THE CONSTELLATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES
AND THE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT CO-ORDINATION COUNCIL:
TOWARDS A NEW REGIONAL STALEMATE?

Deon Geldenhuys

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Dr. Deon Geldenhuyys is Assistant Director (Research) of the South African Institute of International Affairs.

It should be noted that any opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author and not of the Institute.
THE CONSTELLATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES AND
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COUNCIL:
TOWARDS A NEW REGIONAL STALEMATE?

Deon Geldenhuys

Contents

Introduction ........................................ page 1

I The Constellation of Southern
   African States (CONSAS) .................... 2

II The Southern African Development
    Coordination Council (SADCC) .......... 16

III CONSAS and SADCC: some
    comparisons ................................ 31

IV Some implications of the new
    intra-regional divisions ................. 35

ISBN: 0-909239-79-7

The South African Institute of International Affairs
Jan Smuts House
P.O. Box 31596
BRAAMFONTEIN
2017
South Africa
January 1981

Price R3-50
Introduction

One of the features of the Southern African scene of the 1980s is bound to be the existence of two separate groupings of states in the region. On the one hand, there is the South African-initiated constellation of Southern African states (CONSAS)\(^1\) composed of the Republic of South Africa and its three independent\(^2\) former homeland states as full members. Nine black states, all members of the Organisation of African Unity, on the other hand joined forces to establish the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC, but pronounced Sadec). Although the origins of both groupings can be traced back a good many years, the actual process of establishing them only really started in 1979. By the middle of 1980, the two groupings had taken definite, formal shape.

It is not merely coincidental that CONSAS and SADCC emerged in the same year. While it would be unfair to suggest that SADCC was designed solely in reaction to or as a counter to South Africa's proposals for a constellation of states, there can be little doubt that the timing of moves to create SADCC was influenced by Pretoria's intentions. Even if it is accepted that black states' long-standing desire to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa would sooner or later have produced something like SADCC, it remains difficult to escape the impression that SADCC was at least in part designed as a counter to the constellation idea. It is this perception which has earned the endeavours of the nine black states the designation 'counter-constellation'.

The object of this study is to examine some of the implications for Southern Africa of the existence of two separate groupings of states in the region. The origins and development of CONSAS and SADCC will be considered in turn. A comparison will be drawn between the two associations in order to establish whether their aims and activities are in common, compatible and complementary, or whether these are competitive, even in conflict,...
conflict, and duplicative. Some factors which are likely to have a bearing on the measure of success or failure of the two groupings will be suggested. Consideration will then be given to the possible impact which the division of the region into a "constellation" and 'counter-constellation' might have on the prospects for peace and stability in Southern Africa. It should be explained that the present study focuses primarily on the political rather than the economic issues involved. However, it is recognised that the two are by no means neatly separable and that economic matters necessarily have to feature in a study of this nature.

I  The Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS)

There is no need to review the development of the constellation idea in any detail because it has been documented elsewhere. It is nonetheless important to point out that, in its original conception, the CONSAS design was remarkably ambitious and indeed grandiose. In one of the first authoritative official statements on a constellation, Mr Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in March 1979 envisaged between seven and ten states south of the Zambezi and Kumene Rivers, comprising some 40 million people, joining forces in a constellation. It would have been a constellation composed of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Transkei, Bophuthatswana (and other homelands which became independent), Rhodesia and Namibia. It was anticipated that these countries would not merely expand existing economic ties, but that they would develop "a common approach in the security field ... and even the political field".

Such notions were based on a set of crucial assumptions. Firstly, it was assumed that the "moderate" countries of Southern Africa were all facing a common "Marxist threat" and could not rely on the West for support. South Africa portrayed the security of Whites and Blacks in the region as indivisible, compelling them to join forces against their common (Marxist) enemies. Secondly, a constellation would offer an opportunity/...
opportunity for finding regional solutions to regional problems. This assumption flowed from South Africa's known disillusionment with repeated Western settlement attempts in Namibia and Rhodesia.\(^8\) South Africa maintained that it carried a special responsibility towards the internal political leaders in Namibia (i.e. the Turnhalle participants, and particularly the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) and Rhodesia (i.e. the parties to the internal settlement of March 1978): "if we let (them) down", Foreign Minister Botha said, "the whole of Southern Africa is going to disintegrate".\(^9\) Thirdly, a constellation, being composed of "moderate" countries and based on the existing regional order (consider the inclusion of independent former homelands), would reflect the political 'realities' of Southern Africa as seen by the South African Government. The most fundamental reality for South Africa was that of "multinationalism" and its concomitant notions of "vertical differentiation" and "self-determination".\(^10\) In this way, a constellation would have created for the Republic a favourable regional environment compatible with its perceived national interests - political, economic and military. Fourthly, the implicit, and often explicit, assumption was that the centripetal forces at work in Southern Africa - particularly economic but also political and security - were inexorably steering the countries in the region (or most of them at any rate) towards ever closer and more formal relationships. The centrifugal elements, it was assumed, would in the end inevitably submit to the force and indeed the logic of those making for stronger regional ties. Such notions were related to the fact that close economic ties already existed between South Africa and black Southern African States and these ties were, moreover, institutionalised in some cases - notably in the Southern African Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area. The argument was, in other words, that a sound basis for further formal inter-state economic cooperation already existed. Finally, it was assumed that relations between members of a constellation would be formalised through a multilateral "council of states" and "international secretariats".\(^11\)

Being based on these premises, it is not surprising that the hoped-for constellation of seven to ten states has failed to materialise. The basic reason/...
reason for the failure is that the political and ideological divisions between South Africa and black African states are such that the latter are bound to be unwilling to formalise relations with the Republic much further, and least of all to formalise them in the political and military areas. In addition, there was no possibility of internationally recognised black states (and thus members of the OAU) joining a formal association with non-recognised former "Bantustans", Rhodesia and South African-controlled Namibia, as their full and equal partners. The divisions in other words militate against the notion of a spill-over factor and the assumption of shared perceptions between South Africa and black African states regarding the nature of external (i.e. extra-regional) threats and the need for a common military-cum-political response. It is therefore not surprising that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland served notice that they would not consider joining a constellation for as long as South Africa adhered to its present racial policies. An even more important setback to South Africa's constellation plan was the emergence of an independent Zimbabwe under the premiership of Mr Robert Mugabe. Mr Mugabe not only made it plain that Zimbabwe had no intention of playing the key role South Africa had reserved for it in a constellation, but he was also quick to demonstrate his political distance from the Republic by joining forces with the Frontline states in their attempt to form a new economic grouping aimed at reducing black states' dependence on the South African economy and transport and communications networks. Lesotho and Swaziland, too, joined the new Southern African Development Coordination Council.

These developments have left South Africa with no other option but to amend some of its ideas on a constellation and to reduce an initially grandiose design to what is now essentially a device to restructure relations between present and former parts of the South African state. What remains of the original CONSAS idea amounts to an inner constellation, with the outer or wider constellation rendered unfeasible by the prevailing political climate in Southern Africa. This has now been recognised by Prime Minister P W Botha: "It is true that a number of centrifugal forces, not the least of which are of a political nature, are at present working against closer development/...
development cooperation between South Africa and its neighbours", he said in June 1980.\(^{14}\)

The process of scaling down the CONSA S design had, however, commenced several months earlier at the so-called Carlton conference. At this remarkable gathering of government and big business in Johannesburg on 22 November 1979, Prime Minister Botha said: "The concept 'constellation of states' does not primarily denote a formal organisation, but rather a grouping of states with common interests and developing mutual relationships and between which a clear desire to extend areas of cooperation exists". He went on to concede that "(I)n taking into account political realities, it will not be possible, for the present, to establish common consultative structures and secretariats".\(^{15}\) The idea of eventually creating formal structures - specifically a "council of states" and "secretariats" - has, however, not been abandoned by any means.\(^{16}\)

In its reduced shape, CONSA S has been formalised between South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. Following a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the four countries held in Port St Johns, Transkei, on 16 February 1980, a joint statement was issued saying that "(M)atters of common political concern and the concept of a constellation of states or a form of a confederation were also discussed as well as ways and means of furthering the economic development of the independent states".\(^{17}\) This declaration is particularly significant because it not only showed that moves to establish a constellation were afoot, but also revealed who the members of the association were to be and, moreover, confirmed Mr P W Botha's statement to Parliament only ten days earlier in which he, for the first time, indicated that the envisaged constellation would be "a form of confederation".\(^{18}\) In the latter regard, it is worth noting that Mr P W Botha had said only six months before the Port St Johns meeting that talk of a constellation evolving into a confederation was "premature".\(^{19}\)

The preparatory work for CONSA S culminated in a summit meeting of the heads of government of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda/...
Venda in Pretoria on 23 July 1980. Mr P W Botha, obviously the driving force behind CONSAS\textsuperscript{20} at the summit proposed "a new coordinated programme of action" entailing "simultaneous advance on the four broad fronts of interstate political relations, economics, social affairs and security".\textsuperscript{21} This appears to be an ambitious objective, smacking of the initially grandiose dimensions of the CONSAS design. The statement, however, acquires its true significance when set in its particular context, viz. that of a confederation embracing South Africa and its three independent former homelands.

Although Prime Minister Botha's visions for CONSAS go well beyond that of economic cooperation, the main thrust of constellation activity is presently on the economic plane. The economic dimension of CONSAS, in other words, predominates. CONSAS' economic activities are concentrated in three related areas, viz. the promotion of "regional economic development cooperation transcending political borders", the establishment of a multilateral development bank for Southern Africa, and the promotion of small business enterprises.\textsuperscript{22} Because of their importance, each of these three endeavours merits brief consideration.

(i) Regional development cooperation across political boundaries

The adoption of this "totally new approach", as Mr P W Botha called it\textsuperscript{23}, results from an official acknowledgment of the impracticability of the Verwoerdian notion of creating viable separate homeland economies. The influential semi-official Bureau for Economic Research: Cooperation and Development (BENSO) in August 1980 reported that "(A) solution to the problem of race relations in South Africa does not lie in the creation of a number of separate economies, but rather in economic cooperation and a system of separate political sovereignties".\textsuperscript{24} In line with this finding, the South African Prime Minister conceded that "hard experience" had shown that the scope for economic decentralisation to the black homelands (or "national states", to use current official nomenclature) - and thus also to Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda - was limited, and that "the geographical/...
geographical location of material growth is determined in the final analysis by economic laws and requirements, few of which happen to coincide in their effect with political borders as such". In a major attempt at de-ideologising economic activity, he announced a "new regional economic strategy" involving economic development cooperation transcending the political boundaries of states. (This will lead to the creation of what has become known as "soft borders".) These regions would be "functionally defined to meet the requirements for economic development", and "balancing growth points" could be developed in the regions in an attempt to counter the powerful attraction of South Africa's existing four large metropolitan areas (Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging, Durban-Pinetown, Cape Peninsular and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage). As expressed by Mr P W Botha, his new regional economic strategy appears to be, first and foremost, an attempt to redress the glaring economic inadequacies of separate development.

(ii) Southern African development bank
In implementing the new plans for economic development, the proposed development bank of Southern Africa will play a key role. Agreement on the creation of the bank has already been reached between the CONSA partners and it will be formally established in the first half of 1981. It is hoped that the bank will attract considerable foreign investment. It is also envisaged that the bank's operations would extend to all countries forming part of what South Africa considers the "single economy (eenheidseconomie) of Southern Africa".

(iii) Promotion of small business enterprises
The decision to promote small business flows largely from "the failure of past economic growth in Southern Africa to absorb adequately the rapid rate of growth in the economically active population", Mr P W Botha explained. Realising the vital contribution which small business enterprises can make in alleviating the pressure of large-scale unemployment, a Small Business Development Corporation was established in November 1980. This joint undertaking by the public/...
public and private sectors was set up with an initial share capital of R100m, of which the private sector has provided R50m. The services of the new Corporation - which has taken over the functions of a number of earlier development corporations - will include the guaranteeing of bank loans required for working capital and the provision of end-use supervision on projects financed or guaranteed by the Corporation.

Apart from these three main areas of CONSAS activity, the four participating countries also reached agreement on various other matters at the Pretoria summit. These relate to a joint approach to the planning of a transportation system (which has since resulted in the creation of the Consultative Committee on Transport in Southern Africa); the formulation of a joint forestry development strategy, and the establishment of a special committee to consider the training of manpower and tertiary education. In addition to these, Mr P W Botha at the Pretoria summit listed various other areas requiring future cooperation between the constellation partners, viz. monetary arrangements, fiscal and other financial relations, agricultural development and food production, posts and telecommunications, energy, tourism, and the utilisation of mineral and other natural resources. Earlier, Mr Pik Botha envisaged the institutionalisation of cooperation in these areas through the creation of formal organisations.

It is worth pointing out that although specific proposals on cooperation in security matters were not made at the Pretoria summit, the ground had long been prepared for such cooperation. Bilateral non-aggression treaties were concluded between South Africa and Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, respectively, immediately prior to their independence. These agreements might be the forerunners to a multilateral CONSAS defence pact because Mr P W Botha had, after all, singled out security as one of the areas in which CONSAS partners should "advance".

The role of the private sector in promoting CONSAS featured strongly at the Pretoria summit with the participants agreeing on a declaration to promote/...
promote private enterprise. It was resolved to encourage private investment by *inter alia* restricting the public sector's direct role in the economy mainly to the provision of collective and strategic goods and services and the coordination of regional development, ensuring the maximum possible movement of labour, capital and technology, and giving assurance to private businesses that they will not be nationalised. It should be explained that Mr P W Botha has, from the outset, been patently keen to harness the resources of private enterprise in pursuit of his constellation ideal. Government attempts to establish a mutually beneficial partnership with big business was symbolised, above all, in the Carlton conference in November 1979.

The emphasis on the role of the private sector fits in with the South African idea of presenting the constellation as an incomparably better alternative to the "Marxist order"; South Africa is in effect trying to promote a counter-ideology based on free enterprise. (The anti-Marxist strain of the constellation of course showed up prominently at the Pretoria summit in July 1980 where, as mentioned, the four states *inter alia* agreed on a declaration to promote private enterprise.) In addition to repeatedly citing the disastrous economic consequences of Marxism in Southern Africa, South Africa has made great play of black African countries' poor economic records - all in a patent attempt to impress upon them the imperative need for, and the benefits of, economic cooperation with the economically advanced and prosperous Republic and its constellation of states.

South Africa, Mr P W Botha moreover maintained, may not escape its "responsibility" to promote economic development in Southern Africa. Such expressions of benevolence are, however, qualified by an important and entirely reasonable consideration: given its own limited resources, South Africa will give priority to promoting economic development in areas for which it has "traditionally accepted primary responsibility", viz. former and present homelands. Only thereafter can South Africa consider assisting countries in Southern Africa "in whose development South Africa has an interest". The Government hoped that the South African private sector would/...
would be guided by the same consideration in making investments for the purposes of economic development.\(^{46}\)

To give effect to the various agreements and proposals on CONSAS, the South African Government appointed Dr Gerhard de Kock, Governor of the Reserve Bank, as Coordinator of Constellation Affairs. The Coordinator, who reports directly to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, chairs the Special Constellation Committee which is composed of the chairman and secretaries of four working groups; these groups, in turn, are composed mainly of senior civil servants, with the addition of some outside experts. The chairman of working group 1, which deals with monetary matters, is Dr J H de Loor, Director General of Finance; working group 2, responsible for matters relating to the proposed development bank and the Small Business Development Corporation, is chaired by Professor J A Lombard, a prominent Pretoria University economist;\(^{47}\) Dr S S Brand, Chief: Financial Policy, Dept. of Finance, chairs working group 3 which is involved with fiscal matters; and the chairman of working group 4, dealing with regional economic development and industrial decentralisation, is Dr S J Kleu, Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industry.\(^{48}\)

The constellation is presently, as mentioned, formally composed of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda as full and equal (if only nominally so) members. Membership will, it is no doubt anticipated in CONSAS circles, expand as other African homelands are granted independence. Ciskei appears to be well on the road to independence, following its recent referendum on the issue. However, its independence may prove a mixed blessing to CONSAS because Transkei has threatened to withdraw if Ciskei were granted independence (and thus became eligible for full membership of CONSAS). Transkei strongly objects to the creation of a second independent state for the Xhosa people, and insists that the two territories should be amalgamated. This situation may shortly present South Africa with a serious dilemma and it is perhaps not inconceivable - given the recent history of relations between Pretoria and Umtata - that Transkei might decide to distance itself, if only temporarily, from CONSAS.

The status of self-governing (i.e. non-independent) homelands in the constellation has long been somewhat problematic. Although the South African Government has on the one hand repeatedly stated that only sovereign independent states could aspire to membership of the constellation,\(^{49}\) it has on the other hand actively canvassed the idea of a constellation among self-governing homelands. With many of the CONSAS economic plans actually designed to benefit the self-governing homelands, they clearly have to be brought into the constellation. /...
lation. According to Mr P W Botha, "they can be represented by the mother State (i.e. South Africa) and ... they can be present as associated members at those (constellation) discussions as observers and advisers."

It is not unlikely that independent former homelands would be particularly insistent on a definite distinction being drawn between them and what they would regard as mere parts of the South African state. By drawing such a distinction and by reserving the full scope of economic benefits for full members of CONSAS, South Africa probably hopes that non-independent homelands might be persuaded to seek independence. In this sense, the constellation is bound to be depicted as a political instrument to promote independence for African homelands.

The position of Namibia in CONSAS is of great significance. The territory has been represented at a number of CONSAS meetings in the second half of 1980, but in an observer capacity only. The intention apparently is to enable Namibia to enjoy some of the economic benefits offered by CONSAS, but it is uncertain just how much. By involving Namibia in the constellation at this juncture, South Africa hopes to pave the way to the territory's full participation in CONSAS upon achieving independence. CONSAS members have left no doubt about their political preferences in Namibia: immediately following the inconclusive Geneva talks on the territory in January 1981, the Foreign Ministers of the four CONSAS countries pledged their unanimous and unequivocal support to the internal (anti-SWAPo) Namibian parties in their "dedication" to achieving a peaceful settlement. Whether an independent, internationally recognised Namibia will seek formal CONSAS membership will, however, depend on the political complexion of its post-independence government. There can be little doubt that a SWAPo government will refuse to enter CONSAS and will instead join SADCC.

Membership of CONSAS need not, in the South African view, be confined only to those independent states and states-to-be already mentioned. The constellation was open to "any state in the sub-continent which recognised the existing economic and other interrelationship (sic!) between itself and other states in Southern Africa, and wishes to cooperate in a regional context", Mr P W Botha said at the Pretoria summit. These vague, general 'conditions' for participation do, in theory at any rate, leave open the door/...
door for so-called Marxist states to join the constellation.

While the South African Government was, on the one hand, restating the old, original ideal of a broad-based regional cooperative arrangement, there were on the other hand growing signs that it was at long last recognising that the kind of cooperative relationship which it might establish with non-CONSAS states, was bound to be of a much more limited nature than that with its CONSAS partners. Consider Mr P W Botha's statement that

the most logical and constructive way to proceed in developing a constellation of Southern African states is to build upon the existing economic interdependence between these states and to place the main emphasis at this stage on economic cooperation, leaving participating states free to reserve their position on political, constitutional or other non-economic issues if they so desire. 54)

The Prime Minister was, in other words, drawing a distinction between the economic and non-economic dimensions of cooperation and was willing to agree to a state participating only in the constellation's economic activities. The pronouncement reflects a realisation that prospective members of CONSAS might be deterred by the non-economic features of the constellation. In order to promote regional economic cooperation, South Africa appears to be placing heavy reliance on the 'demonstration effect' of CONSAS programmes. The calculation seems to be that the visible, material benefits of CONSAS - in particular the envisaged development bank - would attract non-members to the grouping. 55)

Whether South Africa will succeed in drawing non-member states into CONSAS by detaching the economic from the non-economic areas of cooperation and allowing states to participate only in the former, is open to serious doubt. Mr P W Botha's statement, cited above, in which he refers to placing the main emphasis of constellation activities on economic cooperation "at this stage", clearly implies that he intends expanding cooperation to non-economic matters at a later stage. This implication is bound to deter black states outside CONSAS from formally participating in the economic activities of the constellation for fear that they might get implicated in contentious/...
contentious non-economic issues. To put it differently, they might fear that the economic benefits offered to them were simply a means of 'enticing' them into a formal, closely-knit South African dominated grouping which might then make them parties to the maintenance of South Africa's political status quo.

Such apprehensions will only be reinforced by Mr P W Botha's assertion that, "in the final analysis the constitutional-political, social, security and other dimensions are also crucial to the success of the constellation programme and require our full and urgent attention." From this statement it can be inferred that the present emphasis on the economic dimension of the constellation is simply a matter of short-term practical politics (or political expediency) because CONSAS will, in South Africa's view, only be complete once it embraces also non-economic areas of cooperation. In this sense, it is a restatement of the original grandiose conception of the constellation; as in the past, such declarations will again have the result of deterring non-member states from joining CONSAS.

The Prime Minister's reference to the "constitutional-political, social, security and other dimensions" of the constellation of course fits in with his notion of a confederation. Given the fact that the constellation/confederation is composed only of South Africa and its independent former homelands, it could be argued that a confederation is essentially an internal device to join together, both economically and politically, what separate development has put asunder. If non-member states were to perceive CONSAS in these terms, it will only make them even more unwilling to get formally involved with even its economic activities; their fear would be that participation might implicate them in the policy of separate development. The latter consideration acquires an added dimension if it is true that the re-structuring of South Africa through the constellation will be done in such a fashion that it does not in any material way alter the structure of political power in South Africa; power will remain concentrated in White hands (or, at best, White, Indian and Coloured hands). (If the constellation/confederation were in time to evolve into a federation, then it would obviously hold far-reaching consequences for the structure of political power. Mr P W Botha has, however, repeatedly expressed his unequivocal opposition to the idea of a federation as also to a system of one man, one vote in a unitary state;
both would, in his view, lead to "black domination". These statements are of course not necessarily the Government's final word on a federation; circumstances may yet influence (or force) the Government to reconsider its position.

There are also a number of further connections between the constellation idea and the policy of separate development or, perhaps more accurately, unresolved dilemmas in this policy. The South African Government has made it known that it hopes to settle, through the constellation, the issues of Blacks' nationality, homelands' territorial consolidation and the status of urban black Africans. As far as the latter are concerned, Pretoria initially adopted an ambivalent attitude as to their inclusion in the proposed constellation; it was never quite clear whether they were 'in' or 'out'. The South African Government's present position is that urban Blacks should be included in either of two ways. First, and based on the Government's stubborn insistence that "there is not a single Black man in this country who is not in one way or another connected to one or other national state" (i.e. homeland), the urban black areas would participate in CONSAS "through their national states". (Which urban black areas would these be? What would their status on such a council be?) It would appear that involvement in the constellation is the highest level of political participation which the Government envisages for urban black communities.

The important point about these connections between the constellation and the policy of separate development is that it effectively undermines the creation of a wider grouping involving states which have joined SADCC. In fact, CONSAS has become so closely identified with South Africa's racial policy that it is very doubtful whether this design has any viability as a foreign policy initiative. Independent black states outside CONSAS are only likely to involve themselves in the activities of the proposed development bank, to cite one example, if this could be done outside the CONSAS framework. In other words, they might consider bilateral economic arrangements with South Africa itself, rather than with CONSAS. If this kind of cooperation should occur, it is likely to be of such a limited nature - in terms of numbers of non-CONSAS members involved and areas of cooperation covered - that/...
that it could not realistically be construed as a new economic grouping of states, or as a kind of outer ring of CONSAS. This, of course, is not to say that such forms of economic cooperation will not be seized upon by ardent 'constellationists' as evidence of the growth of CONSAS. There is, in fact, already a tendency - manifested particularly in SABC radio commentaries - to present virtually all forms of economic cooperation, and even trade between South Africa and black states in the region, as evidence of the success of the constellation idea. If the concept of a constellation is being used so effusively, it may in the end become so diluted as to mean virtually nothing more than normal economic interaction between South Africa and black Southern African states. The concept has, however, not yet been reduced to that state of meaninglessness.

To sum up, it can be said that CONSAS is at present to all intents and purposes an institutionalised formula to reshape relations on the economic, political and military/security levels between the Republic of South Africa and its former homelands. In this shape, CONSAS is a far cry from what the South African Government initially envisaged. Those grandiose ideas on a regional constellation comprehensive both in terms of members and areas of formal cooperation involved, nonetheless still remain part of Pretoria's stated long-term ideal. It is, however, increasingly looking like an impossible dream. South Africa is therefore unlikely to succeed in creating a favourable regional environment through a "seven to ten" state regional constellation. The "bulwark against communism", as Mr P W Botha would typically depict the constellation, is bound to be on a much more modest scale than that originally hoped for: it will simply be composed of South Africa and its former homelands (with a remote chance of Namibia joining). That the initially ambitious plan for regional relations should have been reduced to its present shape is, no doubt, cause for disappointment in official South African circles. In line with what has now become conventional South African foreign policy wisdom, Pretoria was keenly aware that a regional constellation could improve the Republic's relations with black African states generally and that that, in turn, offered the key to an improvement in the country's foreign relations over a wide front.

II/...
II The Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC)

The emergence of SADCC should be seen against the background of the close economic ties which black Southern African states maintain with South Africa. In most instances it is a dependency relationship (of black states on the Republic); a situation of economic interdependence exists only in a few cases. There are, generally speaking, three major areas of economic interaction between the black states in the region and South Africa, viz. trade, transport and labour.

(i) Trade

South Africa is the dominant trading partner of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The Republic supplies 80% of Botswana's essential imports and provides outlets for its principal export commodities. Lesotho conducts 90% of its external trade with South Africa, and the latter supplies over 90% of Swaziland's import requirements. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are linked with South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union and SACU receipts are a primary source of revenue for the three black countries. In 1978/79, it comprised 72.5% of Lesotho's total revenue; it was Swaziland's most important source of income in 1977/78 (amounting to E39m), and is presently contributing an estimated P38m per annum to Botswana's budget. Lesotho and Swaziland are also, together with South Africa, members of the Rand Monetary Area. When Zimbabwe became independent in April 1980, South Africa was also that country's major trading partner, providing the bulk of its imports and being the main market for its industrial exports. Last year, South Africa and Zimbabwe concluded a new trade agreement, which replaces the South African-Rhodesian Preferential Trade Agreement of 1964. Oil is a particularly important and indeed

\[ E = \text{Emalengeni} \]
\[ P = \text{Pula} \]

Both these currencies, together with Lesotho's Maloti, are at par with the Rand.
strategic commodity that neighbouring states obtain from South Africa. Mr Mugabe, shortly after coming to power, acknowledged that Zimbabwe imported 90% of its oil through or from South Africa. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are all in probably much the same situation.

Figures on Zambia's trade with South Africa are difficult to obtain but indications are that this trade has increased substantially in the last two years. Food is the most important of Zambia's imports from South Africa: the Zambian Government had said last year that the country would import 3½m bags of maize worth R55m from the Republic in the course of the year. Mining equipment, fertiliser and prefabricated structures are among the other major items it imports from South Africa. Mozambique's trade with South Africa is even harder to quantify. However, a reasonable guess is that Mozambique is nowhere as dependent as Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe on imports from South Africa. While direct trade between the Republic and Mozambique may be rather limited, Mozambique derives considerable financial benefit from its services in transporting South African exports to and imports from Maputo. At present, some 15,000 tons of South African goods are carried to Maputo each day (over 5m tons per annum), while South African imports 3-4000 tons of goods per month via Maputo. This means that Maputo handles 17% of South Africa's foreign trade.

(ii) Transport

With its highly developed transport network, South Africa is the hub of the region's transport system. South Africa's importance is enhanced by virtue of six of the nine SADCC states being landlocked. The Republic offers them reliable outlets to the sea, while in Lesotho's case, all movement of goods and people to and from that country must pass over South African (and Transkeian) territory. It is of course not only South Africa that provides a transport service to other countries; the harbour of Maputo, in particular, is of direct benefit to South Africa.

(iii)/...
(iii) Labour

According to the South African Chamber of Mines, migrant workers in 1979 constituted 42% of a total mining labour force of 470 000. Among the migrants were 9 000 labourers from Swaziland, 19 000 from Botswana, 40 000 from Mozambique and 112 000 from Lesotho.

While it is true that the remittances of migrant labourers represent an important source of income for some neighbouring states, their employment in South Africa is also beneficial and in some cases perhaps even vital to the South African economy - some employment organisations in the Republic maintain that they cannot do without migrant labourers from neighbouring states.

Although only the main features of the economic links between South Africa and black states in Southern Africa have been mentioned briefly, they suffice to illustrate the extent of the black states' dependence on the Republic. The measure of dependence, in turn, reflects the other countries' individual economic weakness relative to South Africa. This has probably brought the black states to the realisation that the best way of trying to strengthen their respective economies would be to pool their limited resources and their efforts, rather than each acting unilaterally. For black Southern African states, strengthening their economies and reducing their economic dependence on South Africa are two sides of the same coin. Lessening their heavy economic dependence on white-ruled South Africa has, of course, been a longstanding objective of independent black states in the region. Zambia went even further, having publicly committed itself to limit trade with South Africa to the minimum. The desire to reduce economic dependence on a foreign power is understandable enough, particularly for a new state.

Numerous African political leaders have stated that political independence can never be complete in a situation of heavy economic dependence.

Apart from these considerations, it has to be conceded that black states' endeavours to curtail their economic dependence on the Republic is related to the latter's domestic policies. That these states are so visibly dependent on the last white-ruled state in Africa - one whose apartheid/...
apartheid policies have made it an international outcast - obviously gives their efforts an added political dimension.

There may also be a further consideration influencing at least some black states in their moves to reduce their heavy reliance on the South African economy. On the assumption that mandatory economic sanctions will in due course be imposed on South Africa (whether over Namibia or apartheid) - a punitive action with which they would sympathise - the black states may well reason that they should make timely arrangements to lessen their economic dependence on the Republic by pooling their resources and strengthening their economies in order to be better able to handle the adverse economic consequences they would suffer.

That the black Southern African states' economic moves away from South Africa should have taken the form they have, at the time they have, has not been merely coincidental. In the Frontline grouping of states (which emerged in 1974), a political vehicle was at hand to organise these economic actions. In a sense, SADCC is an expanded version of the Frontline grouping: expanded in composition to include four other countries (Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe) in addition to the original five Frontline states (Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana), and expanded in scope to deal now not only with political but also economic matters. In addition, SADCC, unlike the Frontline grouping, has been institutionalised. It should, however, be borne in mind that the Frontline grouping is still maintaining its separate (political) identity. The timing of moves to establish SADCC was probably related to South Africa's constellation initiative. At least some of the black states perceived an urgent need to counter Pretoria's constellation moves for fear that it would formalise and deepen their economic dependence on South Africa and further enhance the latter's economic dominance - with obvious political implications. President Kenneth Kaunda made this point, even if indulging in a generous measure of over-statement: "South Africa is to become the king-pin of all of us, and all of us ... are going to be satellite or puppet states of South Africa". The moves to create SADCC, although preceding the independence of Zimbabwe, were undoubtedly/...
undoubtedly given a major boost by the emergence of the new republic under Mr Robert Mugabe's premiership.

Having considered some of the factors contributing to the eventual establishment of SADCC, the formal development of the grouping needs to be traced briefly.

The first major initiative was the Southern African Development Coordination Conference held in July 1979 in Arusha, Tanzania. Arranged by the five Frontline states, the conference's declared aim was the creation of a new economic relationship in Southern Africa - which essentially meant a new relationship between black countries with a view to reducing their economic dependence on South Africa in particular. As a first step, the conference decided to set up a transport and communications commission charged with responsibility for developing a transport and communications network which would not be dependent on South Africa. The selection of transport and communication was significant: without an adequate transport and communications system linking the black states, they could hardly promote economic cooperation among themselves and reduce their economic dependence on South Africa.

A significant feature of the Arusha conference was the list of participants. Apart from Frontline leaders, there were representatives from Western aid donors, the European Economic Community, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme. This was a clear acknowledgement by the Frontline states that, to realise their ideals, they depended on external, specifically Western, aid. The West's early involvement in the creation of the envisaged new economic grouping pointed to Western interest in the matter. Western backing for a new economic alignment could, among other things, help to stem Soviet activities and stabilise the region, thus probably advancing Western interests. Finally, the conference agreed that membership of the proposed economic grouping could be extended to Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Namibia (when independent). 79)
The next important development was the economic summit meeting held in Lusaka in April 1980. Apart from the five Frontline states, the meeting was also attended by Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe, and SWAPO and African National Congress (ANC) representatives. Their participation in the Lusaka summit signalled the latter four countries' formal inclusion in the new grouping, while SWAPO's and the ANC's presence was obviously designed to demonstrate the black states' solidarity with the two "liberation movements"; in SWAPO's case it was also conferring advance legitimacy on what the participating states regarded as the future government of Namibia. The conference adopted a seven-point declaration entitled "Southern Africa on the road to economic liberation". It was in fact a programme of action which provided for the following:

(i) The establishment of a transport and communications commission based in Maputo (something already envisaged at the Arusha meeting). Mozambique was given primary responsibility for promoting SADCC's transport plans.

(ii) The creation of a Southern African development fund to enlist foreign aid. Zambia was selected to prepare proposals to this effect.

(iii) The development of a "food security plan" to make SADCC members independent of foreign (particularly South African) supplies, and for which Zimbabwe will be responsible.

(iv) The establishment of an agricultural research centre, based in Botswana, which will specialise in the cultivation of crops in semi-arid areas. Botswana was to request the International Centre on Agriculture in Semi-Arid Tropics to set up what will in effect be a subcentre to serve SADCC members. Botswana was also entrusted with the task of requesting the EEC to conduct a feasibility study on the regional control of foot-and-mouth disease - which was endemic in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana - and which would include/...
include the expansion of Botswana's existing vaccine production facilities.

(v) The preparation of a programme to harmonise the energy policies of member states was left to Angola (the only SADCC oil producer).

(vi) Swaziland was commissioned to review existing training facilities in the region and recommend improvements.

(vii) The formulation of a strategy for the harmonisation of regional industrialisation programmes was handed to Tanzania.

The seven-point programme was for most part obviously a long-term one. Its success, the meeting recognised, was vitally dependent on the generosity of foreign aid donors. To give effect to the initiatives agreed upon, the Lusaka meeting appointed President Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana as Coordinator of the SADCC programme, a position which effectively made him chairman of the grouping. Upon Sir Seretse's death, this role was assumed by his successor, Dr Quett Masire. As Coordinator of the SADCC programme of action, Botswana was also given responsibility for devising a scheme for setting up formal SADCC institutions.

Following the Lusaka summit, SADCC concentrated on the development of the proposed transport and communications network. In July 1980, the SADCC Transport and Communications Commission was formally established in Maputo. A number of meetings on transport and communications matters were held in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and also in Zaire in the second half of 1980. The meeting in Lubumbashi, Zaire, indicates that Zaire may participate in SADCC transport and communications programmes, and it may well eventually join SADCC per se.

The Transport and Communications Commission last year agreed on four categories of projects. Class 1 projects were those of regional importance and which required no new capital; class 2 projects involved new regional...
projects for which finance had already been found; class 3 projects were new ones for which capital had not yet been found, and class 4 projects still had to be investigated and financed. SADC members proposed a variety of projects in the various categories. The main emphasis of the Transport and Communications Commission's endeavours has, however, been on the improvement of transport (particularly rail) and harbour facilities in order to reroute the trade of SADC members away from South Africa. The key to achieving this will be the Mozambican ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala. Apart from improving facilities in the ports, road and rail access to them likewise require improvements - thus the priority given to and indeed progress made with repairing war-damaged rail and road links in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

In all, SADC calculated that it required $992m in international aid to finance a wide range of improvements in transport and communications. The projects were first approved at a technical conference in Beira on 2 September 1980 and were given ministerial approval in Salisbury on 11 September. The projects were then to be submitted to an international aid donors' conference arranged by SADC in Maputo from 26-28 November 1980. The major SADC transport and communications projects for which foreign aid was sought, were the following:

Rehabilitation of railways

i) Nacala, Mozambique - Malawi border (615 km : $180m)
ii) Botswana main line (642 km at 40 km p.a. : $5.6m p.a.)
iii) Balaka, Malawi - Vila Nova da Fronteira (312 km : $16.5m)
iv) Nova da Fronteira - Beira (94 km section : $16.5m)
v) Almada - Machipanda (100 km : $21m)
vi) Mozambique - Swaziland (145 km section : $27m)
TOTAL: Approx. 1900 km : $277m.

Paving or upgrading of roads.

Nata, Botswana - Kazungula on the Zambian border (490 km : $12.8m)
Karonga, Malawi - Mpulungu (371 km : $98m)

Mtwara/...
Mtwar - Mbamba Bay, Tanzania (614 km : $109m)
Mangoche, Malawi - Mandimba, Mozambique (51 km : $22m)
Blantyre, Malawi - Mocuba, Mozambique (276 km - $90m)

Roads to be repaired
Salisbury - Beira (311 km section : $26m)
Salisbury - Chirundu (40 km : $6m)
Plumtree, Zimbabwe - Botswana border (10 km : $1.6m)

Port improvements
Deepen and widen Maputo to handle 80,000 - 100,000 dwt vessels ($50m)
Deepen and widen Beira and add two berths to handle 70,000 dwt vessels ($156m)
Nacala container terminal ($27m)

In addition to these schemes, SADCC's Transport and Communications Commission also formulated a number of civil aviation projects amounting to $23m (the major one being the redevelopment of Swaziland's Matsapa airport at a cost of $15m); plans for a series of microwave links were estimated at some $66m, and other telecommunications projects (which include a $12m satellite earth station in Zimbabwe) would add another $19m to the aid required. Studies have also been launched into such matters as the navigation of the Zambezi River and a joint shipping line for SADCC states. In anticipation of Namibia's joining SADCC, a railway line from Botswana to the Namibian coast has also been envisaged.

If the proposed projects were to be executed, it would mean that most of the foreign aid money - $508m - would go to projects in Mozambique; $242m to Malawi; $183m to Tanzania; $47m to Zimbabwe; $26m to Botswana and $15m to Swaziland. Figures for projects in the remaining SADCC countries are not available yet.86)

Against this background, SADCC's Maputo conference - its largest and most important to date - got under way in November 1980. All nine SADCC countries/...
countries were represented and Zaire sent an observer, clearly signalling
its desire to join the association. Among the thirty other governments
represented were those of all the major Western countries, ranging from
the United States to Japan and Australia. From South America came Brazilian
and Venezuelan representatives, while Iraq and Kuwait reflected Arab
interest in SADCC. A notable absentee was the Soviet Union, but Eastern
Europe was represented by East Germany and Yugoslavia. Also absent was
the People's Republic of China. South Africa, needless to say, was not
invited. In addition to government representatives, eighteen international
agencies sent representatives to Maputo, foremost among them the EEC, the
World Bank, the United Nations, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), the Arab Bank, the African Development Bank and the
Commonwealth Secretariat. This impressive guest list was in itself a
major achievement for SADCC. For their part, the foreign participants
represented a wide range of interests - clearly not always compatible -
and this has given the endeavours of SADCC much more than merely regional
significance. Maputo in fact symbolised the internationalisation of
SADCC's actions; the nine member countries recognised their need for
international aid while the aid donors in turn registered a direct interest
in SADCC's projects. Accepting George Washington's famous dictum that
"Tis folly for one nation to look for disinterested favours from another", it
can be said that SADCC is bound to be affected by and will reflect
wider international ideological divisions, particularly as they apply to
Southern African issues.

Mr Luis Alcantara Santos, Mozambique's Minister of Ports and Surface
Transport and also head of SADCC's Transport and Communications Commission,
presented the potential aid donors assembled in Maputo with a shopping
list much more costly than the $992m previously referred to. SADCC in
fact required $1.9 billion to finance over 90 projects over the next ten
years, he revealed. The discrepancy between this figure and the earlier
calculation is probably due to a large number of projects being added
to those mentioned above - some of which are not related to transport and
communications. Also, the figure of $1.9 billion represents expenditure
over the full decade and not only finance immediately required for urgent
projects.
The aid donors responded with specific pledges for aid worth $650m over the next five years. The largest commitment was made by the African Development Bank, viz. $380m. The EEC guaranteed $100m through its Regional Fund, apart from the $800m which the EEC channels to SADCC countries (with the exception of Angola and Mozambique) via the Lomé II Convention. Among the Western countries which made specific pledges were: Italy - $50m; the United States - $25m; the Netherlands - $16m; Belgium - $8.5m; Sweden - $11m and West Germany - $2m. France, Canada, Britain, Japan and Brazil made general, but unspecified pledges. The Nordic countries offered to finance SADCC's proposed secretariat and a number of other projects, in addition to their individual pledges amounting to $36m. The UN Development Programme promised $20m, while OPEC indicated that it would contribute an initial $60m. The World Bank and the Arab Development Bank both agreed to substantial, yet unspecified, increases in their financial aid to SADCC countries. Aid pledges from East European countries were notably meagre. In all, the Maputo conference managed to elicit pledges for about a third of the total amount SADCC is seeking for its more than 90 projects.

Reaction from SADCC spokesmen to the aid pledges were mixed. It was, for example, noted that the $650m in aid consisted of pledges and was not "money in the bank". Although the $650m fell far short of SADCC's aim of $1.9 billion, it would appear that the pledged amount was more than most delegates at the Maputo conference expected. There was an appreciation in SADCC circles that some potential aid donors needed time to decide which projects to support. Nonetheless, SADCC members were confident that the Maputo conference had given substance to their objectives and that the grouping "is now in business", in the words of the conference chairman, Mr Peter Mmusi, who is Botswana's Minister of Finance. It was also expected that the aid pledges already made would have a "snowball effect", as the Mozambican spokesman put it. In fact, the foreign governments and international agencies represented at the Maputo conference undertook

---

* Angola and Mozambique are not signatories of the Lomé II Convention.
to increase their financial and technical support for SADCC projects in future.

These optimistic pronouncements need to be set against some sobering facts. Firstly, the EEC was prepared to finance only 14 of the more than 90 projects for which SADCC had sought support at the Maputo conference. Secondly, under $100m of the $650m pledged at the conference can actually be described as 'new' money. The rest consists of financial aid previously promised to member countries of SADCC and which will now be rechannelled to them via SADCC.

There are also a number of other features of the Maputo conference which have to be noted for they demonstrate how deeply considerations of great power politics have influenced some of the aid donors. EEC delegates seem to have in effect tried to coerce Angola and Mozambique into signing the Lomé II Convention - as the other seven SADCC countries have done - by specifying that the EEC aid pledged could only be channelled to those SADCC members who were signatories of Lomé II. (It is commonly believed that Angola and Mozambique have not joined Lomé II previously because the Convention contains the so-called Berlin clause which recognises Berlin as the capital of a united Germany. Given their own ideological leanings and their close ties with the communist bloc, Angola and Mozambique can be expected to object to the Berlin clause. What is more, Mozambique revealed that it was seriously contemplating joining COMECON, the Soviet bloc's economic community.) SADCC countries reacted strongly to what they branded as the EEC's "new colonialism", but the realisation that SADCC was in danger of forfeiting some EEC financial support because of Angola's and Mozambique's refusal to join Lomé II, reportedly caused a good deal of dissension among SADCC countries. Such differences notwithstanding, Mr Mmusi, the conference chairman, recognised that the Maputo meeting was a significant contribution to the creation of a new international economic order through the so-called North-South dialogue. EEC countries were, for their part, divided amongst themselves on whether they should as a united group negotiate with SADCC. In the end, the clear preference/...
preference was to enter into bilateral agreements with SADCC. One of the obvious attractions of bilateral agreements, compared with multilateral ones, is that they offer the donor greater potential for political gain. It is possible to see the absence of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China at the Maputo conference in the same light: to achieve the maximum political benefit, they would prefer to provide bilateral aid to member countries of SADCC.

To discuss the Maputo conference without referring to South Africa, would be rather like playing Macbeth without Banquo's ghost. Despite its absence and despite the conference being remarkably free of emotive anti-South African rhetoric, South Africa loomed large at the meeting; it was the "ghost" which served to concentrate delegates' minds on the issues at hand. The SADCC countries' attempts at 'economic liberation' cannot be divorced from their commitment to the 'political liberation' of South Africa. This was borne out in President Samora Machel's opening address in which he told delegates: "The liberation of Namibia and South Africa is indispensable to the establishment of the climate of lasting peace and stability necessary for the cooperation of every country in the area, without exception". The Mozambican President also maintained that the black states' economic dependence on South Africa helped to perpetuate apartheid. Lesotho's Foreign Minister, Mr C D Molapo, went a step further and assured its powerful neighbour that it would be welcomed in SADCC once it has been 'liberated'. SADCC members made great play of what they presented as "the support of the world community" - political, moral and practical - in their "struggle". They also construed Western involvement with their endeavours as an endorsement of black Africa's long-term strategy to isolate South Africa. Western delegates, on the other hand, saw their support for SADCC initiatives rather as a constructive alternative to sanctions against the Republic. Western countries probably also saw their aid to SADCC as a means of diverting attention from their continued close economic ties with South Africa, or at least as a way of blunting some of the black African countries' criticism of their economic links with the Republic.

The/...
The issue of sanctions against South Africa was not formally discussed at the Maputo conference but it featured at press conferences. Conference chairman Mr Mmisi was probably not only speaking for Botswana when he said that sanctions against South Africa would be ineffective and would injure the black states. This, however, does not necessarily mean that states such as Botswana are in principle totally opposed to sanctions. The key consideration for them is the likely impact of such measures on their economies. If SADCC members were convinced that they could absorb the effects of sanctions against South Africa and that such measures would receive Western support, the chances are that they would actively join in. At present, however, this is an academic rather than practical matter.

The ability, or inability, of SADCC members to support sanctions against South Africa will of course greatly depend on the extent of their economic dependence on the Republic. In this regard it is instructive to note that SADCC states have set themselves target dates by which either to have stopped or drastically reduced trading with or shipping through South Africa. Zimbabwe, for example, has reportedly allowed itself ten years to stop all trade with or through South Africa. Zambia is said to have made a similar commitment. If true, such intentions are difficult to reconcile with the initial cautious approach of SADCC countries, in which they publicly acknowledged that there was no chance of severing economic links with South Africa, and that they could at best try to diminish them. These reports are also hard to square with Mr Mmisi's statement that the Maputo conference implied no threat to or confrontation with anyone, but was instead designed to promote peace and stability in Southern Africa.

Although SADCC is heavily preoccupied with transport and communications projects, other areas of cooperation have not been ignored. Some of the financial aid obtained at the Maputo conference will be used on such schemes as food supplies and labour training. Towards the end of last year SADCC entered a new field with the decision to set up a joint/...
joint labour commission to end the export of labour from member countries to South Africa. In addition, the creation of a regional organisation for the conservation and utilization of the soil has been proposed by SADCC.

A final question to consider in this section concerns the kind of economic grouping SADCC countries envisage. Official statements are not of much use in trying to answer the question. At the Arusha conference in 1979, President Khama of Botswana, for example, spoke of the "integration" of the various economies and he approvingly cited the example of the EEC. Other participants, however, made it clear that national independence would not be dismantled in favour of a "super state". In practice, SADCC members appear to have set their faces against President Khama's vision. In a recent paper, Prof. Gavin Maasdorp of the University of Natal argues persuasively that SADCC has, for sound economic reasons, decided against formal economic integration, such as a customs union. The two main arguments in favour of a customs union, viz. (i) trade creation and trade diversion, and (ii) the achievement of economies of scale, particularly in manufacturing industry, do not have much force in the case of the nine SADCC members. As for the first argument, Maasdorp points to the fact that there is presently little intra-SADCC trade as the countries are all essentially primary producers seeking export opportunities for basically the same variety of products and, with the exception of Zimbabwe, having little industry. (Tanzania and Zambia provide two telling examples of what The Economist has termed the "distorted trade patterns" among SADCC members: three-fifths of Tanzania's exports go to industrial countries and under 3% to African countries; for Zambia the breakdown is 80% and 2%.) For these reasons, Maasdorp concludes, "(A)n integration arrangement ... may not lead to any significant trade creation". With regard to the second argument in favour of a customs union, Maasdorp refers to Zimbabwe having the most advanced manufacturing sector. The country "would almost certainly be the favourite location among industrialists ... (and) would be well placed to cream off new industrial investment". The conditions therefore not being conducive to the kind/...
kind of economic integration entailed by a customs union, SADCC members have, with "a sense of realism", agreed that trade will not be the leading sector. This role has instead been assigned to transport and communications. Trade is still to be promoted among members, but on a selective basis.

III CONSAS and SADCC: some comparisons

A comparison between CONSAS and SADCC reveals a number of striking similarities and a variety of profound dissimilarities.

Probably the most obvious similarity is that both groupings are engaged in economic development activities. This has produced a number of similar programmes and structures, although their actual importance in the context of their respective groupings' full range of activities may well differ. Programmes and institutions — either already created or envisaged — which are in common, include those to finance development (CONSAS's Southern African development bank and SADCC's Southern African development fund); institutions to implement transport programmes (the Consultative Committee on Transport (CONSAS) and the Transport and Communications Commission (SADCC)); cooperation in the areas of education and training, industrial development, energy, food production and other agricultural matters.

Because CONSAS and SADCC are in some cases active in the same basic areas, it could be argued that they are duplicating expenditure and activities. In the field of agriculture, for example, SADCC’s intention to create its own organisation for the conservation and utilization of the soil seems to be an unnecessary duplication of the long-established Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil (SARCCUS) to which South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi belong. Similarly, SADCC's apparent interest in creating its own programme/...
programme and facilities to combat foot-and-mouth disease seems to be an unnecessary expense when SADCC countries could pool their efforts with South Africa's well-developed veterinary research facilities. It is, however, also possible to take a more generous view of such apparently duplicative actions and to see them as complementary in that CONSAS and SADCC could, through their separate endeavours, benefit a considerably larger part of Southern Africa than only one of the groupings could probably have hoped to serve. Nonetheless, the fact that SADCC has decided to launch its own programmes in many of the areas listed, rather than to pool resources with South Africa, does indicate that non-technical considerations have influenced SADCC members in their decisions.

When examining the dissimilarities between CONSAS and SADCC, the importance of non-technical considerations in the shaping of the two groupings becomes even more apparent. Some of the major dissimilarities are to be found in what may be termed the aims and principles and also the composition of CONSAS and SADCC respectively. The following table illustrates the point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSAS</th>
<th>SADCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) South Africa presents CONSAS as a counter and an alternative to the dangers of a &quot;Marxist order&quot;.</td>
<td>(i) Although formally designed to liberate members economically (also from South Africa), SADCC cannot be divorced from black states' commitment to 'liberate' South Africa politically; in this sense SADCC is anti-apartheid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Free enterprise is basic to the envisaged anti-Marxist order.</td>
<td>(ii) Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe all follow various &quot;socialist&quot; policies; the remaining four member states adhere to &quot;market economy&quot; policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iii)/...
(iii) Acceptance of the "realities" of the existing regional order, viz. "multinationalism", "vertical differentiation" and "self-determination".

(iv) Flowing from (iii), independent former homelands may become full and equal members of CONSAS.

(v) Main cohesive forces are members' common origin (viz. part of South Africa) and former homelands' 'pariah' status; strengthened by the perception of a common "Marxist threat".

(vi) On the political level, CONSAS is equated with a confederation.

(vii) In the final analysis, CONSAS is an internal device to restructure relations between present and former parts of the South African state.

Turning to more tangible economic matters, a number of further important dissimilarities between the two groupings are noticeable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSAS</th>
<th>SADCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) South Africa is experiencing something of an economic boom; affluence is however not shared by all other CONSAS members</td>
<td>(i) SADCC formed against the background of severe economic hardship in most SADCC member states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(ii) Main focus of economic programmes is development through wider spread of economic activity and promotion of manufacturing and trade sectors.

(iii) Economic programmes will be financed largely out of local funds, both public and private.

(iv) Economically, South Africa totally dominates other CONSAS partners.

(v) Economic integration between member states is a fait accompli and is bound to become increasingly formalised, e.g. through a customs union.

(vi) In the final analysis, CONSAS economic programmes can be seen as an attempt to redress the economic inadequacies of separate development and as part of the confederal restructuring of relations between South Africa and former homelands.

(ii) Development of transport and communications is the major area of economic activity.

(iii) Almost totally dependent on foreign aid to finance economic programmes.

(iv) Despite its exclusion, South Africa is effectively also the dominant economic power within SADCC. Among SADCC members, Zimbabwe is set to become the economically dominant country.

(v) Formal economic integration not envisaged.

(vi) As for (vii) above.
IV Some implications of the new intra-regional divisions

As so commonly happens in politics, there is also an element of dualism in the actions of each of the two groupings of states in Southern Africa. On the one hand, the fundamental differences between their respective origins, aims and composition mean that they are two formally separate, mutually exclusive associations; on the other, the two groupings are closely related because of the very strong economic ties which members of the one maintain with the leading member of the other. The existence of cross-grouping economic links does, however, not mean overlapping membership; CONSAS and SADCC each has its own identifiable formal membership. SADCC members will in future be able to maintain their economic ties with South Africa without formally joining the latter in CONSAS: there is no reason to believe that the Republic will make the continuation of existing economic relations with SADCC states conditional upon their joining CONSAS as a quid pro quo. This situation will also apply to the formal, institutionalised relations between South Africa and some SADCC countries, viz. the Customs Union with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, the Rand Monetary Area of which Lesotho and Swaziland are also members, and the Southern African Regional Tourist Council (SARTOC) which comprises Malawi, Swaziland and South Africa. The black states are, for their part, no doubt keenly aware of the benefits which these institutions hold. Botswana, for one, made it known in the early days of SADCC that its participation in the new grouping would not affect its involvement in the Southern African Customs Union.118) It should, however, be cautioned that the value which SADCC members presently attach to their institutionalised economic links with South Africa is no guarantee that these ties will be maintained indefinitely. Cognizance has to be taken of the possibility that SADCC countries will in time choose to sever institutionalised economic relations with South Africa as part of their strategy for "economic liberation"; they may indeed regard it as a necessary political gesture. Against the political benefit, the black states will have to weigh the economic cost: they will, in short, have to ask themselves whether they will be able to afford it economically to break their formalised economic links with South/...
South Africa, and whether SADCC could offer them either some substitute or at least material compensation. Whereas SADCC countries may find it relatively easy and not particularly painful to end their membership of such technical organisations as SARTOC and SARRCUS and also the Rand Monetary Area, their involvement in the Customs Union is an entirely different matter. The undoubted material advantages which the Customs Union holds for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are bound to leave them both unable and unwilling to withdraw their membership in the foreseeable future. Their SADCC partners are no doubt pragmatic enough not to insist on the three states' withdrawal either.

Although CONSAS and SADCC each have their own membership, it can nonetheless be asked whether this will necessarily remain fixed in future. The chances of CONSAS attracting, or enticing, SADCC members into the Pretoria grouping at the expense of their SADCC membership are singularly poor because of political considerations. It is for the same reason unlikely that a SADCC country will seek simultaneous membership of CONSAS. And in any case, SADCC members are able to maintain their beneficial economic links with South Africa without having to pay the 'price' of joining CONSAS. Conversely, there is virtually no possibility of any CONSAS member being admitted to SADCC - again for political reasons. To allow either South Africa or an independent former homeland to join SADCC would, in the black states' view, imply acceptance of separate development. Now it has been said in SADCC that South Africa, once 'liberated', would be welcome to join SADCC. Whether a 'new' South Africa (or Azania) will receive the welcome promised by Lesotho's Foreign Minister, Mr Molapo, is however open to some doubt. Assuming that South Africa will at that time still possess the most powerful economy in Southern Africa, the economically less powerful SADCC countries may well be reluctant to allow South Africa to join their ranks for fear that the latter may extend its economic domination over the whole region. In the event, therefore, political euphoria may submit to cold economic calculations.

The/...
The only 'floating' country as far as membership of either the one or the other grouping is concerned, is Namibia. The territory has, as mentioned earlier, been given observer status in CONSAS in an obvious attempt to pave the way to its full membership upon independence. SADCC, on the other hand, has already embraced SWAPO in anticipation of what they would see as its inevitable assumption of power in Namibia. If SWAPO should win power in Namibia, the country will no doubt join the SADCC ranks. Should a non-SWAPO government emerge in an independent, internationally recognised Namibia, it cannot be taken for granted that the country will formally join CONSAS. Such a government may indeed decide against CONSAS membership on both political and economic grounds: politcially, for fear that it might become implicated in the former colonial power's domestic policies, and economically, to avoid a further strengthening of South Africa's existing economic dominance of Namibia. A non-SWAPO government may, however, seek continued Namibian participation in the Southern African Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area. It may go even further and follow the example of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and join SADC while retaining membership of the Customs Union. It is not impossible that a SWAPO government, too, may follow the latter course.

With the temporary exception of Namibia and also of Zaire, all countries in Southern Africa have aligned themselves with either CONSAS or SADCC. Zaire will probably join SADCC in due course. What an independent internationally recognised Namibia will do cannot be predicted with absolute certainty, but it can be stated that the odds are clearly against it - irrespective of government - joining CONSAS. For the rest, each grouping's membership is bound to remain unchanged: there are unlikely to be any 'desertions' or 'poaching' of member countries. CONSAS membership is, however, likely to expand as other homelands gain independence; Ciskei is already on its way to this new status. Such additions to CONSAS will make no real difference to the regional configuration of power or the new regional dividing line being drawn by the two groupings. In a sense, therefore, a new stalemate situation has been reached in Southern Africa: the whole region has been divided into two new camps along the political/ideological cleavage long evident in the sub-continent.
The reference above to SADCC countries' likely unwillingness to seek membership of CONSAS of course touches upon their perceptions of the constellation. In simple terms, they have three major objections to CONSAS. Firstly, they see it as an extension of, or at any rate related to, separate development; secondly, they maintain that it may formalise their existing economic dependence on South Africa, and thirdly, they fear (and this is the worst-case scenario) that the constellation may reduce them, whether in purpose or effect, to perpetual client state status, even satellites, of the Republic. These considerations of course carry what the black states would regard as wholly unacceptable political implications.

South Africa's reactions to the initiatives of the nine black states are particularly interesting for they seem to show that the Republic was not sure how to interpret SADCC's endeavours. On the very day of last year's Lusaka conference, Mr Pik Botha asserted that "(I)t has never been the South African Government's policy to act in an imperialistic way to other countries". Where South Africa had assisted or cooperated with black states, "this had been done without exercising any pressure on them for political advantage". He went on to insist that the Republic "will most certainly not beg" black states to have economic or other relations with it. And in any case, he suggested, South Africa's first priority was the development needs of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. In notably strong language, Mr Botha was in effect telling the black states that they were by no means indispensable to CONSAS. This in turn, was probably because he saw the emergence of SADCC as a counter to the constellation and as a grouping which undermined the constellation by drawing potential members away from it. The Foreign Minister's statement also reflects particular sensitivity over allegations about South Africa's hegemonic intentions with the constellation. A month later, however, Mr Botha took a surprisingly conciliatory approach to the events at the Lusaka conference. Claiming South Africa's understanding of the magnitude of the economic problems of the black states involved and its sympathetic regard for "any attempts to improve conditions for the people of our continent", he went on to paint the following picture of the new grouping:

... we /...
... we do not inevitably see in that conference of nine in Lusaka an anti-constellation aim, or see it in the first instance as an anti-South African conference. We should like to see in it an attempt on their part to improve their own economic situation and circumstances, and in that case we welcome it. We welcome it if they are able to obtain capital and assistance from the industrialized world to improve the circumstances in their own countries, for if conditions around us improve and things go well, the same will apply in South Africa. 123)

The reasons for this remarkable change in attitude can only be guessed at. Perhaps the earlier statement was an over-reaction and the later one had to make amends for it. In this regard, there was perhaps some realisation that any impression of spitefulness on South Africa's part because of the nine black states' actions - as the Foreign Minister's first statement tended to convey - could only serve to strengthen their suspicions about South Africa's intentions with the constellation. Another possible explanation is that the second statement reflected a South African acceptance that the constellation had effectively lost - at least for the time being - the black states as potential members and that the Republic should try to put a brave face on it. In this sense the Lusaka conference confirmed what South Africa must have been anticipating for some time before then, viz. that the constellation will merely be confined to the Republic and its independent former homelands, and that the other black states in the region would not only refuse to join the constellation but would instead join forces in a grouping of their own.

The next question to consider concerns the chances of CONSAS and SADCC achieving their objectives. CONSAS appears set to develop, at the political level, into a confederation, although Transkei's position might prove problematic because of Ciskei's probable independence. On the economic level, the realisation of the ambitious development programmes will to a large degree of course depend on the availability of the necessary finance, both from local and foreign sources. That, in turn, can be influenced by the state of the South African and world economy and
also by the political climate in the Republic. There are of course also a host of other factors - such as the availability of skilled manpower - which are bound to have a bearing on CONSAS' success or failure in reaching its economic objectives. Success in the economic field, it should be said, is not vital to the survival of CONSAS because the grouping's basic objective is the restructuring of relations between South Africa and its former homelands in a confederal arrangement: in this respect, it has just been argued, progress is likely to be made.

In trying to assess SADCC's chances of success, a number of determinants have to be borne in mind. The most important of these is the availability of foreign, more particularly Western, aid to finance SADCC projects. This, in turn, will be influenced by a whole range of factors. Firstly, there is the state of Western economies, which conditions the extent of financial generosity to Third World countries. Western aid commitments elsewhere in the world also have to be considered. Secondly, aid donors are more likely to support SADCC plans which carry a utility rather than a prestige label. Thirdly, aid donors will probably wish to see evidence that SADCC countries are capable of effectively running their foreign financed projects, before further aid is provided. Fourthly, their perceptions of the prospects for stability in South Africa are bound to weigh with aid donors. In this regard, Western powers in particular would probably want to know that the SADCC countries and South Africa can co-exist relatively peacefully. The prospects for stability within SADCC countries is another consideration. It is, however, quite possible that the danger of instability in SADCC countries will not deter aid donors, but rather encourage them to try and counter the prospects for instability through economic development. Fifthly, considerations of great power politics are likely to influence Western aid donors. Thus they may see their aid to SADCC as a means of stabilising the region and countering Soviet designs; in short, as a way of promoting Western interests. The Soviet Union, in turn, knowing that it cannot compete with the West in the provision of development aid, may well resort to attempts to destabilise SADCC countries as a means of gaining influence. Finally, and related to the previous point, there is the likelihood/...
likelihood that particularly the new United States Administration will in its foreign aid policy be influenced by recipient countries' attitudes towards the West. This may mean that Washington could become reluctant to provide aid which would, via SADCC, reach Angola and Mozambique. Instead, the United States may decide to provide bilateral aid to individual SADCC members or to support joint SADCC projects which exclude Angola and Mozambique. It has already been noted that EEC members too have reservations about providing aid which may find its way to Angola and Mozambique. One possible result of such considerations may be that Western aid donors would also prefer to provide aid to individual SADCC countries, rather than contribute to a common SADCC fund.

It has been mentioned above that Western aid donors to SADCC would want to be assured that their beneficiaries and South Africa can co-exist relatively peacefully. This raises a particularly important factor in trying to assess the chances of success of SADCC — and indeed also of CONSAS' economic plans — viz. the absence of armed conflict between SADCC countries and South Africa. A violent confrontation between them will be a severe setback to both sides' ambitious programmes for economic development. In this sense it can be argued that both SADCC and South Africa have a vital interest in the avoidance of war. To put it in a different way, it can be said that concern with economic development may act as a powerful constraint on armed conflict. Having just been through the Rhodesian war, SADCC countries are hardly likely to subject themselves to the severe risks of a war with South Africa. This, however, does not preclude their providing offices and even transit facilities to movements like the African National Congress.

If it is accepted that economic development in Southern Africa requires peace, then it can furthermore be argued that it is not only the absence of war that is called for, but also the avoidance of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. Such measures against the Republic will certainly have serious economic effects on surrounding black states because there can be no doubt that South Africa will 'export' the consequences of sanctions to SADCC countries, whether intentionally or not. Thus SADCC members have a material interest in preventing international economic sanctions against the Republic.
These considerations, it must be conceded, may only apply in the short to medium term. In the longer run, and providing SADCC succeeds in significantly reducing member states' economic dependence on South Africa and developing their economies - and also building up their armed forces - they might feel less constrained about getting embroiled in the final "liberation war" against South Africa. There is, however, a (capitalist inspired) counter-scenario, viz. that SADCC countries, having sampled the fruits of economic progress, would be unwilling to risk losing it all in a war with South Africa. If this were to eventualise, the 'liberation struggle' will in effect be caught in a kind of stalemate. Such an outcome of course assumes a good deal of 'rationality' on the part of SADCC members. Given the dangers of assumptions about 'rationality' in politics, cognizance has to be taken of another short, 'irrational' route to the worst-case scenario: despite their economic weakness and dependence on South Africa, some SADCC countries might, whether of their own volition or under external pressure, throw caution to the winds and get actively involved in an armed struggle against South Africa.

The scenarios outlined have touched on the chances of SADCC succeeding in its economic objectives. While it is of course impossible to put a precise figure on what SADCC is likely to achieve, it seems safe to say that the grouping will not, either in the medium or longer term, be able to create a situation in which member countries are able to completely sever all economic ties with South Africa. And in any case, despite some of the noises emanating around the Maputo conference last November, at least some SADCC countries have not set out to reach such a situation at all. Lesotho for one, given its geographical location, is simply in no position to cut itself economically adrift from its neighbour. What is, however, likely to happen is that SADCC members will in due course be in a position to reduce their dependence on South Africa's transport and communications networks. To lessen their dependence on imports from and exports to South Africa will, however, be more problematic. For a wide range of the products which many SADCC countries import and export, South Africa is the nearest and largest market. Hard economic realities may yet/...
yet severely circumscribe SADCC's endeavours to decrease dependence on
the South African economy. This situation can of course change materially
if a substitute can be found for the South African market - preferably
within SADCC ranks. Here the likely candidate is Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean
businessmen may indeed displace South African importers and exporters in
certain sectors, but it is questionable whether Zimbabwe can either provide
all or most of the black states' import requirements, or offer a market
for their exports comparable to South Africa. As in the past, food may in
future again prove to be a commodity for which the black states are
particularly dependent on South Africa. Zimbabwe's food security plan
will be hard put to provide the needs of nine SADCC member countries in
the event of another poor harvest in the black states because of drought.

Given these problems, it is perhaps not surprising that some South African
businessmen tend to welcome SADCC's plans: by improving the black states' infrastructures, trade penetration could be facilitated.

Another factor which may have a bearing on SADCC's success in promoting
"economic liberation" and also in attracting foreign aid, is its cohesion.
The main forces of cohesion, it has already been pointed out, are economic
dependence on South Africa and opposition to apartheid. Set against these
centripetal influences are a host of centrifugal ones. The potentially
divisive forces even apply to the factor of economic dependence on South
Africa in that Angola and Tanzania, having no direct trade links with the
Republic, are not in any way parties to this dependence. The remaining
SADCC members all have varying degrees of economic dependence on South
Africa. This means that some SADCC states are much more constrained than
others in seeking "economic liberation". A related aspect pointing to
the disparate nature of the SADCC grouping is the fact that Tanzania has
historically been more closely oriented to East rather than Southern Africa
(consider its participation in the East African Community). "Its partici-
pation in a group of states explicitly seeking to reduce their dependence
on South Africa is therefore an anomaly", as Maasdorp rightly argues.125)

Three other factors which may in future adversely affect SADCC's cohesion
have already been mentioned, viz. ideological differences (compare Marxist

Angola/...
Angola and capitalist-oriented, democratic Botswana), the possibility that
the ideological leanings of Angola and Mozambique (and in future also
Zimbabwe?) might affect the availability of Western aid, and the possibility
that Zimbabwe may soon establish itself as the economically dominant
member of SADCC. These potentially divisive influences might put the
centripetal forces under severe strain and might, in an extreme case, lead
to the dissolution of SADCC as a formal, institutionalised grouping. This
would, in turn, of course affect the regional stalemate and inject a new
fluidity into the situation. SADCC members are probably keenly aware of
the potentially disruptive influences in their ranks and know that to
contain them SADCC should, as a grouping, steer clear as far as possible of
contentious, divisive economic - not to mention non-economic - issues.
This would, for example, make the emergence of a military wing of SADCC
extremely improbable.

The foregoing, it should be explained, does not imply that SADCC can
be disregarded as a political force. Its mere formation is in fact
largely the result of the political and ideological divisions between
South Africa and the black Southern African states, and SADCC's very
existence will serve as an ongoing reminder of the major unresolved con-
flict situation plaguing the region. When it comes to specific diplomatic
initiatives in Southern Africa, particularly a Namibian settlement, events
suggest that SADCC will not become involved in it in its own right, but
that the original five Frontline states together with Zimbabwe, will
represent black African states' interests. The original Frontline states
can probably claim a more direct interest in the Namibian issue than the
other SADCC states and also cite the diplomatic rapport which they have
built up over the years. The fact that Zimbabwe has now been added to the
Frontline group, but not Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi, might be cause for
some friction because it is known that Lesotho, for one, has long aspired
to an active role in Southern African diplomatic initiatives. Thus the
existence within the economic grouping (SADCC) of a political sub-grouping
(Frontline states) might prove a difficult exercise in co-existence. It
would be particularly interesting to see whether the now six Frontline
states/...
states would be willing to accommodate Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. If that were to happen, the nine black states would have established a formidable regional association with both an economic and political dimension. The addition of a political dimension will, of course, bring with it new possibilities for intra-group discord. Either course of action therefore appears to carry risks of divisions.

To conclude, it can be said that the emergence of two separate groupings in Southern Africa has accentuated the political and ideological divisions between South Africa and the internationally recognised black states in the region. The existence of CONSAS and SADCC does not in itself necessarily enhance the region's conflict potential because there are various potential inter-state and intra-state sources of conflict in Southern Africa which exist quite independently of the two groupings. In some respects the development of CONSAS and SADCC have moreover, as argued, instead led to a kind of stalemate situation which would effectively limit the chances of violent conflict. The stalemate of course does not apply to the military sphere, where South Africa is undeniably superior to the combined military strength of the SADCC countries. There is likewise no economic stalemate in the sense of SADCC and CONSAS being of roughly equal strength. The new regional stalemate manifests itself primarily in the improbability of either grouping extending its membership (except for Zaire and Namibia probably joining SADCC and future independent homelands joining CONSAS), and in the likely inability of SADCC countries to contribute in any profound, material way to what they would describe as the 'liberation of South Africa' by overthrowing the present political order. Rather than SADCC from the outside promoting meaningful political change within South Africa, CONSAS might do so by serving as an instrument for internal political restructuring, starting with a confederation.
REFERENCES

1) The acronym CONSAS has on occasion been used by one or two other analysts, but it has not gained any wide acceptance. In the present study, the acronym is used merely for the sake of convenience and does not indicate any particular preference for it; least of all is it being used here in an attempt to try and promote its wider usage.

2) In this study Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda are referred to as "independent" solely in the sense that this status has been conferred on them in terms of acts of the South African Parliament, viz. Status of Transkei Act, 1976 (100/1976); Status of Bophuthatswana Act, 1977 (89/1977) and Status of Venda Act, 1979 (107/1979).


5) Mr R F Botha, South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly (Hansard), 6/6/1979, col.7884. (Hereafter abbreviated HA Deb.)


7) Mr R F Botha, HA Deb., 6/6/1979, col.7940.

8) See Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 7/2/1979, col.229.


10) Address by the Honourable P W Botha, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and of National Security, on the occasion of a National Party Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), p.24.

11)/...


14) toespraak deur sy edele P W Botha, DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens, by gelseentheid van die amptelike opening van die Cato Ridge-Abattoir op 27 Junie 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), p.13.

15) Address by the Honourable P W Botha, Prime Minister, Carlton Centre, Johannesburg; 22 November 1979 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), pp.29, 30, 45 & 47-50.


17) Press release, issued by Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information.


20) Fears about South Africa dominating the constellation have already been expressed by President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana. In December 1980 he warned that there appeared to be a real danger of South Africa acquiring "a sinister Big Brother image" in CONSAS. "For any form of constellation to succeed", President Mangope said, "the onus is on South Africa to prove that the structure is not a cloak under which is hidden a bid for South African dominance and hegemony". (Rand Daily Mail, 9/12/1980.)

21) Address by the Hon. P W Botha, MP, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and of the National Intelligence Service at the opening ceremony of the Summit Meeting in Pretoria on 23 July 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), p.7.

22) Opening Address by the Prime Minister, the Honourable P W Botha, at the Annual Congress of the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM)
in Johannesburg on 21 October 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), pp. 7 & 8.


25) This new economic strategy was first revealed by the Prime Minister at the 1980 Transvaal National Party Congress (Toespraak deur sy Edele P W Botha, DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens tydens die Nasionale Party Kongres van Transvaal: 1 September 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), pp.21 & 22.) He spelled out the new policy in much greater detail in his Opening address ... (ASSOCOM), op.cit., pp.17-19. See also Opening Address by Dr J H de Loor, Director-General: Finance at the Sixteenth Annual Congress of NAPCOC, Sun City, Bophuthatswana, 4 August 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), pp.33 & 34.

26) See Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha, DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens tydens die opening van die 35e Jaarkongres van die Afrikaanse Handels-instituut te Port Elizabeth op 7 Mei 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), p.11.

27) Opening Address by the Prime Minister ... (ASSOCOM), op.cit., p.22.
29) Ibid.
30) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ...Nasionale Party Kongres van Transvaal (1980), op.cit., p.22.
31) Opening Address by the Prime Minister ... (ASSOCOM), op.cit., p.24.
33) Opening Address by the Prime Minister ... (ASSOCOM), op.cit., pp.35 & 36.

36)/...
36) Address by the Hon. P W Botha ... at the ... Summit Meeting in Pretoria, op.cit., pp. 10 & 11.

37) HA Deb., 19/5/1980, col.6661.


40) See Address by the Honourable P W. Botha ... Carlton Centre, op.cit., pp.23, 32, 52 & 53.


42) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha, DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens tydens 'n openbare vergadering in die D F Malansentrum te Stellenbosch soos gereël deur die Nasionale Party Jeugtakke te Stellenbosch op 10 April 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), p.23.


44) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... te Port Elizabeth, op.cit., p.12 and Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Cato Ridge-Abattoir, op.cit., pp.16 & 17.

45) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... te Port Elizabeth, op.cit., p.13. See also Mr R F Botha, HA Deb., 20/5/1980, col.6745.

46) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... te Port Elizabeth, op.cit., p.13.

47) Prof. Lombard is the author of a book entitled Freedom, Welfare and Order (BENBO, Pretoria, 1978, 191 pp), which seems to have had a major influence/...
influence on government thinking on the constellation.

48) The names of the four chairmen were announced in Address by the Hon. P W Botha ... Summit Meeting in Pretoria, op.cit., p.10.


51) See Joint Press Statement (following discussions in Pretoria on 20 October 1980 between representatives of the governments of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, and observers from SWA/Namibia) (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information); Opening Address by the Prime Minister ... (ASSOCOM), op.cit., p.9, and Beeld, 28/11/1980.

52) Beeld, 16/1/1981.

53) Address by the Hon. P W Botha ... Summit Meeting in Pretoria, op.cit., p.5. See also ibid, p.7; Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens tydens 'n openbare vergadering te Fauresmith op 25 April 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information), p.25; Opening Address by the Prime Minister ... (ASSOCOM), op.cit., p.38, and Mr R F Botha, HA Deb., 19/5/1980, col.6634.

54) Opening Address by the Prime Minister ... (ASSOCOM), op.cit., pp. 11 & 12. See also Address by the Hon. P W Botha ... Summit Meeting in Pretoria, op.cit., p.7.

55) See Dr J H de Loor, Director-General of Finance, quoted in Beeld, 24/11/1980.

56) Opening Address by the Prime Minister ... (ASSOCOM), op.cit., p.39.

57) The new President's Council can perhaps pave the way to some measure of power sharing at the level of central government between Whites, Coloureds and Indians.

58) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Stellenbosch, op.cit., pp.20 & 21; Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha, DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens, tydens/...

59) Without wanting to draw too close an analogy between South Africa and former Rhodesia, it is nonetheless instructive to recall Mr Ian Smith's famous "majority rule not in a thousand years" statement. (See Moorcraft, P L, A Short Thousand Years: The End of Rhodesia's Rebellion (Khenty Press, Salisbury, 1979), 248 pp.) It should be added that quite apart from whatever fundamental objections the National Party may have against a federation, the fact is that a federal solution is part of the Opposition's policy; this in itself is enough to make the National Party weary of using the concept of a federalism. It is perhaps worth remembering that the National Party has become remarkably adept at implementing aspects of Opposition policies, but calling them by a different name. Consider, for example, the division of power (NP) as against the sharing of power (Opposition).


61) Toespraak deur Sy Edle P W Botha ... Nasionale Party Kongres van Transvaal (1980), op.cit., p.11.


63) Toespraak deur Sy Edle P W Botha ... Nasionale Party Kongres van Transvaal (1980), op.cit., p.11.

64) Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 6/2/1980, col.250.

65) Ibid.

66) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... te Fauresmith, op.cit., p.30.

67) See p.37.

68) See Mr R F Botha, HA Deb., 20/5/1980, col.6746.


73) Ibid.


77) Consider the determination of South Africa's National Party governments after 1948 to reduce the country's economic dependence on the United Kingdom.


84) Briefing Paper, op.cit., p.11.

85) Quoted from a working document circulated among potential foreign aid donors. The proposed projects have also been reported in the press - see The Star, 25/11/1980.
87) Sunday Express, 14/12/1980.
88) Ibid.
91) Ibid.
92) Sunday Tribune, 14/12/1980
93) Ibid.
98) Sunday Express, 14/12/1980.
101) Sunday Express, 14/12/1980.
103) Sunday Express, 14/12/1980.
106) Sunday Express, 14/12/1980.

112) ...

113) The Arusha Conference (Brief Report), op.cit.


117) Transkei, Botshwatswana and Venda have not been admitted as formal members of the Southern African Customs Union; they are informal parties to the customs treaty in the sense that South Africa applies to provisions to them (Maasdorp, G, op.cit., p.2). The basic reason for this arrangement is that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland will strongly object to former homelands becoming full and equal members of the Customs Union. As part of its constellation scheme, the South African Government is apparently keen to establish a formal multilateral customs union. (Beeld, 24/7/1980).


120) See ibid., pp.10-12.

121) See ibid., p.12.


