PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

By

B. COCKRAM
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PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

By

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THE RHODESIAS AND NYASALAND

I

THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND is dead and all that remains is for the heirs to divide the corpse’s poor garments. The experiment in multi-racialism which began so hopefully less than ten years ago, appeared to have gone a long way to achieve its social purpose in 1962, when hotels, cinemas and swimming pools in Southern Rhodesia were, as in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, opened to all. So confident was Sir Edgar Whitehead that he chose that moment to appeal to the electors to endorse his policy, only to be defeated by Mr. Winston Field, and by his defeat fatally to weaken Sir Roy Welensky’s Federal Government.

Mr. Field differed from Sir Edgar mainly over timing: he was prepared to accept the idea of a “black” government in Southern Rhodesia some day, though certainly not for a generation, but he differed from Sir Roy Welensky in that he believed that white supremacy could meanwhile be better defended in Southern Rhodesia if the Government of the Colony was freed from the federal necessity of having constantly to accommodate itself to the wishes of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He was therefore prepared to acquiesce in, even if he did not welcome, the desire of the African population of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to make an end of the Federation, and this enabled the British Government to argue plausibly that since none of the three constituent territories wanted Federation to continue, the demand of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to be allowed to secede must be accepted.

The break-up of the Federation, of course, involves the end of the Federal Government. It has lasted for only a decade, a very short period so far as countries go, but a considerable period for a government to remain in office, and ironically Sir Roy could point to the fact that less than a year ago he won a general election by a record number of votes, and that his party has remained in complete control of the Federal Parliament in which his supporters hold 54 out of 59 seats. Sir Roy could moreover boast an impressive record of achievement, particularly in the economic sphere: the Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia had developed rapidly, tonnage handled by the railways had increased ninefold, and the Kariba Dam had been built to supply power from the waters of the Zambesi.
In 1961 there was a record favourable balance of trade of £59,000,000. Southern Rhodesia's tobacco auctions had seen record sales, and Nyasaland had been given, at the expense of the Rhodesias, the social services of a modern state. The pace of development had indeed been such that both white and black incomes had reached levels which could only be maintained if the mining companies and other outside investors could be persuaded to continue to invest £50,000,000 a year in the Federation, but there had been every likelihood of their doing so.

Sir Roy's bitterness can, therefore, be understood, but is there justification for its being directed, not against Mr. Field, but against Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Butler; and for his charge that the British Government had acted in bad faith? The explanation would seem to be that Sir Roy, who loves a fair fight, was never in doubt about Mr. Field's views, but that he believed that the British Government had acted in bad faith in agreeing that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be given independence, which involved the break-up of the Federation, without obtaining the prior consent of the Federal Government. He has received support from the former Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations (Lord Salisbury) and the Colonies (Lord Chandos) for his statement that it had been taken for granted, when the Federation was set up, that its basis could not subsequently be changed without the consent of the Governments concerned, including the Federal Government, which would, naturally, have to be a party to any discussions. He has been contradicted by the Lord Chancellor on his further contention that the British Parliament could, after Federation, only legislate at the request of the Federal Parliament: the Lord Chancellor pointed out that since two of the three territories forming the Federation were still non-self-governing colonies, Parliament had abrogated neither its responsibilities nor its powers so far as they were concerned. This statement did not refer to the legislative position as regards Southern Rhodesia, which was, before Federation, a self-governing colony. That the constitution of Southern Rhodesia was, during the period of Federation, amended by British legislation might be held to point to Parliament having retained its powers, but the amending legislation was introduced by agreement between the Southern Rhodesian and British Governments, and was designed to do away with the authority which the British Government had retained, under the 1924 Constitution, to instruct the Governor to refuse his assent to legislation which might adversely affect the interests of the African inhabitants of the colony. Further if the British Government had as recently as 1961 recognised the autonomy of Southern Rhodesia it is difficult to argue that it retained
the right to dispose of the Federation of which Southern Rhodesia was a constituent part, without the concurrence of the Southern Rhodesian Government. And, if the concurrence of the Southern Rhodesian Government was necessary, surely it followed logically that the Federal Government would also have to agree.

The tendency in countries with federal constitutions has indeed always been to deny the right of constituent units to secede. The American Civil War was fought to prevent the Southern States seceding. The Australian Commonwealth Government successfully resisted, thirty years ago, the desire of Western Australia to secede. And it is most unlikely that Canada will agree to the recent demands of various organisations in Quebec for independence for French Canada. It is not unreasonable therefore to conclude that in the optimistic atmosphere of 1953 Sir Roy was given to understand that the Federal Government would naturally have to be a party to any revision of the Federal Constitution, and it would have left a better taste had the British Government frankly admitted this and faced the consequences.

To have done so would have had other advantages.

In the absence of a written undertaking, it would have been arguable that such an understanding should be construed in the context of the sort of situation which, in the minds of those concerned with the drafting of the Federal Constitution, was in fact likely to occur. In view of the strong opposition in both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to the formation of the Federation the possible continuance of such opposition could not have been disregarded in 1953 and was not therefore a new factor in 1962. What was a new factor was the overwhelming demand for independence which had become evident among Africans all over the continent in the intervening years. And within a few months another new factor had been introduced into the situation which could certainly not have been forecast in 1953, namely the change of view in Southern Rhodesia. It is reasonably safe to assume that the possibility of two-thirds of the Federation demanding the right to secede and the remaining third indicating that it was prepared to fall in with their wishes, was not a situation which had been in the minds of the two responsible Secretaries of State when the Federation was formed. Sir Roy recognised implicitly the validity of this argument when he acquiesced at the Victoria Falls Conference, in July of this year, in its break-up.

Had the correctness of Sir Roy’s understanding been admitted the British Government would also have been in a stronger position to resist the demand of a number of African countries at the United Nations, that they should, on the break-
up of the Federation, refuse independence to Southern Rhodesia and take steps to ensure that the franchise there was so revised as to make the election of an African Government likely. The countries supporting this demand have been able to point to the fact that the Federal Constitution included external affairs in the list of matters with respect to which the Federal Legislature had powers to make laws and defined them as such external relations as might, from time to time, be entrusted to the Federation by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. They have further pointed out that while, under the 1961 Constitution, Southern Rhodesia was free to make any amendments to any sections of its constitution without reference to the United Kingdom, an exception was made of certain specified amendments which included the right of the United Kingdom to safeguard international obligations. They have gone on to argue that in these circumstances *it is the duty of the United Kingdom to ensure that recognised human rights are guaranteed to the population of Southern Rhodesia*. And why, the argument continues, if the United Kingdom can decide to break up the Federation without the consent of the Federal Government, cannot they insist on amendments to the constitution of Southern Rhodesia?

It is necessary to remember at this point that Southern Rhodesia has, since 1923, and increasingly as the years have gone by, been a constitutional anomaly: a *colony* with almost complete powers of self-government, yet without the control of its own external affairs. Had it possessed the latter it would have been a full Dominion, and an independent member country of the Commonwealth, as Newfoundland was for a few years, even though it would not have been a member of the League of Nations or in all probability subsequently of the United Nations. Without such control the constitutional position of the colony approximated to that of an Australian state. The White Paper preceding the 1961 Referendum in Southern Rhodesia recognised the existence of a convention for "Parliament at Westminster not to legislate for Southern Rhodesia on matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia," and this is in fact the answer which the United Kingdom has had to give at the United Nations and subsequently to support with a veto.

This constitutional argument can be supported by the political argument that there is in fact no international obligation upon the United Kingdom to ensure that manhood suffrage, which is the specific demand of the Afro-Asian countries, should be granted in Southern Rhodesia or anywhere else. Functioning democracies are in a minority among the member countries of the United Nations today, and, while the United Kingdom practises manhood suffrage itself and
has admittedly brought many of its other colonies to independence with the prior grant of manhood suffrage, such suffrage was a prerequisite neither of its own independence, nor of the independence of Canada, Australia, New Zealand or South Africa, nor does it exist today in, for example, Pakistan.

The Labour Party in the United Kingdom which clearly shares the views of the Afro-Asian and other members of the United Nations as to the eventual desirability of the grant of manhood suffrage in Southern Rhodesia, appears, to an external observer, to have tried to walk a tightrope by accepting, sub silentio, the reality of the constitutional obstacle, but getting around it by arguing that Parliament should at least take no step to grant Southern Rhodesia independence, at the time independence is given to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, unless the Constitution is amended at the same time (that is, by Southern Rhodesia) to provide for the grant of adult suffrage. This returns the ball to the Southern Rhodesian court.

In a further attempt, if I may mix a metaphor, to pass the poisoned chalice to others it has been pointed out in the British press that, in present conditions, Southern Rhodesia could not expect a majority of the member-countries of the Commonwealth to accept it as a member, and, therefore, that it would be no use Britain giving a pledge of independence such as the Southern Rhodesian Government has asked for. Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, has pointed out that this is to confuse the grant of independence by Britain, which is a matter for Britain alone, with the subsequent approval of membership of the Commonwealth, by all the existing member countries. It points to the dilemma which will face Southern Rhodesia, which wants to retain membership of the Commonwealth, by all that goes with it, after independence, but it does nothing to resolve the dilemma whether Parliament can and ought to ignore the fundamental constitutional conventions of the Commonwealth by refusing to pass the necessary legislation for the grant of independence if desired to do so by the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia.

In October, 1963, however, Mr. Wilson lent his support to this same line by declaring that Britain should not take the responsibility of deciding the question of independence, but submit it to the arbitration of the Commonwealth. The latter has never been an arbitral body, and since it also does not vote, a decision could only be reached by unanimity. If a Labour Government had previously come into office in Britain, and if Mr. Menzies' Government had similarly been replaced by a Labour Government in Australia, it is however possible that unanimity could be found for some recommendation unfavourable to the grant of independence to Southern Rhodesia so long as the present constitution remains un-
amended. Such a recommendation would be politically convenient to the Labour Party: but there could be no constitutional justification for it.

If, in the event, Britain took no action at all, what could Southern Rhodesia do or not do by itself? This depends on what happens to the powers of the Federal Parliament and Government when Federation comes to an end.

The British Government took the view, when the Federation of the West Indies was dissolved in 1962, that powers formerly in the hands of the territorial Governments did not automatically revert to the territories in question, but fell into the hands of the British Government and although certain of these powers were subsequently reinvested in the different territorial Governments, the process of reinvestment varied from territory to territory in time, if not in content. Sir Patrick Dean has, however, recently informed the Security Council of the United Nations that, when the Federation is dissolved, Southern Rhodesia will simply take over the powers which it had voluntarily surrendered on the formation of the Federation, so that it can be assumed that Southern Rhodesia will, even if it is not granted independence, at least recover full self-governing status.

If this happens it would then be possible for the Southern Rhodesia Parliament to pass legislation declaring Southern Rhodesia to be independent, although such legislation might well not be agreed to by the Governor. It would be unilateral action and might have serious economic consequences, but it is unlikely that Britain would take forcible steps to occupy the country and replace the Government responsible for the legislation. Sir Roy Welensky has very recently quoted Mr. Macmillan to this effect in connection with an earlier Federal crisis. To attempt to do so would be contrary to all recent constitutional practice and it would be a hazardous undertaking. Sir Patrick Dean has already informed the United Nations that after the dissolution of the Federation the Southern Rhodesian armed forces would revert to the colony, which would have full responsibility for their use internally, and Mr. Field told his recent party congress that it was the intention of his Government to keep the military and air forces up to full strength. It is on the other hand difficult to see how Mr. Field could reconcile unilateral action with his statement that Southern Rhodesia wished to obtain independence within the Commonwealth and to continue to owe allegiance to the Queen: the former would certainly not be given in such circumstances and the constitutional problem of what happens when the Queen is given divergent advice by two Commonwealth Governments would be raised in an acute form. It is difficult not to conclude that she would probably be guided by the
advice of the United Kingdom Government, particularly if that were backed by similar advice from the Governments of those other Commonwealth Governments which acknowledge her as Queen, i.e. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, Sierra Leone, Trinidad, Jamaica, etc.

Independent action would tend inevitably to drive Southern Rhodesia into the arms of South Africa. This might lead to any changes in the present policies of the Southern Rhodesian Government being in the opposite direction to manhood suffrage. It is possible that a majority of members of the British Parliament might, even so, prefer this to the grant of independence as a way out of their dilemma, but it would in fact be no solution.

II

I should like now and, as a non-lawyer, with I admit a considerable feeling of relief, to turn to consider briefly the economic factors which are likely to influence future developments in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, before attempting to reach any final conclusions about their future.

The revenue of Nyasaland is £6,500,000 a year. The standard of living of its population precludes any hope of increasing revenue by increasing internal taxation and it has no prospect of increasing its external earnings and therefore its revenue from them. It has no mining industry, no manufactures, and the only important cash crop is tea which brings in about £5,500,000 a year. If the European tea estates are nationalised or divided among the estate workers the crop will decrease. The territory will have to find £5,000,000 for current Government expenditure hitherto met from Federal sources, and about £1,000,000 for interest on its share of the Federal debt (estimated to be from £18,000,000 to £25,000,000).

Nyasaland’s only other source of external income has been the sum remitted by Nyasa workers who have sought, outside the colony, the work which they have been unable to find within it. About 200,000 Nyasaland Africans are employed in Southern Rhodesia, and last year so many came to the gold mines in South Africa that, for the first time for many years, the mines had all the labour they could employ. As compared with these numbers only 137,000 found employment in Nyasaland itself. Dr. Banda has, in fact, been exporting his unemployment problem. Southern Rhodesian ministers have already indicated that Southern Rhodesian Africans will have to be given preference in the restricted number of jobs which are likely to be available after the break-up of the Federation and in South Africa foreign Africans will in future only be admitted if there are no South Africans to take the jobs, or if they cannot be filled by Africans from the High
Commission Territories. (It is perhaps as well to emphasise that this last factor—the drying up of jobs in the Republic—would have operated to the detriment of Nyasaland even if the Federation had survived.) There is no shortage of African labour in Northern Rhodesia or Tanganyika, indeed the opposite, and the sums remitted by immigrant Nyasalanders are therefore likely to decrease rather than increase, and possibly to decrease rapidly.

Dr. Banda has however steadily refused to be moved from his political objectives by economic or financial considerations, and Nyasaland has led the fight to break up the Federation. Nyasaland is therefore faced, as Sir Roy Welensky has pointed out repeatedly, by the alternatives of speedy bankruptcy or dependence upon outside aid on a scale far beyond what Britain has been able to give to other former colonies on their attaining independence.

The revenues of the Copper Belt are, on the contrary, likely to place Mr. Kaunda in the enviable position of inheriting a surplus (estimated by the London “Financial Times” at between £6-million and £8-million a year) in Northern Rhodesia. The mines of the Copper Belt earn about £111,000,000 a year, contributing last year £24,000,000 in taxation, and constitute as compact a revenue-producing area as does the Katanga within the Congo. Sir Ronald Prain, Chairman of the Rhodesian Selection Trust, has said that modern economic history provides no quicker trigger to develop the economy of a country than mining and has expressed the belief that the mining industry can look forward to continued healthy expansion. He has also pointed out that the mines are not operating at anything like capacity because of world conditions in the copper industry and labour disputes in the territory. The industry has been facing overproduction in all of its main centres, the U.S.A., Chile, Northern Rhodesia and Queensland and it is so closely integrated that orders can be switched from one to the other. If, as is highly likely, there are further serious labour disputes in the Copper Belt, there will be a switch of orders and to the extent that costs go up, output and income will also both decrease. Sir Ronald has himself said that the copper companies desired a ladder for able Africans to get to the top, but that what the African Mineworkers’ Union want is an escalator to take all of their members up (irrespective, presumably, of ability or output). Mr. Harry Oppenheimer reported earlier this year a loss of £78,000 by the Rhodesian Broken Hill Development Co., which produces lead and zinc, as against a profit of £678,000 in the previous year: he too ascribed the difference to appreciably lower prices and to “interruptions caused chiefly by the Northern
Rhodesian Mineworkers’ Union." The recent strike and lock-out at the Mufulira Mine have shown how real the danger is. While Northern Rhodesia therefore has at present the external earnings to enable it to face the test of independence with equanimity the Government will be able to tap the revenues of the mining companies for just so long as Mr. Kaunda is able to keep his demands for higher taxes and the African Mineworkers’ demand for higher wages within the limits dictated by other factors in the cost of production and the world price of Copper which he cannot control.

Northern Rhodesia has few other resources. Its manufactures are small, and although it has been estimated that some manufactured products now made in Southern Rhodesia and exported to Northern Rhodesia will in future be made in Northern Rhodesia, the need to build and equip factories, and to train workers, is likely to make the change-over a slower process than optimistic proposals in the Northern Rhodesian press may have led African nationalists there to expect. It has been calculated in Salisbury that up to 10-million pounds of Southern Rhodesian exports to Northern Rhodesia might ultimately be affected but not more. As regards agriculture, almost all the land is owned and farmed by Africans at subsistence level and nearly two-thirds of it is infested with tsetse fly which makes its early development for cattle ranching, for which it might otherwise be suitable, unlikely. The development of both manufactures and agriculture is therefore likely to be both slow and costly, although both could be stimulated by heavy capital investment. In this connection it has been believed in Northern Rhodesia that its share of the former Federal revenues will prove to be larger than its expenditure in those fields for which the Federal Government was responsible, and in respect of its share of the Federal national debt, and that some of the capital investment needed could be financed from this surplus. It is not however certain that the surplus exists. It has been calculated that during the first few years of Federation, Northern Rhodesia contributed £48,400,000 more to the Federal Government than it received from it, but that in recent years the account has been much nearer equilibrium. It is therefore unlikely that Northern Rhodesia will receive any big windfall. It is moreover possible that any small surplus would be immediately swallowed up by the expansion of the social services, health, education, housing and so on, which Northern Rhodesians have been led to expect would follow independence. Mr. Kaunda must also know that Dr. Banda will hope to receive loans from Northern Rhodesia to help the development of bankrupt Nyasaland, especially if, as is probable, Britain is unable to take on more than a small part of the burden formerly shared by the two
Rhodesias. If the prospect before Nyasaland is pomp in poverty, the danger for Northern Rhodesia is that too many eggs are in one copper basket.

The economic prospects of Southern Rhodesia have been the subject of much speculation during the past twelve months but it would be going too far to say that the discussion has led to any generally accepted conclusions. It may therefore be useful to consider, first, the probable immediate results of the break-up of the Federation on the Southern Rhodesian economy and then to consider what the long-term prospects may be. As to the former it seems clear that Southern Rhodesia will have to face a heavier burden of taxation if the present standard of living and of the social services is to be maintained. Forecasts of the division of responsibility for the Federal debt are that Southern Rhodesia will have to take over at least £135,000,000 compared with about £60,000 by Northern Rhodesia and £10,000,000 by Nyasaland, and at 5% interest payments would be £7,500,000 a year for Southern Rhodesia, £3,000,000 for Northern Rhodesia and £1,000,000 for Nyasaland. In addition Southern Rhodesia will be taking over financial responsibility for European education (£6,500,000 this year), and for the expensive units of the defence forces, the European regiments, including the armoured forces, and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (approximately £7,000,000 of a total of £9,000,000 spent on defence). Southern Rhodesia will get back the right to levy income tax and customs duty, but both are likely to produce less during the next few years, the former because of the movement to Northern Rhodesia of the headquarters of various mining, distributive and service companies, with their relatively highly paid personnel and of the reduction in the number of civil servants (from 35,000 in the Federation to 10,000 in Southern Rhodesia); the latter because decreased economic activity (particularly in the cities), reduction in the existing European population, and fewer immigrants will reduce perhaps quite considerably the sums which can be spent on imports. Unemployment will increase expenditure on the social services. The tough 1963 budget and the imposition of a new sales tax are pointers. If attempts are made to break up such common services as the railways and power supply the efficiency and economic working of both will be reduced and both may need subsidies.

The main crop of Southern Rhodesia is tobacco and, at present prices, which have been comparable with the favourable prices obtaining in recent years, the colony can expect this season's sales to bring in about £35,000,000. The exclusion of Cuban sugar from the United States has resulted
in high prices being paid for sugar by the United States and many other countries and it is expected that this year 100,000 tons of Southern Rhodesian sugar will be sold to Canada alone, the present price being about 50/- a ton (over double the price prior to Cuba's confiscation of America's property). There is little doubt that whatever quantity of sugar can be produced in the near future will also be saleable at high prices and irrigation is rapidly extending the area in which it can be cultivated in the south-east of the colony. Cattle production has been calculated to produce about £10,000,000 a year, and since the area infested with tsetse fly is small, this could also be increased considerably: from the Zambesi to the Cape the demand for breeding stock is exceptionally keen. Climatically Southern Rhodesia is much better suited for wheat and maize than most of the neighbouring African states and as the urbanisation of their populations proceeds, the demand for both could reasonably be expected to increase—provided there is no boycott by them of Southern Rhodesian produce.

There are probably more mines in Southern Rhodesia than in any other country of its size in the world, and although there is no single area to compare with the Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia, production of coal, chrome, copper, asbestos, gold and other minerals reached £25,000,000 in 1962, and on the coal and chrome a steel industry has been started which now produces about 100,000 tons a year. Unfortunately for Southern Rhodesia the prices of both chrome and asbestos have been falling and the demand has been slack in the last year or two. World demand for copper has, as I have mentioned in connection with Northern Rhodesia, been overtaken by supply. The first Southern Rhodesian mining congress which met last month emphasised the need of assistance for the gold mines of the colony, but the Minister of Mines had to point out that a general subsidy would be vetoed by the International Monetary Fund and that, while the veto would not operate if a subsidy were given only to the working of low-grade ore, this incentive had been tried in the past.

Of £127,000,000 of manufactured goods produced in the Federation in 1957-8, Southern Rhodesia produced £105,000,000. This could, as already stated, ultimately be reduced by about £10,000,000, by the transfer of factories to, and other development of, local manufactures in Northern Rhodesia, but it is likely to be more seriously affected in the immediate future by contraction of demand within Southern Rhodesia itself. Building and construction generally are nearly at a standstill, and largely in consequence of this, it is estimated that in the urban areas approximately 2,900 Europeans and 23,000 Africans are unemployed. With the break-up of the Federal Civil Service, with its 15,000 Euro-
peans and 20,000 Africans, and the possible break-up of the Rhodesian Railways system with its 10,000 Europeans and 20,000 Africans, the number of unemployed could be considerably increased. It is significant of the effect of the contraction of demand that houses in Bulawayo have been fetching less than one-third of their municipal valuations. The Bulawayo branch of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers has summed up the situation: “If 1962 is revealing, it is certain that 1963 will be catastrophic.”

The immediate prospects of Southern Rhodesia are therefore favourable so far as farming is concerned, and unfavourable as regards manufacturing and construction, while mining is likely to continue depressed. It is therefore the urban population which will be likely to be adversely affected.

The urban recession could probably be absorbed if the long-term prospects were to remain similar or no worse than they are now, but here political factors may have more drastic consequences than they have so far had as the result of the break-up of the Federation. Southern Rhodesia has been carried on the back of the tobacco farmer in much the same fashion that Australians have ridden the sheep. Much the largest buyer of Southern Rhodesian tobacco has been the United Kingdom, but if the Southern Rhodesian Government were to declare the colony independent, without the prior agreement and constitutional co-operation of the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesian tobacco could cease to be entitled to Commonwealth preference in the British market. The British Parliament, if its objections to unconditional independence had been flouted, might well decide not to reward Southern Rhodesia by making a special exception in its favour, or by relaxing the preference by degrees as might have been inevitable had Britain’s own application to join the European Common Market succeeded earlier this year. The Federal Minister of Agriculture stated in July that “the role of tobacco in our economy is so overwhelming, accounting as it does for no less than two-thirds of our entire agricultural exports that I am obliged to make it clear that in this item we can see no possibility of adequate alternative advantage. We simply cannot yield our Commonwealth advantage on tobacco.”

The immediate task of the Government of Southern Rhodesia is therefore to do everything possible to stimulate the economy of the colony quickly, and to the utmost extent of the resources available and to avoid a break with Britain at all costs. Fifty million dollars which were hoped for from the U.S.A. for development have proved to be something of a mirage, but the start of a £2,000,000 irrigation project at Chiredzi, the negotiations for the export of coal by a £16,000,000 pipeline (to Beira), the work on a
£10,000,000 oil refinery near Umtali, the plan to develop an oil-from-coal industry at Wankie, the first stage of the £3,000,000 Pangani asbestos mine, and legislation to set up a £5,000,000 Industrial Development Corporation, all have ambition at least to commend them. The moderation of Mr. Field's speeches before, during and after the Victoria Falls Conference and absence of references to independence have similarly indicated that the Government have realised the full seriousness of the economic consequences of going it alone, and the importance of giving their critics elsewhere in Africa, and overseas, as few grounds for complaints as possible.

III

To conclude; in independent Nyasaland, or Malawi, Dr. Banda will at the start be in an unassailable position and the negro countries of Africa have shown themselves to be more faithful to those who have led them to independence than their Arab counterparts have been. Trouble will come when financial difficulties have given the lie to hopes of economic and social improvement, and disillusionment leads to division in the single-party state. But a reasonable belief that if they do not hang together they will hang separately, may enable Dr. Banda to retain the co-operation of his chief ministers for some years to come.

In independent Northern Rhodesia, or Zambia, the economic prospects are better, and so long as the prosperity of the copper mines continues, no other black African country has a better prospect of succeeding as a viable state. The danger here is more likely to be of struggle between rival parties and rival leaders for the allegiance of the Zambian voters. The present uneasy coalition of Mr. Kaunda, and his United National Independence Party, and Mr. Nkumbula, and his African National Congress, is unlikely to outlive the next election, which the former has succeeded in getting fixed for January, 1964, and which the latter would have preferred to see postponed to give time to register more supporters. There is also the small third force of feudal rule in Barotseland: the supporters of the Paramount Chief were however defeated by Kaunda's supporters in the recent elections to fill 25 seats in the Barotse National Council, and, as the Barotse number only about 365,000 of Northern Rhodesia's 3,500,000 people their opposition or support is not likely to be decisive. So long as Mr. Kaunda is available his party is likely to secure the support of a majority of the voters and he has had, in the Wina brothers, two able, well-educated ministers to support him. He may, by conviction, and because of the extent of his popular support, be ready to try to develop a democratic system of government, which could hold out better long-term hopes for his country. Other African states have rejected this course,
however, and if Mr Kaunda were to be removed from the political scene, his party's position might be challenged. All African precedents would indicate that it might then try to retain control by unconstitutional methods. Zambia might in such circumstances be exposed to a greater risk of political instability than might have existed if it had from the start become a one-party state.

In Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Field has just repeated that his Government is committed to demanding independence at the time when Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia receive it. The date for Nyasaland has now been fixed, July, 1964. Sir Edgar Whitehead, the leader of the Rhodesia National Party, has recently estimated that 90% of Southern Rhodesians are in favour of independence, a calculation of considerable importance to Mr. Field since he is also committed to making no alteration in the Constitution, including the franchise without it first being approved as the result of a general election. Mr. Field has told his Party Congress in this connection that "the British Government are being singularly unco-operative and merely talk vaguely of certain concessions we might make which they would consider and which would make it easier for them to get the necessary Bill through their Parliament."

But at the United Nations, Mr. Adlai Stevenson informed the Security Council recently that the British Government "was not contemplating independence for Southern Rhodesia without amendment to the Constitution which would significantly broaden the franchise." He could hardly have done so without clearing his lines with the British delegation, or, if he did speak out of turn, without the knowledge that this was, in fact, the British Government's policy. The statements are not incompatible because it is probable that the British Government would much prefer not to publish its terms for independence for Southern Rhodesia while the Assembly of the United Nations is in Session. If they are such as to be acceptable to Southern Rhodesia, they would not be acceptable to the African States at the United Nations, and great pressure would be brought to bear on Britain to revise them. If they are such as to give the present British Conservative Government a chance to get a Bill through Parliament, it is highly likely that they will involve a revision of the franchise in Southern Rhodesia and therefore that there will have to be a general election in Southern Rhodesia before they are accepted.

Here the time factor comes in. There must be an election in the United Kingdom before October, 1964. It may come at any time, particularly if Mr. Macmillan's present illness should alter the balance of calculation: it is likely to come not later than July because no Government likes to be up against an absolute deadline, with all that that may involve. If the elec-
toral prospects of the Conservatives should improve it could come whenever these seemed most favourable. In Southern Rhodesia an election would also have to come before July if Mr. Field is to get independence when Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland do. Since a Labour Government in Britain would certainly demand greater concessions than the present Government, the Southern Rhodesia election ought to be held as soon as possible after the United Nations Assembly's present session ends. The United Nations Assembly tries to finish before Christmas, but the session has in recent years often had to be adjourned and resumed in January and February. If agreement is to be reached between the Southern Rhodesian and British Governments, it should therefore be reached, but not announced before the end of the year so that a Southern Rhodesian election could be held as soon as the United Nations Assembly session ends and in time for the results to be available before a bill is submitted to the British Parliament for passage, if all went well with it, before Parliament is dissolved next year.

In this calculation I have assumed two probabilities, that the Conservatives will lose the next election in Britain and that Mr. Field will win the next election in Southern Rhodesia. Sir Edgar Whitehead's party is strong in the Southern Rhodesian Assembly but it has shown little more capacity than Mr. Macmillan's to win by-elections. It could possibly be galvanised into becoming once again a major political force in Southern Rhodesia, if Sir Roy Welensky were to enter Southern Rhodesian politics, and to align himself with it. He has denied any intention of doing the former and he is perhaps more likely to combine forces with Mr. Field, but only if the latter were to be exposed to external opposition so serious that Sir Roy put the necessity of a national government before all else.

The possibility of agreement between the two existing Governments in Britain and Southern Rhodesia is also dependent upon the British Government not getting a fit of electoral nerves and deciding that such an agreement might just turn the scales against them. Southern Rhodesia will therefore have in some way to sugar the pill. In addition to broadening the franchise it could perhaps do so by offering the United Kingdom the one secure military base within Africa now available to it, and by confirming Sir Patrick Dean's statement to the Security Council that the use of the Southern Rhodesian armed forces, outside the colony, would be left in Britain's control.

In this analysis I have, perhaps unwisely, paid no attention to the part which the African political parties in Southern Rhodesia may play. They have been banned, reconstituted under other names, and generally harried to such an extent
that they are probably not an immediate threat. They have also shown a tendency to reject their leaders which has left them without either a Dr. Banda or a Mr. Kaunda. Mr. Nkomo heads a Peoples' Caretaker Council, but he is opposed by the Rev. Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union and there is no certainty that either the one or the other will eventually obtain general support from the Africans.

I must also point out once again that an agreement between the two Governments over independence would not by itself make Southern Rhodesia an independent member country of the Commonwealth. That would require the unanimous agreement of all the existing member countries which would certainly not be forthcoming. Independent Southern Rhodesia would therefore be in a sort of limbo. The Government might request the British Government, as a matter of administrative convenience, to continue to represent Southern Rhodesia in external affairs, and while this arrangement lasted Southern Rhodesia might refrain from asking to be admitted as a member country of the Commonwealth and so avoid a veto. Equally Southern Rhodesia could refrain from seeking membership of the United Nations and so avoid a veto there. In the absence of any other alterations to the Constitution Southern Rhodesians would, as the great majority desire, remain subjects of the Queen. And so long as Southern Rhodesia itself had not been ejected from the Commonwealth, Southern Rhodesian exports and especially tobacco, could remain entitled to Commonwealth preference (so long as the United Kingdom was prepared to give it). In my view such an arrangement could only last, especially if there were a Labour Government in Britain, provided there was continuing evidence that Southern Rhodesia was prepared to go on moving towards further liberalisation of the franchise. But it might tide over the most critical period.

If for any reason, agreement proved impossible: if anything went wrong with the already too-tight time table: if, for calculation, emotion was substituted, the only alternative for Southern Rhodesia would be to seek a closer association with South Africa and to accept whatever terms the latter offered. South Africa, itself a tobacco-growing country, could not provide an alternative market for Southern Rhodesia's chief crop. South African industry, larger and better-equipped than Southern Rhodesian, would be competitive if not destructive. But South Africa could offer, temporarily at least, security; could offer loans or grants to tide over the economic crisis; and could develop Southern Rhodesian mining and heavy industry to bring the country into better equilibrium.

From the South African point of view, Southern Rhodesia might be a liability rather than an asset. While the 200,000
Europeans might be accepted, even if the majority were English-speaking, they would be accompanied by 3,500,000 Africans, so scattered that it would be difficult to envisage suitable Bantustan homelands for them. Afro-Asian criticism would not be divided between the two countries as at present, but concentrated increasingly on South Africa. What might be welcome would be that the frontier of independent Bantu Africa would be the Zambesi instead of the Limpopo, but the lines of communication would be much longer. In such circumstances a Sixth Province solution would probably be unacceptable to the Republic. It was rejected by Southern Rhodesia as long ago as 1924. Sir Roy Welensky, answering a question in Washington recently, said that he personally did not believe that South Africa would look at Southern Rhodesia today, in any form of political association, because Southern Rhodesia had, in his opinion, gone too far down the path of non-racialism. And he added: "I just do not believe that apartheid can work in a country like ours, for economic reasons alone. As far as we are concerned, apartheid as such, is a non-starter." Sir Roy had the benefit of a week-end of private discussion with Dr. Verwoerd some six months ago and his conclusion is probably not too far from the mark. A trade and financial agreement, perhaps supplemented by some arrangement for mutual co-operation in the event of a threat of external aggression might in the circumstances be the likely limit of closer association.

It is difficult therefore to escape the conclusion that the choices before Southern Rhodesia are (1) to abandon independence as an immediate aim, (2) to elect a Government which will be prepared, however reluctantly, to make considerable concessions, particularly over the franchise as the price of independence or (3) to declare its independence unilaterally and try to fight its way with its own resources and limited help from South Africa through the ensuing economic, financial, political and international difficulties. It is doubtful if a white population of just over 200,000, that is of less than 100,000 adults, has much chance of succeeding if it chooses the third course, however firm its determination, however high its courage. In order to preserve something akin to the present system in his country, even for a few years, Mr. Field may therefore find himself obliged to recommend to his countrymen a course which he has consistently opposed and which he was elected to defeat: concessions to Africans over the franchise. Speaking to the South African Institute of International Affairs almost exactly a year ago, Sir Roy Welensky justified the Federation, and spoke with confidence of its future. The basis of his confidence was destroyed by Mr. Field, within a week or two of the speech. In his turn, Mr. Field
breathes confidence and an equal courage: it is difficult to believe that the dice are not even more heavily loaded against him than they were against Sir Roy Welensky.
I REMEMBER BEING TOLD by the late Field Marshal Smuts that what mattered in Southern Africa was under the ground, and I have, ever since, tried to equip myself with a geological map of every country in which I have had to work. Fortunately for one with so little technical knowledge the basic fact, as far as Basutoland is concerned, is that its rocks are volcanic, and its structure a high plateau, the highest in Southern Africa: it possesses therefore few minerals, but its mountains collect the highest rainfall, and from it flows the most important river in South Africa, the Orange, with its tributary the Caledon; sheep graze on the hillsides, and, like the Highlands of Scotland, many Basutos must seek a livelihood elsewhere, even if, unlike the Highlanders who emigrated overseas, they are still able to return to their over-populated glens. Like them they take pride in their warlike past, and like the Navaho Red Indians of Arizona they are the cowboys of today as they ride herd. The Bechuanaland Protectorate, on the contrary, was the bed of an inland sea, which with increasing aridity disappeared. It is now covered to a considerable depth with wind-blown sand. It is naturally at a much lower level than Basutoland, and it is much hotter. There is just sufficient rain for cattle to find pasture on the slightly higher eastern margins, but the main hope at present is to utilise more of the waters of the Okavango river which lose themselves in the swamps of the north-west. In one year in the early forties floods from it and from the Chobe, which doubles into and out of the north-east, filled every pan, and most of the north or half of the territory was under water, but it is doubtful if this had happened for a hundred years. Tsese fly, and malarial mosquitoes have kept the whole swamp area backward and thinly peopled except on the narrow edges between reeds and desert. Bushmen trot across the sands, Batawana raise millet, or fish from punts in the swamps, and the other seven tribes divide the deteriorating pastures of the less arid east between them.

Swaziland, on the contrary, is part of the broken scarp of the Eastern Transvaal plateau: it shares its mineral wealth, and its adequate rainfall, and, to the east, the warm lowveld
which lies below it: the Havelock mine produces nearly £3,000,000 a year of asbestos, much of the iron ore deposits of the Bomvu Ridge will be exported to Japan when the railway from Lourenco Marques has been extended across Swaziland to the Little Usutu River valley, at Pigs Peak there are the largest man-made forests in South Africa, sugar production is booming on the irrigated lowveld, and cotton and cattle, sheep and sorghum thrive. The Swazis had been driven into the hill country by the Zulus, but they were not like the Bechuana, the survivors of broken tribes scattering as chickens do before a fox, or regrouping around a war chief as the Bosotho tribes had done under Moshesh, but a people strong enough and unified enough to hold their own when they made a stand. This was important for life has been easier for the Swazis than it is for the Basutos in their cold rocky fastnesses or the Bechuana in their hot semi-desert. They were described sixty years ago by one who knew them well: the Swazi has "the ambition born with him to live in idleness . . . his responsibility begins when he wishes to buy a wife and ends when he has one." A traditional organisation and autocracy have supplied some much needed stiffening.

With this background of natural history it is possible to proceed to the other history of the Basutos, Bechuana and Swazis.

The first common element is that all three suffered from and feared the Zulus, but while the Swazis were confirmed in their traditional loyalties and ways, and the Basutos were unified by a successful war leader, who imposed an organisation from above and received a limited allegiance in return, the Bechuana were so broken up that they huddled for defence around the kraals of their petty chiefs in barren country where distance from their enemies was the best defence. When the British broke the Zulu power all three were still too weak to defend themselves from the land hungry Boers, the Basutos in 1867, the Swazis in 1878 and the Bechuana in 1884. All three in turn sought British protection, and it is significant that while Basutoland was attached to the Cape Colony from 1870 to 1884, it then was put under the British High Commissioner for South Africa, to the mutual satisfaction of the Cape ministry, which complained that they were only a source of expense, and of the Basutos, who had objected to the attempt of the colonial government to replace their system of tribal law by district magistrates. The High Commissioner was, of course, merely the Governor of the Cape exercising, as the representative of the British Government, the very necessary functions of serving as a link between the various territories, those nominally independent or de jure British, and of keeping the peace. The southern part
of Bechuanaland was, about the same time that Basutoland was handed over to the High Commissioner, attached to the Cape Colony and more permanently, while the rest was administered by the Chartered Company until the railway to Rhodesia was completed, and subsequently also placed under the High Commissioner. In Swaziland the British Government prevented the efforts of the South African Republic to take over the country from 1880 to 1894, but in that year, the South African Republic was allowed to annex it subject to the Swazis preserving their own system of government. With the defeat of the South African Republic it was annexed, detached from the Transvaal, and put under the High Commissioner in 1903. In this way the High Commissioner came to be regarded as the champion of the Africans against the Europeans, and Britain as the protector of the Africans' interests.

One hundred years earlier Britain had similarly tried to protect the interests of the Red Indians against those of the American colonists, by fixing boundaries, restricting settlement and prohibiting raids, and this initial experiment in trusteeship had eventually become one of the causes of the American Revolution. In South Africa, it had become an element in the developing sense of frustration which led to the Boer War. The result of that struggle was, however, the successful assertion of imperial authority, and although self-government was given to the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony a few years afterwards, a compromise was reached over the Africans: within the colonial boundaries they were, in spite of safeguards, eventually subjected to the Europeans: within the three High Commission territories their interests were safeguarded and within a half-century had become the paramount consideration. It was as if the boundary of the United States had been fixed at the Alleghany Mountains.

It is however important not to regard this situation with too much of today's hindsight. For seventy years, from 1869 to 1939, Britain was mainly concerned with keeping expenditure in and on the territories to a minimum. During these years all three were poor, inadequately administered, and provided with the minimum of communications, technical assistance and social services. In 1885 the High Commissioner wrote: "We might . . . confine ourselves to doing as little in the way of administration . . . as possible." In 1927 the Chief Medical Officer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate pointed out that operations at the only hospital had to be performed with rusty instruments under a leaky corrugated iron roof and in a room open to the dusty winds of the Kalahari. It was not until 1940 that the first Colonial Development Act was passed, and not until after World War II that planning really began. Until
then the two territories which could not avoid running a deficit at the best of times were financed by borrowing small sums from the third, Basutoland, and when this source failed, were subjected to even tighter treasury control from London because they had had willy-nilly, to become grant aided. This usually meant the end of any improvements on however small a scale. While Britain gave protection she did not finance development.

This negative policy had one useful result: it left the tribal organisations intact, and it left the Paramount Chief in Swaziland and the tribal chiefs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate as the embodiment of tradition and the focus of loyalty, and it enabled the parvenu Paramount Chiefs in Basutoland to approximate to a similar status.

In Swaziland the tradition reached back to the seventeenth century and was strengthened by the long rule of the present Paramount Chief, Sobhuza II, who was installed in 1903, with semi-priestly attributes shared first with the Queen Mother, and then with her successor as Indhlunkozi. The Paramount Chief was the rain-maker and the centre of the tribal ceremonies at sowing and harvest, at the initiation of boys and girls, and at the holding of the annual councils. Today ninety-five per cent. of the Swazis are estimated to be likely to follow the Paramount Chief’s directions, whatever they may be, partly because his directions will always tend to follow the traditional ways of thought. Sobhuza has been trying to make use of the recent discussions of a new constitution for Swaziland to assert a claim to the title of King, which he bases on its general use to describe his ancestors in the 19th century, and on the recognition by both Britain and the South African Republic in 1880 of the independence of the Swazis. He is, in fact, claiming that Swaziland ought to be, not a protectorate, but a protected state in which the ruler and not the protecting power has the final say in all internal legislation and administration. The elephant is forgetful compared to a Swazi and oral tradition has enabled the Swazis to argue early constitutional points with authority at recent conferences.

In Basutoland, the placing of over a thousand of Moshesh’s descendants as minor district chiefs or village headmen was deliberately intended to break up the tribes and to supersede the authority of their own chiefs, but it resulted in much petty tyranny and when a woman Regent was appointed in 1940, contrary to Basuto precedents, the Paramountcy which had alone kept them in some sort of order became the subject of criticism. At the best the ruler had had something of the position of the Bernadotte dynasty in Sweden: both sprang from military leaders and while both have acquired respect with time neither has very much divine right about it.
Basutoland was moreover the first territory to develop, shortly after the South African War, a National Council to advise both the Resident Commissioner and the Paramount Chief and from the practice of debate there developed political parties. No claim to be a protected state can be based on the annexation of the territory in 1868, since when it has been a colony (not even a protectorate), and any claim to Kingship is shaky compared with Sobhuza's in Swaziland. The present paramount chief is moreover a young man, educated at Ampleforth Public School in England and at Oxford, and the readier to accept the coming of democracy because he has, with his overseas training, more hope of controlling it than resisting it. The Basutos themselves, nearly one-sixth of whom (and a much larger proportion therefore of the adults and especially of the adult men) have to earn their living in the Republic, have meanwhile become more familiar than the Swazis with a non-tribal way of life, more aware of what is happening elsewhere in Africa, and more determined to assert in their own country the right to exercise those privileges of voting, being elected, and legislating which are not accorded to Africans in the Republic. They want these to come to Basutoland and to come soon. As one of them remarked some years ago, "Basutoland is ruled by a Trinity—the High Commissioner, the Resident Commissioner and the Paramount Chief, but it is not like heaven."

In Bechuanaland the tribal chiefs have been able to keep a considerable degree of control over their tribesmen, partly because of the habit of the latter to concentrate in townships (there are now four of over 10,000 in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, none in Basutoland or Swaziland) and to resist, so far successfully, the tendency of the Khamas, the ruling chiefs of the Bamangwato, much the largest tribe, to approximate their position to that of the Paramount Chiefs in Basutoland and Swaziland. The Khamas have also suffered from their tendency to internecine quarrels which led eventually to the British Government insisting that both Tshekedí and Seretse should resign their claims to the chieftainship. Tshekedí's son has just been recognised as chief, but Seretse has, by becoming President of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party, put himself in line for the Prime Ministership, Presidency or what-have-you of independent Bechuanaland when that becomes practical politics. If Sobhuza may hope to become an aged Haile Selassie, and Bereng (or Moshoeshoe II) a second King Freddie of Buganda, who is also President of Uganda, Seretse is more likely to resemble Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana.

It has been the fashion to point to the poverty of the High Commission Territories and to their obvious economic
and financial dependence upon South Africa and to argue from this that in the end South Africa could always crack the whip and bring them to heel. This was certainly true until after World War II. Agriculture and cattle raising were both inefficient, any mining was on a very small scale, and there were no industries. Since World War II, however, the British Government has been taking an increasingly active part in stimulating economic development in all three territories. Soil erosion has been checked in Basutoland, campaigns against cattle diseases undertaken in the Bechuanaland Protectorate and I have already mentioned the Havelock asbestos mine, the Piggs Peak and Usutu forestry plantations, and the construction of a railway to enable the Bomvu iron-ore deposits to be exploited in Swaziland. The Morse Commission, which produced an economic survey in 1960, was able to recommend projects which in its opinion would carry each territory well on the way to becoming a viable economic unit by 1970; the Commission considered that this could be a near certainty for Swaziland, a reasonable probability for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, but just a possibility for Basutoland. Iron ore, coal, water and climate could do the trick for Swaziland, the "great, untrapped Okavango water resources, and the coal reserves along the rail line" might do so for Bechuanaland, but "potentially saleable water and hydro-electric power" was all that Basutoland possessed. The immediate capital expenditure involved would, the Commission estimated, be about £2,700,000 in Swaziland, £1,500,000 in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (both mainly for road construction) and £2,750,000 in Basutoland, partly for road construction and partly for hydrological surveys, a total of almost £7,000,000. This probably seemed to the Commission to be an enormous sum for the British Government to find, but their estimate has already been overtaken by events. Construction of the Ox-Bow Dam in Basutoland, for a survey of which they included provision, has already started and the scheme is estimated to cost £15,000,000 in all. In Swaziland the cost of the railway is estimated at £9,000,000, and the Company which will exploit the iron ore will have to find £6,000,000. It has however also been estimated that Britain will be providing £20,000,000 this year to Kenya alone and with total British overseas aid running at about £180,000,000 a year, the totals for the territories are not impossibly high. A considerable part of the expansion recommended by the Commission has indeed already been provided. It is, moreover, likely that the United Nations will wish to make some contribution and aid from individual countries such as the United States, Germany or Japan, should enable the pace to be accelerated. While viability is the objec-
tive the Commission pointed out that their recommendations would mean that "economic relations between South Africa and the Territories, already close, must become more numerous and complex." In particular, they involved the use of the waters of international rivers for irrigation, power and industry, the development of road and railway communications and the exploitation of the mineral resources. Viability for the Territories means viability with the full co-operation of the Republic; without such co-operation it would be necessary to start thinking all over again.

What, therefore, are the prospects of such co-operation?

It is necessary at this point to consider what has been the relationship of South Africa with the Territories. The Act of Union contemplated that eventually the responsibility of the Government of Basutoland, or of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, or of Swaziland might be transferred from Her Majesty's Government in Great Britain to Her Majesty's Government in South Africa, but such an eventual transfer was to be to a South African Union under the Crown and the time and circumstances of transfer were to be a matter of arrangement between the two Governments, each of which had its own responsibilities in this connection. In South Africa a proposal for transfer could only be made by addresses to the Crown from the Houses of Parliament of the Union advised by the Government of the day. But the Crown could not assent to such a request except on the advice of the Privy Council at Westminster, and of the British Government, and the latter could not give that advice unless assured of the approval and support of the British Parliament. Twenty-five Articles of the Schedule to the South Africa Act, 1909, laid down the conditions under which any territory should be governed after transfer, the legislative authority was to be the Governor-General-in-Council and not the Union Parliament, and the Crown was to have the power of disallowance within a year of any law made by the Governor-General-in-Council and in particular all bills to amend or alter provisions of the Schedule were reserved. These provisions made it clear that even after transfer Her Majesty's Government in Great Britain would have constitutional opportunities for exchange of views with Her Majesty's Government in South Africa. With the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 and the South African Status Act, 1934, the South African Parliament became able to repeal or to make any amendments it wished to the Schedule to the Act of Union which thus ceased to be a safeguard for the inhabitants of the territories. The British Government felt it necessary therefore to pledge themselves publicly in that year not to transfer any of the territories until an opportunity had been given to all African and European
inhabitants to express their opinions on transfer. General Hertzog had himself stated in 1925 that he did not wish the transfer of the territories to take place unless the inhabitants were "prepared and desired to come in," and it was agreed in 1935 that both Governments should seek to bring about a situation in which, if transfer became practical politics, it could be effected with the full acquiescence of the inhabitants. To this end the Union Government was to work in cooperation with the territorial administrators to improve conditions in them and the Union Government in 1936 agreed to pay half the cost of certain measures. These were not implemented however and in 1937 General Hertzog stated that it was inconceivable to him that there should be much further delay in transfer. In 1938 it was agreed that a Joint Standing Conference should be established to consider matters of mutual concern and that the Union Government should set out the terms on which they proposed that transfer, if agreed, should take place. World War II then broke out. With the victory of the Nationalist Party at the 1948 and subsequent elections, and the logical development by legislation of the policy of apartheid, the prospects of the inhabitants of any of the territories agreeing to transfer became steadily less. With South Africa’s own departure from the Commonwealth in 1961 the possibility of a transfer to a South African union under the Crown became legally impossible and in 1962 Dr. Verwoerd said that he no longer believed that the incorporation of the territories was practical politics and that this must be accepted: "the United Party always talks about a possible incorporation of these territories, but, with the development pursued there, incorporation could only contribute to the threatening of the White Man in South Africa. The Government is prepared, however, as in the case of other neighbouring territories, to co-operate in a friendly policy with these territories." This statement went a long way to allay fears in the territories of a possible take-over.

In September, 1963, however, Dr. Verwoerd made an offer to Britain and to the territories. He questioned whether the form of centralised control exercised by Britain through the High Commissioner at Pretoria was the best way of dealing with them, and whether it was in the interests of South Africa whose neighbours they are. "South Africa would aim at making them democratic states in which the masses would not be dominated by a small group of authoritarians, but in which the whole population would be led to democratic rule over their own territory. Furthermore we would steer away from the principle of multi-racialism. The whites in these territories would become voters in the Republic, just as citizens of these territories living in the Republic, would be
voters in the Protectorates.” To this end, South Africa would, where necessary, do what she was doing in the Republic, namely exchange or purchase land and so consolidate the white and black areas. It would appear from the report of this statement that Dr. Verwoerd would like the three territories to become part of his overall plan for Southern Africa; if they agreed to do so they would increase the proportion of land allotted to African occupation from 13% to just under 50% and would provide “homelands” for the Tswanas (akin to the Bechuanas) of whom there are 850,000 in the Republic, the Southern Sothos (akin to the Basutos or Basothos) of whom there are 1,000,000, and the Swazis, of whom there are 350,000. The reserves occupied by these in the Republic are inadequate and so scattered that they cannot be consolidated unless they are tacked onto the territories along whose borders they mostly lie, and these reserves Dr. Verwoerd offered to the territories. He also offered to help the territories to recover white-owned land by purchase or exchange, to assist their economic development, and, when they become politically independent, to give them full consultation in a South African Commonwealth.

The reception accorded in the territories to Dr. Verwoerd’s proposals has varied. His offer to compensate, elsewhere, the whites for any losses which might be involved by compulsory transfer has attracted those who feel that they have inadequate security for their future where they now are. Some of the traders in Basutoland, none of whom have ever been allowed to own land, or even their trading posts in the territory, have felt that they cannot rely upon the Basutos continuing to give them any security, particularly if British control should be relaxed or removed altogether. The Constitutional Commission of the Basutoland National Council, a summary of whose recommendations has been published this month, has recognised the existence of unease among the traders and proposed that their interests should be safeguarded by giving them a right of appeal to the National Council. In Swaziland, however, where the majority of Europeans reside (over 10,000) and where their future might be considered to be much less insecure since they own half the land and most of the mineral concessions, the reaction has been more cautious. Mr C. Todd, the Chairman of the European Advisory Council, has agreed with Dr. Verwoerd that the economic interdependence of Swaziland and South Africa (not “dependence” of Swaziland) calls for co-operation and a good neighbour policy; but he has suggested that co-operation would best be achieved by Britain as well as South Africa recognizing Swaziland’s status as a protected state, and her independence and integrity under a constitution based on the
principles advocated by Sobhuza. These were recognition of his claim to kingship and to control of the grant of mineral concessions, and equal representation of Swazis and Europeans in the legislature, each section being elected in its customary fashion. Mr. Todd’s suggestion was also an oblique reply to Dr. Verwoerd’s reference to a “small group of authoritarians” which was, on the face of it, unlikely to appeal to the Paramount Chiefs in Swaziland and Basutoland; or to the chiefs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and their supporters. The Secretary of the Swazi National Council took the opportunity to turn the tables by saying that it was an “utter lie” that the traditionalists favoured Swaziland becoming a Bantustan, and Dr. Verwoerd’s attempt to appeal to the democratic parties in the territories was no more successful: all three democratic parties in Basutoland have already rejected it out of hand.

Dr. Verwoerd’s offer of immediate independence within a South African Commonwealth was almost immediately overtaken by events. Its attraction was immediacy but the Report of the Constitutional Commission of the Basutoland National Council has now recommended independence before the end of 1965, and, if independence is granted to Basutoland within the next two years, it cannot be much longer withheld from Swaziland or the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Its ambiguity lay in what was meant by the words “within a South African Commonwealth.” This would have had to be spelt out in detail to the satisfaction of each of the territories and would have been likely to take almost as long as the two years suggested as the limit for the discussions between Basutoland and Britain. It has also been made apparent that all three territories would prefer their independence to be guaranteed by Britain, South Africa and the United Nations, rather than by any one, or any two of the three.

Dr. Verwoerd’s doubts about the present form of centralised control exercised through the High Commissioner had a receptive hearing, because they were in line with existing thinking in the territories, but the summary of the report of the Basutoland Constitutional Commission includes the statement that “the Commission is very firmly of the view that no representative of Her Majesty, stationed in the Republic of South Africa, should exercise any function of government in or over Lesotho (the name proposed for independent Basutoland) during the pre-independence period, but that, instead, there should be present in Lesotho an officer who should be directly accountable to London.” Dr. Verwoerd’s view would also appear to be shared in London for it was announced early this month that the Resident Commissioners in the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland were in future to be known
as Queen's Commissioners, have the status of Governors, and communicate direct with the Colonial Secretary. Change of the status of the Resident Commissioner of Basutoland was deferred because of the constitutional negotiations now in progress, but there is no reason to doubt that a similar change will be made.

Dr. Verwoerd promised that, if his offer were accepted, South Africa would assist the economic development of the territories. I have already tried to show that their progress to viability in the near or even medium future will depend upon the maximum of co-operation with South Africa, which would also be of real advantage to South Africa. Dr. Verwoerd made no threats of what might happen if his offer were rejected, although obviously he would then have to consider whether, for example, South Africa's Bantustans had not a better claim on such investment funds as might be available within South Africa. If, however, the territories were to pursue, after independence, an anti-South African policy the South African Government would clearly have to review its relations with them. At present Basutoland draws half of its ordinary revenue from the Customs Agreement by which the Republic collects customs for all four territories and the proceeds are subsequently shared on a pro rata basis. The Bechuanaland Protectorate draws one-quarter and Swaziland one-seventh. At present 150,000 Basutos work in the Republic and remit or bring back £1,150,000 a year; 15,000 Bechuanas remit about £450,000 and 8,500 Swazis about £300,000. The figure for Basutoland is larger than its share of the customs revenue and the two figures together exceed the territory's total ordinary revenue. It is obvious that if there were to be a complete severance of relations between South Africa and the territories the latter could only be kept going by external aid on a much larger scale than any now envisaged, and then only with the additional provision of an airlift greater than that provided some years ago for Berlin. There are few routes over which such an airlift could be flown to either the Bechuanaland Protectorate or Swaziland without trespassing on South Africa's air-space, and none to Basutoland. If an airlift were attempted, the risk of incidents would therefore be very serious. There are therefore excellent reasons why both the territories and South Africa should do everything possible to avoid any sort of cold war between them.

What are the risks of their being unable to do so?

In the first place, there is the exacerbation caused by attempts on the one hand to prevent the flight of political refugees to the territories, and, on the other, by ever-tightening border controls which cause delay and frustration
if nothing worse, and however sympathetically the regulations may be administered. The Basutoland National Council recently refused to pass a vote of thanks to the Resident Commissioner because the members did not believe that the Administration had been sufficiently zealous in standing up for their rights. On the other hand, the South African authorities have seen political offenders in the Republic taking refuge in the territories without difficulty, and their extradition refused. The Brutus and Abrahams incidents have indicated how explosive police action can be in a tense situation. It is for this reason that the Administrations of the territories have all taken such steps as were necessary to ensure either that refugees left at the first possible moment, or that, if they remained, they did not abuse the hospitality given them by pursuing subversive activities in South Africa. They have gone so far indeed as to provoke strong criticism from members of the Labour Party and others in Britain.

Possibly the most dangerous element in the situation is the United Nations. Resolution 1817 (XVII) of the General Assembly of the 2nd January of this year called for independence for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland forthwith; for the suspension of their present colonial constitutions and the fixing of a date for general elections; for technical assistance on the scale necessary to deal with their “deplorable social and economic condition”; and for the return of all land within their boundaries to the indigenous inhabitants; and warned all and sundry (but implicitly South Africa) that any attempt to annex them or to encroach on them would be regarded by the United Nations as an act of aggression. Possibly the wording was intended to represent what the Assembly considered should be early objectives rather than immediate practical arrangements, and it is noteworthy that technical assistance was offered instead of the considerable funds which would be needed in advance but to which the sponsors of the Resolution might have been unable or unwilling to contribute. No attempt was made to define indigenous inhabitants (many of the Europeans in Swaziland are the third or fourth generation to be born there) and the references to encroachment scarcely made sense after Dr. Verwoerd’s statement shortly before the Resolution was adopted that South Africa had no longer any desire to absorb the territories (although in view of his statement in 1963, it may, for once, seem to have had an element of precaution about it. But the resolution was heady stuff for inexperienced “indigenous” political parties in the territories and a subsequent, similar and stronger resolution, if it coincided with tension resulting from some border incident, or affecting emigrant workers in South Africa might lead, particularly on
or soon after independence, to some hasty action which would provoke retaliation. The fact that this Resolution has not done so in 1963 may be an augury for the future.

Porfirio Diaz, one of Mexico's greatest presidents, once remarked: "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so near to the United States." The High Commission Territories are none of them, in the light of their history and their problems today, likely to forget how far they are from London and New York and how close to Pretoria. The memory may prove, for them, as for Mexico, to be highly salutary.
SOUTHWEST AFRICA

SOUTHWEST AFRICA is two-thirds the size of South Africa and more than twice as large as Italy. The population of Italy is over 50,000,000, that of South West Africa just over 500,000; in a square mile of Italy there are, therefore, more than 200 times as many people as in a similar area of South West Africa. The explanation is, of course, that much of South West Africa is uninhabited: the Namib desert, which is from 50 to 90 miles wide, lies inland from the coast along its whole 800-mile length from the Orange River in the South to the Kunene River in the North and is, as Negley Farson put it, just miles and miles and miles and miles of sweet Fanny Adams; the Kalahari desert of the Bechuanaland Protectorate similarly extends across the eastern border along almost its entire length, linking up with the Namib in the south. A north-flowing Antarctic current is apt to shroud the coast in cold fog and the only rain-bearing winds are those which blow across the continent from the Indian Ocean: by the time they have crossed the Kalahari there is so little moisture left that it is only precipitated in small quantities over the high central plateau near Windhoek where some of the peaks reach 8,000 feet. Not a single river within the borders runs all the year round, and only in the north-east, where occasional summer rains are supplemented by the spill-over floods of the Angola rivers, is agriculture generally possible. From that extreme corner: a narrow finger—the Caprivi Zipfel, for much of its length only 15 miles wide, stretches nearly 400 miles to the Zambesi. It is all that is left to remind us of the German attempt to link South West Africa with Tanganyika and it is so little a geographical part of South West Africa that it was for several years administered on behalf of the Union Government by the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which parallels it to the south, and it is now split into a western half administered from Windhoek and an eastern from Pretoria.

A long term Agricultural Policy Commission reported in 1948 that over South West Africa as a whole the soil had become more arid, the character of the vegetation over extensive regions more xerophytic, and erosion by wind and water increasingly widespread. Such conditions, where severe and of long duration, had brought about effects similar to a change of climate. The volume of fertile surface soil lost through erosion over the southern half of the territory had been incalculable, and where any grass still existed, it was suitable only for sheep and goats. Farm incomes here are derived almost entirely from the sale of pelts of the day-old Karakul lambs. In the north cattle can still be raised, but in the south and
north both widespread droughts periodically cause heavy losses of sheep and cattle. The most recent, which lasted from 1958 to 1963, caused the loss of over 2,000,000 sheep and nearly a million cattle, and farmers throughout the country are heavily in debt. The 1936 Van Zyl Commission reported that the average size of farms was 32 square miles, and that even on such huge farms it was frequently difficult to make a living. The Commission found that during the drought of 1931-3, the people of the territory, European as well as Non-European, had gone through terrible hardships and that many of them had been brought face to face with starvation.

Yet the country is, for the size of its population, one of the richest in Africa. In 1961 the value of the diamonds found in the coastal sands of the Namib was £18,000,000 and of the copper, lead and zinc mined in or near Tsumeb £7,000,000. The meeting of cold and warm currents produces a proliferation of plankton in the sea which makes the fishing grounds some of the richest in the world: last year ninety per cent. of the fish caught around the South African and South West African coasts were landed at Walvis Bay, and their value was over £12,000,000. What their aroma has added to the amenities of Walvis Bay is nobody's business: years ago Farson wrote that you had to be very old and philosophical to be able to see any good in it. Over 6-million lbs. of butter and cheese were exported (mainly to South Africa) and the total value of dairy produce and meat was about £10,000,000. Iscor have just spent £1,000,000 in developing a tin mine on the Brandbergs for their own use. The territory has an accumulated surplus of £24,000,000. The country is, therefore, economically viable, and may become even more so if the present widespread search should prove the existence of oil fields.

It is political uncertainty which now, as it has done almost throughout the past century, shadows the present and clouds the future. The middle of the 19th century saw two tribes, the Hereros, of whom there were about 80,000 in the Kaokoveld and adjacent north-west, and the Hottentot Namas, numbering about 40,000 in the south centre, fighting for control of the Windhoek plateau which lay between them. Helped by Hottentot immigrants from the Cape, under Jonker Afrikaner, who brought firearms with them, the Namas were victorious from 1840 to 1863, but were beaten in that year, and decisively in 1880, being saved again by the arrival of a further group of immigrants, the Rehoboth Bastards, a Coloured Community which settled as a second barrier, somewhat further to the south than Jonker Afrikaner had done. The latter were, in turn, too few to have stopped the southward advance of the Hereros for long had not the Germans
annexed the whole territory shortly afterwards, and interposed their troops from Swakopmund to Windhoek, between the two tribes. Both fought the Germans, but the Namas, influenced by the Bastards, eventually linked up with them when they proceeded to drive the Hereros, whom they split, back into the Kaokoveld to the north-west or eastwards into Bchuanaland Protectorate. In the process the Hereros were reduced to about 25,000. I have found the numbers 15,000; 20,000; 25,000 and 30,000 quoted and have chosen one of the higher ones to account for a subsequent, very slow increase which would have been the most that could have occurred if there is any foundation for the reports that the Herero women refused in despair to bear children for ten years. The German military Governor wrote: "At the cost of several hundred millions of marks (£30,000,000) and several thousand German soldiers, we have, of the three business assets of the Protectorate—mining, farming and native labour—destroyed the second entirely and two-thirds of the last." The Hereros, only the toughest of whom survived, developed a lasting hatred of Europeans, and John Buchan, the novelist ex-member of Milner's kindergarten, produced, for the British Government, a Blue Book of German atrocities in South West Africa which is still being quoted at New York today.

The outbreak of the 1914 war saw the beginning of conflict between Europeans in South West Africa. "Are you with us?" telegraphed General Smuts. "To the death" came the answer. "Who are we fighting?" In three months 15,000 (again a guess. I have totalled the figures given by the late General Collyer in his book on the campaign, from the various separate forces employed, but these coalesce, were divided and reconstituted several times. In one account they became 50,000) South Africans forced the surrender of 9,000 German troops and occupied the whole territory. I have been told that General Smuts was so determined that South West Africa should henceforth be South African that he refused all British or other outside help in the campaign in order to prevent any rival claimants appearing at the Peace Conference at the end of the war. When this met at Versailles, President Wilson of the United States was determined to prevent, if possible, any further extension of colonial territories. In the end a compromise was reached by which the former Turkish and German territories were left in the hands of their conquerors, but subject to mandates which laid down conditions for the welfare of the inhabitants, prohibited certain actions by the administering governments, and required the latter to make annual reports to the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva. The Mandates were divided into three classes, A
Mandates for countries which were eventually to become independent (the ex-Turkish territories of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan), B Mandates for those in which there was to be free trade with all countries (Togoland, the Cameroons, Tanganyika and Ruanda Urundi) and C class Mandates whose future was declared to be integration with the administering (adjacent) country: these were South West Africa, North-East New Guinea, Western Samoa, the Carolines, Marshalls and Nauru. When President Wilson indignantly remarked to Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia, that it appeared that Australia intended to keep North-East New Guinea whatever the Conference decided, Mr. Hughes replied “that’s about the size of it, Mr. President,” and that was also about the size of it so far as South West Africa was concerned. There is no room for doubt that the C Mandates were intended at the time to be a form of camouflaged annexation; the restrictions on the authority of the administering country were, therefore, few.

Article 2 of the Mandate for South West Africa stated that the Mandatory “shall have full power of administration over the territory . . . as an integral portion of the Union and may apply the laws of the Union . . . to the territory subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require.” Clearly the laws of the Union were not considered in 1920 to be such as to be unsuitable of application to South West Africa, although they failed to provide for universal suffrage, and did legalise racial discrimination, job reservation, the pass system and the recruitment of labour for work in the mines. The Mandate went on to specify particular obligations.

1. To promote the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants. (This must either have been considered to be attainable under the laws of the Union, or was a pious hope.)

2. To prohibit the slave trade and forced labour except for essential public works and services. (Forced labour at the time represented compulsory labour without payment, and often without provision of food or shelter.)

3. To prohibit the traffic in arms and ammunition, and the supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives. (The one was to keep the peace and the other might now be considered to be an unjustified infringement of individual liberty.)

4. To prohibit the military training of the natives other than for internal police and local defence, and the establishment of military bases and fortifications. (This looked backwards to the use of askaris by the Germans in World War I.)
5. To ensure freedom of conscience and free entry of missionaries. (This was more of a hint to Portugal and Belgium, both of whom tended to exclude Protestant missionaries, than a needed injunction to South Africa.)

6. To submit an annual report to the Council of the League of Nations.

All these conditions were observed by the Union and during the next twenty years it is safe to say that the Permanent Mandates Commission, the body of individual experts appointed to assist the Council of the League by examining the annual reports, tended to regard the Union's administration of South West Africa as a model to be followed rather than condemned. In stating this I was relying upon my own memories of attendance at the Commission, but I have since chanced upon the statement by a foreign delegate to the League of Nations that "the South Africans had established an indirect rule which could be both a model and a laboratory for any Mandate in Africa."

There were several reasons for this favourable judgment. The members of the Commission were chosen for their experience of colonial administration and were much better informed about conditions in colonial territories than those members of the Trusteeship Council who after World War II represented non-administering countries (at least in the early years of the Council's existence); they talked the same language as the administering officials who reported to them and each respected and gave due weight to the views of the other: those members of the Commission who concentrated on particular aspects rather than particular territories were concerned with social or economic rather than political development, e.g. Mile. Begtrup of Denmark concerned herself mainly with the position of women; but mainly perhaps because such political criticisms as were made came, where "C" mandates were concerned, from Germany, the former administering country, and were concentrated on the treatment of those German settlers who had remained: they did not come from Asians or Africans. South Africa had, at the end of World War I, repatriated some 6,000 German soldiers, administrators and others who did not wish to remain, but over 10,000 had been allowed to stay.

When the Advisory Council asked the Union Government, in 1922, to grant a form of self-government to the territory, the latter was ready to do so, on the sole condition that any German who wanted to vote must first become naturalised. To facilitate this the Union Government was even ready to grant automatic mass naturalisation to all who did not wish to contract out, and the German Government agreed, in 1923, to use its good offices to persuade those settlers who had remained to accept this concession. Of 3,400 adult male
German residents, only 240 contracted out. A legislative Assembly and Executive Committee, and an Advisory Council were then set up in 1925 and at the first election in 1926 the German candidates won 7 out of 12 seats in the Assembly. From the German point of view this was model administration and all seemed set fair in South West Africa.

Then as so often before and afterwards, everything seemed to go wrong overnight. The honeymoon with the German settlers ended. During the twenties many South Africans, mostly civil servants or Afrikaans-speaking farmers had come to the territory and by 1929 had so increased in number, that they won 8 out of 12 seats. The world depression then hit South West Africa and was followed by a long and severe drought; diamond and copper production was brought to a standstill, because stocks could not be sold, and the whole country was denuded of grass. The Nazi party took full advantage of the resultant discontent in South West Africa, as it had in Germany, and demands were made, not for further measures of self-government, but for the return of the territory to Germany. This alarmed the Afrikaner majority in the Legislative Council which, in 1934, asked for incorporation of the territory in the Union. In turn the Nazi Party redoubled its activity. The Union Government followed the time-honoured precedent of setting up a Commission to make recommendations for which it hesitated to take responsibility itself and the Van Zyl Commission reported in 1936 that “it is common cause in South West Africa that uncertainty as to the political future of the country is the basic reason for the dissatisfaction now prevalent. It retards the development of the country, makes investors of capital shy and has an unsettling effect on the inhabitants. The result is that they are inordinately preoccupied with politics, not the practical politics relating to the good government and economic advancement of the territory, or touching upon their daily lives, but matters obscure and subtle, remote from use as far as their constitution is concerned, relating to world politics and the international situation.” This diagnosis would be equally true today.

All the Commissioners were agreed that in the circumstances the existing Constitution should be repealed and that steps should be taken to strengthen the Administration. They were unable, however, to agree on what form of Government should replace it. Mr. Justice van Zyl recommended the administration of South West Africa as an integral part of the Union as envisaged by the Mandate, since this would improve the administration and reduce the possibility of subversion from outside; if it could become a fifth province so much the better. Mr. Justice van den Heever considered that the uncer-
tainty was inherent in the Mandate itself, that incorporation, if subject to the Mandate could only be an administrative measure, and that action should therefore be limited to setting up an administrative Commission of Government with a Public Servant as Administrator. Dr. Holloway rejected the latter course as too autocratic, agreed with Mr. van Zyl as to administrative integration with the Union, but considered that to make South West Africa a fifth province, with an elected legislative Council with the usual powers of a Provincial Council, would be to perpetuate the existing weakness. He therefore proposed that Justice and Police, Native Affairs, Land Settlement, Education, Mining and the Budget should be removed from the scope of the local legislature and responsibility assumed directly by the Union Government. This would have left only Agriculture, Postal Services, Public Works, Roads and Bridges and other Local Government activities to the legislative Assembly which, he hoped, would not prove emotional. The Union Government hesitated to choose between three courses, any of which would have provoked an outburst in Germany, but as the situation deteriorated in the territory, as well as in Europe, they were persuaded by the Minister of Justice, General Smuts, to reinforce the police in South West Africa with 300 members of the South African Police (just in time to prevent any attempt at subversion at the time of Hitler's birthday early in 1939) and soon afterwards to transfer control of the South West African police to the Union Government. When World War II broke out later in the year, these steps, and the fact that by this time South Africans outnumbered the Germans in the territory by nearly two to one, sufficed to prevent any uprising. Although a number of Germans were interned, during some or all of the war years, order was kept without much difficulty. But the South African inhabitants did not want to take any more chances: in 1943 the Legislative Assembly unanimously requested the Union Government to arrange for the termination of the Mandate and the incorporation of South West Africa within the Union, and a similar resolution was again unanimously adopted in 1946. The Union Government informed the United Nations of this request but added that it considered that the non-European inhabitants of the territory should also be enabled to express their opinion upon this proposal. A subsequent canvass indicated that 208,850 were in favour of incorporation and 33,520 against, while the views of 56,000 could not be ascertained.

The Union Government therefore refused to sign an agreement with the United Nations putting South West Africa under trusteeship, but did not at the time take steps to incorporate the territory as it was still hopeful of securing international agreement to this course. To be logical it contended that
its obligation to report to the Council of the League of Nations
had lapsed with the dissolution of the League and sent no fur-
ther report to the United Nations. The Assembly tried to insist
upon a trusteeship agreement but in 1950 the International
Court, to which the Assembly had referred the question found,
by 8 votes to 6, "that the provisions of Chapter XII of the
Charter do not impose on the Union of South Africa a legal
obligation to place the territory under the Trusteeship
system."

On the other hand the Court found, by 12 to 2, that the
Union continued to "have the international obligations stated
in Article 22 of the Covenant, and in the mandate, as well as
the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants
—the supervisory functions to be exercised by the United
Nations, to which the annual reports and the petitions are to
be submitted." The Court cautiously did not specify the
responsible body at the United Nations, which, by analogy,
might have been assumed to be the Security Council and not
the Assembly. But it similarly decided that reference in the
mandate to the Permanent Court of International Justice as
the arbiter of disputes over the carrying out of the Mandate
should be replaced by a reference to itself as the Successor
Court. The British and Canadian judges of the Court dissented
and indicated that in their view the obligations relating to
reports accountability to the League of Nations and super-
vision by it had lapsed with the League's dissolution. The
Court was however unanimous in finding that "the competence
to determine and modify the international status of the Terri-
tory rests with the Union of South Africa, acting with the
consent of the United Nations." The initiative lay therefor
with the Union, not with the United Nations.

The Union was however in the awkward position that it
could not yield an inch without being pushed a mile. If
it accepted the authority of the United Nations it would have
to report to it, to submit petitions from any disgruntled
inhabitant of the territory and to justify its every action to
critics who had already shown, in the debates over the posi-
tion of Indians in Natal, that they would be hostile, persistent
and implacable. The Government at first sought to circumvent
the finding of the Court by offering to conclude a new agree-
ment for the territory with the remaining Allied and Associated
Powers which had conferred the Mandate on South Africa in
1919: France, the United Kingdom and the United States of
America, as distinct from the League of Nations which had
subsequently approved its terms. But the Assembly in 1953
affirmed that the supervision of South Africa's administration
of the territory, although it should not exceed that which had
been applied under the mandates system, should be exercised
by the United Nations and that the Union should therefore assume its obligations to the United Nations and not to the three Powers as proposed. The three Powers were, however, able to persuade the Assembly in 1957 to establish a Good Offices Committee consisting of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Brazil (to have included France as the third member would have gone too far towards accepting the Union’s contention about the Allied and Associated Powers for this to be acceptable to the Assembly) and this committee first discussed with the Union Government in 1958 and then recommended to the Assembly, a suggestion that the territory be partitioned, the northern half to be placed under the trusteeship system, the balance to be annexed to the Union. The Assembly however rejected the annexation of any part of the territory as a basis for a solution. From this point both parties to the dispute seemed to be moving on to less defensible ground, the Union in taking steps towards unilateral integration of the whole territory, and the Assembly towards the argument that the situation within the territory is becoming a threat to the peace of the world, and therefore that the Security Council can properly take cognisance of it with a view to preventive action against South Africa.

Such a contention must of course be based on evidence that the internal situation is so oppressive, and therefore so explosive, that it could lead to violence on such a scale that external intervention could become so imminent that only international action could keep the peace. It is therefore necessary at this point to revert to the internal situation of the territory.

It is almost unnecessary to say that the pre-1939 condition of bitter opposition between the German and the South African elements of the European population had almost disappeared. The latter now outnumber the former by 3, instead of 2, to 1, and the present dominant party is a coalition of the Germans and the South African Nationalist Party in the territory, which is opposed by a United Party opposition drawing its support from the English-speaking minority (the smallest of the three linguistic groups), a section of the Afrikaans-speaking majority and some Germans. The main pre-occupation is still the political uncertainty as to the future of the territory but both parties share this pre-occupation and would be likely to welcome complete incorporation of the territory within the Republic if this would end the uncertainty. The economic uncertainty which was a secondary but still strong factor in the thirties has disappeared. Attempts at subversion do not therefore come from within the European group as they did in 1936.

What then is the situation of the non-European popula-
tion? The various reserves are contiguous in the north and much larger there than elsewhere. In the centre north is that occupied by the Ovambos, Bantu agriculturists who number about 200,000. They are governed by their own chiefs and councillors, live according to their own laws and customs and manage their own affairs. They live in small kraals; have no villages and are eminently peaceable; for many years a single officer, Major Hahn, was responsible for all contact with them and even today there are only three. Although the Ovambos occupy the best watered part of the territory, the density of population in the reserve is about 12 to the square mile and their most urgent need is additional water. If, as forecast, the supply of this from dams on the Kunene River is one of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, and can be arranged with the Portuguese Government, the Ovambos, who comprise half the non-European population, will be difficult to enrol in any list of the discontented. To the east of the Ovambos is the Okavango reserve, about three-fifths the size, but with a population of only 30,000, who live along the fringes of the Okavango River and are cut off to the south by harsh desert country. To the west is the largest reserve, the Kaokoveld, but it has a population of only 13,000, mostly poor relations of the Hereros: the whole reserve is rugged and arid. In the eastern part of the Caprivi Zipfel a few thousand share the forests and swamps of an area as big as Swaziland with vast herds of game. No European is allowed to settle in any part of this vast northern area, or to enter it without a permit; it is outside the Police(d) Zone and it is cut off from the centre of the territory by the largest game reserve in Africa, which covers 38,000 square miles around the Etosha Pan. There are no armed forces or police in any of these reserves, but in 1961 the Police Zone was extended over the Game Reserve to the southern borders of the group of northern reserves.

The other components of the "indigenous" populations are to be found scattered over the southern two-thirds of the territory. In the mainly desert, southern third are some Hottentots belonging to small groups which crossed over the Orange River from the Cape Colony; two small Coloured communities, the 9,000 or so "basters" who live in the 5,000 square mile Rehoboth Gebiede, where they have their own Council and administration, and the 7,000 or so Coloured immigrants from South Africa who crew the fishing boats and operate the canneries at Walvis Bay, and the Namas to whose fight with the Hereros for supremacy in the 19th century I have already referred. Their reserves are at Berseba and in the far south, but many of the 20,000 Namas now live in the towns. Their chief grievance has been that moves to new locations, in
Windhoek in particular, while giving them better houses, have increased their rents and, being further from their work, have obliged them to pay fares for bus journeys, morning and evening. They are no more likely to lead a revolt than the Cape Coloured community is in South Africa. The Hereros, on the contrary, have increased to over 40,000 (some say 50,000) and are in two compact groups, the one in the Kaokoveld, the other in the Waterberg. They have forgotten neither their former position as the dominant tribe of the central region, nor their handling by the Germans: when South West Africa was occupied by South African troops in 1914, the survivors had expected to be given back all the lands which the tribe had ever controlled, as well as those which were occupied by their former serfs, the Berg Damaras, in the Brandberg and Anas Mountains. It is their old chief, Hosea Kutako, who is foremost in petitioning the United Nations to reunite the tribe and to give them back their lands. If a direct United Nations trusteeship could be established the Hereros believe that by the time independence came they could, in spite of their small numbers, dominate the country. As in the 19th century they are now the element of potential disturbance.

The South African Government have therefore sought, once again, to fortify themselves with the recommendations of a commission and there has recently been much speculation about what recommendations the Odendaal Commission is likely to make. The report is expected by the end of this year but the Commission has been said to favour strongly a long corridor to link the Sesfontein reserve in the southern Kaokoveld to the small Fransfontein reserve in order to create a much needed large reserve for the unfortunate Berg Damaras, who now number 30,000. A still bigger scheme is said to envisage the creation of a Bantustan which would comprise all the area west of Longitude 15° and link the Kaokoveld reserve to the Otjihorongo and Okombale Reserves further south. These are mainly Damara and the eventual objective might be to concentrate the Damaras to the south and the Hereros to the north of this area. In that event it might mean rethinking the smaller scheme already mentioned. Both schemes would leave the Eastern and Western Hereros still separated by a broad wedge of white farms, etc., extending to the copper mines at Tsumeb. The Eastern Hereros could however in turn be given additional land still further to the east and north of their present reserves, a course which might present strategic advantages if the South African Government expected to have to keep control of the external relations and internal security of the northern area. To retain the Tsumeb corridor would however almost certainly reduce such chances as might still exist of a solution being found on the lines of
the 1957 proposal to divide South West Africa into a trust territory and a fifth Province, since the former could not hope to be viable without the revenue of the Tsumeb mines. The smaller the southern or fifth Province area, the more likely that the Europeans would be, or might soon become the majority race in it; and the area would be perfectly viable without Tsumeb since it would include the karakul sheep area, the fishing port and the diamonds. Such a solution would not relieve the South African Government of the responsibility to provide considerable sums for the development of the reserves in the Trust area. The Van Zyl Commission as long ago as 1936, drew attention to the necessity of considerable additional expenditure if the health and education services in the reserves were to be improved as in the Commission's opinion they needed to be, and it is likely that the Odendaal Commission will have in mind the scale of expenditure recommended by the Tomlinson Commission for the development of the Bantu areas in South Africa when it makes its own recommendations. The alternatives appear to be for South Africa to provide all the resources to develop the reserves or for her to seek outside aid in their development, a course which would probably involve handing them over to the United Nations. This course could result in so active a United Nations presence in the northern half of the territory that its possible repercussions in the southern half and in South Africa itself, might be decisive in South African thinking. At the moment one can only await the report of the Odendaal Commission.

Meanwhile the situation at the United Nations has not been static. The Committee of the Assembly on South West Africa has drawn the attention of the Assembly each year to the steps which have been taken to integrate the territory unilaterally in South Africa. It has pointed out that the South West African Affairs Amendment Act of 1949, which provided for the representation of the territory in the Union House of Assembly by 6 elected Europeans and in the Union Senate by 4 Europeans, also deleted all references to the mandate in the territorial constitution, and the General Assembly at its ninth session condemned this as prejudicial to the development of the territory "as a separate political entity." The Committee pointed out in a later report that the South West African Native Affairs Administration Act of 1954 excluded such affairs from the scope of the South West African Administration and integrated them with those of the Union and that this included vesting the reserves in the South African Native Trust for which the Minister of Native Affairs acts as Trustee, and that the courts of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, itself already administered by the Native Affairs Department of the Union,
were in 1957 placed under the jurisdiction of the Transvaal Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. The Committee further pointed out that in 1958 Dr. Verwoerd, referring to the small native reserves "completely surrounded by white areas" said that "it is the policy with which everyone agrees, that the natives should rather be placed on ground adjacent to the native areas." The Committee summed up that Native Affairs, customs and excise, railways and harbours, air services, police, defence, the Public Services, external affairs and immigration were as a result all integrated.

The Committee appeared, however, to the opponents of South Africa at New York, to be getting nowhere too slowly and in 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia, as former members of the League of Nations asked the Court to find that South Africa had failed to comply with the requirements of the mandate. The object of this request was to get the Court to give, not an advisory opinion to the Assembly, as in 1950, which was not binding on South Africa, but a judgment in a dispute between South Africa as mandatory and another member of the League of Nations, with which judgment South Africa would have to comply at the risk of having enforcement action taken against her, by the Security Council, under Article 94 of the United Nations Charter if she did not. Article 94 of the Charter states that "if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court the other party may have recourse to the Security Council which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations to decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." The Court has rejected by 8 votes to 7 South Africa's contention that it has no jurisdiction, but it has not yet given its judgment on the substance of the complaint and is expected to do so some time next year. If the judgment were adverse to South Africa the latter would have to be given a decent interval within which to comply with it, but if she had not done so within such an interval, which Ethiopia and Liberia would naturally try to reduce to a minimum, these States could appeal to the Security Council. It would then be up to the Council to decide whether or not it was necessary to make recommendations or decide upon measures to give effect to the judgment. The Council would obviously be most reluctant to find that it was not necessary to do so, unless, in its view, there was a probability that steps would be taken by South Africa within a further period, which would have to be a reasonable one. If any statements had been made by members of the South African Government or on its behalf which indicated that steps would not be taken, the Council would be forced into making recommendations, or deciding upon measures, since if it did not do so the result would be seriously
to weaken the prestige of the International Court as an integral and important part of the United Nations organisation, and to create a precedent for future inaction on its judgments in disputes between other member states. The Council would however at this stage probably confine itself to making recommendations, rather than deciding upon measures, but if these recommendations also proved ineffective over a reasonable period then the Council would have to decide upon what measures should be taken. It might still fail to reach agreement upon what measures would be likely to be effective, or it might agree upon them, but decide that the consequences would be such that it would be inadvisable to take them, or certain of them, on the ground that the object to be achieved would be outweighed by the harm done. The risk might lie in a majority decision taken at this point by those members of the Security Council who believed that they would have least to lose and most to gain from it. The possibility of a veto would always remain, and Britain has recently voted against a proposal for action by the Council in connection with Southern Rhodesia, but a veto would be more serious in connection with a judgment of the International Court than on an ordinary proposal, particularly if the British judge on the International Court had concurred in its judgment. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice dissented from the Court’s finding that the Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, but, on the facts of the dispute it cannot be presumed, if the majority find against South Africa that he will dissent again, since the basis of the decision may be quite different. Whether or not the United Kingdom judge might dissent, and whether or not the United Kingdom representative on the Security Council were to oppose a recommendation agreed by other members, it is of course possible that other Judges and other representatives might do so, but South Africa’s last hope of the Council deciding not to take any further action could conceivably depend upon Mr. Goldwater winning the 1964 Presidential election in the United States. Many things can happen, and national representatives on the Security Council have been trained by masters in the tactics of delay, but there can be no question of the seriousness of the possible consequences for South Africa of an adverse judgment from the Permanent Court in the present South West Africa dispute.

It is likely therefore that political uncertainty will continue to bedevil South West Africa’s future, as it has done its past. In 1964 South Africa will have been in control of the territory for 50 years: economic prosperity may then be at a peak but one need not be a cynic to suggest that it might be advisable to defer any celebrations until 1974. De Beers and
Mr. Sam Collins might even be prepared to guarantee that if there is any diamond jubilee then to be celebrated it will at least be worth remembering.
FROM MY PREVIOUS ARTICLES in this series the reader will already have realised that I have a liking for statistics. It is necessary for me therefore to remind myself from time to time of Sir Winston Churchill's dictum that "statistics can prove anything," but, interpret them how we will, statistics, if they are reasonably accurate, are the proper basis for theories. Here in South Africa we live in such a heady atmosphere of assertion and counter-assertion, theory, ideology and belief, that we are perhaps in more than ordinary danger of picking out facts to suit them. Like Don Quixote we are soon riding off on our hobby-horses to tilt at windmills, like him we feel ourselves to be surrounded by enemies, and we are not sure, from time to time, which are the real enemies, which the phantasies. If, therefore, I may begin by anchoring myself to a few facts I promise in so doing to be brief, and I will, when I use figures, stick to round ones.

The first to which I would draw attention, are those of the growth of South Africa's population. In the 3 years since the 1960 census the African population has increased by nearly 1,000,000: in the same period the Coloured population by over 160,000, and the Asian by 50,000: the White population increased by only 180,000, and these included nearly 50,000 immigrants. Excluding any children among the latter there were therefore ten surviving non-white children for every surviving white child. The Tomlinson Commission on the Development of the Bantu Areas found in 1954 that mortality among the Bantus was declining and would decline further, while there was no such likelihood that the birthrate would also decline. If this assumption is applied to the statistics I have quoted there could be in 1970, only seven years from now, about 14,000,000 Bantus, about 2,250,000 Coloureds, about 700,000 Indians and about 3,700,000 Whites in South Africa. Within a few more years there would be more Coloureds and Indians than Whites and five times as many Bantus. By the turn of the century the Whites would be a very much smaller proportion still.

The trend was of course apparent earlier and has led to much thought being given to the possibility of avoiding some at least of the consequences, by occupational and residential segregation, by the restriction of the non-White population to certain parts of the country, even if this involves the parallel restriction of the Whites to other parts, and finally by dividing the country into two or more states on a racial basis. The
first and the second of these possibilities have been pursued in a series of enactments which have eventually been consolidated into a system, and each system has in turn been subjected to increasing criticism, at first from within and then from without the country. Since moreover the second was built on to the first which continued parallel with it, the volume of criticism has increased until inside the country it has led to acts of sabotage which have had to be controlled by emergency legislation, increasingly envisaged as permanent—‘to this side of eternity’—and outside the country South Africa is in danger of being completely isolated. At this point the first steps to the third possibility are being taken partly no doubt in the hope that they will take off some of the heat.

To take the first—occupational and residential segregation—to which the word ‘apartheid’ can be most appropriately applied. When it occurred originally on large pastoral farms, or even where mixed farming was pursued, it was something natural and convenient to all parties. The Boer had his farm house, often, to start with, little more solid or elaborate than the pondokkies of the farm workers, and these were no closer to it or more distant from it than the farm houses and labourers’ cottages of a large English farm a hundred years ago. Each did his work, all went to the same services at the same church, and all shared in the hazards of a frontier existence. But discoveries of diamonds and gold led to diggings, competition for work and unwelcome proximity. As mining became deeper and required larger capital and better organisation, skilled work became first the province and then the preserve of the European, unskilled African labour needed to be specially recruited, fed, housed and directed, and residential followed occupational segregation. Job restriction, apprenticeship regulations, and differential wage rates were demanded and enforced by law. An African required a pass before he could seek employment, and passes could be issued for particular areas and particular types of employment. Possession of a pass did not entitle the holder to bring with him to the town his wife and children. With residential segregation developed segregation on public vehicles, and in public offices, and places of public instruction, amusement and recreation. In 1962 there were 384,000 convictions in the courts for infringements of the pass laws, about 10,000 more than in 1961 and 44,000 more than in 1960. Even though many of those convicted may have been able to pay the fines imposed few can have done so without some measure of hardship and those who could not pay suffered imprisonment. As a result imprisonment has, for the African, tended to lose any social stigma it may ever have had and much of the fear attaching to the unknown, so that its value as a deterrent has been de-
creased. Overseas humanitarian trade unionists, liberal, and racial opinion has become united in dislike of the policy, in criticism of its various manifestations, and in condemnation of its various manifestations, and in condemnation of the methods of enforcement. Because South African trade unions have limited their membership to Europeans, supported job segregation, and sought to widen the difference between the wage scales of Europeans and Africans, they have lost the support of trade unions elsewhere, and the South African Labour Party has withered on its trade union stem until it has ceased to be represented in Parliament by a single M.P.

Yet, in spite of all the steps taken to prohibit or discourage the entry of Africans into the skilled trades and their organisation for bargaining purposes, in spite, until recently, of the squalor of so much of their housing, and the inadequacy of the social services available to them, African workers, both men and women, have increasingly poured into the cities and towns until today less than 3% of the adult men are working as farmers in the Reserves. The urban African population of Johannesburg increased from 622,000 in 1960 to 699,000 in 1963; of Pretoria from 198,000 to 223,000, of Cape Town from 65,000 to 80,000, of Durban from 204,000 to 240,000 and of Port Elizabeth from 111,000 to 139,000, a total of 180,000 in 3 years. In the previous 9 years they had increased in all urban areas by 1,115,000. If this process were to continue it could only be a question of time before the cities become so predominantly African that it would be difficult to continue to exclude Africans from any say in their working conditions and where they will live. There had already been attempts to control the number of Africans by refusing passes to foreign Africans, and by sending back to the Reserves or the High Commission Territories those others without passes, unable to find employment, or convicted of offences, but these had clearly been inadequate for the purpose. They have been supplemented by legislation to restrict the right of residence to those with proof of continual residence for over 15 years prior to 1952, or 10 years with one employer, by strictly controlling the supply to industry of labour from outside the cities and encouraging decentralization of industry, by decreasing the domestic employment available (in Johannesburg it has been as high as 75,000) by limiting each European household to one African servant, and by drastically reducing permission for the entry of wives and children of those workers who are in employment in the cities but whose families are not legally entitled to remain there.

If however the African population of the cities is to be limited, still more if it is to be reduced, they had to be provided with some alternative places of residence and sources
of employment. The Reserves were relatively small in size and many of them suffered severely from drought or erosion accentuated by overstocking. Far from being able to support additional numbers they were proving inadequate for those already there. Agriculture was moreover, by tradition, the responsibility of African women, the children herded the cattle and there were no industries to provide work or income for men. The 1936 Act had recognised the necessity of purchasing additional land for African occupation but the total purchased in subsequent years had been wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the rapidly increasing population, still less to provide for displaced urban Africans.

The concept of tribal reserves was, therefore, modified and the Transkei Constitution Act, which was passed by Parliament at its last Session, provided for the establishment of the Transkei as a Bantustan within which the main body of the Xhosas would be given an opportunity to develop a self-governing state of their own with financial, administrative and other assistance from the South African Government. The Department of Information commented at the time that the Xhosas would be ruling themselves by 1964 and, therefore, that Dr. Verwoerd's policy of apartheid had entered its conclusive stage, since the first of several autonomous Bantu nations would by then have qualified for self-government: it was made clear, therefore, as indeed it had been in the course of the debates in Parliament, that the Transkeian Bantustan was to be followed by others. In the new Bantustans the various African races were to be given a quid pro quo for apartheid in White South Africa. The Xhosas were being given, according to the Information Department, a country of their own as large as Wales, with enormous future potential, in which they could rule themselves and work out their own destiny in their own way. Dr. Verwoerd said that "the Xhosa nation of the Transkei has acquired a level of democratic experience and ability that has justified this major step towards sovereign independence. Over the years Government policy has been preparing a number of Bantu nations to become separately self-sufficient and fully autonomous. . . . The powers entrusted to the new Parliament will increase. External affairs, defence and certain aspects of justice will presumably for the time being remain the responsibility of the Republic. . . . What has been announced for the Transkei will be fully implemented for each of the other Bantu nations, as soon as they feel capable or they are desirous of making the request . . . and finally the Bantu of South Africa will work out their own destiny just like other new states in other parts of Africa and Asia." In other words, the African was to be given "baasskap" over the European in the Black Bantustans.

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The policy seemed from these statements to be reasonably clear but Mr. de Wet Nel, Minister of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, said in the course of the debate: “there will be no autonomy in the Transkei ... where do you see it in the Bill?” The Government Commission which had visited the Transkei had said that the whole process would be a “hundred year” job. And Mr. Fritz Steyn, M.P., added that “the Transkei will have a long wait for sovereign independence, if it were ever attained at all.” It is worthwhile looking at each of these statements for if there was to be, as Mr. de Wet Nel said, no autonomy, or, as Mr. Steyn said, more cautiously, a long wait for independence, the new Bantu states of South Africa were not going to become self-governing realities sufficiently quickly to be a major factor in altering the attitude of the Africans towards the Republic or external African criticism of the Republic at the United Nations and elsewhere. Mr. Steyn had gone on, moreover, to talk of a “confederal vision” and to say that there was nothing to prevent the White state in a confederation from maintaining fiscal, monetary, military and diplomatic control of the group of states, because it would be the leader and the strongest of them, and he had ingeniously cited the position of the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic within the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, as an example of what the position of the Transkei might become. Subsequent developments, however, have indicated that the tempo has been increased as forecast by Dr. Verwoerd, who has himself subsequently invited Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, to participate in a South African Commonwealth without being very definite about how the latter should be organised, but on the basis that they would have full autonomy. The purpose, he said, would be to integrate the economies of the territories with that of the Republic, by giving the territories access to the capital and other resources of the Republic, and by increasing the area of land within them available for the African inhabitants, both within and without, by a dual process of expropriating the Europeans in the territories and compensating them with land within the Republic, and by adding to the territories the adjoining native reserves within the Republic. It is difficult to see how the Transkei could ultimately be treated differently and indeed the Tomlinson Commission had specifically envisaged that the Ciskei would be united with it. I dealt with the immediate reaction in the three British territories to these proposals in the course of my second article, and it is sufficient here to say that it would be the commonsense course for their leaders to wait and see what happens in the Transkei before committing themselves.
This is why so much now depends upon the Transkei, and the policy which the Government will follow there.

The Chief Magistrate, Mr. V. Leibrandt, speaking at the Transkei Territories Civic Association's Congress, shortly after the Transkei Act was passed, sought to allay the anxieties of the White traders by assuring them that they would be in the Transkei for many years to come, although African traders would have to be given an opportunity to make progress. There were, at the time, almost 1,200 White traders in the urban and rural areas and only 350 Africans; the right of the latter to trade would be limited by their ability to do so and by their lack of capital. An even larger White group will be the 1,900 Whites who will constitute the majority of the 2,400 Transkei Civil Service. It has also been made clear that the Transkei will not, at any time, include the area of Port St. Johns, which was sold to the Cape Province at about the same time as the latter acquired Walvis Bay in South West Africa, and that the White areas in Umtata, the capital, will continue as at present. The administrative and trading framework of the territory is, therefore, to remain for some time to come in White hands, very much as it is at present in Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

This is the more sensible because in making their recommendations (in 1954) for the development of the Bantu areas within the, then, Union of South Africa, the members of the Tomlinson Commission had drawn attention to the fact that these areas were not, in their then condition, capable of supporting a larger number of inhabitants. They pointed out that the Bantu had so far proved themselves to be more successful in industry than they had as farmers, and accordingly recommended that industry would have to be brought to the Bantu areas as well as improved methods of agriculture if they were to provide homes for additional Africans. Taking the Bantu areas as a whole they considered that industrial employment would have to be provided for 20,000 persons a year, and that this would involve the development of industry not only in the neighbouring border areas, but in the Bantu areas themselves. The latter would however have involved the presence of White industrialists, scientists, engineers and skilled workers in addition to the civil servants and traders mentioned, and, for this, or other reasons, the Government decided to begin by encouraging the movement of industry to the adjacent border areas, rejecting the subsequently expressed desire of the Transkeian Territorial Authority that the industries should be inside instead of outside the border, and that White capital should be encouraged to invest within it.

A report of the permanent committee for the location of
industry and the development of border areas, which was
tabbed by the Minister of Economic Affairs early this year,
indicated that the Government were prepared to invest
R45-million in the border areas, R20-million on land and build-
ing and R25-million on machinery and plant during the next
ten years in order to promote textile manufactures. This plan
was expected to provide additional employment for 3,000
Whites and between 25,000 and 30,000 Africans. The com-
panies concerned would be given special tax concessions and
protection against overseas competition. It was pointed out
that in 1962 R5,000,000 had been provided and 1,850 new jobs
created for Africans in 13 industries: that two factories had
been completed at Hammersdale in Natal, and two were being
built at the Rosslyn industrial site near Pretoria, and that
other industrial areas were to be developed (at Umdomtganı)
near East London and (at Zwelitisha) near Kingwilliamstown.
A knitwear factory had been built at Rustenburg and expan-
sion of Foskor had been facilitated at Phalaborwa. Eight Afri-
can townships in all were planned, or being built, in Natal
alone. This year Cyril Lord has received much publicity in
connection with his R5,000,000 textile factory near East Lon-
don, to which 100 technicians have been brought out from
Lancashire with R4,000,000 of machinery. Dr. du Toit Viljoen,
the Chairman of the Committee, has said that it is the object
of the border industries not to raise the wages of their Bantu
employees, but to find work for them and that Industrial
Council awards had “killed” factories in Worcester and
George by fixing a differential as low as 5%. The managers of
some of the border factories have complained nevertheless
that it takes them a year to train the local Africans and that
they are less efficient than those in the bigger towns and
cities. Labour turnover is high, local communications often
have to be provided, and long distance freights from the
border areas to the cities add to costs. Houses will have to
be provided near the factories and the number required has
been estimated to be 400,000. The chief advantages would
appear to be that factories are built to individual specifica-
tions, and at Government expense, and that there is the likeli-
hood of a more permanent supply of labour than in the White
cities. Cheap power, for example, from the coal-fields at
Indwe, near East London, could also be an advantage, but
it is not yet available from Indwe.

So far the advantages have not been such as to lead to
any exodus from established industrial centres and Dr. du
Toit Viljoen has recently stated that, while no mandatory
measures were contemplated to oblige industries to move to
the border areas, “more persuasive measures” might have to
be used than at present to speed up the process. The boom
which the country was experiencing was again tending to promote centralisation in the Southern Transvaal and especially in the central Witwatersrand. It was even conceivable that the border industries might, instead of providing employment within the Bantu areas, have the effect of drawing Africans across the borders. Professor J. H. Moolman, a member of the Tomlinson Commission, said "it chills me to think of the massive concentration of Bantu that will soon gather to live on the perimeter of some of our largest towns and cities," and he instanced Pretoria, Durban, East London and KingWilliams-town: it was, he thought, not inconceivable that the new African territories would themselves experience a platteland depopulation similar to that experienced in the White areas and he concluded that a possible ripple effect back to the homelands from the borders was probably the only hope of turning the flow of labour inwards instead of outwards. At this stage, therefore, while the plan for border industries has been welcomed by some economists the prospects of their successful establishment on the scale needed to provide adequate industrial employment within the Bantu areas would appear to be uncertain, costly, and contrary to existing economic trends. The related question of the possible development of mining within the Bantustans is still being considered by a Government Commission.

From the political point of view the pre-election activities of leading chiefs in the Transkei have had a dual interest: as indications of the extent to which they are prepared to support the Government's policy, and as indications of what they believe is the trend of opinion among the Xhosas. Two protagonists have appeared: Chief Kaiser Matanzima of the Emigrant Tembuland area, who was the Chairman of the Transkeian Territorial Authority, has, in endorsing apartheid, and therefore the Bantustan policy, claimed that all the territory between the Fish River and Zululand should become a Bantu homeland and that the majority of the White traders within that area would have to go, trading licences being granted to any Bantu citizens who wanted them. He also claimed that "with the advent of a Transkeian State, the Transkeian Government will negotiate on a high level with the Republican Government for the latter to give remunerative employment to the people of the Transkei in the Republic." He wants a single chamber legislative Assembly to include the chiefs as well as elected members, a Bantu battalion of the Transkeian Government in the Republican Defence Force and the establishment of an African Department of Defence. He has subsequently specifically asked for the districts of Queens-town, Lady Frere, Indwe, Maclean, Elliot, Ugie, Mount Currie, Harding and Port Shepstone to be added to the Transkei, for
an all-Black civil service; for industries within the Transkei, and for no White areas. He has hedged about the future relationship of the Transkei with South Africa: “Nobody can say whether there will eventually be one South Africa. First we must get our independence. Meanwhile I am looking forward to the day when the Transkei will be fully independent of South Africa.” Possibly to compensate for this statement he added that the “United Nations stinks.” Current editorial comment has been on the sobering note that responsibility may perhaps modify his views: it can only be said that almost every precedent in the rest of Africa is against so reassuring an assumption, and that Chief Kaiser has already proclaimed himself to be an uncompromising Black Nationalist.

The rival candidate is Paramount Chief Victor Poto of Western Pondoland. He is older than Matanzima and has been said to be likely to be given the support of at least 45 of the 64 chiefs who will sit in the Legislative Assembly. His campaign is supported by his influential nephew, Paramount Sabata Dalindyebo. He does not wish the Whites to be excluded from the Transkei, and he is in favour of co-operation with South Africa, but he wants independence quickly, and would prefer a bi-cameral legislature with the chiefs removed to an upper house which would possess a right of review (which may be an euphemism for a right of veto). Such a multi-racial policy would enable him to demand equivalent rights for the Xhosas in the Republic, and he may be hoping for the support of the non-resident voters. Chief Botha Sigcau of Eastern Pondoland has been the enigma: he is likely to control the votes of 23 or 24 members of the Legislative Assembly and he issued a statement very recently appealing to the electors to “abide by the principles of separate development.” In so doing he is said to have aligned himself with Chief Matanzima but he may have been playing for his own hand and staking a claim for Government support as a safer Premier of the Transkei than either Matanzima, with his militant Black nationalism, or Poto, with his, from the point of view of Government policy, unfortunate preference for multi-racialism.

Sir de Villiers Graaff said at the time when the Transkei Act was passed that the United Party had three main objections to it; that it was interim legislation; “the first rung of a ladder descending into the impenetrable darkness of the Government’s Bantustan policy”; that seeds of friction between the Government and the Transkei were inherent in it and could lead to open hostilities; and thirdly, that it was an incomplete piece of work which reflected the conflict in the minds of the Government whose members realised that it led to a road of no return, but who were not prepared to admit it objectives.
The creation of the first Bantustan in the Transkei and Dr. Verwoerd’s subsequent offer to the British enclaves, are nevertheless such major steps towards the realisation of the recommendations of the Tomlinson Report that they have provoked general speculation about how far the Government intends to go. The possibility of a Zulustan has been the subject of what seems to have been inconclusive debate at indabas of the Zulu people in Northern Natal and the Government have been in no hurry to press ahead with it: the Zulus live, however, in one geographical area and a Zulustan would be a natural sequel to the Transkei Bantustan. Discussions within the Afrikaans-medium press, and recently in the English-medium press, have tended to move from what might be the next step to what could be the ultimate goal. The Tomlinson Commission would have included within the reserves 13% of the area of South Africa, plus Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, which would have raised the percentage to 47%. The 13% would have included, in the east, a much greater percentage of the well-watered land and in the north-west an area with considerable possibilities of mineral development, mainly asbestos, coal and corundum. Together they would have run in a horse-shoe from the Bechuanaland Protectorate through the north-west, north and north-east of the Transvaal, and then through Swaziland and Zululand to Basutoland and the Transkei. They would not have been contiguous and there would have been a number of isolated areas, for example, north of Pretoria, around Thaba Nchu in the Orange Free State and in the Northern Cape, but since the Commission also recommended the consolidation where possible of even smaller areas, the so-called “Black spots,” the tendency has been to regard the isolated areas as of less importance than those of the horse-shoe. A number of the smaller spots have already been removed, but the discovery or addition of new ones has left the number still to be dealt with after 9 years about the same. So far as the horse-shoe is concerned it may be doubted whether a united Bantu state could possibly emerge in the measurable future. If, however, Basutoland and Swaziland were to become independent (and self-government at least appears to be a probability for both, and for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, by 1965) and if the Transkei and Zululand were to approach independence (and possibly to receive additions in the shape of the Ciskei and Tongaland), Basutoland and the Transkei might develop some form of association, and Swaziland and Zululand; later perhaps the two groups together. Similarly the Bechuanaland Protectorate (or most of it), Ovamboland, the Okavango area and the Caprivi, and possibly other adjacent African areas in South West Africa might form a much larger, but less populous
Bantu area in the north-west. In the still more distant future the Venda areas of the Eastern Transvaal might join the former and the Tswana areas of the North-Western Transvaal the latter. For some considerable time corridors might still continue to exist from the South-East Transvaal to Pietermaritzburg and Durban, and from the Central Transvaal to Southern Rhodesia, but neither would necessarily be permanent. It is very relevant to any speculation about their future that the Transkei would possess access to the sea and the outside world, from the start—and that the north-west group might acquire it through the adjacent African territory of the Kaokoveld in South West Africa. The former, the south-east group, could much more easily become a viable modern state, whether with or without some form of association with residual South Africa than the north-west group which would seem to be mainly dependent upon agriculture in a vast area of deficient rainfall. In the Eastern Transvaal, Swaziland and Zululand, there are on the contrary proved coal-fields, vast deposits of iron ore, the copper-lead-zinc complex near Phalaborwa, the Havelock asbestos mine, and the Lydenburg platinum, gold and manganese mines. The whole area is among the best watered in Southern Africa, and has such cash crops as sugar, cotton, rice, fruit and tobacco, while production of meat and wool could both be considerably developed. Within this area there is also a highly developed industrial complex which could be taken over intact. The problem of the border industries would then be of much less importance. It is here therefore that the future of the Bantustan experiment will eventually be decided.

I indicated in my second article my view that the three British territories were likely to prefer independence guaranteed by Britain, South Africa and the United Nations to any other solution, and this solution would have obvious attractions for the Transkei, Zulustan, and such other Bantustans as may emerge. My guess is that the two groups of African states, the British territories and such Bantustans as may emerge, would also prefer to form their own federal or other associations, and not to reach a decision about entering any South African Commonwealth until they could do so on a much more equal basis than they could hope to do individually or fragmented. In the course of time such a south-eastern Bantu state as I have suggested, might even lay claim to Lourenco Marques (the Tongas once held the whole area) as well as to Durban: possession of either, and still more of both, would obviously do much to raise its status and bargaining power vis-a-vis the Republic. It is quite possible that before this stage was reached both Basutoland and Swaziland might have become member countries of the British Commonwealth
and that the south-eastern Bantu state might prefer to maintain this connection rather than to enter a South African Commonwealth on any terms. It would be one of the ironies of history if it was in this fashion that Natal was able to resume membership of the British Commonwealth.

The possibility of genuine and fruitful co-operation with residual South Africa might also depend upon whether a working arrangement had been reached, in the interval, as to the status of those Africans remaining within the Republic. It would not be considered by Africans to be an equal bargain if some 4,000,000 Africans were to be allowed to deny citizenship, and their accustomed privileges, to some 400,000 Whites (or what remained of them) while some 4,000,000 Whites were allowed to continue to deny them to 4,000,000 Africans. It is perhaps recognition of this hard fact which lies behind the present attempt to assert that the 4,000,000 Bantu in the urban areas are in fact temporary residents. Temporary residents cannot claim the privileges of citizenship, the right to work, or security of domicile, and if the Bantu at present in the European areas of the Republic had been obliged to return periodically to their homelands, to live in hostels or compounds while working in Southern African cities and to remove their families permanently to their homelands it could be argued that this was not discrimination between South Africans of one colour and another, but between South African citizens and those of other countries. This would be a logical argument but it would be unlikely to satisfy the Bantu in whatever independent states were emerging. To the extent that it represented practice rather than theory it would also involve mass movements of the African population which might so reduce the number of temporary residents as to slow down the industrial machine which has been built on the availability of African labour. Even with the maximum assistance from automation, and from the immigration of White settlers from overseas or elsewhere in Africa, the effect of such mass movements combined with the cost of financing the Bantustans would considerably reduce the surplus national income. It would also reduce the potential market for the products of South Africa's industries, since the population of the Bantustans would not only be producing themselves but would probably claim the right to buy what else they needed from other countries than South Africa if they chose to do so. They might, indeed, only obtain financial aid from those other countries at the price of so doing. The whole White population would then have to adjust themselves to a lower standard of living, and the unskilled among them to something approximating much more closely than at present to an open, unprotected labour market. It would also
follow that the Coloured community of 1,500,000, which has no separate homeland, would be in a much stronger position to assert its claims to be regarded as part of the “western” group, and to be entitled as such to equality of economic opportunity.

Dr. Verwoerd has warned that “every member of the Government is totally opposed to such a departure from principle,” but the policy of removing the Bantus (about 122,000) from the Western Cape, of bringing back to it the Coloureds from the Transkei (16,000), and of excluding the Bantus eventually from the west of a line which was first drawn from the mouth of the Breede River to the mouth of the Oliphants River, then from Knysna to Prieska, and most recently from Port Elizabeth to the Orange River near Colesberg would mean that the Coloureds would have to be paid more if their labour is wanted to replace that of the excluded Bantus. In Natal, somewhat similarly, the Indians would need to be given concessions and the paradoxical situation might develop of their proving subsequently to be the last and most strenuous defenders of the White corridor to Durban. Such social transformations could only take place, if at all, in comparative peace, and therefore if the occasions for offence on either side were to be reduced to the minimum. It is difficult to be sure that they would be. Moreover, it is often said that the discrimination most resented is the social stigma of apartheid, and this might prove to be the most intractable, not least because it is the outward and visible manifestation of an ideology rooted in the historical development of South Africa, and held with conviction by at least half of the White population. The strength of the recent reactions by Ministers and others to suggestions in “Die Burger” that “petty apartheid” should be relaxed is an indication of the opposition that would have to be overcome.

I have so far dealt with the problem of apartheid in a south or at most a Southern African context. It must be recognised however that it is this tenet of separate and parallel development, which has become increasingly the focus of the external criticism of South Africa. It is indeed the necessity of producing evidence that parallel development involves the development of all sections of the multi-racial population and not only of one, which may be accelerating the Bantustan experiment as Sir de Villiers said to the point of no return. Unless the South African Government can show, in South West Africa, and within its own borders, that its policies are improving the present and future of its non-European population, and are being pursued to the maximum capacity of the country as a whole, they are unlikely to reduce the pressure which is steadily mounting, at the United Nations and else-
where, for action to compel them to change them. If the International Court should find against South Africa over South West Africa and should call upon South Africa to submit her administration of the mandate to the supervision of the General Assembly, South Africa would either have to satisfy the Assembly, which it is unlikely to be able to do without changing its policy, or risk the Security Council being called upon to take steps or recommend measures to see that it did comply with the Court’s finding. The Court’s decision may not be given until 1965 and it is reported to be the Government’s intention meanwhile to give effect to the recommendations, whatever they may be, of the Odendaal Commission, and at whatever expense to South Africa, so that it will have an answer to the charge that it is failing in its responsibilities to the non-European population of South West Africa. Even earlier than 1965, however, the Government will be faced with strenuous efforts by the Afro-Asians and others to oblige it to change its policy of apartheid not only in South West Africa but within South Africa itself. The policy has already been condemned by the Assembly as contrary to human rights, and the member-countries of the United Nations were recommended a year ago to refuse to supply arms and ammunition to South Africa and to break off diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa. An attempt this year to persuade the Security Council to make this recommendation mandatory failed to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Council, but even so the recommendations made in 1962 have had some effect. In addition to the largely ineffective prohibitions imposed by other African and some Asian, Latin American and European countries on the supply of arms, the major sources of supply, Great Britain, France and the United States of America, have now either stated their intention to refuse the export of such arms as are not essential to repel external aggression, or taken steps to stop all export of arms. Other friendly countries such as Israel and Japan have withdrawn their minister or refused to appoint one to South Africa. And while economic sanctions have been most enthusiastically supported and more readily imposed by those countries whose trade with South Africa is the smallest, South African exports to her natural markets in Africa (to which 25% were exported) and which included Rhodesia and Nyasaland, have already been reduced by 5% or R35,000,000. Where trade has not been prohibited, as in the Scandinavian countries, refusals by dockers to unload ships have resulted in expensive delays. At the present Assembly all the oil producing countries of the Middle East have agreed that sales of oil to South Africa ought to be stopped, although Iran, the largest supplier, pointed out that her arrangement with the oil companies left the latter with the control of sales
to overseas consumers, and that any losses to one exporting country ought to be shared by all. With oil in over-production throughout the world, it is unlikely that a boycott of sales will be universal, but it is probable that the Security Council will be asked by the Assembly to call upon all member states to impose one. So far South Africa's major trading partners, Great Britain, the United States and Canada, have refused to agree to participate in sanctions to enforce changes in South Africa's domestic policies, but the pressure from the Afro-Asian bloc will not be reduced and might be effective in the United States or in Britain during the coming election year, particularly if emotions were aroused by some untoward incident which could be magnified to seem a second Sharpeville.

Even if it does not succeed the Afro-Asians may this year or next try a different tactic. If the Security Council rejected sanctions by the votes of one or more of the permanent members but seven members voted for sanctions it would be possible for the Assembly to take up the question under the "uniting for peace" procedure adopted during the Korean crisis. A two-thirds majority would obviously be forthcoming and would be argued to be mandatory. Whether it would be has never been settled but such a resolution would have more weight than an ordinary Assembly Resolution supported by an ordinary two-third vote.

Hopeful forecasts of the collapse of the campaign are therefore, I fear, likely to prove to be wishful thinking in the absence of some fundamental change in the over-all international situation, and it might be wise for South Africa to take advantage of the desire among many in Britain, the United States, Canada and other western countries to call a halt to the sanctions campaign, by giving some token of her own intention to take steps to bring about a substantial improvement in the lot of the non-Europeans of all races: to offer at least the light of a candle in the long tunnel of darkness which, it has been said, is all that they have so far been able to see before them. This is, I think, what the Transkei experiment and the Odendaal Commission's recommendations are intended to do. Whether the foundations are adequate, or the human instruments of sufficient quality, for this gesture to be followed by visible proof of such improvement before the sands run out, only time will tell.

Whether the more committed of the African states will be prepared to wait for the United Nations to decide for or against some form of sanctions is another question. They formed this year, at Addis Ababa, their own joint organisation. They have provided it with funds from a 1% levy on their revenues, and R400,000 is said already to be available to its action committee at Dar-es-Salaam. Ben Bella offered
10,000 Algerian guerillas as a spearhead but any who may have been available will already have been directed by him against Morocco. Kenya and Ethiopia are similarly pre-occupied with Somalia. Some infiltration on the Angolan pattern is not to be ruled out in Portuguese East Africa or Southern Rhodesia, but there is clearly no organised force at present available for a campaign in Southern Africa. The Committee have recognised this and are reported to have advised the African Governments that the South African Defence Force is of such a strength that they could not hope to defeat it within the next 7 or 8 years. By next year the South African Defence Force will number 140,000 and will have been equipped with modern fighters and transport aircraft and probably with sufficient field transport, weapons and ammunition to rule out any question of attack from the North.

The Committee have therefore been exploring the possibilities of persuading the United Nations to impose an oil embargo or of organising one among the producing states. This suggestion has already obtained the backing of all the Middle East producers, but, to be effective, it would require the full participation of the United States of America and Venezuela and would need to be accompanied by some sort of blockade, since, without one, supplies would continue to get through from a number of small oil-refining countries which would see the chance of quick profits. Russia might undertake to enforce a blockade not so much with any real belief that this would be acquiesced in by the United States and Britain as in the hope of panicking them into participating in a blockade themselves. To resist a blockade without causing incidents which might lead to stronger counter-measures, would, it is reckoned, be beyond the strength of South Africa's small navy. The possibility of such an embargo has been scouted on economic grounds, and particularly because of the over-production of oil throughout the world, by Dr. Rousseau, the Chairman of Sasol, which produces 15% of South Africa's oil from local coal. If an embargo were imposed either by the United Nations or voluntarily by producers it is unlikely that Sasol could produce anything like the quantities needed to keep South Africa's economy going, and the search for oil within South Africa has already been stepped up. If it is successful beyond expectation it still could not meet an emergency for some years and the prudent course may therefore be for South Africa to build up stocks of oil as rapidly as possible. This would not only reduce the chance of an embargo being successful, it would also reduce the likelihood of it being imposed.

If economic sanctions are unlikely, at present, to be imposed by the United Nations, if a direct military and air:
attack by other African nations is only a remote possibility, and if steps can be taken to make the success of an embargo on delivery of oil sufficiently problematical to make recourse to it by the United Nations unlikely, it can be argued that all South Africa need do is to sit back and wait for the pressures to die down. Her economy is booming, her financial reserves steadily increasing, and her efforts to find alternative markets for that portion of her exports which has been affected by prohibitions and boycotts has been unexpectedly successful. I believe that this course is a possible one, but I believe also that it would be dangerous. One of the British delegates at the United Nations has said in connection with the demand for sanctions against South Africa that it is unwise to leave the victim of an attack with no alternative but resistance, and an American delegate that one door should always be left ajar. This applies in reverse. I have recently read the volume of Mr. Louw’s speeches, “The Case for South Africa,” and been impressed by his defence of South Africa against the charges brought against this country at the United Nations. His exposition of the intentions of the framers of the mandate for South West Africa and of the Charter of the United Nations was, so far as my own knowledge went, correct and convincing. But it was obvious, if only from the necessity of constant repetition, that he had failed to convince his hearers that the non-European population was under parallel development, being given equal opportunities. After 17 years it has been very clear at this year’s Assembly that the patience of the Asian and African delegates at the United Nations is wearing thin indeed, and it would be myopic to regard the international position of South Africa as other than serious.

I drew attention in my first article to the desperately tight timetable which faced Southern Rhodesian ministers in their attempt to secure independence, and the probability that something would upset the very delicate balance of considerations which might just enable them to obtain it without paying the price of leaving the British Commonwealth. The strength of South Africa is infinitely greater than that of Southern Rhodesia, and she is not under the compulsion of taking the initiative whether it suits her or not. She still has opportunities of choosing how, when and where to do so. One such now exists in the Transkei. If it is to be taken both courage and generosity will be necessary. It would be naive to expect gratitude or even credit for so doing. But South Africa’s friends at the United Nations would be encouraged, and time might be bought. One of the greatest of all Popes
once had a decision of equal importance to make: he announced it in the words: “the stars shall fall from heaven, and the rivers shall turn to blood sooner than the Pope shall abandon his purpose”: with him died the primacy of the medieval papacy.