South African policy towards Basutoland

By

HAROLD M. GLASS

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"THE AREA OF SOUTHERN AFRICA TODAY IS ONE where the future of the whole Continent is being decided. For all we know, the future of the world may be decided by what transpires there———In essence, the struggle going on is the struggle between the European and African races, and in particular between the two philosophies of apartheid and multi-racialism". (1)

CHAPTER 1

Some Basic Facts

BASUTOLAND, WITH AN AREA OF APPROXIMATELY 11,500 SQUARE miles, is completely surrounded by South Africa. The territory is divided into three clearly demarcated regions. The densely populated Lowland Region,\(^1\) which embraces about a quarter of the west of Basutoland, is the chief agricultural area. The Lowlands lie at an elevation of about 5,000 ft. and vary from 6 to about 40 miles in width. Beyond the Lowlands lie the foothills where agriculture is practised to a lesser extent. The rest of the country, the Highland Region, consists of relatively inaccessible mountain ranges rising to about 11,000 feet in the Drakensberg Mountains. This is cattle country where communications and transport are limited to the pony trails.

Temperature and rainfall vary widely in the territory. The main rains occur in the summer months between November and March. During the winter the mountains are covered in snow and occasionally snow falls in the Lowland Region. The snow and the well-distributed rainfall account for the numerous perennial streams which traverse Basutoland. However, the weather is variable enough to cause intermittent crop failures in parts of Basutoland, and on a few occasions in the last 100 years, the territory has been ravaged by severe droughts.\(^2\)

The population of the territory consists of approximately 650,000 Africans in Basutoland, and approximately 150,000 Africans working mainly on the mines in South Africa, and about 2,000 European traders, civil servants and missionaries. Thus Basutoland is essentially an African territory with practically no settled European community.

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(2) During the winter of 1965 the South African Government donated 100,000 bags of grain to Chief Jonathan for the people of Basutoland to help alleviate the severe food shortage caused by drought.
CHAPTER 2

Economic Background

"AGRICULTURAL LAND, LIVESTOCK, WATER, SCENERY and people are Basutoland's principal resources". The basis of the economy is peasant agriculture and stock rearing on land largely worn out by erosion — under an archaic system of land tenure. Out of a total population of perhaps 800,000 it is estimated that about 150,000 are continuously resident outside the territory, mainly dependent on employment in the mines on the Rand and Orange Free State, but also in neighbouring farms and in industry.

Since most young men are out of the territory at work in the Republic much of the work on the farms is done by women using primitive methods resulting in low yields. Throughout the territory, maize, the staple food is grown. In addition, beans, sorghum and oats are cultivated in the Lowlands and peas and wheat in the mountain areas. The only exploitable minerals are diamonds, which, judging by some of the recent finds, may prove to be a valuable asset to the territory. Apart from labour, wool and mohair are the chief exports and the bulk of these find their way to South Africa, which is also the main source of Basutoland's imports.

The main problems of Basutoland are soil erosion, the provision of water supplies and the improvement of communications. In 1936, following the recommendations made in the Pim Report a soil conservation campaign was started. Although great strides were made in this direction, administrative

(2) Land is vested in the Paramount Chief and is the property of the Basuto nation.
(3) 70% of Basutoland's imports come from South Africa and 95% of its exports go to South Africa.
(4) Until 1947 there was only one mile of tarred road in the territory, and this was built in honour of the visit in that year by King George VI.
officers found that "they were unable to count on assistance from chiefs and had indeed in some cases met with active opposition".\(^6\) Today, such difficulties are still encountered by conservation officers and the battle against soil erosion is far from won.

The revenue of Basutoland is barely enough to cover administrative costs and the cost of economic and social development is borne mainly by British grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. In 1959, in consultation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the High Commissioner appointed a commission to conduct a survey of the requirements and the natural resources of the three High Commissioner territories. The commission\(^7\) headed by Professor Chandler Morse advocated the acceleration and expansion of the existing development programme in all three territories. In Basutoland the commission recommended intensified campaigns against soil erosion, the need for improved communications, increased educational facilities and improved marketing methods and facilities. The estimated total capital cost of the Morse Mission's recommendations was in the region of R14 million, made up as to R5.4 million in Basutoland, R3 million in Bechuanaland, and R5.4 million in Swaziland. The total average annual recurrent cost for the first five years was estimated at R1 million.

Basutoland's most natural asset is water. The territory contains the source of two of South Africa's major rivers, the Orange and the Caledon, which both rise on the Basutoland side of Mont-aux-Sources. They flow over the Basutoland borders, and continue almost uselessly into the Atlantic. Since 1951, a scheme to dam the Oxbow Lake 8,100 feet up in the Drakensberg has been mooted. Such a scheme could supply an abundant source of cheap water and power and could solve many of the Republic's water problems at a much lower cost than projects like those to dam the Orange and Tugela Rivers. It would no doubt also solve many of Basutoland's problems. The accidents of colonialism and international boundaries have prevented any such scheme being implemented up till now. Several different surveys have shown what tremendous benefits Basutoland would acquire by the harnessing of the Orange and Caledon rivers. The most recent survey, by an American con-


sultant, shows that such a project could provide the Republic with up to 130 million gallons of water per day at an estimated one-third of the cost of the Orange River Scheme.

At present, it would appear that both the South African and Basutoland Governments are keen to discuss the Oxbow Dam and allied projects. But the South African Government is reluctant to enter into discussions until Basutoland is independent; in other words, they are not prepared to discuss such matters in the presence of a British representative, who would have to be present at such discussions.

Basutoland is therefore a waif, sustained, but not developed, by the South African economy. The money it draws from the Customs pool, "which represents 40% of Basutoland's total revenue,"(8) is derived from the percentage of customs revenue paid to Basutoland by the Republic under the Customs agreement. In view of the separate development of the three High Commission Territories, the Customs agreement is likely to be re-negotiated shortly. There is, therefore, the possibility that any new agreement would not be as advantageous to Basutoland as the present one since Basutoland's main imports are not of the high-duty-carrying kind.

The future programme of economic relations between South Africa and Basutoland will become clearer once the latter becomes independent. The pattern which the South African Government will follow will probably fit into its basic Bantustan policy and within "a multi-racial Southern African 'common market' about which Dr. Verwoerd spoke in August, 1964."(9)

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(8) News from Basutoland No. 11 April 1st 1964 issued by the B.I.O.
CHAPTER 3

Historical Background to 1909

THE FIRST AFRICANS TO ENTER BASUTOLAND WERE a number of different tribes or groups, who were more or less independent of one another, and who for the most part lived in peace. Early in the nineteenth century this relatively peaceful existence was rudely shattered by Chaka, the young Zulu Chief whose impis spread war and destruction far and wide.

Eventually a young Koen chief, Moshesh, gathered together the remnants of the fleeing tribes and with the impregnable mountain fortress of Thaba Bosiu as his base, he moulded these men into a fighting force and beat back the invading Zulu impis.

Moshesh, by then the acknowledged leader of the Basuto people, set about restoring peace and prosperity. However, new dangers were lurking in the South from the Whites. When he heard of the great services rendered to the tribes in Bechuana-land by missionaries, Moshesh determined to get similar help for his people. In 1833, in response to his request, three missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society arrived at Thaba Bosiu and settled at Morija.* Thus started a new relationship for the Basuto which has been of immense importance to them and which deeply influenced their way of life.(2)

Moshesh died in 1870, secure in the knowledge that negotiations for the establishment of a British Crown colony had been completed and that the “people were folded in the hands of the Queen.”(3)

From 1886 onwards, the High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Philip Wodehouse, urged the Imperial Government to extend protection to the Basuto people whose existence was threatened by the Free State. The Imperial Government accepted his recommendations in principle, “but ruled that the country should be incorporated into the Colony of Natal,”(4) and not be brought under the Governor of the Cape. Following an attack on the Kheme Plateau by the

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(1) They were followed in 1864 by Roman Catholic missionaries with their headquarters at Roma and later by an Anglican Church mission.
(2) "The extension of education of Basutoland has been almost entirely carried out through missionaries". (Cmd, 4807), p. 9.
Free State, Wodehouse issued the Proclamation of the 12th March 1868, declaring that "Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to comply with the request made by Moshesh, now therefore I do hereby proclaim and declare that from and after the proclamation hereof, the said tribe of the Basutos shall be and shall be taken to be for all intents and purposes as British subjects; and the territory of the said tribe shall be taken to be British territory."(5)

From the British Government's point of view, the incorporation of Basutoland was not a question of acquiring more acres, it was a question of saving the Basuto from their predestined fate. In the following year the British Government decided against incorporation of the territory in the Colony of Natal and agreed that it should be administered by the High Commissioner; but the British Government was not enthusiastic about this extension of its imperial responsibilities, so in 1871, Sir Henry Barkly, the newly appointed Governor of the Cape, annexed Basutoland to the Cape Colony. The decision to incorporate Basutoland into the Cape Colony was not discussed with the Basuto—it was not considered necessary. Thus began an uneasy association which lasted until 1884.

A comprehensive set of regulations for the government of Basutoland was put into force in 1871 by the Cape Government. In essence they involved, as Lord Hailey has observed, "a progressive substitution of the jurisdiction of magistrates for that of chiefs"(6) or as it is often called, a system of "direct administration." The Basuto chiefs were bitterly opposed to the new administration mainly because many of their rights and privileges were curtailed and Basuto customs and traditions ignored. Internal discord in Basutoland, an unsuccessful attempt to disarm the people and rising tension against the administration, led the Cape Government to request to be relieved of its responsibilities. So in 1883, again not without reluctance, the British Government agreed to resume the administration of the territory. This time the views of the Basuto were considered. They requested British protection, and the Imperial Government decided to accept control of the country under the authority of the British High Commissioner for South Africa. The then High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, abandoned the

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(6) Hailey op. cit., p. 79.
system of local rule adopted by the Cape Government and sub-
stituted a system based on the recognition of the Chiefs as agents
of the Administration.

Attempts have often been made to describe the system of
administration the British Government introduced into Basuto-
land when it reassumed its responsibilities in 1884. Lord Hailey
has said that the British authorities decided to "abandon the
policy of direct magisterial rule introduced by the Cape Govern-
ment, and chose to maintain the authority of the Chiefs, in an
attempt to use them as an agency of rule." (7) This system of
government in Basutoland was often described as "indirect rule,"
but this is not a correct description. As understood in other
parts of Africa, "indirect rule" implies the preservation of tribal
institutions and making the native authorities a part of the
machinery of government and directing and guiding the people
to the development of their own institutions. The system prac-
tised in Basutoland presents a very different picture, and has
little in common with indirect rule. It has been a policy "of
non-interference, of proffering alliance, of leaving two parallel
Governments to work in a state of detachment unknown in
tropical Africa, while under 'indirect rule' native institutions
are incorporated into a single system of government and subject-
et to the continuous guidance, supervision and stimulus of
European officers." (8) In fact, Sir Alan Pim, writing in 1935, was
of the view that there was not in 1884, and there is not now, any
rule, either direct or indirect by the British Government." (9)

In 1908 the National Convention met to consider the pro-
posed federation of the four provinces of South Africa. The
Basuto chiefs, who were acutely aware of their experiences under
Cape rule, sent a deputation to England to ask that Basutoland
should not be incorporated in any proposed Union. The British
reply was that there would be no immediate change, but that
if South Africa were united, it would be "desirable as well as
necessary for the Basuto to be prepared to come some day under
the same government as the rest of South Africa." (10)

Since the passing of the South Africa Act in 1909, the question
of the transfer of the three High Commission Territories has
been raised by the various South African Governments on num-
erosous occasions.

(7) Hailey op. cit., p. 79.
Referred to in Pim (Cmd. 4907), p. 48.
(9) Ibid., p. 48.
(10) Hailey op. cit., p. 84.
CHAPTER 4

From the Act of Union to the Second World War

It is not proposed to deal at length with the history of the discussions between South Africa and Britain on the question of the transfer of the Territories during the period 1909–1939 for two reasons: firstly, an analysis of this period would need to be too lengthy for the present context; secondly, the correspondence has been set out in a British Command Paper. (1)

It is, however, necessary for an understanding of subsequent developments to outline their general course.

The South Africa Act of 1909 included provision for the procedure to be followed in arranging for the transfer of the Territories to the Union. Section 151 of that Act empowered the King-in-Council, on addresses from both Houses of the South African Parliament, to transfer the administration of these territories to the Union, subject to certain conditions designed for the protection of African rights. (2) But in 1909 statements had been made in the British Parliament that there would be no change in the constitutional position of the Territories without the approval of the British Parliament, after it had consulted the inhabitants of the Territories. Similar statements have been repeated again and again since 1909. (3) The stipulation for the prior consultation of the inhabitants did not imply that their assent to transfer was essential; but the British Parliament was obviously entitled to take the views of the inhabitants into account in judging the merits of any proposal for transfer.

Many consultations have been held between South Africa

(1) Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland—History of the discussions with the Union of South Africa 1909–1939. Cmd. 8707.
(2) The 1961 South African Republican Constitution incorporates these provisions.
(3) See for example: Despatch from the Secretary of State to the High Commissioner on 4th December, 1925 (Cmd. 8707, pp. 18–20) and a letter from the Secretary of State to General Smuts on 4th August, 1935. (Cmd. 8707 p. 42).
and Britain on the significance of Section 151 of the South Africa Act. At first the British did not explicitly counter the South African contentions that transfer must eventually take place. Soon the British position began to harden, and they began to argue that Section 151 merely provided the machinery for transfer if agreed upon and that this Section did not imply an intent to transfer the Territories. The British argued that Section 151 was no different in this respect from Section 150 which provided for the possible transfer of the Rhodesias to South Africa. No one argued that this created an obligation to transfer the Rhodesias to the Union. In fact in 1923, Southern Rhodesia was offered a choice by referendum between self-government and such transfer and decided on self-government. A serious complication in regard to the Bechuanaland Protectorate was that in 1921 Southern Rhodesia raised a claim to part of this territory and "made it increasingly clear that it would assert its claim if there were ever any question of the territory being transferred to the Union."(4)

From the time when they were first administered by Britain, the High Commission Territories were treated differently from British dependencies in other parts of Africa, and the special relationship in which they stood to South Africa indicated the general accord that existed as to the desirability of the Territories eventually being incorporated in the Union. A striking example of this special relationship is seen in the dual role played by the High Commissioner over the years. During the years 1910–1930 the office was vested in the successive Governors-General of the Union of South Africa. This arrangement ceased in 1930 and the office was separated entirely from that of Governor-General, being vested in the holder of the new post of High Commissioner in the Union of South Africa for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. The title "High Commissioner for South Africa" was changed in 1935 to "His Majesty's High Commissioner for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland." In 1961 when South Africa became a Republic and left the Commonwealth the position was changed to the extent that the representative in the Union of South Africa for Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom became Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa, but the latter was also Her Majesty's High Commissioner for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

Since August, 1964 the office of High Commissioner for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland has been abolished, and the post of Resident Commissioner for Basutoland upgraded, as those for the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland had been in 1963, giving a status equivalent to that of Governor with the title of Queen's Commissioner. The Queen's Commissioner for Basutoland, like those for the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, is now directly responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. However, there remains a need for consultation and in certain fields cooperation and co-ordination between Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Queen's Commissioners, particularly in matters concerning both South Africa and the three Territories. The Ambassador will, therefore, continue to be informed about affairs which affect their foreign relations or their defence requirements, but he will have no further responsibility for purely internal territorial affairs. One of the chief advantages of the dual role played by the High Commissioner over the years is suggested by Doxey(5) “to avoid any clash between the special interests of the Territories and the wider interests of Anglo-South African relations which would be more likely to develop if different men held these two posts.”

Another example of the “special relationship” was that unlike other non-self-governing territories, the High Commission Territories in 1925 ceased to be a responsibility of the Colonial Office and we transferred to the newly established Dominions Office, which became responsible at the same time for relations with the Union. When in 1948, the Dominions Office became the Commonwealth Relations Office, the High Commission Territories were administered by the Commonwealth Relations Office, and it was not until, as a result of the establishment of the Republic in 1961, and the relinquishment by the Commonwealth Relations Office of its responsibilities to South Africa in favour of the Foreign Office, that on the 1st December, 1961, the administration of the High Commission Territories was transferred back to the Colonial Office.

The period during which the High Commission Territories were administered by the Dominions Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office has been described by C. Dundas and H. Ashton(6) as a “unique and somewhat awkward arrangement”

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which “had its significance inasmuch as it betokens the special relationship in which the Territories stand to the Union of South Africa.”

Until 1933 the various Union Prime Ministers regarded Basutoland as the Cinderella of the three Territories and were interested primarily in incorporating Swaziland and then the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In 1913 General Botha intimated that the Union “must now press for the transfer, at the earliest possible date, of Swaziland and at the same time of Bechuanaland” but “should the simultaneous transfer of both of these Protectorates not be feasible in the opinion of the Imperial Government, then we urge that Bechuanaland also be transferred as soon as possible after the incorporation of Swaziland has been settled.”(7) In 1924 General Hertzog, in a letter to the High Commissioner reopened the question of the transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.(8) In 1933, in a letter to the Dominions Secretary, General Hertzog overlooked the fact that advances had been “limited to proposals for the transfer of Swaziland and Bechuanaland, for he now took up the question of the transfer of all three Territories.”(9) From that time requests by the South African Government have included all three Territories.

It should be noted that in 1935 an aide-mémoire(10) recorded that the British and South African Governments agreed that in the following years their policies “should be directed to bringing about a situation in which if transfer were to become a matter of practical politics it could be effected with the full acquiescence of the population concerned.” But the changes that took place in the British policy on colonialism and the movement of South Africa’s native policy in the direction of apartheid, made the possibility of transfer becoming a matter of ‘practical politics’ more remote.

(8) Ibid., p. 15.
(10) Cmd. 4948, 1935.
CHAPTER 5

The Smuts-United Party Policy
Since 1939

IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN ASSUMED BY THE UNITED Party that the three High Commission Territories would eventually be transferred to South Africa. In 1943, General Smuts, then Prime Minister, expressed the hope that South Africa could take over the administration of these Territories "if only as a reward for its war services."(1) Although General Smuts hoped that the transfer of the Territories would, for this reason, be granted, he accepted that the inhabitants of the Territories would first have to be consulted before the British Parliament could consider incorporation.

After the war General Smuts stated that the difficulties regarding incorporation were not insurmountable but that the time was not right to tackle the matter.

"Certain difficulties will have to be surmounted, but I do not think they are insurmountable...Lord Buxton officially promised the peoples of the Protectorates that they would be consulted, not that their approval would settle the matter but they would be consulted when steps were taken."(2)

The fact was that the Hertzog native policy was not materially altered by the United Party Government of the war and post-war periods, and was disliked by the British Government, the inhabitants of the Territories and by many South Africans. Even before the war ended, Mrs. Ballinger, referring to a statement by General Smuts on the strengthening of relations with neighbours and the incorporation of the High Commission Territories, said:

"I think these are policies which must commend themselves to all South Africans. But Natives in the High Commission Territories have a fear of our policy of

(2) House of Assembly Debates. Col. 4026, 21/3/46.
white supremacy. They fear to surrender their future."(3)

General Smuts' handling of the High Commission Territories has been criticised by Oswald Pirow in his biography of General Hertzog.

"Then, unfortunately the war broke out and General Smuts took over once more. It would have cost only a word from him especially if such suggestions were linked with the idea of Pan-African defence, and the Protectorates would have been added to the Union. But again, as twenty years before, the matter apparently did not interest him."(4)

To link incorporation with Pan-African defence is hardly valid. Firstly, the High Commission Territories needed no defence and secondly, the whole of British Africa was on the side of the Allied war effort, and the Belgian, Portuguese and French Territories were those of Allied Governments. There was therefore no need for a "unification of Southern Africa in order to defend itself." If Pirow's argument is taken a step further then he should have said that the Rhodesias, too, should have been incorporated into South Africa for the sake of Pan-African defence.

The question of incorporation as such had never been in dispute. It had always been accepted that one day the destiny of the Territories would be in some form of closer co-operation with South Africa. But before incorporation could become a possibility, two difficulties had to be overcome. These were that the British Government would have to consider, firstly, the opinions of the inhabitants; and then whether it could make a recommendation to its own parliament for their transfer to the Union of South Africa being approved. In order to appreciate the problem in this period one must accept that on the British side these two difficulties had first to be overcome.

General Smuts did not raise the matter with the British Government in the early post-war era because of these difficulties, and as the climate of world opinion changed, so the policies of the two countries drifted further apart, and the difficulties became more serious. After the war the possibility of transfer might have been seriously considered by a Conservative Government in England but had General Smuts raised the ques-

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(3) Ibid., Col. 3865, 21/3/45.
tion after the war he would have been confronted by a Labour Government far more hostile to South Africa's racial policy than the Conservatives had previously shown themselves to be.

The two difficulties increasingly focused on one problem—South African native policy. As long as any South African Government continued to practise a policy of white supremacy the inhabitants of the three Territories would have opposed incorporation, and as opposition to South Africa's native policy developed throughout the world, no British Government, Conservative or Labour, could have agreed to transfer without facing tremendous opposition in the House of Commons.

So the United Party had an increasingly difficult task. Much as it desired incorporation, its more intelligent members realised that incorporation was impossible unless there was a change in native policy. This too was unlikely because it became increasingly apparent that the people of South Africa were dissatisfied with the United Party's native policy, not because it was too reactionary, but because they wanted an even more extreme policy, for which they voted in 1948.

After the United Party was defeated in the 1948 General Election, and became the official opposition in the South African Parliament, it continued to follow the same policy towards the three Territories; it still hoped for incorporation and still on the basis that the inhabitants would have to be consulted. In April 1950, General Smuts, then Leader of the Opposition, defended British policy on the question of the High Commission Territories. He said,

"I do not want him (Dr. Malan) to create the impression in the House that the British Government is continuously seeking excuses to delay the matter. That is not so. Naturally, it is a difficult question. In the normal sequence of events the British Government must consult the population concerned, and they must also consult their Parliament. No British Government can deal with the matter in any other way."(5)

In the same debate General Smuts brought up the important fact that the world had changed since the war, and criticised Dr. Malan, his successor as Prime Minister, for being out of step with the modern world:

"I must say, however, that these things are a little out of date. Since then there has been an upheaval in the

world, there has been a world war."\(^{(6)}\)

It was suggested by various members of the United Party that steps be taken to co-operate with the British Authorities in an attempt to create a better climate of opinion in the High Commission Territories for incorporation. Dr. C. F. Steyn,\(^{(7)}\) Member of Parliament for Bloemfontein City and a former Cabinet Minister, suggested co-operation between South Africa and the British Government—on the basis of an exchange of officials—with the object of convincing the inhabitants that incorporation was good for them. He also felt that the Natives of the Territories who came to work in South Africa could spread favourable propaganda about South Africa when returning to their homes.

The United Party believed, correctly, that incorporation would only be possible if they and not the Nationalist Party were entrusted with the task.

Their view was therefore that the Territories should be grouped with the Union, but that there was no hurry, and that the logic of geography and economics would make their weight felt in time. For the United Party there was no need for impatience.

The attitude of the United Party throughout this period had thus been more or less constant. The party started off with a policy similar to that of Britain but eventually the latter's policy came to aim at self-government for the Territories and it is here that United Party policy and British policy began to diverge. The United Party was never in favour of granting self-government to the Territories, and if the Territories were ever transferred to South Africa the United Party would have absorbed them into the general pattern in South Africa; they would not have been treated as separate entities.

By 1963 the United Party had in practice given up all hope of incorporating the High Commission Territories and according to Sir De Villiers Graaff if the Territories were one day to be transferred to South Africa then they would fit into the new United Party policy of race federation. When Dr. Verwoerd made his public offer on September 3rd, 1963, to guide the High Commission Territories to independence under South African patronage, Sir De Villiers Graaff criticised him. He described Dr. Verwoerd's offer as a complete failure. Sir De Villiers Graaff said:

"It was a set-back to South Africa's hopes of having a closer association with the Protectorates and a terrible
error of judgement.”^(8)

So far this view has not been proved to be correct.

It is possible to understand how, from the Nationalists' point of view, incorporation could help to solve South Africa's native problem, but it is difficult to see how it could help solve that problem from the point of view of the United Party.

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^(8) Natal Daily News—18th September, 1933.
CHAPTER 6

The National Party Policy
Since 1939(1)

IT HAS LONG BEEN CLEAR THAT THE MAINTENANCE of these three islands of British administration would irritate any South African Government, but particularly National Party Governments, who view the Territories as relics of that imperial rule of which they have wanted to rid South Africa since the Boer War. For Dr. Malan it "is one of the greatest anomalies existing within the borders of a Sovereign independent nation that there should be areas which are administered by another power from outside its boundaries. That this is an absurdity which few nations would tolerate."(2) The Nationalists—heirs to the Boer Republican tradition—believe that were it not for Britain, the Territories would long ago have belonged to South Africa.

With the development of the Bantustan programme the incorporation of the Territories became even more attractive to the National Party. Incorporation would give the Natives of Southern Africa approximately 50% of the total land area as opposed to the present 13% and would make for a seemingly more equitable distribution of land in the eyes of the outside world. Whether incorporation would help solve the South African native policy depends on the greater question, will apartheid solve South Africa's native problem?

According to Sarah Getrude Millin:

"Every Union Prime Minister has bitterly demanded the three British Protectorates. Each seems to have had secretly in his heart the thought to solve that Union's Native Problem with these."(3)

(1) In 1914 the National Party (Nasionale Party) was formed. In 1935 this Party was fused with the South African Party to form a Coalition Government. Subsequently a small group of members of the National Party broke away and formed the Reunited National Party (Herenigde Nasionale Party) under the leadership of Dr. D. F. Malan. It became the practice, especially in the press, to refer to this Party as The Nationalist Party. In 1947 the Reunited National Party entered into an election pact with Mr. N. C. Havenga's Afrikaner Party for the general election in 1948. On October 22nd, 1951, the Reunited National Party and the Afrikaner Party were united and became the National Party. In the present context references to the National Party will mean that Party which was formed by Dr. Malan and which in 1951 became the National Party.

(2) House of Assembly. Debates, Col. 5664, 11/5/49.

NATIONAL PARTY POLICY UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF DR. MALAN

Throughout Dr. Malan's leadership of the National Party he saw the problem only as a procedural one. His attitude throughout was that the procedure was set out in the South Africa Act and that regardless of all other issues the course envisaged in that Act must be followed. It was a legalistic approach and, at all times, Dr. Malan disregarded such important difficulties as consultation with the inhabitants of the Territories.

This period saw the emergence of a peculiar type of nationalism in South Africa. It was not a white nationalism combining the English and Afrikaner, such as Botha, Hertzog and Smuts had wanted—rather it was an Afrikaner nationalism aimed at maintaining supremacy over the non-European and establishing it over the rest of the community. Their political organisation, led by Dr. D. F. Malan, was the National Party which came into power in 1948 and has been in power ever since.

Discrimination against non-Europeans had already gone far when Dr. Malan assumed office. The Indians in Natal were not allowed out of that Province and were restricted in their rights to own land. The Africans were not allowed to own land outside the reserves. The Coloured people had a qualified vote in the Cape Province. The colour bar applied to all facets of public and social life. Dr. Malan professed as his Party's intention the extension of discrimination to the stage of segregation—apartheid.

Britain's embarrassment at all this was extreme. Racial discrimination was disapproved of by all the members of the Commonwealth, other than South Africa, and was an affront to the new Asian and African states which had, or were shortly to become, members of the Commonwealth. South Africa's attitude towards the United Nations was also apt to subject the whole Commonwealth to criticism. General Smuts had refused to conclude a trusteeship agreement for the mandated territory of South West Africa and Dr. Malan had refused to recognise the authority of the United Nations, and declined to continue to forward reports on the Territory. Since its formation, the United Nations Organisation has been critical of South Africa's racial policy, starting from the S.W.A. issue, followed in 1946 by the complaint of the Indian Government against the discrimination against Indians in Natal, and in 1952 by the action of the Arab-Asian bloc in bringing South Africa's racial policy as a whole
into the United Nations arena on the grounds that it was a violation of human rights and a threat to peace.

In 1946, Dr. Malan, while still Leader of the Opposition, discussed the question of the transfer of the three High Commission Territories in the Union Parliament. He said that the initiative for incorporation lay with the South African Parliament. But the question of the initiative had never been in doubt, the initiative had always been South Africa's. The difficulty was that before South Africa could take the initiative it was up to her to create conditions and offer terms that would have made transfer acceptable to the inhabitants and placed the British Government in a position to consent to transfer while yet keeping faith with the inhabitants.

Dr. Malan rejected the idea that the inhabitants of the High Commission Territories needed to be consulted. In practice he wanted to implement an arrangement made in 1909 when colonialism was the order of the day, and when world opinion accepted the idea of handing over colonial peoples and territories with or without their concurrence.

It was for the British Government to satisfy its conscience in any way it chose but it was that Government's duty to secure the approval of transfer to the Union when the Union chose to ask for it. Dr. Malan concluded that the British Government lacked confidence in South Africa's native policy:

"And why does the British Government not want to hand over these Territories to the Union? What is the real reason behind it? There is only one reply, and that is a lack of confidence in the Union to do justice towards the natives, a lack of confidence in the Union's colour policy generally."

The native policy he was referring to was at the time the United Party's native policy but when his Party came into power with a more extreme native policy Dr. Malan still expected Britain to consent to transfer.

At the 1949 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Dr. Malan restated the Union Government's desire for incorporation of the Territories. He told the Conference that the rights of the inhabitants were fully protected in the Schedule to the South Africa Act and that South Africa would comply with the Schedule. But the British Government's policy remained unchanged and nothing further was said about incorporation until later that year when, at a National Party Congress in the

Free State, Dr. Malan threatened to present a petition to the Privy Council requesting the transfer of the Territories to South Africa.

In April, 1950 Dr. Malan\(^{(5)}\) suggested that the matter be taken up at the point where it was left by General Hertzog in August, 1939. Dr. Malan never really took the matter further than this, that is: requesting the British Government to resume negotiations where they were left off in 1939.

On the 9th February, 1951, on the occasion of a visit to Cape Town by Mr. P. C. Gordon Walker,\(^{(6)}\) Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Dr. Malan referred to the question of transfer, although he felt that the time was not right for discussions, principally because he recognised that the small majority which Mr. Attlee's second Labour administration commanded in the House of Commons presented Mr. Attlee's Government with great difficulties in Parliament.

On the 6th April, 1951, the Cape Times published an article entitled "Malan criticises British Policy in Africa," where Dr. Malan is reported to have stated that if nothing was done about transfer he would have to take practical steps. What practical steps Dr. Malan intended taking is not known. But some idea of what steps he intended taking may be gained from a statement he made at the Transvaal National Party's Congress in September of the following year. He then declared that:

"While anxious that transfer should be reopened in a friendly spirit, if this did not succeed, the Protectorates would be treated as foreign territory, thereby giving the Union Government the right to demand customs payments and making Africans from these Territories ineligible for South African social welfare benefits when resident in the Union."

Dr. Malan was beginning to hit harder and was hitting where it hurt most—at the economic dependence of the High Commission Territories on the Union of South Africa. The inhabitants of the Territories were well aware of it, and realised that should South Africa so desire, it could inflict severe economic hardships on them. It was therefore an error by Dr. Malan to threaten to do what was obvious since this could only lead to bad feeling in the Territories towards South Africa.

In April, 1954, Dr. Malan took what was called a positive step,

\(^{(5)}\) House of Assembly, Debates, Col. 4192, 1950.
\(^{(6)}\) Mr. P. C. Gordon Walker visited South Africa and the High Commission Territories in that year.
though it was nothing quite as positive as the economic measures or the petition to the Privy Council which he had hitherto threatened. He introduced a motion\(^{(7)}\) in the House of Assembly requesting that the Territories be transferred to South Africa and that, with this end in view, negotiations be resumed at the point they had reached in 1939. This motion was carried in the House of Assembly by 73 votes to 31 and in the Senate by 22 votes to 7. All that Dr. Malan was asking for in this motion was that the matter be reopened at the point left in 1939. After a period of 15 years, during which the world had undergone such radical changes, Dr. Malan was prepared to go back into the past and resume negotiations from there.

There was clearly to be no change from National Party rule but the Party's newspaper "Dagbreek" suggested in August, 1955, "that the Union Government should abandon its policy of demanding transfer. It should rather co-operate in some form with Britain, in order to develop the High Commission Territories as Native Reserves as outlined in the Tomlinson Commission Report of 1955."\(^{(8)}\)

During Mr. J. G. Strydom's Premiership he raised the question of transfer at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1956, but took the matter no further.

**NATIONAL PARTY POLICY UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF DR. VERWOERD**

Dr. Verwoerd was the first South African Prime Minister to adopt a completely new approach to the problem of the High Commission Territories. His new approach was actually first made in March, 1951, when he was Minister of Native Affairs. Dr. Verwoerd then said:

"...the Natives of the Protectorates will act wisely if they compare more thoroughly the advantages of the apartheid policy for themselves with the disadvantages of the policy of integration of the United Party which is also the policy of the British Government in regard to certain of these territories. I want to put the contrast very clearly. The apartheid policy will mean that the Protectorates will actually become self-governing terri-


\(^{(8)}\) Hailey, Lord—The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission Territories p. 94.
tories and native areas. Whereas those territories in accordance with the policy of the other side of the House and under the British policy, are in danger of becoming areas where Europeans and non-Europeans will form a mixed population. I do not envisage the development of the government of the Protectorates on the basis of an absurd, sudden, westernised development as in the case of the Gold Coast. I envisage a natural development of self-government, based on the nature and history and mode of living and custom of the races living there.”

However, this did not become official Government policy until Dr. Verwoerd became Prime Minister.

In May, 1956, Dr. Verwoerd said that the inclusion of the Territories was not essential for the implementation of the apartheid policy but he thought that it would be in the interests of the inhabitants of the Territories themselves.

On the 27th January, 1959, Dr. Verwoerd equated National Party policy with British policy. Similar though these two were becoming in that both predicted independence for the Territories, they differed on a fundamental issue: British policy was for multi-racialism, National, for apartheid.

For the next two years nothing much more was said about the matter. During this time Britain started taking steps for the eventual handing over of power to the inhabitants of the Territories, and the South African Premier could see that the Territories were drifting away from South Africa’s expected control. In 1961, Dr. Verwoerd made a statement which brought to an end an era during which every South African Prime Minister had requested incorporation. He said:

“Do Honourable members really think that anything will still come of the incorporation of these Territories, bearing in mind the developments now taking place in Africa and the developments which Britain herself is now bringing about in the Protectorates in the shape of granting various constitutions? It would be a fool who believed that we must now clearly realise that since the concept of incorporation encompasses the principle that these territories will be placed under the control of the Government of South Africa and will become part of the Union, in contrast with the general tendency towards

(10) Ibid., 16/5/56.
granting independence to Black areas, that the Protectorates will never be incorporated, even if the United Party should come into power or the Progressive Party, or the Liberal Party."

In May of that year, South Africa became a Republic and left the Commonwealth, and for Dr. Verwoerd, incorporation of the three Territories became a danger to White South Africa. The wheel had turned a complete circle; every South African Prime Minister had wanted to incorporate the three Territories, but only Dr. Verwoerd realised that this could never be done because incorporation had become a danger to South Africa. However, although he believed that incorporation was no longer a matter of practical politics, South Africa would be prepared to co-operate on a friendly footing with the Territories. The next move taken by Dr. Verwoerd was to restate an offer of independence for the Territories under South African patronage—an offer he had made in 1951 when he was Minister of Native Affairs.

On the 3rd September, 1963, in a major policy speech made in Pretoria at a Transvaal National Party Congress, Dr. Verwoerd made a public offer to Great Britain, as the guardian of the three High Commission Territories, to allow South Africa to present its policies and programmes designed to lead these people to "self-determination and economic prosperity and to satisfy their legitimate aspirations." The Territories, according to Dr. Verwoerd, would be allowed to develop to independence along the lines being followed in the Transkei, as African-governed states. He said that because the economy of the Territories was so closely linked with that of South Africa, the latter was better poised to lead the Territories to independence and economic prosperity more quickly than Britain could. Moreover, Dr. Verwoerd said that such an arrangement would make it possible to link groups of Africans in South Africa with their indigenous homelands.

If such an offer were made to the inhabitants of the Territories and they rejected it, Dr. Verwoerd said that that would be an end to the matter, and the Territories could then go their own way "in ever increasing isolation from South Africa."

Two days after delivering this address, Dr. Verwoerd issued a statement in Pretoria designed to counter misrepresentations which were claimed to have been made in certain news reports

(11) The full text of this speech was published by the Department of Information in pamphlet form entitled "The Road to Freedom for Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland."
(12) "That no man may doubt," published by the Department of Information.
of his proposals. In this subsequent statement, Dr. Verwoerd said that no offer was made to the United Kingdom to “annex” or “take over” or “incorporate” or “administer” these Territories. The offer which was in fact made,

“was based on the assumption that the expressed policy of the United Kingdom Government still held good, namely, that no change should take place with regard to these Territories until their inhabitants had been consulted and on the further assumption that this was in accordance with the principal of self-determination recently stressed by the United Nations Committee.”

Here we see a reversal of National Party thinking about the question of consultation of the inhabitants before any decision about their future could be made.

Dr. Verwoerd’s offer to the High Commission Territories did not gain general acceptance in Basutoland. Such leaders as Chief S. S. Matete, leader of the Marematlou Freedom Party, and Mr. E. Tau, Assistant Secretary of the Basutoland National Party, felt they could not consider the offer since it would mean an end of multiracialism in their country. In any event the offer to them was pointless “as they expected full independence from Britain in 1965”. (13)

During Dr. Verwoerd’s Premiership, the National Party has undergone a complete change, with a general softening of its attitude to the Territories as they moved closer to independence. During the last few years, the South African Government has realised more and more the need to develop good relations and closer co-operation with the Territories. It has become the earnest desire of the Government to live in peace and friendship with the Territories, both now and when they become independent.

The South African Minister of External Affairs has said that the Government welcomed the development of self-government in the Territories and that “the Government would strive to continue to co-operate both economically and otherwise, without interference in their internal affairs or in their political system”. (14)

CHAPTER 7

Basuto Political Attitudes

THE ELECTIONS HELD IN BASUTOLAND IN APRIL, 1965, are a useful guide to future attitudes and relations between South Africa and Basutoland.

Basutoland is one of the few Territories where multi-party democracy is developing in Africa, based on economic, religious and political convictions and not on tribal or racial differences. As such, the indications are that Basutoland will be one of the few African states which may develop on Western political lines rather than the strong one-man-one-party state.

There are clear-cut differences between the major parties in Basutoland. The Basutoland Congress Party (B.C.P.) founded in 1952, is the oldest and best organised party. Its leader, Mr. Ntsu Mokhele, is a socialist and Pan-Africanist and is well known at conferences of African states. His party is a socialist party with pro-Ghanaian leanings, from whence, it is reported, come much of the party's finances. There have also been reports that the B.C.P. is financially supported by Red China—this, however, has been denied by party officials. In 1964, Mokhele visited Accra, Cairo and Peking, and Moscow was conspicuously absent from his itinerary. In fact, to some extent, Basutoland mirrors the Communist ideological dispute between Moscow and Peking, for the small Basutoland Communist Party,\(^1\) with about 400 members, is pro-Moscow and violently anti-B.C.P., which is pro-Peking. The B.C.P. has anti-British leanings and is militantly anti-South African.

The Marematlou Freedom Party (M.F.P.), led by Dr. Seth Makotolo, has a so-called “middle of the road” policy, with the backing of many of the Chiefs. It is also Pan-Africanist and competes strongly with the B.C.P. for support from the Organisation of African Unity. The M.F.P.’s main support comes from the traditional chiefs, and even the Paramount Chief who is supposed to be above party politics. The M.F.P. stated during the election campaign that they would not allow Basutoland

\(^{(1)}\) This party did not put up any candidates in the April, 1965 elections.
to be used as a base for subversive activity against South Africa. The Basutoland National Party (B.N.P.), led by Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan, was formed after the Accra Conference in 1959 by members of the B.C.P. who broke away from that party because of its left wing tendencies. The B.N.P. is Basutoland's Conservative Party and is anti-Communist and pro-Western. Opponents of the B.N.P. have alleged that this party is financed by white Nationalists in the Republic. Many of the B.N.P. supporters are drawn from the Roman Catholic third of the population and from the lower echelon of tribal chiefs. The party's policy may be summed up as "human rights for all, the maintenance of religious freedom and friendly relations with South Africa."

The main issues which faced voters in April, 1965 were the chieftainship, relations with South Africa and East-West relations. The parties are deeply divided on the question of chiefs. The B.C.P. wants this system abolished. The M.F.P., quite out of keeping with its general policies, stands for greater power for the chiefs, and wants the Paramount Chief to have greater authority than he has under the present constitution which accords him the status of a constitutional monarch. The B.N.P. accepts the limited recognition accorded to the chieftainship in the constitution where ultimate authority is with the elected Assembly.

As for relations with South Africa, on paper at least, all three main parties are in accord. The reality of their economic dependence leaves little room for manoeuvre and makes economic co-operation with the Republic inevitable. But in practice the B.C.P. would co-operate as little as possible and would strive to obtain the maximum outside help. The M.F.P.'s approach would be much the same, only its attitude would be less aggressive. And in contrast to them, the B.N.P. would strive, and is striving, to secure the utmost co-operation and friendly political and economic relations with the Republic. The policies of the major parties as regards South Africa thus range from aggressive neutrality to friendly co-operation.

In their approach to international relations the three parties also show marked differences. The B.C.P. is anti-Western and pro-Pan Africanist. The M.F.P. stands for neutrality, co-operating within the framework of the O.A.U. Like Seretse Khama's Bechuanaland Government, the B.N.P. will have formal relations

(2) In 1965 the South African Government made a donation of 100,000 bags of grain to Chief Jonathan personally for the people of Basutoland.
with African states and is pro-Western and anti-Communist.

Chief Jonathan's bread and butter policies appealed to the majority of the electorate, especially the thousands of Basuto women who rely on pay packets from husbands in the Republic. The defeat of the B.C.P.—although narrow—may be regarded as a denunciation of radicalism and witness to a decline in this party's popularity. However, with many of the chiefs being accused of improper allocation of land, the B.C.P.'s anti-chief policy attracted many votes. The overwhelming defeat of the M.F.P. indicates the waning influence of the higher chieftainship and shows the people's refusal to bow to traditionalism and their sophistication as voters.

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(3) The B.N.P. received 41.63% of the votes.
The B.C.P. received 39.66% of the votes.
The M.F.P. received 16.49% of the votes.

(4) The results of the 1960 elections for the Basutoland District Councils were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.C.P.</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.N.P.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.F.P.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressives</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
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CHAPTER 8

The Future Relations between Basutoland and the Republic

BASUTOLAND IS THE LEAST WELL EQUIPPED OF THE three High Commission Territories for real independence. This small, underdeveloped "hole in the South African doughnut" will, for years to come, lean heavily on South Africa. Its future is by no means secure, and although it has made great progress in its political development, it remains economically dependent irrespective of its political status. It has survived and will continue to survive by the grace of South Africa and if it shows signs of political disorganisation it may lose its sovereignty.

The results of the April elections indicate that the Basutos have taken the first steps to strengthen friendly relations with the Republic. Its people realise the need to live in friendship with South Africa, just as South Africa is anxious to show the world that her policy of good neighbourliness can work in practice. Dr. Verwoerd has given the highest priority to his plan for positive co-operation between South Africa and the High Commission Territories as well as with Moçambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and certain other African states to the North. This plan is for the development of a multi-racial Southern African "common market" in which none of the member nations would have political control of any of the others, but in which all would co-operate to their mutual benefit. This embryo Commonwealth of Southern African States has become a major foreign policy objective for South Africa.

The South African Premier is not given to making gestures which are not in accordance with his considered policy and his foreign policy may well be favourably considered by some of the African states falling within South Africa's sphere of influence.

Dr. Hastings Banda, the Malawi Premier, told the African Summit Conference in 1964 that "the geographical position of Malawi made it impossible to carry out to the letter resolutions to sever diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa. He said
that the same situation applied in Basutoland and Zambia."\(^{(1)}\)

Certain delicate problems will have to be overcome once Basutoland becomes independent. One such problem is the right of transit through South Africa, because the Republic is in a position to control all traffic into landlocked Basutoland from other countries. Transit facilities involve two basic rights: one, that any country has the right to prevent undesirable aliens crossing its territory, and the other that any person has the right to return to his homeland. In August, 1965, South Africa refused to allow 10 Basuto to return to their homeland. The South African Minister of External Affairs, Dr. H. Muller, gave as reason for the refusal, that the 10 men were returning to Basutoland after having trained as saboteurs in a Communist country. The Republic's refusal has been seen in some Basutoland quarters as a direct interference in their internal affairs, and has created the fear that when Basutoland becomes independent, South Africa may refuse transit facilities to diplomats from countries like India, Russia, Red China and Ghana, all of which are antagonistic towards South Africa. This problem will have to be worked out between an independent Basutoland and South Africa.

Another problem will be that of diplomatic representation between the two countries. Chief Jonathan has stated that one of his first aims will be to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa. The South African Government might not agree to such an exchange of diplomatic representatives since it could cause difficulties with its colour policy. "Die Transvaler," in a leading article, has suggested that diplomatic contact need not be on the same basis as that between the Republic and other countries:

"The two countries can work together heartily and fruitfully, without each having a permanent diplomatic representative in the other country."\(^{(2)}\)

And the article goes on to offer as a solution to the problem, regular visits by official representatives to discuss common interests. Since "Die Transvaler" is one of the official organs of the National Party, it may well be that the South African Government may act on the lines suggested by this newspaper.

Basutoland will become independent in 1966. Its relationship with the Republic in the near future will no doubt be based on friendly economic co-operation. South Africa presents two facets to the Basuto people—one in Dr. Verwoerd's "White"
South Africa and the other in Chief Kaiser Matanzima's "Black" Transkei. So long as the Basuto reject the policy of segregation there is little likelihood of Basutoland becoming politically integrated with the Republic. However, there is a possibility that the Basuto may look across the mountains to the Transkei where strong tribal links exist between the Basuto and the Xhosas. Along the Basuto—Transkei border the groups mix freely. If the Transkei should become completely independent there is the possibility of a future form of federation between these two countries.

Commonsense and common interests will, in the end, determine the future relationship between the Republic and Basutoland, and there are enough of these common elements in both countries to make peaceful co-existence a reality.
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