SOME FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S "TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY", with particular reference to the "12-point plan"

Deon Geldenhuyys

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
Dr Deon Geldenhuys is Assistant Director (Research) of the South African Institute of International Affairs.

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ISBN: 0-909239-80-0

The South African Institute for International Affairs
Jan Smuts House
P.O. Box 31596
BRAAMFONTEIN
2017
South Africa

March 1981

Price : R3-50
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Introduction

Although of relatively recent origin, the concept of a total national strategy (for the sake of convenience, here abbreviated as TNS) has become firmly established in South Africa's political vocabulary. This is largely due to Mr P W Botha who has, since becoming Prime Minister in 1978, given the concept both a prominence and content previously lacking. When it first appeared in official texts in the early 1970s, TNS - or "total strategy", as it was then styled - was used primarily in a military/security context. Since then, TNS has acquired a much wider meaning and it now in fact embraces also the realms of domestic political/constitutional development, economics, state administration and foreign relations.

The purpose of this study is to try and assess the foreign policy implications of TNS. Local discussion of TNS has largely focused on its domestic ramifications, thus tending to overlook its relevance for South Africa's foreign relations. Although TNS contains specific foreign policy objectives, the strategy's implications for the Republic's foreign relations cannot realistically be determined by considering only these aspects. The internal components of TNS are also of fundamental importance because, to restate a truism, South Africa's foreign relations are crucially affected by its domestic policies. Put in simple terms, the central question which the present study seeks to answer, is: how will TNS affect South Africa's present international standing?

The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Prof. Mike Louw and Mr John Barratt. Opinions expressed in this paper are, however, the sole responsibility of the author.
To understand TNS, it is necessary to consider first the South African Government's perception of a "total onslaught" on the country; TNS is in fact officially presented as the Republic's counter-strategy. The notion of an onslaught has additional relevance because it also provides a picture of South Africa's perception of its external environment.

Following this, the discussion will focus on TNS, particularly on the 'policy' component thereof, as embodied in the Government's "12-point plan". It is this plan which contains the foreign and domestic policy objectives referred to above.

It should be explained that the perceptions and actions discussed in this paper are those of government. Foreign policy is, after all, the preserve of government, although it is recognised that non-governmental organisations make important inputs in the form of influence or pressure. The relevance of official perceptions in a study of this nature is underlined by Professor K J Holsti's statement that "(i)n policy making, the state of the environment does not matter so much as what government officials believe that state to be." The policy-maker therefore acts and reacts "according to his images of the environment."2)

The "total onslaught" on South Africa

The idea of South Africa's security being threatened is, of course, nothing new. Ever since the Second World War, the country has been perceiving a serious communist threat to its security. Over the years, the threat has grown, to the extent that it now takes the form of what is depicted as a total onslaught on the Republic. While the onslaught is still being perceived as "communist-inspired", the threat is not simply confined to communist sources but also embraces a host of other hostile forces.

In/...
In this section, it is left to the authors of the concept of a total onslaught - the policy-makers - to explain it. Given that policy-makers respond to their particular images of the external environment, and not to the "objective conditions"\textsuperscript{4}, it is important to present the official South African view of the world in an 'undiluted' form, rather than give a second-hand, interpreted version of it.

General Magnus Malan,\textsuperscript{5} Minister of Defence, has defined the total onslaught as follows:

The total onslaught is an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state. The aim is therefore also total, not only in terms of the ideology, but also as regards the political, social, economic and technological areas.

The enemy, according to General Malan, applies the whole range of measures it possesses (coercive, persuasive or incentive) in an integrated fashion. Apart from military action, it also includes action in the political, diplomatic, religious, psychological, cultural/social and sports spheres. Turning to South Africa specifically - "which is subjected to a communist-inspired onslaught" - he identified the aim of the onslaught as "the overthrow of the present constitutional order and its replacement by a subject communist-oriented black government". The communist's aim, however, goes beyond control over South Africa; "the onslaught is directed against the whole free Western world"\textsuperscript{6} - of which South Africa, Mr P W Botha maintains, is part.\textsuperscript{7}

In this onslaught, South Africa plays a "key role" due to its strategic location, mineral wealth, highly developed infrastructure and strong economy, according to General Malan. Because of its inherent power,
South Africa poses a major obstacle to the communists' attempts at gaining control of Africa and, through that, "manipulating" the West. Underlying all this is "the communists' imperialistic expansionist desire" aimed at "world domination".

As far as the military side of the onslaught is concerned, Mr P W Botha has argued that a direct, conventional onslaught against South Africa would be "too expensive" an excursion. For this reason, "an indirect strategy is being pursued with every possible means", such as boycott moves in the economic sphere and, on the psychological level, "a concentrated propaganda campaign against everything which is stable in this country".

The total onslaught, in General Malan's view, has long been directed at South Africa's four "power bases", viz. the political/diplomatic, economic, social/psychological and security bases. Given the plural nature of South Africa's population, with resultant conflicting views and aspirations among the component groups, and the fact that "class distinctions" (the owners and the workers) correspond with colour distinctions, he goes on to argue that "it is ... logical to expect that the communists will concentrate on the non-white section of the population in creating an internal revolutionary climate". The South African Communist Party, African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) - all banned organisations - were the major vehicles for promoting these designs. Mr P W Botha has warned his followers "that you must not proceed from the standpoint that revolution cannot come in South Africa", and has suggested that this would in fact happen if the Government followed the policy of extreme right-wing parties and governed in the interests of the white population only. This is indeed a new theme which has been added to the well-established notion of an "internal threat", which is typically regarded as an integral component of the total onslaught on South Africa.

Although/...
Although "the communists" are depicted as the major force behind the total onslaught, they are by no means the only one. The "political and ideological aspirations" of "the West", the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and other groupings of black states all feature in the onslaught, according to General Malan. The threat emanating from within Southern Africa - largely the result of political changes following the 1974 Portuguese coup - has repeatedly been stressed by the Prime Minister, among others. In May 1980, for example, he referred to "the Southern African terrorist threat" and to the growing concentration of sophisticated arms in Mozambique, Angola and Zambia. This arms build-up in due course led Government spokesmen to warn about the danger of a Soviet-instigated conventional military onslaught on South Africa. In his statement of May 1980, Mr Botha also envisaged that Zimbabwe, then just independent, "will probably be pressurised to play an active role in the onslaught on the Republic of South Africa".

Turning to the Western powers, General Malan maintains that many of them regard the situation in South Africa as a threat to their interests in black African countries - such as their investments and supply of strategic minerals. To protect these interests, to safeguard their relations with the black states and to prevent Southern Africa becoming a second Vietnam, "the West has accepted, as a point of departure, that the white government of South Africa should be forced into a position where it has no other choice but to abdicate", as in the case of Rhodesia. Many Western countries see the creation of a favourably disposed black government in South Africa as the only way in which they can protect their interests. This perception of Western policy has led General Malan to the following blunt statement: "It can therefore justifiably be claimed that the Western powers make themselves available as handymen of the communists and they are indirectly contributing to the/..."
the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of world communism".

Such views of the West should be seen in the context of South Africa's growing disenchantment with Western policies in Southern Africa, particularly since the Angolan War of 1975/76. In March 1979, Mr P W Botha, for example, listed instances "of how South Africa had been left in the lurch, how promises made to South Africa had been broken" (by the West), and he went on to claim that "(t)he West is pursuing a disastrous policy in Africa and Southern Africa."14) He has accused Western powers of preventing South Africa bringing "salvation" to the black states facing economic collapse because Western countries were displaying "a kind of neutralism towards the decisive role which the Republic of South Africa is able to play in Southern Africa".15) The Prime Minister has also censured Western countries for denying "the truth of the Republic of South Africa's strategic military, industrial, food and mineral position",16) and for "contributing in blissful ignorance or out of stupidity" to the incitement of terrorism against South Africa.17) These were the symptoms of what Mr Botha has diagnosed as a "paralysis in the mind of the West to acknowledge the importance of South Africa".18) The only specific healthy exception he was prepared to make to this general state of Western affliction, was the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher.19) Mr Botha no doubt hopes that President Ronald Reagan will prove another, vital, exception - if his election does not actually herald a new era in which the West will regain what Mr Botha would depict as "its sense of direction and ... (be) prepared to fight for Christian civilised standards".20)

In this regard, it is worth recalling the depth of the alienation between South Africa and America under the Carter Administration. It was probably best expressed in former Prime Minister B J Vorster's now famous statement of August 1977 in which he said that the end result of American pressure/...
pressure on Southern Africa "would be exactly the same as if it were subverted by the Marxists". "In the one case", he maintained, "it will come about as a result of brute force. In the other case, it will be strangulation with finesse".21) Yet, however much South Africa disliked American policy, there was still an acknowledgement that the United States "remains the leader of the West and ... only America stands between the continued freedom of mankind and slavery", in the words of Foreign Minister, R F Botha.

Having noted the South African policy-makers' views on the nature of the total onslaught, some serious reservations about basing a foreign policy on these images should be stated. Issue has to be taken particularly with the views expressed on Western powers' complicity in the total onslaught. Firstly, there is often a failure to distinguish between the various Western powers; lumping them together as "the West" would imply, wrongly, that South African policy-makers perceive an almost automatic identity of interests among Western states. Secondly, it is an oversimplification to suggest that Western powers are faced with a straight choice of either supporting the status quo in South Africa or forcing the abdication of the present Government in favour of a black one. This view, in turn, reflects a faulty understanding of the complexity of Western countries' foreign policy making; a wide range of competing and often conflicting interests have to be weighed up by the policy-makers and clear-cut, black-or-white policy choices seldom emerge. Thirdly, little if any allowance is made for genuine Western opposition to South Africa's domestic political order; it is simply wrong to ascribe disdain for apartheid to a host of unsavoury motives, indifference or recklessness. Finally, the statements on South Africa's relations with the United States quoted above, appear difficult to reconcile with each other. This very phenomenon reflects a love-hate dualism which has long characterised South Africa's relations with Western powers.23)

The immediate relevance for South Africa's foreign policy of the issues just raised becomes clear when the following "simple truth" is borne in mind: "The most important requirement for foreign policy formulation", Professor/...
Professor Richard W Cottam has written, "is an accurate understanding of the motivations of other governments and peoples". The way in which South African policy-makers have identified Western powers with the total onslaught tends to indicate an insufficient understanding of these states' foreign policy motivations. But while an accurate understanding of other states' motivations may indeed go a long way towards providing a sound basis for South Africa's foreign policy, this requirement in itself is no guarantee that South African policy-makers will make an "objective" assessment of their external environment. There will always be a discrepancy between images of reality and reality, Professor Holsti points out. This is partly the result of "physical impediments to the flow of information" (e.g. lack of time and faulty communications) and partly "a problem of the distortion of reality caused by attitudes, values, beliefs, or faulty expectations."

A final point which needs to be underlined is Mr P W Botha's highly significant warning that a revolution is not impossible in South Africa. By suggesting, moreover, that a revolution could be brought on by the kind of policies advocated by extreme right-wing parties, the Prime Minister has acknowledged that a revolution may indeed have domestic origins, and cannot only be instigated by hostile extraneous forces. Thus, while the notion of a total onslaught focuses primarily on external forces, the Government has not lost sight of the possibility of an internally generated revolution. It must of course be added that Mr Botha saw a danger of revolution in the policies propagated by his right-wing adversaries, rather than in his own.

TNS: countering the total onslaught

"There is only one way of withstanding this (total) onslaught", Mr P W Botha has declared, "and that is to establish a total national strategy". The 1977 White Paper on Defence defined TNS as

the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available
to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure. ²⁷)

The national aims, according to the White Paper (and subsequently reaffirmed on several occasion by Mr P W Botha ²⁸), are set out in the preamble to the South African Constitution, viz. to strive for the co-existence of all peoples in South Africa; to maintain law and order; to safeguard the inviolability and freedom of the Republic; to further the contentment and spiritual and material welfare of all, and to strive for world peace. ²⁹) Such "very heart-warming and wonderful words" ³⁰) have frequently given way to a much more basic - and contemporary - view of the national aim, viz. survival in a hostile world. ³¹) Nonetheless, it is significant to note that Mr P W Botha has said that South Africa should apply its "total national strength" not only in a reactive combating of perceived threats, "but wherever possible also for the elimination of the fundamental causes which give rise to the threat" ³²) — an obvious allusion to the domestic situation, and one which ties in with his statement on the possibility of an internal revolution.

The planned utilization of the means of the state refer to what General Malan terms "the management of South Africa's four power bases as an integrated whole" ³³). This is being done by means of the so-called national security management system, the component parts of which are the following:

+ the State Security Council — a cabinet committee headed by the Prime Minister; ³⁴)
+ the working committee of the State Security Council;
the security planning branch of the Prime Minister's Office; and
a number of interdepartmental committees, and
a number of joint management centres and the Department of
National Intelligence "to provide the essential strategic
background". 35

Although these various structures provide for joint state management of
the four power bases - the political, economic, social/psychological
and security bases - the Government however insists that TNS cannot be
a matter exclusively for the state, but also requires the active involvement
of the private sector. 36

The definition of TNS quoted above, refers to the achievement of the
national aims "within the framework of the specific policies".
The policy framework has been expressed in the form of the "12-point plan".
These twelve points, or "policy principles", first enunciated by Mr P W Botha
at the Natal National Party Congress in August 1979, 37 in effect represent
twelve policy objectives for a broad spectrum of government activities
at home and abroad.

The 12-point plan

Being a component of South Africa's "counter-strategy", 38 the 12-point
plan understandably reflects the nature of the perceived onslaught.
It would, however, be an over-simplification to see the plan merely in
a reactive fashion, as a response to an essentially external threat.
The 12-point plan is, in fact, the product of various influences.
Mr P W Botha's insistence that the plan "is a reaffirmation of the basic
principles of the NP", 39 and therefore "the National Party's plan for
South Africa", 40 leaves no doubt about the major determinant of the 12-point
plan. It may well be argued that the plan is simply an attempt to reconcile
the need for responding to a perceived threat, with the exigencies of
National Party policies. But for it to be called the National Party's
plan might in itself indicate a compromise: given the divisions within
the Party on some key aspects of domestic policy, notably the political status of Indians, Coloureds and urban Blacks, the 12-point plan in a sense represents the lowest common denominator. It is perhaps for this reason that many of the twelve points are vaguely defined, thus allowing for a fair measure of political manoeuvring, both in interpretation and implementation. While it is tempting and popular to see the 12-point plan only in terms of a total onslaught on one hand, and narrow party political considerations on the other, this would be rather unfair. As will be illustrated later, the plan also reveals other interests which the Government has tried to accommodate. There are the so-called moderate Coloureds, Indians and black Africans who are involved with Government-created political institutions (e.g. the President's Council and homeland governments) and who, for the sake of their already questioned political credibility among their own peoples, badly need evidence that the Government is committed to liberalising its racial policy. Then the interests of the South African private sector also feature prominently in the 12-point plan.

In short, the 12-point plan is an attempt to define policy objectives for a wide range of government activities in response to a diversity of interests. But having said this, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the mould in which the 12-point plan has been cast, is that of National Party policy. This means that other interests have only been accommodated in the plan to the extent that they do not conflict with stated party positions. Put differently, the 12-point plan is a counter-strategy devised within the broad parameters of existing Government policy.

A striking feature concerning the 12-point plan, is the Government's total commitment to it and its attempts to present it as the one and only hope all South Africans have to deliver them from the total onslaught. Mr P W Botha is adamant that there is for South Africa absolutely no alternative to the 12-point plan. In telling Parliament that "I stand
or fall by that 12-point plan"\textsuperscript{43)} he was by implication saying, 'and South Africa too'.\textsuperscript{44)} The Prime Minister was, in effect, presenting the plan as a zero-sum formula. In other words, although it may be "the National Party's plan", the Government is trying to promote it as the only national plan for survival in the face of the grave threats against the country. The status which the Government has conferred on the 12-point plan, raises a question of a different nature: although the vagueness of some aspects of the plan leaves some political latitude, is it politically wise to elevate policy objectives - formulated by one political party at a particular point in time - to what virtually amounts to twelve eternal commandments?

The Prime Minister is fond of contrasting his 'only alternative' with what he rejects out of hand as three wholly unacceptable options. The first option is "the creation of an authoritarian, Marxist type socialist political order". This is being suggested by those who argue that "the whole world is turning Marxist" and that South Africa should therefore do likewise. Such a system for South Africa would among other things lead to a dictatorship, civil war and economic chaos. Secondly, there is the option of "a system based on permanent and total separation, legally defined and artificially maintained by means of the institutionalised white supremacy". This would, according to Mr Botha, produce a permanent state of confrontation with the "free world" and black-white confrontation within South Africa, thus playing into the hands of "Marxist forces". The third option is "black majority rule under a dictatorship". This, Mr Botha claims, would be the logical consequence of the Progressive Federal Party's policy, but it was acceptable neither to white nor black South Africans.\textsuperscript{45)}

The twelve points in the Government's plan will now be considered\textsuperscript{46)}, with a view to assessing their implications for South Africa's foreign relations.
The first six points all deal with what are essentially domestic political matters, more specifically race relations. The first and second points set the ideological scene, as it were, and they immediately make it abundantly clear that the 12-point plan is indeed a restatement of National Party policy. The first point concerns "the recognition and acceptance of the existence of multi-nationalism and of minorities in the Republic of South Africa", and the second deals with "the acceptance of vertical differentiation with a built-in principle of self-determination at as many levels as possible". Based on these premises, the third point provides for "the establishment of constitutional structures by the Black peoples to make the highest degree of self-government possible for them in states that are consolidated as far as practicable". Part of the right to self-determination of these black states, "is to allow them to grow towards independence according to their own judgement". The Coloured and Indian communities are treated separately: the fourth point decrees "the division of powers between South African Whites, South African Coloureds and South African Indians with a system of consultation and co-responsibility so far as common interests are concerned".

With the possible qualified exception of the latter point, the others just quoted in fact sum up some of the basic causes of South Africa's alienation from the mainstream of world opinion. There is a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the basis upon which South Africa's political order should be built. Generally speaking, the South African Government, in line with its insistence that South African society is not homogenous, but instead is composed of various separate minorities or ethnic groups, each with its own identity it wishes to protect, is committed to a constitutional order which gives expression to these differences; constitutional arrangements should, in other words, institutionalise differences by creating separate political structures for each of the groups (i.e. Whites, Coloureds, Indians and the various ethnic units comprising the black population). But while the structures are separate, the fact of the matter is that they are not equal but subordinate to the white Parliament/...
Parliament, which is sovereign. The international community, by contrast — and again speaking in general terms — objects to a political dispensation which institutionalises racial differences — something they would tend to depict as racialism — and which, moreover, entrenches white minority rule. In addition, international opinion rejects the balkanisation of South Africa into separate black homelands and the granting of independence to them. As long as these features of the South African political system remain, the country cannot hope to effect any major improvement in its international standing. Since the first four sections of the 12-point plan clearly reaffirm the Government's commitment to some of the basic tenets of separate development, the four points do not hold any meaningful foreign policy benefits for South Africa. They may, on the contrary, jeopardise the potential foreign policy advantages held by some of the remaining sections of the 12-point plan.

It is of course appreciated that the 12-point plan, and least of all its first four items, was not in the first instance formulated for reasons of foreign policy; this acknowledgement, however, does not make the assessment of the plan's foreign policy implications any less valid.

Turning to the fourth point — the division of powers between Whites, Coloureds and Indians — it can be argued that it opens up some prospect of constitutional change in a direction away from a situation in which South Africa is governed in terms of a Verwoerdian-type master plan, and where constitution-making is a white monopoly. In this regard, the new, nominated President's Council will be a key institution. The foreign policy benefits which South Africa might derive from these new moves will, of course, depend on the nature of the President's Council's suggestions for constitutional change and on the Government's reaction thereto. The Council is, however, starting with several disadvantages: the facts that it is Government-nominated, it excludes Blacks, and the fact that the Government is already committed to rejecting any recommendation by the Council that it should be expanded to include Blacks. 48) Furthermore,
Prime Minister P W Botha has repeatedly tried to draw a distinction between the "division" of power and the "sharing" of power between Whites, Coloureds and Indians: he was emphatically opposed to the latter. He likewise rejected "(constitutional) models which are based on the idea of consociation", saying consociation "cannot succeed in a multiple, plural community because strife and conflict are inherent in it".

In practice, however, it may prove virtually impossible to draw a clear distinction between dividing and sharing power: if Coloureds and Indians were to become involved in joint decision-making with Whites on matters of 'common concern' at the central level — something already envisaged in the National Party's 1977 constitutional blueprint — this will clearly involve an element of power sharing. As for the consociational idea, it is rather ironical that this blueprint and also the Government's creation of the President's Council do indeed display some consociational features.

It can be added that the Government has also repeatedly come out against both "a unitary state with a system of 'one man, one vote' ", and "a federation ... in whatever form". The former, Mr P W Botha has argued, will not guarantee minority rights and self-determination, and would lead to a power struggle and a black dictatorship. Federation, he suggests, will likewise mean the loss of self-determination and will also impair effective decision-making. The supplementary statements, which do not appear in the concise 12-point programme, are important because they help to identify the contours of the fourth point and are therefore directly relevant in trying to assess the foreign policy implications of this particular aspect.

What, then, might the impact of the fourth point be on South Africa's foreign relations? Because the constitutional position of Coloureds and Indians is still under active consideration and no precise formula for the "division of power" has yet been devised, it is of course too early to try and judge foreign reaction to this provision of the 12-point plan. Nonetheless, it seems safe to assume that foreign expectations (in government circles) are pitched at a rather low level, because of the often deeply ingrained suspicions about the reformist intentions of the South African Government/...
Government and also because of some of the supplementary official statements indicating the narrow parameters of a new constitutional deal for Whites, Coloureds and Indians.

The fifth of the twelve points commits the Government to "the acceptance of the principle that, where at all possible, each population group should have its own schools and live in its own community as being fundamental to social contentment". This is a highly contentious subject, for it deals with so-called group areas. Group areas have long been regarded (by both supporters and critics of the Government) as one of the pillars of separate development or apartheid, and it has in fact been legislated for. Group areas are also one of the features of apartheid which has drawn the strongest condemnation both locally and abroad. As long as the group areas policy remains legally and rigidly enforced, it will be difficult to convince the international community of the genuineness of political liberalisation in South Africa. Relaxing some of the legal provisions (e.g. with regard to manufacturing and trading activities), some official acquiescence in violations of these provisions, and a more lenient official policy on opening white universities to other races, may earn South Africa some marginal foreign policy benefits. Statutory group areas will, however, always remain a major obstacle to improving South Africa's international standing. As far as schooling is concerned, the problem - from a foreign policy perspective - is perhaps not so much the segregated nature of it, but the vast difference in official expenditure on and in facilities provided for white and black education.

The sixth point provides for "removing hurtful and unnecessary discriminatory measures". This, Mr P W Botha was quick to add, does not mean that he is in favour of "compulsory integration" or of "endangering my own people's right to self-determination". Needless to say, Government moves to abolish racial discrimination can only work to South Africa's advantage abroad. A mere verbal undertaking is, of course, wholly inadequate. A highly sceptical international community would want to see some rather dramatic/...
dramatic, highly visible moves in this field, such as doing away with the Immorality, Mixed Marriages and Separate Amenities Acts. While there may well be some understanding abroad for official caution on the level of 'high politics', further delay and prevarication in making good an undertaking already given in 1974 to remove hurtful discrimination, can only serve to harden international opinion against South Africa and to add grist to the mill of those who perceive South Africa as a static community, impervious to liberalisation through its internal dynamics.

The seventh point refers to "the recognition of economic interdependence and the properly planned utilisation of manpower". It appears to have a domestic rather than external applicability: having mentioned the point at one public meeting, Mr P W Botha immediately challenged the audience to try and deny "that we need the black and brown people for the economy of this country". The realities of economic integration between the races have, it is fair to say, been increasingly accepted by the South African Government and have resulted in official moves to de-ideologise economic activity. Foreign companies operating in South Africa, particularly those affected by the EEC Code of Conduct and the Sullivan Principles, are bound to welcome such steps. Indirectly, Western governments, too, have an interest, because it may somewhat ease the disinvestment pressures on them if their companies are seen to be operating under 'acceptable' conditions in South Africa.

Before proceeding to consider the next three points which deal with foreign policy matters, it is necessary to draw attention to what must be a crucial consideration in any assessment of the foreign policy implications of all those points which deal with aspects of domestic policies. Foreign opinion on domestic political initiatives will be fundamentally influenced by local Black, Coloured and Indian reaction thereto. The domestic acceptance of the 12-point plan will, in fact, condition the international response. Given that there is much in particularly the first five of the twelve points to which Black, Coloured and Indian opinion has/...
has taken strong, demonstrable exception, it has to be concluded that the 'domestic' half of the 12-point plan at this stage promises precious little foreign policy advantage for South Africa.

Turning to the points concerning foreign relations, the eighth involves "striving for a peaceful constellation of Southern African states with respect for each other's cultures, traditions and ideals". With the mass of publicity given to the Government's constellation design, this has undoubtedly become publicly the best known of the twelve points. The idea of creating a constellation, it should be explained, was not first raised in the 12-point plan but it had in fact already become a major policy priority of the Botha Government several months before the 12-point plan was first unveiled publicly. But despite its salience, there is no need to discuss the constellation proposal in any detail, because a good deal has lately been written on it elsewhere. It will therefore suffice to confine the present discussion to considering the viability of the constellation idea as a foreign policy option.

Despite the constellation now having taken on a primarily 'internal' character, as will be explained below, there can be no doubt that it was initially designed as a foreign policy initiative in the first instance; even today, the 'external' or foreign policy dimension remains an essential part of official thinking on the constellation. Thus, there has been and still is talk of the eventual establishment of a comprehensive grouping of co-operating states in Southern Africa: comprehensive in terms of the number of states involved, areas of co-operation embraced and formal structures created. As for the states to be drawn into the constellation, Mr R F Botha, the Foreign Minister, has on more than one occasion referred to between seven and ten independent states, comprising some 40 million people, joining forces in the proposed constellation. In July 1980, Mr P W Botha declared that the constellation was open to "any state in the sub-continent which recognises the existing economic and other interrelationship (especially he presumably meant interrelationships) between itself and other states in Southern/..."
Southern Africa, and wishes to co-operate in a regional context.\textsuperscript{61} The areas in which constellation partners should, in South Africa's view, co-operate, cover a very wide spectrum. They are not merely confined to such technical, relatively non-contentious matters as agriculture, transport, trade and medicine, but also extend to political and military/security issues.\textsuperscript{62} The formal structures being envisaged by South Africa, are a council of state, as the representative deliberating organ, and international secretariats.\textsuperscript{63}

These ideas on the nature of the constellation scheme are based on a set of crucial assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that the "moderate" countries of Southern Africa all face a common "Marxist threat" and cannot rely on the Western powers for support. The security of Whites and Blacks is indivisible, and other differences or disputes ought to be subordinated to a joint struggle against their common Marxist enemies.\textsuperscript{64}

Secondly, it is assumed that the constellation would be built on the basis of the existing regional order - the essential components of which are set out in the first four sections of the 12-point plan. For South Africa, one feature of the regional order is the existence of former black South African homelands as sovereign independent states. Thirdly, the implicit, and often explicit, assumption is that the centripetal forces at work in Southern Africa - particularly economic but also political and military/security - were inexorably steering the countries in the region (or most of them at any rate) towards ever closer and more formal relationships. The centrifugal elements, it is assumed, would in the end inevitably submit to the force and indeed the logic of those making for stronger regional ties. Such notions are related to the fact that close economic ties already exist between South Africa and black Southern African states and these ties have, moreover, been institutionalised in some cases - notably in the Southern African Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area.\textsuperscript{65}

The argument is, in other words, that a sound basis for further formal inter-state economic co-operation already exists; the spill-over factor would see to its expansion.

Being/...
Being based on such assumptions, there is very little chance of
the envisaged comprehensive regional constellation materialising.
The basic reason is that the political and ideological divisions between
South Africa and black African states are such that the latter are bound
to be unwilling to formalise relations with the Republic much further,
and least of all to formalise them in the political and military/security
areas. In addition, there is no possibility of internationally recognised
black states (and thus members of the OAU) joining a formal association
which *inter alia* comprises independent, non-recognised former "Bantustans"
as their full and equal partners. The black states' central concern is
that closer ties with South Africa, particularly if it were to involve
non-economic areas of interaction, might compromise their stand against
separate development and even implicate them in the maintenance of it, or
lend respectability to it. The political and ideological divisions, in
other words, militate against the notion of a spill-over factor and against
the assumption of shared perceptions between South Africa and black African
states regarding the nature of external (i.e. extra-regional) threats and
the need for a common military-cum-political response. It is therefore
not surprising that Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe — all
'prospective' constellation members — have turned their backs on South
Africa's design, and instead joined the Southern African Development
Co-ordination Council of nine black states.

The constellation has nonetheless been formalised, but in a much
reduced form: the members are South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and
Venda. (Following its planned independence on 4 December 1981, Ciskei
is likely to join the constellation too.) In this shape, it is possible
to describe the constellation as essentially an internal device to
restructure relations between present and former parts of the South African
state. The contention is strengthened by Mr P W Botha's equating of
the constellation with a "confederation". This internal dimension is
bound to deter internationally recognised black states joining the
constellation/...
constellation for fear that it would, as mentioned, implicate them in the policy of separate development, apart from also implying recognition of the independence of former homelands. It is also doubtful whether South Africa would succeed in attracting non-member states to the constellation by offering economic 'rewards'. Despite the fact that economic programmes have been accorded top priority in the constellation, non-members would probably have noted Mr P W Botha's statement that "in the final analysis, the constitutional-political, social, security and other dimensions are also crucial to the success of the constellation programme". This statement of course fits in with the idea that the constellation should take the form of a confederation, but it may well have the effect of deterring non-member states from becoming involved in even the constellation's economic activities for fear that this would draw them into the other more contentious areas of interaction. In short, the constellation's primary identification with South Africa's domestic policies leaves serious doubt about its viability as a true foreign policy initiative.

Whatever the chances of success of the wider regional constellation, an aspect which requires emphasis, is the connection between South Africa's regional policy and its concern with national security. One of the bases of South Africa's initial (highly ambitious) constellation design was the close economic ties and the perceived potential for greater co-operation which exist between the Republic and surrounding black states. National security, in turn, nowadays has a higher salience than ever before, as the TNS so clearly illustrates. Prof. Gerrit Olivier, of the University of Pretoria, argues that South African policy-makers hope to change the nature of the conflict situation in Southern Africa through economic co-operation. "To put it in a nutshell, South Africa offers material progress in exchange for peaceful co-existence", he maintains. "One could conclude, therefore, that to the extent that co-operation succeeds, the emphasis will shift away from national security". The political climate in Southern Africa however casts doubt on the prospects for increased co-operation between South Africa and black states. The formation of
the Southern African Development Co-ordination Council (SADCC) by nine black states not only reflects their determination to lessen their economic dependence on and indeed also co-operation with South Africa, but it is also another demonstration of the depth of the political and ideological divisions between them and South Africa. In a situation not conducive to the development of increasing co-operation between South Africa and black states in the region, the logical converse of Prof. Olivier's conclusion may well be the order of the day, namely that South Africa's emphasis on national security will become even stronger as black states become less inclined to co-operate with the Republic and more openly committed to the 'liberation struggle'. Circumstances indeed seem to favour the growth of conflictual rather than co-operative forces in Southern Africa.

The ninth point states "South Africa's firm determination to defend itself against interference from outside in every possible way". In expanding on this statement, Prime Minister Botha has asserted that "we are better able ... to defend South Africa militarily than ever before in the country's history" and he threatened that, if tested, South Africa "will hit back" for the sake of its "self-respect". By "interference", Mr Botha was also referring to external political interference; "(w)e are not speaking from a position of weakness", he warned, "we are speaking from a position of decency".

South Africa's insistence on (political) non-interference from abroad in what it regards as its internal affairs, is of course an established principle of its foreign policy. Mr Botha's pronouncements imply that South Africa is not only physically better able to resist such interference. His mention of "speaking from a position of decency" can be taken to refer to South Africa's domestic base, i.e. that the Republic's internal policies meet the requirements of "decency", or it can refer to the respectable manner in which South Africa believes it conducts its foreign policy, or to both. Regarding the "decency" of domestic policies, it is worth/...
worth recalling that Dr Hilgard Muller, Foreign Minister, 1964-1977, introduced a new approach based on the premise that South Africa's domestic policies were in many respects in line with international standards as articulated in the UN Charter, instead of the established defensive approach which emphasised the uniqueness of South Africa's domestic problems. It seems a fair assumption that Mr Botha was not merely giving a parochial South African meaning to "decency", but that he was, in line with the approach initiated by Dr Muller, thinking in universally applicable terms; he was, in other words, suggesting that South Africa's domestic policies conformed to the international standards of the day. Mr Botha probably felt that his claims to morality were being strengthened by his reformist intentions in the domestic political arena. As far as "decency" in the conduct of foreign policy is concerned, South Africa would regard its professed adherence to the principle of non-interference as a primary manifestation thereof.

Turning to foreign military interference in South Africa, the major danger facing the country has long been that of unconventional warfare - or "Marxist terrorism". To try and counter this threat, South Africa has repeatedly issued stern warnings to neighbouring states that it would retaliate severely if they allowed their territories to be used as springboards for "terrorist" attacks - specifically by exile movements - against the Republic. The South African military raid on ANC quarters in Maputo in January 1981 was the first time South Africa openly attacked such a target on foreign soil. In the case of the Namibian war, South Africa has of course long been involved in military operations against SWAPO in Angola. It is safe to assume that South Africa, having now crossed the 'threshold' to offensive military action against foreign-based South African exile movements, will in future repeat such strikes. The idea of such action would not only be to strike a military blow at the exile movement's fighting ability, but also to serve as a warning to the host country. South Africa's military strike against the ANC in Mozambique/...
Mozambique should also be seen against the background of General Malan's warning in February 1981 that the Republic's enemies were trying to open a second front, besides Namibia, for "terrorist" activities against it. By attacking the ANC in its Maputo base, South Africa was, General Malan suggested, taking preventive action. It is worth recalling that the notion of South Africa's (communist) enemies trying to weaken the country by forcing it to fight simultaneously on several military fronts is not new; Prime Minister B J Vorster in 1976 referred to this danger, adding that South Africa had avoided it by not intervening in Mozambique following decolonisation.

Another way in which South Africa has tried, and is in fact still trying, to counter the "terrorist threat", is by offering to conclude non-aggression pacts with black African states. One of the key provisions of such agreements would of course be an undertaking by both parties not to allow their territories to be used as bases for military attacks against one another. Thus far, there have been no takers for Pretoria's offer — except for the three independent former homelands — and there are unlikely to be any in future either. Black states would no doubt fear that being parties to such agreements would implicate them in the safeguarding of South Africa's political status quo.

In addition to the "terrorist" threat, South African policy-makers have, more recently, also begun to point to the danger of a conventional war being launched against the Republic from surrounding states. The amassing of conventional arms in some of these countries is cited in support of this view. This situation has led General Malan to the conclusion that South Africa, because of its geographical location, its minerals, infrastructure and prosperity, still remains one of the communists' primary targets. The possibility of a conventional military onslaught on South Africa has indeed added a major new dimension to its security situation and will be presented as confirmation of official views on the seriousness/...
Seriousness of the external threat — and concomitantly, of the need for a 'total' national response.

In the absence of both non-aggression treaties and growing regional co-operation as envisaged in the constellation idea, South Africa will be compelled to rely increasingly on other means to try and counter the military dangers facing it, viz. issuing threats, resorting to military action and manipulating economic ties with black states. The realisation of Mr P W Botha's eighth point — a comprehensive constellation of states co-operating in economic, political and military matters — would of course have obviated the need for such measures by creating for South Africa a favourable, peaceful regional environment. Mr P W Botha's explanatory remarks under his ninth point reflect the unlikeliness of the envisaged constellation emerging: the need to issue threats of retaliation vividly underline the depth of political divisions and divergence of interests between South Africa and the black states in the region. Related to the pattern of interaction between national security and regional co-operation suggested by Prof. Olivier, it means that South Africa will place increasing emphasis on national security as the forces of conflict undermine those of co-operation in Southern Africa.

In terms of the tenth point, South Africa will follow "as far as possible, a policy of neutrality in the conflict between super powers, with priority given to Southern African interests". "Neutrality" and a pre-occupation with regional relations, Mr P W Botha goes on to explain, are two of the five "strategic options" open to South Africa in its foreign relations.

The first of these options, "the one we have traditionally selected", according to Mr Botha, "is to follow our natural instincts and align ourselves unreservedly with the West, on the side of democracy against communism". The time had, however, arrived for South Africa to review its relationship with the West, because the reciprocity inherent in an "alignment" was lacking. The Prime Minister has repeated the familiar charge/...
charge that "South Africa has been taken for granted by the West", saying that whatever treatment Western powers meted out to South Africa, "we could be relied upon to fall into line if there were an East/West crisis". The Western powers, in turn, far from trying to make South Africa an ally, were becoming increasingly critical of the Republic's domestic policies and some of them "have latterly adopted a threatening posture, rejecting our economic and military potential as a partner". Because Western powers were cold-shouldering South Africa militarily, he has insisted that they cannot expect South Africa to protect the Cape sea route for them. "If the West wants to protect its own interests, it will have to provide for that in its own way", Mr Botha said in 1979. This statement is in sharp contrast with one he made in 1968, when Minister of Defence, when he asserted that, if the non-communist world would not support South Africa as a strategic ally, the Republic would have to defend the Cape route alone, for its own and the free world's sake, whatever the sacrifices. A significant fact which emerges from this earlier statement is that South Africa at that time already had strong doubts about Western powers' reliability as allies of the Republic. It should be added that South Africa, despite its dissociative moves vis-à-vis the West, still insisted that it was of vital strategic importance to Western powers. Another complaint that has been repeated by Prime Minister Botha, is that the trust South Africa has placed in some Western countries to serve as "honest brokers" in the search for a settlement in Namibia (i.e. the Western "contact group") has been disappointed.

Because of all these factors, South Africa was no longer prepared to be taken for granted by the Western alliance, Mr Botha has insisted, adding that the Republic "will not necessarily" allow itself to be drawn into supporting the West "in future conflicts or competitive situations". Instead, South Africa will take a self-interested position and "negotiate the best advantages for ourselves". He was careful to stress that South Africa did not intend dismantling its strong economic ties with the West -
since it would be self-defeating - but he let it be known that the Republic "might not be averse to developing economic arrangements with other countries and groupings of countries". These stances, Mr Botha has explained, were the outlines of the second strategic option, viz. "qualified neutrality or neutrality".

It is important to note the connection between Mr Botha's first and second options: the idea of neutrality stems primarily from South Africa's alienation from the West, although the Prime Minister has on occasion presented this option as a reaction to the "unjust treatment" South Africa has been receiving from both super powers. South Africa's estrangement from the West is, of course, not a new phenomenon. In reaction to what was seen as the Western powers' indifference to the Republic's "strategic importance" to the West, South African policy-makers were already by the late 1960s openly questioning whether South Africa should maintain its traditional alignment with the West. While such views were then expressed only sporadically and failed to generate much ongoing interest, official suggestions about South Africa adopting a neutral stance between the East and West were much in evidence particularly in the years 1976/77 - a time during which South Africa's disenchantment with the West was, as already mentioned, very pronounced. Not only was it the aftermath of the Angolan war, but it was also a period in which Western criticism of South Africa's domestic situation intensified sharply, culminating in Western support for a mandatory UN arms embargo against the Republic in November 1977. In addition, South Africa expressed severe misgivings about the West's role in both the Rhodesian and Namibian issues. Against this background, Mr P W Botha in October 1976, when Minister of Defence, raised the question of whether South Africa should not take a more "neutral position" in the struggle between the major powers. In due course, Mr Botha became an active advocate of what can conveniently (albeit incorrectly) be designated the neutral option. It was only to be expected that the idea would be accorded a new prominence under his premiership. Although the propagation of a neutral stance is today still firmly related to the state of South Africa's/...
Africa's relations with the West, it must be said that this option can no longer simply be regarded as little more than a sporadic and emotive reaction to perceived Western weakness or unreliability. By including it in his 12-point plan, Mr Botha has formally elevated the neutral option to a definite foreign policy objective.

The new status accorded to the neutral option has been reflected in Foreign Minister R F Botha's address to the Swiss-South African Association in Zürich in March 1979. In what was, according to him, a "carefully worded" statement reflecting the Government's attitude, Mr Botha said:

Thus far we have been a target for many and diverse forces. We have attracted stormy weather. However we have no intention of remaining a target. We have the will and the desire and the technical skills and the resources to set up targets of our own, new objectives to be achieved. These targets would include the achievement of peace and stability in the whole of Southern Africa, reinforcement of mutual trust among the leaders and nations of our region and the establishment of a subcontinental solidarity which could form the basis for close co-operation in all the important spheres of life. We will have to give serious consideration to the desirability of adopting a neutral position in international affairs, a neutral position in the struggle between East and West. Our sole commitment ought to be towards the security and advancement of our own Southern African region. Southern Africa could steer a new course of its own midway between East and West.

As in the Prime Minister's explanation of his tenth point, the Foreign Minister also coupled the adoption of a "neutral position" to a new emphasis on South Africa's regional relations. The tenth point is therefore linked to the eighth, which deals with the creation of a regional constellation of states.

Having/...
Having noted the official statements on the neutral option, a brief assessment of some of its possible implications is called for. An obvious comment to make at the outset is that these statements display either confusion or ignorance, or both, in policy-making circles regarding the meaning of the concepts used. In referring to "the option of qualified neutrality or neutralism", Mr P W Botha was in fact not using – as he probably thought he was – two synonymous concepts, but two fundamentally different ones. "Neutrality is defined as an international legal condition or status which enables a country, as far as its foreign relations are concerned, to remain uninvolved in international disputes or armed conflict", according to Venter.97) Neutralism, on the other hand, is the "militant variant" of non-alignment. A neutralist posture in foreign policy should be seen in the context of the North-South divide, "an idealistic concern for world peace, an endeavour to play a mediatory role in the 'cold war' and a determination to eliminate the use of force in international politics". In practice, as Venter mentions, this typical Third World foreign policy stance adds pressures of its own – primarily due to its militancy – to those of the opposing super powers. Non-alignment means that a state refuses to commit itself to an alliance with either power bloc engaged in the 'cold war'. Perhaps the major function of a non-aligned posture is to maximise a state's freedom of manoeuvre in international politics and to base its actions solely on the dictates of national interest.98)

There may well have been an element of real neutrality in the Government's advocacy of a "neutral position", in that South Africa would not, in the event of a major East-West war, participate on either side but instead formally declare itself neutral. Venter has, however, made the point that the modern phenomenon of "total war" severely limits the utility of neutrality as a legal restraint on belligerents. In addition, neutrality is only a viable posture in a bipolar situation if the crucial interests of the neutral state are not threatened by either of the opposing forces.99)

In view/...
In view of these considerations, it appears that neutrality is an option of very restricted usefulness or viability in South Africa's foreign relations. South Africa has for too long been an international cause célèbre and has also become too entangled in the East-West ideological conflict to be able to extricate itself and become a 'spectator' of the tensions and conflicts inherent in present-day international relations. What is more, the official content given to the notion of a total onslaught makes it clear that South Africa considers its crucial interests being seriously threatened by the communist powers. There is also reason to doubt whether the Soviet Union and its allies would, in the event of an East-West war, respect South African claims to neutrality.

As far as non-alignment/neutralism is concerned, it should be borne in mind that states adopting such a posture enjoy some measure of acceptance from both East and West - and are in effect 'courted' by both - and, of course, also from within the non-aligned group. The so-called non-aligned states have, furthermore, aligned themselves in a formal association - the Non-Aligned Movement - which, through its regular conferences, endeavours to formulate common political strategies for member states. South Africa, it is only too obvious, is far removed from the mainstream of non-alignment, not to mention neutralism. Unlike the non-aligned states (or most of them, at any rate), South Africa is faced with hostility from both East and West and its support is not seen as a desirable diplomatic attribute by either. The Republic is, in addition, the object of unremitting criticism from the non-aligned states. South Africa therefore has no chance of joining the non-aligned ranks, and least of all those of its more militant members, the neutralist countries. If South Africa contemplates becoming 'non-aligned', it would be a new variant thereof: based not on its acceptability to the two opposing ideological blocs and the non-aligned group, but instead on its unacceptability. Such a posture would in the end leave South Africa as ostracised as ever, because a new foreign policy orientation is unlikely to produce meaningful diplomatic benefits if it is not accompanied - and indeed supported - by changes to the domestic base.

To return/...
To return to the remaining strategic options listed by Mr P W Botha, the third one is "the opposite one to alliance with the West". He would not expand beyond saying that "any overtures" from the Soviet Union "would require objective assessment in the same way as overtures from any other quarter". Although Mr Botha's reference to the "opposite" of an alliance with the West strictly speaking means an alliance with the East, it is highly unlikely that this was his intention. He was probably merely thinking of coming to some understanding with an ideological opponent of the West. His statement does, nonetheless, sound strange, considering South Africa's consistent, uncomprising anti-communist stand.\(^{100}\) In fact, in the very address in which he discussed South Africa's strategic options, the Prime Minister also restated an old South African strategic doctrine, viz. "that the Republic will have to be practical in helping to counter foreign intervention and especially communism far north of its present borders". Unless South Africa was prepared to do this, Mr Botha maintained, "we will go through a steady process of restriction and strangulation".\(^{102}\)

Suggestions about South Africa reaching some understanding with communist powers have nonetheless been made from time to time, both in official and unofficial circles. The most articulate proposal has been that of Mr John Chettle, Washington director of the South Africa Foundation. In a lengthy treatise published in 1977, he argued that South Africa had more to fear from the United States, given the changeable nature of its foreign and domestic policies, than from the Soviet Union. He suggested that South Africa should abandon its alliance with the West and adopt a new "neutralist" strategy which would include the development of a new relationship with the Soviet Union and participation with the USSR and African countries in a cartel arrangement involving strategic minerals. Mr Chettle also held out the possibility of developing a similar relationship with the People's Republic of China, particularly if the USSR was not interested. He maintained, however, that the attractiveness of his proposed strategy did not depend on Soviet acceptance; the mere knowledge/...
knowledge that South Africa was thinking in these terms, and doing something to implement its new strategy, would cause American policymakers to think again. 103) Dr P C Eidelberg, a University of South Africa historian, in an article published in 1980, also advocated the idea that South Africa should seek an accord with the USSR over the sale of strategic minerals. In addition, South Africa should try and reach an understanding with the Soviet Union on Southern Africa, which would make it possible for the constellation of states to be endorsed by both Pretoria and Moscow. 104) Dr C P Mulder, then Minister of Information, in 1977 hinted that South Africa might try and establish relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis that "my enemy's enemy is my friend". 105) The enemy in this case was, of course, the Soviet Union.

Mr P W Botha's reference to Moscow, however, indicates that the Soviet Union rather than China is considered the leading communist candidate meriting South African attention and possible approaches. This is no doubt, as Eidelberg implies, due to the USSR's active involvement in Southern African affairs and the threat which this is perceived to pose to South Africa. Thus, while on the one hand taking a resolutely anti-Soviet line and emphasising the grave nature of the Soviet threat to the Republic, Mr Botha's statement seems to suggest that South Africa has on the other hand not rejected the idea of trying to come to some understanding with the USSR as a means of countering the very Soviet threat. This interpretation might be regarded as being reinforced by the fact that South Africa maintains trade links with the Soviet Union and its satellites; 106) a tangible basis for an understanding therefore exists, in terms of such thinking.

In practice, the chances of South Africa reaching even a covert or tacit understanding with the USSR and the latter consequently abandoning or greatly curtailing activities in Southern Africa which are detrimental to South African interests, are effectively nil. If so, the Prime Minister's reference/...
reference to overtures from the USSR should rather be seen as a gesture designed for Western consumption; it is a way of reaffirming South Africa's disenchantment with the West and its determination to pursue a "neutral" foreign policy which would leave it free to establish relations on both sides of the great ideological divide. Whether this message will impress Western powers is doubtful, for they too are bound to be highly sceptical of the chances of a Pretoria-Moscow accord, whether on economic or non-economic matters.

The fourth strategic option identified by Mr P W Botha, "would be to avoid any sort of commitment to any of the major powers and to seek to develop an alliance with other middle-rank powers whose political philosophies have something in common with ours". In this regard, South Africa has the advantage, he added, of not being encumbered by membership of any existing alliance. Mr Botha has, however, acknowledged that "the shifting fortunes and instability of many of these states may make this a hazardous enterprise". The Prime Minister was, quite clearly, speaking of the so-called pariah option, i.e. a coming together of outcast states. Again, this is not a new suggestion. It has been raised in the past, by Mr Botha among others, and, significantly, coincided with particularly low points in South Africa's relations with the West.107)

South Africa has, it is true, cultivated close ties with two other 'pariah' states in particular, viz. Israel and Taiwan. Prime Minister Vorster visited Israel in April 1976 and signed a wide range of agreements on co-operation between the two countries.108) In October 1980, Mr P W Botha paid a return visit to Taiwan after Prime Minister Sun Yun-Suan had visited South Africa in March that year. The two states entered into agreements on co-operation in various fields.109) South Africa also maintains reasonably close ties with some South American 'pariahs' - notably Paraguay110) - but there is no such thing as a 'pariah community' to which South Africa belongs, or an alliance between the Republic and one or more other 'pariahs'.

Recent/...
Recent events in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Iran - all formerly more or less in the league of 'pariahs' - confirm Mr P W Botha's remark that "the shifting fortunes and instability" of many of these states may make an alliance with them "a hazardous enterprise". For one thing, many outcast states typically desire to be readmitted to the Western community and once this has been done - usually through domestic political change in the state concerned - the 'pariah' easily turns its back on its former fellow-outcasts.

Although South Africa's 'pariah' option is primarily the result of its alienation from the Western community, it should be said that the nature of the relationships that have been built up with Israel and Taiwan, in particular, make this much more than a mere rhetorical exercise or a cheap display of hurt innocence vis-à-vis the West. There are undeniable benefits for South Africa - economic, technological and probably also military - in its close ties with these states. It does indeed make good sense for the Republic to turn to other friendly 'pariahs' for some essential goods and services if Western countries are, due to political considerations, becoming unwilling of unreliable sources of supply. South Africa's 'pariah' partners, in turn, no doubt also derive material advantages from their relationships with the Republic. But apart from considerations of material self-interest, 'pariahs' characteristically also perceive other common interests, such as being small or middle-rank powers faced with a serious external, usually communist or communist-inspired, threat. A close, mutually beneficial 'pariah' relationship does not necessarily lead to an alliance. It is in any case doubtful whether 'pariahs' geographically far removed from one another and each with very localised interests, would regard an alliance - which is normally associated with a contractual relationship between two or more states for mutual military assistance in the event of an attack against any member - as either desirable or feasible. There is, however, an aspect of military co-operation between 'pariahs' which is bound to cause serious concern among Western powers in particular, viz. nuclear co-operation. If Western powers/...
powers impose restrictions on the export of nuclear technology to 'pariahs', it is only to be expected that the outcast states would try and overcome the imposed difficulties through mutual co-operation. For a 'pariah' state perceiving a threat to its survival, it should be said, the acquisition of nuclear arms can hardly be excluded as an option.

In view of the connection between South Africa's 'pariah' status and the state of its relations with Western powers, some consideration ought to be given to the implications which an improvement in the Republic's relations with the United States might have for its ties with other outcast states. Mr Ronald Reagan's election as American President has raised cautious hopes in South Africa that relations between the two countries would improve, after the sharp deterioration experienced during the Carter Administration. These hopes have been strengthened by Mr Reagan's conciliatory remarks about South Africa on 3 March 1981.\(^{13}\) The South African Government lost no time in welcoming President Reagan's "realism" and "understanding".\(^{14}\) The new noises from Washington are bound to raise expectations in South Africa that there will now not merely be a change in emphasis but indeed also in essence, in American policy towards the Republic.

'Pariah' states, it has been noted, usually aspire to being readmitted to the Western community. South Africa, it can be accepted, is no exception to the general rule. For South Africa to assume that recent American pronouncements presage the Republic's return to the Western fold, would, however, be downright unrealistic. South Africa still has a very long way to go down the road of political reform before it becomes "a society with which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constraint, embarrassment or political damage". To promote the emergence of such a society - which means a "nonracial" one - should, according to Dr Chester A Crocker, now American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, be the fundamental goal of United States policy towards South Africa. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, he/...
he suggested that this goal should be achieved by a "creibly organised" combination of pressure and support: pressure for political change and support for "positive movement".  

While the goal of American, and indeed also other Western powers', policies towards South Africa is the creation of a society which would no longer be ostracised by the international community, the Republic will in the meantime - which is the foreseeable future - remain a 'pariah', albeit perhaps one reforming or rehabilitating itself and receiving some Western support and encouragement in the process. If this were to be the case, there is clearly no justification for South Africa to reconsider its close ties with other 'pariahs'. In fact, it still needs them in a very material sense, as previously mentioned. It is unlikely that American 'rewards' for positive movement in the Republic would be such that South Africa would be able to satisfy all its needs for imported high technology in the West. For one thing, Dr Crocker favours continued American adherence to the United Nations arms embargo as being "symbolically important".

Thus, while a new convergence of Western, particularly American, and South African interests might develop in future, there will still remain a perhaps even stronger identity of interests between South Africa and some of its 'pariah partners'. In addition, South Africa's 'pariah' connections are hardly an impediment to closer ties with the West, least of all the United States under the Reagan Administration. In short, South Africa's pursuit of both closer ties with the West and a strengthening of its 'pariah' relationships are not two mutually exclusive objectives.

The final strategic option has already been touched on, viz. "to look to our hinterland and concentrate on our relations with Africa, in particular with our immediate region". Apart from it being linked to the neutral option, the emphasis on regional relations is also one of the policy objectives in Mr P W Botha's 12-point plan. There is no need for any further/...
further discussion of the 'regional imperative', except to note that
the various options listed by the Prime Minister are not mutually exclusive;
thus, the focus on South Africa's immediate external environment is, at
least in official thinking, coupled with the neutral option. In fact, of
the five options it is apparently only the first - unqualified alignment
with the West - which is being rejected by the Government. All the
others seem to be regarded as viable, to a greater or lesser extent, and,
moreover, well within the limits of the 12-point plan.

The five strategic options, to recapitulate, were considered in the
context of the tenth of the twelve policy objectives, viz. "a policy of
neutrality in the conflict between super powers". It now remains to
consider briefly the two final sections of the 12-point plan.

The eleventh point concerns "the maintenance of effective decision-
making by the State, which rests on a strong Defence Force and Police Force
to guarantee orderly government as well as efficient, clean administration".
At first sight, this statement may not seem to have any direct relevance
to foreign policy, but the reference to "decision-making" does raise the
question of foreign policy making. There are two aspects which deserve
mention in this regard, both related to Mr P W Botha's style of government.
The first concerns the so-called rationalisation of the state apparatus
and the way this affects the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the second
deals with the influence which the military bring to bear on foreign policy
making in view of the Prime Minister having previously been Minister of
Defence.

There is a popular notion, both locally and abroad, that the military
today constitute a primary, if not actually dominant, influence in foreign
policy formulation. Reference is then usually made to the State Security
Council (SSC) as evidence for this contention. The SSC is, without doubt,
the most important of the five cabinet committees. It is not a new body,
having been established by law in 1972. Under Prime Minister Vorster,
twenty different cabinet committees existed, and the SSC, like the others, only met sporadically, while there also appears to have been little co-ordination of the various committees' activities. Since becoming Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha has reduced the number of cabinet committees to five permanent ones, and introduced regular meetings and proper co-ordination. The SSC is the only cabinet committee created by law and in fact the only one of which the fixed membership is therefore largely known to the public; the composition of the other cabinet committees remains a closely guarded official secret. In terms of the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, 1972, the SSC is composed of the Prime Minister (chairman); the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police; the senior Cabinet Minister, if not already included under the portfolios just listed; other co-opted Ministers (no specific provisions), and certain heads of Departments (again, no specific provisions). The functions of the SSC include advising the Government with regard to the formulation and implementation "of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic".

Since the making of South Africa's foreign policy is presently the subject of a separate and more detailed study, it will suffice to say here that the military do indeed, particularly via the SSC, provide a major input into foreign policy making, but that this is by no means the dominant influence it is popularly made out to be. It can rather be argued that the SSC provides an essential forum for the co-ordination of the most important foreign policy inputs and for their in-depth consideration. By providing a forum for various interests, the SSC in effect helps to prevent a single 'interest group', such as the military, having a disproportionate influence on foreign policy. Given the conflict situations in Southern Africa, it is however, only to be expected that the military have a very direct and material interest in South Africa's regional relations. Regarding policy towards countries further afield, it is safe to assume that the Department of Foreign Affairs provides the major input. On the whole, the SSC creates some form of checks and balances in the formulation of foreign policy, and is decidedly not a mere vehicle for the military/...
military to impose its will in foreign policy matters. As far as domestic policies are concerned, it can be added in parenthesis, the military probably have a liberalising influence, compared with the National Party caucus. Senior military officers have on several occasions publicly expressed the need for internal political reform and for winning the 'hearts and minds' struggle; unlike National Party politicians, military leaders are not constrained by party political exigencies.

The twelfth, and final, point commits the Government to "the maintenance of free enterprise as the basis of our economic and financial policy". In a foreign policy context, this raises two aspects. The first, which has already been mentioned in the discussion of the seventh point, relates to the Government's moves to abolish artificial, ideologically motivated constraints on the operation of market forces. The second aspect deals with the role of the South African private sector in realising the Government's constellation plans (the eighth point).

Mr P W Botha has, from the outset, been patently keen to harness the resources of private enterprise in pursuit of his constellation ideal and to establish a new, mutually beneficial partnership between government and big business - an approach symbolised, above all, in the Carlton conference in November 1979. This emphasis on the role of the private sector fits in with South Africa's attempts to present the constellation as an incomparably better alternative to the "Marxist order" which has taken root in some Southern African countries. South Africa is, in effect, trying to promote a counter-ideology based on free enterprise. The anti-Marxist strain of the constellation showed up prominently at the Pretoria summit of the four constellation partners in July 1980, where they agreed on a declaration to promote private enterprise.

In trying to promote the constellation, South Africa is fond of not only contrasting the potential material benefits of the constellation with the poor record of Marxist formulas in Africa, but also of highlighting the serious economic problems facing many African countries. The message being/...
being conveyed is clear enough: economic "salvation" for the black states lies in close economic links with South Africa — for those in Southern Africa, it means participation in the constellation.

Conclusion

In attempting to assess the foreign policy implications of South Africa's TNS, one dare not lose sight of the fact that the 12-point plan — which provides the policy objectives of TNS — is essentially an internally oriented programme. Not only is it designed for a domestic audience in the first place, but it is also primarily a framework for domestic rather than foreign policy. Another important feature which has to be mentioned, is that the 12-point plan has been drawn firmly into the party-political arena. The Government has served notice that the plan will be used as the National Party's platform in the coming general election on 29 April 1981.

The 12-point plan's primary domestic focus is nevertheless of direct relevance in trying to determine some of its foreign policy implications. The reason is only too evident: South Africa's domestic policies have a profound impact on its foreign policy. The internal policies will in fact largely determine the success or failure of the foreign policy objectives set out in the 12-point plan. This means that any foreign policy benefits which the plan may have, will in the first instance be found in those sections setting out domestic policy objectives, rather than in those dealing with foreign policy matters.

When looking at the domestic components of the 12-point plan, a number of observations can be made. Firstly, if it is, as Mr Botha claims, "the National Party's plan for South Africa", the 12-point plan is inevitably heavily status quo oriented and reaffirms the Party's adherence to some of the fundamental tenets of separate development. Secondly, by being presented as the "only alternative" for South Africa, the 12-point plan has, as already suggested, acquired zero-sum features. This is, however, to...
some extent qualified by virtue of the fact that many of the points are vaguely formulated. This is perhaps deliberate, and it does allow for some latitude in both interpretation and implementation. As far as interpretation is concerned, the impending general election is bound to provide an important guide to the real meaning of some of these points. If the National Party decides to place a particularly conservative construction on the 12-point plan, it may well produce negative foreign policy results in the sense that it may further undermine whatever remains of the National Party's image abroad as a vehicle for substantial political reform. True, it is in the final analysis the implementation rather than verbal interpretations of the 12-point plan which determine foreign opinion (and informed opinion abroad may also make some allowance for electoral exigencies), but a preponderantly 'negative' slant in authoritative interpretations could only add to the reservoir of foreign suspicion about the Government's commitment to political change, and in the end perhaps make it that much more difficult to 'sell' actual reform abroad.

Thirdly, it must once again be emphasised that the crucial factor conditioning foreign reaction to the 12-point plan's domestic objectives will be local Black, Coloured and Indian reaction. There is, in short, very little chance of these objectives producing a favourable and meaningful response abroad, if they fail to find favour among at least a sizeable section of Black, Coloured and Indian leadership.

The third observation just mentioned, leads to another vital consideration, viz. the difficulty of gaining general acceptance among South Africa's various racial groups, of the 12-point plan's domestic policy objectives. To make "the National Party's plan" a truly national plan with which the majority of the population can openly identify, is bound to prove particularly difficult; Blacks, Coloureds and Indians are unlikely to come out in general support of Government policy objectives which are so heavily status quo oriented. The lack of a broad national consensus regarding basic political objectives among the various racial groups...
composing South Africa's plural society effectively undermines the notion of a total national strategy. But uniting the South African population behind the 12-point plan's policy objectives is not the only problem; there is good reason to doubt whether the Government's perception of a total onslaught is generally shared among Blacks, Coloureds and Indians. It is impossible to escape the impression that what Whites would generally perceive as a threat, the other racial groups tend to welcome as a contribution to their 'liberation'.

Thus, the situation exists where the South African population appears deeply divided about the nature of the threat facing them and the nature of the counter-strategy required. Mr P W Botha has admitted that "in a democracy it is difficult to launch a national strategy because there are inherent divisions in a democracy". Although his remark seems to have been confined to divisions among Whites, he went on to state his conviction that "this 12-point plan, if positively implemented, is the correct way in which the security, prosperity and freedom of the Republic and its population groups may be assured". It seems a fair comment that Mr Botha still has to prove to the population groups other than the Whites, that the 12-point plan is indeed the "correct way". As long as they do not share his conviction, the 12-point plan will merely remain a partisan programme of political objectives, and TNS will therefore fall far short of a total national mobilisation of the country's human resources in a common cause.

Before offering a few comments on the sections of the 12-point plan relating to foreign policy, reference should be made to the seventh point, which deals with economic interdependence and manpower utilisation. Economic interdependence, it has been suggested, seems to have a primary domestic meaning in the sense of recognising the racially integrated nature of the South African economy. Perhaps the Government had more in mind than this, and also meant economic interdependence to refer to the new concept of regional economic development transcending political boundaries. In view of the prominence that the Government has recently been giving to this/...
this notion, particularly in the context of a constellation, it would seem to merit specific mention in the 12-point plan - whether as part of the seventh point, or the eighth, which deals with a constellation.

The creation of a constellation of Southern African states, together with a policy of "neutrality", are really the two main foreign policy matters mentioned in the 12-point plan. It will suffice to restate that there is very little chance of a comprehensive regional constellation embracing South Africa, its former homelands and some OAU member states, and providing for co-operation in economic and non-economic matters, being established. Instead, the constellation which has already taken shape is bound to be the best South Africa can expect, viz. a grouping of present and former parts of the South African state. In this sense, the constellation becomes more an instrument of domestic rather than foreign policy.

As for "neutrality", South Africa is unlikely to be able to extricate itself from the prevailing East-West ideological conflict, or to strengthen its position internationally, or to check international criticism of its internal arrangements, by purporting to adopt a non-aligned posture. South Africa's domestic policies have for too long been internationalised and, moreover, caught up in the East-West conflict, for the Republic to be able to detach itself in this way. Under these circumstances, South Africa cannot hope to become a non-aligned state in the traditional sense of the word or to expect the customary benefits of non-alignment. The Republic can, however, declare its determination not to be automatically drawn into an East-West war as a Western ally. But having been effectively excluded from the Western defence community since the Second World War (save for the Berlin airlift and the Korean conflict in the early post-war years), it is questionable whether such a declaration would cause undue concern in the West. In the end, South Africa seems to be left with a rather unique kind of non-alignment in which it is rejected by both opposing blocs as well/...
as well as by the real non-aligned states, and only welcome in an
alignment of sorts with other 'pariahs'.

Since the 12-point plan also deals with foreign policy specifically,
it can justifiably be asked why it does not contain any reference to the
role of trade in South Africa's foreign relations. External trade has,
in fact, long been a major instrument of South African foreign policy,\(^{127}\) and the Republic has established itself as a leading trading country.
Having an open economy, heavily dependent on external trade, South Africa
also has a vested interest in free trade without political interference.
Although the Republic's commitment to free trade and its opposition to
economic boycotts and sanctions - to which it has long been subjected -
have repeatedly been stated, it is not reflected in the 12-point plan.

There is another notable, and related, omission from the 12-point
plan, viz. South Africa's strategic minerals. In view of South African
policy-makers persistent emphasis on the importance of its raw materials
to Western powers, it is surprising that the 12-point plan ignores this
matter. The minerals issue of course has wide ramifications, one being
the maintenance of a stable supply situation; this, in turn, raises the
vexed question of safeguarding political stability in South Africa.

The 12-point plan furthermore ignores the most pressing foreign
policy issue presently facing South Africa, viz. an internationally
acceptable solution in Namibia. In view of the rampant suspicions abroad
about South Africa's good faith in this matter, a statement of the Republic's
objectives is called for. Also ignored are South Africa's relations with
the United Nations. True, the UN features in the total onslaught,\(^{128}\) but
a positive statement of policy about what is after all a major factor in
South Africa's external environment, would seem in order.

A final foreign policy omission from the 12-point plan, is South Africa's
relations with black African states. The proposed constellation (the
eighth point) is simply no substitute for a considered policy statement on
relations/...
relations with black states. Given the salience of South Africa's relations with these countries in the days of dialogue and détente in the recent past, it is surprising that the 12-point plan ignores this vital part of South Africa's external milieu. The Government might have used the 12-point plan as a means of articulating a declaration of intent regarding relations with black African states. The suggestion of such a declaration is, of course, not new, but it remains a proposal worthy of serious official consideration.

Taking the 12-point plan as a whole, a striking feature is its diffuse nature and the partial lack of a sequential order among the twelve points. While the first seven points are related in that they refer to essentially domestic political and economic matters, the next three deal with foreign relations, followed by two concerned with state decision-making and the maintenance of free enterprise, respectively. It is difficult to see why the latter two points do not immediately follow after the first seven.

A consideration of a different nature which should be mentioned, is that the very concept of a total national strategy, of which the 12-point plan is part, tends to carry rather unfortunate connotations. Both locally and abroad, a whole range of unsavoury motives have been read into the TNS, above all that it is a strategy for more authoritarian official action in the face of a "total onslaught". While the concept may be a perfectly acceptable one in military circles, it is hardly one which is associated with policy-making in a state purporting to be democratic. Given South Africa's international standing, political reforms initiated in the name of a total national strategy are bound to be met with scepticism.

Apart from politically or morally inspired misgivings about TNS, there may also be doubts among South Africans and foreigners about the Republic's physical capability to launch a counter-strategy which can contain an onslaught as serious and dangerous as that portrayed by the Government. South Africa's physical power and its ability to maintain domestic stability,
compared with black African states, are established 'selling points' abroad, but these may be undermined by the official preoccupation with an awesome total onslaught. While the white electorate may well generally share the official perception of a total onslaught and rally around the Government's TNS, it has to be said that the emphasis on South Africa's threatened, embattled position may be counter-productive in a foreign policy sense, by creating doubts about the country's prospects for stability and, ultimately, survival.

Finally, and having suggested some of the 12-point plan's more obvious shortcomings, it should be reiterated that the plan has to be judged against the background of a variety of interacting forces, both domestic and foreign. The way in which the policy-makers react to them depends on their images of these forces - and images, it has been noted, do not easily correspond with reality. This study has been an attempt, albeit modest and exploratory, to assess some of the implications of these images, as articulated in TNS, for South Africa's foreign relations.
REFERENCES

1) See Southern Africa Record (SAIIA), No. 22, December 1980, for official statements on the total national strategy.

2) Holsti, K J, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Third Edition (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1977), p.367. Holsti defines image as "an individual's perceptions of an object, fact, or condition; his evaluation of that object, fact, or condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value; and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced from, that object, fact, or condition."


5) Toespraak deur Generaal Magnus Malan voor die Instituut vir Strategiese Studies: Universiteit van Pretoria: 3 September 1980 (Duplicated, by courtesy of ISSUP), 18pp. Unless otherwise stated, the quoted official statements on the total onslaught are from this address.

6) See also Mr P W Botha, in Republic of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly (Hansard)†, 21/3/1980, col.3317, and Toespraak deur Sy Edel P W Botha, DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens tydens die Republiekfeesvierings van die Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit op 30 Mei 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information)++, pp.3-6.

(† Debates of the House of Assembly hereafter abbreviated as HA Deb.
++ All the public addresses of Mr P W Botha referred to in this paper, have been made available in duplicated form by the Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information.)


10) Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 1/5/1980, col.5294. As far back as 1951, Prime Minister D F Malan declared that South Africa's non-white population was "a very fertile field for communist propaganda and agitation". His Government therefore regarded communism as both an external and internal threat. (Quoted by Geldenhuys, D J, Search, op.cit., p.3.)

11) Mr P W Botha has often spoken out on what he depicts as the UN's campaign of subversion and hate against South Africa. See Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha, LV, DVD, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van Nasionale Veiligheid, tydens die O.V.S. - Nasionale Party Kongres in Bloemfontein op 6 Augustus 1979, pp.9 & 10; Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha, LV, DVD, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van Nasionale Veiligheid tydens die opening van die Transvaalse Kongres op 17 September 1979, pp.7 & 8; Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van Nasionale Veiligheid tydens 'n openbare vergadering in die Parow Civic Centre op 24 September 1979 (Opening van die Kongres), p.17, and Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 28/1/1981, col.227.

12) HA Deb., 1/5/1980, col.5295. See also Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Pietersburg, op.cit., p.7; Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Koedoespoort, op.cit., pp.4 & 5 and Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Parow, op.cit., pp.10 & 11.

13) Beeld, 17/2/1981.


16)/...

17) Ibid., col.3317.

18) Ibid., col.3319. See also Eerste Minister, Sy Edele P W Botha, Onderhoud met mnr. Engel, Redakteur van "der Spiegel" op 17 Augustus 1979 om 09h30, Unie-geboue, Pretoria (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information, duplicated), pp.1 & 2.


22) HA Deb., 19/5/1980, col.6628.


31)
31) See *Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Bloemfontein*, op.cit., p.16; *Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Parow*, op.cit., p.14, and Mr Pik Botha, HA Deb., 19/5/1980, col.6627 & 6628.


33) See also Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 21/3/1980, col.3322 & 3323, on the "five power bases from which the total national strategy must operate".

34) The State Security Council is discussed on p.38, below.


37) Address by the Honourable P W Botha, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and of National Security, on the occasion of a National Party Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979, pp.24-27. Mr Botha has repeated his 12-point plan on several occasions - see, for example, *Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Bloemfontein*, op.cit., pp.22-25; *Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Koedoespoort*, op.cit., pp.11-13; *Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Transvaalse Kongres op 17 September 1979*, op.cit., pp.16-24, and *Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Parow*, op.cit., pp.21-24. The 12-point plan is appended - see pp.60-62, below.


In this study, the term "Black" is used to refer only to that group previously known, in official nomenclature, as "Bantu". It is recognised that limiting the application of the term "Black" in this manner is not altogether satisfactory, since a great many Coloureds and Indians also regard themselves as Blacks. However, for the purposes of the present study, it is important to draw a clear distinction between the various groups often lumped together until the rather offensive designation "non-white".


Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Parow, op.cit., pp.19 & 20.

See also Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Bloemfontein, op.cit., pp.18-20 and Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Transvaalse Kongres op 17 September 1979, op.cit., pp.14-16.

Unless otherwise stated, all the Prime Minister's statements on the 12-point plan quoted in this study, are from Address by the Honourable P W Botha ... Durban, op.cit., pp.24-27.

See Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 29/4/1980, col.5073. The premise of the National Party's racial policy has been formulated in the following terms by the Prime Minister: "Let us remember that the main problem for South Africa is a problem of minorities and we must create opportunities so that every minority in this country will feel safe and secure in the future. Its (sic) not only the White man that is a minority in this country; it is not only the Coloured and the Indian person who is part of a minority group in South Africa. You also have Black minority groups in this country. We must not think in terms of White/Black in South Africa. We have a number of minorities in this country."

(Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha, DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, tydens 'n openbare vergadering te Ladysmith, Natal, op 29 November 1980, p.6.)
48) HA Deb., 26/1/1981, col.30. Although he has committed himself to reject any recommendation by the President's Council that Blacks should be represented on it, Mr P W Botha has left open the door for accepting other far-reaching recommendations of the Council by saying that if it proposed "drastic departures" from Government policy, he would refer such proposals to the National Party's congresses and ultimately call a referendum to determine the (white) voters' views. (HA Deb., 27/1/1981, col.217. See also Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Ladysmith, op.cit., p.14.)

49) See the Prime Minister's explanation of the fourth point in his 12-point plan, in the addresses cited in note 37, above.


51) The constitutional blueprint was widely publicised by the National Party in 1977, and inter alia featured in a full-page advertisement in Die Burger, 5/11/1977.


54) The object of the Group Areas Act, originally promulgated in 1950 and subsequently amended several times, is to provide "for the establishment of group areas in which members of different groups could occupy or own land".

55)
During 1979-80, for example, the official per capita expenditure (including capital expenditure) on white education was R724; for Indian education, the figure was R357; R225 for coloured education, and R71 for black education. (Rand Daily Mail, 14/11/1980.)

See statement by Ambassador R F Botha, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, in the Security Council on 24 October 1974, in Southern Africa Record (SAIIA), No.1, March 1975, p.21: "I want to state here today very clearly and categorically: my Government does not condone discrimination purely on the grounds of race or colour. Discrimination based solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be defended. And we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour".


Address by the Hon. P W Botha, MP, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and of the National Intelligence Service at the opening ceremony of...
of the Summit Meeting in Pretoria on 23 July 1980, p.5.


64) Mr R F Botha, HA Deb., 5/6/1979, col.7801 and HA Deb., 6/6/1979, col. 7940. See also Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Stellenbosch, op.cit., p.23.

65) Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are linked with South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union. Customs Union receipts are a primary source of revenue for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In 1978/9, it composed 72,5% of Lesotho's total revenue, it was Swaziland's most important source of income in 1977/8 (amounting to E39 million++ per annum) and is presently contributing an estimated P38 million per annum to Botswana's budget. The Rand Monetary Area comprises South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. Although Lesotho and Swaziland have introduced their own currencies (the Maloti and Emalangeni respectively), the Rand remains legal tender in these countries and their currencies are backed by the Rand. (Figures quoted in Geldenhuys, D J, "Some strategic implications of regional economic relationships for the Republic of South Africa", ISSUP Strategic Review (University of Pretoria), January 1981, p.17.)

(+ E = Emalangeni
++ P = Pula).


67) Opening Address by the Prime Minister, the Honourable P W Botha, at the Annual Congress of the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM) in Johannesburg on 21 October 1980, p.39.

68) Olivier, G C, "Co-operation or national security? Choices and options for White and Black Africa", International Affairs Bulletin, Vol./...
69) See Geldenhuys, D J, The Constellation, op.cit., pp.16-20, on the origins of SADCC.

70) Consider, for example, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's increasingly outspoken support for the 'liberation struggle' against South Africa (compare The Star, 7/7/1980; The Star, 30/9/1980; Rand Daily Mail, 8/12/1980; Rand Daily Mail, 2/2/1981 and Beeld, 2/3/1981), and Zimbabwe's support for sanctions against South Africa in the UN General Assembly in March 1981 over the question of a Namibian settlement; South Africa's military attack on ANC quarters in Mozambique in January 1981 (see note 75, below), and the continuing conflict over Namibia.

71) See also Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 20/4/1979, col.4606, in which he refers to South Africa as "a Christian and a civilized State".


75) Rand Daily Mail, 31/1/1981.

76) Beeld, 17/2/1981.

77) HA Deb., 30/1/1976, col.357 & 358.

78) Non-aggression pacts between South Africa and black African states were first proposed by Prime Minister Vorster in 1977 (HA Deb., 15/9/1970, col.4208) - an offer since repeated by Mr P W Botha (HA Deb., 1/5/1980, col.5296).

79) General Malan, reported in Beeld, 17/2/1981.

80) Ibid.


82) See p.21, above.
83) Mr Botha outlined the five strategic options in Address by the Honourable P W Botha ... Durban, op.cit., pp.32-34. Unless otherwise stated, all the quotations relating to the five options are from this address.

84) See also Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Parow, op.cit., p.18.


87) See Eerste Minister ... Onderhoud met mnr. Engel, op.cit., pp.1 & 2.

88) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van Nasionale Veiligheid, tydens 'n openbare vergadering gehou te Swellendam op 7 Mei 1979, pp.4 & 5.


90) See pp.6 & 7, above.


93) See Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 28/2/1979, col.1502.

94) HA Deb., 6/6/1979, col.7884.

95) Address by the Hon. R F Botha ... Zürich, op.cit., pp.24 & 25.


97) Venter, T D, op.cit., pp.i & ii.

98) Ibid.

99) Ibid.

100) See, for example, Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Parow, op.cit., p.14.

101) ...

102) Address by the Hon. P W Botha ... Durban, op.cit., p.31. See also Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Koedoespoort, op.cit., p.14.


110) In April 1974, President Stroessner of Paraguay paid a state visit to South Africa (*The Star*, 3/4/1974), and Prime Minister Vorster made a return visit to Paraguay in August 1975 (*To the Point*, 22/8/1975).


113) In a nationwide television interview on 3 March, President Reagan inter alia said: "Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we have fought? A country that, strategically, is essential to the Free World in its production of minerals that we all must have? I feel that, if we are going to sit down at a table and negotiate with the Russians, surely we can keep the door open and continue to negotiate with a friendly nation such as South Africa". Mr Reagan also gave credit for reformist steps that have already been taken in South Africa, saying that "(a)s long as a sincere and honest/..."
honest effort is being made, then based on our experiences in our own land, it would seem to me that we should be trying to be helpful". (The Star, 4/3/1981.)


116) Ibid., p.346.


118) The permanent cabinet committees are those for National Security (i.e. the SCC), Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Internal Affairs and Finance. (Toespraak deur Sy Edele A L Schlebusch, Minister van Justisie en van Binnelandse Sake by die Nasionale Party Kongres, Natal, 21 Augustus 1980 (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information, duplicated), pp.12 & 13.)

119) The SAIIA is presently undertaking a comprehensive study of South Africa's foreign policy making, and it is scheduled for completion towards the end of 1981.

120) See Address by the Honourable P W Botha, Prime Minister, Carlton Centre, Johannesburg: 22 November 1979, 60pp.

121) See Mr P W Botha, HA Deb., 6/2/1980, col.251 & 252 and HA Deb., 28/1/1981, col.237; Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha DVD, LV, Eerste Minister, Minister van Verdediging en van Nasionale Intelligensiediens tydens die opening van die 35e jaarkongres van die Afrikaanse Handelstituut te Port Elizabeth op 7 Mei 1980, p.19 and Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, op.cit., p.11.


123) Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Stellenbosch, op.cit., p.23; Toespraak deur Sy Edele P W Botha ... Ladysmith, op.cit., pp.4 & 5; Toespraak deur sy Edele P W Botha, DVD, LV, Eerste Minister tydens 'n openbare vergadering te Vrede op 23 Oktober 1980, p.9; Mr P W Botha,

124) Quoted on p.6, above.


126) See p.17, above.


128) See p.5, above.
Appendix: the 12-point plan

The 12-point plan, as spelled out by Mr P W Botha in his address to the National Party Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979, reads as follows:

"First, the recognition and acceptance of the existence of multinationalism and of minorities in the Republic of South Africa.

Secondly, the acceptance of vertical differentiation with a built-in principle of self-determination at as many levels as possible.

Thirdly, the establishment of constitutional structures by the Black peoples to make the highest degree of self-government possible for them in states that are consolidated as far as practicable ... We believe that part of the right to self-determination of these Black states is to allow them to grow towards independence according to their own judgement. And to help them to build up the best possible economic future in co-operation with us.

Fourthly, the division of powers between South African Whites, South African Coloureds and South African Indians with a system of consultation and co-responsibility so far as common interests are concerned.

Fifthly, the acceptance of the principle that where at all possible each population group should have its own schools and live in its own community as being fundamental to social contentment. In my view this is not discrimination, it is the recognition of each others' rights. The preparedness to consult as equals on matters of common interest with a sound balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community.

In the sixth place, I am in favour of removing hurtful and unnecessary discriminatory measures. I have said this in Parliament,

I have/...
I have said that those discriminatory measures that are unnecessary and create bad feeling should be removed ... But I am not in favour of a system of compulsory integration in South Africa, and I am not in favour of endangering my own people's right to self-determination.

In the seventh place, the recognition of economic interdependence and the properly planned utilisation of manpower.

In the eighth place, striving for a peaceful constellation of Southern African states with respect for each other's cultures, traditions and ideals. To talk of a federation or a confederation at this stage would, in my view, be premature. A pact between states becomes possible only when the will is there. One first has to make all those states equal through independence, and then leave it to them to decide what they want to belong to.

In the ninth place, South Africa's firm determination to defend itself against interference from outside in every possible way. And allow me to say here tonight, not boastfully, but we are better able tonight to defend South Africa militarily than ever before in the country's history. And I want to warn those who think that we practise our politics from a position of weakness: We are not speaking from a position of weakness, we are speaking from a position of decency. If they want to test us, our strength, we will hit back for the sake of South Africa's self-respect.

In the tenth place, as far as possible, a policy of neutrality in the conflict between super powers, with priority given to Southern African interests.

In the eleventh place, the maintenance of effective decision-making by the State, which rests on a strong Defence Force to guarantee orderly government as well as efficient, clean administration.

Clean/...
Clean administration is essential at all levels. And strong security forces with contented members are of the utmost importance in today's dangerous world ...

In the twelfth place, the maintenance of free enterprise as the basis of our economic and financial policy. This also presupposes the most effective training and utilisation of manpower."
Postscript

Just as the present study was completed, Die Transvaler, 6/3/1981, first revealed that the Government had made some amendments to the 12-point plan, which have, as yet, not been officially announced. The revised version of the plan will nonetheless be used by the National Party in the forthcoming general election. The changes are said to clarify "certain aspects of the NP's policy development" since the plan was first unveiled in 1979. Freely translated, the points amended now read as follows:

Point 3: "The establishment of constitutional structures which make provision for the complete independence of the various black nations in the RSA, meaningful consolidation of the black states and areas and the acceptance of a socio-economic programme directed at the development of such black states and areas."

Point 4: "The willingness to co-operate as equals and to consult on matters of common interest, with a balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community, and the removal of hurtful unnecessary discriminatory measures."

There are no amendments to the points dealing with foreign policy matters. The changes to the two points just cited are, from the point of view of this study, of marginal importance and they do not materially affect the arguments advanced in the study. There is, however, one slight exception: the reference to "a socio-economic programme directed at the development of such black states and areas", which appears in the revised version of the third point, seems to allude to the new notion of regional economic development across political boundaries. In this sense, the amendment goes some way - but it might have gone a good deal further - towards recognising the integrated nature of the South African and (independent) homeland economies and the importance of regional economic development across state frontiers.