Due to a rise in intra-state conflict in Africa and the tendency for such conflicts to spread across national borders, regional organisations are increasingly well placed to respond to regional peace-and-security issues. In Africa the RECs are taking on this role, one example being SADC, which operates in southern Africa. Given their proximity to and experience of countries emerging from conflict, currently, the RECs are arguably in the best position to serve as the regional focal points for PCRD.2

This paper, which is part of a larger project – Enhancing South Africa’s Post-Conflict Development and Peacebuilding Capacity in Africa – explores the role that South Africa might play in implementing PCRD through its membership of SADC. The paper is based on desktop and field research conducted from 21 to 27 September 2014 in Gaborone, where 12 interviews were conducted with various SADC officials, and members of the academic and donor communities.

In 2014 the African Union (AU) commissioner for peace and security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, highlighted how daunting the challenge of PCRD is. Chergui cited the recent examples of the Central African Republic and South Sudan, both of which had appeared to be emerging from conflict, only to have plunged back into violence.3 SADC is an important actor in matters of peace and security, but currently the organisation has limited capacity to implement PCRD. That capacity lies primarily with the individual member states. SADC is not able to make full use of the capacities
of its individual member states because the organisation operates on the basis of policy documents whose guidelines have been very difficult to implement and because control of the agenda rests with the member states, and not with the organisation itself. South Africa could play a bigger role in implementing PCRD through SADC, but SADC would first have to address many challenges. However, since so much expectation has been placed on the RECs by the AU and the UN, it is worth exploring the opportunities that do exist to strengthen SADC’s PCRD capacity.

The paper starts by examining the role of the RECs in terms of how they can implement PCRD. South Africa’s foreign policy regarding the continent and SADC is then explored. Next, SADC’s structures and how the organisation conceptualises peace and security are explained. The paper then discusses SADC’s key documents that deal with peace, security and development. The context of peace and security in another REC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is then explored to identify lessons for SADC. The paper identifies opportunities for South Africa to work more closely with SADC to implement PCRD and, finally, policy recommendations are made.

The role played by RECs in implementing PCRD

In their policy documents, the AU and the RECs broadly refer to ‘issues of peace and security’, which could mean anything from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and PCRD. For the purpose of this paper, however, it is important to distinguish between what is meant by peacekeeping, peacebuilding and PCRD, and to note that even when making a broad reference to peace and security, this paper concerns itself with the peacebuilding and PCRD aspects of peace and security. The UN broadly defines peacebuilding as identifying which structures need support to solidify peace and avoid a ‘relapse into conflict’. According to its 2006 policy, the AU conceives of PCRD as a means for consolidating peace, and promoting sustainable development, growth and regeneration in countries emerging from conflict.

The role that regional organisations can play in matters of peace and security has long been recognised. For example, in a 1992 report the former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that ‘regional arrangements or agencies … possess a potential that should be utilised [in] preventative diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building’. The report also notes that regional arrangements, for which it provides a flexible definition, could help ‘lighten the burden’ of the UN Security Council, and, at the same time, ‘contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs’.

According to the AU, the organisation has, along with the RECs, ‘put enormous efforts’ into the ‘facilitation and negotiation of peace agreements’. The challenge, however, is how to ‘sustain and consolidate such peace processes [by] rebuilding … institutional and governance structures’ and creating the infrastructure necessary for ‘national reconciliation, socio-economic recovery and growth’. The RECs are expected to implement peacebuilding and PCRD, but how do they even begin to approach this enormous task? There is still a lack of harmonisation among the AU, the RECs and the UN, and this often leads to a ‘confusion about mandates’, which makes both early response to conflict and post-conflict follow-up activities problematic.

One of Africa’s eight current RECs, ECOWAS has already been working on improving its relationship with the AU and the UN, and has been the most active REC in terms of peace-and-security initiatives. ECOWAS was established in 1975, and although
it was set up to advance regional economic integration, it soon found itself facing the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and could not escape the reality that peace is the necessary foundation for economic integration.13 The origins of SADC, on the other hand, go back to 1980, when the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established, a group whose objective was to reduce its economic reliance on apartheid South Africa.14

In 1992 SADC was founded after it became clear that South Africa was about to be liberated from the apartheid regime.15 By 1996, SADC had established its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, and in 2002 this unit was mandated to prepare a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), intended to ‘provide guidelines for implementing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation …’16

Compared with ECOWAS, SADC is a fairly young organisation and has not had much time to develop its capacity to deal with peace and security, or establish relationships with the AU Peace and Security Council or the UN Security Council. Even so, one should not assume that as SADC grows older it will automatically increase the capacity it needs to implement PCRD. Some of these challenges are covered later, while a section of this paper also analyses the experience of ECOWAS.

The RECs are important pillars of the APSA, as they constitute the building blocks of the AU

To understand the role the RECs play in terms of peacebuilding and implementing PCRD, it is important to mention the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The key components of the APSA are the AU Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund.17 To implement the APSA, the AU must collaborate with the RECs to ensure ‘full and effective functioning of the architecture …’18 The RECs are therefore important pillars of the APSA, as they constitute the building blocks of the AU, so liaison officers for the various RECs have been appointed to the AU to improve coordination.19

There are still a number of challenges, however, regarding coordination between the AU and the RECs. For example, besides the ASF and the Continental Early Warning System, there are still difficulties experienced with coordinating the other components of the APSA with the RECs. And there are no direct links between the AU Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise and corresponding structures in the RECs.20 The ASF is not yet operational; it is envisioned to be so by late 2015.21 The ASF is based on contributions from ‘regional

battalions … controlled by the RECs’.22 The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), an interim initiative undertaken by South Africa, is set to be operational sooner. Unlike the ASF, however, which is controlled by the RECs, the ACIRC is supported by specific countries, namely South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Uganda, Tanzania, Niger, Chad, Liberia, Sudan and Senegal and is ‘controlled directly by the AU Commission’.23 There are also concerns over how the ACIRC will be run, especially in terms of how it is to be funded.24 On the whole the APSA is not yet flexible enough to be able to deal with the various emerging security problems affecting the subregions of Africa.25

South Africa: foreign policy and peace-and-security initiatives on the continent

Although apartheid South Africa sought to destabilise its neighbours, in the post-apartheid era the country has subsequently become an important role player in peace and security developments in Africa.26 South Africa has contributed to the evolution of the AU and the APSA27 and, more recently, it helped facilitate the AU’s decision to set up the ACIRC. South Africa has sent troops to a number of UN peacekeeping missions, but it generally prefers to engage in mediations to help resolve conflicts.28 Notably, South Africa was involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Côte D’Ivoire, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Sudan, where its activities included peacekeeping, peacebuilding and PCRD. South Africa has also been involved in mediation through its SADC membership. For example, in Zimbabwe’s post-electoral crisis in 2012, President Jacob Zuma was appointed as the mediator.29

As a member of SADC, South Africa also played an important role in the constitutional mediation process in Madagascar.30

South Africa has been involved in various PCRD initiatives – the DRC is a case in point – but predominantly its activities have focused on mediation and support during elections. Although the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation has an office that deals specifically with peacekeeping, the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions, there is no office whose explicitly stated function is to deal with peacebuilding or PCRD. However, the new South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), which is intended to coordinate all South Africa’s outgoing development assistance, has stated that it will support initiatives aimed at

The APSA is not yet flexible enough to be able to deal with the various emerging security problems affecting the subregions of Africa
‘peace, security, stability and post-conflict reconstruction and development’, as well as ‘promoting good governance’ and ‘humanitarian assistance’. South Africa operates according to a rather broad conceptualisation of PCRD. This is not necessarily a problem, as it provides South Africa with the opportunity to be able to support the SADC region in more diverse ways.

In the South African government’s view, the state’s foreign policy towards SADC is clear: it will take a ‘leading role in multilateral fora … including SADC’ to ‘solve the challenges confronting the international community’. South Africa also states that its foreign policy includes a focus on strengthening regional integration, particularly as this pertains to the ‘political and economic integration of SADC, towards the AU goal of a Union government’ – which is also the rationale behind the establishment of the SADPA. South Africa also emphasises its commitment to ‘reflect the interests’ of the African continent. SADC has been an essential avenue through which South Africa has worked towards achieving regional integration, and the finalisation of SADC’s Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan has been significant for the stimulation of regional economic development. South Africa’s strategy in SADC rests on three pillars – restoring, strengthening and maintaining political unity and cohesion, deepening regional economic integration; and intensifying infrastructural development. The Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan will focus on ‘energy, transport, ICT/communications, water, tourism and meteorology’.

On the continent, South Africa’s actions are viewed with a certain sense of distrust, and the same holds true in the SADC region.

To a certain degree, however, South Africa is constrained in its ability to carry out its foreign-policy objectives, and this can be partly attributed to perceptions over South Africa’s hegemony in the region. Even though South Africa is expected to do a lot in the SADC region, and the continent as a whole, a theme that often arose during the interviews conducted in Gaborone, upon which this paper is partly based, was South Africa’s dominance in the region and how it is perceived by the other SADC member states. On the continent, South Africa’s actions are viewed with a certain sense of distrust, and the same holds true in the SADC region. Some interviewees believed that a regional organisation will only be able to make significant progress under the leadership of a hegemonic state, and the example of Nigeria’s domination of ECOWAS – as well as ECOWAS’s degree of success in matters of peace and security – immediately came to mind. However, this was the opinion of the minority of the participants. Most contended that South Africa does have to do more, but that whatever it does should be done as a part of the SADC community, and South Africa should avoid taking unilateral actions.

South Africa has also faced criticism over the lack of consistency in its foreign policy. According to Hengari, South Africa has ‘flip-flopped when it comes to a consistent message that speaks to the values … that underpin its constitution and the draft White Paper on foreign policy, namely democracy, human rights and good governance’. South Africa is therefore constrained not only because of concerns over its hegemonic role, but also because of its ‘flip-flop’ diplomacy.
The origins of SADC can be attributed to a need for ‘co-operation on development projects in the region’ and a simultaneous attempt to boycott the apartheid government of South Africa. Therefore, between the genesis of SADC and the end of the apartheid regime, there has been a marked shift in South Africa’s significance in the region. South Africa used to be a pariah and a regional liability intent on destabilising its neighbours, which explains the residual distrust that many SADC member states feel towards the country. But, today, South Africa is the regional member upon which the highest expectations are placed.

The question has to be raised as to whether Pretoria really views SADC as a big enough priority

During the interviews, it emerged that while South Africa is willing to contribute more to advancing SADC’s capacity in matters of peace and security, it is also faces several constraints in being able to do so. Firstly, as mentioned above, South Africa is sometimes perceived as a hegemon. According to the interviews carried out in Gaborone, South Africa should avoid being seen as making unilateral decisions in SADC. South Africa’s conundrum is that it is very difficult to strike the balance between offering help and appearing to act as the dominant regional state. It emerged during the field research that some observers view every action taken by South Africa, from volunteering its soldiers for peacekeeping missions to the creation of SADPA, as box ticking for the purpose of gaining membership of the UN Security Council.

Secondly, South Africa does not always send staff to SADC, and is therefore not always adequately represented. This is due not only to certain rules over staffing, but also because South Africa does not wish to appear dominant to the smaller member states. During the field research, it also became clear that many diplomats from around the world, including those from South Africa, do not view Gaborone as a prime posting (SADC’s headquarters are in Gaborone). Consequently, it is not always easy to find the right staff to appoint to SADC. However, this, combined with negative perceptions of South Africa held by other members, does not provide an adequate reason to explain South Africa’s staffing strategy regarding SADC, and the question has to be raised as to whether Pretoria really views SADC as a big enough priority. Is the lack of South African staff at SADC rather a manifestation of South Africa’s flip-flop diplomacy mentioned above?

Thirdly, there are some within SADC who will oppose suggestions put forward by South Africa purely on the grounds that the suggestions were motioned by South Africa. This, unfortunately, means that good suggestions do not always get moved forward. In combination, these constraints create a difficult situation for South Africa because, at the same time, it is expected that the country should play a greater role within SADC.

It should be noted that South Africa has already contributed to several developments at both the AU and SADC levels. For example, South Africa helped adopt the APSA, which encouraged a move away from the principle of non-intervention and instead promoted engagement with member states experiencing conflict. This development was crucial in terms of ‘providing guidelines for conflict prevention and intervention’. At the SADC level, South Africa was also instrumental in similar developments,
including the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, along with its associated policy documents and instruments.44

**Origins and structure of SADC**

Having discussed South Africa’s involvement in the continent through SADC, it is important to clarify how SADC is structured, especially in terms of the role it plays in peace and security, and its approach to regional development.

To better understand the organisation as it is today, one has to delve a bit deeper into how SADC came into being. It was mentioned earlier that the SADCC was the precursor to SADC. But SADC can be traced back to two separate organisations, the SADCC and the Frontline States.45 In the mid-1970s, the Frontline States was an organisation formed by Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia with the goal of supporting the anti-colonial liberation struggles of Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) and Namibia (then South West Africa).46 As these countries gained political independence and joined the Frontline States, it became clear that economic liberation was the next priority for the region. This led to the formation of the SADCC in 1980.47 The Frontline States and the SADCC are therefore the ‘forerunners to the political and security cooperation wing and the socio-economic cooperation segment of SADC’.48

The SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1992, which became the ‘promoter of trade liberalisation and economic integration in the region’.49 The structures of the Frontline States were absorbed into SADC, and in 1996 a SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (SADC Organ) was proposed.50 The SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government (SADC Summit) is the organisation’s ‘top policy-making mechanism’.51 The SADC Secretariat is tasked with the ‘strategic planning, coordination, and management of SADC programmes’.52 The SADC Secretariat is based in Gaborone, while the SADC Summit convenes annually in one of the SADC member states.

Under the SADC Summit is the SADC Organ Troika, a group that heads the SADC Organ.53 One should note that the SADC Organ Troika is different from the SADC Troika. The troika system consists of a chairperson, an incoming chairperson and an outgoing chairperson, and it takes decisions by consensus.54 The existence of this double troika encapsulates the disconnect between peace and security, on the one hand, and development issues, on the other, which characterises the functioning of SADC.

The field research also revealed that there are other issues connected with the troika system. Firstly, the troikas are, to an extent, disconnected from the SADC Secretariat. Secondly, there is no unified vision among the SADC member states over what it wants to achieve through the troikas, and since decisions are taken by consensus, this leads to a high level of paralysis. And, thirdly, the two troikas are also linked to different guiding policy documents, which will be discussed later in this paper.

Gavin Cawthra summarises the challenges facing security cooperation in SADC as ‘the absence of common values; weak institutional capacity; member states’ guarding
of their sovereignty … overemphasis on military rather than political cooperation; and problematic relationships with the AU and other RECs’. However, the field research revealed that these challenges not only affect SADC’s security-cooperation mandate, but also define a number of SADC’s intra-organisational problems. For example, just as individual states may choose to guard their sovereignty, individuals within SADC also guard themselves, often not wishing to undertake new or bold initiatives, but rather adhering very strictly to the decision-making hierarchy. There is also the question of loyalty within SADC – are SADC personnel loyal solely to their own member states, or is there a pan-national esprit de corps driving the work of SADC? This allegiance issue is something that can be improved only if SADC staff were to be held accountable at SADC level, instead of at member-state level.

The field research also revealed that SADC needs to be understood as an evolving institution that is constrained in its development because it still operates in silos. SADC will only function effectively if it is able to make decisions on how it wishes to work based on a real post-liberation middle ground. SADC’s current ‘silo’ style of operation is influenced by the people in power, who, in turn, have been influenced by the various liberation struggles in which they took part.

**SADC’s conception of peace and security**

As mentioned earlier in this paper, the AU and the RECs (as well as many international organisations) refer to issues of ‘peace and security’, which can entail various types of activities. It is therefore necessary to clarify how SADC conceptualises peace and security. In August 2001, in Blantyre, Malawi, the SADC Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. This protocol establishes the objectives of the SADC Organ: to promote ‘peace and security across Southern Africa, protecting the region’s people from instability due to the breakdown of law and order, developing a common foreign policy throughout the region, and cooperating on matters related to security and defence’. Upon closer examination of the protocol, it appears that SADC adheres to a state-centric conception of security, even though when the ‘SADC Organ was launched in 1996 … it intended to promote security in the wider meaning of the word, i.e. human security’. Cawthra offers an illuminating explanation as to SADC’s conception of security. Firstly, he employs the definition of human security as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. Cawthra then explains that SADC’s ‘various structures dealing with development and regional integration’ also address the ‘freedom from want dimensions of human security’. The SADC Organ and its subsidiary structures deal with ‘freedom from fear’ by focusing more narrowly on ‘security cooperation and conflict resolution’. SADC is an ‘interstate organisation premised on the notion of sovereign equality of states’ and ‘non-interference in internal affairs’, which inform its approach to security, and therefore, according to Cawthra, it should not come as a surprise that SADC ‘focuses on state security rather than human security’.

Article 2 of the protocol (see Box 1 on page 8) reveals much about how SADC conceives of peace and security. The general tenor is one of prevention and peacekeeping, but not much mention is made of the activities that would take place after conflict. Although subsection 2 (a) refers to the protection of people against instability arising from inter- and intra-state conflict, no mention is made of long-term commitment to improving human security. The field research revealed that the
SADC IS CONSTRAINED BY A TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF SECURITY: ONE THAT IS STATE-CENTRIC, NOT HUMAN-CENTRIC

Article 2 of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

1. The objectives of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security are listed as follows: The general objective of the organ shall be to promote peace and security in the region.

2. The specific objectives of the organ shall be to:
   a) protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression;
   b) promote political cooperation among state parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
   c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policy collectively in international fora;
   d) promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;
   e) prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;
   f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;
   g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations respectively;
   h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats;
   i) develop close co-operation between the police and state security services of State Parties in order to address:
      (i) cross-border crime; and
      (ii) promote a community-based approach to domestic security
   j) observe and encourage State Parties to implement, United Nations, African Union and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament, and peaceful relations between states;
   k) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
   l) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance.

perception of SADC’s early-warning system is that it is a state-centric mechanism. Consequently, the organisation’s peacebuilding approach is reactive and, over all, SADC is constrained by a very traditional conception of security – one that is state-centric, as opposed to human-centric.

Linked to this is SADC’s tendency to approach conflicts by dousing the flames instead of really putting out the fire. As a result of its traditional approach to security and respect for sovereignty, SADC favours mediation over intervention. Hence, a pattern has emerged that SADC tends to become involved in mediation, pushes for elections, but does not follow up with peacebuilding and PCRD efforts. This approach to conflict will never lead to lasting solutions because it does not provide room to address the root causes of conflict and, unfortunately, SADC’s trend of pushing for elections often ends up being a trigger for renewed conflict. (The case that bucks this
trend – that of the DRC, where SADC did intervene militarily in 2013 – was unique, but one should also bear in mind that several SADC member states have business interests in the DRC.

Furthermore, SADC does not necessarily see eye to eye with the AU on the matter of the RECs being responsible for implementing PCRD, nor does SADC’s conception of peace and security, prima facie, allow for PCRD to be addressed. According to some of the interviewees, not all the RECs bought into the idea that the APSA requires them to implement PCRD, so when the AU insists that the RECs need to implement PCRD, the idea is sometimes met with resistance. The field research revealed that there appears to be a gap between how the citizens of SADC states conceive of peace and security, and how it is conceived at SADC level. To implement peacebuilding and PCRD, SADC will have to adopt a more holistic approach to peace and security, and this would involve consulting the citizens. It is important for the people, and indeed the SADC member states themselves, to have more of a sense of ownership over SADC.

**Framework issues: Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and SIPO**

In the same way that SADC has a double troika system, the organisation also has two guiding policy documents: the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the SIPO. In the case of the SIPO, the revised edition, SIPO II, is now being used. The field research determined that the RISDP has undergone a desktop review at SADC, as well as a comprehensive external review, which was completed in October 2013.

The RISDP was conceived in 2001 with the aim of providing strategic direction to SADC programmes and activities, and to ‘align the strategic objectives and priorities of SADC with the policies and strategies for achieving its long-term goals’. The RISDP identifies the priority intervention areas shown in Box 2.

The foreword to the RISDP also mentions the SIPO, and explains that together, the RISDP and the SIPO are intended to ‘refocus the policies and strategies’ of SADC to address the challenges facing the region. The RISDP identifies these challenges as ‘poverty reduction, in all its dimensions, including malnutrition, high levels of infant and child mortality, illiteracy, unclean water and poor sanitation’ the ‘HIV/AIDS and pandemic and other communicable diseases’; and upholding ‘peace, security and democracy’. The RISDP maps out ‘general goals and targets’ for a 15-year period, including ‘trade, economic liberalisation and development, infrastructure support for regional integration, sustainable food security, and human and social development’. A number of these RISDP priority areas would therefore be addressed by means of PCRD activities and a human-security-based approach to peace and security.

The second policy document of concern is the revised edition of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO II). The SIPO was revised for several reasons. It had to accommodate ‘the changing geo-political environment’ and ‘respond to evolving challenges’; it did not originally provide for monitoring and evaluation (M & E); it lacked the human resources needed for implementation; and there was a need to ‘restructure organ sectors’. Furthermore, the SIPO was not able to coordinate the implementation of ‘issues that cut across sectors’.

The objectives of the SIPO II are outlined in the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. Interestingly, the SIPO II does contain some explicit

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<th>RISDP priority intervention areas</th>
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<td><strong>A. Cross-sectoral intervention areas</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Poverty eradication</td>
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<td>• Combating of the HIV and AIDS pandemic</td>
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<td>• Gender equality and development</td>
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<td>• Science and technology</td>
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<td>• Information and communication technologies</td>
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<td>• Environment and sustainable development</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B. Sectoral cooperation and integration intervention areas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trade/economic liberalisation and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Infrastructure support for regional integration and poverty eradication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainable food security</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Human and social development</td>
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references to peacebuilding, even though the protocol is so state-centric that it
does not provide for PCRD implementation. However, under ‘specific activities’ it is
mentioned that SADC should ‘promote peacebuilding activities such as awareness
programs and resource mobilisation for mine action’. Although this is a reference to
a specific activity, SADC should consider including more examples of peacebuilding
activities for the sake of clarity. The SIPo II mentions peacebuilding in the context of
mine action (humanitarian action to reduce the impact of landmines), reintegration of
soldiers and identifying ‘conflict factors’. But, otherwise, it does not specifically refer to
peacebuilding and refers to various aspects of PCRD only very broadly.

Communication needs to be improved at various levels – within SADC, and between its departments
and the member states

There are a number of areas where the AU’s PCRD policy of 2006 and the SIPo II
broadly overlap. However, whereas the AU PCRD policy specifically addresses PCRD,
the SIPo II addresses different aspects of conflict prevention, conflict resolution,
conflict responses and PCRD. This is problematic because for the APSA to be put in
place, the AU and the RECs must coordinate and harmonise their policies. According
to Van Nieuwkerk, the SIPo was originally designed with the following goals: to
‘provide guidelines for action’; to ‘shape the institutional framework for the day-to-day
activities of the Organ’; and to ‘align SADC’s peace and security agenda with that of
the AU’.

During the interviews conducted for this paper, the SIPo II was often a point of
discussion, and mostly it was heavily criticised for various reasons. For one, it is too
broad and general, so it does not provide a clear basis from which to operate. The
second is that the SIPo and RISDP are two separate documents, and many see this
separation as unnecessary. While there has been a proposal and an agreement, at
least in principle, to integrate the RISDP into the SIPo II, the proposal has not gone
ahead, and it is not likely to materialise. Another criticism was the lack of involvement
of SADC’s citizens in creating the SIPo, and SADC’s failure to try to involve them in it.

Essentially, both the RISDP and SIPo II aim to promote ‘peace and security … through
integration’ but while the RISDP focuses on ‘economic and social policies’, the SIPo
II focuses on ‘political and defence-related integration’. Implementing the RISDP
has been more successful than that of the SIPo or SIPo II. However, none of these
documents has been fully implemented to date. The reasons for this are a ‘lack of
clarity as to the relative sequence and priority of objectives’ and the fact that both the
RISDP and the SIPo are just too ambitious.

It should be noted that the SIPo II was developed for three reasons – the need for a
review of the SIPo, which had been conceptualised as a five-year plan; the perception
in the donor community that the SIPo was never implemented; and the fact that its
implementation would require donor support. One of the most significant new things
that emerged from the revision of the SIPo was the establishment of a ‘structured
relationship between the SADC Organ and the donor community’ in the form of a
Peace and Security Working Group. This new working group holds a lot of promise
for the implementation of the SIPo II objectives, but it will require the involvement
of ‘appropriate research, training and policy institutions of the region … as well as
a renewed engagement with civil society’.78 Vital for the success of SADC will be the creation of a ‘shared foreign policy approach’ in the region.79 This would enable SADC to function as a unit, while allowing South Africa to do more without fearing the accusation of behaving like a hegemon (or using it as an excuse not to do more).

As for the RISDP, the recommendations made in SADC’s review are to prioritise its implementation at member-state level, develop tools for the member states’ involvement, develop cooperation with regional institutions and improve the ‘staff situation in the SADC Secretariat’.80 It is clear that among the biggest challenges to the successful implementation of SIPO II and RISDP are the lack of coherence among the SADC member states and the various levels to which individual member states have prioritised SIPO and RISDP. Looking ahead, it is important that SADC works on creating cohesion between the SIPO II and RISDP, and ensures that the Peace and Security Working Group gains momentum. At the same time, communication needs to be improved at various levels – within SADC, and between its departments and the member states, as well as between SADC and its external partners.

The fact that the RISDP and SIPO do not provide an easy basis from which to operate is due to the generality of the documents, as has been noted by donors. The strict adherence to hierarchy within SADC has led to difficulties in efficient communication with donors about implementing the SIPO II and general reporting on activities for which donors had already provided funding. The SIPO II and the RISDP are both still heavily reliant on donor funding for their implementation, so a lot hinges on the RISDP review and the Peace and Security Working Group. According to van Nieuwkerk, a major difference between the SIPO and the revised version, the SIPO II, is that the structure of the SIPO II ‘theoretically enables’ M & E, as it ‘defines detailed activity plans and expected outcomes …’81 However, it does not appear that there is currently the capacity to carry out M & E, since donors are still receiving only vague reports on activities. Developing the capacity for M & E was also noted as a priority for the RISDP.82

There is a certain expectation from SADC that its partners must fall in with its plans without asking questions

The fact that SADC has not joined up its policies on security and development might also be a problem for donors. The field research revealed frustration among donors, arising from the fact that there are two separate policy documents, the RISDP and SIPO II. Cawthra argues that ‘since the end of the Cold War, security has been mainstreamed’ into discussions on development as well as into development practice.83 Donors see security as essential to development, and development as essential to security.84 The field research established that there is a certain expectation from SADC that its partners must fall in with its plans without asking questions – something that the donors find hard to accept. Although it is understandable and desirable for SADC to seek a sense of ownership over its activities, it must nevertheless bear in mind that as long as the bulk of its funds come from outside the member states, it has to accommodate the funders’ needs too.

Currently, relations within SADC are also far from perfect – a situation that will serve only to impede the implementation of the RISDP and SIPO II. There are a number of problems. One is that several SADC member states also belong to other RECs, which
results in additional duties and competing loyalties. This especially complicates the
duties of such member states in terms of their role in the APSA.85 In addition, SADC
member states are not all represented by permanent missions in Gaborone, which
means some have greater access to the SADC Secretariat.86 From the field research it
emerged that there are opportunities for improvement in communication within SADC,
and that improving this will have a positive effect on aligning and implementing the
RISDP and SIPO II. At the same time, external communication with its partners, such
as donors, non-governmental organisations and academics, must also be improved.
SADC member states also tend to be critical, rather than supportive of the secretariat,
which erodes the organisational esprit de corps and the collective cultivation of a
SADC ‘brand’ of solutions in the region. The problem is that SADC personnel tend to
remain loyal to their respective member states, rather than to SADC as an institution.
The reality is that staff are ultimately accountable to their governments, not SADC.

Learning from the experience of PCRD
in the ECOWAS region

Of all the RECs, ECOWAS is generally seen as having made the most progress
in terms of peace and security. ECOWAS has been described as a ‘pace setter
in continental integration processes within the framework of the human-security
agenda’.87 While its peace-and-security responses are still far from perfect, ECOWAS
has nevertheless gained vast and valuable experience over the years, and can be
seen as a trailblazer in the continent. One of the critical issues facing the organisation,
though, is that it is yet to ‘acquire a reasonable degree of real supranationality’, as it
struggles to bring its more powerful states to comply with all its adopted protocols.88
However, ECOWAS has had some notable successes. For example, by working with
civil-society organisations, it has managed to establish a practice of pre-election
fact finding and monitoring, which has greatly reduced election-related violence in
West Africa.89

Given how the field research revealed that flaws in SADC’s policy documents are
instrumental in the failure to implement regional peace and security, it is useful to
examine ECOWAS’ policy documents in this light.

The AU and ECOWAS have both ‘developed conflict-management frameworks’
to manage ‘peacebuilding interventions’.90 The AU’s PCRD policy and ECOWAS’s
Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) both have the goal of coordinating ‘more
holistic approaches … towards the management of conflict …’91 According to the
Swedish Defence Research Agency, ECOWAS has achieved a lot from its ‘policies
and frameworks guiding peace and security’, of which a ‘key accomplishment’ has
been ‘the acknowledgement of the need to address root causes of conflicts in its
protocols and frameworks for peace and security’.92 Another key achievement has
been ECOWAS’s efforts to ‘transform from an ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS
of the peoples’. The aim of this was to bring the organisation’s ‘conflict-prevention
efforts closer to the concept of human security’.93 SADC would benefit from working
towards becoming more of a community, and moving away from what Van Nieuwkerk
describes as a ‘loose collection of ruling elites’.94

Unlike SADC, therefore, ECOWAS has adopted a human-security-centred approach
to conflict prevention and has achieved a certain level of cohesion with the AU. Its
policies are considered to be highly developed, although their implementation remains
a challenge. Like SADC, this lack of implementation is often due to ‘constraints in human capacity’ and a ‘highly centralised decision-making structure’, which cause delays. ECOWAS has put a great deal of effort into establishing a ‘sub-regional early-warning network’, but has not always been able to respond adequately to early warning. It has shown its commitment to peacebuilding in post-conflict situations, but its main challenge is its exit strategies from post-conflict engagements. ECOWAS has made more progress than SADC in peacebuilding but still faces similar problems in terms of implementing and completing projects. One valuable area where SADC could learn from ECOWAS is how the latter has managed to successfully liaise with the international community.

The kind of language used in the ECPF documents contrasts starkly with that of SADC’s. Firstly, ECOWAS recognises that its member states ‘bear the primary responsibility for peace and security’, and that to transform ECOWAS from ‘an ECOWAS of states into an ECOWAS of the peoples’ it needs to resolve the tension between ‘sovereignty and supranationality’, and between ‘regime security and human security’. The ECPF states that these tensions should be resolved ‘in favour of supranationality and human security’ and that ‘civil society shall play an increasingly critical role alongside Member States in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security’.

SADC would benefit from working towards becoming more of a community, and moving away from a ‘loose collection of ruling elites’

ECOWAS views its role as a facilitator of ‘creative conflict transformation interventions by Member States and civil society’, and states that the purpose of the ECPF is to ‘serve as a reference’ for ‘Member States in their efforts to strengthen human security’. The ECPF also recognises the importance of moving beyond interventions and the need to ‘support peacebuilding in post-conflict environments’. Thus, the ECPF focuses on human security and emphasises the importance of the involvement of civil society, and the need to focus on post-conflict activities, such as peacebuilding, to consolidate peace.

SADC can learn much from this more holistic approach and move beyond its mediating stance to implement follow-up peacebuilding and PCRD. SADC should take heed of ECOWAS’s policies, and especially the clarity with which the organisation conceptualises peace and security. The level of harmonisation between the ECPF and the AU’s PCRD policy, whereby both policies engage in more holistic approaches towards peace and security, is something that SADC should consider.

The ECOWAS Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security highlights how ECOWAS has conceptualised peace and security. Article 2 of the ECOWAS Protocol states that the ECOWAS member states recognise that ‘economic and social development and the security of peoples and states are inextricably linked.’ The ECOWAS Protocol is specific about peacebuilding, making provision for peacebuilding during various stages of conflict. In the ECOWAS subregion, like in the SADC subregion, elections are often a trigger for conflict. ECOWAS has recognised this and determined to be ‘involved in the preparation, organisation and supervision of elections in Member States’ to help prevent ‘social and political upheavals …’ ECOWAS aims to ‘actively support the development of democratic institutions of Member States’ and to ‘assist Member States emerging from conflicts to increase their capacity for national, social, economic and cultural reconstruction’ by urging all ECOWAS financial institutions ‘to develop policies to facilitate funding for reintegration and reconstruction programmes’, SADC could benefit from doing the same, but in addition it should encourage public–private partnerships with SADC member states’ governments as sources for funding peacebuilding and PCRD.

Article 43 of the ECOWAS Protocol is devoted to peacebuilding during times of conflict, an activity that ECOWAS intends to take place in ‘zones of relative peace’ where priority should be ‘accorded to implementation of policies designed to reduce degradation of social and economic conditions arising from conflicts’.

Article 44 concerns post-conflict peacebuilding, but also encapsulates PCRD. Under article 44, ECOWAS undertakes to help consolidate negotiated peace; establish ‘conditions for the political, social and economic reconstruction of the society and governmental institutions’; implement ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes’; resettle and reintegrate refugees and internally displaced persons; and help ‘vulnerable persons, including children, the elderly, women and other traumatised groups in the society’.

One valuable area where SADC could learn from ECOWAS is how the latter has managed to successfully liaise with the international community.
It is evident that ECOWAS’s policy documents translate into practice when it negotiates peace agreements. The 1996 peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone is a case in point. This agreement includes an article on the ‘socio-economic dimension of the conflict’. According to the agreement, Sierra Leone’s socio-economic policy should be guided by, first, the ‘enhancement of the nation’s productive capacity through meaningful grassroots participation in the reconstruction and development of the country’ and, second, by the ‘provision of equal opportunities … especially [to] those in the countryside and the urban poor’ to empower them to ‘contribute effectively to decision-making … which affects their lives’. A third clause addresses the issue of ‘improving the quality of life of the people …’ This is followed by a comprehensive list of basic needs, including healthcare, job opportunities, access to drinking water, education and rural development.

Although one may criticise this article as too ambitious in scope or too idealistic, it does nevertheless go to the heart of PCRD and shows an understanding of peace in its human-security dimension. ECOWAS may still face many difficulties but it has at least managed to define the issues of peace and security in a clear structure that provides a framework to address all stages of conflict, from early warning and prevention to interventions, peacebuilding and PCRD. Implementation remains a challenge, but as long as there is a logical, clear base from which to operate, the challenge of implementation may be overcome. ECOWAS also clearly recognises the link between development and security – and this is something that will help facilitate the implementation of its programmes, as it will resonate with donors. SADC could also benefit from adopting a more modern approach to security, and making clear the link between development and security in its own policy documents.

**Working with SADC: opportunities for South Africa**

South Africa should involve itself more in SADC but in such a way that its activities do not appear to be a form of unilateral interference. If South Africa can manage to circumvent suspicion about its actions, there are a number of opportunities for it to enhance PCRD through SADC. Assuming that SADPA gains momentum, South Africa could use it to fund development projects in the region under the auspices of SADC. There is also a Regional Development Fund in SADC. However, this fund is earmarked only for infrastructure projects. Although infrastructural development is an important part of PCRD, other types of development also need funding. This is something that South Africa could consider addressing by means of a collaboration between SADPA and the SADC Regional Development Fund. For example, if the fund were to extend its mandate to address more PCRD activities, then SADPA could get involved by providing technical support, helping source funds for projects and helping with M & E capacity. It would also be useful if the SADC member states, like those of ECOWAS, could support development projects through their financial institutions. South Africa is the largest economy in SADC, so it would have to provide the bulk of the funding from its own institutions.

South Africa has a lot of experience to offer the SADC Organ. For example, it is one of the few countries with a maritime security capacity and is the sole naval power in the SADC region. Indeed, SADC’s maritime strategy, which was adopted in 2011, was largely ‘designed, implemented and paid for by South Africa’.
unfortunately, this has become controversial, as SADC’s maritime strategy is perceived as being guided largely by South African interests. South Africa also has one of the most impressive track records of involvement in conflict resolution. South Africa does not have too many staff members in SADC, so it may be useful for it to increase its representation within SADC – but this will have to be done delicately.

In the end, South Africa has to accept that it may not be able to do much about how other states perceive its actions in the region. Some member states will always see South Africa as the regional hegemon and label whatever actions it takes as unilateral bullying; others will argue that South Africa’s inaction is a failure to live up to its responsibilities. Pretoria should accept that this conundrum is inevitable, but at the same time it could make a greater effort to ensure that it communicates its intentions more clearly. One of the interviewees pointed out that SADC should not hesitate to receive help from Pretoria because, historically, the SADC member states have done a lot for South Africa, and that it would be foolish for SADC not to harness the power of its most powerful member state.

The more South Africa makes it clear that it is genuinely committed to SADC, the more it will be able to implement peacebuilding and PCRD

If Pretoria looks to help the SADC Organ more, it should take heed of the prevailing intergovernmental nature of SADC and try to ensure that its contributions bear a SADC – as opposed to a South African – label. It will not be easy for South Africa to help the organ to move from a national to a supranational brand, but that is a necessary step that Pretoria must take to help reduce its hegemonic image in the region. It is also necessary to promote SADC as a REC that has the capacity to address peace and security in the region.

Therefore, the question that Pretoria should ask is not how it can implement PCRD through SADC, but how SADC can implement PCRD through South Africa and SADPA. In the same interview mentioned in the previous paragraph, it was stated that South Africa must move from implementing PCRD bilaterally to implementing PCRD multilaterally. Now that South Africa is the current head of the SADC Organ, it should not squander the golden opportunity to make a positive impact on the workings of the organ, especially by visibly prioritising SADC in its own foreign policy. The more South Africa makes it clear that it is genuinely committed to SADC, the more South Africa will be able to implement peacebuilding and PCRD through the organisation.

Although South Africa is always likely to harbour some concern over its regional hegemonic status, the fact that South African stateswoman Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was appointed to the chair of the AU Commission does indicate that South Africa can pull off top appointments on the continent. Dlamini-Zuma’s election and role as chair of the AU Commission does indicate that South Africa can pull off top appointments on the continent. Dlamini-Zuma’s election and role as chair of the AU Commission did not come about without causing certain tensions, but it nevertheless inspired South Africa. Will this development have a positive influence on what South Africa can achieve in SADC? It is very possible that it will. However, it was also suggested in the interview mentioned above that South Africa must make an effort to be more inclusive towards non-South Africans. One of the criticisms levelled against Dlamini-Zuma in her position as chair of the AU Commission has been the
extent to which she has surrounded herself with South Africans. It was also suggested that South Africa should put more effort into training its diplomats to appreciate the value of other African countries and to present proposals to these countries, rather than imposing final decisions.

Conclusion

As an organisation, SADC does not currently have any peacebuilding or PCRD capacity – all the capacity is with the individual member states. Incorporating this capacity into SADC is constrained by the organisation’s silo mode of operation, by its limiting, traditional conceptualisation of security and by the reluctance of member states to let SADC control its own agenda as an organisation. The broad and general nature of SADC’s guiding policy documents – the RISDP and SIPO II – is also an operational constraint. The slow, opaque process under which these documents have undergone review, combined with SADC’s lack of M & E capacity, have made it difficult for donors to liaise with SADC and obtain clear information regarding the status of the projects that they have been funding.

South Africa’s image as a regional hegemon is not going to disappear overnight and Pretoria will have to work with the hand it has been dealt. But it can improve this negative perception by means of rigorous training for its diplomats and improved communication strategies. It is very important that SADC starts to develop its identity and that a brand of collective SADC solutions emerges in the subregion, instead of continuing with its bilateral approach. SADC staff need to be held accountable by the organisation and its policies need to be harmonised with those of the AU. Creating accountability at SADC level will also help the organisation enforce its decisions in the region.

These may appear to be enormous challenges, and peacebuilding and PCRD also pose enormous challenges. Nevertheless, it is important that South Africa and SADC as a whole stay focused on the capacities that are available in the member states; that they do not squander the opportunities that are available; and that the organisation starts to cultivate a post-liberation middle ground and organisational identity that will provide a foundation for SADC to implement PCRD in the region.

Recommendations

• The SADC Organ needs to be strengthened by more staff appointments. However, new capacity should be enabled by a review of SADC’s decision-making processes.

• South Africa can either help supply or pay for this new personnel to facilitate the implementation of PCRD.

• SADC can improve its liaison with international partners, taking lessons from ECOWAS.

• South Africa should explore possibilities for collaboration between SADPA and the SADC Regional Development Fund for the purposes of implementing PCRD activities.

• Since Pretoria has been instrumental in the AU’s evolution, the APSA and the SADC agenda, it should devote some energy to harmonising the visions of the AU and SADC.
• SADC will have to improve its M & E capacity. This is something that South Africa can help with, drawing on its experience of establishing a Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation.

• The reviews of the RISDP and SIPO II should be used as an opportunity to promote alignment between the two documents, integrate clear sections on peacebuilding and PCRD, and adopt a more modern, holistic view of security, based on consultation with citizens.

• In general, SADC could benefit from working towards being a citizen-based, as opposed to a state-centric organisation.

• South Africa should include non-South Africans in its peacebuilding and PCRD efforts. There are experts from other SADC member states who can add value to South African teams.

• To implement peacebuilding and PCRD, SADC member states should develop their own programmes that are funded through public–private partnerships with SADC governments. SADC should also explore other sources of funding.

Notes


4 Examples include the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ II, the AU’s PCRD policy, the structures of the AU and the language used in the various components of the African Peace and Security Architecture.


9 Ibid.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., 72.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


28 Ibid.

29 H Hartmann, The evolving mediation capacity of the Southern African Development Community, Conflict Trends, 1, 2013, 5.


31 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Progress made with the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency; South Africa’s role; partner countries; objectives; role of each partner; scope of the development assistance that South Africa will provide through the agency, www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2013pq/pq16ncop.html (accessed 30 October 2014).


35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.


40 Ibid., 3.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 19.
48 Ibid., 18.
49 Ibid., 19.
50 Ibid., 20.
51 Ibid., 24.
52 Ibid., 26.
53 Ibid., 25.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 20.
69 Ibid., 20-21.
70 Ibid., 26.
71 Ibid., 28.
75 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.


Of the SADC member states, only Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe have diplomatic missions in Gaborone. See www.embassypages.com/botswana (accessed 26 November 2014).


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