African perspectives on challenges of police command in peace support operations

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Summary

Conflicts in Africa result in loss of life, weakened social structures and fragile economies. This provides an impetus for stronger African initiatives in conflict management through participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, among others, and increased African-led peace support operations (PSOs). This paper aims to identify African perspectives specific to the police component and its role in the African Peace and Security Architecture. Challenges for police command at strategic, operational and tactical levels are then reviewed. Cross-cutting issues that affect command and the effectiveness of PSOs are examined. The conclusion notes questions and issues that may be considered to better understand and devise solutions to police command challenges in African-led PSOs.

CONFLICTS IN AFRICA HAVE had a significant effect on the continent, with major loss of life and long-term impacts on social structures and the continent’s economic livelihood. The pressure has provided an impetus for stronger African initiatives in conflict management, not only through participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs), but also through a ‘significant increase in African peace support operations … undertaken by the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Commissions/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs)’. 1

The deployment between 1948 and 2011 of ‘about 40 per cent (27 of 65) of the UN peacekeeping and observer missions … to Africa’ is indicative of the international response to conflict on the continent. 2 Data indicate that more than 60 000 African uniformed and civilian personnel were deployed in 2013 to African-led peace support operations (PSOs), while a further 35 000 African uniformed personnel were contributed to UN PKOs. A significant number of African uniformed and civilian personnel are thus deployed to both AU PSOs and UN PKOs, often into complex environments where the conflict had not fully subsided, or where only a peace agreement had been successfully signed. 3

As the AU, RECs/RMs and member states have become increasingly involved in PSOs, the architecture guiding the processes has also been evolving. Efforts to develop structures, policies
and mechanisms focus on a more effective preparation for and implementation of PSOs. The missions to which the African-led PSOs deploy are increasingly robust high-risk or combat environments the UN will not enter until a peace agreement is signed. African-led start-up PSOs are characterised by deployment to unstable environments, acting as ‘first responders’ to the conflict, but without fully resourced support systems. While the military component still dominates the planning structures and processes to PSO due to the volatility of the operational environments to which the AU deploys, the police component is making a case for the approaches to be harmonised and the processes to run concurrently. The police component is focused on the restoration and strengthening of law enforcement and public safety and security, within the framework of the rule of law; hence the component is working hard to develop and finalise its necessary policing policies, guidelines and structures so as to have greater representation and to ensure that the police has a voice in decision-making. Robust African-led PSOs are increasingly underway while the policing components and PSO frameworks evolve, resulting in challenges for police participation in decision-making processes, command and control and impacts in these operations.

It is in this context that this paper aims to identify African approaches and perspectives relevant to the police component of African-led PSOs. It is based on a desk review of relevant academic and policy documents, interviews with a range of AU officials, former and serving African police commissioners, and others who have held command positions in PSOs, as well as an array of international policing experts and scholars. The paper first examines the context and evolution of Africa’s growing role in responding to conflict on the continent. It then focuses on the position of the police component within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Particular challenges for the command of the police component of African-led PSOs at strategic, operational and tactical levels are then considered. The paper turns to cross-cutting issues that can affect command and effectiveness more broadly throughout the PSO. It concludes by noting several questions and issues that may be further considered to contribute to a better understanding, and proposes solutions to police command challenges in African-led PSOs.

The African Union in peace support operations

While the UN has been the more visible actor in international peacekeeping, African contributions to UN peacekeeping have been significant over the past 20 years. For example, Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Gambia and Tanzania are among the top ten female police contributors. Overall, the top 10 troop and police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) for UN PKOs include Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana and Egypt. Included among the top ten PCCs are Senegal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Togo. Moreover, the uptick in African-led PSOs over the last 10 years is noteworthy. Following the end of the Cold War, regional and sub-regional organisations increased their involvement in peacekeeping operations on the African continent.
The identification of peacekeeping failures in the mid-1990s, particularly in Rwanda, resulted in the recognition by African countries of a need to respond to challenges on the continent in a more robust manner, to ensure the ability to take ownership and to respond to conflicts when the international community was either unwilling or unable to do so. The reasons for the subsequent increased engagement vary widely, but include a need for faster deployment; overall knowledge of the history and the geographic and sociological realities of the area; as well as generally being more linguistically prepared. Parties to conflicts and populations affected by the conflict often presented the AU as an actor with greater political legitimacy and credibility.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the continental responses to armed conflict were initially led by the RECs/RMs. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) all initiated responses to security and conflict challenges in their regions. Between 1989 and 2005, 31 PSOs were initiated by regional or sub-regional actors, reflecting the belief that regional organisations were better suited to respond to crises in their own regions since they were closer to the situation, were more aware of the issues on the ground and were more likely to have a long-term commitment. They provided ‘local solutions to local problems’ that were perceived by the affected populations as being more legitimate.

These initial conflict management responses were largely ad hoc and were plagued by a lack of sufficient financial and logistical resources. The challenge was that these initial conflict management responses were largely ad hoc and were plagued by a lack of sufficient financial and logistical resources, effective and efficient infrastructure, and expertise. The need for consensus decision-making and partisan political interests affected the development of a coherent set of mechanisms that would support more substantive responses to crises.

With the AU’s increasing response profile, it also became clear that African countries suffered from a lack of capacity to engage in PSOs fully, in particular as regards difficulties concerning financial and operational capacities and capabilities. Donors became more involved in supporting the organisation, placing emphasis on the building of capacities in training, strategic and operational planning, the improvement of the communication infrastructure and, in general, augmenting coordination and cooperation among the respective UN and AU organisations. As a result, AU PSOs have been characterised by African countries providing the majority of personnel while external actors such as the European Union (EU), the UN and bi-laterals have provided funding, training, logistics and planning support.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was the culmination of a process to build a continental mechanism focused on ‘African solutions to African problems’. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was the culmination of a process to build a continental mechanism focused on ‘African solutions to African problems’ that came about partially in response to the rise of initiatives by regional organisations with regard to PSOs. The security architecture is outlined in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which positions the AU to intervene in the internal affairs of member states in the case of ‘grave circumstances’. These are defined as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This change from the earlier principle of non-intervention to the principle of non-indifference was significant. As noted by the African scholar Dr Solomon Dersso, ‘this is more than a generic commitment to the promotion of peace and security and encapsulates the resolve of Africa to never let another Rwanda happen again’. He further commented that with this action, the AU had not only imposed an obligation to intervene against such serious crimes, it also ‘creates a legal basis for intervention’.

However, while the 2010 Assessment Study of APSA addressed progress made, it also identified gaps that were considered to affect the achievement of ASF operational readiness and components of the entire architecture. Specific problem areas applicable to the entire architecture include vertical coordination between the RECs/RMs and the AU, and horizontal coordination among the five components of APSA. The absence of harmonised training standards, doctrine and standard operating procedures (SOPs), as well as the larger issue of the relationship between the RECs/RMs and the AU, specifically on the practical implementation of subsidiarity, continue to be identified as significant issues that affect command structures at the strategic and operational levels.
In the more recent Report of the Independent Panel of Experts Assessment of the ASF (2013), chaired by Professor Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, the recommendations note that, considering the extent of the PSOs being fielded by the AU, the need for clarity in defining the roles and responsibilities of mission planning, as well as the mandating processes, are a top priority. The recommendations also spoke to the need for streamlining procedures and processes to support a rapid response in the field. Of particular note is the comment regarding the time it takes for the various member states to obtain ‘parliamentary approval prior to the deployment of their forces in peace operations’.9 With consideration that member states need to operate within their national legal frameworks, the reality remains that the time taken to obtain parliamentary approval often affects the ability to respond within ASF scenario timeframes. As a result, the report notes, it ‘would be challenging, if not impossible to meet’ the specified timeframe. The Panel of Experts recommendation is that the principal stakeholders find a way to harmonise and streamline their respective processes so that the response time can be met.10

The issue of weak logistical and equipment provisioning was linked to the inability to respond rapidly and appropriately

In relation to the costs of the ASF, the report noted that a key outcome of the assessment was to make the ASF ‘leaner with just-in-time capabilities that can be self-sustainably resourced from primarily African sources.’11

The ASF focuses on creating five stand-by capabilities, one each to be provided by the five regional communities, using a pledge system whereby military, police and civilian personnel are identified and names are forwarded to the respective REC/RM. This information is then sent to the AU for entry into a database, ready to be called upon when required. Six scenarios framed the conditions under which the ASF would respond to continental conflict and three road maps outlined how the ASF would progress to achieving full operational capacity (FOC) by the end of 2015.12

Some of the challenges affecting the ASF’s mission readiness include difficulties in verifying pledges and assessing individual readiness in terms of skills, knowledge and experience. Typical of any organisational structure, the fundamental question of ‘who is in charge’ when it comes to the making of decisions is a complex one given multiple stakeholders, political power realities and overlapping AU and UN memberships, as well as between individual MS and the cacophony of RECs/RMs.13

The ASF is intended to be a multidisciplinary body, with military, police and civilian components. It is to have achieved pre-set readiness standards that will support the delivery of PSOs against the six scenarios mandated by either the AU or the UN. In preparation for deployment, training and command-post exercises have been conducted (AMANI I in 2010 and NIJWA in 2012) and AMANI II is being planned for 2015, focusing on practicing coordinated responses based on doctrine, SOPs and the six ASF scenarios.14 The AMANI II exercise is designed at the political-strategic level and has objectives that exercise command decision-making processes for the military and police.

The reports on ASF progress indicate that while it has an initial operating capability, the overall state of readiness is not at the FOC level and is unlikely to meet the 2015 deadline. The ability to deploy remains on an ad hoc basis and is slower than hoped...
for. Critiques and assessments consistently comment on the uneven capabilities of the RECs. ECOWAS, SADC and the EASF are considered as being the furthest advanced, but even these RECs rely on a few specific countries within their regions.

The development of consistent and harmonised command and control structures, and the need to mitigate the effect of training and evaluation inconsistencies, was also outlined as critical areas for improvement if the ASF is to achieve its objective. The issue of weak logistical and equipment provisioning was linked to the inability to respond rapidly and appropriately to the ASF scenarios.

At the 2014 inaugural meeting of the AU Police Strategic Support Group (PSSG), which brought together a number of former African police commissioners, AU and REC/RM planners and others with African PSO-relevant experience, the slow development of the police component at AU and REC/RM levels was a focus of discussion. Some observers maintained that the gaps in policy, SOPs, doctrine and training with regard to the police increased the likelihood of slow mobilisation and deployment of PSOs, as well as the overall failure of interoperability within the ASF. The varying degrees of capacity and capability among the RECs/RMs were also factors that affected the progress of the ASF towards its FOC. The lack of consistent standards and harmonised training further impacted on the effectiveness of the police and military when deployed to a PSO.

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In both the 2010 assessment of APSA and the 2013 assessment of the ASF, the issue of sustainability, given ‘that the operationalisation of APSA has been largely dependent on partner support’, was highlighted. A recent article reporting that 97% of the AU’s programming support comes from external donors is a cause for concern. If APSA is the vehicle for ‘African solutions to African problems’, and the ASF is the implementing arm, then funding from the member states must be increased significantly. If this does not occur it will be difficult to claim continental or African ownership of the decision-making responsibility.

The consequences should in that case not come as a surprise: donors can set conditions and ‘call the shots’; domestic economic or political priorities in a donor country can result in a withdrawal or reduction of funding support; and a change in a donor’s programme monitoring and evaluation policies can affect where and how its donor funds are spent. The donor can earmark funds and create situations where the AU holds funds that it cannot use towards its own priorities as those may fall outside the earmarked priorities. Donor funding is thereby unpredictable. The potential impact of unexpected changes in donor funding on APSA’s overall capabilities and, more specifically, on its equipping, training, movement/logistics and deployment of uniformed personnel in times of crisis could seriously affect successful deployment and constitute a risk to the population concerned. The need to diversify APSA’s funding support base, and the consequences for the ASF of not doing so, are clear and are recognised by the AU.

At the AU Summit of May 2013, given the failure to deploy rapidly to Mali and taking into account a similar problem with response to Libya and Côte d’Ivoire previously, the AU initiated the development of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to
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Crises (ACIRC) that could quickly deploy in an emergency and serve as a transitional mechanism until the ASF achieves FOC. A recent survey has indicated that despite the best intentions, the principle of state sovereignty hinders the momentum for the ASF to reach its FOC. The factors that led to this failure were, in principal, identified as a lack of agreement on what FOC means, the different stages of development of the REC standby capabilities, the gaps in operational coordination mechanisms and the challenges faced by AU heads of state as far as the delegation of authority to the AU. The absence of a coherent decision-making structure as a result of all parties having to agree to the standards, command and concept of operations, leaves the ASF without the necessary momentum to make substantive progress. There is a concern that with the focus being on building a new rapid response capacity in the ACIRC, the ASF may be neglected and its FOC delayed further.

A central question is how the AU expects to promote multidimensionality while creating a military heavy structure that does not provide for equal development of the police and civilian components

The police and the African Peace and Security Architecture

International conflict management and peacebuilding approaches recognise the centrality of the rule of law as critical to security, social and economic development. However, at the 2014 PSSG meeting it was noted that the first ‘ASF Road map’ exclusively reflected military input. The police was not involved in the initial design of the ASF, with the effect that the military representatives of member states, as well as international military partners, were the dominant voice in the creation of the APSA and the ASF subsequently. The police was not integrated into the APSA until 2008. Even the Continental Planning Element (commonly called the Peace Support Operations Division or PSOD) within the AU Commission, is also military heavy, complete with a military chief of staff. A central question is how the AU expects to promote multidimensionality as envisaged in the Protocol while creating a military heavy structure that does not provide for equal development of the police and civilian components.

There is no dispute that the roles and responsibilities of the police in PSOs and the range of their tasks have increased in complexity since their first deployment in the UN Operation to the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. Not only have the numbers of police peacekeepers increased, but mandated tasks have evolved from simple monitoring operations to the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of national police organisations, community confidence-building and direct law enforcement, promoting human rights, providing operational support to the host nation or law enforcement agencies. As a result, there is a valid argument that ‘getting policing right’ is at the heart of a successful PSO. The need for an expanded range of technical skills, and for intercultural communication expertise and sensitivities to local cultural practices on the rule of law, concepts of justice and traditional mechanisms used to resolve disputes, requires a sophisticated response to police functions, including command frameworks that support the objectives of the host state in restoring the rule of law.

From an African perspective, the PSSG was established to bring strategic police representation to the same level as that of the Military Staff Council under the Protocol and Military Operations Coordinating Committee specifically created for AMISOM military operations, to ensure that the police equally participate and are heard in all aspects of PSO decisions, planning, execution, and monitoring and evaluation. The inaugural PSSG conference provided a platform for a select group of police experts in PSOs to focus on the structure and organisation of the AU police or the ASF Police Component in APSA, the relationship with the regional planning elements (PLANELMS), and the regional police capacities and capabilities.

Developing a clear corporate identity and role definition for the police component is a high priority. As was noted in an address to the PSSG, the police component must establish its identity by being clear about its mission, vision, core values, code of ethics, core functions and structure in order to advocate for itself in APSA. It is noteworthy that the word ‘police’ does not even appear in the entire PSC Protocol. This point featured in many discussions at the PSSG and it was recognised that if the police leadership, the PCCs and policing roles do not feature in the legal documents of AU and APSA, it confirms that the police does not have a platform as ‘no one is listening’. However, the identity and command and control system of the military are fully articulated in the same Protocol, with clear duties and responsibilities of the Chiefs of Defence Staff, Military Staff Committee and a Force Commander being expressly provided in it.

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It was acknowledged that the lack of a harmonised framework or common standards among the RECs/RMs, between national police organisations and with APSA resulted in significant
ambiguity, not only in command functions but also for the police leadership and their staffs, including planners. The absence of clarity on their roles and responsibilities in PSOs contributed to a lack of autonomy from the military component. Consequently, the balancing of roles and relationships between the military and the police in African-led PSOs remained a challenge. A comprehensive doctrine that guides police roles and responsibilities, and supports command functions is a critical requirement.

A related issue on how PSO police components will function focused on a variety of PLANELMs that are unique to the REC/RM but are structured differently, are at varying degrees of development, and have neither a common doctrine for PSO police planning, nor a concept of operations, capacity-building or planning processes.

This diversity is driven largely by budgetary and political considerations. Changing the REC/RM structures is difficult and leaves little opportunity to develop a common structure among the regional bodies. In the PSSG discussions it was acknowledged that this resulted in the absence of a coherent strategic direction, with the police leadership un-empowered to participate in peace and security decision-making, processes and platforms, and finding itself without a functioning chain of command and control.

To facilitate a higher profile for the police component overall, the PSSG discussion focused on adjusting the AU headquarters’ structure so that the Police Coordinator has greater functional authority over the various police officers staffed in the AU PSO Division (AU PSOD). Increased participation in APSA decision-making structures and processes was also identified as a means to raising the profile of the police and its role in PSOs. In addition, the development of straight lines of communication and decision-making within a harmonised police structure was considered to be critical to the development of a highly functioning police component that is no longer subordinate to the military component.

When it comes to the ASF, the police component is also subordinate to the military, is not represented at strategic decision-making meetings and is understaffed at the PSOD level. In the REC/RM institutional structures, this pattern is repeated. This makes it difficult for the police to implement the tasks related to rule of law mandated to it, particularly in the absence of a police component doctrine and related frameworks.

The AU PSOD draft doctrines being developed for police serving in PSOs is patterned closely on the existing UN PKO doctrine. In instances where there is no AU doctrine, the default position is to use UN doctrine. In this case, the doctrinal development process linked to the UN Police Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF-2014) may be useful to continue building a partnership between the police division and the UN DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS). However, a question that arises is whether the UN Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) and the related doctrine fully encompass the types of environment and conditions where the AU deploys PSOs.

Command

Command has a very specific connotation and authority level, and applies to uniformed components in a PSO. It is concerned with the capacity of an organisation and its responsible personnel to lead the primary components of PSOs, namely the police and military. The exercise of command involves leadership, authority, doctrine and guidance. It derives from management principles on planning, organising, leading and controlling, but goes much further in terms of authority, responsibility, direction and leadership. Command in a PSO refers specifically to the managing of adequately

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AT THE 2014 PSSG MEETING

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trained and equipped forces, establishing a clear and effective chain of command, coordinating with member states and other relevant organisations, and coordination among different components of the PSO.26

The second major area of command focuses on directing the available resources in the planning and implementing of operations, as well as actions and activities in support of mandate implementation. For police, this relates specifically to rule-of-law issues. Ancillary to this is the development, management and oversight of the policy framework at the operational level that guides the achievement of objectives and includes everything from rules of engagement (ROE) and directives on the use of force and firearms (DUFF) to guidelines on operating within international human rights law frameworks that may be in conflict with local judicial and criminal law statutes, cultural practices and traditional or common law practices.

There have been continual disagreements between the AU PSC and the UNSC as to which organisation has primary legal authority to authorise the use of force in a regional (African) intervention. The command system at strategic and operational levels should create circumstances conducive to achieving the objectives outlined in the mandate, develop plans, ensure that personnel and the materials needed are available, coordinate activities and perform other functions that enable other (usually subordinate) organisations to accomplish missions.27 As set out in UN and AU documents, both follow a similar three-tiered system of command management for PSOs and PKOs, encompassing strategic, operational and tactical levels.28

This system also applies formally to the overall understanding of command authority in the police components of AU and UN missions. However, it is important to note that within several missions, such as the UN Missions in Sudan (UNMIS), the operational and tactical levels have been inverted for the police component, so that the word ‘tactical’ is applied to the operational and tactical levels have been inverted for the police component, so that the word ‘tactical’ is applied to the operational or mid-level as is generally understood in command authority. The inversion of ‘operational’ and ‘tactical’ in police components likely results from the influence of practices at the national policing systems of PCCs in which ‘operational’ is understood to be activities on the ground (corresponding to ‘tactical’ in traditional military understanding).29 This paper will follow the general practice by following the strategic-operational-tactical hierarchy.

**Strategic level challenges of police command**

The strategic level of command at PSOs, including that of the police component, generally concerns the political and institutional strata at which a PSO is authorised and its mandate defined. This occurs at the highest political level of the authorising organisation. African-led PSOs may be mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC) or the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AU PSC). The latter crowns the wider APSA, established by the AU and RECs/RMs as Africa’s overarching architecture that addresses the continent’s peace and security challenges. An African-led PSO may be carried out by the AU, or led at sub-regional level by a particular REC/RM.

Since the establishment of the AU, there have been continual disagreements between the AU PSC and the UNSC as to which organisation has primary legal authority to authorise the use of force in a regional (African) intervention. Tension have also developed between the AU Commission (AUC), which asserts that the PSC has the sole legitimate authority to mandate interventions in Africa, and some of the RECs/RMs, such as SADC and ECOWAS, which have tended to prefer to deploy forces under a UNSC mandate.30

The issue of which organisation authorises and mandates a PSO is relevant to command in so far as mandating organisations differ in (a) their capacities to act quickly and effectively, (b) the degree of institutional capability in terms of planning and management systems, and (c) their ability to marshal the necessary resources to implement the mandate. At the strategic level of the authorising and implementing organisation, these factors will determine the extent to which mandates are defined without excessive delay, and the ability of the organisation to react quickly to changes on the ground.

While the AU’s institutional framework has been evolving, it remains a relatively young organisation

PSOs that are authorised and mandated by the AU will be influenced by its political and institutional dynamics. While the AU’s institutional framework has been evolving, it remains a relatively young organisation with numerous gaps in its structure and staffing levels. Decision-making within the AU is acknowledged to have, on occasion, been a complex process, making it slow to act when circumstances required urgent action.31 For example, a political impasse and delayed decision-making were evident in the AU deliberations over intervention in Mali. Disagreement over whether the AU or ECOWAS should be
The pace of decision-making processes also affects the elaboration of official doctrine governing African-led PSOs. AU guidance to member states on PSOs has been slow in coming, although recently there has been an increase in draft guidance development in view of the build-up to the anticipated full operationalisation of the ASF in 2015. Because of the pace at which documents have been adopted as policy, a compensatory process has evolved in which lower-level technical guidance documents, such as SOPs, are elaborated while other policies have remained in draft form for many years without being formalised. Some implications of this at the operational and tactical levels are discussed below.

The need for a clear, credible and achievable mandate has proven to be equally relevant for African-led PSOs

The precise definition of the PSO mandate is a key element affecting strategic command. As stated in the Brahimi Report with regard to UN PKO, the mandate of a PKO should be ‘clear, credible and achievable’. If the mandate is unclear or ambiguous, the fact that it may be subject to different interpretations by different mission elements, could potentially have serious consequences in the field. Clarity is of particular importance when a mission is deploying into a dangerous environment, as ambiguity may encourage spoilers to test the resolve of the mission to uphold the peace. Credibility is linked to an expectation that the political objectives outlined in the mandate will be achieved and is thus dependent on the provision of adequate and appropriate forces and resources that will enable the mission to implement the mandate and have a better chance at meeting its objectives. In the UN context, the need for adequate resources to implement a PSO has resulted in the re-emergence of the idea of a two-step mandating process, in which a UNSC resolution mandating a PSO remains in draft form until the Secretariat has received firm commitments from TCCs/PCCs that adequate troops and critical mission support elements will be made available.

The need for a clear, credible and achievable mandate has proven to be equally relevant for African-led PSOs. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was mandated in 2004 to carry out investigations and to verify, monitor and report on compliance with the ceasefire agreements. AMIS was assigned 60 observers and a protection force of 300. However, as the security situation in Darfur deteriorated, the PSC expanded AMIS’ mandate to include the protection of civilians and authorised a large multidimensional force consisting of 3 000 uniformed personnel, which increased to over 7 000 uniformed personnel by the end of 2006. The expansion of the mandate was conducted without adequate planning and assessment of the AUC’s ability to generate, deploy and support this level of personnel. With an ambitious mandate, but with lack of cooperation from parties to the conflict, insufficient uniformed personnel, and financial and logistical resource constraints to meet the expanded mandate in the vast and challenging environment of Darfur, AMIS proved incapable of fulfilling its mandate, losing its credibility both locally and internationally. This resulted in the AU eventually proposing that the mission convert to a UN mission, and resulted in the hybrid AU-UN mission, UNAMID.

Poor mandate definition may also compel innovation at the operational level. This occurred in the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), although with limited success. As the AMIB mandate did not include the protection of civilians, senior mission officials revised the rules of engagement to allow for the use of force where civilians were ‘in imminent danger of serious injury or death’. Such use of force, however, would have been cumbersome, requiring prior authorisation by military and civilian mission officials. As a result, the mission never deployed in that role.

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Beyond the challenge of designing a clear, credible and achievable mandate, the AU experience with AMIS points to other critical aspects at the strategic level of command, namely planning and resourcing – the capacity to plan effectively and to generate the necessary human and materiel resources to sustain a mission and enable it to fulfill its mandate. These challenges will be addressed in turn.

For AU PSOs, the strategic level is comprised of ‘the elements of planning and command and control function on the continental/AU headquarters (HQ) level’. This level controls all the capabilities of the regional constituents, which is also responsible for planning and following up on activities at the continental level. This political-strategic level of police command for AU-mandated PSOs includes the following: the AU PSG as the decision-making component that considers all options and mandates possible actions; the chairperson of the AUC implementing authority who provides political direction and appoints the head of mission, the force commander and the police commissioner; and head of mission support. It also includes the AUC, which, as the secretariat of the AU,
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The AU PSOD has limited institutionalisation and personnel in comparison to other regional HQs that have existed for much longer. There has been a predominance of military personnel and perspectives, and a corresponding lack of representation of the police (and civilian) components in the key HQ planning and management structures. For example, the police is placed under the military in the PSOD and in all RECs with the partial exception of the SADC PLANELM. The police is not currently involved in key strategic decision-making processes, such as the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS). As the PSOD and regional PLANELMs continue to be understaffed and have limited financial resources, their capacities to adequately plan and command PSOs remain constrained. This has implications for force preparation and pre-deployment planning, as well as for the overseeing of operations.

While the protocol explicitly sets out the role of the military chiefs, the police is not mentioned.

This is particularly so with regard to the police component, given the underrepresentation of the police perspective and voice in key decision-making and planning structures. The evolution of strategic-level AU decision-making institutions on peace and security has resulted in strong military representation and voice within the structure, but a weak police (and civilian) voice. The absence of a precise definition of ‘peace’ and ‘security’ in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article I became subject to military interpretation. While the protocol explicitly sets out the role of the military chiefs, the police is not mentioned. Structurally, police advisers within the PSOD are subordinate to the military. This subordination is mirrored in all the RECs.

Since the military dominates the peace and security structure and the PSO decision-making process, one AU insider maintains that principals within the peace and security architecture have tended to view peace and security largely through a military lens. The AU PSC reportedly spends more time deliberating the military aspects of PSOs than police or civilian aspects. This has implications for AU deliberations on PSO responses to crises, including a predisposition towards military options that the AU is hard pressed to sustain logistically and financially.

Consequently, AU PSOs generally have not embraced or reflected a ‘comprehensive approach’ or multidimensionality. Whilst the ASF specifically aims to be comprehensive in embodying military, police and civilian components (though belatedly), the legacy of military pre-eminence continues to be reflected in the planning and implementation of AU PSOs. The strategic-level challenges of police command on African-led PSOs therefore include the crafting of clear, credible and achievable mandates; timely decision-making by the relevant authorising structures; and overcoming limited capacities at AU and REC/RM levels for effective planning, force generation and resourcing.

Operational-level command challenges

In military doctrine, the ‘operational level’ is the mid-level between strategic direction at the top and implementation on the ground (the tactical level). Organisationally, the AU and the UN have a similar interpretation, although it should be noted that in national police components the terms are often used in reverse, with ‘operation’ referring to doing operations, i.e. ‘feet on the ground’ at the lowest level, while tactical refers to mid-level tactical planning. This variation in terminology use has been observed in several missions. A specific example is UNMIS, where the latter is accepted usage in the police component. However, in this discussion, when talking of the operational level, we are referring to the ‘mission level’ or, more specifically, the mission HQ, leadership component and its direct supporting staff.

Command at the operational level involves the authority and responsibility to effectively use available resources to plan, organise, direct and control the police component in order to accomplish the relevant objectives identified in the mandate. Generally, the key challenge at the operational level is to translate the mandate of the mission/intervention to field level, issue guidance and ensure that all levels, from the tactical (feet-on-the-ground) level upwards understand how the mandate is to be implemented in the particular mission environment.

According to the ASF Command and Control draft doctrine, the operational command level includes ‘elements of planning and command and control on the regional ASF level’. This includes control over all the regional components (capabilities) where they are stationed. At mission level, it encompasses the head of mission, head of military staff, joint military headquarters, force commander, commissioner of police and the heads of civilian components.
AU and UN police command and control mechanisms have similarities at the operational and tactical levels. All police officers in an AU mission fall under the operational command and control of a commissioner of police or the head of the police component, who reports directly to the head of mission and maintains a working relationship with heads of other components. Operational police command is considered by insiders to be clearly established and better organised at AU mission level than at AU headquarters level, where the police is underrepresented in key decision-making and planning bodies. However, the lack of an established police command mechanism at headquarters in the AU PSOD and in the AUC cannot but affect command of the police component in missions.  

**Operational police command is considered to be better organised at AU mission level than at AU headquarters level**

As noted above, the concentration of PSO management within the AU PSOD is seen by some as providing AU-led missions with flexibility and agility. In a similar vein, some credit recent successes by AMISOM to the absence of ‘micro-management’ by Addis Ababa, and the ability of the force commander, contingent and battalion commanders’ to exercise a ‘high degree of autonomy to pursue tactical objectives in their respective areas of operations.’

Police PLANELMs at the REC/RM levels are less developed and have fewer planning experts than the UN or other regional organisations such as the EU. There are also differences between the RECs, with some being more institutionally developed and having more robust planning and management capacities than others. In a mission environment, this may be mirrored at the operational level by inadequate numbers of police with the requisite experience of in-mission planning to help translate strategic-level guidance into operational and tactical guidance.

The challenges facing the police commissioner at the operational level of a PSO are substantial. Police commissioners generally receive minimal training and preparation before deployment. Not all police commissioners have a management background and experience in strategic planning, which is an essential skill for commanding the police component in a PSO. Nor do they necessarily have relevant knowledge of international legal frameworks, such as international human rights law or international humanitarian law (1949 Geneva conventions and additional protocols). Police contingents represent a heterogeneous mix of traditions and cultures, and varying levels of skills, knowledge and expertise. The two categories of police employed in PSOs – formed police units (FPUs) and individual police officers (IPOs) – fulfil different functions, a situation that is generally not well understood by other components of the PSO. African PCCs further represent a mix of national policing systems, some of which include gendarmerie-type police with military status in addition to civilian police, while others only have a civilian police tradition. In addition to overseeing the operational coordination of the FPUs, attending to the overall management of IPO tasks and leading the diverse elements of the police component, the police commissioner must see to the component’s interaction with host-state counterparts, and do so in the highly political context of the PSO.

A planning issue that directly affects the focus of the police commissioner is the decision by AU/REC planners regarding the specific type of police capacity required for a mission, including the ratio of FPUs to IPOs. The current ASF approach has
and establishes the standards to which it will seek to hold the sub-regional organisations accountable, the RECs/RMs are responsible for the mission’s selection and training of police and other personnel. The relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs is still unclear in certain respects, in particular whether this relationship is hierarchical or based on the principle of subsidiarity. Coordination between the AU and RECs is still very weak, and while the AU has been developing draft policies and SOPs to govern the police component of PSOs, certain RECs such as ECOWAS have been developing their own SOPs. Harmonisation and coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs is currently still a work in progress – its resolution will be vital to effective force generation in future.

A key concern for the operational command of AU police components is the sustainability of contingents that have been deployed

The availability of adequate equipment and logistics is a consistent challenge for the police component of AU missions, particularly in the case of FPUs that are supposed to be self-sustaining, but are often deployed without adequate equipment or logistical capabilities. As Africa tends to deploy to higher risk environments than UN forces, and often does not have support systems in place before deploying, a key concern for the operational command of AU police components is the sustainability of contingents that have been deployed. Heavy reliance on external funding creates risks and vulnerabilities for the sustenance of AU police as changes in donor priorities or a realignment of interests can result in a shift in mission support. This was the case, for example, with AMISOM, when international attention was diverted from Somalia with the emergence of crises in Mali, the DRC and the CAR. The AU police should be deployed with proper equipment in order to perform the tasks of the mandate, e.g. capacity-building and development tasks, investigative tasks, executive policing tasks, etc. Given these different tasks, there is an obvious difference between military equipment and police equipment. The AU is working to finalise a comprehensive table of law enforcement and support equipment for IPOs and FPUs in different types of missions.

According to discussion at the PSSG, the AU has been faced with the problem of member states self-deploying FPUs to AU-led missions, with some of those FPUs being significantly below standard strength in terms of capability, and in particular as regards personnel and equipment. Some PCCs have put military officers in charge of FPUs, or have used military forces rather than police as FPUs. The AU is developing AU policies and standards to avoid such situations in future. Such actions include listing the personnel and equipment required and determining the scale of equipment for the deployment of FPUs.

African-led PSOs also lack specific guidance with regard to military-police coordination. The AU currently has no official doctrine on what in other contexts has been called ‘blue box – green box’, or the delineation of military and police roles in joint operations. It is the AU’s intention that mission-specific guidance is developed in the planning phase of each mission for joint approval by the heads of both the military and police components. This is to be supplemented by joint training exercises. Nevertheless, military-police coordination is likely to be a critical challenge in the high-risk environments into which AU forces are deploying. Military forces should be trained to respond to civil disturbances when fulfilling their task of establishing an overall safe and secure environment. Also, according to AU draft command and control doctrine, the military should take primary responsibility for resolving rule-of-law incidents when ‘the local threat reaches a level that is determined by the police to be beyond police capacity’. However, the military is not trained to perform law enforcement functions and the police needs to (re)establish public security. Lacking a formal doctrine, the police commissioner faces the challenge of clearly delineating police roles and making these roles known to the military and civilian components to avoid common misperceptions within AU missions. One of these is the uninformled if not misguided military perception that FPUs and police augment the military or generally function as extensions of the military.

**Tactical level challenges of police command**

When referring to the tactical level, the mainstream organisational approach of referring to the lowest or ‘feet on the ground’ level is followed, not as is often the case in police forces, the mid or operational level. The tactical level of police command is concerned with ‘the local management and supervision of individual personnel and units within the mission area of responsibility’. The tactical level comprises ‘the local-level implementation of the mission plan by individual civilian and uniformed personnel and units’. Many difficulties can be identified in this regard and this section addresses some of the main issues that arose in confidential interviews and focus group discussions with African police who had PSO experience.

In the view of some observers, the tactical level is perhaps the most reliant on policy and SOPs, and, as a consequence, is the most affected by doctrinal gaps or inadequate guidance. One example was provided by police officers who were appointed as training coordinators and instructed to develop workshops
in community-oriented policing (COP) for host state police. However, no guidelines were provided by the UN on key COP concepts and no workshop curriculum was available. The IPOs came up with their own material and based their workshops on COP practice in their home countries. The process was repeated when they were replaced by new IPOs, who arrived at the mission with their own national traditions and approaches to COP. It seems that training materials are generally not handed over to new IPOs arriving at a mission. Apart from the fact that there was no programme or framework for training, no assessments were made of the impact of the training. The creation of a standard curriculum for PSOs, one that could be adapted to local needs and circumstances, was considered to be one way to avoid such problems arising in future and to better ensure some degree of consistency and continuity in the training of host-state police.65

Nevertheless, military-police coordination is likely to be a critical challenge in the high-risk environments into which AU forces are deploying

At the tactical level, police encounter a shortage of resources to implement tasks, including vehicles, logistics, radios, training materials and other critical resources to support police reform and development of the host state police. A challenge for operational and tactical-level police commanders, both in AU and other PSOs, is carrying out an assignment in the absence of the necessary means. André Roux, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) focusing on police capacity development for PSOs, related an example from UNMIS. IPO officers deployed at state and county level to train, mentor and advise the Sudanese police had strategic direction to include a number of cross-cutting issues in their local-level training programme. However, they received no practical or applicable training materials for their specific environment and level. Lack of access to funds meant that no organised training could be done as the participants expected their meals, or at least bottled water, to be provided. Failure to deliver training materials and financial and other resources with which to execute organised training has been observed in several other missions. Consideration should be given to creating a specific police trust fund that could be used to support capacity-building efforts of the host state police.

In the AU PSO policing context, police from divergent PCCs face the challenge of acclimatising to the local environment and learning how to operate locally when they join a mission. This is a process that according to personal accounts can take between three and six months. By then, many international police come to the end of their deployment within another six months. Police are of the opinion that they are not going on deployment adequately prepared for the mission environment. In addition, there is little in-mission training to develop their mission-specific knowledge, skills, insight and performance. African police describe general pre-deployment courses that instruct them about the UN and what is expected of them once they are part of a mission, but do not provide details of local culture and traditions that could facilitate their adaptation and effectiveness on the ground. Deployment periods for some African PCCs – just one year in some cases – are considered too short by police personnel, and many find they came to the end of their term only a few months after learning how to operate effectively in the mission context.66
Pre-deployment training should always be specific to the particular mission to which police will be deployed.

A major factor that impacts on performance is the language barrier. Often undue reliance has to be placed on language assistants/interpreters in order for police officers to engage with the local population and relevant actors. In some contexts the language assistants/interpreters can be very unreliable; they either work for the host government or an opposition rebel group, or they do not understand a specific local dialect of the main language with which they are supposedly conversant. Language problems also arise when dealing with police colleagues and members of other components on the mission, some of whom do not speak English even though this is a mission requirement. In order to mitigate this challenge, priority should always be given to recruiting police experts who can speak the mission operating language.

Language problems also arise when dealing with police colleagues and members of other components on the mission, some of whom do not speak English

Police at the tactical level spend considerable time and effort writing progress reports on implementing mission mandate activities. Numerous respondents reported that they had never been evaluated or had not received feedback about the quality of their reports. They thus did not know if their monitoring effort had been effective. Several of the police officers interviewed reported that colleagues returning subsequently had told them about experiencing the same types of problems. The conclusion was that there had been little improvement in mission monitoring and evaluation since their own deployment. It is also possible, however, that the importance of report writing, specifically effective report writing, was not adequately conveyed by tactical and operational-level police commanders, and that this could have contributed to perceptions that reports were not read, evaluated or taken seriously.

It is clear that police commissioners must be aware of the many concerns and requirements at the tactical level, even while working primarily on the strategic and operational levels themselves. In the view of one former police commissioner, a commissioner should frequently move between the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and be aware that he serves by example to tactical-level personnel, who will not be willing to operate in areas into which he himself is not willing to go.

Cross-cutting issues

There are a number of cross-cutting issues that impact on the implementation of PSO mandates. These should be considered carefully by the leadership team of a PSO as they can affect the responses received from the components of the mission. While one component may take the lead in addressing a cross-cutting issue, more often than not action will be required across the mission. Given the political nature of cross-cutting issues, the mission leadership will have responsibility for ensuring that the issues are managed transparently and in line with good international practice and standards.

Failure to consider these cross-cutting issues can seriously impact on a police commissioner and his/her leadership with regard to meeting mission objectives. For example, if disrespect for diversity, whether perceived or real, becomes a point of tension in the police component, teamwork in the working environment may suffer...
and affect the implementation of tasks. If this situation becomes
evident to the general public, there is a possibility that the
mission's mentoring, advising and community programme
may suffer.

The ultimate responsibility for a smoothly functioning
component rests with the police commissioner and his/her
team. Any situation that affects the ability to work together as
one detracts from achieving the mission's objectives.

Gender

The passage of UNSCR 1325 (2000) ushered in a global effort
to highlight the substantive contributions women can make
across the conflict spectrum. In the same year, the AU created
the Women, Gender and Development Directorate, which was
followed by the AU's adoption of the Solemn Declaration on
Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) in July 2004. Five years
after the SDGEA the AU published the African Union Gender
Policy, which was designed to provide the AU, the RECs and
other instruments of government with a coherent policy on the
involvement of women in all aspects African society.

Despite the international focus on increasing the number of
female police officers in PSOs, the reality is that within domestic
police organisations the percentage of women who serve is
still low. For this to change, national police organisations will
have to rethink their respective policies on the recruitment,
vetting, selection and promotion of women. Attention should
also be given to overcoming cultural norms that have an affect
on women joining a country’s police force. Unless national
police organisations change their approach to recruiting women
for police service, it is unlikely that there will be a pool of
experienced female police officers for the AU or UN to recruit,
vet and select for deployment to PSOs.

Not only are women police officers needed in the police
components of missions, they are also critical in planning
aspects. Both the 2010 and 2013 assessments of the ASF
and APSA recommended that women planners, particularly for
service in the police, be included in the PLANELMS at the REC/
RM levels, as well as in the PSOD and ASF planning units. The
inclusion of women in PLANELMS and in mission environments
should result in the utilisation of their knowledge and skills
across the spectrum of activities undertaken by the police
in PSOs, and their policing activities should not be limited to
gender-oriented tasks.

In interviews and discussions with focus groups, African
female police officers discussed the obstacles that affect
advancement in their respective policing structures in their
national organisations. Issues ranged from rules that excluded
them from equitable access to police housing, which was
available to their male colleagues even though they had non-
police wives, but not to them with their non-police husbands,
to limited access to training opportunities that were often
reserved as ‘rewards’ for male police officers at the expense of
equally qualified female police officers. One discussant noted
that if training was offered to women police officers it generally
focused on gender issues. This limited their contributions to
missions to specific ‘women’s’ issues, rather than to the overall
roles and responsibilities taken on by police officers in PSOs.

Racism/disrespect for diversity

Experiences with racism as far as their positions at missions
were raised with African interview/focus-group respondents.
Some described resistance by European colleagues when an
African was assigned to a command position, despite such a
person having the right qualifications. Anecdotal reports also
revealed a sense that there was less respect among European
colleagues for ideas proposed by African police officers at
the mission. Some respondents also felt that African police
officers tended to be subjected to more rigorous oversight and
accountability when perceived incidents of misconduct were
being investigated. Standardised UN courses were considered
as one possible means of dealing with such perceptions.

At senior levels, when a mission was re-hatted from an AU to a
UN mission, tensions over the allocation of senior posts could
elicit frustration on both sides. Even though there is no clear
proof of inappropriate behaviour, decisions that are not racial in
intent can be perceived as such, this can result in unnecessary
tension that requires much intense discussion to rectify.

One discussant noted that training
offered to women police officers
generally focused on gender issues.
This limited their contributions

Culture

The noted management expert, Peter Drucker, is credited with
the saying: ‘Culture eats strategy for breakfast’. In PSOs there
are multiple levels of culture that affect the success or failure of
a mission. All the strategy in the world cannot compensate for
ignorance of the cultural landscape of the host environment, or
of the different cultures that characterise the military, police
and civilians who serve in PSOs. Interoperability between the police
and military is particularly important and is often affected by
discipline-specific cultural habits and patterns that generally are
deeply ingrained.

Police cultures tend to be structured on the basis of the law
and the courts, and police forces are thus subordinate to
the higher legal offices in their home countries. Their role puts them in direct contact with the population and the place they fulfil in social structures makes them highly visible. A significant consequence is that their attitudes and behaviour are scrutinised in the host country to see whether they enforce the law in an equitable and effective manner. This can have an impact on how their legitimacy is perceived by the population.

Furthermore, police tend not to be organised in units, but often operate singly or in small teams located throughout their areas of operation. Their chain of command is less universal than that of the military, as are their insignias, rank designations and decorations, given the myriad of approaches to policing. Police professionalism stresses individual discretion or judgment and police tend to have a higher level of professional autonomy. Finally, police tend to be less expediency than their military colleagues, and they have less experience in managing logistics, transport, medical and catering services, etc.

Respondents maintained that African police personnel had a better understanding of African policing problems than colleagues from a different cultural background.

In contrast, military culture tends to be more institutional in its structure, with strict chains of command and personnel who typically work in units. The management of military units tends to be top-down, with commands coming from a hierarchical authority. Military command structures, uniforms, badges and rank insignia are generally more universal, which enhances international interoperability. Military culture tends to be outward looking and units are tasked with the legitimate use of force to protect state boundaries. As a result, military commanders tend to have less of a problem with the integration of their personnel than do police commissioners, who have to integrate IPOs and FPUs with different professional cultures and a wide variation in experience.

Police deployed to PSOs bring their own unique cultures and national policing practices to the mission. In focus groups and interviews, African respondents who served on both UN and AU PSOs were of the opinion that they, because they were Africans, were able to acclimatise to the host-state culture more quickly. Having similar histories and traditions, and a higher degree of familiarity with local socio-economic conditions and challenges than police officers from other parts of the world, reduced the amount of time it took them to adapt to the local context. Respondents also maintained that African police personnel had a better understanding of African policing problems than colleagues from a different cultural background. At the basic level, ‘African solutions for African problems’ was felt to be an appropriate and fitting response.

Not only are the cultural differences between the police and military an important factor in the interoperability of the mission, but it is imperative to know and understand the cultural landscape of the host state. An appreciation of the history, geography, political and economic systems, religious practices, the role of women and children in the social hierarchy, and local approaches to conflict resolution is a priority for mission personnel. Without this awareness, it is difficult for a mission to know how best to promote local ownership, support the design of institutional infrastructures, and plan for the transfer of control over social and economic recovery to the host State.

Rank

At the PSSG meeting, one session focused on the issue of police officers’ ranks in PSOs. Rank was defined as ‘the level of a person’s position in an organisation or community. It influences the level of responsibilities, authority, influence and legitimate power of the holder’. Rank affects all levels of policing and is generally interpreted by the general public as an indication of authority, competence, trust and respect earned through service. There is, however, a lack of uniformity in terms of authority, responsibility, influence and legitimate power among the PCCs assigned or identified with rank. Within the African police community, there is a significant challenge to be managed as a result of the widely varying structures and substantive disparities in rank structures.

The evolution of policing tasks from a monitoring and patrolling role to mentoring and advising, as well as increased collocation, requires officers with specific skill sets and ranks reflecting these capabilities. If the respective PCCs fail to deploy an officer who has the necessary experience and rank for the task, it is not unusual for the host state to lose confidence in such a police officer. Likewise, if a junior officer is assigned to mentor a police officer with a more senior rank in the host state, the likelihood of a successful mentoring relationship developing between the two is low.

A practice often employed by PCCs is to give their police officers a higher temporary rank prior to deployment. This practice is not considered to be particularly helpful as the gap in skills, knowledge and experience becomes evident quite soon. As regards skills testing, specific rank levels for mentors and advisors, and the division of ranks into three levels reflecting tasks and responsibilities, interviewees suggested that guidelines and training would be needed to harmonise the different approaches and levels of ranks. Another suggestion
One suggestion was to align the AU police ranking system with that of the UN doctrine and ranking system.

**Conclusion**

This study has set out the context and current challenges specifically related to police command in African-led PSOs. Several conclusions can be made.

The development of doctrine, policies, SOPs, structural frameworks and guidance is challenging, requiring both time and resources to achieve frameworks that support decision-making and implementation. In the case of the AU, what is impressive is the on-going effort to create the instruments necessary for decision-making at the same time as deployment to robust, high-risk environments continues. However, while the shift from non-intervention to non-indifference indicates a normative change, there is not yet consensus or agreement on the way forward. It is important for the process to continue so that the objectives of harmonised training standards, equipping and deployment of uniformed personnel in a timely manner are met and enable the AU to be more effective and efficient peacekeeping organisation.

With regard to the police component of a PSO, command is a highly complex undertaking, requiring specialised skills and capacities. There is an urgent need for the AU, RECs/RMs, member states, the UN and other regional organisations to focus more attention on properly preparing police commissioners and others who will be taking command positions, with attention being given to the improvement of training and mentoring opportunities, the development of adequate doctrine and guidance, the harmonisation of standards, and the provision of adequate staff and materiel in particular.

The question arises whether the general replication of UN doctrine goes far enough to meet the needs of the AU and RECs/RMs. Emerging AU PSO practice suggest that the environments of African-led PSOs are different from those of typical UN PKOs, but the extent to which draft AU policies adequately reflect these robust environments is questionable. UN doctrine is being replicated where it is deemed appropriate, and to a certain extent this is being supplemented by additional AU doctrine for stabilising and peace enforcement in the situations being dealt with by the AU. For example, the reform and restructuring doctrine elements for command found in the SGF will likely be more relevant in later peacebuilding stages of AU missions or the transition to UN missions.

Finally, very little documentation about the challenges and effectiveness of command structures has been made available by the AU and the UN. This absence of evidence-based research about police command and the police component in a broader sense is hampering the closer examination and an informed public discourse about the requirements and constraints of command. Such a discussion is essential if the effectiveness of multidimensional peace operations is to be improved.
Notes
This report was made possible through the generous support of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies. The authors would like to thank all those who responded to our questions and shared their experiences and insights.


3. P Williams, ibid., 149–204; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to UN Operations, www.un.org/peacekeeping/documents/yearly.pdf; see also UN DPKO, Monthly Summary of Contributions (Police, UN Military Experts on Mission and Troops), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/index.html; also note that the African Union Peacekeepers number just under 22,000 in AMISOM at the moment (22126 authorised by UN Security Council resolution 2124 of 2013). Also note that there is a difference between the total average deployed as indicated above, and the total number of peacekeepers who have been in that mission in a year—for instance in the last year in AMISOM, there have been nearly 60,000 troops deployed due to troop rotations that are often at 3 months due to the high pressure of active combat operations, unlike the average UN where deployments vary between 6 months and one year, with the UN moving to a 12 month deployment policy as of next year.


6. APSA’s components include the Panel of the Wise (POW), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Peace Fund, and the Continental Early Warning System (CEW). Of these, the least developed are the POW and the CEWS. With regard to the POW, questions remain about its role; with regard to the CEWS, the lack of a uniform communication system affects its utility. The body most critical to peace support operations is the PSC, which was launched in only 2004. Article 3 of the PSC Protocol outlines its objectives; Article 4 ties the PSC to the Constitutive Act, the UN Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and states the principles under which the actions undertaken by the PSC will be guided. The PSC is a 15-member body responsible for making decisions regarding conflict management. Article 2 of the PSC Protocol identifies APSA as the PSC support body. The Peace and Security Operations Division (PSOD) implements the decisions taken by the PSC. The APSA is the implementing agent for the PSC and is to be composed of five standby brigades, one from each of the RECs, and are prepared for rapid deployment.


10. Ibid., 19.

11. Ibid., 6–9.

12. The six scenarios reflect the AU PSO conditions for intervention and the timeframes by which the ASF would be required to deploy. Concern has recently been expressed that the scenarios fail to reflect emerging trends. In discussions with Annette Leijenaar, Division Head, Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, the ZF Centre for International Peace Operations (Berlin) 2025 future scenarios were shared with relevant stakeholders, but changes to the trends reflected in the scenarios have not been made. It is important to note that the scenarios have not been revisited since their creation in 2008, they do not reflect current trend analysis in peace operations. In view of the current attention to issues such as transnational organised crime, counterterrorism and violent radicalism, there is some concern that the scenarios do not address the contingencies appearing in sections of the continent.

13. Festus Aboagye, A stitch in time would have saved nine, ISS Policy Brief No. 34, September 2012, 2–4.

14. On 13 October 2014 the decision was taken to postpone the AMANI II CPX scenario until April 2015, when it is to be conducted in Botswana. As noted in endnote 20, the AMANI II exercise will use Scenario VI, which will transition to Scenario V, focusing on establishment of a multidimensional PSO.

15. The maiden conference of the African Union Police Strategic Support Group was held in Addis Ababa from 23 to 26 September 2014.


18. Ibid.


21. Ibid., 32, as an indication of how the need for police has been affected by the changes in conflict and mandates since 1960, police have been deployed to more than 30 UN missions on four continents; the numbers have increased from 35 civilian police (QIVPOL) in 1988 to over 16,700 QIVPOL in mid-2013.

22. BK Greener, The rise of policing in peace operations, 183–185.

23. PSSG Opening Remarks, 23 September 2014.


25. Senior AU political official, Addis Ababa.

26. For elaboration on police command concepts and approaches, see Maureen


29 Confidential interview, Pretoria, October 2014.

30 Festus Aboagye, A stitch in time would have saved nine, ISSN Policy Brief No. 34, September 2012, 3


34 Ibid.


36 Brahimi Report, para. 56b; Christian Stock, A Mandate is Not Enough, 4–5.


Available at: http://www.ffl.no/no/rapporter/11-01888.pdf


41 Ibid.

42 The AU’s Military Staff Committee does not have police participation.

43 Draft AU Policy on Command and Control, 2006, para. 9, Fig. 2.

44 PSSG, 23–26 September 2014, Addis Ababa.

45 The SADC has a military chief of staff under whom are located the police, the military and civilian planners. Thus the police is actually under military leadership/authority although not structurally under the military component.

46 Confidential interview, Addis Ababa.


48 See reference 44.

49 Confidential interview, Addis Ababa.

50 Draft AU Policy on ASF Command and Control, 2006, para. 9b.

51 Draft AU Policy on ASF Command and Control, 2006, para. 9, Fig. 2.

52 Confidential interview, Addis Ababa.


54 Confidential interview, Addis Ababa.

55 Confidential interview, Addis Ababa.


57 Confidential interviews, Brussels and Addis Ababa.


59 PSSG, 23–26 September 2014, Addis Ababa.


62 Confidential interview, Addis Ababa.


64 Ibid.

65 Focus group discussion with African former police peacekeepers, September 2014.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.


71 African Union Gender Policy, Rev 2/Feb 10, 2009, http://wgdi.int/en/sites/default/files/Gender%20Policy%20-%20English.pdf; the gender policy was intended to establish a clear vision and make commitments to guide the process of gender mainstreaming and women empowerment to influence policies, procedures and practices. This will accelerate achievement of gender equality, gender justice, non-discrimination and fundamental human rights in Africa.


73 Confidential focus group discussions, September 2014.


75 This quote by noted management expert Peter Drucker was made famous by Mark Fields, the president of Ford Motor Company.

76 BK Greener, The rise of policing in peace operations, International Peacekeeping, 18(2), April 2011, 189.


78 Confidential interview: former UN Police Commissioner, September 2014.


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