RESTIVE JONGLEI
From the Conflict’s Roots, to Reconciliation

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Acronyms

BBC          British Broadcasting Company
CEDAW        UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CGA          Country Gender Assessment
CPA          Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and SPLA, 2005
CRS          Catholic Relief Services
DDR          Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
GBV          Gender Based Violence
GoS          Government of Sudan, often referred to as “Khartoum”
GoSS         Government of Southern Sudan (2005-2011)
GRSS         Government of the Republic of South Sudan
HSBA         Human Security Baseline Assessment, Small Arms Survey
ICC          International Criminal Court
ICTJ         International Centre for Transitional Justice
IDP          Internally Displaced Person/Peoples
JAM          United Nations’ Joint Assessment Mission
Khartoum     The Government of Sudan, which is based in Khartoum
LRA          Lord’s Resistance Army
MoGCSW       Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare
MSF          Médecins Sans Frontierès (Doctors Without Borders)
NGP          National Gender Policy
NSCC         New Sudan Council of Churches
OAG          Other Armed Groups
RPG          Rocket-propelled Grenade Launcher
RSSDDRC      Republic of South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Committee
SAF          Sudan Armed Forces, the army of GoS
SPLA         Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
SPLM         Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement, the ruling party in South Sudan
SPLA/M       Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>SSANSA</td>
<td>South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defense Forces</td>
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<td>SSIM/A</td>
<td>South Sudan Independence Movement/Army</td>
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<td>SSPS</td>
<td>South Sudan Police Service</td>
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<td>SuWEP</td>
<td>Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
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Jonglei State, South Sudan

The ten provinces forming South Sudan cover a vast region (approximately 600,000 km²), and there are about 56 different ethnic groups and almost 600 sub groups, the largest of which are the Dinka (40%), Nuer (20%), Bari, Shilluk and Zande. In addition to the main languages of English and Juba Arabic, 71 unique languages and over 400 different dialects are spoken in the region. Jonglei, in South Sudan’s south east, is the largest and most populous state. Jonglei borders Ethiopia in the east, Unity state at the north east, Upper Nile state in the north east, Kenya in the south, Eastern Equatoria in the south east, Central Equatoria in the west and Lakes state in the north. Jonglei is inhabited by six Nilotic ethnic groups, namely Nuer, Dinka, Anyuak, Murle, Kachipo and Jieh. The state consists of eleven counties and has a population of 1.2 million, 91% of whom live in rural areas. Almost half of the population (48%) in Jonglei lives below the poverty line, and in 2012 over 65% of households suffered from food insecurity.

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5. Ibid.
Introduction

South Sudan has been decimated by 22 years of civil war between the Khartoum-based government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of the south—the longest of all armed conflicts on the African continent—during which two million people died and four million were displaced. In 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed ending the war and giving South Sudan the right to self-determination. After the “long and heroic struggle of our people for justice, freedom, equality, human dignity and political and economic emancipation”, 7 South Sudan’s infrastructure is nearly non-existent and it’s people are tormented by lack of education, lack of access to healthcare, and psychosocial trauma from years of war. In 2010, over 4.3 million people (half of the population) required food aid, and there was a 15% malnutrition rate 8 and acute poverty. Most of the physical and administrative infrastructure has been destroyed, and South Sudanese barely have access to essential goods and services.

South Sudan became the newest country in the world through a referendum to secede from Sudan in January 2011, amidst joyous celebrations and proclamations that peace had finally come to the newly formed nation. South Sudan has claimed it will shape itself “with a commitment to respect the human rights, human dignity and fundamental freedom of all people”. 9 However, there is a stark contrast between the rhetoric of post-war unity and peace and the realities of heightened tensions on the ground; the United Nations has warned that escalating inter-ethnic violence threatens to destabilize the country and many regions in South Sudan have “plummeted into self-perpetuating cycles of violence, cattle raiding, banditry and loss of human life.” 10 According to Geneva-based Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment, competition for land and natural resources coupled with poor governance gives rise to insecurity and causes inter-ethnic clashes. 11 Pastoral violence between migratory nomadic groups and sedentary farmers affects Unity State, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile. Eastern and Western Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile are further affected by spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring countries, both from armed groups such as the Ugandan LRA—which based its operations out of Western Equatoria before 2005—and as a result of cross-border pastoral violence.

Jonglei state has seen some of the most extreme violence in South Sudan; the Lou Nuer, Murle, and Dinka in Jonglei raid and retaliate back and forth, killing civilians, abducting women and children, and taking cattle. The age old tradition of cattle raiding has become increasingly lethal due to antagonistic inter-ethnic relations and the prevalence of small arms; compounded by extreme poverty, a severe lack of social and physical infrastructure and a chronic skills shortage; and exacerbated by politics. Tribal and political dynamics are intertwined, 12 and smaller ethnic groups who feel politically marginalised—such as the Murle—often fight with larger ethnic groups—like Nuer and Dinka—who dominate the political space; furthermore, political battles are often used as opportunities to raid cattle from neighbouring ethnic groups. Unemployed cattle-camp youth play a leading role in this violence. The recent escalation of violence is a result of a legacy of mistrust between ethnic groups along wartime political and military fault lines. 13 Beginning in 1983, Khartoum supported militias in Southern Sudan to fight the SPLA, playing on already established inter-communal divisions, and reinforcing existing antagonistic identity misunderstandings and disapprobation. These negative perceptions of ethnic identities continue today, and have risen to “threats of annihilation and elimination through hate messaging, particularly against the Murle.” 14

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7 South Sudan Declaration of Independence, 2011.
9 Declaration 2, South Sudan Declaration of Independence, 2011.
10 Clement Ochan, Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and Local Efforts to Restore Order, Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, 2007.
13 Ibid., p. 6.
14 United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Incidents of Inter-Communal Violence in Jonglei State, June 2012.
At the end of 2011 an estimated 6,000 – 8,000 armed youth, primarily Lou Nuer, launched a series of attacks over 12 days on Murle communities, in retaliation for a Murle raid in Pieri a few months earlier in which over 400 people were killed and almost half of the houses in the town destroyed. Smaller groups of Murle launched counter attacks. The United Nations states that more than 2,600 raiding-related deaths were reported in Jonglei from January 2011 to September 2012, and account for more than half of reported deaths in South Sudan. The government-led peace process laid a positive foundation for peacebuilding and reconciliation in Jonglei, but violent raids are continuing. On February 8, 2013, over 100 people were killed in Jonglei in a rebel group’s (David Yau Yau’s militia, comprised primarily of Murle) attack on a group of 3,000 Nuer people moving with their cattle to better grazing. “The attackers left with cattle and hundreds of children and women who have not reported back to the village.” In retaliation, armed Nuer youth entered Murleland in mid-July 2013; although casualties are still unknown, an estimated 100,000 Murle have been displaced. An attack, allegedly by Yau Yau loyalists, on 3 cattle camps in Twic East on October 20, 2013, resulted in the deaths of at least 78 Dinka people, and scores are still unaccounted for.

In February 2012 President Kiir appointed a Presidential Committee for Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei State, chaired by Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul. The Committee arranged state-wide intra-community dialogues and an inter-community peace conference in May, where space was provided for free expression of long-held feelings, and where working together to find lasting peace for all communities was strongly endorsed. Although the re-emergence of David Yau Yau’s militia put much of the committee’s work on hold, the All-Jonglei peace process has been welcomed and the report contains a wealth of rich community insights and recommendations which can be used as a foundation for further reconciliation dialogues. However, some perceived the process as exclusionary, arguing that it did not effectively address each group’s concerns equally. In order to begin restoring social harmony and build reconciliation in affected communities, community-level social cohesion and reconciliation programming implemented through inclusive democratic dialogues, urgently needs to continue to be carried out in key areas across Jonglei state.

The conflict in Jonglei is a “complex and murky situation to untangle” without one definitive explanation, and the timing and context of many events have contributed to its continuation. In order to create lasting peace in South Sudan, it is imperative to look critically at the complex layers of the recent inter-ethnic conflict in the region: increased access to weapons; lack of education; limited economic opportunities; political tensions and instability and the politicisation of inter-ethnic conflicts; ethnic tensions and perceptions of opposing ethnic groups, particularly conceptualisations of ‘the other’; and poor handling of the disarmament processes. Addressing the core causes of the conflict by exploring issues of the past through dialogue, and creating infrastructure for an inclusive environment will help build reconciliation and political stability.

Reconciliation is the process of repairing damaged relationships. In order for people to come to terms with a traumatic past, a process of acknowledgement, forgiveness, reconciliation and healing is required as stepping stones towards the building of a viable, legitimate and inclusive democracy. Only with acknowledgement of what has gone before—at the national, community and individual level—can relationships begin to be restored. Reconciliation in the context of post-conflict recovery and transformation entails the intersection of a search for a

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15 MSF Condemns Large Scale Attacks on Civilians in South Sudan Hundreds Of Deaths Reported; MSF Facilities Burned And Looting.
17 Al Jazeera, ‘More than 100 dead in South Sudan cattle raid’, Al Jazeera, 11 February 2013.
18 Leben Nelson Moro, Director of External Relations, Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba, interview with author, Juba, South Sudan, September 6, 2012.
shared truth, some form of justice, and an element of forgiveness and healing, all of which is founded on an understanding of interdependence and a desire for peace. During the reconciliation process, the parties should feel that the truth about the past is being revealed, recognised, and remembered; that justice is being fulfilled or re-established and injustices are being corrected; that their vulnerability is decreasing; and that healing is taking place through "the acknowledgment of victimization, the restoration of dignity and the management of trauma." According to Donald Shriver, "no 'new integration' will ever be possible between enemies in a struggle over social justice without their mutual achievement of a new memory of the past, a new justice in the present, and a new hope for community in the still-to-be-achieved future."

This working paper analyses the roots of the conflict in Jonglei state and the role of ethnic divisions in perpetuating the conflict, and interrogates the 2012 Jonglei peace processes to determine effective pathways towards authentic and sustainable reconciliation in restive Jonglei.

An inductive mixed approach was used to conduct this research, which included an extensive qualitative review of existing academic literature, news articles, NGO reports, and peace conference transcripts. Interviews with government officials, youth leaders, academics, gender experts, activists, women’s groups, and participants in the peace conferences were conducted in South Sudan in September 2012, in both the capital Juba, and in Bor town, Jonglei. The subjects were selected based on their expertise, or their participation in the All Jonglei Peace process. Eleven in-depth interviews (1-2 hours each) were conducted with mainly South Sudanese (9 of 11) individuals in-country, and a group interview was conducted with 8 members of the Bor Women’s Association, through a translator. All of the interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using a framework of transitional justice, peacebuilding, reconciliation, and gender justice. Throughout the interviews and the analysis, the author remained keenly aware of her position as an outsider, and understands that her ethnocentric perspective can have both positive and negative impacts on the process and the perspectives contained herein.

For the Love of Cattle and Wives

To disentangle the roots of the conflict, one must begin to understand the social value of the cattle which are being raided. Cattle are viewed as a measure of wealth by the majority of people in South Sudan. The value of cattle lies not only in the important utilitarian aspects of milk and meat provided by the cattle, but also in the role of cattle in bride-price practices. When South Sudanese youth talk about girls “they cannot keep off the subject of cattle, for flirting leads to marriage and this involves the transference of cattle,” and old men spend many hours sitting under trees discussing past and present bride-price payments. Almost all South Sudanese engage in traditional payment of cattle to a bride’s family by the groom, both to demonstrate his readiness for marriage, to signify her value, and to link the families together. Traditionally, relatives of a young man would all contribute cattle towards his bride-price, and these cattle would be divided up between the relatives of the bride. In the Murle language, people who are related are spoken of as antenoc, which means ‘there are cattle between them’. “Of course, the youth are trying to [find acceptance] in their society, where a very big percentage of the communities think you are useful when you get married and you have kids. And getting married involves paying from 40 [cattle (a value of 10,000 USD)] to as many as you want to” says South Sudanese analyst Geoffrey Duke.

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26 Lewis, op. cit., 1972.
27 Ibid.
Polygamy is legal and widely accepted in South Sudan, and young men often endeavour to marry many wives, thereby increasing their need for cattle acquisition.

Since the end of the civil war, the bride-price has increased significantly. Once the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, men looked to increase their herds and marry; according to an unpublished UN report, bride-prices increased by 44% following the CPA. Among the Lango community in Eastern Equatoria, for example, a wife costs 40-50 heads of cattle, in contrast to the pre-war price of 15-22. In Jonglei, the prices are extremely high: in the Murle community, young men have to pay “at least 50 something to marry a girl. It’s a lot of cattle.” According to the Jonglei representative on the Gender and Child Committee, Anne Lino Wuor Abyei, “in the past, people used to say it may not exceed about 30 cows in some places, and it depends whose daughter you are marrying and how beautiful she is, how tall, how all this stuff were also part of reasons why the bride price can really go up, or if she is pretty and there is competition.” Now, in Juba, there have been reports of rich men paying upwards of 200 cows to marry.

As demonstrated, the bride-price is a crucial economic feature in South Sudanese society and “the need to afford bride-price payments gives men an important motivation to accumulate wealth.” A limited economic environment puts great pressure on young men to conduct successful raids for cattle to pay the bride-price. Anthropologist Jon Arensen links bride-price to increases in Murle raiding, stating that when “the members of a buul “age-set” became a little older (late 20s) they became interested in marriage and they needed cattle to pay the bride-worth. Such a buul would step up the number of raids to gain the necessary cattle for marriage.” Abyei confirms this: “the young people also say, ‘yes, if we want to marry, we need to go and get cattle’.”

A number of interviewees suggested fixing the bride-price may stem the escalation of raids arising from increases in bride-price. According to gender expert Akinyi Walender, “the price of [bride-price] used to be fixed and after every period of time the men would sit at the marketplace and fix the price of [bride-price]. The last time the price of [bride-price] was fixed was 20 years ago when the Dinka elders basically sat down and did that. That’s when the war broke out again and they’ve never had an opportunity since then.” While Chair of the Human Rights Commission in Jonglei, Peter Guzulu met with Murle chiefs in 2011 in an attempt to fix the bride-price across Murleland. He described his experience as follows:

> We proposed in Murle, we said ‘now what is causing all this raiding is the number of cattle’. We said, ‘okay, make it at least 30’. Simple. Then, civilians refused. They say, ‘okay you go and tell your family, when the girl is married from the family, give those people by 30 head of cattle. But MY daughter, I will give somebody by 56. It is the daughter who is going to charge the cattle, it is not me. And even if they are going to discuss about marriage, I will not be present.’ So they charge the way they want. That’s why our proposal didn’t work. It is still 50 something [heads of cattle]. Because you don’t have control. He is a civilian, he can stay even where you don’t know. You don’t know when his daughter will be married, married by whom, you don’t know. There is no way! We tried. [laughter] We tried. We tried.”

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30 Marc Sommers & Stephanie Schwartz, Dowry and Division, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 295, 2011.
31 Clement Ochan, Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and Local Efforts to Restore Order, Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, 2007.
34 Stern, Orly. ‘This is how marriage happens sometimes: Women and marriage in South Sudan’ in Friederike Bubenzer and Orly Stern (ed.), Hope, Pain and Patience, the Lives of Women in South Sudan, UJR, Cape Town, 2011.
36 For greater exploration of buul, see chapter on Ethnic Identities.
38 Abyei, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
Despite efforts to fix the price of bride-price, it remains high and continues to increase. This has negative effects on the way women are perceived within their families and by other community members. “Because the price of [bride-price] is so high, it affects the way women are treated. Women are seen as objects, literally,”41 says Walender. The rising bride-price has had a negative effect on female youth, who continue to be perceived as property to generate family wealth.42 “A female is only as valuable as the number of cows she can bring,”43 and often very young girls are married to much older men, as they are able to afford a higher bride-price.44 According to the 2006 South Sudan Household Health Survey, close to half (48%) of South Sudanese girls between 15 and 19 are married,45 and some are married as early as 12 years old. Today, in conjunction with increased raiding, men are also marrying younger and taking more wives.46

Each wife is expected to produce many children to replace the cows her husband’s family paid for her in bride-price. One of the primary reasons men endeavour to marry many wives is because many wives mean many daughters, who can then bring many cattle to the family when they are married. “Women here are just still treated like objects for their family.”47 In South Sudan women are still considered “property,” owned or controlled by men—typically fathers, then husbands.48 While the civil war resulted in a generally low level of education for both men and women, the gender disparity is acute. Ninety two percent of South Sudanese women cannot read and write.49 Forced marriages and early marriages are cited by many to be the primary cause of a high female dropout rate. This is rooted in a culture that sees girls and women as “economic resources” whose bride price can be a significant source of income for the family.50

The practice of bride-price is integral to the causes of the conflict in Jonglei; cattle acquired during raids are used to pay rising bride price, and women who are abducted are valued because they bring their “reproductive capacity and labour into the abductor’s family” without the cost of a bride-price. Women also often play supportive roles in the raids, encouraging and celebrating raiders from their community through songs and feasts.

Roots of conflict, and Cattleraiding

Cattleraiding has been occurring in Jonglei since “time immemorial”.51 Cattle are integral to the economy and culture of the people of South Sudan, and youth in cattle-camps have historically fought both to protect their own cattle, and to acquire cattle from their neighbours.52 According to one Dinka man, cattle are “…the same thing as life. We eat from them and we get married from them.”53 Although strong arguments have been put forth linking rising bride-price to an increase in cattleraiding, Geoffrey Duke, Programs Coordinator at the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), explained that “in some communities, [society] places cattle rustling as a sports

41 Walender, interview with author, Juba, September 3, 2012.
45 Human Rights Watch, “’This Old Man Can Feed Us, You Will Marry Him,’ Child and Forced Marriage in South Sudan”, Human Rights Watch, 2013, pg. 4.
49 Lise Grande, Press Conference held on 12 August, 2009. (Quoted in Bennet et al., op. cit., 2010.)
51 Akinyi Walender, Head of Mission, South Sudan, Cordaid, interview with author, Juba, September 3, 2012; Geoffrey L. Duke, Programs Coordinator, South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), interview with author, Juba, September 7, 2012; and Guzulu, interview with author, Juba, September 7, 2012.
activity. So, you don’t play to get married, you just play to win the game, and when there is that aspect of game in cattle rusting, you don’t pay much attention to where you use the cattle that you have raided.”

In many South Sudanese cultures, there is great prestige in capturing cattle. According to Reverend John Chol Daau, “youth raid cattle because they can increase the number of their cows; I mean it has some prestige.” Peter Guzulu says that, “within the [culture], it is just something to show that they are men, warriors.” “So if you have so many marks [or scars representing men killed in battle] you are considered a hero,” says Geoffrey Duke, “so all the young boys are missioning to get ‘height’: who did well [is] who was able to raid.” “But,” says Jonglei State Director for Community Security and Small Arms Control Aguti Adut, “for you to get the cattle you must kill the owner of the cow. Because you cannot take that cow if that person is alive.”

Although in the past cattleraidding was driven purely by a desire to increase wealth and to gain status as a raider, the reasons for the recent violent cattle raids are more complex. Guzulu elucidates, “it has involved politics, and also disarmament. Some people are just doing it to get wealth as it used to be, some people of these days maybe are going to kill for revenge, maybe for torture, for the rape against their families and so on, others are going to fight the other ethnic group for the political reason. All of these [factors] these days are now combined.” These factors are exacerbated by increased access to weapons, lack of education, limited economic opportunities, and extreme poverty.

Lack of education perpetuates lack of access to both economic opportunities and political engagement. Only 27% of the South Sudanese population above the age of six has ever attended school, and in 2009 there were 84 students per teacher and 169 students per classroom. In Jonglei, “they don’t have an education. They don’t have an opportunity for an education because there are no schools, literally.” In Jonglei the literacy rates for both men and women are significantly lower than the national level; only 16% of the population 15 years old and above is literate, increasing to 25% for the age group 15-24, lower than the figure for South Sudan which is 27% and 40% respectively. In addition, after years of civil war, the infrastructure to support viable economic alternatives to cattleraidding does not exist.

Cattleraidding has also become “a little bit sophisticated.” The use of powerful artillery during raids—including semi-automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades: relics of the war, or acquired from the SPLA, from rebel leaders in South Sudan, or from across the porous borders—has elevated raiding to an increasingly destructive practice. “In all these warring areas, everybody has gone militant, so whether they are trained or they are untrained, they have guns. And coupled with loneliness and the rule of law being gone” the violence of raids has reached new levels.

Raiding parties have grown from small groups of cattle-camp youth to large and well organized battalions. “In olden days, ten people who are from the same village or same area can go to lokilo [raid]” but the recent raids have been politicised and have involved hundreds or thousands of raiders. “How can civilians gather into thousands unless it is politicised, unless there is good communication to bring them all together? That’s why it is different [now].” Although Murle still usually raid in small mobile groups of between 2-20 people, the Lou Nuer have organized into a strong fighting force dubbed “the White Army” (which fluctuates in size, but has been

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57 Aguti Adut, Jonglei State Director for Community Security and Small Arms Control, interview with author, Bor, September 10, 2012.
64 Biel Boutros Biel, Executive Director, South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
reported to be at its strongest between 6000 and 11,000 people) and Murle, Nuer and Dinka both attack and partake in revenge attacks with increased violence. “Militarised segments on both sides of this ethnic divide have sought to rationalise their increasing viciousness as retaliations for abominations earlier experienced.”

Professor Leben Nelson Moro at the University of Juba emphasises the culture of revenge within the current raiding cycle, explaining the mind-set of many raiders that “my cattle were taken long, long time ago, and I have the opportunity, and my people were killed, I revenge. I take back what was taken from me. So if I know that you don’t have any deterrents, I come. Please. Bring the cows.”

According to Aguti Adut, the Jonglei State Director for Security and Small Arms Control, “the Murle, they were coming, revenging, because the Lou Nuer went, and he killed Murle, so the Murle was revenging to the Lou. The matter was the revenge, and they mobilised themselves in a group and they came. And then Lou mobilised themselves and they went also.”

As the violence of the raids has increased, the victims of attacks have become not just the cattle-camp youth and men as warriors, but the elderly, the women, and the children. In the past, the killing of women and children was regarded by South Sudanese not only as an act of cowardice but as a direct affront against God. However, according to Hutchinson and Jok, the killing of unarmed women and children became standard practice in raids over ten years ago between Nuer and Dinka combatants, who came to think of women not just as assets with inter-ethnic mobility, but as fixed members of an ethnic group and therefore the target of any attempt at ethnic annihilation.

**Escalation of Violence**

It is important to highlight that the recent attacks in Jonglei did not occur in isolation, but are part of a continued cycle of raiding and retaliation that has grown increasingly violent. In 2009, South Sudan experienced its worst internal violence since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), when some 2,500 people were killed, and more than 350,000 were displaced by inter-ethnic conflict. Almost half of those displaced or killed were from Jonglei state. A Lou Nuer attack on Likuangole in 2009, during which around 450 mainly women and children were killed is regarded as the start of the current cycle of violence. These attacks marked a change in strategy, whereby raiders targeted not just cattle but entire communities, killing civilians, including women and children. In 2009, attacks in Akobo and Pibor—both in Murleland—resulted in more than 1000 casualties, with more than 700 allegedly killed in one week-long attack.

The escalation of violence continued, and in Pieri in August, 2011, the Murle attacked Lou Nuer, killing over 400 people and abducting many women and children. Because of a lack of effective intervention from the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) to stop attacks and defend the citizens of South Sudan, the retaliatory raids continued to escalate. Lack of political will coupled with lack of capacity to investigate crimes or hold perpetrators accountable contributed to the cycle of attacks that have resulted in “increasing numbers of casualties and been marked by acts of deliberate cruelty.”

According to a White Army press release in 2011, Lou and Jikany Nuer lost over 35,000 cattle and 4,800 people in Murle raids. They retaliated, and according to Small Arms Survey the Nuer attacks on Murle in Pibor county in

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68 Moro, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.

69 Adut, interview with author, Bor, September 10, 2012.


75 UNMISS, op. cit., 2012, pg. 6-7.

76 Ibid., pg. i.

77 Lou and Jikany White Army, Press Statement: ‘Nuer Youth Have Captured Lolkuangole And Are Advancing To Capture All Murleland’, *South Sudan News Agency*, 25 December 2011.
December 2011 and January 2012 were the deadliest inter-ethnic clashes since the 1991 Bor Massacre. According to the UN, the attacks that occurred in Jonglei in December 2011 and January 2012 were the worst to have ever occurred in the state, in terms of brutality and destruction; thousands were killed or abducted, hundreds of *tukuls* (huts) were burnt to the ground, social and economic infrastructure was destroyed, and over 170,000 people were displaced. The UN has stated that the objective of the attack “appears to go beyond retaliatory reprisals and more towards the depopulation, displacement and possibly even the destruction of the opposing community and their livelihood.”

The UN conducted fact-finding missions and interviews immediately following the 2011-2012 violence and published a detailed report, *Incidents of Inter-communal Violence in Jonglei State*, in June 2012. The number of people killed as listed in the report is only that of deaths that could be verified by the UN; there has been speculation that the actual number of deaths could number in the thousands. In the report, the UN noted that their warning messages to SPLM/A leaders could have reduced the violence, but were not heeded by either the SPLM or the army. As early as 5 December 2011, the UN warned the GRSS of the mobilisation of Lou Nuer youth. On 13 December UNMISS told the SPLA Chief of Staff that an attack was imminent, but no immediate action was taken.

On 23 December 2011, an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 Lou Nuer youth calling themselves “the White Army”, armed with AK-47’s and RPGs, converged and launched a series of systematic attacks over 12 days in Murleland, in retaliation for the Pieri attack. At least 906 Murle were confirmed by the UN to be killed, and over 370 people were unaccounted for, including hundreds of children and women who were abducted. Attackers killed men with gunshots, women and children with machetes, and burned people to death inside their *tukuls*. On 27 December, eight columns of White Army youth started their attack on Likuangole. Armed youth in uniforms (SPLA, SPSS, Prison Services and Wildlife Police) were at the front of each column, and women and children followed at the back, carrying provisions. Due to their large numbers, the White Army passed the SPLA’s 358 Battalion barracks unchallenged. In Likuangole, over three days, the attackers burnt *tukuls* as well as health and education facilities, destroying all infrastructure. The walls of the school and municipal building were covered in English and Nuer graffiti that read “We come to kill all of Murle” and “We come again don’t sit again in your *payam* (district).” In the subsequent days, the White Army attacked surrounding *bomas* (towns) where killings, destruction and abduction continued.

On 27 December, three weeks after UNMISS’s warnings to the GRSS, then Vice President Riek Machar travelled to Likuangole, where he urged thousands of fighters to go home. He told them not to attack Pibor and other towns guarded by the government, and emphasized that if they attacked any government controlled town they would be treated like rebels. He reminded them that in Lou Nuer culture, women and children should not be killed. The youth did not heed his warning, and on 30 December, UNMISS reported that the columns were moving towards Pibor, attacking and burning all villages along the way. One young man reported that he travelled to Manythakar village in search of his grandmother, his great-aunt, and a 10-year-old relative, and found their three bodies; they had been burned alive inside their *tukul*.

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78 Small Arms Survey, op. cit., 2012; for more discussion of the Bor Massacre, see chapter Politics.
79 UNMISS, op. cit., 2012, pg. i.
80 Ibid., pg. 7.
81 Ibid., pg. 14.
82 Ibid., pg. 20.
83 Ibid., pg. 12.
84 The 512 soldiers were heavily outnumbered, and were ordered not to fire. They were able to protect 100 civilians who had sought refuge in the barracks. Ibid., pg. 16.
85 Ibid., pg. 16.
86 Ibid., pg. 17.
87 Ibid., pg. 17.
On 31 December, the White Army entered the outskirts of Pibor town and burnt tukuls, the Anglican Church, and ransacked Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). The White Army also attacked villages surrounding Pibor; in one village alone, at least 160 people were killed, including one witness’s two wives and six children. In the next few days, smaller groups of Lou Nuer youth fanned-out and attacked villagers and IDPs who had fled Pibor; one man in Fertait village reported that the Lou Nuer had pushed people into their tukuls and then set them alight. Those who fled were ambushed and killed by small groups of Lou Nuer. The UN reported that all tukuls, food stores, and crops had been burnt, and at least 52 people were confirmed dead.

At the beginning of January, the Lou Nuer began retreating north with “tens of thousands of stolen cattle and a significant number of abductees. They were able to do so unchallenged and they have continued to enjoy impunity”.

The Murle reacted to the Nuer onslaught with retaliatory attacks on Lou Nuer and Dinka villages from December 27th, 2011 to February 4, 2012. Lou Nuer and Dinka reported 44 attacks in Lou Nuer land and 13 attacks in Dinka land, all attributed to Murle groups. The Murle attackers operated in small, mobile groups, usually attacking one settlement at a time. The UN recorded 276 killings and 25 abductions, as well as considerable loss of livelihood, including 61,000 stolen cattle.

Shortly after the beginning of the civilian disarmament campaign of the Murle that immediately followed the attacks on Murleland, Murle rebel leader David Yau Yau, who had been granted amnesty in June 2011 by the GoSS, returned to Pibor. He claimed one of the primary reasons of his return and the resurgence of his militia was to defend the Murle from the SPLA, as “the SPLA has lost discipline,” as stated in the Jebel Boma Declaration, released in April 2013 by Yau Yau’s South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A). In May, Yau Yau said in an interview, “this time around, we are fighting for the people of South Sudan, the minority communities like the Murle and the others.” In response, Government spokesman Barnaba Marial Benjamin said “there’s no truth in what he’s saying he’s fighting for. This government is well represented, if it is an issue of ethnicity. He’s not fighting for this cause; he’s fighting because he lost the elections”.

From March 2012 to early 2013, there were battles between Yau Yau’s forces and the SPLA in and around Pibor county. On 8 of February 2013, using heavy artillery and RPGs, Murle members of the SSDA attacked Nuer civilians in Walgak, Akobo who were migrating with their cattle to areas with greater pasture and water resources. According to UNMISS, 103 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed, as well as 14 of the 40 SPLA soldiers who were accompanying the group for protection; 65,766 cattle were taken.

In response to the Walgak attack, in July 2013 armed Nuer youth entered Pibor county to root out David Yau Yau’s forces. The alleged number of attackers varies from the GoSS report of 11,000, to the Pibor county administrators’ report of close to 63,000 men; they attacked in all corners of Jonglei, and although the casualty figures have not been reported, they were suspected to be very high. Nuer fighter Tut Mut said they had killed many people in response to the killing of children, women and the elderly in the Walgak cattle raid. Human Rights Watch has

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88 They were unable to penetrate the centre of the town due to SPLA reinforcements. On 2 January, 150-200 White Army youth tried to enter town by crossing the Pibor, but were stopped by SPLA armored vehicles and SPLA gunfire.
89 Ibid., pg. 18.
90 Ibid., pg. 19.
91 Ibid., pg. 19.
92 Ibid., pg. 20.
93 Ibid., pg. 20.
94 Ibid., pg. 20.
95 Ibid., pg. 20.
96 See section on Effects of Civilian Disarmament, below.
RESTIVE JONGLEI: FROM THE CONFLICT’S ROOTS, TO RECONCILIATION

stated that there are allegations of government support, including the provision of ammunition to the Lou Nuer, reported by credible sources, which have further deepened Murle perceptions of government persecution. 100

Manipulation and Politics
The recent escalation of violence is a result of a legacy of mistrust along wartime fault lines. Leben Nelson Moro explains:

> During the [civil] war, I think the real fighting [was] between the [SAF and SPLA]; the two sides were then also using those communities who were also having those traditional animosities to pursue their own military objectives. The security in Jonglei also has been very much linked to the nature of relationship between the [South Sudan] government and the government in Khartoum. 101

In 1983, SPLA fighters began consolidating their power by occupying territory throughout South Sudan. When the SPLA overran Murleland, they took governance of the Murle people. According to Jon Arensen, because of historical animosities from years of tit-for-tat cattle raids, the SPLA treated the Murle very poorly, including raping and physically assaulting civilians. 102 Chief Ismail Konyi, a Murle leader and former police officer, took a contingent of Murle warriors and travelled to Khartoum allegedly to ask the GoS for support to protect their people from the SPLA. Other authors have argued that Konyi’s flying militia was armed by Khartoum “in order to raid and harass people sympathetic to the SPLA.” 104 According to Professor Moro,

> “Because the [Murle] are a small group of people they are politically also very weak, maybe why they cooperated with Khartoum is simply because they are just so weak, so they had to find some way to [protect themselves]. Maybe from their perspective it is about defending themselves against these big tribes, who would be very willing to come and take what they have.” 105

When the SPLM won independence for South Sudan, they viewed the Murle’s alignment with the GoS as against not just SPLA abuses, but against the SPLA and thus against the revolution for self-determination. However, the Murle were not the only group who aligned themselves with the GoS at one time or another during the long civil war.

During the war, many cattle-camp youth from all ethnic groups formed militias to protect themselves both from Khartoum’s forces and from cattle raids from neighbouring communities. One of these militias, the White Army, was an unofficial Nuer armed group which many young cattle-camp youth initially joined to respond to local threats. 106 In 1991, the White Army supported ex-Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, and Dr. Lam Akol, a Shilluk, when they broke away from SPLA and formed the SPLA/M-Nasir splinter group, alleging that the army was Dinka-dominated, that Dr. John Garang was authoritarian, 107 and they did not support the SPLA’s vision for a united New Sudan, but rather desired southern self-determination. 108 In 1992, the SPLA/M-Nasir faction, backed by the White Army, officially aligned themselves with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), although it is claimed Khartoum—eager to foment south-south violence 109 —had been supplying them with weapons for some time before. 110 Riek Machar led

101 Moro, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
102 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
103 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
105 Moro, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
106 Cecily Brewer, Case Study No. 7 in the Complex Operations Case Study Series: Disarmament in South Sudan, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2010.
the armed White Army cattle-camp youth, who were excited by the prospect of acquiring cattle, to attack the Dinka Bor in the heartland of the SPLA, resulting in the deaths of over 2000 Dinka Bor people. The Bor Massacre has been described as one of the greatest humanitarian disasters to have taken place during the civil war, leaving a deep and unresolved legacy of hatred.\footnote{Young, op. cit., 2007.} In 1995, the SPLA/M-Nasir split, with Akol’s faction taking the name SPLA/M-United, and Machar’s faction, the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A).

During this time, the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) emerged as a loose coalition of other armed group (OAGs) fighting the SPLA as a response to SPLA violence and abuse against civilians, and the White Army and the Murle militias joined many militias from the Bari, Latuka, Mundari, Didinga, Taposa, Fertit, and some Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile Dinka and received weapons from GoS.\footnote{Young, op. cit., 2006, pg 13.} In April 1996, Riek Machar signed an agreement with Khartoum, and in April 1997, the SSDF merged with the SSIM/A and signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement, officially aligning with the SAF and taking Machar as its commander.\footnote{Young, op. cit., 2006, pg 15.}

When the CPA was signed in 2005, the war officially ended, but the inter-communal animosities that were manipulated and stoked by the SPLA, the White Army, and Khartoum during the civil war remained and continued to fester. In discussions with Aguti Adut about the recent escalation of violence in Jonglei, reference to Murle’s alignment with Khartoum as early as Anyanya I, in 1955, was cited as a reason for distrust. He did not refer to Murle as South Sudanese, but rather as Khartoum’s proxy militia who were “relying on the north because the north was supporting them to fight the Southern Sudanese [during Anyanya 1] who were ‘rebels’ in the bush.” This residual distrust was made further evident during the recent escalation of violence when the Nuer youth, in a statement released in January 2012 by the White Army, stated:

\begin{quote}
We the Nuer Youth in South Sudan do not recognise Riek Machar as a Nuer leader. He is responsible for all the killings we experience today because it was him who armed Murle tribe in 1997 when he signed Khartoum Peace Agreement with Omer Bashir. He cannot talk to us because we know he is responsible for all the deaths in Jonglei for arming Murle in 1990’s to fight John Garang. Now Murle are killing Nuer and Dinka with weapons Riek Machar supplied to them in 1997.
\end{quote}

Khartoum’s meddling did not end with the signing of the CPA; even now, the GoS continues to stoke the violence through support of rebel militias, who are currently fighting the SPLA, by supplying them with weapons, munitions, and uniforms. In 2010, David Yau Yau, a theology student and former member of the South Sudanese army, launched a rebellion after failing to win a parliamentary seat in the April 2010 general election, citing SPLM manipulation of ballots. South Sudan has repeatedly accused Sudan of backing Yau Yau and airdropping weapons and supplies to his troops, although Khartoum denies the claims.\footnote{Michael Onyiego, ‘South Sudan Cattle Clash: 103 Said Killed In Livestock Raid’, Huffington Post, 10 February, 2013.} In July 2013, the African Union began an investigation into allegations by both Sudan and South Sudan that they are supporting rebels operating in each other’s territory. “The greatest fear is that it can become very destabilising as more people might follow the example of Yau Yau, and Khartoum is waiting with open arms, at least for now.”

Members of the Bor Women’s association in Bor, Jonglei, were asked what their priority issues were in relation to the current insecurity, and how they viewed the success of the peace process.\footnote{Moro, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.} They said the current surge in the conflict is not due only to inter-ethnic divisions or cattleraidding as such, but rather to David Yau Yau’s rebellion (response given through a translator):

\begin{quote}
They made sure, before answering any questions, that the local and national government would support them being interviewed, and calls were made to the Governor’s office in Bor and to the MoGCSW in Juba for assurance. They were additionally assured that they would be safe by the translator, who was a member of the SPLM RSSDDRC.
\end{quote}
Here in Jonglei we are, there are 6 different languages here in Jonglei. The peace [conference] was done very well, the one in Ma,. That peace has been settled. People were good. People were travelling from here to the other part of the languages. They also come to [Bor] here. Peace is very good. It has been settled since then. But recently, some months ago, these start with the rebel of this man called Yau Yau. This man Yau Yau, he is the one now threatening the security of the people here because he has disagreed with the government; he is a rebel. So this is the only thing, but with the rest of this, and all the other ethnic groups, people are all good. Only that Yau Yau started the problem that people now are in insecurity in Jonglei.119

Professor Leben Nelson Moro agrees, arguing that the greatest problem Jonglei is facing is that militia leaders who are not happy with the system “run to Khartoum, and they show up in those remote areas with fresh guns from Khartoum and money, and then they now use those young people…and exploit communities…exploit local tensions”120 to fight the SPLA. Marc Sommers and Stephanie Schwartz of the United States Institute of Peace argue that youth join militias simply to acquire guns: “They say it’s a free ticket: help the militia capture this town. After that, with those guns, the youth raid cattle and kill people.”121 According to a government official whom they interviewed, “some youth are joining the rebels [militias] to loot properties so they can marry.”122

It has been argued that the youth are not motivated to join just to kill and loot to marry, but also to protect themselves from the perceived threat of SPLA violence; from August 2012 onwards, between 4,000 and 6,000 Murle cattle-camp youth unhappy with the recent civilian disarmament campaign123 joined Yau Yau’s militia. In early March 2013, the SPLA began an offensive against Yau Yau; he requested negotiations with an independent international mediator and they refused, then claimed that “all the efforts to bring (Yau Yau) into reconciliation have failed; the only way is to fight him,” as stated by South Sudan’s Deputy Defence Minister Majak D’Agot Atem.124 In a May interview with Voice of America, Yau Yau dismissed the government’s offers to talk peace, calling what Juba was offering “no kind of peace at all. It’s just a joke.”125 In early 2013, Yau Yau’s militia members were fighting SPLA throughout Pibor county. According to the County Commissioner of Pibor, Mr. Joshua Konyi, “the youth who want to keep their guns are ambushing the army.”126 Says David Yau Yau, “we are fighting now to get our own freedom, to be given our own state.”127

Effect of Civilian Disarmament

Although cattleraiding had been present in South Sudanese society before the war, the increase in small arms and the political affiliations of different ethnic groups during the civil war intensified the frequency of inter-ethnic raids and the intensity of their violence. In the years between the CPA and the 2011 referendum for independence, inter-ethnic conflicts within South Sudan that had begun during the war continued with extraordinary violence, particularly in Jonglei State. There is a continuous threat of political violence along the border with Sudan, and of spill-over violence from other conflicts in the region,128 particularly in northern Kenya and Uganda. To ensure their safety, many South Sudanese have remained armed and there exists an overwhelming amount of small arms and light weapons in the country. At the end of the civil war there were an estimated 1.9 to 3.2 million small arms in

119 Nyakan Makuei, a Women Representative at the Jonglei Peace Conference, May 2012, interview with author, Bor, 10 September 2012.
120 Moro, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
123 See next chapter, Civilian Disarmament.
In addition to the weapons which are in the hands of the SPLA, regional militias, and OAGs, an estimated two-third of small arms in South Sudan are in private hands. This poses a particular threat to women, as a high number of sexual assaults involve weapons.  "In a society that is highly militarized, where guns and force are equated with entitlement and power, women remain at risk both inside and outside their homes." 

The UN and the GRSS have poured resources into a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme as well as a civilian disarmament programme. The Community Security and Small Arms Control department, tasked with civilian disarmament, was under the DDR Commission until 2008, when it was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior.

The CPA was ambiguous about civilian disarmament; its stipulation to “monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed” failed to clearly define what constituted a civilian in such a heavily militarised country. According to Cecily Brewer, South Sudan specialist at the United States Department of State, weapons’ collection has been inadequate, and guidelines for voluntary disarmament have yet to be established. All attempts to disarm the civilian population have been met with resistance and violence. An order for disarmament signed by President Kiir in early 2008 was given to state governors and the SPLA to “peacefully have all civilians in all ten states surrender their firearms” within six months, but noted that “where individuals or groups refuse or show resistance, ‘appropriate force must be used’”.

Disarmament is particularly difficult in South Sudan because of the deeply entrenched warrior identities of South Sudanese men, prevailing distrust between communities, and because the GRSS is unable to provide adequate protection. Warriors have always been highly valued in South Sudanese culture, and during the 22 year civil war, gun ownership became inextricably linked to the warrior identity. From the beginning of the civil war, attitudes and values towards gun-ownership changed dramatically, with small arms increasingly playing a role as “symbols of wealth, physical strength and, hence, marriage worthiness” for young men. As one Lou Nuer citizen described, the society has been changed by “the realization of power that came with the gun”. According to Jonglei’s Director of Civilian Disarmament Aguti Adut, 

"Disarmament was not easy. Because they do believe in the gun rather than cattle. Because they believe that if I have my gun, I will get more cattle. Because, but if I have cattle, and I don't have the gun, if something happens those cattle will be taken. So this is what they believe. So this is why disarmament was not easy to be conducted."

Due to this deeply embedded and complex relationship with gun ownership, the civilian disarmament program has largely failed and has had little impact on security within the region, according to Small Arms Survey.

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129 Brewer, op. cit., 2010.
131 D’Awol, Anyieth M. “Sibu ana, sibu ana’ (‘leave me, leave me’): Survivors of Sexual Violence in South Sudan’, in Friederike Bubenzer and Orly Stern (ed.), Hope, Pain and Patience, the Lives of Women in South Sudan, IJR, Cape Town, 2011.
133 Michael Malual Wuor, Jonglei State Director, RSSDDRC, interview with author, Bor, South Sudan, September 10, 2012; author believes this transfer likely occurred following an international backlash over the violent forced disarmament of Lou Nuer civilians in 2006.
134 Bennet et al., op. cit., 2010.
135 Brewer, op. cit., 2010.
138 Bennet et al., op. cit., 2010.
139 Ochan, op. cit., 2007.
140 Bennett et al., op. cit., 2010.
141 Henri Myrttinen & Kate McInturff, Gender, Small Arms and Development: The Case of Southern Sudan, Peacebuild: the Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group and The Small Arms Working Group, 2008; and International Crisis Group, op. cit., June 2006.
142 Brewer, op. cit., 2010.
143 Adut, interview with author, Bor, September 10, 2012.
Furthermore, the distrust and violent resistance in Jonglei can in fact also be partly attributed to the SPLA’s heavy-handed tactics to forcibly disarm civilians. According to Amnesty International, five civilian disarmament campaigns have followed outbreaks of inter-communal violence in an ongoing cycle since 2005. The most violent of these campaigns have been the forced disarmament of the Lou Nuer in 2006 and of the Murle in early 2012. As outlined earlier, these campaigns can be attributed to political tensions, particularly between the SPLA and the White Army, and the SPLA and Murle militias.

Nuer–Dinka tensions in Jonglei flared in late 2005 when the Lou Nuer requested permission for their cattle to graze on Dinka land in Duk County, and the SPLM requested that they disarm before doing so. The Lou Nuer were hesitant to disarm before the neighbouring Dinka, due to their distrust of the Dinka and lack of trust in the SPLA, composed primarily of Dinka, as an adequate protection force. The conduct of sections of the SPLA forces, the police and the local administration in South Sudan “made it difficult for some communities to trust them to ensure their security [due to] accusations that they practice nepotism, are corrupt, impose unfair communal punishments, use torture on suspects, and rape women from villages of suspected criminals,” according to respondents interviewed by Clement Ochan, a South Sudanese Senior Researcher at Tufts University and the Feinstein International Centre.

Neighbouring communities, including the Murle, were not asked to disarm simultaneously, further increasing the Nuer’s resistance to disarm. When the SPLA began their civilian disarmament campaign in January 2006, unsupported by the UN due to its violent coercive nature, the Nuer resisted. The Nuer White Army attacked the SPLA and killed their Nuer mediator, Wutnyang Gatkek. The SPLA leadership and SPLM officials continued their military campaign and forced disarmament, while the White Army continued to be armed by Khartoum. In May 2006 the conflict escalated in northern Jonglei and 113 White Army soldiers and one SPLA soldier were killed. Over the subsequent months, the disarmament campaign—described as “95% effective” by local Jonglei authorities—collected 3,300 weapons, while 1,200 White Army soldiers, 400 SPLA soldiers, and 213 civilians were killed. John Young cites speculation, which he argues is credible, that the forced disarmament of the White Army was not to seize weapons, but rather to smash the White Army, driven by deep seated hatred from civil war animosities, because they had challenged the SPLA monopoly of weapons.

According to a South Sudanese human rights advocate, “when the Lou Nuer were disarmed, the intention was to make the area peaceful, but the government failed to protect them.” It is suggested by Jon Bennet et al. that the selective disarmament of the Lou Nuer encouraged the Murle to take advantage of communities without guns and without effective protection from the SPLA. According to reports by the BBC and other news agencies, attacks have continued and are characterised by raids and retaliations from both the Lou Nuer and Murle. As discussed, in response to a Murle attack in August 2010 that left 600 Lou Nuer dead, the White Army, with a force of about 7000-8000 soldiers launched a series of cattle raids that killed over 900 Murle and displaced 170,000 people. They stated their intention was “to defend our cattle and kids from the Murle because our government

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147 Brewer, op. cit., 2010.
149 Ochan, op. cit., 2007.
150 Brewer, op. cit., 2010.
151 Young, op. cit., 2007, pg. 23.
152 Biel, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
153 Bennet et al., op. cit., 2010.
155 UNMISS, op. cit., 2012.
failed to provide security after disarming us in 2006.157 The Murle counter-attacked, and the cycle continues. President Salva Kiir’s response to this surge in raids was the launch of a new civilian disarmament programme in March 2012 called *Operation Restore Peace*. This involved the deployment of 12,000 soldiers and police to collect an estimated 30,000 weapons from Murle civilians in Jonglei.158

In May 2012, aid groups and community leaders said that the disarmament campaign had “provided cover for [SPLA] troops to rape, torture and kill members of the minority Murle [ethnic group] in remote Jonglei state”.159 In August, the UN appealed to the GRSS to put an end to the violence committed by members of the SPLA, citing human rights violations “including one killing, 27 allegations of torture or ill-treatment, such as beatings, and simulated drowning in some cases, 12 rapes, six attempted rapes and eight abductions. The majority of the victims are women, and in some cases children.”160 At a news conference, SPLA spokesman Col. Philip Aguer dismissed allegations that the abuses were widespread, attributing the incidents to “indiscipline and drunkenness”.161 According to Human Rights Watch, these explanations do not account for the large number of killings, or the patterns of abuse.162

It has been widely reported that SPLA were are near Pibor to disarm Murle have abused and killed civilians to “disarm” them. One account detailed from March 2012 in Amnesty International’s report on the disarmament describes the violence:

> I was coming from Likuangole on my way to Pibor. A soldier told me to stop and asked ‘where did you come from?’ I said I came from Likuangole and am going to Pibor town. The soldier asked for a gun. I said that I am a disabled soldier and don’t have a gun. The soldier shot me through the stomach [right side of abdomen]. I fell down and again he shot my left arm and the third time he shot my left upper leg. The fourth time he wanted to shoot my head but missed and went away. The soldier only asked the question of gun. After I fell down the soldier ran away. I tried to get up and the soldier turned around and pointed the gun. I fell down and the soldier ran away [again]. The soldier was wearing a new police uniform, light yellow in colour.163

Human Rights Watch found evidence that 74 civilians were killed by SPLA soldiers between December 2012 and July 2013 in around 20 different incidents. Seventeen of those killed were women and children.164

According to Amnesty International, these human rights violations by the SPLA continued throughout the disarmament campaign with impunity,165 and there continue to be reports of violence against Murle civilians despite calls by President Kiir for “ill-disciplined” elements within the regular security forces to halt violence against innocent citizens.166 In August 2013, the SPLA took a positive step forward and relieved General James Otong, the commander in charge of troops in Pibor County, of his post. The SPLA also opened investigations into allegations that soldiers under his command killed civilians and committed other human rights abuses, and Otong may be formally charged once the investigations have been completed.167 On 24 October 2013, the *Sudan Tribune* reported that 31 soldiers had been sentenced in military court for charges of murder, rape and human rights violations in Pibor, Akobo, and Bor; of these, five were sentenced to death for murder, 2 were sentenced to prison

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159 Michael Onyiego, ‘*Teen Killed in South Sudan; Anti-gun Campaign Continues*’, *Associated Press*, 25 May 2012.
161 Onyiego, op. cit., 2012.
162 Human Rights Watch, “*They are killing us*” op. cit., 2013.
164 Human Rights Watch, “*They are killing us*” op. cit., 2013.
for rape, and 24 were given various sentences from dismissal to prison for misconduct due to frequent drinking.\textsuperscript{168} This is significant in that it “is the first time the SPLA has charged soldiers for committing serious crimes such as murder or rape.”\textsuperscript{169}

Disarmament is perceived by many communities as being targeted along ethnic lines\textsuperscript{170} for political reasons,\textsuperscript{171} forcing non-Dinka “to accept that the SPLA alone has the right to bear weapons.”\textsuperscript{172} Ochan found that the SPLA are often “seen as actively encouraging and condoning cattle raids by members of their own ethnic groups, while seeking to punish others,”\textsuperscript{173} and Human Rights Watch states that many of the documented killings and other abuses which occurred during the disarmament campaign “appear to be deliberate reprisals by SPLA against civilians belonging to the Murle ethnicity, a form of collective punishment, which would also constitute a war crime.”\textsuperscript{174} According to one woman interviewed:

\begin{quote}
When rebels and SPLA fight in the bush, SPLA come back they do revenging on us. This is why we have to flee.\textsuperscript{175}
\end{quote}

According to former Chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Jonglei State Peter Guzulu:

\begin{quote}
Even the government knows that this [civilian disarmament] is not the solution. But they just want to bring it as a tool for punishing communities. But when you translate it, they are just saying: ‘we are going to that community to punish that community through disarmament’. They are coming with a white curtain, but behind the curtain it is something else. This is not about bringing the real solution. It is about politics and it is about punishment.\textsuperscript{176}
\end{quote}

The re-emergence of the militia led by David Yau Yau as a reaction to SPLA violence during the disarmament campaign\textsuperscript{177} has blurred the definition of “civilian”, as many Murle youth who joined the rebel group to protect their villages after experiencing abuses during disarmament are now treated as “rebels”. Civilian disarmament in South Sudan is challenged not only by perceptions within the community that the process will have no value, but also by the aforementioned acute lack of a viable economic alternative to cattleraiding, and by the challenge of disarming a large number of civilians in possession of small arms while raiders, militia, and sometimes even the SPLA continue to pose a threat. The five civilian disarmament campaigns, including that of the White Army in 2006 and the current disarmament campaign of Murle, have not reduced the violence, but rather increased vulnerability to violent cattle raids and fighting between groups. As Peter Guzulu elucidates:

\begin{quote}
A gun cannot shoot itself. It is a human being who shoots a gun. A human being cannot shoot a gun without a reason. There is a reason behind it. And we have to stop the reason, not the gun...So the problem is no rule of law, no good governance, no fairness. So that is the problem. Disarmament right now, people are ‘disarmed’, but when you go to communities today, you find a lot of guns.\textsuperscript{178}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{170} Bennet et al., op. cit., 2010.

\textsuperscript{171} Myrttinen & McInturff, op. cit., 2008.

\textsuperscript{172} Brewer, op. cit., 2010.

\textsuperscript{173} Ochan, op. cit., 2007.

\textsuperscript{174} Human Rights Watch, “They are killing us” op. cit., 2013.

\textsuperscript{175} Human Rights Watch, “They are killing us” op. cit., 2013.

\textsuperscript{176} Guzulu, interview with author, Juba, September 7, 2012.

\textsuperscript{177} Hereward Holland, ‘South Sudan Army Kills at Least 11 in Disputed Incident,’ Reuters, 11 December 2012.

\textsuperscript{178} Guzulu, interview with author, Juba, September 7, 2012.
Ethnic Identities: Misunderstandings and Misappropriation

Competition for resources coupled with poor governance motivates inter-ethnic clashes. Beyond competition for resources, the inter-communal violence is driven both by a desire to increase wealth, and the politicization of ethnic rivalries through the militarisation of identities and widespread image destruction. Hutchinson and Jok describe Nuer-Dinka “mutual suspicion and ignorance”, as having ideological currents on both sides of “pervasive and yet superficial … mutual misunderstandings”. Some of the common ethnic slurs and stereotypes used to explain the deteriorating relations during the 1990s “were undoubtedly circulating long before this war began, while others appear to have been picked, reshaped and redeployed by Southern military leaders and warlords seeking to justify not only their political ambitions but their very existence in the eyes of those they claimed to protect”. The current escalation of violence in Jonglei is fuelled by much of the same identity misunderstandings and misappropriation.

The Murle have been demonised by many people in South Sudan, and are “being portrayed as the aggressor [in the recent surge of violence in Jonglei state].” According to Aguti Adut, “the Murle, they began this, even I think 191 years ago, this is how they began the raiding” because, as said by Rev. John Chol Daau, “there is something in Murle culture that motivates them, culturally”. The Nuer Youth, in a statement released in January 2012 by the White Army, stated “the problem of Jonglei state is a persistent attack of Murle against Nuer, Anuak and Dinka civilians. The Murle are the ones who do not want to live in peace.” Leben Nelson Moro explained, “when you meet the Nuer and the Dinka, they always say, ‘it is the Murle; the Murle are the aggressors. The Murle have been the bad guys.’ But the Murle will also say different things. Not everything that is happening is caused by Murle.”

Jon Arensen contends that only one side of the story is being told: “the Nuer are being portrayed as noble warriors simply reacting to the attacks of the evil Murle people. Nothing is further from the truth.” According to a statement released by the Nuer Youth White Army, composed of the Lou and Jikany White Army of Akobo, Jonglei, since the forceful disarmament of the Nuer in 2006, the government and UN had failed to protect them from Murle raids, and thus they have argued they must protect themselves: “to do so, we have decided to invade Murleland and wipe out the entire Murle tribe on the face of the earth as the only solution to guarantee long-term security of Nuer’s cattle. There is no other way to resolve Murle problem other than wiping them out through the barrel of the gun.” According to Genocide Watch, the subsequent ethnic massacres constituted a “Genocide Emergency” that had reached the level of “extermination”. Professor Leben Nelson Moro explained that the “greater utmost fear and instability” caused by the rhetoric of “wiping out the complete ethnic group” contributed to the escalation of violence, and the UN has warned that the trauma of the recent inter-ethnic conflict has been exacerbated by the “threats of annihilation and elimination through hate messaging particularly against the Murle, who suffer from marginalisation and disenfranchisement.

In addition to their small population and physical isolation, the Murle are further marginalised because, unlike other ethnic groups in South Sudan, there are not many Murle who were educated in the diaspora. During the civil
war, many Nuer and Dinka youth, commonly known as “the Lost Boys of Sudan”, fled the war to neighbouring countries and received education. Many from this diaspora have returned to South Sudan to speak for the youth of their ethnic group. For example, Gai Bol Thong, a young Nuer man from the United States diaspora is the current White Army spokesperson. Few Murle youth joined this group of young refugees “because rather than walking out of the country they simply went into hiding in remote parts of their own territory and continued living their traditional lifestyle,” and as such, there are very few educated and vocal voices who are able to speak for their ethnic group.

There have been limited academics studies of the Murle conducted by just two researchers. Bazette Lewis, was an anthropologist who served in the Sudan Political Service for 20 years from 1930. His book, *The Murle: Red Chiefs and Black Commoners*, was written in 1972. At the time of writing, the Murle numbered only 20,000. The second, Jon Arensen, is a Professor of Anthropology who lived with the Murle as a linguist during the 1970’s, translating the Bible into Murle. He has written linguistic studies and a short series of papers presented in 2012 in Nairobi as *A Memorandum in Defense of the Murle People*. Because of Murle isolation, the descriptions of the social structure described by Lewis and Arensen are still relevant today.

The Murle are a Nilotic ethnic group of 148,000 living in the south eastern corner of Jonglei in a vast area covering 48,000km. “Because they are a small group of people they are politically...very weak.” In addition to political marginalisation based purely on population size, Murle face additional exclusion “because they find themselves in an extremely weak position in a very difficult environment.” Geoffrey Duke explains the isolation:

*The Murle area is a completely cut off piece of world. When we were there, when we tried to go from a village to a village, we would get lost because there are no paved roads. Cars have not been moving there. People walk on foot.*

In Jonglei, 46% of the population has to walk for more than 30 minutes one way just to collect drinking water, and 20% have to walk more than one hour. Because of the lack of infrastructure, it can take anywhere from three to five days to walk between villages during dry season, and during the wet season, many villages are completely isolated.

The villages in Murleland are the most isolated in Jonglei. The “isolation and lack of connection to other communities,” has led to Murle not having much interaction with neighbouring ethnic groups, whom they regard simply as “hostile neighbours”. “We don’t have roads. And if we don’t meet, we are enemies to each other. If people don’t visit each other, they will see [each other] like enemies.” According to Arensen, in Murle:

*All other peoples are referred to as moden. The literal translation of this word is ‘enemy.’ although it can also be translated as ‘strangers.’ Even when the Murle are at peace with a given group of neighbours, they still refer to them as moden. The neighbouring ethnic groups also return the favour by referring to the Murle as the ‘enemy.’ The Dinka people refer to the Murle as the Beir, [‘enemy’], and the Anuak call them the Ajiba, [‘enemy’].*

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192 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
193 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
195 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
196 Moro, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
197 Ibid.
198 Abyei, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
199 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
200 Adut, interview with author, Bor, September 10, 2012.
201 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
Because they view each other as enemies, according to Lewis, “the capture of cattle or children from a neighbouring [ethnic group] was a highly laudable act of war.”

Geoffrey Duke, who has lived with the Murle, explains:

You cannot blame the violence of a group that existed since time immemorial with such little interaction and with the known perception about strangers as enemies. No, you can't blame them for that, because they are not connected. Every time they met it was, ‘come on, he has cattle, and those are mine.’ ‘Oh he has come to do...what is he here for? For my cattle.’ As a matter of fact, some of these community members have not come to discover their neighbouring community by day.

As like the Dinka and Nuer, the Murle consider themselves to be cattle people, and cattle form the “basis of the philosophy of life.” Young men in cattle-camps live with their cattle all year, searching for grazing land and guarding them from others. “For young and old, men and women, cattle provide the most absorbing topic of conversation” and there are myriads of terms for the colour and colour combinations, and horn configurations. Murle love their cows individually and believe that their spirits join the spirits of the ancestors when they die. When a young boy becomes a man, his father gives him a large ox with “beautiful colours and spreading horns.” He takes his “bull name” from a riddle about his bull, and will spend hours singing to him. According to Lewis, their bond is so deep that the bull is able to recognise his master’s voice.

As noted earlier, becoming a man in Murle culture is synonymous with becoming a warrior, and in 1972 Lewis wrote that a man must “kill his man in war” before he can “attain full warriorhood and participate in the war dances of the drums.” Lewis has observed that “in the past the dances of successful warriors, when the drum was beaten in triumph, were the greatest moments in Murle life, and today there is no substitute.”

To understand the current conflict it is necessary to look at the role of generational masculinities in Murle culture. Unlike other hierarchal communities in South Sudan, “since there is little hierarchy, the cohesive factor that holds Murle society together is the highly functional age-sets [buul]” regarded as the core social identity among the Murle. Boys become members of a buul in their teenage years and they remain in that buul as they move through life. Only young men who have become part of a buul have the right to dance with girls, sing, hunt, fight the enemy, and steal cattle. “So the different [buul], when that [buul] comes up they must do something to supersede the [buul] before them, to show them they’re stronger, they’re mightier ... And even their wives become also arrogant and proud of them.” Each buul is named after an animal, and the youth wear coloured beads and feathers to identify themselves as members. According to Small Arms Survey, the two age-sets from the Nanaam and Likuangole areas are currently conducting most of the raids: “the ruling age-set is the Bototnya, made up of young men in their prime (aged 20–30); the Titi is composed of men aged 30–40 years.”

Successful raiders are so admired in Murle culture that the old word for raid, koodh, has been replaced with the word lokalio; this was apparent during the peace conference. Lokilo is the name of one of the two “greatest experts of single-handed raiding” during the early 1900s, who wore “iron rings round his toes and ankles to

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202 Lewis, op. cit., 1972, pg 94.
204 Lewis, op. cit., 1972.
205 Ibid.
207 Lewis, op. cit., 1972.
208 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
209 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Arensen, op. cit., 2012.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
217 Lewis, op. cit., 1972, pg 86.
commemorate the men he had killed.”218 This change of name is reflective of the great importance and admiration Murle have historically to a successful raider, and it is indicative of the significance this prowess has in their culture.

Cattle-camp youth play a prominent role in the violence. The people who participate in raids and who die in numbers are youth. The majority of the population is youth; fifteen percent of the population in Jonglei is under five years of age, and 51% under the age of 18.219 The recent peace process in Jonglei that has relied primarily on discussions between chiefs and leaders has not been effective in stopping the youth-on-youth violence, particularly because it does not resonate with Murle, whose ethnic group does not have the hierarchical structure of the Nuer or Dinka. Says Peter Guzulu:

> Chiefs are not raiding. They are too old to go around. So why you don’t bring the youth themselves? Come and talk. We know, like in Murle we have one [buul], we call it Acheps, we give them different names. Now the Acheps which are very active in these raids, we know them by names. We know them by villages. In any village, who are those who are very active in raiding? And ask for them and so on, and then go and collect them and bring them to the conference to speak, to convene themselves. And then when they go back, they will convene the rest, they will follow us. You bring chiefs who are 70 years, they have never even gone out [on raids], to attend the conference in Bor...with his weak hearing power...it will not do anything.220

Some Nuer youth, in a press statement released by the Nuer White Army, have echoed these sentiments, expressing that “mediation between Murle, Dinka and Nuer chiefs is not in the interest of the youth on any side,” and further “advis[ing] the international community to know that the chiefs of the Nuer, Dinka and Murle will not solve the on-going conflict,” and that the only solution will be “a direct peace talk between Murle Youth on one side and Dinka and Nuer Youth on the other side. The chiefs and politicians in Jonglei and Juba are complicating the matter and the youth do not recognise their authority.”221 They appealed to the UN and the US government to facilitate youth-to-youth dialogue “independent from chiefs, churches and Juba’s government,” instead of “wast[ing] time talking to tiny majority like chiefs, elders, pastors and politicians.”222

The Wunlit and Liliir Peace Conferences, 1999 and 2000

Ten years prior to the recent escalation of violence, a surge in violence in then Upper Nile, Bor County, Sudan, led to truth-telling and reconciliation processes that have been heralded in the new South Sudan as positive examples of inclusive peacebuilding and reconciliation. In 1999 and 2000, two inter-communal peace conferences were held in what is now Jonglei: the Dinka Nuer West Bank Peace & Reconciliation Conference (in Wunlit, March 1999), and the East Bank Nilotic People Peace and Reconciliation Conference (in Liliir, May 2000). The conferences are commonly referred to by the locations they were held, and thus will be called ‘the Wunlit Conference’ and ‘the Liliir Conference’ henceforth.

Inspired by the success of the Wunlit Conference, the Liliir Conference223 brought together over 250 traditional and civil leaders from Anyauk, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle and Duer ethnic groups, to “address the deep division and conflict that have arisen between them, especially as a result of the country’s 17 year long civil war” and “aggravated (and in many cases manipulated) by the warring parties”.224 As a result of the conference, attendees

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218 Ibid., pg 89.
223 Under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC)
agreed on access to animal grazing areas and water points, to amnesty for prior offences, and to the return of all abducted women and children; these agreements were written as a public covenant between the ethnic groups for peace and reconciliation and signed by all 129 representatives.225

The Jonglei Peace Conference, 2012

Over a decade after the Wunlit and Liliir conferences, following the recent surge in violence in Jonglei, in February 2012 President Kiir appointed a Presidential Committee for Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei State, chaired by Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, and the Committee arranged state-wide intra-community dialogues and an inter-community peace conference in May, facilitated by the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), where space was provided for free expression of long-held feelings, and where working together to find lasting peace for all communities was strongly endorsed. Anne Lino Wuor Abyei, who was selected by President Kiir to serve as a session leader at the All Jonglei Peace Conference in Bor, explained “the objective is to see the root causes and to see how the government can bring a lasting peace, and how the community can be involved, how the leaders, the chiefs, the women, the youth, and even the students and the civil society, we include the church also, yes. So the objective of it is to know the root causes and the lasting peace in Jonglei state.”226 However Lam Cosmas, co-facilitator of the Greater Fangok regional peace conference, described the peace process in Jonglei as “an effort of...not peacebuilding…but it is fire fighting.”227

While the Committee’s work has been welcomed and the report contains a wealth of rich community insights and recommendations, this government-led initiative has not yet succeeded in bringing peace, and some groups have expressed concern that the peace and reconciliation process was not neutral. Although Rev. John Chol Daau, the Co-facilitator of the conference for the South Sudan Council of Churches who headed the selection committee, made provisions for the inclusion of all ethnic groups, as well as equal representation by religious leaders, traditional leaders, youth from cattle-camps, and women,228 some Murle did not feel that they were able to speak freely and lacked trust in the process, believing that “that conference was not fair from the beginning. First of all, we don’t trust the government. We don’t even trust Bor itself. Secondly, mediators should not be the same Governor who is suspect.”229 Many Murle believed that they were not represented fairly or given equal voice. The peace conference also took place as the civilian disarmament campaign was underway in Murleland, deepening their mistrust.

The peace conference was also criticized for being too far removed from the actual conflict. According to Leben Nelson Moro:

“You create this artificial environment; you pull [people] out of the wild and then you sit here in this hotel, a very strange environment, and people talk and they agree on something, people clap, and then people go back to the real world...It is a lot of this one off with the media people showing up, they go around and they greet [each other], they sometimes do, like, the cultural funny funny what, and then they go home. Everybody says, ‘we have solved the problem.’”230

Due in part to the resurgence of David Yau Yau’s militia, the All-Jonglei process was not been able to put an end to the violence. However, it is important to recognise that progress was made towards truth-telling, open dialogue, and reconciliation. All six of Jonglei’s ethnic groups signed a peace deal witnessed by President Salva Kiir Mayardit on May 6, 2012 in Bor, and a short period of increased security followed.

225 Ibid.
226 Abyei, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
230 Moro, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
A new National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation Committee, chaired by Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, was formed in May 2013, to continue the work of reconciliation not just in Jonglei, but in all of South Sudan. The Committee took over where the former Journey of Healing and Reconciliation—led by former Vice President Riek Machar and his wife Angelina Teny, and supported by Initiatives of Change—left off. In a political move in April, a precursor to the government reshuffle which removed Machar from the Vice Presidency, President Kiir issued a presidential order halting the Machar-driven reconciliation process, and forming a new committee. The new church-led national process began with a day of prayer on 8 July 2013—the eve of the anniversary of Independence. As Deputy Chair of the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, Bishop Taban emphasised that the process “must be built on spirituality and also on our rich traditional culture.”

The Committee will begin the community-led process of National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation by travelling to all 10 states later this year and into 2014 to conduct extensive community consultations. Guided by the core values of pluralism, inclusivity, peacemaking, social justice, forgiveness, healing, atonement and sovereignty; the Committee will endeavor to establish and strengthen an independent and inclusive platform and mechanism to collectively address the root causes of conflicts in South Sudan; build bridges across the political and social divides; heal and reconcile all South Sudanese, particularly those with the most severe physical and psychological scars; resolve all war-induced community conflicts; and document and establish community narratives of the war and the respective healing and reconciliation journeys.

After the longest civil war on the African continent, “we are all traumatised,” says Bishop Taban, “we have to heal ourselves. It is a big thing, but for me I say, because I have faith, I am always optimistic. With God, there is nothing impossible.”

Conclusion

The conflict in Jonglei in driven by complex and interwoven motivations, each of which resonates across different social strata. Youth raid cattle for economic gain and for revenge, Khartoum funds raiders for political purposes—often revolving around access to oil, and the SPLA intervenes to disarm the warring factions, often doing so to the detriment of the very populations they are meant to protect.

In March 2012, a Presidential Order was issued setting up an Investigation Committee on Jonglei State Crisis. Professor Deng Awur Wecnyin was named to head the seven-member committee, whose mandate is “to investigate the root causes of the violence; establish the extent of damage to lives and property; reveal those inside or outside South Sudan involved in ‘fanning and influencing the youths in order to cause atrocities’; investigate the sources of funding and supplies to the youth; and propose actions to prevent similar occurrences in the future.” Although the Committee was tasked to present its report within three months of the issuing of the order, no investigations have been carried out.

Although the youth involved in the most violent outbreak—the Nuer Youth White Army—have appealed for youth-to-youth dialogue outside South Sudan, this has not taken place, and instead peace processes have involved chiefs and older leaders whose authority does not resonate with the youth who are fighting. These peace processes have not been successful in that there has been no cessation in the cycle of violence. Rather, the violence has reached extreme levels, and attacks for revenge and retaliation continue.

While bringing people together for truth-telling and dialogue can begin to disarm their minds, this is difficult to do without adequate roads and infrastructure. Sadly, lack of development will continue to hinder peacebuilding and reconciliation activities in Jonglei with no infrastructure in place.

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231 Bishop Paride Taban, conversation with author, Juba, June 2013.
233 UNMISS, op. cit., 2012, pg. 32.
As long as there is no development and no change of the issues touching their real life, nothing will change. As far as I know, it is just seen as talk of the people of the towns. So nothing will change. Services must be delivered to them. Let them see the reality of a hospital, let them engage in some tangible work. Even if you give them agricultural activates, the young men would be happy to do, they will get something, divert them from the issue of war. Because at the moment this is the real that I said before. They are doing this for survival. If you don’t divert their attention from those things, they will always go back. Because going to Murle, getting 10 cows, you sell them, you are rich overnight. Coming to Nuer land, taking one child, you sell, you are rich overnight. It has become a business. 

Says Aguti Adut, “What can bring peace to Jonglei is only roads. If you build roads, peace will just come by itself.”

With or without roads, peace will be difficult to achieve without reconciliation; deep forms of social reconciliation and transformation are needed in South Sudan to redress social injustice as well as the traumatic events that transpired during the civil war. For South Sudan to begin to heal from decades of civil war, people must begin to focus on points of mutual interest rather than disagreement. Through inclusive, open dialogue, people from different ethnic groups can begin building mutual trust, and recognizing their interdependence. They can begin to move from a divided past into a shared future.

234 Biel, interview with author, Juba, September 6, 2012.
235 Adut, interview with author, Bor, September 10, 2012.
Appendix

Interviewees

- Aguti Adut, Jonglei State Director for Community Security and Small Arms Control, Bor, September 10, 2012.
- Biel Boutros Biel, Executive Director, South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy, Juba, September 6, 2012.
- Bor Women’s Association members, Bor, September 10, 2012.
- Leben Nelson Moro, Director of External Relations at the Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba, Juba, September 6, 2012.
- Michael Malual Wuor, Jonglei State Director, RSSDDRC, Bor, September 10, 2012.
## Intercommunal attacks, 23 December 2011 to 4 February 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Perpetrators</th>
<th>Town(s), Village(s)</th>
<th>County</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 December</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Gumruk, Gune, Kongor, Maniadeng villages</td>
<td>Pibor</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 December</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Konsolo, Wuno, Monchack villages</td>
<td>Pibor</td>
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<td>25 December</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Kiginya boma, Lanyerit and Manyirí villages, Tontol boma</td>
<td>Pibor</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 December</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Othagon and Nyergeny bomas, Nyam and Nyol villages</td>
<td>Pibor</td>
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<td>27 December</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Dalmany village</td>
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<td>27 December</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Likuangole</td>
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<td>30 December</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Lilibok, Manythakar, Oden, Kelekanya, Wunkok, Manyrueen villages</td>
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<td>31 December</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Pibor town</td>
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<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Lanyakir village, Bei boma</td>
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<td>Fertait village</td>
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<td>Lou Nuer</td>
<td>Bilait village</td>
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<td>Waat Payam</td>
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<td>Bong boma</td>
<td>Akobo</td>
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<td>2 January</td>
<td>Lou Nuer</td>
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<td>Anyidi Payam</td>
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<td>Wechdeng village</td>
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<td>Weidang village</td>
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<td>4 February</td>
<td>Murle</td>
<td>Pariak cattle camp</td>
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