

**RHODESIA, SETTLEMENT AND SOUTHERN AFRICA**

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*Professor Donald G Baker* is a member of the Political Science Department at Southampton College, Long Island University, Southampton, New York, USA. He has, over the last few years, done extensive tours of research at the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies at the University of Rhodesia in Salisbury and is therefore well qualified to comment on Rhodesian affairs.

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## RHODESIA, SETTLEMENT AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Donald G. Baker

The recent Kissinger-Vorster talks and increased American concern with the problems of Southern Africa do not mean that a quick solution will be found to the Rhodesian problem, but the "internationalisation" of that issue and new settlement proposals could provide possible guidance or solutions to the numerous problems plaguing Southern Africa. Viewed from this perspective, Rhodesia constitutes the "key", and solutions implemented there might be applicable to such problems as Namibia, apartheid in South Africa, economic development within Southern Africa, and black-white relations. However, hopes for an early settlement in Rhodesia are suspect, for the resilience and obduracy of that country's white minority regime (where 275 000 whites control over six million blacks) and the disarrayed nature of black nationalist policies both contribute to the political impasse. White Rhodesians, despite UN economic and political sanctions, have held tenaciously to power since their unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Great Britain in 1965, that step taken to assure continuation of white minority rule.

Circumstances, though, have changed in recent years. What is increasingly apparent is that the present Rhodesian government, embroiled in an expanding guerrilla war, its productive capacities severely strained by the constant military call-up of its white workforce, and forced to cope with a steady exodus of whites from the country, simply cannot survive forever. But in holding on in that obdurate fashion and in refusing to negotiate seriously, the white Rhodesian government creates conditions and animosities which virtually guarantee no future for whites once black rule occurs. Some white Rhodesians (and particularly members of the Rhodesian Front that has held power since 1962) still believe that black Rhodesians are content with their subordinate position in society. The guerrilla war is seen as the work of outside agitators, not as the reflection of increasing black frustrations with racial subordination and discrimination. At most, the ruling RF party (or many of its members) believes that minor concessions will pacify black discontent. Indeed, the government appointed in late 1975 a commission to investigate and recommend changes in policy leading toward the elimination of "unnecessary discrimination". However, in its July 1976 Report, that Commission recommended major structural changes which would incorporate black Rhodesians more fully within the political and economic sectors. The changes were considered necessary if black support was to be maintained. The recommendations, however, prompted intense opposition within the ruling party, and Prime Minister Ian Smith quickly repudiated the Commission's major proposals while accepting peripheral ones that in no way endangered white power and privilege. With these changes the government believes it can retain the allegiance of black Rhodesians, and it claims that with South African support it can ultimately win the guerrilla war.

Cuban intervention in Angola and Western fears that Cuban troops would move to Mozambique to support Rhodesian guerrillas prompted the internationalisation of the Rhodesian issue. Thereafter, Kissinger's "fact-finding" tour of Africa in April 1976, his proposals at the Nairobi UN Conference on Trade and Development, and his June talks with the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, clearly indicated America's new

concern with the problems of Southern Africa. Indeed, what now appears evident is the convergence in views concerning Southern Africa that characterises the thinking of Ford-Kissinger, Carter and many congressional Democrats. If this is so, and should Carter be elected President in November, the likelihood is that there will be little change in US-Southern Africa (including Rhodesian) policy under a new Democratic administration. But that near-unanimity in viewpoints (even if supported by Britain and South Africa) does not guarantee success in finding a solution to the Rhodesian problem. For the time factor is most important, and time is running out for achieving a stable transition from white to black rule in Rhodesia.

Time is the crucial factor. For the moment, the white Rhodesian government is solidly entrenched in power and, with covert South African support (including military and economic assistance), it can cope with even an intensified guerrilla war. But the longer the war continues, the greater will be the exodus of whites, the wearing down of the economy and, perhaps more significantly, the greater the probability that the present Rhodesian nationalist political leadership will lose control of its guerrillas to President Machel of Mozambique. Machel is intent on usurping control of the Rhodesian guerrillas within Mozambique, using them to impose a military solution on Rhodesia that will result in a communist state under his influence. Neither whites nor non-communist blacks will have any future in that state. Consequently, by its refusal to negotiate seriously with black leaders, the Rhodesian government increases the possibility of Machel's takeover of the guerrillas.

The Smith regime, though, is *not* about to topple of its own accord. What is generally neglected in assessments of that government are the numerous factors, internal as well as external, which contribute to its power and resilience. Among the most important internal supportive factors are the following: (1) most whites support the present government (though, as indicated below, they do so for different reasons and to various degrees); (2) the government retains support within industrial and commercial sectors; (3) the government receives support (at least at the surface level) from African tribal chiefs and, to varying degrees, from the rural population over which those chiefs hold sway; (4) factionalism within the black nationalist movement (whether the consequence of differing political beliefs, tribalism or contests for influence and power) prevents Africans from coalescing in opposition to the government; (5) the police/security measures and control by government help stifle black opposition; and (6) the political apathy or indifference (whatever its cause) of many blacks and whites enables the government to remain in power.

Numerous external factors also contribute to the present government's persistence. One such factor is the factionalism that splits the external African nationalist movement, this rivalry reflected in splits within both political and guerrilla organisations. Had the nationalists remained united during the August 1975 Victoria Falls talks, they, in conjunction with pressures being exerted by Vorster on Smith, might have forced the Rhodesian government into political concessions. Instead, the nationalists fragmented, shattered the conference and precipitated the subsequent split of the African National Council into Nkomo and Muzorewa factions. One source of this split is the tribalism that has continually surfaced, created mistrust and prompted open conflict and killings. In a confidential report written earlier this year, Ndabaningi Sithole warned that tribalism was destroying the guerrilla movement,

and he sharply criticised the Karanga who had gained control of the guerrilla forces. In 1975, that factionalism precipitated the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, one of the top ANC leaders, in Zambia; and earlier this year factional and tribal fighting in the Mozambique guerrilla camps was halted only when Machel used his own soldiers to stop the slaughter. Under these circumstances, the Rhodesian nationalists often appear to be their own worst enemy: it is their disorganisation, in part, not the strength of the Rhodesian military that accounts for their ineffectiveness.

The ineffectiveness of UN economic sanctions has also contributed to the perpetuation of white rule in Rhodesia. Industrial and commercial concerns of numerous countries (English, European, American, Japanese, etc) retain covert economic ties with Rhodesia, and the continued availability of manufactured goods (from radios to automobiles) from various countries (France, Germany, Japan, etc) indicates that governments are not strictly enforcing economic sanctions. Likewise, Rhodesian goods (from agricultural produce to manufactured products) surreptitiously find their way into world markets, and Rhodesians have perfected (with the complicity of governments and those corporations elsewhere in the world) the fine art of "sanctions busting". Efforts to enforce economic sanctions have been futile or ineffective, and through its exports Rhodesia acquires the foreign exchange it needs for survival.

Most crucial, though, in bolstering the Rhodesian regime has been the support given by South Africa. Both overtly and covertly the latter provides support services, financial assistance, and military equipment needed for sustaining the Rhodesian economy and war effort. Following Mozambique's March 1976 closure of its rail and port facilities to Rhodesia, the latter's *sole* link (given its landlocked status) to the outside world has been its road and rail connections with South Africa. Air and road links account for the transport of some exports and imports, but the rail linkage is most vital: indeed, the railroad is Rhodesia's life-line. Should South Africa curtail or terminate the rail traffic (or if guerrillas destroyed the rail links), Rhodesia could not survive for very long. Thus South Africa holds the key to Rhodesia's future, and Kissinger's negotiations with John Vorster are a clear recognition of this factor.

Kissinger (and American policy-makers) evidently envisage a convergence of US and South African policies concerning Rhodesia despite other policy differences. There is increasing evidence that US policy toward Rhodesia is based on the following assumptions: (1) that white Rhodesians (though for various reasons) remain basically united behind Smith not because they are racists but because they are "boxed in" and cannot discover a way out. However, if offered options that assure their well-being and security, they would accede to black rule or accept compensation and settle elsewhere in the world; (2) that black Rhodesian groups, both external and internal, are hopelessly divided *at present*, their divisiveness preventing a cohesive opposition against the Smith regime and foretelling probable rivalries, instability and chaos under a post-settlement black government unless steps are taken to circumvent that possibility; (3) that *for the moment* there exists no military force (be it Rhodesian guerrillas or troops from Black states) that could intervene and topple the Smith government (the introduction of Cuban or other military forces could quickly transform that situation), hence military pressures are presently of limited impact in forcing changes upon the Rhodesian government; (4) that economic sanctions and coercive measures are (at least as presently applied) ineffectual in

bringing about changes in Rhodesia or South Africa, indicating thereby the need to employ new approaches, including positive coercion or measures (i.e., the use of the "carrot" rather than the "stick" approach) for pressuring change; and (5) that unless changes occur soon within Rhodesia (i.e., within the next two years, if even that is not too late) Machel could impose control over the Rhodesian guerrillas and use them (with, possibly, Russian military assistance and outside troops) to "liberate" Rhodesia. That latter step would clearly have broader implications and lead to an escalation of Black Africa's confrontation with South Africa, precipitating the possibility of a racial holocaust.

This latter possibility has prodded American policy-makers into seeking a quick solution to the Rhodesian problem. For, despite Congress's rebuff of Kissinger's attempt to involve the US in the Angolan civil war, congressional members remain apprehensive about the continued Cuban troop presence in Africa. Their possible intervention in Rhodesia cannot be discounted. Should Rhodesian guerrillas, given additional training, experience and support, wrest control of a small area of Rhodesia, they could call for UN recognition as the "legal" government of Zimbabwe (especially since the present Smith government is considered "illegal") and "invite" the intervention of Cuban troops to assist in their liberation efforts. The possibility of that happening, increases as possibilities for a negotiated settlement are thwarted.

Although South Africa could intervene militarily if a black military conquest of Rhodesia appeared imminent, what it appears to favour is the installation of a black government through a negotiated settlement. The contradiction is easily explained. South Africa desires a stable black Rhodesian government, one that has economic ties to and serves as the rail link between South Africa and Black countries to the north. Vorster's détente policy is not dead, and South Africa's economic ties with black nations (including, among others Zambia and Zaire) are increasing. What Vorster envisages is South Africa at the hub of an economic union embracing Southern and Central Africa. A stable, capitalist-oriented black government in Rhodesia would enhance Vorster's dialogue and détente policy with Black Africa, allowing Vorster to pursue his policy of technical and financial assistance to black nations as a means of stabilising white-black relations in the region. But the present power struggles within the Rhodesian nationalist movement suggest that factionalism might continue under a post-settlement black government. The resulting instability, chaos and possible military *coup d'états* could bring to power a government hostile towards South Africa. Consequently, until a black leadership emerges that Vorster believes is capable of sustaining stability after a settlement, he will play for time and (though reluctantly) support the Smith regime until that stable black leadership develops.

Time is therefore the significant factor. Vorster needs time to resolve the racial problems of South Africa. He cannot tolerate the presence of revolutionary governments in Mozambique and Rhodesia, for both could serve as staging areas for South African guerrillas. Thus there remains the likelihood that South Africa will militarily intervene if Rhodesian guerrillas and outside (e.g., Cuban) troops are about to topple the Smith government, for that guerrilla success would encourage future guerrilla incursions against South Africa itself. One "message" was certainly intended by South Africa's military intervention in the Angolan civil war: namely, it would use its military forces if it felt threatened by the introduction of foreign troops in African wars. Thus South Africa could reintroduce troops into the Rhodesian war (they were with-

drawn in mid 1975), but Vorster would prefer a negotiated settlement. But the Smith government has shown little willingness to negotiate seriously when it believes it is winning the war. Consequently, South Africa must maintain a delicate balancing act: on one hand, it must support the Rhodesian military indirectly though not to the point where it destroys the guerrilla movement; on the other hand, it recognises that an escalation of that conflict is virtually necessary before Smith will agree to negotiations. However, successful negotiations depend on the presence of a stable black leadership. Should that leadership emerge, South Africa would quickly pressure the Rhodesian government to negotiate, as it did for the Victoria Falls talks. At that point, US and South African interests coalesce.

Given the basic assumptions of US policy (i.e., the factionalism of black nationalist politics; the inability of white Rhodesians to extricate themselves from their "box"; the probability that with time Machel can impose a military and communist solution; etc), its strategy must encompass a broad spectrum of approaches that include racial, political and economic solutions to the problems besetting Southern Africa. Both short and long-term proposals are needed, though some of them at least initially appear contradictory.

One of the major short-term settlement proposals is aimed at eroding the Smith regime's support through the offer of inducements to whites desirous of leaving Rhodesia *now*. At present, whites are virtually "captives" in Rhodesia, especially since recent restrictions have made it difficult for them to leave the country. For example, those who wish to emigrate can take out only Rhodesian \$1 000 (roughly, US \$1 500), and those eligible for any form of military service (aged 16-38) must have prior approval to leave the country. With the money restrictions it is difficult for people to survive elsewhere while they seek employment. Hence, many are fearful of emigrating. Moreover, white Rhodesians have been propagandised with the belief that they are pariahs and no other country will accept them. That viewpoint is often confirmed by reports of would-be emigrants rebuffed when seeking visas to Canada, the US, Australia and elsewhere.

Although white Rhodesians could possibly emigrate to South Africa, most are opposed to settlement there for numerous reasons. Some, for instance, dislike its racial policies; others believe racial conflict will escalate there in coming years; and still others have a cultural dislike for Afrikaners. That leaves many of that group as virtually captives in Rhodesia. Believing there are no alternatives, white Rhodesians reluctantly remain captives of the system. What is more, they are bombarded with statements that "immediate black majority rule" will bring a reign of terror and the expulsion of whites, as occurred in Mozambique and Angola. The fratricidal fighting within the nationalist movement is used as an example of what will happen with black rule, and that exacerbates white fears. These fears contribute to white reluctance to accept change, for the people see no way out of the impasse. "Boxed in" and reluctant to support racial reforms that might lead to black rule, whites thereby create black discontent and promote a racial confrontation that could be avoided if other countries intervened and imposed a settlement. Were white Rhodesians classified *now* as "refugees" and provided with financial assistance for settlement elsewhere in the world, many (perhaps not immediately, but certainly as the guerrilla war escalates) would depart. A refugee-type program would deplete Rhodesia of numerous whites, and the government could not long fight a guerrilla war without white troops. It would be forced to seek a nego-

tiated settlement.

A second proposal, on initial inspection contradictory to the first, rests on "economic guarantees" for keeping whites in Rhodesia after a settlement. The program would be implemented once whites accepted the principle of majority rule and agreed to a transition government leading toward a new constitution and majority rule. Economic compensation would be guaranteed by *other* governments, not the incoming Rhodesian government. Its basic purpose is that of retaining whites with needed expertise and skills, for what has contributed to chaos and instability in other countries when black governments assumed power has been the exodus of skilled whites. The flight of those whites has led to disruptions in government services, commerce and industry, and the economy of those countries has often failed as a result. Under the compensation scheme (the money, put in escrow, would be guaranteed by the US, Britain, South Africa and other countries), whites wishing to leave immediately would receive a small percentage of their total assessed assets (perhaps 20 percent). Those remaining after the changeover in government would receive a higher (graduated) percentage dependent upon the years they remained. Those remaining five years, for example, would receive the fully assessed value of their assets, the determination made at the time of transition in government. That would be the base, or subsidy. However, if a person's properties appreciated in value during those years, he could sell them on the open market, receiving that price instead. The compensation, then, would be a form of subsidy, aimed at retaining whites in the country, their skills essential for economic development. Three additional aspects of the compensation scheme should be noted. First, the obligation would be met by outside countries, not by the new government in Rhodesia. Thus if that new government reneged, whites would not lose out, for they would still get their funds since the cash was deposited in foreign banks. Second, to protect against the new Rhodesian government simply expelling whites (leaving the outside countries to pay the compensation), the new Rhodesian government would have to accept as a legal economic obligation (owed to those foreign countries) the funds paid out in compensation. The government would thereby find it economically beneficial to preserve stability and retain whites since it would incur a huge debt if whites fled because of unstable political and economic conditions. And, third, a maximum figure would be set on the compensation an individual could claim if he left or if he was expelled, that figure (possibly \$100 000) still to be determined.

The purpose of the economic guarantees is to stabilise the transition and post-settlement years and remove potential sources of white fears. With stability, there is greater probability that whites with needed skills will remain. Moreover, private, governmental and international funds and assistance will flow into the country and contribute to its economic development. Economic guarantees are simply part of a larger package aimed at helping the new black government stabilise itself as it works toward rapid economic and political development. What are most needed are massive training programs for rapidly training and incorporating Africans within the economic sector, for stable employment (and the opportunity for employment) helps assure economic and political stability. What are needed to implement these programs are massive infusions of technical and financial aid, as well as the introduction of labour-intensive industries. The requisite aid and support could come from diverse sources once a political settlement is reached, including international development agencies, multinational corporations and other developmental groups. As Kissinger suggested in his Lusaka and Nairobi speeches, neither marxist nor capitalist modes of develop-



ment alone hold the solution to the developmental problems of Africa. Ideology should be left aside, and Africa (and, in this instance, Rhodesia) might find greater success by drawing components from both systems.

As part of that package proposal, other, including political guarantees, have also been discussed. They are aimed not solely at whites but at coping with the innumerable problems that could undermine future political development in Rhodesia. A problem endemic to and which has torn apart most new African states has been that of tribal and ethnic rivalry and conflict. It is a problem that cannot be ignored, for conflicts based on those factors already exist within the Rhodesian nationalist movement. It is essential, then, that new political structures be devised which protect group rights and opportunities, black as well as white. Otherwise, group suspicions will persist, and the denial of or restrictions upon equal access and opportunity (be it in the political or economic sectors) to some groups will generate future conflicts. Those group/tribal conflicts and chaos could lead to anarchy and coups in Rhodesia similar to those that have plagued other African states. Were that to happen, *all* Rhodesians would lose, for the stability, welfare of the people and economic development would suffer. Hence, the new political structures must confront that issue of group rights, opportunities and security.

Unless the government can maintain stability and security, it will soon see the exodus of capital, industries, commerce and skilled black as well as white people. This has happened elsewhere. The economic shattering of the economy will lead to political problems. The new government must have the power to preserve stability and order, and for that it needs complete control of the police/military forces. To achieve that it must make sure that as part of a negotiated settlement it establishes programs for fully repatriating the present guerrilla forces. They especially must be given opportunities for education, training and employment. If denied opportunity, they could become a dissident force that has the potential for overthrowing the government.

Some components of the various settlement proposals (especially those concerning compensation) have been aired in the media, but other parts have yet to be discussed. The Rhodesian government has responded in ambivalent but generally hostile ways. For instance, the Prime Minister and other officials criticised as "sinister" the compensation proposals, warning that "outsiders" were trying to "buy out" white Rhodesians with "thirty pieces of silver". When newspapers divulged in late July that white business and industrial leaders were discussing compensation plans under a transition government, Rhodesian Front party members demanded they be "tarred and feathered". Proposals for compensation, first revealed in *Newsday* and the *New York Times*, led Rhodesian officials to claim that they were instigated by outsiders or disloyal local industrialists and businessmen. What the government ignores, discounts or simply does not wish to indicate is that the initiation of *many* of these proposals came from African nationalists, especially the Nkomo ANC. The Smith government cannot acknowledge this fact, for it would render suspect the Prime Minister's credibility when he tells white Rhodesians that talks with the Nkomo ANC disintegrated because its sole demand was (and purportedly still is, according to the Prime Minister) "immediate black majority rule".

Controlling as it does the major media (radio and television), the Rhodesian government can propagandise (and frighten) whites with the notion that black nationalists want only an immediate majority rule that will bring chaos, violence and the expulsion or death of all whites.

The government neglects to admit that black nationalist leaders accept whites as part of the society, recognise the need for a stable transition and post-settlement government, and realise the crucial role that whites who remain can play in the continuing economic development of the country. But what nationalists do demand is a transition to majority rule (whether based on a qualified franchise or some other political structures still to be worked out) and the formulation of a political system that assures *all* people equal rights, opportunities and safety. What must end is the present system where a white minority (less than 5 percent of the people) hold all power and privilege.

Following the March 1976 breakdown in the Smith-Nkomo talks, the Nkomo group recognised the need for initiating broader settlement solutions that included economic and political guarantees for whites; guarantees that were essential if whites were to support a settlement. These proposals were discussed within the ANC and submitted to the British government, which then revealed them to Kissinger prior to his April trip to Africa. The ANC also discussed the proposals with white Rhodesian business and industrial leaders who recognised the imperative need for a settlement, and that group conveyed the proposals to their counterparts in South Africa. Hence, a major instigator of the present settlement proposals is the ANC, *not* as the Rhodesian government would have people believe, "outsiders". Aware of the difficulties of nation-building that any new government faces, some nationalists (particularly within the Nkomo group) are working on settlement proposals aimed at assuring stability and development thereafter.

The response of government to the nation's problems was appointment of a Commission on Racial Discrimination. That group, assigned the task of investigating and recommending areas in which "unnecessary discrimination" should be eliminated, issued its report in June 1976. Its three major recommendations were: a return to the common voters' roll (thereby leading at some future date to black majority rule); allowing Africans with financial assets the right to purchase and/or operate farm lands or businesses in what are presently classified as "European" areas; and making the Declaration of Rights judiciable, which meant that blacks could prosecute in the courts against acts of a discriminatory nature. The Commission recommended numerous other basically minor proposals for the elimination of discriminatory practices. The Prime Minister quickly rejected the three major recommendations but accepted the peripheral proposals, none of which threaten white power and privilege. Hence, the government's response to black discontent, manifested especially in the guerilla war, is to tell its people that they are fighting a war against communism. It will not acknowledge that racial discrimination and its refusal to move toward majority rule are the major source for discontent.

There is, however, growing apprehension and discontent within the white sector. Many whites claim they will "fight to the finish", but even some of them are searching for countries that will accept them as immigrants. To stop the exodus of whites, the government in late July restricted funds that emigrants could take out of the country to Rhodesian \$1000 (previously the limit was \$5000). Tight restrictions were also imposed on the rights of males, aged 16-38, to leave the country, even on holiday, particularly if they are eligible for any form of military service. Increasingly, as the guerrilla war escalates, *all* physically able males may be conscripted for some sort of service - be it the regular or police/military reserves. Most are called up for short tours of duty, lasting a few weeks. But with the escalation in guerrilla war, these short tours may account for six months or more each year.

The loss of this manpower is having a serious impact on the economy. Moreover, by restricting the holiday allowance that individuals can take out of the country (cut from Rhodesian \$400 to \$250 per year), the government has curtailed the exodus of people purportedly going abroad on holiday, but who in some instances are searching for jobs elsewhere. The ostensible purpose of these emigrant and holiday restrictions is to control the loss of foreign exchange, but its real impact is to keep white Rhodesians from leaving the country. These restrictions have created disgruntlement, and if outside countries offered settlement inducements to white Rhodesians, many could certainly be expected to leave Rhodesia.

There has emerged a muted opposition to government policies within Rhodesian commerce and industry. Criticisms are seldom voiced openly, for government, through its regulatory controls and concessions, has the necessary power to stifle that criticism. For example, it can withdraw privileges, withhold licences or apply stringently the diverse laws for harassing people who oppose it. Commercial and industrial leaders are largely "outsiders", excluded from the inner circles of the RF government. Yet it is those groups who despite insurmountable problems and adversity have developed the economy since UDI, and it is they who have managed to break economic sanctions, sell Rhodesian products overseas, and bring in the foreign exchange earnings without which the country could not survive.

At a recent conference of leaders from the major economic sectors (industry, commerce, mining, agriculture), leaders acknowledged Rhodesia's reliance upon the world economy. Sanctions were referred to as "logistical problems", and implicit in the numerous discussions was a recognition of Rhodesia's vulnerability to the world economy. Thus, were economic sanctions stringently imposed, the economy would soon falter. Already it is faltering, prompted by military call-ups of the white workforce and other factors. For the moment the economy survives, but an intensified guerrilla war necessitating further military mobilisation (accompanied by the emigration of other whites), will hurt further the economy.

It is these factors that have generated increasing opposition within the economic sector to government policies. These factors, along with their belief that black rule must be achieved shortly to assure continued economic stability, have prompted commercial and industrial leaders to approach black nationalist leaders in seeking a political settlement. Neither group, though, has much influence within government circles. But there is a growing recognition within other economic sectors (mining, agriculture, etc.) that black and white can work together in building a multiracial society based on stability, development and opportunities for all citizens.

Despite the Prime Minister's recent statement that he would welcome talks with the U S and other countries, there is little indication that the Rhodesian government is interested in serious negotiations leading toward majority rule. Even if the tightest of economic and political guarantees were established, many of the incumbent ruling party would reject them. However, an increasing number of white Rhodesians do recognise the necessity for negotiations, but they are virtually powerless in putting pressure on the government. Business and industrial leaders could act in concert, and so could the South African government - but not the electorate. The RF is securely entrenched until the next election three years hence. In the meantime the government (as it has done for years) indoctrinates Rhodesians with the idea

that because the country has survived economic sanctions and guerrilla war since UDI, it can continue to survive indefinitely. What government propagandists ignore is that (a) Mozambique is no longer under Portuguese rule, but controlled by a black government that assists the Rhodesian guerrillas, (b) the Rhodesian issue has been internationalised, and (c) the Soviet Union is intent (through Machel) on controlling the Rhodesian guerrillas and imposing a communist solution in Rhodesia after a military victory. The end result is that Rhodesia's days of "benign neglect" by the world community are over. Rhodesia may still win numerous skirmishes with guerrillas and even Mozambique forces, but the war will continue to escalate. Already the Rhodesian military suffers shortages in manpower and equipment, and as further attrition occurs it will have to plead with South Africa for assistance. Under these circumstances, Rhodesia becomes a "problem" for South Africa as Vorster seeks to resolve his own racial problems and moves toward racial détente with Black Africa. His offering of Rhodesia as a sacrificial lamb does not mean that Black Africa will thereafter ignore South Africa, but it does give Vorster needed time for resolving the Namibia issue and for restructuring his own society by setting up independent black homelands (or bantustans). The first such step in that direction is the granting of independence to the Transkei in October 1976.

In one sense, the recent race commission Report (and its recommendations) places Rhodesia precisely where it was in 1962: namely, that of making a choice as to whether white power will be perpetuated at all costs, or whether a peaceful transition to black rule will be worked out for a country where blacks outnumber whites 22 to 1. The parallel between 1962 and 1976 is startling. For example, the recommendations of the 1976 race commission closely parallel the proposals offered in 1962 by the United Federal Party for incorporation of blacks within economic and political structures. It was those proposals that brought about the UFP's downfall in that year's election and brought into power the present Rhodesian Front, its campaign program a promise that it would never allow black rule. Thus, the present government's rejection of the Report's major recommendations simply reaffirms the RF's staunch adherence to the racial policies it has espoused since 1962. Holding obstinately to that policy, it ignores changed circumstances and growing concerns within the electorate and economic sectors. The basic problem is that the RF party has an iron-tight grip on the country. No election need be held for another three years, leaving the white electorate as a virtual captive in its own country. Only through the external pressures suggested above is it possible to force the Rhodesian government into meaningful negotiations leading toward majority rule.

As one prominent member of the Rhodesian Front recently admitted in confidence: "Let's face it, our power rests on three things: support from the whites; support from the African tribal chiefs; and support from South Africa. Without those whites we wouldn't have the military forces we need to continue the fight; without the support of those tribal chiefs we wouldn't have much justification for continuing our control over this country; and if South Africa decided to discard us, most of us would be on the next airplane out of here." His statement should not be discounted, for it holds the crux of how whites hold power in the country. All three of his points merit closer inspection.

As long as they remain in Rhodesia, and as long as they believe there are no options for getting out (given restrictions against the removal of funds by emigrants; their belief that no other country will accept them as refugees; etc), most whites, since they cannot change the government,

must remain and serve as the military force for the RF regime. Given their almost-captive status, and propagandised to believe that black power will lead to chaos and certain death for whites, Rhodesian whites see no alternative to that of supporting the war effort. Were programs devised for assisting their exodus from the country, though, the government and its remaining supporters could not continue the war. They would be forced into negotiations. Or, if leaders within the economic sector could somehow coalesce and, despite the possibility of government reprisals, demand that government negotiate a settlement, change could possibly result. Given their inability to change that government, many whites (in increasing numbers) show their opposition by leaving the country. Those, though, are usually individuals who have outside means of support, possibly relatives or jobs awaiting them in other countries. But most Rhodesian whites have no such outside contacts. Given their limited economic resources (especially on funds they can take out) and their realisation that jobs are scarce elsewhere due to the worldwide recession, most whites are virtually forced to remain in Rhodesia. As a result the government uses them to fight its war for preserving white rule.

The present government also maintains itself in power through support from most of the African tribal chiefs. The government pays their salaries, administers its policies through them in the Tribal Trust Lands, and has incorporated a few chiefs into Parliament and the Cabinet. One major segment of black nationalist support comes from the urban areas, but those blacks constitute only a small percentage of the total African population. The remainder are in the rural or Tribal Trust Land areas, and those Africans are under the control of the chiefs. However, as revealed in the Pearce Commission Survey in 1972 (where Rhodesian blacks were queried on whether or not they accepted proposals for a political settlement), rural blacks overwhelmingly opposed the settlement terms. This rebuff dismayed the government, and it claimed that blacks had been coerced by nationalists into rejecting the terms, refusing to believe that the chiefs could not control the responses of their followers. The government persists in claiming that the chiefs "represent" their people (though it has negotiated over the years not with the chiefs but with the nationalists in trying to reach a political settlement) and that both the chiefs and their followers support the government.

But what the government classifies as "support" is in some cases simply indifference or grudging support by rural blacks because of the power the government holds over them, through the chiefs. The chiefs do have an important stake in the present system: their support comes from the white government, and conversely, the nationalists reject the role of the chiefs and threaten to depose them when they come to power. This has *driven* some of the chiefs into the white camp. However, were the nationalists to seek support among the chiefs, if only to rely upon them during the transformation period of Rhodesian black rule, it is quite likely that many chiefs would less willingly support the incumbent white government. That does not mean that they would openly oppose it, for their position is tenuous and they could be (and some have been) ousted by the government. But the chiefs could support the nationalist cause in a more subtle fashion. Without the full support of those chiefs, the present government would have difficulty controlling the TTL's or their use as a base by guerrilla forces. Presently, though, by their opposition to the chiefs, the nationalists force a part of their own community (the chiefs and their supporters) to the other side, in support of the white government. The government capitalises on this, suggesting to

Africans that if the nationalists come to power (a) their traditional bases of political authority (the chiefs) will be destroyed and (b) tribalism, or the conflict between various tribal groups contesting for power (evident already in the nationalist movement) will lead to massive bloodshed and the possible exploitation and oppression of some tribal groups by others. Thus, nationalists not only fight among themselves but also restrict their possibilities of success by alienating potential followers. Were the nationalists to compete with the white government for the allegiance of the chiefs, the probability is that the nationalists would succeed, and that would seriously erode any justification that whites have for holding on to power.

The above two factors, though, would be insignificant should South Africa withdraw its support from Rhodesia. That, by itself, could topple the Smith regime. If the US, Britain and others could convince Vorster that his dumping of Rhodesia would help South Africa (by providing it with time for working out its racial problems; by providing numerous inducements, including aid and development assistance; etc.), that step could force Smith or a successor government into settlement negotiations. Such proposals were discussed in the Kissinger-Vorster talks. But Vorster must be wary of the power of the rightwing in his own country, especially the Herstigte Nasionale Party, which opposes any concessions to blacks. Vorster's policy of granting independence to the black homelands is a strategical device for "removing" all blacks from the "white homeland" of South Africa, but its implementation can be accomplished only if additional (presently) white lands are given to those homelands. Otherwise they are too small in size (and fragmented, as noted below) to accommodate all the blacks who are presently living in the white areas. One long-range problem is that the independent homelands could pursue policies hostile toward South Africa, and being independent, they would no longer be under South Africa's control. However, given their lack of economic development, the homelands would remain basically dependent upon South Africa, for most of the blacks would become migrant workers within South Africa. Rightwing Afrikaners, however, oppose the splitting off of the homelands, for they wish to keep the blacks firmly under their control, and they bitterly oppose Vorster's homelands and détente policies. Thus, the "shedding" of both Rhodesia and Namibia by Vorster could lead to a white backlash resulting in Vorster's removal. That could lead to control of the government by a group that is dogmatically anti-black, a step that could precipitate future racial conflicts and wars.

An "economic compensation guarantee" plan for Rhodesia could set a possible precedent for resolving Vorster's own homelands policy. The Rhodesian plan is based on the principle of keeping whites in Rhodesia through economic guarantees. Should at any time whites wish to leave, they would receive compensation for their property and assets. Given the graduated percentage basis on which they would be compensated, it would be more beneficial for whites to remain for an extended period -- or permanently. This program has possible applications for South Africa's homelands. What is envisaged is the establishment of nine fairly compact homelands for the different African ethnic groups. But the African groups are presently scattered in over one-hundred widely separated enclaves. To consolidate these pieces with additional lands into nine fairly compact bantustans necessitates the purchase of properties presently held by whites, costing the South African government billions of dollars were it to purchase those lands for incorporation within the homelands. The costs of such a policy are thereby prohibitive, but what is even more problematical is the refusal of many whites to sell

or move from their lands. At this point the Rhodesian "guarantee" plan might have applicability. Rather than purchase the South African white properties for the homelands, the Vorster government could legislate to have those included within the homelands, offering to whites who remained (and thereby became a part of the homelands) an economic guarantee. Should they at some later date desire to leave their properties in the homelands, they would be compensated. Under these circumstances, some whites might possibly opt to remain in the homelands. They would, however, retain their citizenship within South Africa, an option not open to the homelands Africans. Consequently, by pressuring Rhodesia into a settlement, Vorster can use that additional time for seeking solutions to his Namibian and racial problems. And the withdrawal of South African support from Rhodesia (or the threat of its withdrawal), could quickly force the Smith government into negotiations.

At this point there appear to be possibilities for a convergence between US and South African policies, at least for the interim. Even one black American Congressman, Andrew Young, has suggested this possibility in his May 17, 1976 article in *The Washington Post*, where he stated:

South Africa may be saved from massive turmoil and bloodshed if it does three things: force Smith to step down; set a time-table for Namibian self-rule; and abolish the cruder realities of internal apartheid. What is not said, of course, is what else South Africa then perhaps could count on from the United States: a lifting of the arms embargo; softer monetary policies in World Bank and IMF decision-making; extension of direct loans from EXIMBANK; possible recognition of the Transkei, South Africa's first Bantustan, for instance.

What is important about Young's statement is his leadership role among blacks in the United States and, perhaps as significant, his influence with the Democratic nominee for the presidency, Jimmy Carter. For were Carter elected, Young might play an influential role in shaping US-Southern African policy.

As indicated in Young's statement, there is a parallel between his and Kissinger's approach: namely, greater reliance upon positive inducements (e.g. development aid, loans, armaments and even future possible recognition of the Transkei) for prodding Vorster into resolving the Rhodesian and Namibian issues and moving to "abolish the cruder aspects of internal apartheid". The latter is an especially significant statement. It does not mention "black majority rule" in South Africa as it does for Rhodesia. Rather, it indicates an awareness that the problems of South Africa are somewhat different and that, as a consequence, perhaps other solutions or alternatives should be considered for South Africa. That is present policy, though in its platform the Democratic Party made more explicit its opposition to the principle of apartheid as it presently exists in South Africa.

This policy of inducements is reflected elsewhere as well. For example, on the day preceding Kissinger's meeting with Vorster in Germany, the *Wall Street Journal*, the most influential business newspaper in the United States, editorialised that the US should reconsider its outright opposition to South Africa's homelands policy. It suggested that the US consider the possibilities of the homelands as a means for improving the condition of blacks in South Africa. Earlier, still (May 9), the *New York Times* carried a long article appraising America's

reliance upon Africa's resources, including those from both Black and White Africa, the article suggesting the need for stability and peace on that continent. What appears increasingly evident is that the US, viewing its past policies (based on economic sanctions and coercive measures) as having had limited impact, is now reassessing those policies and the possibilities for applying positive inducements as a means of prodding change, a policy that most likely would be followed were Carter elected President. But that does not mean that the US will discard the use of coercive or negative measures entirely, for it will continue to exert coercive pressures on South Africa to settle the Namibian issue. Hence, both carrot and stick approaches will be used.

Possibly, though, it is those positive inducements that will most influence Vorster. Economic and development assistance from the US (and other countries) for rapid development of South Africa's homelands and for Namibia and Rhodesia, would contribute (though not necessarily insure) political and economic stability in those areas. In the meantime, Vorster could move forward with his own dialogue and détente policy, including developmental assistance (flowing in also from international bodies and new development agencies as proposed by Kissinger in his Nairobi speech) to black states. For the moment, at least, these efforts would help "de-racialise" the present conflict situation in Southern Africa and possibly lead toward a period of stable economic and political development for African nations. But a first step in that direction must be the resolution of the Rhodesian problem, and to bring that about the role of Vorster is crucial. US policy, directed at these diverse levels, could play a significant role in resolving some of the problems of the area.