The drug trade and governance in Cape Town

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Summary

The Western Cape continues to be plagued by the drug trade and accompanying development of organised crime networks. The paper discusses the racial, economic and geographic variations in the drug trade and drug use, and the trade’s growth during the apartheid, transitional and post-apartheid periods. It describes the various types of drugs, and, using a network approach, focuses on those involved in the trade and their effect on the development of criminal governance in Cape Town. While the growth of criminal governance can partially be attributed to the failure of state institutions, it also develops from the increasing links between criminal networks and political and civic institutions, which can protect criminal activities.

The drug trade in the Western Cape region is one of the most dangerous and noticeable in the country. The large number of drug addicts and gangs and the continued violence, especially in certain suburbs, have steadily exacerbated the seriousness of the situation, leading to international headlines, violent confrontations and mass civil society action. The drug trade and the accompanying development of organised crime networks have been a constant problem for the government and citizens living in areas where organised crime has taken hold.

However, the drug trade often varies on racial, economic and geographic lines and, therefore, in order to understand this trade and its role in criminal governance, it is necessary to describe the various drug markets, give a broad outline of users and the criminals involved, and historically trace the growth of the trade as an explanatory tool, because it is linked to the apartheid, transitional and post-apartheid periods. Finally, the paper will seek to analyse how the drug trade has impacted on ‘criminal governance’. The concept of criminal governance is therefore used to describe and explain the existence of:

...parallel sources of authority by criminal networks. This does not necessarily mean that criminal networks seek to supplant the state, but rather to exist alongside state structures, providing some goods and services (including illegal or illicit ones) that the state does not provide – including employment. Concurrently, core actors in crime networks become alternative sources of authority that provide (and are even asked to provide) dispute resolution mechanisms and protection. The capacity of crime networks to use violence increases their social control and legitimacy.

While the growth of criminal governance can in part be attributed to the failure of state institutions, criminal governance also grows with the increasing links that criminal networks may have with political and civic institutions, which can protect criminals and criminal organisations.
Organised crime networks

Understanding the development of organised crime and its effect on criminal governance in Cape Town has often been made more difficult by the various understandings and overlapping characteristics of ‘street gangs’ and organised crime groups and a failure to recognise the broader network involved. Legislation on the subject has also been vague and often profiles young (often-coloured) males and foreigners. This is evident in the characteristics attributed to gang’s members and organised crime in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA).\(^1\)

While POCA remains open to interpretation and has been used to prosecute a variety of cases,\(^4\) including commercial or ‘white-collar’ crime, there is a construct or Durkeheimian notion vulgaire\(^5\) of who gangs are, what organised crime is and how it operates. In one of the earlier case studies of gangs and organised crime in South Africa, Gastrow differentiated between ‘street gangs’ and organised crime groups, networks, or syndicates based on the level of formality and the extent of the crime.\(^6\) Street gangs were seen as the less sophisticated counterparts to organised crime syndicates, with members often being youths.\(^7\) Gangs seemed to be conceived as more territorially inclined compared to organised crime groups that were considered to be more sophisticated and to have a wider reach.

This type of understanding was widespread in the country and internationally and influenced South African policy formulation and law enforcement initiatives, with the highly publicised shift in focus by the police and legislature from street gangs to ‘high flyers’ in the late 1990s, which arguably continues to this day. High flyers were perceived as the individuals on the top rung of organised criminal groups in the city, whom law enforcement specifically targeted. Standing, however, argues that this view of organised crime is ill informed and has confused the conception and role of such crime in South Africa.\(^8\)

He argues further against a common misconception about monolithic ‘super gangs’ with central command centres, suggesting that rather ‘the organisation is decentralised. The supergangs operate as a conglomerate of affiliated smaller businesses and the relationship between each area cell is distant’.\(^9\) Standing even states that not all drug merchants and dealers need to be affiliated to gang or organised crime structures and, even in the Cape Flats, many drug dealers operate independently or cooperate with other dealers and/or gangs when they need to. Similar arguments can also be made regarding the nature of other criminals and the structure of criminal organisations in Cape Town.\(^10\) Standing succinctly states, ‘There is organisation to criminal transactions, but not just a series of clearly defined organisations’.\(^11\)

Recent research suggests that organised crime groups should not only be analysed as a singular hierarchy, but as a criminal network that criminal networks may have on both the state and society at large based on their interactions with others, and one can therefore better describe the effects and levels of criminal governance.

The history of organised crime in Cape Town

Organised crime has existed and has been concentrated in the Western Cape for decades. A number of studies are dedicated to understanding the growth of organised crime and organised crime networks in Cape Town.\(^\text{12}\) Previous research found that the apartheid government’s failure to police non-white areas led to the growth of ‘community-based’ defence gangs who sought to protect the inhabitants from isotisia or skollies\(^\text{13}\) who preyed on the community. However, many of these defence gangs began demanding protection money from inhabitants and thus became part of the problem.\(^\text{14}\)

It could be argued that the continued failure of the apartheid government to include and protect large parts of the population led to the first systematic turn toward ‘organised’ criminal governance during this period. While non-white sections of the population had turned to varied non-state institutions before this, these actions were markedly different in that criminal and gangs were providing a service of protection where the state was not.

Increasing urbanisation and migration, and the divisions of apartheid Cape Town, especially the 1950 Group Areas Act, laid the foundation for the development of organised crime networks in Cape Town. Drawn to the
city for work, coloureds increasingly came into contact with white South Africans and lived in areas such as District Six. The apartheid state, opposed to cross-racial intermingling, declared a number of areas around the city ‘whites-only’ areas and started to remove the coloured population.

Many communities were forcibly removed and socially excluded in the 1970s to the outskirts of the city, into what became known as the Cape Flats. At the same time, a number of coloured families voluntarily moved to the area, due to the low cost of property there.

The conditions created by the state made the gang an integral part of social and economic life

A short period of time without a gang presence following the relocation of many families to the Cape Flats soon ended with an exponential growth of gangs in the region. Lambrechts argues that the ‘conditions on the Cape Flats encouraged the formation and activities of loosely structured gangs as they provided structure, a sense of belonging and identity and a way to pass the time’. She agrees with Legget that the norms of the gang became the norms of individuals as the family unit made way for the gang as a surrogate family. She further states that this situation intensified due to increasing drug and alcohol use in the 1970s and 1980s. Standing argues further that this growth in alcohol and drug abuse (mandrax in particular) was due in part to apartheid policies and apartheid perceptions of the coloured working classes that resulted in poorly operationalised alcohol control efforts. Alcohol control in these areas led to a criminalised market, increased numbers of shebeens, and an increase in organised criminality and opportunities for its growth.

The very conditions created by the state made the gang an integral part of social and economic life, as more people turned to gangs for both employment and social control in an exclusionary system. Moreover, illegality became an increasing norm and way of life as, for example, the increase in illegal shebeens created a situation in which the very locations of social interactions became governed by the rules and norms of criminal enterprises. These apartheid measures increased the level of criminal governance, as the coloured populations were increasingly isolated from the state and economic opportunities. Thus, criminal governance became more entrenched economically, socially and spatially.
members of crime networks became involved in politics or business after the struggle. Ellis confirms that government documentation shows that the African National Congress (ANC)–South African Communist Party alliance was involved in motorcar theft and mandrax smuggling. Operations sought to increase the numbers of informants in the state security forces and therefore criminals began playing peculiar double roles. Crime bosses such as Cyril Beeka, who is alleged to have continued major criminal activity long after the end of apartheid, had friendships with the police and politically connected ANC figures such as the Shaik brothers while maintaining a position as an informant. This blurred the line between the political, security and resistance institutions and organised crime.

These connections were not limited to the resistance movement, because the apartheid state had an important role in the Cape Flats drug trade. Ellis states that ‘from about 1986, there was a marked increase in the importance of this sector as both the state and the ANC launched initiatives that aimed to make greater use of the criminal milieu in order to attain their strategic objectives’. During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in South Africa there was acceptance of the fact that the apartheid government experimented with drugs, including mandrax and ecstasy, as a part of crowd control experiments. The head of Project Coast in the apartheid government’s chemical and biological weapons programme, Wouter Basson, was arrested and tried for attempting to sell large amounts of illegal drugs.

Thus, the complicity of the state extended beyond turning a blind eye to the activities of gangs and organised criminals. The most noticeable was the well-known South African Defence Force (SADF) involvement in trade in illicit wildlife products from across Africa. According to Ellis, the smuggling of high-value goods such as drugs, currency, diamonds and cars ‘became the medium wherein professional criminals, sleazy politicians, corrupt guerrilla leaders and policemen and those who gave strategic direction to the armed struggle and counter-insurgency all developed common interests’.

Some members of crime networks became involved in politics or business after the struggle

Ellis records an interview with a police detective who commented on the illegal trade routes developed during apartheid:

We all used the same routes, the smugglers, the South African intelligence services all of them together and the ANC. They used to smuggle their weapons on those routes, your smugglers would obviously bring in the drugs and stolen vehicles in the night and we used these routes to, you know, catch up on them.

In the Cape Flats the apartheid government began using gangs to quell political dissent. Gangs, which had already developed considerable strength, were used in a variety of ways. They were used to inform on political activities and threaten or target political activists. In exchange, police turned a blind eye to their activities. This symbiotic relationship between these gangs and the state drastically increased the power and influence of the gangs on the Cape Flats and increased part of the population’s dependence on drugs.

It could be argued that this period increased the growth of criminal governance in the region because the state increasingly legitimised parallel sources of authority, including criminals, to attain its political objectives and security. Furthermore, those who resisted apartheid needed these alliances and were therefore politically beholden to organised crime following the end of apartheid. The sins of the apartheid period continued in Cape Town long after the end of apartheid as the political linkages and network forged in this period continued and developed.

While the subversive activities of both the state and resistance provided the smuggling routes and added to a growing drug problem, market forces, the opening of borders, increasing speed of transportation, and a growth in global travel and demand for drugs began increasing the levels of drugs imported into the country. While South Africa’s relative exclusion from the world economy during the apartheid period isolated the country from hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin, the opening of the country’s borders allowed both these drugs and organised criminals to make their way into the country and feed a growing market. These markets brought with it new criminals and new spaces and markets in which to develop.

According to Gastrow, by the mid-1980s adventurers and ‘fortune hunters’ arrived in African countries from countries such as France, Portugal, Britain, Greece, Lebanon, India, Israel and Central European states. They set up small trading or import and export business that often served as fronts for illegal business. These fortune hunters soon arranged with local operators to supply a variety of illegal goods for foreign markets. Gastrow states:

The indigenous operators were the suppliers of the goods for which the foreigners could pay and then smuggle to the ‘rich’ markets of South Africa and abroad. The relatively tightly controlled South African borders and airports and the harsh discriminatory
laws in place in South Africa at the time, made it very risky for Africans from countries to the north to enter the country in order to dispose of their goods or to make contact with local criminal groups. For white foreigners from Zaire or Zambia, or for Portuguese nationals living in Angola or Mozambique, it was less difficult to visit South Africa for the same purpose. Similarly, Chinese organised criminals, often referred to as the ‘Triads’, had already set up poaching and drug-trafficking networks during the 1980s and began developing at a greater rate over the next few decades, spurred on by the growth in demand for illegal wildlife and the importation of mandrax (and later manufactured methamphetamines). The instability of many West African nations, and in particular fluctuating oil prices, led to the expansion of West African criminal networks, which commonly became known as ‘Nigerian organised crime’ or ‘the Nigerians’, that law enforcement had noticed in the mid-to-late 1980s in South Africa. Flexible and amorphous in shape, with the ability to draw on a broader ethnic network that spanned the globe, West Africans, despite the smaller structure of their groups, were able to become successful ‘middlemen’ in the drug trade, moving drugs from cultivation and production centres such as the Andes and Asia to more lucrative Western markets.

While South Africa was used as a transit point for large quantities of drugs, it was also an untapped end-user drug market. Where it is widely believed that organised crime almost always has an international dimension – with both national and international or regional actors – all the cases reviewed show that the offenders or people whose property was confiscated or forfeited to the state were South African nationals. Most importantly, all the offences were committed not by people in highly organised criminal groups or gangs but by one or more individuals who were purely motivated by profit. The author was unable to find a reported case in which the crime was committed with proven aim of the offenders ‘smuggling’ their property out of South Africa.

It is important to note Singh’s argument that foreigners became the racialised ‘other’, seen by the police as a threat, demonised as criminals, and blurring the distinctions between illegal aliens and criminals. The majority of drug crime is committed and facilitated by South Africans, and foreign criminal networks almost always have to cooperate to survive. Importantly, the study of case law also highlights the roles that individuals rather than gangs (both national and international) often play in organised crime, frequently working alone (or not tied to any crime group) to facilitate a criminal conspiracy.

Furthermore, it should be noted that a number of other individuals are involved in the greater criminal conspiracy, ranging from money launderers to businessmen who provide ‘fronts’, corrupt police, lawyers and law enforcement officials, and politicians. While not directly involved in drug selling, they can be as significant to the network as the dealers, traffickers and gangs who sell the drugs.

Pakistani and Indian criminals often worked in conjunction with locals and had been at the forefront of the heroin- and mandrax-smuggling trades. Often disregarded by law enforcement and researchers, they frequently possess significant supply chain networks to provide illegal goods and services to the drug trade. Like many criminal groups, they were noticeable in the 1990s, although they maintained a lower profile than other foreign criminals.

The end of the cold war also led to many criminals expanding their reach across the globe – and Cape Town was no exception in this regard. Although not necessarily linked to a ‘Russian mafia’, Eastern European criminals became noticeable across the Cape Town underworld. While often not directly involved in the drug trade, prominent Eastern European crime figures have been implicated in criminal networks that are linked to the trade.

While these foreign criminals have often been in newspaper headlines, a number of other criminal groups and individuals are less documented but integral to the drug trade. Importantly, many individuals who were associated with the struggle against apartheid on both sides began using their skills, contacts, smuggling routes and expertise to develop a foothold in the drug trade. Many former police officers, SADF officers and resistance fighters facing limited economic opportunities in post-apartheid South Africa used their old smuggling routes, networks or violence to carve their own niches in the drug trade. In his analysis of case law relating to POCA over the years 1999 to 2009, however, Mujuzi states:
Current drug use in Cape Town

Measuring drug use in a population is difficult, given the illicit nature of the substances and the social stigma attached to drug use. The South African Community Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (SACENDU) has conducted studies on drug use and trends across the country since 1996, including in Cape Town. Data is collected through drug and alcohol treatment centres across the country, and the information is then disseminated and analysed.

The survey design records the primary and other drugs used by a patient, i.e. their main abused substances and the other substances used by him/her, as well as racial, employment, gender and age categorisations. According to the statistics released by SACENDU in December 2012, the profile of users seeking rehabilitation in Cape Town and their drug use can be described as follows:

- Males make up 74 per cent of patients.
- 69 per cent of people seeking treatment are single and 17 per cent are married.
- 75 per cent of patients have completed secondary schooling, 13 per cent only have primary schooling and 9 per cent have a tertiary education.
- 56 per cent of patients are unemployed, with 23 per cent working full time and 15 per cent of patients being students.
- The use of different drugs differs between patients having a primary drug of use and using other drugs. In terms of primary drug use, methamphetamines have been the most widely used drug, with 35 per cent of admissions, followed by alcohol at 28 per cent and dagga at 18 per cent. Heroin abuse stood at 13 per cent and cocaine at 2 per cent.

- The types of primary drug use have remained relatively stable since 2006, except for methamphetamines, which have seen a 7 per cent drop.
- Among all drugs consumed, methamphetamines had the highest usage, with 47 per cent of patients using the drug, followed by alcohol (37 per cent), cannabis (35 per cent), cannabis/mandrax (15 per cent), heroin (15 per cent) and crack/cocaine (5 per cent).
- In terms of age, cannabis users had an average age of 19 years, methamphetamine users of 26 (up from 22 in 2006), heroin users of 26, cocaine users of 34 and alcohol users of 39.
- Payment for drugs came from a variety of sources, with 24 per cent of people saying the state, compared to friends and family at 23 per cent, self at 15 per cent, medical aid schemes at 7 per cent (dropping from 18 per cent in 2007) and combinations at 21 per cent.
- Multiple substance use was reported by 39 per cent of patients. In terms of frequency of use, those who used heroin reported daily use (92 per cent), whereas 24 per cent reported daily meth use and 61 per cent crack/cocaine use.

Coloureds make up by far the largest group of drug users, with 73 per cent of patients being coloured, followed by whites and blacks and a small minority of Indians. The racial composition of primary drug use is also particularly interesting.

The profile in Cape Town differs substantially from other regions in the country. For example, in Gauteng there is just a 2 per cent admission rate for abuse of methamphetamines, compared to 38 per cent for the abuse of alcohol. The percentage of abuse also varies, with high levels of heroin use among both coloured and white populations, as well as a significant (60 per cent) use of cocaine and 83 per cent use of prescription drugs by white patients.38
It is important to consider the racial and economic composition of Cape Town compared to other cities. According to the 2011 census the racial makeup was divided among four main races. The largest racial group is coloured, making up 42.4 per cent of the population, followed by blacks (38.6 per cent), whites (15.7 per cent) and Indians/Asians (1.4 per cent). This differs from the rest of South Africa, where blacks make up the largest segment of the population and there are fewer whites. The racial makeup of the city in economic terms is vastly skewed in favour of whites, who earn six times more than blacks. The annual household income of whites stands at R365 134, compared to R60 613 for blacks. While the national average income is R103 204, Cape Town averages R143 460. Furthermore, the apartheid divisions of the city have never been fully erased and whites, coloureds and blacks still live largely separately. Figure 1 maps the racial composition of Cape Town according to the self-identification of residents.

**Table 1 The racial composition of primary drug use in Cape Town**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagga/mandrax</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagga</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methamphetamines</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>7</td>
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Source: SACENDU, Monitoring alcohol and drug abuse treatment admissions in South Africa

**Figure 1 Racial self-identification in Cape Town, 2011**

Each dot represents 50 people.

Race and income are important determinants of the political economy of the drug trade in the city, and from the apartheid period the consumption of drugs, except for alcohol and cannabis, has been divided on racial lines. In generalised terms, whites have often been able to afford more expensive drugs such as cocaine, whereas cheaper drugs form have been arriving from both Africa and Asia, and more commonly the precursor elements have been illegally shipped, including ephedrine and/or pseudoephedrine (often found in medicines for the treatment of colds).

Precursor substances are often sourced from Asia (China and India in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe. These are smuggled into the country, often by foreign criminals, and then ‘cooked’ into tik and mandrax in clandestine laboratories. India is also a source of illegal ephedrine and mandrax, while Indian organised criminals have had a long history in the supply of precursor substances and ‘completed’ mandrax.

There have also been concerns over West Africans involved in the transportation of ephedrine from India to South Africa, as well as over growing clandestine laboratory factories in Africa that then send drugs to South Africa. Laboratories are also widespread in Gauteng province and other parts of South Africa, from which drugs can be transported to Cape Town. There are, however, a number of laboratories in the Cape region as well.

Other South African nationals have also been highly involved in the mandrax and tik trade. While consumption in the country remains high, African and South African methamphetamine has also been making its way into the markets of Asia. Research has also found a definite link between abalone smuggling and the meth trade, with Cape Flats drug merchants trading illegal abalone (highly valued in the East) for precursor ingredients of drugs in the country.

Increasingly the drug has been making its way into black townships as well, and communities have been noticing an upsurge in its usage. The poverty in...
these communities combined with a lack of social services make the problems of understanding the problem larger. The dealers in these townships have been noted to be both locals and ‘Nigerians’. The latter term is, however, often used to refer to West Africans in general. Interviews also suggest that coloured gangs and dealers have also been ‘crossing the border’ (i.e. conducting business between coloured areas and black townships) to supply drug dealers in townships.

Criminal gangs on the Cape Flats and independent merchants in these areas have derived a large income from the sale and distribution of these drugs. Without painting all criminal gangs with the same brush, and taking into consideration that they have varied business interests, the Cape Flats has arguably seen a ‘decentralisation’ of larger criminal gangs due to the changing nature of the tik trade. These gangs, which may or may not be under the broad umbrella of a ‘super gang’, have altered their modus operandi to act in smaller cells and in particular locations. The decentralisation thesis is supported by earlier work conducted by Standing shortly before the tik ‘boom’. According to Standing:

One source in Atlantis involved in the trade said that there were ‘hundreds of people selling tic’ and that no individual monopolises tic selling in the area. In contrast, there are rumoured to be only five main Mandrax suppliers. We can speculate that while tic is lucrative, it is a commodity that will never produce wealthy drug merchants on the same scale as Mandrax. It is possible that the popularity of tic will eventually undermine the Mandrax industry and erode the concentration of criminal wealth.

Cannabis

The use of cannabis is widespread across racial demographics and it is possibly the most widely used illegal drug across the country. Figures for use according to addiction rates are lower due to the less addictive properties of the drug. Unlike drugs such as tik and heroin, mandrax does not have the same effects and law enforcement does not take the same stance as with other drugs. Often the drug is smoked far more openly in many locations and has a social aspect in indigenous cultures.

The Cape Flats has arguably seen a ‘decentralisation’ of larger criminal gangs due to the changing nature of the tik trade

It is produced and grown in the country, predominately in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, as well as in neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. The drug can also be produced on a large agricultural scale or in greenhouses or even in houses. This has led to a variety of differing costs and qualities, with low-grade cannabis available alongside better strains and ‘scientifically’ (higher-grade/strain) grown cannabis, while there is a growing market for hashish.

Cannabis has also been argued to underpin the drug economy of South Africa, being bartered for other drugs in return, and varied organised criminals, including many South and West Africans, have inserted themselves into the trade. The levels of income vary across the size of distributor and dealer, and there are a number of varied supply chains and networks. South Africa has been a primary supplier of cannabis in particular to the European and British markets, but South Africa also has a large local market. A number of supply chain networks can be illustrated. For example, farmers and independent producers grow the drug and sell it either directly to the consumer or to wholesalers. This can be noted across Southern Africa, particularly in Lesotho and Swaziland. Transporters of the drug across South Africa vary and can include both large wholesalers and smaller independent merchants.

According to field research conducted by Paterson as part of one of the most detailed academic explorations of the cannabis trade in the Southern Cape, a type of ‘growers’ union’ exists in Swaziland for the sale of larger quantities of cannabis.
export trade. South Africa is the largest supplier of cannabis to the UK, but it is in the last few years that import substitution has occurred in the UK. The extent to which the process of European cannabis import substitution has affected the export trade from Southern Africa is as yet unclear, however, it is certain that it has had some effects, some of which were visible from as early on as 1990.\textsuperscript{53}

The higher-grade market has also shifted the patterns of consumption in Cape Town, with many users turning to higher-grade strains and indoor-cultivated cannabis. Paterson’s research into the cannabis trade in Cape Town was, however, met with hostility and he argues that the networks in Cape Town are often more coercive and violent. In his view:

in Cape Town it is not uncommon for the central individual to use force, violence and intimidating tactics to ensure that the growers continue to produce cannabis at a price dictated by the middleman. Furthermore, in Cape Town there seems to be a distinct link between the dealers in indoor cannabis and other drugs.\textsuperscript{54}

This suggests a greater dealing of cannabis by organised crime groups and gangs, who derive a very large income from its sale.

An underexplored dynamic has been the use and sale of hashish, which is not as prominent in South Africa as it is in other countries. Large hashish-producing regions include North African countries such as Morocco and certain Asian countries such as Pakistan. Paterson suggests that hashish is either being imported into South Africa for export or being produced in the country or surrounding regions.\textsuperscript{55}

It seems a viable alternative to cannabis production, because the shrinking export market from cannabis requires a new approach, and hashish is an alternative. While the hashish market has not attracted significant attention, the sensational arrest and trial of Glenn Agliotti and his links to former police commissioner Jackie Selebi shed light on the way in which the drug was trafficked. In this particular case, South Africa was being used as a transport hub for hashish (via Iran) and cannabis (produced in Swaziland). The drugs were then sold back to Europe through East Africa.\textsuperscript{56}

It is suggested by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime that a large portion of heroin destined for South Africa is trafficked through East Africa into South Africa.\textsuperscript{57}

Once the drug is in East Africa it is often transported by road to South Africa. However, this is not the only method of trafficking. Ports and airports are also vulnerable to the trafficking of the drugs, with noticeably large heroin seizures at South African seaports. The drug can also be brought into the country by air, primarily by drug ‘mules’, which is often the modus operandi of West African criminal groups.

It is evident that a variety of networks traffic the drug into the country, including South Africans and foreign nationals, which has resulted in no single group maintaining a monopoly on the heroin trade. These include West African criminals, Pakistani and Indian criminals, Chinese organised crime, European criminals and local criminal groups. The varied nature of these trafficking networks makes it harder to make generalisations about the nature of illicit networks involving the drug, but from media reports it is apparent that there are varying scales of importation.

Sale of the drug is prevalent in both black and coloured townships and among white populations. There was a significantly higher addiction rate among higher-earning white populations in earlier years, but a declining price for the drug has seen an increase in use in both lower-income coloured and black populations. While the figures for addiction are lower in black townships, it is suggested by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime that a large portion of heroin destined for South Africa is trafficked through East Africa into South Africa. South Africa is used as both a target market and, on a smaller scale, a transhipment site.\textsuperscript{58}

Heroin

While the usage of heroin may not be as widespread as that of \textit{tik} or cannabis, the severity of the addiction has been a cause for alarm to authorities. Heroin is predominately trafficked in from Asia, because the opium used to produce it is primarily grown in Afghanistan (around 70 per cent of total production), Pakistan, India, Nepal, Myanmar and Thailand. Transhipment of the drug takes place across the globe, with a large portion going through Iran, Pakistan and the Balkan regions (although this is declining), as well as Africa. Africa has seen an increase in heroin being passed through the continent, especially through East African countries.

Once the drug is
additives in black townships. It is known by varied names such as whoonga or nyope. It has also become popular among school-going children, which is a major cause of concern. Interviewees in black townships have commonly associated the sale of the drug with the ‘Nigerians’, although this is more likely to mean West Africans. However, it should also be noted that there is a noticeable xenophobic element to these allegations and a form of ‘alien conspiracy’.

Cocaine
Cocaine is both marketed in and trafficked through South Africa. The drug is brought in from South America and consumed locally or shipped off to European markets. Transportation is commonly by air or sea.

Cocaine has long been the drug of choice for wealthier (often-white) South Africans following the end of apartheid and the growth of the ‘hard drugs’ trade in South Africa. It is predominately used by wealthier South Africans due to its high cost and is also used by a variety of ‘respectable professions’; however, the decreasing cost of the drug has also resulted in increasing numbers of users. The cheaper, free-based crack cocaine used by many coloureds in Cape Town popular in the 1990s has made way for tik and, although, still used, it no longer has the same market share.

Cocaine has commonly been associated with West African organised crime, but this is a simplistic way of looking at it and although West Africans have been particularly noticeable in both the trafficking and dealing of cocaine, they are not the only suppliers or traffickers of the drug.

The favoured modus operandi of West Africans is to use drug ‘mules’ to transport the drug on commercial flights. While this may result in a number of arrests, the quantity of drugs that a single person can carry is limited. However, larger drug busts using harbours often do not have a West African connection and some of the largest busts in South Africa have had connections to South Africans, Chinese, Taiwanese and Cubans, among others. At a dealer level, cocaine dealers may work from particular drug houses and may deliver to particular addresses, but also sell their wares on the streets.

Other drugs
Cape Town has a significant market for ‘club drugs’, such as ecstasy, psychedelic mushrooms and LSD, which are transported to South Africa by a variety of organised criminals. Unlike the other drugs, these are not particularly addictive and are often used as a recreational enhancement. The large ‘trance’ scene in Cape Town is conducive to the taking of these drugs. The trade is predominately focused on younger higher-income youth and there is a link between the protection racket business and club drugs.37

A variety of prescription medications are also abused. They are used as recreational drugs, but also to come down from the highs of other drugs. They are obtained via prescriptions from pharmacists and doctors, whether unsuspecting or not, or through illegal importation.18

Alongside these drugs are other abused substances such as khat, which is predominately used by North African immigrants.

Criminal governance and the drug trade
As stated before, this paper seeks to understand the dynamics of criminal governance in the Cape Town region. However, the sections above highlight how diversified and large the market for drugs is, and this market is supplied and maintained by a sizeable number of people involved at various levels who can range from low-level independent dealers selling cannabis on a street corner to large-scale traffickers who transport hard drugs by the ton.

The trade also includes a large number of people acting in supportive roles. Therefore, the type and effect of ‘criminal governance’ varies significantly, because...
• Fourthly, the power of capital allows for varying degrees of corruption, which can ultimately result in the criminalisation of the state or state capture.

On a global scale, certain countries, such as Afghanistan or Guinea-Bissau, are referred to as narco-states or narco-economies, while other countries, such as Colombia, have previously held this title. The reason for this title is that narcotics become so entrenched in the countries’ economies that the functioning of the economic and political system becomes beholden to drug finance and often drug dealers. The intense corruption that follows in order to continue the drug business criminalises the economy and leads to a level of state capture, in terms of which those who are meant to be limiting the drug business are actively involved with it.

The levels of finance derived from the drug economy in South Africa are far less significant than countries such as Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau. Cape Town, however, contains particular locations with extremely high levels of drug use, which is often also tied to gangs. These locations thus become a localised, micro version of the narco-economy, but on a smaller, regional or suburban scale, often due to the exclusion of the population from the formal economy and institutions. It is here that the highest level of criminal governance is to be found. In areas in the Cape Flats the drug economy becomes a source of employment for those who may be marginalised from the formal economy.

The high levels of unemployment that plague the city are rampant in these suburbs, and individuals and families become reliant on the drug economy and drug trade. These suburbs could be described as ‘narco-suburbs’ whereby the trade in drugs has become integral to both the society and many legitimate enterprises. Thus, gangs become a local employer (even if not on a full-time basis) and a provider of finances. The importance of the drug economy is also heightened when those at the top become a type of social security net for the population, providing finances to families in need (yet evidence suggests that this remains more of a myth and gang bosses often demand certain favours in return).

As Goredema and Goga argue, ‘Criminal networks constitute a visible and influential authority in certain contexts. Sometimes this is because of the absence of formal state presence and authority. These networks therefore expose limitations to the extent and depth of state authority’. Areas with the highest level of criminal governance are noticeable in parts of the Cape Flats due to faltering state authority there. A combination of historical and political failings, combined with a lack of political will, high levels of corruption and significant social issues, has resulted in a destructive pattern where the criminal economy has been entrenched in parts of the Cape Flats.

It is also one of the only areas in Cape Town where there is a distinct level of social control by organised crime, despite the fact there is often no monopoly on the drug trade (even in areas with a heavy gang presence there are independent dealers with no gang affiliations that can sell drugs). In a study of the local power dynamics in the Cape Flats region of Manenberg, Lambrechts states:

In some areas of the Cape Flats, the drug economy becomes a source of employment for those who may be marginalised from the formal economy.
agents of the state (specifically in the security sector); a level of operational ease that exists for the criminal community (and the intertwining of the criminal community in the social community) and a relatively strong society that acknowledges the benefits of criminal activities for the social community, but also recognises the authority and control of the state.

According to Lambrechts, it is very difficult for the state to break this power relationship down. Furthermore, she finds that the ‘criminalisation of the state’ is limited to the Cape Flats region and in particular the security sector of the state. What she does find, however, is that in an area like Manenberg, criminal groups will fulfil some of the functions of the state due to weak state capacity, but that the power of these gangs is based on coercion rather than legitimacy. The power exuded by the criminal milieu over what should be state authority is argued to be inimical to a constitutional democracy, because it ‘amounts to exposing a community to self-appointed providers of arbitrary and illicit forms of justice and security’.

State institutional failure has been highlighted in a survey of criminality faced by spaza (informal tuck-shops) owners in the Cape Flats suburb of Delft. In the survey it was found that coloured shopkeepers would often turn for security to state institutions (such as a community policing forum), whereas South African black shopkeepers would turn to street committee leaders. Somalis, however, would turn to their landlords and often to criminals (such as drug dealers), because the latter maintain a level of power and control that state institutions do not have. Therefore, it is argued:

The state is perceived to either lack the capacity or to be too ineffective to discharge its responsibility to ensure safety from crime. The credibility of state institutions mandated to protect residents from crime is low, partly because the criminal justice system that they serve is poorly understood, and partly because of perceived inefficiency. In the face of serious criminal threats, crime victims are likely to turn to non-state structures, such as street committees, vigilantes, taxi drivers or even ‘hit-men’.

Further exacerbating the situation is the continual political polarisation between the two major political parties in the region, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the ANC. The DA currently dominates at the provincial and city levels, while the ANC controls the national government. The acrimonious relationship between the parties and their failure to cooperate and align institutions has resulted in the public discrediting of state forces and a failure to find long-term solutions to political and social problems.

Increasingly, there is the also the belief that beyond sites where the state lacks authority, illegal actors will use drug money to taint and penetrate the legitimate world and launder their proceeds, disrupting the economy and state control via finance, and this is a major threat to the political system.

However, Standing convincingly argues against this belief and states that the influence of illegal finance is limited in comparison to white-collar fraud and other crimes (such as tax evasion) and much less than the billions lost to large-scale corruption and tender rigging. He further argues that although the top rung of drug dealers may be independently wealthy, they are not an exceptional case compared to many wealthy businesspeople in Cape Town. When analysing the forfeited assets of top ‘high flyers’ in court documents, one can highlight how many high-flying criminals would not be near the upper echelons of wealth in Cape Town (although they are exceptional cases).

There are, however, a number of links between business and drug-trafficking networks, with gangs expanding their reach and investing in a number of legitimate businesses. This is particularly noticeable with regard to criminal interests in property developments and those involved in the entertainment and bar industries. In order to conduct business in the ‘licit’ realm, gangs and drug traffickers have to engage with a number of partners, including lawyers and businesspeople, who are often aware of the sources of illegal incomes. A social network analysis of the protection rackets in Cape Town illustrated the murky world of drug finances with business and corruption whereby known gang leaders do business with others (see Figure 2).

In the case studied, a well-known criminal businessman was able to involve himself in a significant number of mutually beneficial relationships with other partners, including businesspeople and state employees. Using information gathered from investigative newspaper reports, Figure 2 illustrates some of the relationships formed by Cyril Beeka (labelled BUCBD in the figure), a now-deceased criminal businessman who controlled protection rackets and was rumoured to have interests in the drug trade in Cape Town.

Next to him is controversial criminal Radovan Krejcir (labelled CRKR in Figure 2), who has continually expanded his influence in the underworld and is linked to at least 12 deaths. In the layers close to Beeka there are a number of important
relationships, including that of a protection company (PRBBUSPS) that was opened after his death. Those heavily involved in its creation included a former rival, Andre Naude (BUAN), former city employee and rumoured drug and gang kingpin Jerome Booysen (BUJDB) and businessman Mark Lifman (BUML), both of whom have a sizable legitimate portfolio, particularly in property. Other important relationships include those that various criminals have had with politicians, lawyers and law enforcement, as well as businesses.

Corruption is always a concern when studying the impact of organised crime. It can start from petty corruption (such as paying a bribe to get out of a speeding ticket) and ascend to high-level state capture (such as Manuel Noriega’s Panama in the 1980s, where the country’s leader had an active interest in the drug trade). Our research found that many drug dealers play a role in the corruption of the security sector and policing. In Grobler’s study of corruption in the police force, she found a significant level of corruption in the police force. Corrupted police officers can conduct a number of tasks with regard to the drug trade. This includes,
• The selling of drugs on behalf of drug dealers
• The confiscation of the drugs of rival dealers; these drugs are then passed on or sold
• Guaranteeing safe passage on drug-trafficking routes
• Providing intelligence to gangs
• Threatening rivals and intimidation
• The selling of weapons or issuing of licences to gangs
• The possibility of murder for hire

Continued police corruption has increasingly been cited as a reason for residents of certain communities turning to gangs for security in the Cape Flats. However, the corruption of the police force can be seen as a continuum ranging from an antagonistic relationship at one extreme, to mutually beneficial relationships somewhere in the middle (whereby both the police and criminals help in each other’s respective endeavours, legal or not), to a situation on the other extreme where there is complete criminalisation and the police either commit or sanction crime.

The continuum in the Cape Towns drug markets is highly varied, with anecdotal evidence being the norm. However, one of the more telling explanations comes from Standing, who relates:

The sheer scale of corruption, however, came through in interviews with several sources, most revealingly in a group interview with three police station commanders of notorious gang-controlled areas. I was reticent on the issue of corruption, believing that this would be a controversial and insulting question. However, when the subject was broached the response was alarming. All agreed that corruption represented the greatest problem confronting their efforts to combat gangs and organised crime. As one put it: ‘Corruption is our biggest enemy. If it wasn’t for corrupt police then we would have sorted these gangsters out years ago’. Several sources [Standing] have spoken to suggested corruption has been the main cause of inefficiencies in investigating gang crime.69

Corruption is always a concern when studying the impact of organised crime

A number of criminals associated with the drug trade engage with more sophisticated crime and more sophisticated corruption, including corrupting those at a higher level of policing structures. According to Dan Plato, member of the Executive Committee for community safety in the Western Cape, the movement of drugs as a result of tip-offs suggests corruption at high levels of policing.70

In October 2013 the investigation of the provincial commissioner and a number of high-ranking police officials in the Western Cape for accepting bribes from a businessman came to light.

Thus the levels of criminal governance that arises from the corruption of policing is varied across levels. At the local level police lose legitimacy among the population and become part of the drug economy, while at a higher level networks of criminals are maintained and developed.

Conclusion

The drug trade in Cape Town will continue to be a major problem unless the city’s underlying infrastructural and institutional problems are resolved. With rampant marginalisation in Cape Town, particularly in non-white areas, and a lack of economic activity or opportunity for these marginalised citizens, the allure of both drug trafficking and consumption remains high. The historically entrenched nature of organised crime in the Cape Flats has seen it take on an important role in the governance of the city, and it remains to be seen whether the authorities will be able to control the problem. This will become harder as criminal gangs decentralise across Cape Town. Of concern is the growing drug use in black areas and the growing youth gangs developing there. Unless urgent steps are taken, criminal governance will spread across more parts of the city and increase.

Worryingly, there is a high level of institutional corruption in many areas in Cape Town. The police remain at the forefront of state–society relations and have come to represent the state. The recent Khayelitsha commission of enquiry into police inefficiency has revealed many of the problems faced by police in the townships of Cape Town. Extreme levels of corruption and a continued lack of legitimacy will only reinforce the levels of criminal governance.
admits to criminal gang membership

resides in or frequents a particular

gang, has been arrested more than once in

an investigation, is identified as a member of a criminal

gang, and is a member of a criminal
group in the Western Cape

ISS, 1998; I Kinnes,

ISS Paper, Pretoria:


J Steinberg, The illicit.abalone trade in South


It is important to note the xenophobic or
ethnically focused stigmatisation of many Nigerians and West Africans in South Africa. While they do influence the drug trade, there is no evidence to suggest that they are responsible for more crime than the rest of the population.

West African organised criminals often focus on a variety of other crimes as well, including credit card fraud, cell phone theft and cybercrime.


38 Ibid.
39 Census 2011.
40 T Samara, Cape Town after apartheid: crime and governance in the divided city, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011.
41 ‘A cook’ is the person who makes the mandrax or tik.
45 See Steinberg, The Illicit abalone trade in South Africa.
46 Interview with residents of Khayelitsha, Cape Town.
47 This point was made by Cape Flats gang expert Irvin Kinnes at a workshop held in Cape Town.
48 Standing, Organised crime, 99.
49 See the South African cannabis community website Below the Lion, http://www.belowthelion.co.za, for more information on the varied strains available.
50 A prepared cannabis resin made from the cannabis plant.
53 Ibid, 88.
55 Paterson, Prohibition and resistance.
59 Goredem and Goga, Crime networks and governance in Cape Town.
60 Standing, Organised crime.
62 Lambrechts, The impact of organised crime on social control by the state.
63 Ibid, ii.
64 Goredem and Goga, Crime networks and governance in Cape Town.
65 Ibid.
66 See ibid. The authors argue: ‘Property development has long been attractive to high-net-worth individuals, regardless of their sources of income. In the case of crime networks, property can be used to conduct illicit transactions discreetly, conceal contraband and provide justification for depositing large sums of money. Residential and commercial property is acquired openly through numerous auctions and subsequently rented out or sold. By constructing property portfolios, core actors in crime networks in Cape Town consolidate territorial power. In the localities in which their property is concentrated some have established alternative services, which come to the fore in the settling of disputes by a combination of both legal and extra-legal methods, including assassination. A survey of responses by suspected criminal leaders in Cape Town to attacks on their properties indicates a preference for private investigation as opposed to leaving it to the police.’
69 Standing, Organised crime, 146.
70 Interview with Dan Plato, Western Cape MEC for community safety, 2014.
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Khalil Goga is a research consultant with the Institute for Security Studies. He has been researching organised crime in Africa since 2009 and has been affiliated with the ISS since 2012. He previously lectured at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and received both his undergraduate and master’s degrees from there.

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