They are rare and have rather vague configurations. International ones, which rely on the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates and Sudan, after the proselyte fever of the 2000’s, were banned following government action. Islamic organizations currently operating in the country have a totally international face (e.g. Islamic Relief Service, etc.).
Apart from traditional development actions, Christian churches have attempted to reduce tensions between communities. In the south, for example, mixed groups of farmers (Christians) and herders (Muslims) are established by Diocesan Justice and Peace Commissions to settle conflicts between sedentary farmers and nomads. Churches are actively involved in interreligious dialogue and reconciliation, but the Muslim hierarchy seems unwilling to become involved. In this nearly one-way dialogue at institutional level, a real momentum is however emerging among Muslim communities at grassroots level towards improving dialogue. In addition, more and more new missionaries from overwhelmingly christianized countries discover with circumspection a Muslim world to which they were not prepared at all. Some fundamentalist protestant churches practise proselytism, strongly backed by the organization of "Gospel crusades" in the Muslim community, and go as far as publishing and distributing anti-Muslim pamphlets such as "Which of the two, Jesus or Muhammad?". Since 1995, public evangelistic campaigns have been organized with the participation of foreign ministers and sometimes internationally renowned evangelists.

Most inter denominational organizations are conscious of their role in the areas of religious tolerance and peaceful cohabitation. Nevertheless, they admit that their members are sometimes manipulated by political actors. In the past, religious dignitaries were used by political actors to relay divisive messages. Relations between denominational organizations and the government are ambivalent at best. Most face the difficulty of wanting to participate in policy processes while protecting themselves from political manipulation which can be a difficult balance. Besides, even if a permanent ecumenical structure does not yet exist, the interdenominational organizations repeatedly reaffirm their availability to participate in common initiatives in the pursuit of social peace and reconciliation. Because of the weight given to religion in Chad, the interdenominational organizations should play important roles in conflict management, but they could also turn out dangerous if they are manipulated by political actors.

2.1.1.8 Youth organisations

Youth organizations are numerous and very active throughout the country. They are the basic expression of the dynamism of youth.

The most established are predominantly Christian, including Catholic (Young Christian Student, boy Scouts, girl Guides and Catholic Action for Children) and Protestant (Union of Christian Youth, boy Scouts and associations of very dynamic women) ones. As for Muslims, UIJMT (Union of Young Muslims in Chad) used to be the most active organization. From the 1990’s, with the advent of democracy, there has been a mushrooming of secular youth organizations. This is the case for example for the Association des Abeilles, Action of Partners for Development (APAD: Action de Partenaires pour le Développement), Organization for Development training (OFAD), Support to initiatives on academic support and training (SISEF: Soutien aux initiatives en Soutien Scolaire et en Formation), etc. These organizations are primarily aimed at teaching young people the basic precepts of living together and the tools necessary for human, social and spiritual development.

Youth organizations are structured around different groups, such as FOJET, UNET, UGEEET and CNJL. The youth groups struggle to operate, because of their weakness in organization and collegiate management of activities, and particularly due to their politicization.

The forum of youth organizations in Chad (FOJET: Forum des organizations de la jeunesse tchadienne), which was formed in 1995, comprised dozens of youth organizations to serve as the interface between youth organizations and the line ministry as well as partner organizations. FOJET was a highly hierarchical but inefficient organization, which did not encourage the creation of spaces of expression and active participation of member organizations. This has created a sort of "leadership war" and a gradual erosion of the network. In addition, some youth leaders were engaged in visibility ploys in order to "dialogue with the government" for personal gains.

In 2004, while the National Union of Students in Chad (UNET: Union nationale des étudiants du Tchad) was considered difficult to control by the government, a group of young students, mostly Muslims, attempted to create UGET (Union générale des élèves et étudiants du Tchad), thought by many as being exploited by the regime in place. The attempt to create UGET eventually failed, and therefore UNET remained the only student organization.

As for the National Youth Advisory Council, whose establishment had been recommended by the national sovereign conference in order to give voice to Chadian youth, it was politicized from its inception in 2006. Its leaders quickly used it for political gain and for promotion to important positions by mobilizing young people in favour of the President of the Republic. In 2007, it organized a caravan for political awareness and propaganda throughout the country.

Since 2005, a large network of youth organizations - REPPACT (Network for the promotion of peace and citizenship in Chad) has given rise to 6 Christian and Muslim youth organizations to promote exchanges among the youth and their full civic participation in civil society and in building a division-free society. This network has played an important role in the capital city and in 19 towns in the country.

2.1.1.9 The civil society’s platforms

2.1.1.9.1 CILONG, development NGOs group

In the context of the euphoria which accompanied political liberalization in the 1990’s civic organizations invested resources very quickly to address social problems such as democracy, human rights and good governance. Their original objective was to occupy new and growing spaces and to channel legitimate needs and aspirations which had been hindered for a long time by years of civil war and the dictatorship of Hissène Habré. Many of these organizations were able to secure funding from the international community within the framework of structural adjustments policies and decentralized cooperation.

At the beginning of the 1990s, development NGOs were organized into a common platform, the CILONG (Liaison and Information Center of NGOs) as a network of development NGOs operating in Chad. Created in 1986, CILONG was officially recognized as a non-profit organization by the government in 1992. It had about 20 members including national and international observers. According to its constitution texts, CILONG’s action targeted different levels – grassroots and national. As a network, CILONG promoted information sharing between its members while building up an information data bank, producing several technical journals and setting up a documentation center. CILONG facilitated consultation between its members on development issues so as to adopt a common strategy for action and for the defence of their interests. CILONG also strengthened the capacities of local organizations outside the capital city N’Djamena and connected them with other development institutions. In theory, CILONG intended to accompany these organizations in the implementation of sector based projects (health, education, and agriculture). At the state level, the CILONG participated in the conception, follow-up and evaluation of various national strategies on poverty alleviation, good governance, and support to rural areas among others.

Although very active at the end of 1990s, CILONG’s visibility progressively reduced during subsequent years although the network is still formally in existence. Several reasons explain this situation. First of all, enthusiasm among its members decreased as new priorities emerged. Secondly some of its members lost their capacity to raise funds. The network lost a significant amount of human resource capacity and its most active coordinators left the network to pursue new agendas and social mandates. Some members admit that CILONG served as a stepping stone to pursue other objectives. The network gradually lost its core sources of funding and member contributions waned due to the unwillingness or new policies of its partners. Finally CILONG also faced severe internal rivalries and distrust between its members.
2.1.1.9.2 OANET
The Chadian non state-actors organization (OANET) was created in 2001 to gather NGOs in the country. OANET includes more than a hundred members. The European Union supported its implementation within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement which recommends the establishment of key platforms in the signatory countries. The Chadian government also encouraged its creation. Due to this history, the OANET is sometimes perceived as a potentially controllable "civil society" structure by public authorities.

In 2007, for example, the collective of human rights organizations (CADH) withdrew from OANET, expressing the discomfort felt by some CSO towards the OANET. Certain actors of the civil society met within the scope of this study questioned the legitimacy of the OANET to represent the views of the civil society.

2.1.1.9.3 Human Rights Organisations collective
Next to the CADH above mentioned, there are other ADH networks. It is “the other civil society”, which, according to the CADH, would be subjugated to political power. Two main platforms can be cited: the Coordination of the Civil Society and the Defense of Human Rights in Chad (CASCIDHO) and the network of Human Rights Organizations (RADH). These organizations, while having the same scope of action as the CADH, maintain distant relations with the latter: they blame CADH for its increasingly radical positions.

According to CASCIDHO and RADH, the CADH is not "politically neutral and betrays the ideals of the civil society". CASCIDHO’s leitmotif is that a dynamic civil society can support the government’s efforts to fight poverty and towards good governance. The RADH, for its part, would like to think that it is a framework for action and dialogue to promote respect for the human dignity and value. Unlike the CADH which operates in a regular and active way, the CASCIDHO and the RADH operate only occasionally and seem to encounter operational problems linked to material and financial difficulties.

2.1.1.9.4 Peace and reconciliation collective
Following the escalation of conflict in Eastern Chad and the national political deadlock between 2003 and 2009, civil society increasingly became involved in the promotion of national reconciliation and even went to the extent of offering a common plan for resolving the crisis. There are several OSCs, active in the field of national reconciliation and dialogue within the society. These include the Chadian Association on Nonviolence (TNV), the Association for Youth Anti-Cleavage (AJAC), and, the National Justice and Peace Commission (CNJP).

In 2002, CADH recommended a discussion on peace at the conclusion of which a plea for peace and reconciliation was launched and signed by the participants (civil society, political parties, and representatives of religious denominations). The plea called for a proper diagnosis of the causes of instability in Chad and proposed a national dialogue in the form of a forum bringing together the principal political actors. A follow-up committee was appointed to monitor the implementation of the plea which consisted of actors of the civil society (human rights organizations, labor unions, women organizations, the youth, development NGOs and the networks of the national commission on justice and peace). Other signatories of the plea, namely, political parties, religious groups, and traditional leaders were urged to collaborate with the committee and to support its initiatives. This committee became a permanent structure under the name of CSAPR (Follow-up Committee of the Plea for Peace and National Reconciliation).
At first, the CSAPR recommended the organization of a national dialogue, reforms in the security and governance sectors and organization of a process of national reconciliation which would include the entire population. After encountering the Government’s refusal to organize a national round table, the CSAPR’s initiative was broadened to include a global analysis of political issues, such as the reform of the electoral process and the army through a DDR program (Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration). After eight years of implementation what are the CSAPR’s outcomes? The main contribution to the national dialogue will have been the August 13th, 2007 Agreement which broke the political impasse. The CSAPR has also been active on the ground through the publication of memoranda of political analysis and proposals to resolve the crisis, the publication of a monthly news bulletin, press releases, a weekly radio program, raising community awareness and, a study on the electoral process. Round tables were also organized on the theme of peace in Chad.

Since 2010, the CSAPR strengthened its expertise on issues of peace by launching several surveys and field studies, and in particular a study on Chadian political parties and a study on the process DDR-SSR in Chad. At the same time, it continued to set up regional antennas. In November 2010, the CSAPR also organized a forum on the theme "Peace and Security". In 2011, CSAPR published studies on the character of the national context and subsequent public discussions on the same. These discussions resulted in a decision taken in September, 2011, to center CSAPR’s activities on advocacy in order to accompany the peace process in Chad which still remains largely reversible.

2.1.2 Constraints and opportunities of the Chadian civil society

Despite occasional tensions with the government, it should be noted that Chadian civil society was reinforced in its internal organization and its level of influence between 1990 and 2002. The landmark for the Chadian civil society was its involvement in the Chadian oil project, supported by the World Bank. This project turned out to be a paradoxical step for the Chadian civil society. Though it helped the civil society to gain visibility internally and externally, it also marked the starting point for its setbacks. Aware of the influence that civil society can exert, the government begun strategising on how to weaken the civil society from the onset of the oil project. This strategy was not targeting the actions of the civil society but was rather aimed at dividing it by encouraging the emergence of an alternative civil society that was sympathetic to the government’s position. The role of civil society in conflict management and development became important over the last years with the return to civil war in Chad in 2003. However, though this role is undeniable and is unanimously embraced by civil society stakeholders and their external partners, questions of impact remain.

Chadian civil society is generally characterized by an insufficient technical and institutional capacity to truly play a censor role and participate in a decisive and continuous manner, as a partner of the public and private sectors, in the process of policy formulation and strategy development. Thus, while there are expectations for a more actively involved and responsible civil society, it is clear that its organizational capacities need strengthening. For example, in terms of strategic planning, geographical distribution in relation to national issues, conviction and professionalism, setting up of sustainable alliances, influence and lobbying strategies.

There are constraints that affect the human rights NGOs more than the development NGOs. Because of their vocation to political advocacy and to the defence of human rights, the former are often perceived as taking rigid positions close to the opposition, even though they have no partisan affiliation. The ADHs are also sometimes identified as "a southern civil society". They are also more prone to political manipulation. The polemics between the CADH, the CASCIDHO and the RADH demonstrate this. Whatever the degree of their independence, the ADHs cannot escape a subjective interpretation of their actions. Moreover, areas such as conflict management and good governance (including the oil sector) remain very sensitive for the public authorities who in turn endeavour to obstruct the OSCs involved there.
Despite the existence of platforms such as OANET, CSAPR, CILONG or CADH, Chadian civil society must still strengthen its collective structures and move beyond rivalries or prejudice that sometimes prevents it from speaking with one voice. The OSCs must strengthen collaboration and communication to avoid acting in a disorganized manner. They also need to overcome legitimacy quarrels that render them vulnerable to manipulation. The uses of the OSCs as a springboard, the poaching of players by the public authorities, the subservience to political formations, are all practices that reduce the credibility of the civil society.

Chadian OSCs are largely dependent on external financing. This situation reduces their ability to manoeuvre within international partnerships. The projects implemented do not always reflect realities on the ground, but rather the criteria imposed by external partners. Sometimes, weak management capacity of the Executive structures also leads to financial mismanagement. Moreover, the heavy reliance on external financing jeopardizes their sustainability. Indeed, since its creation, the OANET for example, is funded on a permanent basis by the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) and the European Union. This type of dependency does not guarantee OANET’s sustainability should funding end. The strength of Chadian civil society is that it intervenes to solve problems beyond the divisions between North and South, Christians and Muslims, pastoralists and farmers, etc. Social and political crises facing the country equally affect the vast majority of Chadians. There is a large adherence by national opinion and part of the international opinion to diagnoses made by Chadian civil society.

2.2 Central Africa Republic Civil Society

2.2.1 Emergence of civil society

As with many civil societies in Central Africa, the Central African civil society as an independent structure began to emerge in the early 1990's with the liberalization of political life in the country. In 1991, following a series of strikes and demonstrations in which the Central African League for Human Rights (LCDH) actively took part, President André Koulngba agreed to establish the multi-party system. Under the leadership of lawyer Nicolas Tiangaye, the civil society group played a pioneer role with the opposition, which led Tiangaye to be accused of overstepping his role.

Initially, the main organizations constituting the Central African civil society were essentially the ADHs, the Catholic Church and the labor movement. The influence of the ADHs is a result of the legitimacy that they developed through their participation in the struggle for democracy. Two main ADHs are active in the country. These are the LCDH and the OCDH (Central African Republic human rights observatory). The influence of the Catholic Church is, on the other hand, explained by the role she played in the formation of elite states. With the ADHs, the unions played a political role, introducing or supporting democratic claims, strongly objecting to attempts to question the trade union pluralism and freedom of association, and thus becoming real counter-powers.

The liberalization of political life saw the birth of many OSCs across the country, most focusing their intervention in the field of local development. Overall, Central African civil society is divided between OSCs involved in the development field, those that work within the youth and women frameworks and those who are specialized in political advocacy. Due to the predominantly rural nature of the population, these organizations focus their intervention in the provinces although their headquarters remain, for the most, in Bangui.

As in Chad, Central African civil society has experienced a reflux period after the 1990s euphoria. This situation is also due to the loss of enthusiasm for non-profit involvement following the degradation of the political situation in the country. However, it is also explained by the fact that the low resource mobilization capacity of most of the OSCs was detrimental to their sustainability, many having ceased to exist due to lack of means. From this point of view, Central African civil society is the image of the country: dilapidated and lacking financial means. Less organized than the civil societies of Chad and Cameroon for example, she competes with international NGOs who have invested in Central Africa following the collapse of the State.
2.2.1.1 Human Rights Organisations

Though the Central African ADHs are still present and active, they have lost much of their dynamism. Some of their activists have engaged in politics while others were poached by successive governments. As a result of the military mutinies, attempted coups d’état and raids by foreign armed groups, the political violence ever-present throughout the country have mostly made the work of ADH increasingly dangerous. Confined in Bangui with little means, they are struggling to meet their objectives. The accidental death in 2009 of the LCDH president, Goungaye Waniyo, has also been a major fact. Waniyo, a lawyer, was very committed to the defence of human rights.

After the inclusive political dialogue organized in the country in 2007, Central African civil society was involved in different peace building strategies. Two of its representatives sat in the coordinating committee of the Strategic Framework for Peace building in Central African Republic. The United Nations Office in CAR (UNOCA) worked with local CSOs to undertake awareness and popularization campaigns for weapons collection and intercommunity reconciliation. The group of CSOs have also acted as intermediaries and facilitated political dialogue between the opposition and the government.

In 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) started to focus its intervention in Central Africa with a workshop involving CSOs. The purpose of this workshop was to rely on CSOs to develop a strategy of awareness and popularization of international justice in the country. Beside the representatives of NGOs for human Rights, representatives of religious denominations, labor unions, youth groups, journalists and lawyers, have been actively involved in setting priorities and activities that the Court will deploy throughout the proceedings. The workshop also helped to lay the foundations for partnerships, based on exchange of experiences, and consistent with the specificity of the situation in CAR.

2.2.1.2 Few NGOs in the North

However, we notice that civil society organizations are less present in the north of the country than in South Central. Similarly, Central African CSOs based in Bangui do not have branches in the northern part of the country which is at present the most affected by the abuses of armed groups. The communication difficulties with the region make intervention difficult. Generally, the North has more international NGOs mainly composed of humanitarian agencies. In the South-East, some associations are trying to provide information and increase public awareness about the atrocities of the LRA. An association like Youth United for environmental protection and community development (JUPEDEC) is present in the area and has conducted numerous awareness and advocacy campaigns on the situation in the region. Working sessions with this association enabled citizens to become aware of the seriousness of security conditions in South-East. Unfortunately, like most other NGOs, the ability of JUPEDEC to take action is limited and the challenge of personalization of NGOs remains.

The main features of Central African CSOs are; small sized and often run by inexperienced young people for whom the associative commitment is most of the time, only a temporary activity while awaiting employment. There is also a strong tendency to compete within the CSO, which reduces the flow of cooperation and information. Ethnic polarization is also a major element increasing mistrust and prejudice between CSOs.

2.2.1.3 NGOs platform

Currently there is a core platform for CSOs, the Collectif Inter ONG de Centrafrique (CIONGCA). The CIONGCA has 75 CSO members. Its main tasks are coordination, training of NGO members, representation, information and communication. In terms of representation, CIONGCA is the platform with which public authorities and outside partners work together. At the sub regional, regional and international levels, the CIONGCA represented the Central African NGOs during the sub-regional and international debates. The CIONGCA is nevertheless challenged by other platforms such as the Platform for Consultation of Civil Society for Human Development (PCCSHD).
2.2.2 Constraints and opportunities of the Central African civil society

The current weaknesses of Central African CSOs are obvious. Implementation of local action requires a participatory approach that allows local capacity building of actors in conflict resolution and management of local development processes. CSOs in CAR are hampered by several factors - both external and internal that impede their performance and effectiveness. External influences include influences from foreign sources within and outside borders, government and local political forces. Internal influences are those factors that affect CSOs but that are within their ability to change. The key limitations of CAR civil society groups include: Approximately all CSOs funding in CAR are from external sources. The dependence on external sources for subsistence though helpful can also be a source of major uncertainty in the delivery of CSOs programs and projects. The lack of predictability of funding undermines CSOs hold on professional staff and sustainability of projects. CSOs long-term survival and effective implementation of programs is linked to the availability of funds. When CSOs are in a state of dependence, their independence to make program decisions and ensure that the right programs are pursued for beneficiaries, is diluted.

The resource constraints of CSOs in CAR cannot be underestimated. These constraints also have human resources implications. Often, the number of people with the capacity, critical perspective and inclination to be activists and CSO administrators are in short supply. The issues that CSOs deal with are mostly policy driven and require knowledge of key issues. i.e. Professionalism tagged to activism is needed. The sector is plagued with massive brain-drain as leading CSO intellectuals and activists are co-opted to join Government, the United Nations system, and the international organizations as “Advisors” CSO’s in CAR are also ethnically biased. Political polarization is also conspicuous and labelling of the self and the others is quite common reflecting deeply institutionalised mistrust.

Achieving sustainability for projects and programs by is a challenge. To gain the trust of communities within which they work, sustained engagement is useful. Lack of sustained engagement undermines CSOs effectiveness overtime. CAR CSOs are to a large degree centralized in Bangui due to the centralized presence of the international community. There is the propensity for CSOs to move from one project area to another without building long-term relationships with beneficiaries of their programs. Many CSOs executives point to the number of projects undertaken say within a year as key achievements, rather than the impact these projects have had on its beneficiaries.

CAR civil society groups are marred by internal wrangles and a general lack of internal unity. Wrangling and jostling for position is very common thus making the groups to appear incompetent and untrustworthy. Their urban base and their limited geographical and social outreach creates concerns about the legitimacy and social accountability of CSOs as many of these organizations are largely disconnected from the very communities they claim to represent.

Accountability for CSO’s should encompass both financial and administrative information and records. But the fundamental question remains should CSOs only demonstrate fiscal and administrative accountability to their donors? What about the people (beneficiaries) whose needs were used as platform for raising funds? Also, what about the government that is often plastered with accusations of corruption and being a pursuer of bad policies? Doesn’t government have the right to know about CSOs fiscal and administrative management? Maintaining transparent, accountable and sound ethical standards are useful for cementing the standing of CSOs in CAR.

This is significant because CSOs as watchdogs of society need to set good examples in their endeavour to safeguard society from inimical influences. The reality in CAR is however far from this, most CSO’s are divided along ethnic and geographical lines and the same tensions and loyalties that are manifest between the different rebel groups are also reflected in civil society groupings.
The adequacy and depth of CSOs contribution to policy issues in CAR is limited. There is a serious lack of intellectual capacity to deal with the complex socio-economic and political issues that populate the area. Many practitioners lack the experience and knowledge of the dynamics of governance. The lack of technical and intellectual depth among CSOs to sufficiently engage government on major policy issues has left them overlooked and weakened.

Despite its difficulties, the Central African civil society has a number of opportunities that could enable it to carry out joint actions focusing on local communities. Among the main opportunities are:

• A genuine federative platform representative of all the concerns related to indigenous and local communities rights and issues of good governance
• A pro-active reflection on some topics (e.g. environmental protection, communal conflict, disarmament, awareness of armed groups)
• A free and independent platform that could drive a joint action
• Good cooperation with external partners

2.3 North Sudan Civil Society

2.3.1 Background of civil society

2.3.1.1 From the anticolonial struggle to famine

Khartoum is generally not tribalistic but has a history of links with the Islamic brotherhood. Thus the origins of its strife are religious. There are active trade unions as Khartoum is fairly advanced in terms of trade and unions advancing workers’ rights are present. In addition to this, there is a high level of educated and exposed Sudanese, who have studied in places like Khartoum, Cairo and in the Arab and Western world. From the 1940s, trade unions were particularly influential in the anti-colonial struggle and after independence, they led the overthrow of the military dictatorships of Ibrahim Aboud in 1964 when workers' and farmers' unions were the main force of change and Jaafar Nimeiri in 1985 when the uprising was led by professional, urban-based white collar unions since the workers' and farmers' unions had been weakened by the Nimeiri regime. In both cases, university students, notably the Khartoum University Student Union, were vital in the spearheading and coordination of the revolt. The Graduates' Congress led the resistance to colonial rule until independence and prompted the emergence of modern political parties. There is also a group of civil society organisations that emerged in response to drought, famine, large-scale displacement and destitution during the civil war with the South. These CSOs include large numbers of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and relief agencies. These were formed under the umbrella called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). Many of these were based in both North and South Sudan, as well as in Kenya and Uganda were undertaking cross-border relief operations.

2.3.1.2 Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)

OLS came into existence because of the Sudanese government’s inability to address the critical situation of famine. They agreed to cooperate for a short period and allowed national voluntary organisations and the creation of a favourable environment for INGOs to operate. Lokichoggio, at the Kenya/South Sudan border was chosen as the main relief centre to serve the SPLA-administered areas of southern Sudan, largely by air. During this period, relief items were delivered into the areas of southern Sudan controlled by the SPLM/A and GoS by river, rail and air. Following the advent of OLS, there was considerable and noticeable improvement of humanitarian and health conditions among the population. The advent of OLS also provided an opportunity for the SPLA High Command to have a presence outside Addis Ababa, facilitating sustained direct access between SPLM/A leadership with the international community and the press. In addition, the OLS connection brought about opportunities for peacemaking, even if peace was not its stated aim. The operation was mounted to ameliorate the suffering caused by war-induced famine. OLS also provided donors, especially the US, with leverage or influence on the SPLM/A.
During this time national Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) largely Khartoum based, non-political, service-oriented and dependent on external funding from INGOs and UN agencies and which directed their efforts to serve the victims of famine and war increased in number. This changed when Omer El Bashir came to power in 1989. The NCP regime begun to tighten the space for civil society organisations that were politically/conflict/governance engaged.

Political parties were dissolved and trade unions and CSOs were required to re-register under new conditions that prohibited political engagement. Moreover, the coordinating agency for voluntary work, later named the Humanitarian Affairs Council (HAC), was transformed into a security organ whose aim was to curtail the work of CSOs. The government prohibited CSO engagement in political issues such as human and civil rights and governance, restricting their activities to service delivery.

As well as trying to restrict an independent civil society sector, the Sudanese government succeeded in transferring its social and economic responsibility for groups such as displaced persons, children and the urban poor to national and international NGOs. Sudan was isolated from the international community at that time, because of its policies towards the south and amidst this isolation, the consequences of natural disasters, growing violent conflict and the short-term negative impact of economic liberalization policies, CSOs were left to address the gap left by the 10-year ban on political parties and the weakness of state governments. Meanwhile, the CSOs’ agenda were re-shaped by increased interaction with international organisations, new emerging visions and methods of civic action and the spread of new development concepts like grassroots empowerment, participation and peace building.

Given the utility of CSOs as a vehicle for receiving donor money, the number of registered organisations shot up as Sudan’s international isolation began to recede after 2002, most of them were however linked to the state and the ruling party. In addition, the Sudanese government continued its efforts to curtail the independence of CSOs. It used its own parallel organisations to undermine existing CSOs, especially those working on rights issues, swamping meetings held in the presence of international or UN representatives. New legal restrictions on CSOs included the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act from 2006 which requires the approval of all CSO proposals from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs’ before they are submitted to donors. The Ministry can also ban any person from voluntary work.

Although one might not call this new regime a stratocracy, security organs infiltrated most groupings from university student councils to trade unions. This remains the status to date. This level of interference extends to the appointment of leaders in independent organisations and even NGO’s. No one is hired unless s/he is approved. The chosen ones are those associated to the system. Several “Islamic” organisations were formed, supported by the state and primarily funded from Gulf states.

However, when Sudan in 1990 expressed their support to Iraq and Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, most of the funding from the Gulf States was withheld and only the strongest and heavily state-supported organisations survived, such as the Zubeir Charity Foundation and el-Shaheed.
2.3.1.3 The Darfur Consortium

The Darfur Consortium is a coalition of more than 50 Africa-based and Africa-focused NGOs dedicated to working together to promote a just, peaceful and sustainable end to the ongoing humanitarian and human rights crisis in Darfur. The Consortium came together in September 2004 as concerned NGOs gathered on the fringes of the third extraordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Pretoria, South Africa. Its objective was to respond to the dangerously unfolding situation in Darfur.

Since the conflict in Darfur in Western Sudan escalated in April 2003 it is estimated that over 400,000 people have died and over two million are displaced. The deliberate targeting of civilians through heinous acts such as genocide, torture, forced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement motivated these organisations to come together to advocate for what amounted to crimes against humanity. The group is a loose coalition with varying interests, motives and capacities. It also had a fair share of prominent members who hold clout and international sway on foreign policy and conflict issues. People such as Samantha Power, Special Assistant on Foreign and Multilateral affairs, for President Obama. One of the most significant achievements of the Consortium during 2005 was the part it played in helping to secure the historic first referral by the UN Security Council of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court in March 2005 (Resolution 1593).

The consortium bridged the gap in the spectrum of voices in the Darfur debate. Since Darfur was always cited as a test case for the African Union (AU), who were brokering the political negotiations and deploying ceasefire monitoring troops on the ground, the African civil society was to make a vital contribution. The AU provided a unique forum for Arab/North African and sub-Saharan African voices to come together, united by adherence to common goals, including a collective responsibility for the protection of human rights on the continent. Independent assessment of, and advocacy around, Darfur by a pan-African group has so far made a contribution by increasing international understanding of the crisis and by presenting solutions.

A 2009 UNDP study estimated the number of CSOs in Darfur at no less than 241, with an additional roughly 230 Darfur-related CSOs based in Khartoum. Those figures take into account only the CSO registered by the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) and exclude trade unions and professional associations, cultural groups, faith-based organizations, and sport associations. Tribal affiliation most dominantly delineates the identity of Darfur CSOs. Every Darfur tribe has its own NGO, but these rarely work effectively across tribal lines. For example, those active in intertribal reconciliation rarely cooperate with organizations linked with other tribes, posing a fundamental challenge to prospects for success. Predominantly urban-based, these have limited contact with their rural constituencies. This is even truer of Khartoum-based organizations. CSOs also tend toward politicization, falling roughly into categories of pro-government or anti-government with the latter being a mixture of CSOs that are sympathetic to the rebels or to other opposition political parties. The government has often created its own civil society organizations (CSO) in an effort to increase its control at the grassroots level. In October 2008, the government launched its own civil society conference, the Sudan People’s Initiative, which gathered those civil society organizations that were considered acceptable by the government. The conference was chaired in Khartoum by the NCP’s vice president, Nafi Ali Nafi. IDPs were notably absent from the conference. In the early stages of the conflict, the rebel groups generally rejected civil society, seeing it as either pro-government or unsuitable to be included in negotiations. After the Abuja peace process, however, their approach changed and the rebel groups started trying, like the government, to extend their influence by creating their own civil society representatives. For the purpose of the Darfur peace process meetings, the United Nations Joint Mediation Team support (JMST) divided civil society into six categories: CSO, traditional leaders, IDPs and refugees, women, youth, and nomads. In reality these categories often overlap - a civil society actor can easily and simultaneously fit into multiple categories.
Darfur’s traditional leadership is inconsistent with the common perception of civil society. However, it is “the earliest form of civil society institution” in Darfur and it still has links with and influence on all the other, more modern categories of civil society. Darfur’s traditional authority structure historically represented tribal power. The conflict has fundamentally altered this structure. The government has removed traditional leaders who were critical of its strategy and appointed new ones. The armed movements, including the Arab militia, absorbed or replaced many of the traditional authorities as the de facto local authority in many areas. Beyond their controversial political affiliations, traditional leaders have played and can continue to play an important role in the civil society track of the peace process. Traditional leaders can reach consensus among themselves and with the rest of the civil society because they are often the only ones with real experience of traditional reconciliation mechanisms.

The displaced and refugees are drawn predominantly from certain tribes - namely, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit - and constitute a core constituency of the rebel movements. Their representatives are largely from new power structures that have replaced the traditional authorities. Since the camps no longer fall exclusively under the structures of traditional authority, government, or armed movements, they represent a distinct pillar of civil society that is tribally defined and influential.

Faced with this traditional under-representation of women and youth in Darfur, as in other parts of Africa, the international community pushes for affirmative action. Darfurian intellectuals are generally seen as important because of their potential to contribute constructive ideas toward the peace process, and have played a prominent role in various civil society peacebuilding initiatives.

2.3.2 Constraints and opportunities of the Sudan civil society

The nature of registration of civil society remains the biggest challenge for operating in Sudan. No NGO can operate outside the HAC framework. This framework is riddled with security and intelligence elements that curtail the work, movement and ideologies of organisations. Creativity is needed for those NGO’s that operate under the human rights, peacebuilding and governance umbrella because these are officially banned. Organizations like ACORD therefore steer clear from these aspects but focus more on livelihoods projects.

Over the years, NGO’s have mushroomed to reap the benefits of increased international spotlight either in Darfur or the crisis between north and South. It is therefore difficult to assess the more genuine groups, the government groups and the briefcase groups.

Operational dynamics are also difficult. The fact that Sudan is under sanctions means that international transactions are hampered apart from those with the Muslim world. Transfer of funds is also not easy and foreign change is largely absent or in the black market. Movement of money therefore becomes difficult particularly when conducting projects. Physical movement from one place to another requires travel permits.

The talk of creating a purely Islamic state, and secession from the South has meant that most of Sudan is largely Muslim, operations amongst other religions particularly Christians has been severely hampered and is subject to discrimination.

Sudanese civil society can however:

1. Work under HAC - Once registered by government there is room to work in the field of capacity building, humanitarian issues, training and the like
2. Work in International Advocacy – Sudan has received much international attention particularly over Darfur. This has created a momentum for advocacy in other areas that are suffering the plight of conflict like Eastern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Southern Kordofan
2.4 South Sudan Civil Society

2.4.1 Background of civil society

2.4.1.1 Issues and responses

Southern Sudan does not have the same strong tradition of civil society organisations as does the rest of Sudan. Through the OLS framework during the war period, CSOs were active in promoting a peaceful settlement and in responding to the humanitarian crisis brought about by the civil war. Civil society influence on the Naivasha process that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 was ultimately very limited. Like the northern political opposition parties, civil society was marginalized, perceived by the government as backing SPLA/M on the main stumbling blocks in the negotiations: religion and the state, wealth redistribution, democratic transformation and accountability. Civil society engagement in briefings and informal sessions was only made possible after the wider international community and policy advocacy groups in the region and abroad became involved in the negotiations. Various civil society meetings and forums created for civil society actors, such as a series of meetings convened by Justice Africa in Kampala from 1999, were a response to the exclusion of civil society groups from the peace talks.

There was particularly good CSO engagement on aspects of advocacy and humanitarian relief before the CPA was signed and for a brief period the CPA was signed. Thereafter, most active CSO workers were co-opted into government. Sadly, in the post CPA period, civil society is weak and disparate. Active voices for peace and mobilisation like the Sudan Women’s Network (SWAN) has seen most of its membership join government ministries and commissions. This has left many of the groups and networks without leadership or capacity. Another case in point is the NESI network of over forty NGO’s which was a membership organization whose leadership is active within SPLM and now the network has been left without capacity or direction. Other members have become business people and act on behalf of big international companies and businesses. Some of these prospects are seen as more rewarding than working for CSO where the pay is small while the magnitude of work is immense and conditions are extremely tough.

The current perception is that apart from UNOCHA which invites various civil society groups to discuss issues relating to humanitarian updates, there are no concrete CSO networks in South Sudan. The South Sudan Civil Society Referendum Taskforce (SSCSRT), is a body composed of heads of non-governmental organizations and civil society networks in South Sudan. It represents a wide range of constituents, including in the areas of peace and justice, human rights, a free and open press, economic development, democratic reform, and armed violence prevention, among many other sub-sectors. More than 160 civil society organizations are represented by the SSCSRT, as well as at least 35 media institutions.

Others like the SUNDE network were formed to respond to a particular need for civic education and governance for both election and referendum periods. This was also because donors availed funds for this purpose but it remains to be seen whether these priorities will remain. The atmosphere amongst the local population since the CPA was signed was that the war was over and that they would be independent and as such there was a yearning for information on democracy. The obvious challenges of responding to this hunger for information and participation is the size and accessibility of the ten states in Southern Sudan. Some of the states are enormous. Jonglei State for example is 122,479 km². This coupled with Insecurity and lack of infrastructure including road network, telecommunication, living facilities and social amenities) make it near impossible for civic educators to carry out their activities.

38. Civil Society in North and South Sudan, MS Denmark
Lack of a long-term strategic vision for their programs and the in-depth research needed to guide their plans and priorities means that civil society work is reactive and vulnerable to external influence by the state or donors. Often civil society work is guided by the funding trends and doesn’t necessarily stem from a response to critical societal needs. When it comes to important issues like human rights violation, oil production/oil revenues, these are 'no-go areas' for civil society activity. The regime has sought to divert civil society attention from important issues such as human rights violations in Southern Sudan, oil production/revenues etc. Some of the more recent oil contracts have also raised eyebrows but due to capacity deficiencies and lack of interaction with government, civil society cannot respond or even react in a timely and coherent fashion. The oil has raised many questions, including how the profits are used, what the government of Sudan has done to secure the oil fields, what the opposition has done to disrupt oil operations, and what constitutes responsible behavior by oil companies and foreign governments. Still civil society has no stake in such discussions.

The dependence on foreign funding and a lack of specialization among civil society has undermined the formation of effective networks, making them competitive rather than cooperative. Donor conditionality is sometimes imposed at the expense of local priorities. Stereotyped and foreign methods have been adopted; for example, credit and women’s empowerment programs common throughout Sudan are rarely adapted to its varying local contexts. In many instances the nature of responses by organisations is guided by organization politics, tribal cleavages and funding.

The most active movements are mainly those that focus on Gender Based Violence (GBV). For instance the women’s lawyer’s association has been working towards engendering the South Sudan constitution and has also been involved in carrying out a land baseline survey. Community based groups are seen to be stronger in terms of project/objective delivery largely because they work on a small scale and amongst the people in the localities. They are more inclined to respond to the immediate primary needs of the people and are less prone to follow politics.

During the war, in areas where there was no effective presence of the SPLA or SAF, the churches and NGOs created community based bodies for the enforcement of peace and the law. An example is the Peace Village (Peace Corps) established by Bishop Paride Taban in Kuron on the border of Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei states. It mainly dealt with inter-communal conflict. The Bishop is seen as an impartial authority by the mutually hostile local communities. Another example, amongst communities in Eastern Equatoria, is that they practice rule through the corporate age-grade of middle-aged men (‘monyomiji’). These are particularly useful in situations where communities are vulnerable to attack by armed groups of superior military force that may be intent on kidnapping community members, and/or robbing their food. Then there are the ‘arrow-boys’ of Western Equatoria, who have responded to the LRA menace by mobilizing themselves to protect their community.

In general, community-based (community security) defence forces played an important role in the civil war in Sudan. The ‘Popular Defence Forces’ (PDF) of the communities just north of the North-South boundary in Kordofan and Darfur, actively participated in the war sometimes coordinating their attacks with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), sometimes acting on their own. The PDF were responsible for the slave raids into Bahr-el-Ghazal. However, the challenge is that in comparison to state armies, community-based defence forces are less disciplined and are thus more inclined to commit human rights violations and war crimes.

When it comes to oil resources, there is a civil society oil taskforce which has little capacity and in which the state interferes. It doesn’t help that the oil industry in Sudan is notoriously opaque. The oil fields were never accessed during the negotiations and there are myriad problems on the oil question. There has been forced displacement amongst the population, degradation of the environment, lack of compensation for the communities surrounding the oil resources and lack of access for a wide array of stakeholders particularly at community level because most negotiations are done in the capitals.
2.4.1.2 Level of Social Movements

There aren’t any concrete movements to talk of. Very soon, jobs, working rights, public services and control of resources will most likely be the immediate demands from Southern Sudanese and this are the kind of environments where social movements thrive in addition to serving as a precondition for further political organization. Understandably, most efforts and energy were geared towards the struggle for self determination and a peaceful transition. At the same time there is a psychology that separation will give Southerners permission to develop their country, including developing civil society and movements. For many, the last 50 years of war was characterized by survival. The collective memory of how to function normally evaporated in areas where successive generations were forced to flee; often there was a tendency not to do anything because it may be destroyed before there is a chance to reap the benefits.

Most able returnees find it difficult to build any movement because most find this concept of collective action culturally alien. Therefore any steps towards developing such movements will require hard work, creativity, patience and a high level of public consciousness. The general environment is further complicated by the reality that because nearly all associations that sprung up during the war have clear ties to the SPLM.

SPLM is the dominant party in South Sudan. Historically, it has been at the forefront of the struggle for independence. According to opinion polls, SPLM has 95% approval rating. Other political parties have little space for various reasons. They are either briefcase political parties or have previous affiliations with the Khartoum regime thus creating problems of trust for cross party interactions. The extent of this mistrust has seen alienation of the National Congress Party (NCP), a current elected MP from the party has made claims that she has been cut out from meetings. It was the only political organization known by most Southern Sudanese during the war and its setting up of civil administrations, youth leagues, etc, in the liberated areas rather than leaving military hierarchies in control was a welcome approach. But now most associations have formal or informal ties with the SPLM. This has negative implications on the level of political, economic or rights debate. There is deference to authority and legitimization of hierarchy that is surely related to the high degree of participation in the SPLA during the war. This deference is only strengthened by the lack of available jobs, the informal nature of most work and the mechanism of patronage as the means of securing work. For example, decisions, even trivial ones, by government officials will not be made until permission from management is granted, no matter how long it takes.

The youth and women’s leagues are not necessarily vibrant, although they have been receiving training and technical support from other Liberation movements like South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) party. However, it still remains the most influential group in Southern Sudan.

Other complicating factors include high levels of fear and suspicion resulting from the trauma of war. Recent unity between Southerners is commonly regarded as being based on the necessity of fighting a common enemy (the north) and guaranteeing the referendum. However, broadening of the SPLM, church growth, and reconciliation measures, peacebuilding between communities, recent inclusion of opposition political parties and military pardons from the Government of South Sudan have also played their part in building confidence. There is light at the end of the tunnel because Southerners are already highly politicized — having undergone war means there is a high degree of political awareness. This will be a useful starting point for building effective movements.

2.4.1.3 The Church in Southern Sudan

The Church has a long history of promoting peace in Sudan. For example in 1997 the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) brought together the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) after it had splintered into various factions resulting in violence throughout southern Sudan. Those talks helped to unite the various offshoots of the SPLM and subsequently reconciled communities that were at odds because of the factional fighting.
Churches were given a mandate to launch their people-to-people peacemaking process, which is essentially peacebuilding at the grassroots level. This came about from the understanding that when politicians fight, or in the case of the splintered SPLM, the Church needed to step into the role of peacemaker. As peace began to grow in these communities, the Church then went to the leaders and brought them into the dialogue to reinforce the grassroots peace agreements. The Church was able to facilitate 23 people-to-people peace agreements in 10 different regions. This reunification of the SPLM by the Church has ensured that it is strategically placed. Even the president of southern Sudan himself, Salva Kiir, acknowledges that the SPLM would have never reunited and the Government of Southern Sudan would not be where it is today had the church not played a mediatory role.\textsuperscript{39}

According to the report, The SPLA: Fit to Govern, by the European Sudanese Public Affairs Council, the church in South Sudan is a structure within SPLM. The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) from Catholic and Episcopalian Churches was formed in February 1990 and could not have been created without the support of the Late John Garang, the SPLM Chair. The extent of NSCC’s independence on SPLA is therefore questionable considering its origins. Although, at the same time, the Church has suffered persecutions. Today the Church particularly through the Sudan Bishops Regional Conference (SCBR) remains quite influential. Under President Kiir, a catholic himself, who attends mass frequently, the clergy are clear voices of conscience for the leadership. Recently, Paulino Lukudu, the Archbishop of central Equatoria, was sent to head a peace delegation on the conflict between Commander George Athor and the government.\textsuperscript{40} The signing of the CPA, elections held in 2008 and the 2011 referendum helped deepen the democratic process. In order for these to have taken place effectively, civic education had to take place. The SUNDE network, led by New Sudan Council of Churches, was a joint platform of NGO’s working to ensure civic education and a fruitful participation of citizens in the electoral process.

\subsection*{2.4.1.4 The Media}

The media is also an influential part of South Sudan civil society. There are two types of media operating in South Sudan; controlled media and independent media. The controlled media outlets are operated by the government while the other outlet is privately owned. Most of the media operating in South Sudan are FM radios. For example Radio Miraya which is operated by the UNMIS during the first six years of the interim period could not air messages about independence of South Sudan because it is controlled by the government in Khartoum. Radio Bakhita, is a Catholic radio channel, whose aims are pastoral but it also manages to touch on political, social and economic affairs.

The ratification of the media will bring about opportunities and challenges. The advantage is that media houses will operate without guidelines and will not be subjected to any particular laws which provide basis for any legal action against their operation. The disadvantage is that they will be left vulnerable to arbitrary prosecutions and abuse by the security and government organs. Although the South Sudan constitution guarantees freedom of information, in the absence of the media bill this freedom is not being actualized. Recently, the closure of a local paper that reported news regarding the marriage of the President is an example of the controls witnessed.

Apart from the UN Radio Miraya and South Sudan radio, the rest have limited coverage. When it comes to television, South Sudan Television (SSTV) is only watched in the big towns. There is a big role for the media in education and sensitization particularly in a society that reconstructing itself.

\subsection*{2.4.1.5 Tribal Leaders and Authority}

Since the British Administration of South Sudan, traditional leaders have played a central role in transforming the communities. Children were mobilized to attend school through their chiefs; administration of law and justice was made through traditional authorities; participation of communities in development and maintenance of roads was implemented through traditional authorities.

\textsuperscript{39} People to People Peace Conference, Catholic Relief Services
\textsuperscript{40} The SPLA: Fit To Govern, The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 1998
They are the spokespersons of their communities vis-à-vis state authorities and neighbouring tribes. Although traditional authority was eroded during the war, it regained some legitimacy when SPLM injected in the element of Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS) after the Chuckudum Convention 1994. Their role remains unclear despite their long history in South Sudan. They have proven effective at spiritual and lower administrative levels (bomas and payams). They meet annually to review their administration and to strengthen customary laws. Most of those laws are still being applied by Chiefs Courts. Chiefs Courts are recognized by the Judiciary of Southern Sudan. Under the present Interim Southern Sudan Constitution 2005 there are 5 layers of governance. That is (1) Traditional Authority at Boma level, (2) Payam Authority, (3) County Authority, (4) State Authority and (5) GoSS Authority. Founded on an in-depth understanding of the realities of socio-political, administrative and legislative frameworks of Southern Sudan, the Council of Traditional Authorities Leaders is an adapted model of the House of Nationalities. At Boma Administration where there is tribal authority, the rural majority meet with their Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Therefore the traditional authorities play an important role influencing the livelihood and wellbeing of the rural majority. Due to poor infrastructure and underdevelopment, they are forced to travel on foot for several days to reach people and state authorities. South Sudan has no efficient radio broadcasting network. In its administration of Boma, local government relies on executive chiefs under whom are the sub-chief and Gol Leaders (Makungu). Traditional authorities play pivotal roles in mobilizing their communities to interactively participate in provision of emergency support, rehabilitation and development. Many actors have recognized this and have engaged traditional authority in efforts to build peace and promote a culture of peace.

2.4.1.6 Dinka and Nuer Traditional Leaders

Amongst the Dinka and Nuer traditional leaders, are the Bany Bith and the Kuar Kwac respectively. They are spiritual leaders and the symbols of their offices are the “spear” and the “leopard skin” respectively. These offices are hereditary and are held by special priestly clans. These leaders had no political or executive authority to compel parties in a conflict to abide by the decision to pay compensation. However, the Dinka and the Nuer respected this person who alone has a moral force to make the parties to a conflict to make peace. They perform sacrifices, oaths and mediate in all types of conflict. Their residences are sacred. Any offender who seeks refuge in the residences of the Bany Bith or the Kuar Kwac is spared by the offended. The other important actor in conflict resolution is the Bany Alath who the government appoints as chief. The Bany Alath is a member of the customary court. This individual decides cases in the customary law courts. The Bany Alath interacts with the Bany Bith. The most familiar mechanisms of conflict resolution consist of customary mediation, compensation and restitution. They also arbitrate in criminal and civil cases in the community41.

2.4.2 Constraints and opportunities of the South Sudan civil society

The constraints and opportunities of CSOs operating in South Sudan are in direct proportion to each other. Constraints include lack of trained personnel, lack of infrastructure, insecurity, a traumatized society, inability to balance conflicting priorities and need for the people, government/SPLM interference, bureaucracy, suspicions between staff from different tribal, different countries (regional and international), and those from Khartoum, a weak civil society environment and a culture of corruption and dependency as well as a culture of impetuousness and arrogance stemming from the newly acquired independence.

The opportunities are such that there is need to do everything in South Sudan. Every sector needs support, advice, staff and an injection of ideas, money and capacity building. All spheres of civil society work need these inputs.

3 Regional Linkages and Dynamics

The main purpose of the research study was to identify some of the common themes in Chad, Sudan and CAR. Other practitioners and researchers have been equally keen in pursuing the linkages and dynamics common in this tri-border area. The aim of this chapter is to identify and strengthen programming in areas that will impact conflict prevention and management for both ACORD and CCFD. These linkages and challenges have been drawn from the analysis done in the previous sections and have been clustered into three broad categories i.e. resources, identities and political dynamics.

3.1 Natural resources

With reference to conflicts linked to competition over resources, the study highlighted relationship problems between farmers and herders, the challenge of developing a local economy in a difficult agro-ecological context coupled with violent local competition between grassroots communities for access to water and land, as well as tensions related to mineral resources exploitation. These conflicts are also expressed at a much broader territorial level, as exemplified by the Darfur conflict over access to land, and raise the broader question of the sustainability of the pastoral model in a region affected by desertification and whose population is steadily increasing.

Civil wars, drought and climate change have led to population mobility and an increased number of "internal refugees". With these movements of populations to the most favorable areas, the spaces prone to agro-pastoral activities have increased competition for water and land and this leads to an increase of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. These conflicts are worsened because of the organization of the protagonists into armed militias and the involvement of public authorities favouring one side or the other. Sometimes, what is perceived as the farmer/pastoralists conflict as an irreconcilable antagonism is generally a competition for access to natural resources. Increasing pressure on natural resources in a context of widespread poverty and poor governance has heightened the rivalry between the two groups. In this context, political manipulation and accumulation of weapons complicate the conflict and in most cases it reduces the effectiveness of traditional conciliation methods.

For a long time, the context of poverty has increased competition over access to resources. State power has been perceived as the most effective means of enrichment. That is the reason why its monopoly and control has been the main motivation behind murderous conflicts of political leaders. For Chad and Sudan, joining the club of oil-producing countries had created big hopes of change and development within the country. However, the mismanagement of the oil income as well as the civil war in the country did not allow the expected economic takeoff. The oil contributed to the radicalization of the government by providing it with the means to fight armed groups. Corruption increased in the country as well as patronage, embezzlements, etc.

We can identify four main resource problems that ignite conflicts in this region: economic problems causing movement of populations rural to urban migration and shifting stability e.g. CAR; competition over scarce resources like water, land, pastures, livestock e.g. Southern Sudan; spill over of resource conflicts from neighbouring countries and in border regions e.g. the Darfur crisis; presence of highly profitable natural national resources like oil, diamonds e.g. Chad, Sudan and South Sudan.
Example in Darfur

The debate over the environment in Darfur illustrates the complexity of a conflict that has numerous levels. The lowest level of conflict, between neighbouring tribes and villages, displays the environmental aspect of the conflict most acutely, as different livelihood groups seek to adapt their ways of life to increasing resource scarcity. This is happening in a context where traditional rules of environmental management have been weakened, and in places rejected altogether. However, even the conflict between different tribes has both local dimensions, over control of resources, and higher-level political dimensions. The local conflicts over resources have become a dimension of the wider conflict between Darfur and central Sudan, relating to long-term issues of political and economic marginalisation, amid regional tensions relating particularly to Chad. Ethnicity complicates the conflict at all levels. The interaction of these different levels of conflict is one of the defining complexities of the Darfur crisis.

3.2 Identities

The issue of identity is also at the heart of sub-regional conflicts: during conflict, people are recognized on the basis of their ethnic and community identity, but also on the basis of their territory control (native, non-native, farmers / herders). Inter-religious tensions are also very strong in the four countries. This is both natural in the regional context but also a product of political strategies (French colonization in Chad, Libya’s influence in Sudan, political game, evangelical sects ...). There is also a logic of racial domination in four countries: Zaghawa and BET in Chad, Nile Arabs in Sudan, Dinka in South Sudan and Yakomas in CAR. In the face of this growing rejection of the other, there is a gradual extension of the concept of identity to the concept of citizenship, national identity, secularism, and a greater participation of women in community life. It is mainly young people and women who are involved in this movement.

3.2.1 Identity and politics

When the resource management challenges meets the politics, the question of identity arises because allocation of state resources is done according to the prism of identity (governments consume resources to share with their families - families are part of clans) an illustration of the complexity of this resource issue is seen in the Darfur crisis which affects Sudan, Chad and CAR.

The most serious consequence of the persistence of conflicts in Sudan, Chad and CAR has been the increased tensions between communities. These tensions are usually the result of the exploitation of categories of individuals by political actors while others are historical and colonial in nature. The competition by political actors in search for power or seeking to retain power or competing over resources has a dimension of identity. For example Muslims versus Christians in Sudan and South Sudan, Arabs versus Africans in Sudan and Chad, and, ethnicity between political actors in search of power. Divisions along ethnic and regional lines are rampant in these four countries.

Identity is multiple, flexible and changing, the concept of ethnicity is not fixed and therefore it gives us a field of action to change these references. But it is intimate to people and very deep in their souls, thus the approach to these concepts needs respect and sensitivity.
We can identify five main identity problems in this region: the ethnic groups issue - when people are identified and defined by their tribe. This exacerbates competition, rejection and domination and can cause conflicts at local, national and regional levels; religion - this is particularly problematic when matters of state are intertwined with religion and are not separate. Religion is then used as a tool to discriminate and intimidate; natives versus non-natives - this usually encourages exploitation and discrimination of the powerless and marginalised; citizenship - this is used as a tool to remove rights and duties of specific groups by the state; cultural practices – these can propagate violence, unfair practices and isolation of others e.g. cattle raiding.

**An Example of key ethnic groups linked to instability**

The confrontation in the Central African Republic is fuelled by a power struggle between political elites engaged in competition for the country’s scarce economic resources. This struggle has an ethnic dimension in that it pits several ethnic groups against each other. These groups are the Sara-Kaba of President Patassé in the north on the one hand, and the Yakoma, the southern ethnic group of former military dictator General André Kollinga on the other. Although the Sara and Yakoma are minorities, their longstanding ties with other ethnic groups put them at the forefront of the internal conflict.

### 3.2.2 City-dwellers to the rural communities

Generally, there is a very high rate of illiteracy in the rural zones and in the Northern and Central Eastern regions. When they immigrate to the cities, rural migrants who only frequented public schools face tremendous difficulties to integrate into the modernity of the city and the relative complexity of social life (the importance of writing, the frequent contacts with authorities, the administrative procedures, etc.). This situation further reinforces their dependence towards their community and/or towards the religious group to which they belong; these often playing a role of mediation or sometimes real guardianship of the common life. For example, the inhabitants of Juba in South Sudan have to deal with the many newcomers from rural areas who are searching for means of livelihoods. The differences in cultural attitudes and the level of education greatly affect stability. The process of decentralization is a case in point as outlined below.

**Decentralization (Kokora)**

Kokora is a form of decentralization particularly favored by people from the Equatoria region of South Sudan. It was seen as a structure aimed at reducing monopoly of leadership especially that of the largest tribe - the Dinka - by smaller communities. Historically, the Equatorians were reluctant to join the SPLM movement because of the feeling that it was dominated by Bor Dinkas, who they believed carried a ‘born to rule not to be ruled’ mentality. This attitude urged the formation of the kokora which is basically regionalism. During the war period, because of Kokora, the Dinkas were asked to leave Juba which mainly consists of the Bari tribe from Equatoria, and go back to their region and develop it. Juba was well developed unlike other parts and most people wanted to come and settle there. The Government’s decision to move the current Capital from Juba to Ramciel, 250km away in Lakes State could be seen as a practice of Kokora. It was a means of alleviating the tensions between the Juba based town dwellers who are educated and more exposed and those coming from the rural areas, who tend to be less exposed and educated but who wish to dominate because they feel the fought the war. There has been endless wrangling over jurisdictions of its administration by different levels of government, land grabbing and/or open seizures of land by top officials, coupled with lack of standardized housing and poor surveying. The move to Ramciel, is welcomed mainly in Equatoria. Despite, the obvious challenge of this move, it will mean new developments for Lakes States where this new capital is situated. It will quell tribal animosities and overall tensions.
3.2.3 Women and youth

A key defining feature of contemporary conflicts is the ever-shifting ‘battlefield’ such that wars are often, if not increasingly taking place on the bodies of women and children in what were once considered the safe havens of home, and spaces of worship, healing and education. Women suffer the most during war particularly when traditional social support and community protection mechanisms are broken. Youth too are particularly vulnerable. Child-headed households demonstrate both the weakened state of social support networks and exemplify the particular vulnerabilities of children and youth today. Not only are women and girls exploited as resources in times of conflict, but they are also targeted for sexual violence as a strategy of war. Men and boys are also victims of sexual violence, although this is rarely acknowledged by policy-makers and organizations addressing gender-based violence. Youth are vulnerable because they too are exploited during war time and are conscripted into armies either by force or through manipulation. Gendered and age-based vulnerabilities certainly play a role, including the lack of opportunities to achieve economic stability or social status via more nonviolent or traditional means. When paths to traditional definitions of adulthood and/or prosperity are hampered, undermined or rewritten altogether, the taking up of arms may provide an alternative path to security, status and adulthood. (e.g. land shortage limits a young person’s ability to set up a homestead, a traditional marker of adulthood in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa). Young people, if empowered, hold the key to effective community development and too building a culture and attitude of lasting peace and non-violence within communities that have been torn apart by war and violence”.

The Case of Youth and Cattle Raiding

So far young men had little economic perspectives outside the cattle economy. The cultures in the Karamoja cluster value competition. Wealth is measured by the size of one’s household, the number of dependants, especially children that a man commands. To have children one needs to marry. To be able to marry one needs cattle. The cattle are controlled by the head of the household (in most cases one’s father). It is up to the household head to decide for whose weddings the available cattle will be used either his sons, nephews, younger brothers, or for marrying an extra wife himself. So, apart from the prestige of confirmed warriorhood, ambitious young men also have a powerful economic incentive to raid cattle as a shortcut to full manhood. The alternatives to the cattle economy have so far been in politics, the church, and the army. These jobs require formal education which very few men in this area have. Government authorities sometimes assume that pastoralists could easily switch to agriculture. Because of the unpredictable rains in the Karamoja Cluster such a scenario is only available in a few places with permanent water supply. Traditionally agriculture does not carry prestige. Cultivation could become an alternative if it would enable a young man to earn the money necessary to marry and establish a family like his brothers who are successful herdsmen. Cattle raiding is today worsened because it has become commercial plus it involves the use of small arms. This problem of Cattle raiding is rampant in areas where there are pastoralists who are predominant in the countries covered by this study.

3.3 Political governance

3.3.1 A crucial issue

Political governance remains central to conflicts in these four countries. The sub-region is marked by political regimes that do not seem to serve the people as a whole, but rather by the logic of resource collection and possible redistribution to their communities. This results in the use of public funds for the purchase of arms, a very high level of corruption of the ruling elites and the lack of a truly representative political system. Traditional regulation systems are obsolete; legal systems are weakened; and civil societies are perceived as a new form of political opposition. People do not feel well represented, have no confidence in the political and judicial systems, and have no control over internal and trans-border conflicts.
Problems of the State are commonplace in Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and CAR. Internal strife is mainly due to bad political and economic governance whose main impact has been community tensions or popular uprisings sometimes very bloody ones. The violent repressions of the central authorities in response to these contestations in turn led to armed rebellions previously and if unchecked will also recur in the new South Sudan. These tensions and divisions are further crystallized by denominational, regional, tribal, linguistic or clan-related fibs in all these four countries. The democratic space needs to open. The monolithic, tribal, one party system plus a weak, controlled civil society have choked prospects of civilian mobilisation or political organization. The multiplication of armed groups in a country gives rise to militarization in the country, sometimes to the detriment of civilians. “Civilians" and "military" are sometimes confused, many people claiming one or the other status depending on the situation. Public authorities use the army for their own protection, but also as an attribute of their function and an instrument of coercion.

3.3.2 Border conflicts and repercussions from neighbouring conflicts

"How wars made states, and vice versa" is a very critical issue. Today’s national borders are products of colonial boundaries that put little considerations for the repercussion and dynamics of the division. Conflict and defense have thus historically played a central role in the determination of national borders. There have been dramatic breakups of countries and increasing demand for separatism particularly in Sudan. This has renewed interest in the formation and redrawing of national borders, which is a major conflict trigger. In other places the movement of peoples across countries because of the cross-border spill-over of conflict has also caused renewed political tensions along the borders and triggered actions from central governments.

The crisis undergone by Eastern Chad since 2003 is an indirect repercussion of the Darfur’s crisis. The impact of this crisis revived local tensions and deteriorated relations between Chad and Sudan which, on many occasions, have been on the verge of clashing militarily. In order to respond to what they considered as attacks, both countries encouraged the creation of numerous armed groups in the region. This crisis has destabilized a vast regional space which extends from Darfur to the Central African Republic border. The Central African armed groups are currently attempting to ally themselves to the Chadian rebellion to fight governmental armies. At present, Northern Chad runs the risk of suffering from the collateral effects of the ongoing Libyan crisis and end up with consequences similar to those of Darfur.

There are also internationally beleaguered borders that affect South Sudan. The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda have resulted in displacement and spill over conflicts. The absence of clearly defined international borders further exacerbates the border crisis. Whole tribes have been split with one group of relatives settling on side with others on another. Some examples of this population division in South Sudan is in the western part of South Sudan (western Equatoria). This international boundary consists of the two counties of Yambio and Tombura which are inhabited by the Azande tribe, who are found in North Eastern DRC and South Eastern Central African Republic (CAR). In the south and western international boundary of South Sudan there is the Kakwa people living in Yei and Morobo Counties in Central Equatoria. These are also found in DRC and Northern Uganda District of Koboko in West Nile Sub-Region and along the Southern part of South Sudan and Northern Uganda. The counties touch two countries, South Sudan and Uganda. Key rebellions that caused spill-over include the 1960 Simba rebellion of DRC which caused Congolese to flee to South Sudan and settle in Yei, Yambio and Juba while others fled to Uganda as refugees and settled in West Nile region of Uganda. Their refugee status added considerable strain on the already limited developmental social services in the two countries causing tensions and fuelled the LRA insurgency which has resulted in the displacement of populations in northern Uganda, southern Sudan, north eastern DRC and southern eastern CAR. Stephen Wani, ACORD, South Sudan Country Director
3.3.3 Cross-border migration and trade

The area between Sudan, Chad and CAR did not historically function as a border, and even when the line of demarcation appeared on the map, people and goods still travelled more or less freely across it. There is longstanding migration and transborder trade between eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur, which continues even today and has contributed to spreading armed conflict in the region. The migration of Chadians into Darfur continued during the colonial phase as well as after independence. Cross-border trade has been important in the region, which is logical given that eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur have been oriented more towards each other than towards their respective capitals. The same applies for trade between Sudan and South Sudan which until recently was one country. Indeed, there has been little restriction of cross-border movement of goods, as governments in the region lack the capacity to control their borders. This has facilitated the regionalisation of conflict insofar as it has allowed trade of military material across the borders. It has also fostered the proliferation of small arms and the emergence of a pool of combatants with fluid loyalties, as described below.

3.3.4 Proliferation of Arms

Self-defence, retaliation and intra-community confrontations in various regions have shaped the ways in which numerous ethnic militias have formed. Various domains of the social life (school environment, country communities, etc.) have not been spared by the violence and experience eruptions of conflicts linked to the proliferation of firearms and the trivialization of unpunished violence. Cattle rustling has been made bloodier and deadlier by the presence of small arms. Disarmament and demobilization programmes have been weak in large part because reintegration of combatants has been ineffective and unsuccessful and insecurity continues to be rife. Most governments in these four countries have been unable to provide security for their citizens and consequently people take it upon themselves to provide their own security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms proliferation in CAR</th>
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<td>Small arms and light weapons begun to play a prominent role in 1982. After a failed coup attempt, non-state actors in CAR began to acquire arms from abroad. The change in government in Chad in 1982 also had serious ramifications for CAR, including the movement of armed personnel across the border. The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a number of coup attempts, suspected coup attempts, and relatively small-scale violence involving dissatisfied factions and the Forces armées centrafricaines (Central African Armed Forces, FACA). The situation deteriorated sharply after 1995. In 1996 elements of the FACA mutinied, resulting in the looting of the arms depot at the Kassaï barracks in the capital, Bangui. The following year many more thousands of weapons flooded CAR when Mobutu was overthrown in DRC. More weapons entered CAR two years later when the Ugandan-supported rebel group the Mouvement de libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba defeated the Forces armées congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces, FAC) of Mobutu’s successor Laurent-Désiré Kabila, in the north of the DRC, along its border with CAR. Chad introduced yet more weapons into CAR by supporting former FAC Chief of Staff François Bozizé in his 17-month struggle against Central African President Ange-Félix Patassé. Bozizé succeeded in overthrowing Patassé in March 2003.</td>
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We can identify five problems at the level of political governance in the region: state control – autocratic, theocratic, securocrats, kleptocratic governments all have a negative impact on stability and freedoms in a country. The government is often the principal actor and source of internal and external conflicts; military power and armed groups - when protagonists use modern weapons making the conflicts bloodier; this is compounded by the absence of legislative and judicial frameworks; absence of a vibrant civil society, political and press freedom; absence of a workable constitution and accountability from the State.
Recommendations

Conflicts in the sub-region are caused by three determining factors, namely access to resources, identity issues and poor political governance. Scaling up and deepening grassroots peacebuilding activities presents many challenges, not least the potential for generating new sources of conflict. The process requires skillful stewardship by credible intermediary organizations with a keen insight into the political environment and detailed knowledge of the structures and processes of the many inter-communal, internal and cross border conflicts. All of the countries covered in this study have either weak or authoritarian governments which in turn has an impact on the type, level and role of civil societies or movements. Others have very nascent civil societies like in CAR and South Sudan. This challenge is compounded by a race for funds and other political, ethnic and ideological dynamics.

Therefore meeting immediate needs which include livelihoods, humanitarian work and conflict management must be balanced with engaging in structural change and long-term programming. CSOs can bridge the gap between what the peoples in this tri-border area want, and what the negotiating parties and the international community perceived they wanted. They could:

• Provide civic education, democracy principle and peaceful co-existence at the community level.
• Facilitate and encourage dialogue between ethnic, religious groups and other fighting groups.
• Promote community participation and drawing attention to local, national and international problems including transparency, accountability and monitoring initiatives.
• Promote regional and local development and more equal distribution of wealth and opportunities between states and social groups.
• Providing education on the environment, resource use and management, and promoting economic alternatives to reduce the pressure on resources and the likelihood of conflict.
• Participate in direct service provision (water, medical and veterinary) to returnees and war-affected communities.

At pan African and regional level, it is recommended to:
• Complementing regional efforts such as disarmament, cattle rustling and policing campaigns, Early warning Conflict Mechanisms (CEWARN)
• Complementing efforts on regional groupings like IGAD and African Union
• Working on advocacy of GBV, vulnerable groups, children
• Highlighting the plight of vulnerable groups and forgotten conflict through ACORD’s Communication platform
• Support to ongoing peace processes
• Using ACORD’s continental and international platform to pursue issues

At national and local level, it is important to:
• Work on livelihoods programmes alongside peace and conflict prevention. The lack of immediate peace dividend can easily trigger new conflicts and inter-tribal conflicts will continue as long as there is no development, livelihoods and education particularly when people feel that there is no difference between the war and peace times.
• General awareness raising for the communities in this tri-border area who have relatively poor knowledge of their governments’ responsibilities and its programmes and on key issues such as borders and boundaries, constitution and governance processes. Various generations of South Sudanese have been unable to attend school. There are also poor existing structures in police, army and social services. Campaigns and advocacy on key priority issues such as security, disarmament, legislations, social services and education will be useful for the population.
• Promotion of traditional, cultural and religious mechanisms which are very effective at the grassroots level because most communities in Chad, CAR and Sudan are cut off from legislative affairs. At this level, there are mechanisms for resolving conflicts if well utilized and well handled. It is important to note that if not well handled they can perpetuate revenge killings and fuel hatred.
The major hindrance will be in some communities where traditional leaders or elders are not revered or listened to. Reluctance of the youth/militia mainly to listen and/or to disarm may be problematic. Tribal pride and stereotypes could also be a hindrance.

• Working on ‘forgotten’ conflicts; those parts of this triangle of CAR, CHAD, SUDAN and South Sudan which are grey areas when it comes to conflicts, have had lasting crises and some suffer due to the fact that the conflict is forgotten. This is typical when there is no vested interest in the conflict or there has been no spotlight on it. Even though certain conflicts come to an end, many do not because no solution is found for the underlying causes. The great majorities of these conflicts are internal and involve non-State entities. Such complex and interminable crises are a challenge not only for statesmen and diplomats but also for “humanitarians”, in particular the international organizations in charge of humanitarian action.
ACORD and CCFD - Terre Solidaire brings to you unique research findings on conflict regional dynamics and in particular the links and inter-relations which generate conflicts between Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan (North and South). The research highlights the linkages between the four countries, including trans-border trade of all kinds (food, primary resources, arms, etc.), trans-border mobility and population movements (shepherds, refugees and displaced peoples). It also illustrates the linkages at the more macro level, for instance the political issues and conflicts of interest as well as the influences on the evolution of the political situation of one country on the others. The main objectives of the research were: i) to assess the political history of the CAR, Sudan, South Sudan and Chad with a specific emphasis on regional geopolitics; ii) to identify the causes of conflicts in each country and in the region and draw out the most significant social/societal and economic issues; iii) to identify and analyze the role of all parties involved which assist or interfere with the present situations and crystallizations; iv) to identify the role of civil society actors in dealing with conflict issues; and v) to analyse existing traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution that safeguard the survival of populations and that could be adopted in programming responses.