Issues in the Economy and Politics of Swaziland Since 1968

Editors: Ackson M. Kanduza
Sarah T. Mkhonza
PREFACE

The papers published here were presented at the first OSSREA national workshop which was held at the New George Hotel on 25 April 1998. This was a result of a new policy which OSSREA had adopted to support and promote research and scholarship at chapter level in each country which is a member of the organisation.

The workshop was well attended. The University of Swaziland supported the workshop enthusiastically. Consequently membership of OSSREA in Swaziland increased.

The workshop attracted researchers from the University of Swaziland, Teacher Training Colleges and Non Governmental Organisations.

Certain Circumstances delayed the publication of these papers. However, they still represent what a group of scholars considered, individually, to be important issues in the history of the nation in 1998. A number of issues addressed in the papers are still attracting much national interest today. Therefore the belated publication of these papers does not diminish their historiographical and scholarly value.
# CONTENTS

**PAGE**

**PREFACE** .............................................................................................................. 3  

**CHAPTER ONE** .................................................................................................... 7 - 16  

**CHAPTER TWO** ................................................................................................. 17-23  
Economic and Social Aspects of Farm Squatters in Swaziland Since 1982 by Ackson Kanduza

**CHAPTER THREE** .............................................................................................. 24-29  
Youth Participation in the Development of Swaziland: Challenges and Prospects During the Transition by Suffian H. Bukurura

**CHAPTER FOUR** ............................................................................................... 30-42  
Development and Change: Issues of Housing For Women In Post-Colonial Swaziland by Miranda Miles

**CHAPTER FIVE** ................................................................................................. 43-51  
Environmental Degradation and Economic Retardation in Rural Swaziland, 1960s and 1970s, by B.A.B Sikhondze

**CHAPTER SIX** ................................................................................................. 52-58  
Language Rights and the Constitution of Swaziland by Sarah Mkhonza

**CHAPTER SEVEN** ............................................................................................ 59 - 67  
Towards a Language Policy of Empowerment in Swaziland by Sihle Zwane

**CHAPTER EIGHT** .............................................................................................. 68-82  
Christianity and the Ideological Base of the Swazi Monarchy by M.H.Y Kaniki

**CHAPTER NINE** ............................................................................................... 83-88  
From Christian Exclusivism to Religious Pluralism by Christopher B. Zingara

**CHAPTER TEN** ................................................................................................. 89-97  
Demoralisation in the SADC Region: From One Party State to Multi-Party Democracy in Zambia and Lesson For Swaziland by Sitwala Mutonga

**CHAPTER ELEVEN** .......................................................................................... 98 - 111  
Regional Cooperation and Swaziland: Which Option? by Grace Peter

**CONTRIBUTORS** ............................................................................................... 112
CHAPTER ONE

SOCIAL WELFARE PROVISION IN SWAZILAND: A PROFILE

John K. Ngwisha  
Rajan Mathew  
Mamane Nxumalo

INTRODUCTION

According to Davies, et al, (1985:1) the Kingdom of Swaziland came into being, during the violent upheavals known as the iMfecane which transformed African Societies in Southern African in the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. During this period, the Dlamini clan consolidated its dominance over other clans leading to the transformation of the Swazi from a number of divided groups of clans to a single unit formation - the present Swazi nation and which later became the Swazi state.

Since the creation of the Swazi state at the turn of the nineteenth century, one can detect that the formation has undergone through three evolutionary stages of development. The first stage manifests itself as a state moulded on the basis of feudal relations. Its responsibilities for the population was limited to ensuring the stability of the social order by ensuring law and order, security and stability of the key institutions of the nation. For obvious reasons, it did not assume responsibly of a modern unitary state which has clearly marked borders, formal diplomatic relations, an economic, social infrastructure and a formal structure for the provision of social services. Most important was the fact that the state operated an economy based on barter-trade. An economy based on barter trade does not exert pressure on the family in terms of equal access to means of survival to the same extent as a market economy does because the wealth of the family nourishes all its members.

Moreover, the family under a feudal state does not experience disorganisation in its functions. For the simple reason that the family is capable of dealing with social problems such as poverty, indigence and loss of means of survival through catastrophe such as famine. The family can deal with social problems affecting it very efficiently due to the relative stability of society.

The second phase of the Swazi state was the colonial experience, which started with the advance of the Boers into Transvaal and later the advance of the British into Central Africa. Swaziland was formally declared a British Protectorate in 1881. It became part of the British sphere of influence in Central and Southern Africa.

As a protected colony, Swaziland as did other colonial states in the region, experienced a process of transformation. The state as a first step lost its sovereignty to the British and Transvaal Boers as it became a politically dependent nation. Secondly its economy changed from that based on barter to money economy. Third, but not last, the Swazi were coerced into accepting a foreign value system based on the Juda-Christian religion.

As a consequence of these forces, two changes happened simultaneously. First the state and the family changed functions and secondly the relations between the state and the family changed. The Swazi state which had hitherto enjoyed autonomy, became one of the dependencies of the British in Africa. In practical terms this meant that the policies, programmes and value system practised in Swaziland were determined by the Colonial office in London. Colonialism engenders dependency. Fostering dependency is a deliberate mechanism used by colonialists in order for them to manipulate and exploit the resources freely without hinder.

The family as a basic unit of society was not spared by impact of the process. For example, there was a direct assault on its functions as a result of the value system based on Juda-Christian. The introduction of payment of personal taxes in hard currency forced males to migrate to work places outside their community
to earn hard currency so as to pay tax. Taxation is a colonial power strategy which was used very successfully in disorganising the family. As we know, initially migration occurred as trickle but later it became an avalanche, exerting a debilitating impact on the Swazi family. The family has not been able to recover from this assault since.

Figure 1 A chronicle of the development of social welfare and social legislation in Swaziland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Convention of London 27 February 1884 created Swaziland as a state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Administration of Estate Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Hut Taxes introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>African Community Centre in Manzini and Mbabane formally included in the &quot;Eight Year Development Plan&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Africa Woman Community Organiser employed 1952 Adoption of Children Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Boys Scouts Organisation created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Pauper relief scheme instituted by the Government and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Wills Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Tinkhundla Centres formally created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Case of Lepers formalised by the Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Adoption of Children Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Boys Scouts Organisation created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Pauper relief scheme instituted by the Government and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Swaziland National Youth Organisation initiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Juvenile reform facility Malkerns established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Widows and Orphans Pensions Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Swaziland National Youth Organisation initiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Urban Housing Project initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Vagrancy Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Swaziland National Provident Fund (Constitutional Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Child Care Services Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Education Act Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Employment Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Industrial and Vocational Training Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Workers Compensation Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Marriage Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Mental Health Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Employment Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Industrial and Vocational Training Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Workers Compensation Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Marriage and Death Registration Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Swaziland National Provident Fund (General Regulations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the absence of a father, the mother assumed two roles that of father and that of mother. As formal education in the nature of a school became part of the new form of socialisation, this meant that the family lost one of its basic functions: socialisation. These two examples of change in the role of the family are an indication of the fact that the family lost its independence through no fault of its own. Circumstances, such as payment of tax, sending children to a school to be educated by strangers, or getting coerced to accept a new set of Judea-Christian values, irrevocably affected the functioning of the family.

What we have described is the manifestation of the process of social change forced on the Swazi nation by powers of imperialism. For the sake of clarity, social change here refers to change in the constitution of
by powers of imperialism. For the sake of clarity, social change here refers to change in the constitution of social entities, such as the state and the family, over time and change in the relations among entities over time. The important thing to keep in focus is that for the purpose of this profile we limit the meaning of change to the relation between man and man. In other words, we will be concerned with the consequences of social change in society. For example, our concern maybe what happens to the extended family under social change and what happens to those individuals, who through no fault of others, may fall into poverty.

The third and final stage of the evolution of the state in Swaziland is the post-colonial era. 1968 to date. At this stage, the Swazi state has regained its political and economic autonomy. It has joined the group of nations which has an identity and sovereignty as a member of the United Nations (UN). As a member of the UN she is signatory to various resolutions on the provision of social welfare to its population. Even though the charter of the UN is not enforced on members, it includes a mandatory inclusion of provision of basic services by a state to its citizens and socio-economic rights are a prominent feature of the charter. (United Nations. 1959)

Social Welfare As a Provision

In general terms, this is the social welfare system of laws, policies, programmes, benefits and services which strengthen or assure provision for meeting social need to be recognised as basic for the welfare of the population and for the functioning of social order (Wermes and Vining. 1989)

For purposes of this profile, social welfare provision refers to:

- the degree to which a society's social problems are managed.
- the extent to which its population needs are met. and the degree to which individual opportunity for advancement is provided

Following on this position, it can be said that, social provision as a system rests on the assumption that a government should:

(a) create underlying conditions favourable to the better functioning of a society.
(b) regulate socio-economic and political elements in society for the interest of all.
(c) supplement other social institutions in fulfilling their obligations.
(d) widen the basic knowledge on which human existence depends and
(e) direct services or benefits recognised as essential to the functioning of society.

To this end a society must, therefore:

(a) ensure that opportunities provide for full growth and development of individuals
(b) assure that the means for meeting needs in terms of production of services are made possible and
(c) assure that social services for meeting needs are available.

In light of all this, the state must provide national social welfare policies and programmes at the local and national level. Since no literature exists in the social welfare field, because no studies, commission reports, etc. have been carried out. the profile looks at historical material of the modern state in Swaziland traced back to 1881. In this sense, this paper can only create a profile of social welfare provision. The paper examines natural social welfare policy from the view that

(a) the nature of social welfare provision.
(b) the institutional network which supports social welfare provision.
(c) the nature of the delivers system, and
(d) the population of beneficiaries of social services in Swaziland

Since 1881. Swaziland has gone through a social transformation which is precipitated by the process of modernisation which has impacted on society at the level of the individual, the family, the kinship group and society in general. When transformation takes place, social conditions leave some individuals and families exposed to the harsh realities of modern living. The impact of the harsh realities leaves no choice to a nation state, but to create a safety net to ameliorate suffering by members of society who are disadvantaged. The safety net may consist of a basket of social policies, social legislation, social programmes and social institutions
The Nature of Social Welfare in Swaziland

The present system of social welfare in Swaziland is a result of a unique constellation of historical forces and experience of the Swazi nation. As pointed out earlier, the present Swazi state in passing through three stages of evolution has inherited principles of social welfare provisions from three sources:

(a) its original African society, which ended its life with the coming of colonialism.
(b) the influence of the Boer Republics particularly the Transvaal with which it shared borders and from which its administration was conducted, and
(c) the British colonial administration.

Early origins of the present system can be traced to the Traditional African family system and its practice of ‘mutual aid’. The African family system is a tested and tried custodian of the culture, customs and morals of African society. A scholar of the development of the social welfare system in South Africa has observed that:

‘The African lived in tribal groupings, underpinned by an agriculture economy. Custom determined the procedure by which their lives were lived, roles were clearly prescribed, and their economic social and political practices embraced measures of care for individuals affected by the contingencies of life: the wealth of the family, clan in food or cattle, nourished all its members. The family-based meeting of welfare needs was a functional solution of people...’ (McKardrick, 1990: 7-8).

The extent to which the Swazi state implements the principles of ‘mutual aid’ in providing social welfare services to its population remains an interesting question. More so in the light of the impact of the transformations of the family as indicated by the processes of migration, urbanisation and modernisation of the population. For example, close to 14,000 Swazis form the active labour force in South Africa, and in the country itself, close to one in five Swazi were urban dwellers in 1986 (1986 Census). This indicates that changes have taken effect and that the family-based mutual aid may not be the only method of providing services but can be one of the methods.

Conventional social science theory informs us that social changes normally affect the functioning of the traditional society and that this affects the manner in which society provides a safety net for its citizens. Today, there are street kids’ in the large urban centres of Swaziland, clearly showing that the family is not capable of coping with change. Under such circumstances the Swazi state will be forced to adopt a system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Type</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Assistance</td>
<td>Public Assistance Act (none exists)</td>
<td>Destitute. Terminally ill. Widows. Disabled, aged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>Swaziland Administration Act, 1950</td>
<td>Drought impact on families, neighbourhoods and communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>Widows and Pensions Act, 1966</td>
<td>Widows, Pensioners. Ex-Service men get a fixed pension of E100 per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>No Act</td>
<td>Disabled persons mostly old. and Orthopaedics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Offenders</td>
<td>Juvenile Reform Act, 1922</td>
<td>Delinquent Juveniles and Children committing crimes have no access to Juvenile Courts or Safe Homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Counselling</td>
<td>Marriage Act, 1964, Maintenance Act, 1970</td>
<td>Divorced wives, Broken down families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table generated from various Government of Swaziland reports
social welfare provision based on modern thinking, drawing its principles from the tradition of the Poor Laws of Britain.

If we look at the nature of social provision, particularly if we look at the social welfare policies and the form and structure, we get confirmation of the origin of the principles. Social Welfare has been equated with charity and has not been accorded a priority among government programmes, which it deserves. The allocation of funds in the national budget is small even though indicators of the disorganisation of society and such as increasing unemployment, the escalating crime rate, increased urbanisation, etc. reflect a disintegration of the social fabric of Swazi society.

Until 1995, the Department of Social Welfare which was created in 1952 (Her Majesties Stationery Service, 1962, 1968) has been housed by several ministries. In that year it was moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. The department experiences a perennial shortage of professional and para-professional staff. For the function of social welfare to be effectively carried out, the department needs a stable and permanent home.

Let us turn to policy to see what is on the ground. At the moment there is no written policy document on social welfare policy of Swaziland. The result is that the state has not planned social welfare provision for disadvantaged groups, children who need care, street kids, orphans, persons with disabilities, widows, unemployed youths - particularly the secondary school graduates who have great potential for contributing to the economy of goods and services which are needed in the society, and school dropouts of all types beginning with primary, secondary to tertiary education. The following table illustrates the paucity of policy guidelines and services.

Table 2. Social Welfare Services, Social Legislation and Service Providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE TYPE</th>
<th>STATUTE</th>
<th>PROGRAMME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family and Child</td>
<td>Child Care Order. 1977</td>
<td>NGOs only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance Act, 1970</td>
<td>NGOs only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marriage Act. 1964</td>
<td>NGOs only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption Act, 1952</td>
<td>NGOs only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Girls Protection Act, 1966</td>
<td>NGOs only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicapped</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Difficulty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services</td>
<td>Swazi Adminst. Act. 1950</td>
<td>NGOs only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialised Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of Swaziland, 1996.

We found very little government activities in support of the policies which have been enunciated in the statutes. As we pointed out above, this type of behaviour by the state is symbolic of its attitude towards social welfare. The state sees social welfare as charitable work when in fact it should be providing a service to its vulnerable groups in society (Dror, 1974).

The state may be drawing much discomfort from the UNDP’s 1995 Human Development Index Report (HDI) which has ranked Swaziland as the 124th out of a total of 174 countries. The index is an indicator of human welfare in a state and is developed from broad indicators such as life expectancy, education attainment and purchasing power of individuals. Lying unsuspecting behind the HDI are some poignant indicators of imbalance in Swazi society. Some of the salient and obvious ones are: income distribution in Swaziland is heavily skewed with a small proportion of the population commanding a large proportion of national wealth, for example. 5% of the households at the top of society receive 26% of the total income while 40% of the low households in society get a meagre 11% income of male headed households is 50% higher than female headed households income of urban household is approximately 2/3 higher than rural households poverty is common in households where the head is unemployed. However, poverty is worse in households where the unemployed head is a female and with a dependency ratio of 104 per 100 the relatively young population is dependent on a small workforce in employment (World Bank.
The Structure of Social Welfare Provision

The institutional framework for the delivery of social welfare services in Swaziland is very complex. The following ministries are involved in delivering social services (the service a ministry delivers is in brackets):

- Deputy Prime Minister's Office (Community Development)
- Ministry of Labour and Public Service (Social Security. National Provident Fund and Workmen's Compensation)
- Ministry of Home Affairs (Sports, Culture, Recreation, Youth Matters, and NGOs)
- Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (Social Welfare)

The spread of the social welfare function among so many ministries can only lead to a very ineffective delivery of social services. This will result in government duplication of service and therefore, to a higher cost to the taxpayer. The state, on the basis of this type of framework cannot expect an impact of the service on its beneficiaries. The impact will be less because the stakeholders in the social welfare are too many. They will lose too much time, energy and resources on territorial fights to the detriment of achieving results.

A parallel delivery system for social welfare exits. It consists of 124 NGOs who carry out the function of providing a service to beneficiaries. The NGOs are of many types and of different origin. First there are international NGOs which are branches of international NGOs with head offices in the United States. Britain. Europe and Japan. The second group consists of national NGOs which are formed by indigenous Swazi and may have branches in the country. The last group consists of NGOs which are community based and some which are locality based.

Table 3: Distribution of Social Welfare Function 1997-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Ministry</th>
<th>Statutory Functions</th>
<th>No Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Health and Social Welfare</td>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Home Affairs</td>
<td>Sports, Culture Recreation, Youth Refugees. NGOs Gender.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Enterprise and Employment</td>
<td>Social Security, Worker’s Compensation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Home Affairs</td>
<td>Community Development, Disaster Relief</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Education</td>
<td>Vocational Training, Non-formal, Education</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Finance</td>
<td>National Provident Fund</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Agriculture</td>
<td>Rural Settlement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table generated from Swaziland Government Gazette, Legal Notice No 194 of 1995.

Table 4: Comparison of 1997/1998 Recurrent Expenditure Social Service in Swaziland* and South Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Head</th>
<th>Swaziland %</th>
<th>South Africa %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Social Services</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Reserve Bank of Swaziland Table on Central Government Expenditure 1997.

**Source: Adapted from Sunday Times of Johannesburg. 16 March 1998
Table 5. 1998 Recurrent Expenditure Swaziland and South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Head</th>
<th>South Africa R bills.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Swaziland E mills.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Services</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>472.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Services</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>156.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts of Law</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>512.4</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>373.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security and Welfare</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Services</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>179.8</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Schemes and Related Projects</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel and Energy</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
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Source: Adapted from Reserve Bank of Swaziland table on Central Government Expenditure 1997 and Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 16 March 1998

societies, has a direct interest in social welfare work. This is a tradition which goes back centuries.

One drawback in terms of policy, is that the state has no policy document or legislation that can guide the work of NGOs. This is a very serious flaw in the development of the delivery of social welfare services in Swaziland. In a report to the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, a World Bank consultant has pointed out a rather weak relation between the government and NGOs. The NGOs feel that they do not get support and appreciation from government for their contribution to service delivery in social welfare.

SUMMARY

There is no doubt that a lot of things are wrong in the house of social welfare in Swaziland. There appears to be reluctance to appreciating the necessity for an overhaul of the social welfare in Swaziland. In particular there is need for:

- a written document on social welfare which lays out the principles and objects of the function
- a revisit and an update of the social legislation in order to update it and make it relevant today's needs.
- a revisit to the institutional framework for the delivery of social services in order to streamline the delivery.
- a consideration by the state of the necessity to contract out services in view of its incapacity to deliver services to vulnerable groups.
- a written policy document on NGOs.
services to vulnerable groups
• a written policy document on NGOs.

ANNEXURE I

Organisation Structure: Ministry of Health & Social Welfare

ANNEXURE II

Organisation Structure: Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)
Coordinating Assembly of Non-Governmental Organisations (CANGO)

<table>
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<th>State Provision</th>
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ANNEXURE III
ANNEXURE IV

Chronicles of Swaziland

1700 Rise of the Swazi State - Reign of Ludvonga I, Dlamini II, Ngwane IV, Ndvungunye
1810 Consolidation of Swazi State - Reign of Sobhuza I
1836 Boer exodus from British rule leads to formation of Boer Republics
1840 Arrival of first European peoples in Swaziland
1843 British claim sovereignty over Boer Republics
1844 First missionary station - Mahamba - by Methodists (James Allison)
1852 Boer Republic recognised
1855 Boers sign agreement with Mswati on purchase parts of Eastern Transvaal
1858 Transvaal Republic formed
1867 Diamonds discovered Kimberly
1869 Gold discovered Witwatersrand
1870 Influx of Africans, Europeans migrant into Rand
1871 British annex diamond mines
1877 British annex Boer Republics
1881 Swaziland declared a British Protectorate
1883 Paul kruger elected State President of Boer Republics
1884 Convention of 27/2/1884 establishes separation of Boer Republic of Transvaal from Swaziland as states.
1890 British Foreign Jurisdiction Act sets British Administration in South Africa
1900 British Act of Parliament recognises Swaziland as a British Protectorate
1903 Union of South Africa created by British Act of Parliament Swaziland becomes part of union.
1904 Swaziland Administration Proclamation No.4 of 1904 sets laws, courts and recognises chief's districts
1907 Swaziland Proclamation sets Swaziland as part of Transvaal Governor's administration
1910 Boer War ends Swaziland becomes a direct British Protectorate under British Colonial office administration
1913 Native Lands Act creates Swazi National Land (SNL.)
1915 Introduction of Hut taxes
1938 Opening of Havelock (Bulembu) Asbestos Mines
1963 (a) White Paper (Command 2057) creates constitution for Swaziland
(b) Swaziland Order in Council 1963 establishes self-rule Constitution
(c) Districts administration of Manzini, Hhohho, Shiselweni and Lubombo created
1964 First national elections
1965 Council of Social Services founded
1966 Swaziland National Youth Organisation founded
1969 Social Welfare Section established in Department of local Administration

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CHAPTER TWO

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF FARM SQUATTERS IN SWAZILAND SINCE 1982.

Ackson M. Kanduza

INTRODUCTION

On 27 January 1982, The Times of Swaziland reported that fifty Swazi women protested their eviction from Droxford farm near the Ngwenya - Oshock Border gate. The actual number of people involved is unknown because there is no such information in contemporary sources but in all about 230 families were involved. For this social class and given a national household size of 7 people, we can estimate that about 1610 people were affected. A group of women matched to see King Sobhuza II to report their plight and seek relief from the King. The King referred them to Prince Gabheni who was Minister of Home Affairs. The women squatted at the office of the Minister of Home Affairs. One of the 'squatters', Mrs M. Tfwala, told the Minister that we must have a place to stay. We will continue to fight until justice is done'. Indeed, on 22 February 1982 the king indicated that the Swazi Nation would buy Droxford farm which would become part of the Swazi National Land (SNL). At the end of April, the House of Assembly and the Senate passed The Farm Dwellers Act which replaced one which had been enacted in 1967.

The origin of this saga was a proposal of four men to levy E20 per family in order to build a market shelter on Droxford farm for residents. Instead of building the market, the four men bought the farm, apparently using the levies from the farm dwellers. The four men further served notice of eviction to all residents, they still refused to leave the farm on 31 March 1982. An initial reaction of the Minister of Home Affairs was to ask the protesting women to return to the farm and claim back their contributions. The refunds were not forthcoming but reminders of eviction persisted. Thus, the King's indication at the end of February that he would acquire the farm and add it to the SNL appeared a temporary and an ineffective measure to what was a complex problem in need of urgent relief.

The purpose of this paper is to examine some broad issues which the Droxford incidence highlighted about labour, production and political relations in agriculture in Swaziland. A second intention of this paper is to discuss the nature of Swaziland's colonial inheritance on land and examine the approaches which the government implemented after Swaziland attained independence in September 1968. Here, it is important to bear in mind the nature of class and institutional interaction in Swaziland in order to understand which class or institutions had decisive influence on government policy. It is worth noting also that land was a key element in the decolonisation process in Swaziland. This study is therefore partly a review of continuity and discontinuity in class conflict during and after the colonial era.

COLONIAL INHERITANCE

The origin of squatters in Swaziland may be dated to the land proclamation of 1909. That proclamation confirmed about two-thirds of Swaziland as crown land and individual title deed land. The Swazis who were on these title deed lands were given until 1914 to move to Swazi reserves which constituted one-third of the country (R.T. Coryndon, 1915). The relocation was insignificant so that 42 percent of the Swazi population was reported to be landless and squatting on land which had been recognised as belonging to white settlers. Equally significant is that between 1914 and 1918, 134 homesteads were evicted. Endless evictions and resettlement of Swazis, especially after the 1940s did not eliminate the squatter problem. While there have never been accurate statistics, official studies carried out between 1961 and 1967 considered the situation of squatters as undesirable. This thinking led to the passage of the Farm Dwellers Act of 1967 which envisaged to eliminate the squatter problem by 1977 (K. Mathews, 1987: 200-201)
The colonial period was marked by fundamental land related conflicts. The Swazi traditional rulers adopted populist strategies designed to acquire land on which to settle the landless population found on white owned farms. This was a sophisticated response to a challenge that threatened to undermine the basis of Swazi chieftaincy and aristocracy. The Swazi aristocracy understood that the loss of land and population through colonial law had the potential effect of undermining, if not destroying, the foundation of traditional and indigenous governance (Kanduza. 1993). The Swazi monarchy, under the leadership of Queen Regent Labotsibeni (Kanduza. 1997) had embarked on a campaign to raise funds from the Swazis in order to buy land from the white settlers. Although this was stopped by the colonial administration, it had one lasting legacy (Kanduza. 1996). That legacy was that the Swazi aristocracy forged a class alliance with the lower classes which was a critical movement in anti-colonial resistance. It should also be pointed out that the reaction of the Swazi aristocracy recognised and accepted the premise of a capitalist economy in which land was a commodity which could be bought or sold. The irony of the Swazi approach was that while endorsing the existence of a colonial capitalist economy with all its unequal and conflicting relations, the Swazi aristocracy was not sensitive to potential contradictory class positions within the Swazi society. There was no fear or sensitivity expressed that Swazi commoners would rise against chiefs. The land purchase campaign was presented as a shared and national good. It was a perpetuation of relations of exploitation between commoners and the aristocracy in respect of labour relations predicated upon control of the right of access to land.

This is clearly demonstrated, and ironically accepted, in another fundamental contradiction following the land partition of the 1910s. The Swazi squatters on settler-owned land constantly challenged their status as a landless class and squatters. In general terms, they either paid a monetary rental or provided labour service in return for rights of residence, grazing and cultivation (J. Crush. 1987: 131 - 154). The Swazis did not readily accept these demands made upon them in the context of the land proclamation. The Swazi Aristocracy championed these resistances and conflated them with their campaign to buy land on which to settle Swazis who had been disadvantaged by the land proclamation. The Swazi aristocracy also benefited from a British Government decision in the 1940s following Sobhuza's petition of 1941 to release crown land on which to settle some landless Swazis. In essence, the new British land policy endorsed the programme of the Swazi aristocracy to buy land for the Swazi nation (Kanduza. 1993). Thus, circumstances connived to the benefit of the Swazi aristocracy so that at the time of independence in 1968, the Swazi nation land raised its share of the land from one-third of the country in 1909 to about 56 percent in 1967. However, there were still about 10,000 Swazis who were considered to be squatters (Report. 1967). This record of success in increasing Swazi national land convinced the departing British administration and the incoming Swazi rulers to believe that they would eliminate the phenomenon of squatters by 1977. Optimism turned into failure. It was against this background, which was also punctuated by increasing evictions of squatters, and consequently increased protest and resistance to demands on resources of squatters that the 1982 Farm Dwellers Act came into being.

CONTROL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE SQUATTERS

As noted in the introduction, the 1982 Farm Dwellers Act was a response to a crisis among farm dwellers which needed urgent attention. The Droxford farm incident in January 1982 was neither unique nor isolated. It was a cog in a chain. The 1970s witnessed a regular and increased pattern of evictions. These evictions met with increased resistance and protest among farm dwellers who had believed that political independence effectively dismissed individual tenure and all associated obligations to which squatters had been subjected. In the face of renewed evictions in mid 1994, the Minister of Natural Resources and Energy told the Swazi Parliament that farm dwellers who traced their residence to the colonial era believed that no one who acquired a farm during the colonial era could claim ownership legally (Times of Swaziland. 9 Aug. 1994).

Therefore, the Act turned out to be a specific intervention to assert control of traditional institutions over a population which was potentially beyond the arm of traditional rulers. This view is not widely accepted. In Times of Swaziland of 9 August 1994, the Minister of Natural Resources and Energy. Senator
Khoza, told the House of Senate categorically that:

A farm is not under a chief. This means that farm dwellers are not answerable to any chief. However, if a farm dweller wants to perform duties for his chief, there must be an arrangement between him and his landlord. I want to stress that chiefs have no control over farms. But dwellers can answer to summons by his chief on Swazi National Land on his own if this does not impede the agreement with the farm owner.

The apparent ambiguity in the minister's statement is that he stressed the political character of the squatter problem. The ambiguity lies in the fact that the farm dweller appears to have first loyalty to the landlord on whose land the farm dweller resides and works. In practice, demands from the landlord and the farm dweller's chief for tribute labour (Ummemo) coincide with the farm dweller's own labour or general needs. The farm dweller has to see to it that the primary callers upon his resources, namely, the landlord and the chief, are satisfied. Since it is usually labour service which is demanded, the farm dweller has to split family labour. So, while the term "squatter" infers a dependency relationship because of land shortage, squatters in general constitute a subordinate class without much control over its resources. The research carried out in the middle of the 1980s by. K. Matthews and M. Russell revealed a variety of situations in which squatters in the 1980s showed that it was extremely difficult to manage or control the time sharing system. The squatter was clearly a pawn in a complex contest created by land shortage in Swaziland.

The powerlessness of the squatters is slightly compensated for because the 1982 Farm Dwellers Act was a contest between a landlord and elements or functionaries (such as chiefs) of the indigenous system of government. The latter still viewed the farmer, as a symbol of irrational deprivation since the introduction of individual land tenure during the colonial era. It should be emphasised that despite political collaboration between the Swazi aristocracy and white settler (capitalist) interests since the late 1960s, landowners and chiefs represented antagonistic processes. In order to subdue the landowner, the Swazi aristocracy consolidated the heroic tradition associated with the Swazi indigenous rulers since the inauguration of the scheme to buy land. Powers of the landowner were restricted under certain procedures while the squatter was empowered but not to the same extent as the empowerment of traditional or indigenous Swazi structures.

These are indicated in the main structures of the 1982 Farm Dwellers Act. Under the Act, two tribunals were established, namely, the Central Tribunal and District Tribunal. The District Tribunal has the Regional Administrator (former District Commissioner) as chairman. Members of the Swazi (traditional) National Court, representatives of chiefs, and local labadzala (district elders and powerful man) are included in the Tribunal. The Central Tribunal combined districts at regional level. This body was established as an equivalent of the magistrate's court. The High Court and the Court of Appeal were excluded from hearing cases relating to squatters and landowners. Such matters are handled entirely through indigenous institutions with the King as the final authority. The Central Tribunal is a duplication at a higher level, of the District Tribunal. Moreover, the landowner could evict a squatter only on the understanding that adequate compensation and an alternative place of residence, cultivation and grazing were provided. The reality was that "—evictions by court order were the order of the day" (Matthew, 1987: 201).

The failure of the Act was deeper. There was also subtle and complex psychological manipulation. The impermanent word, 'squatter', was replaced by the term 'farm dweller' in 1967 and in the 1982 Act. The latter term fulfils the anticipation of every Swazi that they were entitled to receive land from their King through his (their) chiefs. The effect of all this was that the 1982 Act was a clear attempt by the traditional authorities to acquire greater control over the squatter population. At the same time, farm dwellers did not overstretch their imagination in considering themselves as dwellers on land which belonged to their King. The Land Concession Order which came into effect on the day of Independence and was sustained in the King's Decree of 1973 which suspended the Independence constitution provided that:

Concession land to be held at the will and pleasure of the King. Notwithstanding anything in any law, any land held in Swaziland by a concessionaire, whose concession title or lease is still...
any law, any land held in Swaziland by a concessionaire, whose concession title or lease is still in force, shall be so held at the will and pleasure of the King on such terms as he may determine.

Moreover, there was no right to have concession land converted to free hold title. Notwithstanding any other law a concessionaire shall not be entitled as of right to be issued with freehold title in respect of any land or portion of land held by him under a concession title or lease (Swaziland Government. 1995:95).

This did not make it easy for the Farm Dwellers Act to pass through Parliament. There was a significant challenge in the House of Senate to the Bill despite the fact that traditional rulers had unmitigated and absolute control of the political institutions of the country. The Times of Swaziland, 28 April 1982, described the debate in the House of Senate as an 'uproar'. The Bill was a revision of the 1967 one and was to address several cases of evictions and threats of eviction. The minister attached a 'certificate of urgency' because:

Swazi people have been subjected to elements peculiar to their way of life. People lived in these areas for generations. They woke up the following morning and found that the areas had been declared farms. They were then required to work for some strange person.

Senator Mabalizandla Nhlabatsi did not sec or accept grounds for claims of 'urgency'. In his view it was "not good to rush such legislation. We need time to think carefully about it before we can debate it" (Times of Swaziland, 28.4.82). At this time, over 50 percent of freeholders occupying 37 per cent of the country were Swazis. Most of these were either retired or still in active employment. Some of the members of parliament were among those with individual title deed farms. Prince Gabheni commented that "I know most of us own farms here and we ought to understand better the position of the farm dwellers" (Times of Swaziland. 27.04.82). In his view it was "not good to rush such legislation. We need time to think carefully about it before we can debate it''. But in the long term, the rulers of the day made much political capital which further enhanced their legitimacy for the land they had already acquired for the Swazi people since the 1910s.

The 1982 Farm Dwellers Act generated much intra-class conflict but finally moved the land issue permanently under the responsibility of traditional administrative elements and institutions. At a time the Swazi non-party-political system was stable and strong, the issue of squatters would not be a source of serious political challenge. Moreover, in terms of political naivety of decolonisation the government hoped that Swazi farm owners would be more sympathetic towards their fellow Swazis - but this was not to be. The Times of Swaziland 27 April 1982 made this observation in a survey of how the 'land dilemma was born' in Swaziland. In fact, the evictions from the 1970s have been common during transition in land ownership to an indigenous Swazi. The new indigenous owners of farms with many farm dwellers tended to be legalistic and in believing that they could evict farm dwellers as the law had provided.

The real dilemma related to the social and economic conditions of the squatters. The squatters were often in uncertain and desperate conditions. The law had aimed at ensuring that squatters did not impede development. The State supported any owner who intended to make major investment aimed increasing agricultural productivity in the country. However, the research of Russell on relations between squatters and landowners showed that many did not understand the dynamics of the squatter population. The case of a farm at Dwaleni in Manzini is particularly illustrative. A new owner in November 1988 evicted squatters because they did not accept five conditions he had spelt out for them. The first condition was reduction of the land available for cultivation to satisfy family needs to one acre of land. Second, he imposed a 100 percent ban on the squatter's domestication of any animals. Third, they were not to collect firewood from anywhere in the farm. Fourth, families were confined to their homestead areas to avoid trespassing within the farm. Fifth, they were to report the arrival of any visitors, who were, in any case strongly discouraged to visit friends and relatives on the farm.

Prince Gabheni in introducing the Farm Dwellers Bill six years earlier had criticised 'brutality and mercilessness' among Swazi landowners who evict families who squat in their farms without any human
of evictions especially in 1988. This was acknowledged in the Swazi parliament. A member of parliament, J N. Mamba, pointed out in December 1984 that 'farm dwellers are getting a raw deal from farm owners and the tribunals set up to administer welfare of the two parties' (Times of Swaziland, 6.12.84). An Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ambrose Maseko, acknowledged that there was never a day in this office when we do not receive reports about squatters who have gone on rampage causing malicious damage to private property and livestock' (Times of Swaziland, 2.03.84, see also 29.09.84, 6.07.89, Swazi Observer, 21.08.89).

One goal of those who formulated the 1982 Act was to terminate the jurisdiction of modern courts over land matters in order to assert control over private land and the squatter population. In many parts of the country, this was difficult to realise. An informant in a research which K. Matthews undertook in 1987 pointed out the difficulty of paying allegiance while being a squatter. He stated that 'I am not always able to go to the chief's place because of work to be done on the farm. This is a serious problem during the six month work period' (K. Matthews, 1987: 207). Another informant told Matthews (1987: 209) that I am not always able to respond because of my duties on the farm. If I can't go to the Inewala, I send money instead (about E40). These informants underlined the problems of squatters and also pointed out that landowners were not going to surrender easily. Some Swazi chiefs welcomed the challenge.

Prince Bhekimpi, a senior prince and chief of Enkaba, represented the best elements in the Swazi traditional hierarchy who were to regain all land from private land owners. In the 1980s, he moved, from being an official in the Deputy Prime Minister's office to being a Prune Minister. He came from a long line of the Swazi aristocracy committed to maintain Swazi traditions and to regain lost land. In February 1982, Prince Bhekimpi proposed to levy every family in his chiefdom at Forbes Reef. In Prince Bhekimpi's view, and profound Swazi wisdom, 'we can't have people roaming around large stretches of land while we squeeze together on small portions of land. These people beat their chests and boast about their farms' (Times of Swaziland, 08.02.82). At the end of 1988, Prince Bhekimpi had not accomplished his mission. While levying E500 per family in 1988, he also encouraged, and at times, instructed his subjects to settle on private farms (Times of Swaziland, 28.09.88). Early in 1995, a combination of evictions of squatters in many parts of the country and the continued difficult in his efforts to reach his subjects on private farms near his chiefdom led Prince Bhekimpi to force the House of Senate to institute a report on private farms (Swaziland Government, 23 August 1995).

The position of squatters is also precarious in economic terms. In the 1987 study of squatters in Manzini, one squatter explained:

I work on the farm for six months looking after the owner's cattle most of the time. Then I rest for the remaining six months though I can be employed during the rest period. I am not happy with this arrangement because I am not paid during the six month period. I would prefer that we at least get half the normal wage (Matthews, 1987: 209).

This was not an isolated experience. Another squatter observed that:

I work on the farm for four months without pay. Then after this period I work for a salary. This is not good because for four months I work for free. There is not much one can do about it either (sic) because we are staying on his farm (Matthews, 1987: 209).

The squatters on private land are simply cheap labour for farm owners. Because they are usually working as isolated homesteads, it is difficult for them to combine and sustain their protest. The grievances of farm squatters in the 1980s represented a long historical process of uneven social differentiation and economic change. This is the core of the powerlessness of the squatters. Crush's work (1985, 1979) on the early colonial period stressed taxation and land alienation as representing major forms of primitive accumulation. The almost insatiable settler need for cheap labour was met because of taxation, land alienation and a variety of quasi-feudal arrangements for obtaining labour. In examining the issue of squatters in the 1980s and 1990s, it appears that little has changed in the way the landlord and the squatter related to each other at the turn of the century. The dominant elements in the state basically contested for control over squatters and
related to each other at the turn of the century. The dominant elements in the state basically contested for control over squatters and their resources. This is echoed in the work of Booth (1985, 1986) and Simelane (1991, 1992) which extend the work of crush to the post-war and post-colonial era. Swazi squatters are often described as being in the most desperate state and were engaged in struggles which did not bring any fundamental change that was beneficial to them.

As discussed here, the major change in the 1982 Farm Dweller's Act in Swaziland was to increase the role of indigenous Swazi institutions and leaders in the regulation of relations between landlords and squatter. The Swazi traditional rulers converted political power into a legislation which left the individual squatters at the mercy of the landlord unless the farmer precipitates a crisis. The squatters rarely have an opportunity for collective redress of their grievances. This kind of cheap labour is ideal for undercapitalised farmers. In a research conducted in 1986, M. Russell found that most Swazi land owners have little conspicuous wealth but live a life indistinguishable from that of the majority on (Swazi) National land' (1990: X-XI, 22-34). This is confirmed indirectly by the citations made earlier where squatters complain about prolonged periods in which they offered no labour service to the landlord. Those complaints also imply that there is extremely limited commercial production among some squatters because they wished they worked for the landlord all year despite the low wages they were paid. This is not peculiar to the squatter population in Swaziland. Much research from the 1960s to the early 1980s dealing with the Swazi homestead and its relations with the urban sector brought out widespread rural poverty. The Swazi homestead was highly dependent on supplementary income from wage employment (De Vletter, 198.3).

CONCLUSION

It is clear that, as in many parts of Southern Africa, '...destitute rural dwellers with little hope' of making a living out of farming appear to dominate the rural landscape' (Hendricks, 1995: 25) in Swaziland's privately owned land, the 'destitute rural dwellers' typified by Swazi squatters reflect a focal meeting point of significant historical developments in Swaziland. The long history of semi-feudal labour relations exemplified by the persistent squatter phenomenon in Swaziland reveals a process of retarded, and uneven capitalist development. Jonathan Crush (1997: 216) in analysing why white settlers did not remove squatters from their farms noted that white farmers were in desperate straits. He wrote that 'in 1921. one official reported that the majority of farmers are without capital to be able to raise money to tide them over the current very bad period". This picture was repeated in the 1960s and in scholarly research in the 1980's (Matthew, 1987: 208 - 212).

How did this persistent problem relate to the dynamics of Swazi politics? Squatters in Swaziland have for a long time seen themselves involved in a struggle for justice. Their view is that 'they were the rightful occupants and that they had been cheated by unscrupulous whites and a deceitful British government' (Crush. 1995, 223). King Sobhuza II addressed this view in legal, cultural and political forums from the time of his installment in 1921 to his death in August 1982. Squatters and landlessness were key issues in the anti-colonial movement led by the Swazi aristocracy. The laws and government action since the 1960s protected squatters because the Swazi King and his chiefs are obligated to give land to all their subjects.

REFERENCES


YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SWAZILAND: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS DURING THE TRANSITION

Sufian H. Bukurura

INTRODUCTION

The population structure of Swaziland shows that the number of people aged between 15 and 39 constitute between 35 to 40% of the total national population. This is the age group normally referred to as the youth. Below that group are children and infants who may be many but too young for much useful economic purpose. On top of the population structure are the old and aged, mostly inward looking and conservative, with wisdom as their main asset. That middle age group - the youth, is not only numerically and physically strong, it is also socially and economically powerful. Society as a whole depends in many respects on that age group for survival (Moller 1967/8).

The paper is an attempt to analyse the difficulties which hinder effective youth participation in the setting of the agenda for the creation of national wealth and social prosperity in view of international trends, national and community complexities, and personal dilemmas. Conclusions are drawn that there is a lot at stake for both the youth and the nation that efforts have to be made and measures taken if long term economic growth and social development are to be achieved. Not only that the youth have to participate in national planning, they also have to set their priorities correctly in order to be able to look ahead with hope and pride. They have to come to terms with the odds for both personal achievements and national economic and social development.

Case Studies of Confusion

Research experience derived from working with local populations in several rural areas of Tanzania has brought to my attention instances of confusion among youth and parents. Below are highlights of two such confusions.

Case I: The Case of the 'Prospective Hunter'

A seventeen-year old male, born and bred of well educated parents who are also economically well-to-do, had just finished junior secondary school. His parents were aware that senior secondary school opportunities in the country were limited. The parents made arrangements to send their first born to a private senior secondary school. To their dismay, the young man had his own plans. He had for some time been involved with colleagues who had exposed him to hunting which was to become a business after his education. In particular, he wanted to hunt big game from where, God willing, he might one day be able to kill an elephant and sell its tasks.

The young man's parents had never thought of hunting as a future profession for their beloved son. The young man, on the other hand, knew how lucrative hunting may be notwithstanding the attendant risks. He even knew the price of an elephant tusk - Tshs 1.2 million (equivalent of 16000 USD at an exchange rate of roughly Tshs 500 per dollar).

Discussion between the parents and the 'prospective elephant hunter' got deadlocked. None appeared to be convinced of the other's arguments. Parents were offended and even fell insulted by the hunting proposal. They had never thought about it and did not find it sensible. That is, however, what the young man wanted.

The young man appeared to recognise his parents' frustration and was willing to compromise his
position. He asked his parents to send him to a Wildlife Management Training Institute. This, he is known to have said, would be acceptable because it was still within his overall ambitions. One day he would ultimately be employed and work in Game Reserves and, therefore, very close to selling elephants and their precious tusks. The dangers attendant to selling elephant tusks did not appear to deter that young man's ambitions. In his mind those were adequately taken care of and not an hindrance in any way.

**Case :2: The Case of the 'Bus Conductor Who Never Was'.**

A Primary school failure, fifteen years old and son of a security guard refused his father's offer to attend a carpentry course conducted at a vocational training institution. The poor old man had done his best to secure that opportunity in very difficult and hostile circumstances. The boy asked his father to tell him what influenced his choice of carpentry training. According to that old man, carpenters were self employed for the whole of their lives. He said to me that his reply to his son was that: 'carpenters might not have a lot of money but they are never hungry. "His son turned down the offer and told his father that lie preferred to be a bus conductor. The wishes of that boy never materialised. He turned to criminal conduct and had been in and out of prison since. At one point the old man is known to have said he wished the boy was dead and forgotten.

**DISCUSSION**

The above case studies arose very far away from Swaziland and in different socio-political circumstances. They, however, raise issues with a lot of bearing and relevance to events and processes in contemporary Swaziland. Those interested in grassroots studies and social lives of rural communities in Swaziland might have heard of tales like those narrated above. I, for one, have not heard of similar tales in Swaziland. The language barrier might be one of the limiting factors. Manifestations of confusion, however, exist. These could be gathered from some academic literature (Macia 1995 and Mngomezulu 1992), trends and tendencies among campus students with whom I regularly speak to and observe, and some media reports. These few impressions and initial signposts may not by themselves be enough to support any solid conclusions. They are, however, suggestive of important undercurrents.

One of the things which the narratives raise is the confusion not only faced by the youth in question (who do not consider them as such any way), but also that of their parents. The parents in the above studies thought they were working tirelessly towards preparing appropriate mechanisms for the provision for their children's future. Such preparations, however, turned out to be either inadequate or even unacceptable in the eyes of the youths to whom the suggestions were made. In other words, the parents' preparations were considered erroneous in the eyes and minds of the respective youths. What do we learn from such studies of confusion?

Before venturing into some potential lessons, it is imperative to point out two things which inform this discussion. The first is that in working this paper I am well aware of the ambiguities attendant to the category of 'youth' and what it entails in different disciplines and social settings. For the purpose of this discussion, youth is confined to the age group between 15 to 39 years. The second thing is to emphasise that it is the occupants of this crucial age group who are mostly blamed for involvement in criminal activities. This is the case in both developing or developed world (Bukurura 1995). It is for the second point, if for no other reason, that the energies of this age group have to be treated carefully and put to proper use for development objectives before the same are otherwise wasted and/or utilised for destructive purposes (Beckerleg 1995. Bundy 1987 and Burawoy 1976).

**Youth and Development: The Context**

Today's youths, unlike their past counterparts, have the benefit of more than one world. The youths of the past lived in closed social politics. They were given and in most situations took what their parents offered them, either because there were limited options or because they had limited knowledge of what was available elsewhere. There were a few who had the courage to decline what was on offer. Those few could be ostracised or castigated as exceptional deviants.
The youths of today, on the other hand, may be living under the authority of their parents (and traditional authorities) in the case of rural Swaziland, or South Africa or Tanzania, they, however, enjoy not only the luxuries of international consumerism (with Coke, Kentucky Fried Chicken and satellite images, including Eddie Murphy and Gangster Rap, in their neighbourhood) but also the protection of the United Nations Conventions and other international documents of which their respective countries are signatories. The former is courtesy of free market ideology, and the latter is in the name of empowerment and human rights guarantees.

The dilemmas of the youths are not new. This is so because youth is a stage in the life cycle of mankind which comes to all men and women in the world at a point in their life time - because today's pensioners are yesteryears' youths. The American baby-boomers of the 1960s, for example, are now looking forward to become pensioners in not many years to come.

Modern challenges, though, have complications of their own. Localised methods which were used to prepare off-springs in general, and the youths in particular, for different individual and social tasks existed (Kuper 1947, see Appendix 3). These might have worked relatively well in closed social polities of the time. Those methods, however, cannot be essentially relied upon in themselves to serve the needs of the youths and their nations in the 21st century. Not only are some of the youths being alienated by these practices (in cases where they are divisive), in certain respects some of these practices are either threatened or even questioned if and when measured by international standards. The checks and balances provided by these international documents have been welcome, they, however, need to be reconciled with local mechanisms available for the preparation of individuals and communities as a whole. There is very little reconciliation, as far as I am aware, of these contradictory trends.

The youths of Swaziland had, at some point in history, experienced migration to neighbouring countries from where they not only earned themselves a living but also contributed to the well-being of their extended families and to the economy of their nation. With the benefit of hindsight it could be argued that migration also had consequences of exposing the migrants to the luxury (or necessities depending on how one looks at it) of wide regional and international connections. They not only made a living but they also earned money and acquired property they called their own, and in some cases participated in assisting their extended families. By working away from home they also escaped the rigorous disciplinary machinery of the parents in particular and the traditional arrangements in general.

Historical sources suggest that parents were not only happy and proud of their youths but they were also worried. Swaziland authorities, for one, got concerned with the emerging trends in the 1960s and formed the 'Decline of Tribal and Parental Control Committee' to assess the situation (see SNA File 1444 for its activities). Information on how the international community reacted at that time is scanty. If such a committee, with similar terms of reference, was formed today some eyebrows could be raised and justifications, in terms of provisions in an international charter, might not be hard to find.

Opportunities for migration are getting fewer and fewer. Some youths who might have taken advantage of that option are having to stay with their own parents, within local communities and national boundaries. Some youth are already voicing their displeasure with certain aspects of old methods and practices in Swaziland, for example, (see Mgomezulu 1992 and Macia 1995). International bodies have not hesitated to lend them a supporting voice. Parents, on their part, may still be struggling to understand these new needs and demands and how to come to terms with them. The extent to which personal demands (of the youths and parents), local measures (in the communities and the nation) and the international limitations, correspond need to be very carefully thought out.

Whereas parents genuinely felt obliged to prepare their children to face social challenges, that desire cannot be measured only in terms of what used to be done in the distant past. Parental needs and local requirements may be considered, not as ends in themselves but, among the many components of what the youths need to be trained in just as much as national and international restrictions have to be considered.

All the above have to be done within the context of international influences to which modern youths are already a part. It is, therefore, not enough for parents to decide on their own what they consider to be best for the youths. The latter have already demonstrated that they need to have a say in the way in which their
present lives are managed and their future prepared. What exactly they have to say may be based on rosy Utopia, but it is an expression of needs all the same. Perspectives of the needs of these two parties do not necessarily overlap. That is where the difficulty arises.

United Nations organisations and their charters provide wide ranging enabling conditions and protection for different categories of people in the world. These same documents, however, do very rarely show how the rights can be balanced against different kinds of individual and social needs and necessaries. Whereas respective national governments may be aware of the documents and their limitations (because they are signatories and parties to them), parents and local communities may not. The ignorant parties are, however, bound by provisions of these same documents in the same way.

There are indications that the needs of the youths, directions of the parents and the nation, on the one hand, and international exposure and restrictions, on the other, may be pulling in different ways. In the absence of methods to reconcile these competing needs and interests it is the youths who are exposed to the vagaries of markets as propounded by both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

The logic of market forces suggests that the youths engaged in rural activities and working on their parents' farms (and occasionally on Chiefs' farms in the case of Swaziland) would be better off if they were incorporated in the national labour force. Employment opportunities, on the one hand, however, do not permit that. If and when opportunities do arise the youths are likely to find themselves poorly educated and unskilled. It is not clear what sociological explanations could be given for these deficiencies in the first place.

Small scale activities in the informal sector, which are basically urban based, are considered by the youths to be a good source of income and mechanisms of liberating them from laborious and demanding chores involved in farming. These activities, however, demand some form of capital which the youths may not be able to obtain and do not even know where to find. As suggested earlier, the youth who attempt to become part of the market system are likely to encounter unlimited obstacles and on some occasions fall foul of the long arm of the law. I doubt if parents, local communities and national governments, or even the international community, have thought of any solutions to such paradoxes.

Free market consumerism and satellite images in general, and Eddie Murphy and Gangster Rap in particular, continue to take their toll (Kwong. 1994). These have enormous appeal to the youth which outweigh both parental and local constraints. Yet, the youths' initial preparations for social responsibilities have to be shouldered by parents in local conditions. Parents are part of local communities which in turn are parts of the nation. These, therefore, are challenging times not only to parents but to local communities and the nation as a whole.

Looking Forward with Hope

It is doubtful whether current national programmes and plans sufficiently address these challenges. In the absence of that, parents and local communities have to confront the confusions and bear those obligations on their own and without much guidance. To what extent the parents and local communities will manage to hold the youths of the nation together, against the demands and pressures of market forces and satellite images, while keeping within the rules laid down by the international restrictions, no one can speculate correctly at this stage.

I am aware that in the case of Swaziland, several development initiatives are already in place. These include: the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC). Economic and Social Reform Agenda (ESRA) and National Development Strategy (NDS) all of which are in various stages of implementation. The extent to which they solicit and incorporate the views of the youths in national processes and directions may ultimately determine how the contradictions and confusions are reconciled. If, however, these national initiatives approach the problems of the youths in the manner in which they were handled by the parents in the two case studies above, little or nothing might be achieved. In other words, the youths need to be made part of these initiatives in order to avoid making plans which might ultimately be rejected in favour of other things. Those familiar with the initiatives may testify whether the needs and wishes of the youths have been sufficiently dealt with to avoid potential disappointments.
Parents and the nation can no longer afford to take today's youths for granted. Thanks to the development of the global village, they are aware of what is going on, not only within their homes, localities and national borders, but also within neighbouring countries and sub-regions. They are also able to communicate instantly with the international community in general, and representatives of the international community in general, and representatives of international bodies in particular, to raise their concerns and express their fears. International intervention has been blamed for breaking the fabrics of nations and local ethics. They have at the same time, however, helped to introduce controls in the operations of our homes, local and national institutions.

Bill Clinton's 1996 Presidential campaign speeches and 1997 inaugural speech spoke of the "Bridge to the 21st century" and courageously laid down what each age category of Americans should be able to do and when - logging on internet, going to college and continuous learning for the adults. Their third world counterparts (who simultaneously watched the speeches on CNN as part of the global village) cannot afford the bare minimum of knowledge that may enable them to earn a living, leave alone positively contribute to national development. Irrespective of the distances which separate those who watched the speeches, certain common denominators have already been established. We all live in a global village and there are many things we share. Youth, a delicate stage in the life cycle, of all other age categories, shares most and need to be treated very carefully if their numeric strengths are to be properly harnessed and their strong muscles and energies are not to be wasted or misused.

What has been said so far might suggest an era of doom and gloom for the youths, parents, communities and the nation. It has even been suggested in some quarters that the youths are a time bomb. Social processes are much more complex than are portrayed in daily life. As such they also embody indicators for hope. The challenges which emerge, therefore, are those of tapping the potential.

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CHAPTER FOUR

DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE: ISSUES OF HOUSING FOR WOMEN IN POST-COLONIAL SWAZILAND

Miranda Miles

INTRODUCTION

Sustainable human development is development that not only generates economic growth but distributes its benefits equitably, that regenerates the environment rather than destroying it, that empowers people rather than marginalising them. It is development that gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities and providing for their participation in decisions that affect their lives. It is development that is pro-people, pro-jobs and pro-women (UNDP, 1994).

One of the primary objectives of the post-colonial Government of Swaziland has been to achieve sustainable human development (Government of Swaziland, 1995). Yet after 28 years of independent rule, the success of the country's efforts at human development remain under-achieved and the country is categorised according to the UNDP human development index as a low human development country.

The geographical focus of this paper is on women's migration as a factor of post-colonial development in Swaziland. Female migration in Swaziland bears significance to the actual and Southern African region on female migration, because of the close economic links that Swaziland holds with the Republic of South Africa. It also illuminates and reflects the major social and political transformations taking place in Swaziland, particularly in the past three decades. Spatial processes of economic, political and social adjustments in the sub-region and in the kingdom of Swaziland have affected patterns of Swazi female migration and the roles of women in the Swazi urban economy. Female migration thus gives a perspective on a variety of issues that relates to Swaziland's socio-economic development in the period after independence from British colonial rule.

One major problem caused by large-scale rural-urban migration in Swaziland has been the pressure on the limited, "formal" housing supply. For low-income women, the more critical issue they face is, their access to housing in an urban environment. The growing recognition of the marginalisation of women's interests in housing research has generated significant studies which have concentrated on the neglected areas of women's role in the housing process, particularly in the case of female headed households (Buvinic et al., 1983). certain types of households (Varley, 1995) and in housing policy (Todes and Walker, 1993 Little. 1994). Very little attention has been paid to the fundamental issue of the role of women in the provision of housing in Swaziland and other such basic services and the roll of housing in women's livelihood strategies in an urban environment.

This paper explores the complex relationship between women's access to housing, their livelihood, strategies and women's work in post-colonial Swaziland. Faced with an urban housing market that marginalises low-income women, women adopt alternative housing strategies to secure shelter. The role that housing plays in their pursuit of a better livelihood gives insight into coping strategies women adopt to combat urban poverty and to reduce their vulnerability. The paper draws from a broader study on migration and development and its implications for the growth and sustenance of domestic work in Swaziland after 1968. Focus on domestic workers as rural-urban migrants in this paper, highlights the importance of women's entry into wage labour as a coping strategy in response to the changing character of national and local development and as a response to the general urban housing crisis.
For many African countries, the independence decade of the 1960s marked an era of optimism. With Governments' serious pledges to better the disabled economics inherited from colonial authorities, came anticipation of sustainable human development for all sectors of society. Notwithstanding the achievements of independent rule, very little change has however been experienced, especially by women. Yet for a long time, the effects of colonial policy and post-colonial development on African women's roles went unnoticed because of a general negligence of the roles of women in the development process.

Concepts of development that influenced development strategies of many African Sovereign States were predominantly economic. Inevitably, development plans failed to link social and economic activities and to encourage equality of participation in the development process. A more striking implication for women was that spatial separation of home and work and variations in women and men's responsibilities, meant that their full integration into the development process was inhibited (Momsen. 1987).

Debates on development crystallised from several ideological positions. Underdevelopment theory and modernisation theory both proposed development based on industrialisation. While underdevelopment theory argued that exploitative capitalism was to blame for African under development, the modernisation paradigm argued for a trickle down effect of skill, labour, capital, technology, resources and entrepreneurship from core regions to peripheral regions. These development paradigms have been challenged to incorporate a more holistic approach to development. A development approach that has been advocated. has been one that not only demands of fundamental reassessment of the foundations of development theory, practice and strategy, but takes cognisance of processes by which women's activities are relocated from the sphere of the household to the labour market, and where control of their environment is transferred to form an important link in the international division of labour (Redclift. 1984).

This new development discourse has increasingly sought to incorporate an evaluation of women's work as an important parameter, outside the formal labour force, while taking into account structural changes in households and in the growing numbers of households headed by women. Another important parameter of development that has emerged has been migration. Chant and Radcliffe (1992) observe that gender differentiated migration is important because it acts as a mirror for the way in which the divisions of labour are incorporated into spatially uneven processes of economic development. The historical process and pattern of Swazi female migration in like manner, mirrors uneven variations in the process of economic development throughout the colonial period and in the post-colonial era.

Sporadic but significant studies have emerged that have focused on the internal migratory flows within Swaziland (deVletter. 1983 Gulc. 1984. 1991 Maro. 1991 Subair. 1991). Apart from a general preoccupation with the statistical analysis of migration, key themes that the literature on internal migration centres around, include the depressed state of the economy and the efforts of the Rural Development Agricultural Programme (RDAP) which was initiated in 1966 to promote rural development in order to regulate rural-urban migration and the detrimental effects of labour migration on household economics. Even less documented is the rural-urban migration of women in Swaziland a movement that has been on the increase with rural transformations in post-colonial Swaziland, and growing economic opportunities in urban areas, the changing role of women in society. the influence of rural-urban linkages and gender relations.

The process of migration in developing countries has undoubtedly surfaced as a result of their colonial heritage. The exacerbation of inequalities in access to land, resources and power, and the growth of powerful internal classes and groups whose interests lay in the maintenance of an open economy, were wrought in the colonial period. The seeds of impoverishment which were sown in the colonial era. have incited mass scale urbanisation to burgeoning urban centres. Herein lies the genesis of the developing world's crisis of survival, especially for women. The gendered dimension of migration in Africa, as in many parts of the developing world, has occurred at an intersection of two major social transformations: increasing urbanisation and the changing status of women. In many developing countries, increasing rural-urban female migration is associated with shifts in women's occupational roles in the urban economy. As Fawcett et al. (1984) suggests, entry into their new roles in the urban environment implied not only a change
Faweett et al. (1984) suggests, entry into their new roles in the urban environment implied not only a change of status for rural women, but also new policy issues that have economic, demographic and cultural dimensions.

For a long time, migration has been viewed solely from an economic perspective. Though economic factors have influenced women's migration substantially, the very significance of female migration lies in its linkages as a spatial process of adjustment, with the developmental and societal changes that provoke it and the ensuing consequences of women's migration. Focus on women's migration thus gives a broader perspective on a variety of issues that relate to social and economic development.

The crucial question that needs to be addressed concerns whether the study of Swazi female migration makes a difference to an understanding of the processes of urbanisation and development in post-colonial Swaziland. First, women have represented a different human resource than men; one indicated in the explicit preference for women workers in certain occupations and industries. These preferences are certainly a reality in the Swaziland labour market. Women's distinctive economic and social roles have implications for the socio-economic development of the post-colonial Swazi State.

Second, the causes and social effects of Swazi female migration have varied considerably from those of male labour migration, over time and space, even though the social processes that controlled their movements were similar. Apart from the economic consequences of women's migration after 1969, there have been significant social effects of women's migration in Swaziland. Their social roles in the urban areas they migrate to, have had an influence on the economic roles that they play. One significant feature of this is their involvement in the informal labour market and in the invisible economy of domestic service. Housing is another important aspect of women's migration to Swaziland's urban areas, especially in light of the fact that Swazi women are faced with cultural and social constraints on their access to land. The role that housing plays in their urban adaptation is also a point of consideration for policy making in reconciling female migration with Swaziland's development planning. Reflecting on women's response to urban poverty is pertinent in a country whose historical experience of governance has for a long time marginalised women, and in a country that has experienced economic instabilities since the 1980s. High rates of inflation and increased levels of urbanisation.

**Gender-Selective Migration: Implications for Women's Access to Housing**

Post-colonial urbanisation in many Third World countries such as Swaziland, has significantly affected the roles of men and women in society. One of the well-documented causes of Third World urbanisation has been rural-urban migration, which has increasingly taken on a more gendered dimension. Gender-selective migration, which involves the differential movement of men and women from rural areas to urban areas, reflects a range of social and economic imperatives and constraints to men's and women's access to resources and social organisation. For a small country like Swaziland with a population of less than a million, gender differentiation in rural-urban mobility has not only been a barometer for existing gender roles and relations, but has also acted as a catalyst for change, primarily in the post-independence period.

Gender is a vital component of the urbanisation process. Post-independence development and the Government of Swaziland's emphasis on the need for rapid industrialisation (Government of Swaziland, 1978) created serious implications for the employment patterns of women. On the one hand, a demand for female labour created. Yet on the other hand, as increasingly more Swazi women joined the labour market, a vacuum was created at the household level in the greater demand for household help and nannies for child care (Miles, 1996b). The gap could only be filled by a contingent of women in domestic service.

The feminisation of the Swazi labour market in the 1980s and 1990s generated a new wave of female migration as women with little or no marketable skills joined the ranks of domestic service (Russell, 1986). By the 1980s domestic service constituted the largest sources of employment for migrant women in Swaziland (Armstrong, 1984) and continues to be a female-oriented sector of employment in Swaziland. Women's migration to the city of Manzini is testimony not only to their increasing involvement in the urban economy, but also to the diverse coping strategies that they adopt as migrants and in some cases, female heads of households, to support their families. While predominant as a major source of female
records. Yet for many women, it is an occupation through which they gain the easiest foothold into the urban economy. The work and living conditions of domestic workers have not been subjected to policy statements nor structural factors that limit women's access to proper housing. The paper discusses how women in domestic service have skillfully secured shelter, ownership and have mobilized their housing to generate income. Emphasis on domestic workers brings to light the efforts of these vulnerable groups of women workers in an urban environment.

All too often, housing reinforces disadvantage and inequality. The following section demonstrates the housing options available to Swaziland's urban poor and how gender affects their access to different housing. The analysis proceeds to examine through case-studies of domestic workers, how certain women have limited access to any form of shelter in their own right and how this has in turn affected the alternative housing strategies they adopt. Drawing from interviews conducted with domestic workers in the city of Manzini, Swaziland's largest urban centre, the discussion investigates how these women have coped with prevalent housing shortages in the city, while paying attention to whether they are able to get their own houses or live as tenants in light of the obstacles in the housing process that mitigate against possibilities of gaining access to housing in the urban areas. For many migrant women the option of domestic service continues to be an attractive and easy means of getting a job and earning money in town. More seriously, it also provides a means of free accommodation, in spite of the indignities and constraints that domestic workers face. For other migrant women in the city whose earnings are below the poverty datum line, informal housing has provided accommodation, but not without certain constraints that are related to women's access to resources in general. For women who have managed to secure a place of their own in urban informal settlements, housing becomes an important asset in their strategies against vulnerability and economic adversity.

WOMEN AND HOUSING IN SWAZILAND

Historically, a combination of inappropriate policy, outdated legislation, insecure tenure, poor management, insufficient and misdirected planning and unavailable or even inaccessible housing finance have together worked towards creating a precarious housing market in Swaziland. As in many colonial territories, the pattern of housing development inherited at independence in Swaziland's urban centres, did not accommodate the African population. Changes in the social and economic geography of the country during the period of transition to independent rule in the period of the late 1960s to the early 1970s, created a demand for housing as the urban population began to grow.

In an attempt to cope with urban growth and the demand for housing during the 1970s, the Government of Swaziland initiated several donor-aided self-help housing schemes. However, these schemes failed for several reasons which included unresolved tenure problems and unclarified responsibility for infrastructural provision, maintenance and cost recovery (Hock-Smit, 1988). Public sector low income housing projects were also initiated although in reality, only a small number of rental housing projects have been developed for low income households. While most of them were heavily subsidised to make them affordable for low income groups, high rent increases in most of these schemes have made them less accessible to the target group. To close the housing gap, Swaziland's informal housing sector has supplied the bulk of low-income rental housing in recent years. It has provided a much needed response to growing housing demand in spite of the serious deficiencies in the quality of Informal housing, both structurally and in terms of access to services and infrastructure (Hock-Smit, 1998).

Although the Government of Swaziland's National Housing Policy pledges to be equitable, sustainable, comprehensible and flexible. Swazi women, especially low-income women and female heads of households, more often than not are denied access to basic shelter through various economic, social and cultural mechanisms. On the first level. Swazi women are denied access to decent housing because of financial constraints. Women's low and irregular earnings have restricted their access to rental accommodation in the formal housing market, or to sponsored housing projects. Women also have less recourse to loans because of their small and/or fluctuating incomes which have played a part in barring them form obtaining credit...
recourse to loans because of their small and/or fluctuating incomes which have played a part in barring them from obtaining credit through formal banking channels. For most women, obtaining formal credit is difficult not only because they lack collateral, but also because a husband's consent may be required. This prerequisite eliminates female-headed households from accessing housing finance.

According to Tabibian (1983), another constraint that Swazi women face relates to their limited and or lack of knowledge on how and where to gain credit. Undoubtedly for low-income women, avenues of obtaining credit are limited. At another level, one of the greatest constraints women face with regard to access to housing concerns their rights to land. In general, the land question in Swaziland is a particularly sensitive one in view of the existing tenure patterns. One of the most crucial factors that have affected the urban dwellers' ability to access the land and housing market, is the unresolved and complicated issue of land tenure in Swaziland.

There are basically three types of tenure in Swaziland: traditional or customary tenure, freehold title land and Crown land. Swazi traditional tenure is prevalent on Swazi Nation Lands which are controlled by chiefs and held in trust for the nation by the King. Although in theory, there is no official Swazi Nation Land (SNL) in the urban areas, with rapid urban growth existing boundaries of urban areas have had to be extended, especially for the purposes of providing urban shelter. The encroachment of urban boundaries onto SNL has meant that many of the informal settlements in urban areas have developed under temporary occupancy permits that have formed a major obstacle to the urban poor wanting to build permanent structures. Women's access to land in informal settlements has therefore been also limited by traditional law that prohibits women from acquiring land in their own right. The situation is worsened by the fact that traditionally, SNL is inalienable. Divorced, widowed and never-married women may control land, although their access to land may only be acquired through a male representative, even if he is a minor.

Further complicating the land issue is the fact that the lack of affordable land with secure tenure is the main cause of Swaziland's urban shelter problem (Government of Swaziland. 1995). The problem is even more acute for the majority of Swazi women who do not enjoy full and equitable participation in development issues. To this end, a battery of laws and social factors have successfully worked together to further marginalise low-income Swazi women in an already precarious housing market.

Vulnerability and Women's Strategies: A Conceptual Analysis

For Swazi women, poverty has always been a significant feature of their lives. The seriousness with which poverty has impacted women's lives has at best been downplayed even in the present decade. Drawing from the intuitive and insightful work of Caroline Moser (1996), women's vulnerability as urban residents is investigated within the broader context of rural-urban migration and urban development. The basic tenet is that Swaziland Government policy and urban development strategy in the post-colonial era, has hardly met the needs of the more vulnerable strata of the urban population, such as women. Focusing on a group of domestic workers, it is argued that women in the city are confronted with harsh conditions exacerbated by economic fluctuations, job scarcity, housing shortages and social and cultural factors that have historically marginalised them in society. Rather than migrate back to the rural areas, they adopt strategies to cope with the day-to-day problems caused by high consumer prices, and an inadequate social and economic infrastructure.

Moser (1996) introduces the concept of vulnerability, which is described as the insecurity of the well-being of individuals, households or communities in the face of a changing ecological, social, economic and political environment. These changes can increase an individual's vulnerability. Women's ability to avoid or reduce their vulnerability and to increase economic productivity depends not only on their initial assets, but also on their ability to transform those assets into income, food and other basic necessities effectively. Therefore, the more assets people have, the less vulnerable they are, and the greater the erosion of their assets, the greater their insecurity (Moser, 1996). Vulnerability is in this case, closely linked with asset ownership.

An analysis of the vulnerability of domestic workers involves not only the threats they face in coping with urban poverty, but also the resilience in exploiting opportunities in the workplace and in the
coping strategies of domestic workers, emphasis will be placed on how women have mobilised both their tangible assets such as housing, to earn a living and intangible assets, to meet the demands of urban life. The extent to which social networking strategies, which are based on social relations which interweave themselves into the strategies of women, will also be addressed. The housing situation of domestic workers suggests that women's access to, and power over land, housing and credit in the city is severely circumscribed. This has led to the adoption of a variety of coping strategies that draw attention to a need to understand urban women's action, needs and visions in creating gender sensitive approaches in planning. Their resilience has cumulated in the mobilisation of their most important asset: housing, and in the creation, adoption and reinforcement of certain networking and coping strategies which portray their ability to cope with economic crisis a dimension of analysis that has become increasingly important.

**Domestic Work: A Housing Strategy?**

In any urban community, a major source of vulnerability for women has been in the labour market (Moser, 1996). To keep their households out of poverty and to reduce their vulnerability, women have mobilised, amongst other things, their labour. This has meant that they have undertaken poor paid employment to reduce short-term poverty. The importance of domestic work as an asset which has been mobilised to cope with economic crisis in the city, is brought to bear through the lived experiences of women who have moved to the city as a livelihood strategy, where they have resorted to domestic work. An analysis of the research findings revealed two broad categories of women who used domestic work as a housing strategy. In the first category were those who came to the city without their children, and had no family or friends in the urban area with whom they could live. In this case live-in domestic work provides shelter, safety and a home-base in the city:

**Case Study 1: Beatrice Kunene**

Beatrice Kunene’s story is the story of an elderly lady who is trapped in domestic service by virtue of her having no formal education, no skills and no capital to seek an alternative occupation or business venture. She was born in the Southern part of Swaziland, and with only a Standard one education, she can only barely read and write. She does not even know when she was born. She was forced to migrate to Manzini at the age of 14, together with her friends in search of any employment to make some living. Their options were not many; they settled for domestic service. More than forty years later, Beatrice is still a domestic worker. Her story is that of a woman with no family at all except for four grown sons, whom she rarely sees. The death of her grandmother totally severed all links she had with rural kin. Beatrice works for a single mother in a middle-income quarters, which is now the only home she has. Her work and living conditions also draw attention to the conditions that many migrant women in Manzini are subjected to. made more serious by the fact that many domestic workers, by virtue of their being migrants with no family in town and no money to rent affordable private quarters, are forced into the status of being dependants. Beatrice's dependence on her employer limits even her private life. She has very little time to relax, neither is she allowed to entertain visitors or to visit her friends. Being a live-in domestic worker, especially one dependent on her job for shelter, has meant being subjected to long working hours and no food. Although unlike most domestic workers in Manzini, Beatrice has (he privacy of living in the servants quarters, is very poor. The only piece of furniture in her room is a bed. Even though her room is attached to the main dwelling house, Beatrice's room has no electricity. Beatrice suspects that her employer purposefully disconnected the power supply to her room. Beatrice has discovered that there is a price to be paid for being a live-in domestic worker, but for a salary of E100 a month that is erratically paid, with no home to go to or any alternatives to employ. Beatrice is forced to tolerate her work conditions, only because the job provides a roof over her head.

The story of Beatrice Kunene echoes that of many women, who come to town in search of employment. Wary of the difficulties of finding affordable rental accommodation, for many of them domestic work becomes a housing strategy. In some cases, it was expressed that domestic work was attractive not only for the accommodation it provides, but also because it provided a measure of safety and security that the alternative, informal housing, did not offer, given the high rates reported in those areas.
the accommodation it provides, but also because it provided a measure of safety and security that the alternative, informal housing, did not offer, given the high rates reported in those areas.

The second category of women who took advantage of live-in domestic work as a housing strategy were those who saw domestic work as a "waiting zone" in which they whiled away time in the city, while waiting for more alluring employment opportunities and ambitions that they had. This category of women tended to be younger, single women who had migrated to the city in search of employment other than domestic service. In the city, these young women are confronted with an urban economy characterised by high levels of unemployment. Unable to find employment, they turned to domestic work. For them, domestic service is a migration strategy used to gain a foothold in the city with the ultimate goal of gaining skill or material possessions. Alternatively, it was seen as a means of earning the cash needed to pursue their aspirations. In the latter case, they were taking advantage of the fluidity and flexibility of domestic service as a strategy to save money and to secure a roof over their head in the city. With its ease of entry and prospects of providing free housing with the job, domestic service is an attractive option because it is seen as a temporary form of employment a means to an end and yet also an effective housing strategy:

Case Study 2: Judith Maseko

Judith Maseko is 19 years old. She came to Manzini in 1991. At the time of the interview, she was working for a young couple who had two small children aged 8 and 4. Judith came to work in the city because seeing her elder sisters working and buying themselves clothes, furniture and cosmetics, she longed to have these things too. The perceived material lure of the city that attracted and prompted Judith to migrate from the rural area to the city. With consent of her parents, Judith came to the city of Manzini where she entered into live-in domestic service for two reasons. First, because her job provided food and shelter, she would be able to save her income of E200 a month, to buy the furniture and clothes she aspired to have. Second, her ambition was to accumulate enough money to go to sewing classes, buy a sewing machine and establish her own dress-making business. From her savings, Judith has already built herself a one-roomed house on her father's plot in the rural area and has acquired basic furniture for her house. Meanwhile Judith lives in a servants quarters which has a fully furnished private room, a shower and a toilet.

In cases such as Judith's, domestic work is considered as temporary regardless of the length of time that women actually spend doing it. Women typically perform household chores on a permanent basis, but perceive the engagement as temporary as long as they anticipate finding alternative income-earning employment outside domestic service.

Not all live-in domestic workers necessarily live in the privacy of a servant's quarters. Because of a general shortage for affordable housing, coupled with generally low salaries even in white collar jobs, many middle income families let out their servants quarters to help meet the demand for housing, and also to supplement their own household incomes. In this context, live-in domestic workers are sometimes forced to live in the main house with their employers. This normally means sleeping with the children in their bedroom, or on the floor in the living room. This living arrangement subjects domestic workers to extreme forms of oppression, hard work, abuse, limited use of space and unequal power and gender relations within the household they work in (Miles, 1996a). Furthermore, domestic workers in this situation tend to be overworked, under- and erratically paid. Privacy and respect are denied them, and because of the isolated nature of domestic work as a labour process within the confines of the private household, their vulnerability increases.

Yet despite using domestic service as a housing strategy, and a strategy of being urban, the controls over one's life, erratically paid wages and a lack of privacy are still sufficient reason for women to yearn for a home of their own, as Beatrice Kunene commented: 'I need my privacy. I need my own room, something to call my own home... I would accept anything, even a one-roomed house made from any kind of material. Live-in domestic service is therefore not always a practical and preferred housing option, especially for women who have families. What other options do they have in an urban area?
Renting at exorbitant prices, is not always a preferred option, but is an alternative to live-in domestic work in the case of domestic workers, and more generally, to homelessness. It also allows women to live with their children who have either to build their own homes or resort to rental accommodation. From the findings of the study, most women aspired to own a home of their own. But despite several frustrated efforts at acquiring land and a home of their own, many women have been forced to live in rental informal housing for several reasons. First, the lack of an affordable low-income rental market in Swaziland has meant that the present housing stock in Manzini is far too expensive for migrant women who earn a basic minimum wage of E1 58.40 per month. Most women interviewed reported paying rents of up to 60 percent of their monthly income for one or two rooms.

Case Study 3: Sara Kubheka

Sara Kubheka is also a migrant woman who moved to Manzini in search of a job to feed and clothe her children who lived with her sister in the rural part of Southeast Swaziland. She had come to Swaziland from South Africa some two years before, and lived with her sister. In those two years she made a living brewing beer, but profits were low and she frequently lacked capital to buy stock for her business venture. She then decided to migrate to town to find a job and "buy soap for the children". With no education and skill, Sara arrived in town with no place to live. After living for a few weeks with a woman she met at the bus station, Sara found a job as a domestic worker. She also found a place to live at Estandini, an informal settlement in Manzini. For the most part of her life in town, Sara has worked as a domestic worker, and has lived in rental accommodation in different informal settlements in Manzini, depending on where she found a job. The reasons for her living in informal housing are that she cannot afford formal rental housing, none of her employers have provided accommodation for her in their servants quarters, and also because she has failed to acquire land in her own right. The rental accommodation that Sara has lived in has mainly been a one-roomed mud hut, with no access to water or electricity. For this shelter, she pays E40 a month. Her monthly income is E1 00. The rest of her money she sends to her sister for her children.

Despite the fact that rent accounted for a substantial proportion of their income, they found informal housing not only accessible but also flexible under changing work, migration and household patterns in the lives of migrant women.

Second, from the interviews with domestic workers, their status as migrants with little prospect of returning to the rural area, was found to influence their housing preferences and determine the decisions made in housing and other financial investments. That, although home ownership was certainly expressed as the ultimate ambition, and a means to their being permanently urban however, the major limiting factor to owning a home of their own, is their marital status. Without a husband or a male relative, according to Swazi traditional tenure laws, women cannot be allocated land.

Case Study 4: Malta Mamba

Malta Mamba has been married since 1986. She met her husband shortly after she migrated to Manzini in search of employment. She first worked in a Textile Factory in the industrial area near Manzini. After she got married, she moved back to the rural area to live with her in-laws. Her husband built her own house on his father’s land. Three years later, Malta’s marriage took a turn for the worse after her husband insisted on bringing home a second wife. She eventually left him and migrated back to Manzini in 1991. She has been employed as a domestic worker since, but has had difficulty finding accommodation because she is a single mother with two children. Her brother did manage to get her a piece of land on the outskirts of Manzini, but when she tried to erect a small house on it, she was told by the chief of the area to tear it down, because "a woman without a husband cannot build her own house". Malta now lives in the same area, but this time in her brother’s house.

With some exceptions, women’s hopes of home ownership remain but distant dreams because of their inability to cut through the bureaucracy involved in the acquisition of land and credit in Swaziland. As alternatives to home ownership, various strategies are adopted by women in the city, not only to secure shelter, but to secure a permanent base in the city for their children. Drawing similar
inability to cut through the bureaucracy involved in the acquisition of land and credit in Swaziland. As alternatives to home ownership, various strategies are adopted by women in the city, not only to secure shelter, but to secure a permanent base in the city for their children. Drawing similar conclusions to those that Schlyter (1989) made from her study of women householders in Zimbabwe, their housing histories suggest that for women who had no rural alternative, their strategy was to become urban, in which housing was used as a means. More importantly home ownership is sought as secure platform for successful urban household is dependent on access to accommodation. This may only be done by adopting one of a variety of strategies to acquire land. More often than not, the strategies of land acquisition make use of the loopholes in the system of land allocation. The significance of home ownership as a cultural factor, and as an important asset in undermining the constant threats of poverty in the lives of women and their households, will be considered in the following section.

The Role of Housing as a Coping Strategy

Housing is an important productive asset that can cushion households against severe poverty, and land market regulation can either create opportunities to diversify its use or foreclose them' (Moser. 1996:7). A home of one's own provides far more than simply shelter. Ownership opportunities for the urban poor in Swaziland are very limited, particularly for women who are faced with financial, legal and cultural constraints to home ownership. Yet the dream of home ownership is however realised in several ways and the home ownership strategies women adopt are varied. Also significant are the reasons for home ownership in the city. Women are increasingly realising the significance of the role of housing in reducing their vulnerability. For women with weak or no links with the rural area, housing is an effective strategy for being urban. Inevitably, having a home of one's own becomes a matter of necessity. Home ownership is also eagerly sought after because of the prospects it offers, of generating income by home-based enterprises and other income-generating activities is especially important for women. A third and more sombre reason is that, according to Swazi custom and tradition, it is important for one to have a home for themselves and for their children because it is regarded also as one's final resting place. Culturally, but preferably, in the family homestead, even if the deceased were an urban dweller. Because it is considered shameful for one to have no home to be buried in. it is of utmost importance to have a home to leave to your children and to be laid to rest in.

From the findings of the study, for women who have secured a home of their own in and around the city of Manzini, either through marriage, through their sons or other means, housing becomes an effective tool for generating additional household income, extending personal relationships and generating social capital (Moser. 1996). Housing has been used as a resourceful asset, particularly when other sources of income fail to meet the needs of the household.

Case Study 5: Dora Hlope (Ma-Hlope)

Dora Hlope was born in 1939 in the city of Estcourt in the Natal Province of South Africa. She lived with her family who were tenant farmers on a boer farm for a short period, but later moved to the township where she spent the most part of her childhood. Like many women of her day, Ma-Hlope never finished school because there was no money to educate her. and secondly, the value of education was not quite appreciated back then. Ma-Hlope began working as a domestic worker while she was a teenager. She was married in 1969. As a young bride she lived with her in-laws who were originally from Swaziland. After the birth of their first baby, her husband and her in-laws decided to move back to Swaziland.

Ma-Hlope came to Swaziland in 1969. Her in-laws were given a piece of land by the chief in Mbuleni, a large informal settlement in the peri-urban outskirts of Manzini. The area where Ma-Hlope originally moved to in the late sixties, grew and today is one of the biggest informal settlements on the outskirts of Manzini. As the settlement grew, Ma-Hlope’s in-laws decided to give her and her husband their own piece of land from their own: 'My elder brother-in-law decided to give me a small piece of land to erect my own house., to me it was like a dream!' As is customary in Swazi tradition, she continued living with her in-laws in their homestead Ma-Hlope bore four children, while moving in and out of domestic work where she
Ma-Hlope has remained in domestic service in spite of the hard work and her ill-health. The perks of domestic work include the fact that her employers often give her clothes for the children and sometimes even buy her groceries.

As the sole breadwinner, Ma-Hlope sought alternative means of earning extra cash. After failed attempts at selling vegetables, she decided to extend her house further. She has built on three more rooms which are attached to the back of her own house, built from stick and mud. She rents them out to young men who work in the city of Manzini at the rate of E80 per month. Through this venture, her household income has increased substantially, allowing her to educate her children (the youngest is now enrolled at university) and join various burial and credit societies in which she plays an active role.

Ma-Hlope's story raises several pertinent issues that draw attention to the role of housing in women's strategies against poverty. First, it draws attention to the fact that the household is a very dynamic unit, which as Schlyter (1989) has noted, is dependent on access to accommodation. Because Swazi Nation Land is unregulated, the traditional pattern of inter-generational 'nesting', in which different households of the same family build their houses within the same homestead, is an effective strategy for home ownership. It was in this way that Ma-Hlope and her husband were able to acquire a piece of land because the extended family Ma-Hlope married into, guaranteed her support and more importantly, access to land. Although the land does not belong to Ma-Hlope, she has gained considerable control over its use and in the decisions concerning housing improvements for the purposes of income-generation. The above case study points to the importance of household relations in helping one another to move out of a position of need and poverty by providing less fortunate and dependent family members with access to assets that could be effective to their coping strategies.

Second, that Ma-Hlope lives with two of her grown daughters, who are also her dependants, is also part of her long term plan of old age security. Daughters are viewed by most mothers as security for the future. In the absence of a social security and welfare system in Swaziland, women constantly look forward to their children, especially their daughters, taking care of them. Although the fact that her daughters are dependants has created an added burden, Ma-Hlope's time and budget, it provides the advantage of an increased household size which has allowed her as a working mother with multiple responsibilities, to delegate other household chores to her daughters. This delegation of duties has freed Ma-Hlope to get involved in other income-generating and community activities.

Third, a home of one's own provides more than just shelter, but presents itself as an economic asset because it offers rental space and serves as an income-generating facility. Thus, being in the privileged position of always having owned land and a home since she migrated to Manzini, Ma-Hlope has effectively used her land as a strategy for income-generation by building extra rooms and letting them out to young migrants who worked in the city. The role of housing as an economic asset cannot be underestimated in cushioning households against the vagaries of urban life. Coping strategies that centre around housing as an asset help households reduce vulnerability to poverty.

Fourth, as Hansen (1996) has pointed out, though a home of one's own may facilitate urban arrangements for living in very significant ways, it also surfaces as a major factor of gender inequality in housing in Swaziland because women can only obtain land through men. One direct manifestation of the gender inequalities that surround women's (lack of) access to land is distinctly in the hierarchical relationship that emerges between a woman and her husband with respect to ownership of the house built. The case of Malta Mamba clearly portrays this point. Although her husband built her a two-roomed house when they got married, after she refused to let him bring in his girlfriend into their house, Malta's husband told her in no uncertain terms that though he built the house on land she obtained through him, this does not mean she owns the house! Inevitably, Malta's husband's interpretation of home ownership gave him the license to conduct his own illicit activities in her house. For Swazi women, their position in society denies them title to land, thus making them an increasingly vulnerable group regardless of their poverty.

Similar observations may be made with respect to women's access to credit and building materials, and may be attributed to statutory rules which even after independence in 1968 have not ruled out gender-biased practices which continue to shape urban gender inequalities. To evade the social processes and power
Similar observations may be made with respect to women’s access to credit and building materials, and may be attributed to statutory rules which even after independence in 1968 have not ruled out gender-biased practices which continue to shape urban gender inequalities. To evade the social processes and power relations that reinforce gender inequalities in land and housing acquisition, women have sought home ownership in other ways, albeit ways that accentuate their vulnerability. One such strategy of securing a house of one’s own that women have employed is to rely on the goodwill of a friend who already has land. This is usually an informal agreement in which a woman is given permission to erect a building structure on his/her land free of charge (Miles. 1996a). Whatever strategy women adopt to get land and/or build a house, they still remain vulnerable. Women who have managed to secure a home of their own have opted to mobilise their resources as an important platform from which they can develop other strategies (see also Schlyter. 1989). Owning a home of one’s own also further promotes effective urban adaptation.

Women’s Reciprocity Networks

Women’s involvement in various women’s groups presented itself as one of the mainstays of their well-being and sanity in the city. With an increasing awareness of Government’s inability to better their situation, women have resorted to their own collective methods in order to acquire decent shelter and maintain their dignity as women and mothers. Recent literature on housing (cf. Edited collection in Schlyter. 1996) has convincingly shown networking and solidarity in everyday life to be important to women’s survival in urban areas, and to their roles as homemakers and carers in their households.

Although Swaziland’s housing crisis shows similarities with that of other developing countries (see edited collection in Aldrich and Sandhu. 1995), certain unique factors exist which have played a role in the history and development of urban housing and related policies in Swaziland. With inadequate levels of affordable housing, low-income urban dwellers, particularly women, have had to find shelter for themselves in various ways, and in areas which lack the services essential to meet their most basic needs, has been promoted and made possible by various social processes at work to solve both short and long-term housing problems. Central to their coping strategies in the city to meet their demands for housing and general day-to-day needs for themselves and their children, is the strategy of networking. Unlike in other African countries such as Kenya (Malombe. 1996), Swaziland does not have a very long tradition of women’s groups. However, apart from the more formal organisations that are externally funded, women have formed their own informal organisations and networks in which they cooperate in the case of need to help one another. The inability of Government to provide even the most basic services and land for the poor, has called for women to bridge the gap by providing for themselves and their children through various mechanisms, networking being one of the most important methods through which women can accumulate credit to meet their housing needs, and other household needs. Women have increasingly established networks through informal credit organisations, which have only recently been documented in Swaziland (Kappers. 1988). Most women reported that their membership in informal credit organisations, no matter how small or how large they may be, have enabled them to save both for specific targets and as a safeguard against emergencies.

In her study of the housing strategies of women householders in Zimbabwe. Schlyter (1989) found that domestic workers adopted various short term strategies to cope with emergency situations. These strategies relied strongly on the urban network of relatives and friends (see also Hansen. 1989). Similar strategies were adopted by domestic workers in Swaziland. Paramount amongst these was the liholiswane system, also known as merry-go-round groups, devised to overcome obstacles of financial shortage. None of the women interviewed had any banking accounts, or had they any knowledge of ways of accessing commercial housing finance. Many women reported having furnished their houses, built extra rooms for letting, or improved their houses, built extra rooms for letting, or improved their homes with the money they got through liholiswane. For other rotating credit associations provided capital to start small business ventures at home, such as the selling of vegetables, confectionary and other snacks. This only reinforced the desire for women to have secure housing. However, in more cases than one, the profit margins of these business ventures were very minimal because of a restricted market. The role of housing as an income-generating
Conclusion

Although variations occur in the gendered nature of urban development in relation to the provision of housing in different places, generally women have borne the brunt of housing shortages and increasing urban poverty. This paper has attempted to show how women, whose only form of employment is domestic work, have acquired shelter in the face of sometimes adverse circumstances. The role that housing plays as a means to an end, and as a significant coping strategy to combat mounting poverty is explored.

Schlyter (1989) has noted how experience from other countries has shown that women, particularly women-headed households, constitute a group which lends to be marginalised in housing policy. One reason for the oversight stems from the erroneous assumption that regards housing as shelter for a nuclear family (Moser, 1996 1993). Like many other developing countries, Swaziland holds no exceptions in basing its policy on the erroneous assumption that pays little attention to the role of women in the development of human settlements and housing. The historical and dynamic process of housing in Swaziland has persistently rendered invisible, the housing situations of certain categories of society, namely women. For women who have migrated to the city for their various reasons, who are also classified as low-income urban dwellers, the delivery of housing and the mechanisms that assist urban dwellers in securing decent housing in the city, constantly fall short of their ability to gain access to land, shelter, credit and basic services.

Notwithstanding the obstacles that hinder women from gaining access to decent housing in the city, this paper has been concerned with the positive efforts of migrant women to satisfy and meet their own housing needs. Focus on domestic workers has revealed the more acute problems faced by women who occupy the most vulnerable niches of the labour market, and how in some case problems they face. The powerlessness, vulnerability, hardships and constraints that live-in domestic workers have to put up with as a price for the roof over their heads, are indicative of their position as disposable property in the households they work and live in. To avoid this situation and possible forms of conflict a domestic worker may resort to alternative accommodation in informal settlements. That the domestic workers interviewed lived in informal housing units or as live-in maids was a strength of rural-urban linkages.

Every woman interviewed in this study expressed a desire of owning a home of their own. However, because rental accommodation is expensive, women's aspirations of owning a home of their own are hindered by their marital status, rights to land and lack of financial resources. Unless the land question with respect to Swazi Nation Land, is resolved, women will continue to be denied the right to a home of their own. For them, chances of owning dwelling units in the formal housing market are only remotely possible. This has called for alternative housing strategies which may include informal agreements for land that only increase their vulnerability.

Yet notwithstanding the hurdles women face with respect to land acquisition in the city, some women have been able to build their own houses in the city. This however, has depended on their marital status and the structure of their households. The desire for a home of one's own is deeply influenced by the need to mobilise housing as an asset, to reduce their vulnerability in a society riddled with social, economic and gender inequalities. The significance of the role of housing in women's lives, as principle users of housing, bring to the forefront a need to address the issue of gender-aware planning in Swaziland's development process.

End Notes

1The Swazi currency, lilangeni (plural emalangeni (E)) is on par with the South African Rand (R). The bank exchange rate for U.S. $1 is E4.61 (March 1997).

2See Rose (1988) on the discussion of women and land acquisition strategies in rural Swaziland.

References

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CHAPTER FIVE

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND ECONOMIC RETARDATION IN RURAL SWAZILAND, 1960s and 1970s.

Bonginkosi Azariah Bhutana Sikhondze

INTRODUCTION

Economic development touches upon a variety of issues, but here the discussion shall concentrate on environmental issues which have determined economic development. When economic development occurred both urban and rural areas were mobilised to ensure some balance in the distribution of the resources on which the process hung. When writing on economic development, Gunnar Myrdal suggested that wherever such a process occurred, gross inequality in the distribution of the resources that determined economic development resulted. When one sector developed, it did so at the expense of others because it either drew the resources from the disadvantaged ones or denied the latter any access to any developmental resources.

In the same vein rural areas which were set aside for the exclusive occupation and use of the colonised in the colonial period, were deliberately denied access to the resources which supported economic development, and Haggett has made this observation in his study. For instance, the state of roads in areas that were reserved for the colonised was deplorable to say the least. Technical education, which was meant to assist growers of agricultural commodities to meet the market demand, was withheld from them deliberately to render the labour market viable for the settler community. But in the case of an independent government the factors which governed the distribution of resources for economic development depended on the geographical position of the industrial area where these commodities were marketed. The second and perhaps minor explanation would be the selfishness of those politicians who determined the production and sale of those resources that were geared towards economic development. Some politicians had vested interests in industrial development because of the capital they had pumped into the latter sector and the benefits which they realised from it.

Some of these politicians neglected certain developmental projects from which the Swazi masses stood to benefit, sometimes out of sheer negligence while in certain instances it was a deliberate effort to frustrate rural economic development in those areas from which they had not come. The major concern of this study is the failure of government technicians to combat the degradation of the environment in Swaziland generally. There were various causes of environmental degradation, and the chief one among them was the overgrazing of livestock on the same ground. When grazed repeatedly on the same ground, and driven on the same route to and from the grazing areas and dipping tanks, livestock encouraged environmental degradation by causing soil erosion. In the course of these processes soil erosion occurred, and that is what happened in colonial and post-colonial Swaziland where the environment was degraded. Overgrazing was largely due to the shortage of grazing grounds, which resulted from land alienation during the colonial era in that most fertile areas were alienated for the exclusive occupation and use of European settlers.

The other agents of environmental degradation were government negligence of those areas which needed to be rehabilitated such as damaged and overused roads and some footpaths. Negligence in this regard often led to the condition developing into dongas which widened when more rain water fell and washed away the loose soils. The negligence of this magnitude was common place in African areas, known as reserves, in the colonial era. These issues are among those which attracted African nationalists for use in politicians campaign for the support of their fellow men during decolonisation. At independence, African politicians were expected to honour their promises (to attend to the urgent matters which handicapped economic development), but once they ascended to the seat of political power the major excuse they used to
justify their incompetence was the shortage of capital for financing the anticipated projects such as environmental rehabilitation. Some rural roads became impassable soon after independence was won due to soil erosion. This development handicapped a number of projects which were meant to alleviate rural poverty. Some feeder roads also became a major handicap to economic development because responsible government officials neglected their maintenance.

This disposition is adequate evidence of government's negligence of degraded areas in Swaziland. This study focuses on the rural areas of Swaziland, and its contention here is that when degraded areas were neglected as far as their rehabilitation was concerned, economic development did not receive the attention it deserved. Urban areas would not alone carry the burden of economic development but often did so with the support of the rural areas which were the source of the resources that supported economic development. In colonial days there were laws which protected rural areas against destruction in that cattle were culled down to a number deemed not too heavy for an area on which they were grazed. Under the guise of economic nationalism, the people's government relaxed the laws which had protected the environment. The explanation for the relaxation of the laws in question was that even some government officials were headers. In that case cattle culling was going to affect rural dwellers along with some government officials hence their success to relax the laws which combated environmental degradation.

In order to place this study in its proper perspective, it was deemed germane to fall back on some social theories which have been used elsewhere to analyse similar developments. These are the Ratzel's and Huntington's theories of 'Physical determinism' and 'Scientific determinism'. The essence of the theory of physical determinism is that early man, whose science was still limited, was contented with what nature provided and did not change the environment in which he found himself. Yet history suggests that since man was a dynamic creature he did not simply accept what nature bestowed upon him without modifying it. Hence history tells of numberless efforts man made to make his environment more habitable than before, and numerous examples of these accounts abound in the history of Africa. On the other hand Huntington's 'Scientific Determinism' suggests that man made some attempts to conquer his environment through scientific means or skills. In the same trend Schultz and Grigg have demonstrated the impact of modern technology on agriculture the world over. In the latter case, man was already more in a position to challenge nature in that he realised that nature did not foresee what human needs would be. In the latter case what transpires is that man did not wait for nature to provide yet another panacea to the problems he already encountered. Instead, man used the intelligence which nature had bestowed upon him to provide for himself. In this regard 'Scientific Determinism' stresses the fact that man used the common sense bestowed upon him to solve his problems.

In a nutshell, it is clear that the theory of Physical Determinism denies the fact that man had naturally been bestowed with adequate intelligence to tame the environment and make it respond to his needs, something which Ratzel acknowledges hence his promulgation of 'Scientific Determinism'. According to the latter argument man is seen emerging as a victor over the environment in which he found himself. In the case of Swaziland, particularly at independence, there were adequate scientific developments which made it possible for the Swazi to conquer nature and make their livelihood worth living. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), already had mobilised enough well trained officers to go around the country preaching the gospel of environmental rehabilitation to facilitate economic development. The only handicap it suffered in this regard at that time could have been the means of transportation for the officers who required to travel wide enough to reach most of those rural dwellers who needed technical education. Soil erosion was one of those scourges which hampered economic development, and since it was arrested in its infancy economic progress was hard to achieve, and these issues constitute the crux of this study. Yet the other concern for the study is the effect of agro-chemicals on the same environment upon which cultivators depended for their livelihood. Ezaza has carried out a similar study in East Africa, and the present study shall attempt an analysis of the experience of Swaziland in the light of the experiences of other regions of the world.
methodology

Various sources of research have been used to make this study a success. These sources range from written and published sources to oral ones. Published works were consulted in order to establish the most relevant and effective model of analysis. For that reason the study sampled different published works, which do not necessarily have any bearing on Swaziland but discuss the same problems as those which the present study investigates on Swaziland. Such an approach helps one to avoid embarking on a narrative but instead follow an analytical approach of the events which occurred in Swaziland. Once the latter approach was accomplished, the published local literature, primary and oral sources were contacted.

The purpose of the above approach was to fit the experience of Swaziland into that of the rest of the world for other people elsewhere to realise that their problems were not necessarily peculiar to them but that some people elsewhere shared their problems with them and that peradventure a collective solution might be the most effective palliative. Use of oral sources was thought to be one way of checking and balancing the biased records of the colonial regime, particularly on the efforts of colonised people at economic redemption. In order to achieve this goal the interviewees were chosen from old and middle age people whose memory of the period before, at and after independence was still credible. It might not be easy to identify people with a good record of keeping traditions, but those who knew them and had spent some time with them would be the most reliable reference on the issues. Even the collection of these traditions should be such that one question was presented to a number of people at different times so that it would be possible to identify any discrepancy. In order to achieve this goal, different people were consulted at different times for interviews. Where time and resources permitted even primary sources of records of the colonial and African independent regimes were consulted. It is hoped that such an approach facilitated the realisation of the effort to strike some balance between indigenous African views and those of the colonial regime. There were other people like apologists of the colonial administration in Swaziland, on the eve of independence, in 1968 who were contacted for information on the subject.

erosion

The above passages have already outlined the various agents of soil erosion which affected the environment both before and after the granting of independence in 1968. The main focus for this section of the study is the countryside as the centre of agricultural production. In the colonial days land alienation facilitated the promotion of soil erosion because Swazis were pushed into limited land rights where they competed with livestock for usufructuary rights to the land, and these areas were called reserves. Government failure to monitor the grazing habits of rural Swazi livestock keepers led to the destruction of the vegetation which later led to soil erosion. An area whose soil had been eroded could not boast of a strong economy because it failed to sustain itself due to its low surplus generating capacity, and failure to provide for future expansion in natural and human resources.

Rural dwellers, most of whom were illiterate, particularly those who kept large numbers of cattle, were not aware of the modern methods of avoiding soil erosion. There were other equally harmful causes of soil erosion such as the indiscriminate burning of the veld and the felling down of the natural and artificial forests. To return to cattle. the whole idea of keeping large numbers of cattle. when the land rights did not expand was an issue which government neglected yet it was her duty to address it. As per the ILO prerequisites for economic development the reduction of cattle to numbers that the environment could carry without showing signs of failure, was one of its duties⁸. However, the independent government which succeeded the colonial one in 1968 overlooked these issues due to the fact that some of its officials were keepers of large herds of cattle. As keepers of large herds of cattle themselves, they knew that the policy on cattle culling hit directly on them, hence the silence towards the latter policy. Yet once neglected its rehabilitation became one of the most expensive projects in terms of capital and energy deployment.

Elisworth Huntington, argued that science could alleviate those problems which hampered economic development. One might also add that science could be a solution where the affected people took advantage it (the technology which science offered) and not to wait for it to miraculously bring about the desire
changes, and that is what seemed to be what was happening in the case of Swaziland, particularly long after the territory had been declared independent by its ex-colonial masters. In those areas where such scientific skills did not yet exist Friedrich Ratzel's *physical determinism* suggests that dwellers were contented with natural determinants and had to make do with those natural endowments. The experience of history is quite different in that man seemed determined to conquer his environment instead of the latter conquering him.

The Swazi plight in the rural areas did not receive technical attention from the MOAC even after independence, a disposition which makes it dovetail into the arguments of Ratzel's in that while they depended on what nature provided, they challenged nature and forced it to accommodate their needs. Among these requirements are the rehabilitation of areas that were being eroded, and those which underwent desertification as a result of the cultivator's ignorance of the use of agro-chemical fertilisers and herbicides. These chemicals destroyed the environment in the course of being applied to the soil either to raise its surplus generating capacity, or help control the rate of growth of weeds respectively. The result of such a process was, in the long run, the destruction of the soil. Where Swazis made scientific attempts at environmental rehabilitation then the much improved version of the above theory, which Huntington advances, would apply in our analysis of the problem of environmental destruction in Swaziland.

Swazi use of the sledge for transport, has been among the chief agents of soil erosion because wherever it was pulled, it made small furrows which encouraged soil erosion when heavy rains fell. The sledge had the effect of removing the vegetation and rough gravel and thus encouraged soil erosion in the process. The colonial regime had denounced sledge use for its deterrent effects on economic development. However, its officials had failed to enforce the ban placed on the sledge because of the suspicion that it was meant to hamper the efforts of the colonised from redeeming themselves in economic empowerment. In this regard Regional Chiefs were entrusted with the responsibility to ensure a good condition of the country's roads. They had been ordered to stop Swazi cultivators from using the sledge for transport on the roads because it destroyed the environment. Only little had the Regional Administrators known that Chiefs, who did not even receive any allowance for the job, were more sympathetic to the plight of their subjects than to their (Regional Administrators) concerns.

It look an enlightened chief to understand the concerns of the regional administrators, and most of these would have received formal education to understand the effects of soil erosion on their rural economy, and appreciate the efforts of the modern methods of countering it. As an agricultural demonstrator, Brian Manana, a born Swazi at Lwandle in Manzini, was of the view that regional administrators failed to mobilise chiefs because they did not appreciate that Swazi destructive effects on the roads were deliberate due to their (Swazi) suspicion that the colonial regime was intentionally denying them participation in the agricultural market. In other words, whether or not roads were maintained well it would not alter the fact that only the European settlers stood to benefit from their good condition. This view was. most unfortunately, allowed to linger on and it affected even post-independence projects which were meant, at that time, to benefit every Swazi citizen regardless of colour, creed and religion, at least in principle. The phrase in principle' is used here because even in some independent countries racial discrimination continued to bedevil economic developmental projects.

In a nutshell, Swazi refusal to observe the rule of law which governed the use of the country's roads even after independence was due to the feeling that the officials of the black government, who themselves were products of the old colonial system, wanted to promote themselves at the expense of the masses who paid the tax which financed state projects. Yet it was also the same recalcitrant rural dwellers who complained to the regional administration about the bad and impassable rural roads. Their state of backwardness hampered economic progress because goods from the urban areas could not be transported there as often as the demand necessitated. Trucks which ventured to move any commodities destined for rural areas, whose roads were bad, often broke down, and heavy repair costs were what most owners of the trucks dreaded. When the communication between the rural and urban areas broke down, the exchange of ideas on development got hampered, and economic stagnation was a direct result.

The most common means of communication between urban and rural areas was the tractor and the horse and ox drawn wagons because they did not break down often even when driven on bad roads. There
however, a few exceptions, which necessarily were not a rule of law. where government officials used their influence to improve roads which served as a link between urban areas and their homes. Take the case of Prime Minister. Prince Makhosini's attempts to link his chiefdom to the urban areas in Shiselweni between 1968 and the late 1970s as an instance. The roads in that region were made passable compared to those found in the other rural areas of the same country. But be that as it may. the Prime Minister's efforts did not bring about remarkable economic improvement to Shiselweni. his place of origin. What needs mentioning, however, is the self-centredness of most African leaders, who. while they led. they allowed their interests to loom larger than those of the people they led. The above case is one of the few isolated ones, but these cases appear to have become the norm in the case of Swazi leaders. The recent case of former Prime Minister Mbilini (1990s), is yet another one where he channelled state money into developing his home, and not even his neighbourhood as had done premier Prince Makhosini.

Prince Makhosini's efforts, however, had a positive impact on rural entrepreneurial skills where some business-minded people began to grow vegetables and fruits for sale at urban markets because the condition of the roads allowed such a development. The view that poor roads frustrated entrepreneurial efforts need not be exaggerated because there were isolated cases of Swazi business people who used wagons to move their commodities to nearby markets even in those areas where roads were thought impassable. The roads were bad and the movement of commodities was very slow but the returns were profitable to those who undertook to sell their commodities to such distant urban places. Hluthi is one of those small urban areas which offered market opportunities for some rural entrepreneurs. Hlathikhulu was yet another urban area which encouraged some rural entrepreneurs who were ministers of religion to produce fruits which they transported on wagons to the market.

These isolated pockets of aggressive entrepreneurs should not however deter the reader from making an objective evaluation of the plight of the rural entrepreneurs whom government did not help to improve socio-economic conditions even after independence. Wagons, as a means of transport, had their own problems in that they too broke down because of the bad roads on which either the mule or ox pulled them. However, rural entrepreneurs continued to use them because of the absence of better roads to facilitate the transportation of market commodities. Tractor transportation was not common in the 1960s and 1970s in those areas where roads demanded the use of hard forms of transport. The main factors responsible for the failure of some cultivators to buy tractors were the poor roads and the low standard of living of most of the people found in those areas. Yet another explanation was that the economic justification for the purchase of a tractor could not be found because the investment opportunities were absent in the areas. Some of the entrepreneurs might have heard about such opportunities but the distance which separated them from the market, where they could get hard cash was just daunting. In that case then the absence of a nearby market, sometimes caused by poor roads served as yet another deterrent to economic advancement.

Poor methods of agricultural farming have also encouraged soil erosion among agrarian communities of Swaziland. The poverty of agricultural farming methods were due to the lack of technical education which has helped to curb soil erosion. Most of the methods used in the dissemination of technical education to cultivators were too sophisticated for most of the growers in the sense that they were conducted on the media. In short, the MOAC depended largely on the radio for the dissemination of the methods of arresting soil erosion, and its manual. In this regard the MOAC demonstrated its ignorance of the level of educational awareness, and standard of living of its clientele when it depended on the media to disseminate technical education. Not all cultivators could read even the vernacular at independence, and not many of them owned radios from which they could receive the MOAC instructions on agricultural farming.

The major handicap in the dissemination of technical education was the bad state of roads which discouraged agricultural demonstrators from using even bicycles. The independent government behaved like the colonial one in that it did not provide demonstrators with the means to travel to their student cultivators in order to observe their farming methods and discourage those which caused soil erosion. The erosion of arable lands meant the marginalisation of the potential productive areas which had produced adequately for domestic consumption and for the market. The argument was that Swazi people imported from South Africa because of the shortage of arable land. However, these arguments did not always
auger well in the face of these realities. From the time independence was granted, Swazis depended on South Africa for food due to the country's "dead" policy on agriculture and economic development in general. However, economic historians disagree with this view because the argument of economists like Myrdal supports the trend in that whenever one views economic development one should expect economic stagnation, and to him (Myrdal) that is a normal trend. The argument is that wherever economic development occurred one ought to have expected to witness economic stagnation in nearby areas because the developing ones drew their resources from those which did not have the means to develop competitively.

In that line of argument it could be concluded that it was no mere coincidence that when Manzini and parts of the Hhohho areas developed, those of Shiselweni and Lubombo stagnated. The resources were being channelled to those areas which had become the seat and centres of administration for the governments of the time. However, the 1970s witnessed some change in the distribution of the resources which had been set aside for the improvement of roads in the country when G. Leibbrandt was Minister for Works and Communication. Gravel roads, which linked urban areas to rural ones were given attention and their condition was improved at that time. These roads were upgraded to standard, and for the first time in the history of colonial and independent Swaziland, travelling in the countryside on gravel roads was tolerable, however short-lived this improvement was. The tendency for most ministers after Leibbrandt was to give attention to those roads which had direct contribution to their interests and home areas.

**Agro-chemical Effects on soils**

There were other agents of soil exhaustion which were a result of cultivator ignorance of the usage of fertilisers. Herbicides and other chemicals, for instance, produced some negative effect on the soil. This subject has been raised by Ezaza in his attempt to address the effects of some chemicals on the soil in East Africa. Ezaza's argument is based on the fact that cheap chemicals had the tendency to destroy the humus content in the soil. His thesis is based on the fact that when these chemicals were manufactured in the developed countries, investors did not ensure that their quality would be at par with those which were sold and used in the developed countries. To him those chemicals which were sold in the less developed countries were rejects because developed countries did not need them due to their poor quality and negative effects they might have on the soils. Better quality and more effective chemicals had already been identified for the use of developed countries but because they already produced more of the poor quality ones, they had an obligation to rid themselves of these chemicals, and the only solution was to dump them at low prices in the less developed countries.

These chemicals lowered the surplus generating capacity of the soil, thereby marginalising agricultural output whose long term effect was the weakening of the rural economy. In cases where the production was geared towards the market, the producer battled with many problems in an attempt to meet the market demand of the commodity produced. In foodstuffs the gross domestic product also declined and its impact was reflected in the amount of food the territory imported from South Africa particularly in bad seasons. In the years before independence, such as 1959, for instance, about 55,471 bags of 200 lbs of maize each were reported having been imported from South Africa for the purpose of feeding the Swazi who could not produce adequately to feed themselves. Some social scientists like K.D. Kowet have found other explanations more appealing in accounting for the food shortages in Swaziland then and even in later years. Colonialism which had led to land alienation was used as the shield to hide behind. This was done deliberately to avoid more pertinent issues than the colonial one. However, such arguments are not meant to totally exonerate the colonial contribution in the above issue, but the point being made is that there were more pertinent issues which lay somewhere other than colonial rule that needed to be addressed and that is what this study is doing.

It would be equally wrong to give the impression that the poor quality of the agro-chemicals was the only cause of soil exhaustion, because cultivator ignorance of the effects of these chemicals on the soil when not applied correctly was one of the causes. Marginalised output, which resulted from these problems, had a direct negative impact on the economy. To retrieve lost fertility in the soil was yet another expensive and
neighbours who kept cattle. Kraal and compost manures are said to have had a strong effect on projects like these. These manures were used to rejuvenate the surplus generating capacity in the soil, and at planting time agro-chemicals were used because most of the seeds which were planted after independence were hybrids which responded well only to the above agro-chemicals.

Industrialisation is yet another major cause of the miseries of rural cultivators in that once a company was assigned an area to use for investment, its occupants were ejected and thrown out without any due regard to their social and economic interests and needs. Take the case of Simunye Sugar Company when it was established in the 1970s. The socio-economic woes it created for the ejected pre-existing dwellers of the area were taken very lightly because they did not have any direct impact upon the policy-makers of this country, and the investors. Once deprived of their source of livelihood, they were thrown to mountainous areas where they were told to eke out a living. The area, known as Ngomane, was small compared to the numbers of people who had been moved from the present sugar plantation grounds. The small size of the new settlement area could not reasonably accommodate all the human beings and livestock, and the result of that disposition was a decline in agricultural and pastoral output. This is one example out of many cases which failed to demonstrate due regard to the interests and well-fare of those people who were dispossessed of their land in the name of economic progress.

These development strategies are among those which have failed to strike some balance between the investors and those who were expected to provide labour power to the investment. The point of imbalance in the distribution of resources for economic development has been discussed at length by Myrdal. In that same vein, therefore, it could be argued that some compromise had been struck between policy-makers and investors to invest where the business would not suffer any labour shortage hence the displacement of pre-existing people in the Ngomane area. This hypothesis fits well the theory of development as per the presentation of Myrdal.

The decimation of those people who could not compete effectively in the investment sphere did not auger well even for the investors because the capitalist mode of production was dependent upon the pre-capitalist forces. Yet the latter were being decimated in the ease of Simunye. and for that reason a housing scheme, which provided accommodation on the premises of the company, was devised and proved quite effective in keeping the labour within easy reach of the investor. But lack of a supplementary system of maintaining the labour cheaply served as a deterrent to the system of the reproduction of the labour. It failed to reproduce itself because it did not provide the alternative means of doing so through the equivalent of the South African Bantustan system of labour control the latter used until independence in 1994. In South Africa the latter scheme provided land on which the labour cultivated some food crops to help supplement the meagre wages they were paid at their places of employment. This arrangement ensured a constant stable labour supply to the investment, and lowered the cost of maintenance on the part of the employer and labourer as well.

The consequences of this economic change created some gross inequality in the distribution of the resources which supported economic development. Even though the classical school of thought assert that for economic development to take place the survival of the above process should be ensured, the imminent danger is that the more widened the gap between the poor and the rich, the more delayed was the process of national economic advancement. In the latter case, political leaders did not need to place the interests of the few at the forefront while those of the majority were being trampled upon.

**Conclusion**

In a state where the degradation of the environment is overlooked, economic development gets delayed or frustrated unless the infrastructure upon which it rests receives attention. In colonial Swaziland, the Prevention of the above process received adequate attention, and the colonial state had set up a mechanism to discourage all forms of environmental degradation. Soil erosion is one of those agents of the process that the state countered. To most indigens, the colonial state set up a mechanism to counter soil erosion in African areas while it shut its eyes to those areas which had been set aside for the exclusive settlement of
African areas while it shut its eyes to those areas which had been set aside for the exclusive settlement of Europeans. The point which the African component of the Swazi population missed here was that while their areas were physically limited in extent those of the European race were not restricted. Most of the farms of the European settlers were big to the extent, that when compared to those of the Africans, sometimes one farm belonging to one European settler could accommodate as many as 200 or more of the indigens.

The logical result of such a disposition where land had become a scarce commodity was that the competition between human beings and animals became very keen. The keenness of the competition led to the degradation of the environment. There were limited grounds for the grazing of livestock, and even when these animals were driven to dipping tanks, they were moved on the same route repeatedly because of the limitation of land rights. Sometimes even the most developed technology could not cope with such a situation, hence in most of those areas where soil erosion occurred the major cause was the limited space for all the economic activities. There were instances, however, where the limitation of land rights was not necessarily the cause of environmental degradation, but that the cause was combined with some political factors.

In this case, those politicians who kept large herds of cattle were also responsible for the degradation of rural areas. These were traditional politicians who had been entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing laws on their subjects which were meant to arrest soil erosion. Sometimes these politicians were government employees whose departments were responsible for the combat of soil erosion, which was one of the major agents of environmental degradation. Independent Swaziland of the late 1960s and later years, witnessed absence of the colonial state which had been at the centre of the campaign because Swaziland already had an independent government which controlled all national political proceedings. Lack of cooperation between the independent government and the rural farmers of that time was due to illiteracy on what should be done to discourage and arrest environmental degradation. Once environmental degradation had been discouraged, opportunities for producing for the market were enhanced along with the volume of trade. This development was also aimed at the alleviation of social and financial problems witnessed mainly by the rural people, and this was a result of the low standard of living, particularly in the rural areas.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION
The need to protect people against discrimination also includes issues of language. A close study of language issues in Swaziland reveals sporadic disputes on language use in different spheres of life. These include spheres such as the courts, parliament and education, to mention a few. At a time when Swaziland is working on a new constitution, it is timely to raise some questions about the way language will be dealt with in a new constitution. The should be done so that the discussions on language issues could be part of the process that is meant to ensure that the rights of the citizens of Swaziland are protected. In this paper, I will highlight some of the issues that studies in Applied Linguistics have focused on in relation to the issue of language rights.

This paper will address language rights as specified in Phillipson (1992). Phillipson points out that language rights that are cited in the UN document entitled The Draft Universal Declaration on indigenous Rights (E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1988/25) states that indigenous groups have:

The right to develop and promote their own languages including an own literary language, and to use them for administrative, judicial, cultural and other purposes.

What Phillipson says is relevant to Swaziland because there is a need to develop the language Swaziland can use for all the purposes cited in the declaration. This call for discussion of language, and how it can be used for the enhancement of language development should go along with the development of the people. At a time when Swaziland is embarking on a transformation of society that will focus on development, it is necessary to focus on language and equality in Swaziland.

Historical Perspectives on Sociolinguistic Realities of Swaziland
Swaziland was colonised by the British up to the year when she gained independence in 1968. While the people of Swaziland speak siSwati, English became the language of power because it was the language of the colonisers. It is still the language that is used in education, parliament, commercial transactions and other domains. The need to empower the people of Swaziland with language was not addressed at independence. The constitution that Swaziland had at independence did not address how language should be dealt with, yet language is an important part of a constitution. The rewriting of the constitution should address the language issue because it is through language that people can articulate their aspirations and construct their own history. Having English language as the language of power results in the perpetuation of the colonial legacy which was designed to make people base their development on the culture of the colonisers.

At independence Swaziland adopted English and siSwati as the official languages of Swaziland. This was clearly stated in a short statement in the Imbokodvo manifesto. The statement was not interpreted in detail so that it would help in the implementation of a concrete language policy. What language development has been done has been through the efforts of the Ministry of Education? Such bodies as the siSwati Board and later the Panels have been the ones that have had to decide on how the languages should really function. Since there is no proper guidance, these bodies have failed to work out a policy that can ensure the empowerment of people through language. There is a need for a constitutional clause that governs how languages should be used in Swaziland.
English is the language of the elite who are in the professions such as law, medicine, engineering, accountancy and education. Addressing the language issues in Swaziland means giving consideration to a number of factors:

a) That the majority of Swazis are not educated and therefore cannot understand English. Their lack of understanding of the English language affects accessibility to employment opportunities.

b) English is not easily available. The majority of the people do not know it.

Language as a Social Resource

The notion of language rights is linked to the view that considers language as a social resource, like other resources that are needed by people in a polity for their development. Like access to education, access to language is viewed as the right of every citizen. In the African situation where the languages of ex-colonisers are the language through which people can get better jobs, changes that can make the indigenous languages have better status are mandatory because the majority of the African population is discriminated against, because the people do not understand what is said. This affects their contribution to the democratic processes which are a necessary part of creating and shaping a people's destiny.

Language is seen as a means through which people can have access to other freedoms such as the freedoms of expressions, association, assembly and even movement which are considered core parts of the democratisation of human experience (Grimshaw, 1981). Grimshaw says:

Language both as a human right and as a resource is directly linked to another equally important principle-participation of citizens in national affairs... Thus democracy... is not democracy, or is of limited legitimacy; in situations in which the vast majority of the people are prevented from having an effective say in national affairs that directly or indirectly affect their personal lives. This... is the case in those settings where... by not utilising languages spoken by the majority of the people, the prevailing language policies effectively exclude from political an economic completion and involvement a very large segment of the population (Grimshaw 1981, p 166).

Grimshaw argues that the participation of people in shaping the destiny of their nation hinges on the utilisation of the language that is spoken by the majority of the people. He points out that this is very important where there are large rural populations that do not speak the language that is spoken by the elite. For people in rural areas to get involved, the language that they speak has to be empowered so that they can also feel that they are able to take an active part in the democratic construction of experience that will guide them into the future. This makes it mandatory for Swaziland to engage in language planning that will ensure that the rights of the people are protected.

Language Rights and Social Development

Coulombe (1993) points out that there is a need to clarify how language rights can be viewed in different social contexts. He makes a distinction between language rights, individual rights and language rights as communal rights. He argues that rights are an important aspect of the well-being of people. They are important for the creation of their autonomy and their identity. This is because language rights should form the subject of identity related rights. He points out that this view follows the thinking that considers language as human rights. He says:

Language is essential to human life since it plays a critical role in defending individual identity, culture and community membership (Coulombe 1993 p 141).

What Coulombe says helps in enhancing the right not to be discriminated against, on the basis of language. Section 26 of the United Nations Charter states that civil and political rights should protect linguistic minorities against discrimination that is based on language.

Apart from focusing on legislature, Coulombe sees language rights as a necessary part of individual development. This links language rights with the whole language planning process of a country and the
literacy rights of its citizens.

Guy (1989) focuses on the use of language in the allocation of employment opportunities. He says:

Where language is used to obstruct access to jobs, education, progress and power, it becomes politicised and a source of conflict.

This view of language is linked to the argument on the empowerment of individual which is included in the transformation of society that is considered in the constitutional process. The constitution is a document that is supposed to allocate the resources of a country fairly. If language is viewed as a social resource, it is viewed as an aspect of the people's lives which should be guided in its development so that all people are not disadvantaged because they do not know the language of power

Tollefson (1991) argues that language rights are an important part of people's lives. He says:

The claim that people have a right to speak their language in education, government, the media, and other areas is an effective strategy in the effort to resist domination by more powerful groups, p136.

His argument is in line with the declaration of Recife which spells out the principles that should guide legislation on language rights. The declaration of Recife of 1987 asserts that language rights are a part of human rights (Tollefson, 1991, p. 171). Discrimination on the basis of language creates inequalities that should be done away with. The principles state that

Considering that the ideas and principles of equality, solidarity, freedom, justice, peace and understanding which have inspired national and international legislation and instruments on human rights, share a crucial linguistic dimension. Recognising that the learning and use, maintenance and promotion of languages contribute significantly to the intellectual, educational, sociocultural, economic and political development of individuals, groups and states. Mindful of the need to arouse and foster awareness, within and across cultures of the recognitions and promotion of the linguistic rights of individuals and groups. Asserting that linguistic rights should be acknowledged, promoted and observed nationally, regionally and internationally, so as to bring and assure the dignity and equity of all languages. Aware of the need for legislation to eliminate linguistic prejudice and discrimination, and all forms of linguistic domination, injustice, and oppression, in such contexts as services to the public, the place of work, education system, the courtroom, and the mass media. Stressing the need to sensitise individuals, groups and states to linguistic rights, to promote positive societal attitudes towards plurilingualism and to change societal structures towards equality between users of different languages and varieties of languages. Hence, conscious of the need for explicit legal guarantees of the linguistic rights of individuals and groups to be provided by appropriate bodies of the member states of the United Nations, Recommends that steps be taken by the United Nations to adopt and implement a universal declaration of Linguistic rights which would require a reformulation of national, regional, and international language policies.

These principles provide adequate guidance for countries that want to draft their own language laws. It is important to note that the AU also embraces policy changes that can lead to eliminating inequality that is caused by discrimination on the basis of language.

**Language Rights and Language Policy**

While the constitutional process is largely a political process, the work of planning how language develops in a country is the work of linguists. The development of a language is done by academies, panels and similar bodies. The constitution is useful in the process of status planning when the politicians clarify how the languages will be used

The role of siSwati needs to be highlighted in the constitution's Bill of Rights. The detailed laws can be
spelt out in the more detailed part of the document. This can lead to a better understanding of the status and corpus planning exercise that the language of Swaziland has to go through in its development. These processes involve the codification and implementation of how language should function in the country. Such a development needs to be preceded by clearly through out statements on what the aspirations of Swazis are on issues of language as a right.

**Domain of Language Use and Language Inequality in Swaziland**

Discrimination of people on the basis of language takes place in real situations where people live their everyday lives. These sites of everyday experience are called domains of language use. Fasold (1984) views domains as 'constellations of factors such as location, topic and participants' (p. 183). This view is also shared by Rubin (1984) who argues that in order to bring about focus on how people are affected by language, it is important to look at the domains of language use. This provide a way of addressing such questions as:

1. Which people are affected by language and how?
2. Which situations can planning take place in?
3. What plans and goals could be set out to attend to linguistic disparities?

Such a formulation of research on language enables the discourses of people to be heard. Their views are made part of the language change process because they are able to spell out the inadequacies in participation which is useful in understanding how language rights are violated. In this section I will draw on the discourse of articles from the Times of Swaziland and use it to point out the views of people and what they think of language in different domains.

**Language and Employment**

Rubin sees employment as one domain in which people use language everyday in order to express themselves. When people are at work, they have certain tasks that they have to carry out. If they do not understand the language that is used, they cannot carry out the task. Employment that requires people to use a language that they do not understand very well, makes life difficult for them. In those countries where the language of the ex-colonisers is used, it is difficult for some people to even get jobs because they cannot speak the language through which employment opportunities are controlled.

Tollefson (1991) argues that situations which require people to learn a second language before they can be employed result in social violence that relegates people to low income jobs. He says:

> Economic, political and social inequality are reinforced by language policies that require people to learn a second language in order to obtain work... requiring widespread second language acquisition may help sustain a system in which language is a key maker of socio-economic class and power (p. 136).

As a domain employment ought to be considered by language planners so that people in the country all feel that they are not discriminated against because they cannot use a certain language effectively.

**Language and the Courts**

The courts that practise Roman Dutch Law use English as the language of the law. When people do not speak English they have an interpreter. Articles from the *Times of Swaziland* show that people who do not understand English have problems in expressing themselves in this domain. An article in the *Times of Swaziland* of September, 11 1990 entitled "I speak siSwati" Bhozongo Explodes' shows how one person reacted angrily when addressed in English.

The situation of language and the law need to be reviewed so that the majority of the people can feel that the language that is used in the courts is their language. The legal concepts can also be best understood when interpreted from the perspective of the people and expressed in a language that they understand. At the present moment, the court system that uses siSwati is the Swazi National Court.
Language and Education

Education is another domain in which language has to be considered. In Swaziland English is the medium of instruction at school. It is also required for entry into most tertiary institutions. Many people have been disadvantaged by not being able to attain the required English grade. An article in the *Times of Swaziland* of April 16 1996 entitled *Why is English made a priority in this Country’* points out the reasons for looking into the problem that is created by making English compulsory for entry into institutions of higher learning. The response of the Editor of the *Times of Swaziland* to the letter reveals how the ideology that allows languages of the ex-colonisers to prevail is well entrenched in the minds of the people. The editor said:

> English is possibly the most widely used language of communication, apart from maybe French, in the world. As an English speaking country (it is the second language here after siSwati) it only makes sense that English should also be used in just about every sphere of our lives in Swaziland both for education purposes and convenience of everybody who happens to be here."

What the editor says does not justify is using a language that is not understood by the majority of the population. In this response the editor speaks mostly for the elite who understand the English language and not the majority of the people of Swaziland who have no access to education. African countries have realised the need to have an education that enhances the culture of the people. It is through an education that is done in the language of the people that the development of cultural consciousness can be nurtured. The year 1996 was declared as the year for education in Africa. The theme of the observatory of the Segou Perspectives stated that it is important to foster cultural identity through language in Africa. The domain of education was cited as one which needs to be focused on. if there is to be progress on the African continent (ADEA 1996. p.8).

Language and Parliament

The issue of language and parliament is linked to the issue of deprivation of participation in public space (Mazine Greene 1988). People need to engage in the parliamentary process in a language they understand. For a country like Swaziland, siSwati should be used in parliament so that all people can express themselves in a language they understand. An article from the Times of Swaziland shows that people who discuss in parliament use English instead of siSwati and also that this disadvantages some members who feel that they cannot understand what is said.

Recommendation for the Constitution of Swaziland

The recommendation on the constitution should enshrine the right of Swazi people to be able to express themselves in a language they understand. This could be included in sections of the constitution.

The Bill of Rights

The importance of the bill of rights section of the constitution is that it gives a backbone to the whole constitution. If Swaziland is committed to social amelioration, equalisation of opportunity, and the common good, this section should address discrimination on the basis of language. The nature of the history of language and discrimination in Swaziland would foster a strategy of language development which would include a clause on language stating that people should not be discriminated against the basis of language. Grimshaw (1981) states clearly that one of the goals of the language as a social resource approach to language and equality is to include a clause on language that states that:

> No person should be handicapped or discriminated against because of speaking the mother tongue... of the majority of the population (Grimshaw 1981 p. 184).

Grimshaw argues that the linguistically "handicapped" should be given the chance to voice their opinion in all areas of social development. He says linguistic disadvantage can be ameliorated if people engage in
constructive dialogue on how this can be done.

**Domain Specificity**

Details on the way the constitution guards against discrimination on the basis of language could be spelled out in the detailed section of the constitution. The present draft does not make any statement on language except in the section on informing people who have committed an offence in a language they understand (MacCartney, 1971). The section reads:

> Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be informed, in a language that he understands in detail, of the nature of the charge. (MacCartney 1971. p.68).

Clauses on how language should be used should address even other domains not just the law. Even this section on the law need to be developed. There is a need to specify how language is to be used in parliament, education, and other domains.

A look at clauses in other constitutions reveals that the issue of language varies from country to country.

**The Namibian Constitution**

The Namibian constitution has a clause that addresses languages. This is a general clause that does not single out any language. Article 3(2) of the Namibian constitution states that:

> Nothing contained in this constitution shall prohibit the use of any other language medium or instruction in private schools or in schools financed by the State, subject to compliance with such requirements as may be imposed by law, to ensure proficiency in the official language, or for pedagogic reasons (Prinsloo, Peeler, Turi and van Rensburg 1993, p. 185).

This statement is seen as inadequate in the protection of the rights of people who speak indigenous languages in Namibia.

**The South Africa Constitution**

The South African Constitution addresses language issues in the founding provisions. It has a whole section on language that mandates the state to advance the languages of the country. The first statement states the languages that are official languages and a second statement addresses the issue of indigenous languages.

The section reads:

1. The official languages of the Republic are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Xivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu.
2. Recognising the historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages of our people, the state must take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages.

There are many other clauses in this constitution that cover even minority languages such as Hindi and Urdu. It is obvious that in formulating the provisions, the people of South Africa wanted to make sure that all languages are catered for in the constitution.

The constitution states clearly that it is the Pan South African Language Board that must promote and create conditions for the development and use of all official languages such as Khoi, Nama and San languages and sign language' (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 1996 p 5-6).

The South African constitution is a good example in that it gives guidelines on how language issues should be handled. It is also clear who should see to it that languages are developed. The constitution cited above show that there is a need to take issues of language and include them in the constitution so as to protect the rights of the people. How the language rights of Swazis will be protected will depend on how Swazis feel the constitution should handle issues of language. What is important is that language be accorded the seriousness that it demands because of its importance in shaping the culture and identity of the People. It is the constitution that can make sure that Swazis forge a future that enhances the development of the people and their language.
CONCLUSION

In this paper I have argued for the inclusion of language clauses in the constitution of Swaziland. This is necessary because people are negatively affected by the dominance of English in most spheres of life in Swaziland. The constitution should not leave out the issue of language because it affects the freedom of participation - in the democratic process - of the majority of the Swazis who cannot speak English. Including clauses on language in the constitution would provide necessary guidance to the language and cultural development of the people of Swaziland. This is because language is an important part of the development of a people.

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CHAPTER SEVEN
TOWARDS A LANGUAGE POLICY OF EMPOWERMENT IN
SWAZILAND

INTRODUCTION
Sihle Zwane

Linguistically, Swaziland could be described as originally a monolingual country in which the majority of indigenous Swazis speak siSwati, their indigenous mother-tongue. Also, Swaziland could be said to be linguistically homogeneous because siSwati is natively spoken by 85% or more of the population within the country. However, today there are many languages which are in contact with siSwati in various settings in the country. For example, English has enjoyed very close contact with siSwati since the advent of white settlers of British extraction in the country. The English language was introduced in the country's first schools in 1904; together with siSwati, it has been the official national language since the country's independence in 1968. Portuguese is another language which is spoken in Swaziland. People of Portuguese extraction from Mozambique have resided in the country for a long time and they speak Portuguese in Swaziland. For many years, isiZulu was the only indigenous African language which was taught in the country's schools before Swaziland became independent. For a long time, Swazis have been in contact with Mozambicans who speak Portuguese and a range of different Mozambican indigenous languages.

While Portuguese and the indigenous languages of Mozambique have had social contact with siSwati (as Swazis interacted with groups and individuals speaking these languages) only at a personal level, it has always been through the school system and at official government level as well as socially that contact has been maintained with the English language. Contact with Afrikaans and French has always been only through the school system and only to a limited extent when compared to English. Viewed from this perspective, the language situation in Swaziland is more complex than the popular simple notion that linguistically Swaziland is largely monolingual and homogenous or even bilingual. Rather than being a simple statement that English and siSwati are the two official languages in the country, the national language policy should take into account the importance of siSwati as the mother-tongue and the entire language situation in the country.

Purpose
By describing and examining the educational and, to some extent, the socio-political aspects of the language situation in the country, this paper shows how Swaziland has, through an uncertain if not silent language policy, continued to promote an elitist type of language education by downplaying the importance of siSwati as a national language and by promoting foreign languages like English and French at its expense. The historical ties and importance of English in Swaziland are well acknowledged but the socio-cultural and economic benefits of the French language are well-hidden to the majority of the Swazis for it to supersede siSwati in importance within the school system. This scenario will be discussed later on in this Paper. Firstly, the paper examines the positions of French, Afrikaans and Portuguese in Swaziland focusing on their status in the country. Secondly, it analyses the current language situation in Swaziland focusing on the status of English and siSwati as the official languages and their impact on education. Finally, it proposes a language education policy which would take into account the importance of siSwati as a national language: the importance of siSwati and other imminent African languages in establishing Swazis as viable partners in the promotion and maintenance of cultural, political and socio-economic cooperation as major desirable constructs in the sub-region.
The Position of French in Swaziland

Prior to independence in 1968, the French language was taught in the three exclusively white high schools in the country. These schools were Evelyn Baring in Nhlangano (then Goedgegun), Mhlatane in Pigg’s Peak and St. Mark’s in Mbabane. In these schools French was taught to the children of white residents in Swaziland in order to give them easier access to higher education in South Africa and Europe. In many instances the pupils were to choose either French or Afrikaans to have an additional language to English which was a compulsory subject and a medium of instruction. French and/or Afrikaans were taught to the white pupils instead of an African language which was isiZulu at the time.

More than anything the learning of French in these schools was a status symbol to differentiate them from the native’ schools whose language curriculum was restricted to ‘vernacular’ and English. It is important to note here as Mkhonta (1988) also pointed out that the term vernacular’ had derogatory racial undertones. In fact, it was regarded as extremely demeaning to have white pupils learn African languages as they were perceived as "primitive". Prior to independence, the three white schools that taught French were segregationist, elitist and often racialist by design.

At this point in the history of Swaziland, French did not serve any national development or social need. French was in no way used in the country's economic, political and social structures. French was also not used in any of the immediate neighbouring countries around Swaziland.

South Africa and Mozambique. Swaziland’s immediate neighbours used Afrikaans and English and Portuguese, respectively, as the politically dominant languages. Rhodesia. Lesotho. Botswana. Zambia and Malawi all used English not French. French was taught in these schools to maintain their status as white and to perpetuate racial segregation and elitism as no indigenous African Swazi had any background in French let alone seeing the need to learn French in Swaziland at the time.

Except for a few coloured children (children of mixed black and white parentage), enrolment in these schools was not for the indigenous Swazi children. Obviously, the language education curriculum of these schools was by design as far removed from the local needs as the French language was. itself. From the onset the language education curriculum was elitist and segregationist and it had to be maintained as such in these schools.

The Position of French after Independence

Swaziland ceased to be a British Protectorate and gained political independence in 1968. With independence came the restructuring of the country’s education system. In a nutshell, this meant that the country's education system necessarily had to be relevant to the national aspirations and development needs of the majority of the Swazi people. Prior to independence, education of the indigenous Swazi was restricted to and kept at the minimal level. The colonial government had neither a national development plan focusing on the national needs and aspirations of the Swazi people nor a language education policy in the country.

At independence the task of government was to reform the education system in the country in order to cater for the aspirations and development of the Swazi people as an independent new nation. Part of this reform in education meant expanding the school system and, indeed, new schools were built at both primary and secondary school levels. Existing ones were expanded to accommodate highly increased pupil intakes; many existing junior secondary schools were upgraded to senior secondary schools. This new drive for a relevant and expanded education system also meant that there should be in place a relevant education policy commensurate with it. Among other things, this meant that racially segregated schools had to be abolished and their place taken by those that would serve the relevant needs of an independent Swaziland. The curriculum had to be made relevant to the national development needs in line with the country’s new educational policy.

The Imbokodvo Manifesto, the independence government’s working document stated in broad print that English and siSwati were the two official languages in the newly independent Swaziland. In relation to the language education curriculum the same document stated that the indigenous culture of the Swazi needed to be developed and promoted and that the siSwati language needed to be developed and taught in all schools.
needed to be developed and promoted and that the siSwati language needed to be developed and taught in all schools in the country. In response, the Ministry of Education acted promptly and siSwati was introduced in the country's primary schools for the first time in 1969 to replace isiZulu which was hitherto the only African language taught in the school system in Swaziland. English was established as the official medium of instruction in the entire school system. English and siSwati formed the core of the language education curriculum in all the country's schools. There was no mention of French or any other language in the new language education curriculum. This was so because French and/or Afrikaans were at the time perceived to be far removed from the national needs of Swaziland and therefore irrelevant.

The new reforms also meant that white schools like Evelyn Baring, Mhlatane and St. Marks' high had to cease to exist as they had become irrelevant and undesirable to the country's education system. For their continuation Evelyn Baring, Mhlatane and St. Mark's schools were compelled to adhere to the educational policy; more so because of the diminished white clientele in their enrolments as most white and some coloured pupils had moved to schools in South Africa after the compulsory inclusion of siSwati in all the schools in the country. The majority of the Swazi children who entered these high schools could not study French because they had no background in the subject at primary school level. By 1970 both Evelyn Baring and Mhlatane had stopped teaching French. Evelyn Baring, however continued teaching Afrikaans, the other option until it also died a natural death a few years later.

The above-mentioned scenario puts beyond reasonable doubt the fact that prior to independence and immediately thereafter, the teaching of French in Swaziland was a luxury that was reserved only for the elite. The subject had no direct bearing on the national development aspirations of the Swazi nation at large.

**The re-emergence of French in the education system**

Ten years after independence many developments had taken place in Swaziland. The private and public sectors had expanded tremendously. Swaziland had become a member of international organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity and the like. Many expatriate workers in the various sectors had become resident in the country together with their families. The same was happening in the diplomatic sector as more embassies were opening in the country. As the University of Swaziland expanded, more expatriate staff members were being employed there. This had an impact on the education system which was forever expanding. Swaziland had awakened to a new need to introduce an additional language in those schools which showed a serious need to cater for pupils from the international community. The Ministry opted for French.

It was in 1981 when the Government of Swaziland embarked on a project to support the re-introduction of French in some schools in the country. The new project was undertaken with the support of the French Government which helped with the recruitment of teachers. Government provided the curriculum and other logistical arrangements like provision of textbooks and setting up the schools inspectorate for French. With this effort, French was introduced in a number of primary secondary schools in the country. By 1985 French was taught as a subject in the following schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
<th>Secondary Schools</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evelyn Baring Primary</td>
<td>Evelyn Banng High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malkens Valley Primary,</td>
<td>Mater Dolorosa High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mananga Primary</td>
<td>Salesian High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigg's Peak Primary</td>
<td>St. Mark's High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sifundzani Primary</td>
<td>St. Michael's High</td>
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<td>St. Mark's Primary</td>
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<td>St. Michael's Primary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sydney William's Primary</td>
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<tr>
<td>L'sutu Forest Primary</td>
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</table>

In 1993 the number of schools teaching French had increased to 13 primary schools and 10 secondary schools.
industrial towns like Usutu Forest and Big Bend. For the majority of the expatriate children, French was a second language or a third language which they needed for their language education curriculum as they did not wish to study/learn siSwati. SiSwati was of no really value for them outside of Swaziland. After all, they could pick up conversational or functional siSwati outside the school in their day-to-day interactions with the Swazi. Besides children of the expatriate workers, the other group of elite pupils were those whose parents saw their employment marketability prospects beyond Swaziland and Anglophone Africa. For most of these Swazi children, the reasons were, in the main, elitist if not for widening horizons for their personal development.

While these developments were good and promising for French, they were a big disadvantage for the siSwati language. In all the schools the pupils were to choose to learn either French or siSwati. This meant that those children who opted for French could not learn siSwati, their national language, in their own country. This arrangement had the potential of rendering the siSwati language unimportant and therefore inferior to French and English. This arrangement could be more devastating for siSwati should the teaching of French spread to more schools in the country under the same conditions. In terms of national development it is rather retrogressive to promote a foreign language at the expense of the indigenous national language. Rather, French and siSwati should be promoted side-by-side with equal vigour than letting the present arrangements prevail.

The position of Afrikaans

As mentioned earlier on in this paper, Afrikaans was taught in the exclusive white schools as another language option with French which could be learned and taught instead of Zulu. In some instances, Afrikaans was chosen by the pupils because they were of Afrikaans speaking parentage and Afrikaans was their home language in Swaziland. Also, knowledge of Afrikaans would allow them entry into the white South African job markets and possibly into education should they want to continue with tertiary education in that country. In a sense, knowledge of Afrikaans meant some form of economic and political empowerment for whites in South Africa as there was (at the time) job reservation for whites in that country. It should be noted here that job reservation meant that whites, especially white males, had easy access to any type of employment, more so if they could speak Afrikaans. For this reason Evelyn Baring High School continued to teach Afrikaans up to as late as 1972 when the last of the white settler children left the school and the Swazi took full control of it. It is, however, important to note the resurgence of Afrikaans in many, if not all, of the ‘private’ primary schools in the country.

After 1972 the position of Afrikaans changed drastically in the country as no schools with the exception of Waterford and Mananga Primary offered the subject. With political independence, there was more awareness in government and other political circles of Afrikaans being an oppressor's language and therefore being undesirable in Swaziland. There was no ethical justification for the teaching of Afrikaans in Swaziland schools. The 1976 Soweto schools uprisings put further testimony to the fact. Afrikaans had died in the country’s schools.

The Portuguese language in Swaziland

Swaziland has always had a small but significant number of Portuguese-speakers in the country because of her neighbourliness with Mozambique. The Portuguese community is significant because it has somehow managed to form an almost exclusive language group amid the predominant English and siSwati groups. This is not to say that the Portuguese do not interact and socialise with the Swazis. They have, however, formed social clubs in the country whose membership is almost exclusively Portuguese-speaking and whose sole official language is Portuguese. Recently, Portuguese speakers from as far abroad as Angola and Madeira have resided in Swaziland.

Many of the older generations within this community speak "fanagalo" (a form of pidgin siSwati or Zulu) and a semblance of English for social and business interaction with siSwati and English-speakers, respectively. Increasingly, many of the younger ones of schools going age and those who have completed school either in Swaziland or in South Africa speak and write English and a fair amount of siSwati in
respectively. Increasingly, many of the younger ones of schools going age and those who have completed school either in Swaziland or in South Africa speak and write English and a fair amount of siSwati in addition to Portuguese.

Lastly, the number of Portuguese-speakers in Swaziland increased drastically during the displacement of Mozambicans as a result of the war in Mozambique between 1982 and 1992. Even though there has been repatriation of Mozambican nationals from Swaziland since 1994 a number of them have remained in the country or re-entered Swaziland for economic and other reasons. As a result of these factors, a number of people especially in the urban areas throughout Swaziland speak and interact in Portuguese and/or in some Mozambican language. Many use Portuguese as their first or second language. In my view these factors must not be overlooked when discussing the language situation in the country and when exploring ways of establishing a workable and meaningful language policy in the country; more so if such a language policy has to take into consideration the factor of language as a socio-cultural and economic construct in regional co-operation. Portuguese is there to stay in Swaziland and so are the Mozambican languages. The language policy of the land needs to consider this factor in a meaningful way by examining its socio-cultural and economic implications.

**ENGLISH IN SWAZILAND**

English was introduced as a language in Swaziland when the British settlers arrived in the country in the second half of the 19th century. From that time onwards the language has existed side by side with siSwati. When Swaziland became a British Protectorate in the late 1880's, English became the official language in the administration of the country's affairs. Prior to that, concessions giving way chunks of Swazi land were written and signed in English. The language was introduced as a subject in Swazi schools in 1904. Prior to independence in 1968, Swaziland used English as its only official language in government. siSwati, though a national language, was relegated and confined to the "tribal courts" in matters of Swazi Law and Custom. Officially, English was elevated higher than siSwati. a status that language has enjoyed to the present.

On independence, upon realising the importance of siSwati in the development of Swaziland and for the full realisation of the aspirations of the nation. English and siSwati were established as the two official languages of Swaziland. Their status was reiterated in 1972 in the *Imbokodvo Manifesto* which had become the government working document as follows: "siSwati and English will be the official languages in Swaziland" (p. 10). This established the official contact between the two languages, a position that has become acceptable to many as "the two languages have existed side by side uninterrupted and without conflict". (Mkhonza. 1988 p.23). Indeed this may be so if we do not consider language inequity.

The Status of English in Education

The Imbokodvo Manifesto also established the English language as the official medium of instruction in the school system while siSwati was to replace isiZulu which had been the only African language which was taught in "Swazi" schools prior to independence. English was also declared the passing and/or failing subject in the school system. This declaration established the language education policy as well as tentatively, described the national language policy of the land. The status of English was elevated even higher than that of siSwati.

In education, English determined the learners' progression from one level of schooling to the next status the language enjoys extensively today. This means that pupils or candidates who fail English at the end of primary school level cannot proceed with their formal education to the next level. Those who fail English at the end of junior secondary level cannot proceed to the senior secondary level; those who fail to obtain a credit in English language at "O"level cannot proceed to some tertiary education institutions in the country. English language is also a compulsory subject at all levels of education in the country. The other official language does not enjoy these privileges, even though it is the predominant national language-a factor that makes English not only higher than siSwati in status, but also a more important language in the school system. This is a glaring example of inequity in the language education system of Swaziland.
The social status of English

On the social level, English enjoys a high social stature. The status quo has persisted from the pre-independence days when English was the sole language for official communication in the various official documents in government. This continued to be so until very recently when some, and not all, official documents became bilingual to include English and siSwati. While the situation has improved to become bilingual in some government departments, financial institutions and other settings, English has remained the controlling language in many social settings.

What comes to mind here are the following examples in which English dominates the social scenario: application forms for jobs and admission in various institutions in the country including schools, colleges and the university, scholarship agreement forms which need to be signed by parents who are sometime illiterate or semi-literate, medical documents in hospitals and clinics (the situation in pre-natal and postnatal clinics is intriguing), higher purchase agreement forms (a facility most Swazis use for a variety of their household needs) and many others. In many of these settings people with no knowledge or little knowledge of English become frustrated and helpless, and that is a significant number of people. This, to me, is one social injustice which has been perpetuated and sustained by the inequities between English and siSwati through the country’s silent language policy. What does this mean in the context of dual officialism of the two languages? It makes it an absurdity if not a farce Swaziland needs a language policy that will make explicit the roles of the official languages in providing equitable social and economic access to all the people of Swaziland.

The Position of siSwati in Swaziland

It may sound absurd to address the position of siSwati in Swaziland because obviously siSwati is the indigenous language of the indigenous Swazi people which should be naturally perceived as their national language. Interestingly it is when we view siSwati as the “native” national language that we see how deprived it is of power. SiSwati plays second fiddle to English in the education system. English far exceeds siSwati in power in the country’s language education system. In some cases in the school system, French is proving to be a stronger option than siSwati in language learning even for some indigenous Swazi pupils.

The above-mentioned position of siSwati does not auger well for the country’s only indigenous national language as a vehicle for national development and promotion of the Swazi culture. In fact siSwati seems to have ceased to play such a role. This seems to be so when one considers the fact that all print media houses have stopped disseminating information in siSwati. Umbiki a national siSwati newspaper which came into circulation in the country a few years after independence stopped circulation about 15 years ago. Tikhatsi, another siSwati newspaper, was stopped from circulation in 1994. This development has meant that siSwati readers cannot read the news about what is going on in their country in their own language. They can only do so in English from The Times of Swaziland and The Observer, the two daily newspapers in circulation. Those who cannot read in English are deprived of information. If indeed “information is power” this means that these many Swazis are powerless as they are deprived of information. The only access they have to information is the radio which specialises in broadcasting Government propaganda and local news. Is it the wish of the government of Swaziland to use siSwati not for the social and political empowerment of the Swazi people, but for Government propaganda?

In fact it becomes so. when newspapers report that:

"Government is in the process of designing an additional policy for all Government controlled media... This policy will take cognisance of the Swazi Nation’s interest for balanced information instead of being controlled by certain pressure groups. "The Swazi Observer, p.1)"

This is a statement attributed to the Government spokesman, Mr. Meshack Shongwe, which appeared in The Swazi Observer of April 22, 1997. This is an indication that information is being censored in the country. Logically it follows that in as far as the Government of Swaziland is concerned the country is better
governed without siSwati newspapers to censor, therefore, there shall be no siSwati newspapers in the country.

This must change if all the Swazi are going to be a viable social entity in national aggrandisement and social change. An uninformed national cannot make meaningful contribution to society locally and abroad. Swazis need information in order to be viable participants in matters of regional cooperation.

The final observation about the position of siSwati is that, even though the language is taught as a subject in all the schools in the country, it has fallen tremendously in status in comparison to English and French in the school system. Socially, the influence of siSwati is also suspect as a vehicle for national development and social empowerment of the Swazi people. In my view all these factors are a result of a weak if not foul language education system and a language policy that is silent on the roles of the so-called official languages in the country. A way forward must improve the language situation in the country by making the language education policy "siSwati friendly".

Major observations about the language situation since 1968.

a) Swaziland has suffered from an elitist language education system and a language policy, both of which do not recognise in a meaningful way the role of siSwati in national development.

b) Although English and siSwati are the two official national languages, the former enjoys an elevated status and more importance educationally and socially in the country as a result of (I) as mentioned above.

c) SiSwati is made to suffer unfair and unnecessary competition in prominence with French in schools where the latter is taught. This indicates that siSwati could be completely wiped out in the school system should the teaching of French spread to all the schools in the country under the prevailing conditions.

d) French and Afrikaans, the two languages whose importance had subsided soon after independence have re-emerged as new languages of power and elitism in Swaziland.

e) Portuguese has been in constant contact with siSwati and both languages have co-existed without conflict and without interference from one another.

f) On the surface, neither English nor siSwati commands social significance to the Portuguese communities in Swaziland, but Swazis need Portuguese for social and economic contact with Mozambique where Portuguese is a national language.

g) There is growing contact between siSwati and some Mozambican languages whose implications need to be studied carefully in their socio-economic context.

**Toward a language policy of empowerment in Swaziland**

In view of the prevailing language situation in the country, Swaziland has to undertake vigorous steps in formulating and implementing a language policy that will consider the roles of English and siSwati as equal partners in national development with an equitable educational and social responsibility for all the people of Swaziland. In part, this could be achieved by promoting siSwati and English, the two national languages, to some semblance of equality educationally and socially in the country. Secondly, Swaziland must recognise the African languages in contact with the siSwati language with the view to promote mutual respect between those languages and siSwati. This second step could go a long way in promoting linguistic and socio-cultural cooperation at regional level with Mozambique and Mpumalanga Province in South Africa.

**Promoting English and siSwati as equal partners in the school system.**

In Swaziland siSwati needs to be recognised meaningfully as a national language within the school system in order re-establish and maintain the language's importance to the people of Swaziland and all those residing in Swaziland. Initially this could done in the following ways:

i) making siSwati and English compulsory subjects throughout the school system (i.e in all the schools in the country). This would ensure that every person of school going age will have some knowledge of siSwati while domicile in Swaziland. Mkhonta (1988) tentatively made the above
private and English medium schools. In these schools siSwati native speakers must be required to study siSwati A while non-native Swazis pupils could study the softer siSwati B (mainly conversational and functional siSwati). French and/or any other language must be additional options in the languages curriculum. In this way unfair competition between the other languages and siSwati could be eliminated within the school system and the importance of siSwati within Swaziland would be maintained, however imposed. (After all it is imperceivable to live in Britain. France, Russia, Botswana or Tanzania without learning the national languages of these countries).

ii) The Ministry of Education can do away with the requirement that primary school graduates should pass English in order to proceed to junior secondary school. Instead, all primary school graduates with an overall pass grade, but who fail English must be allowed to proceed to junior secondary school and continue to learn English, just as the case is with siSwati or any other language. This arrangement gives all the primary school graduates whose overall mark constitutes a pass access to junior secondary school - a chance they could use to improve their academic and/or technical skills instead of being school drop-outs because of having failed primary level English. After all, the overall failure rate averages 11% at Primary school level.

Promoting siSwati at the social level
At the social level efforts must continue to recognise siSwati as a social partner in various contexts of social function. There must be evidence of bilingual importance and functioning of siSwati and English in all government institutions, clinics, hospitals, schools, the media, and the like.

There must be meaningful efforts on the part of government, the media houses (both print and electronic) and other social partners to promote siSwati in the media. Perhaps the private sector should be persuaded to see the need to promote siSwati through the media.

Promoting contact with other imminent languages

i) Swaziland needs to recognise the social contact siSwati has with imminent African languages used in Mozambique and Mpumalanga Province of South Africa. This contact could be developed for viable socio-cultural and socio-economic interaction and mutual cultural respect between Swazis and Mozambicans. Research on in these areas must be undertaken.

ii) Swaziland must recognise Portuguese as an important language for cooperation with Mozambique. In this regard Swaziland must take the initiative of promoting the study of Portuguese more comprehensively in the country. Currently, there are bi-weekly one-hour Portuguese radio lessons that are privately sponsored. There are also individually sponsored private classes of Portuguese in Mbabane and Manzini. There needs to be co-ordination of these efforts for them to be of service to the majority of the Swazis. Government could sponsor language teachers to attend these on a regular basis.

Here I am proposing establishment of formal cooperation in the promotion of siSwati in Mozambique and Portuguese in Swaziland at government level. This could be in the form of a language exchange programme which could enable siSwati language teachers to study Portuguese in Mozambique and Portuguese language teachers to study siSwati in Swaziland.

iii) Finally, Swaziland must consider seriously the idea of introducing a second African language in the school system. Instead of concentrating on the teaching of single languages as subjects, the language education system must introduce a language programme in the school system in which the pupils could opt to do English, siSwati and another language in order to develop a languages orientation in their education. In my view languages are important for regional and international cooperation. All good education programmes have languages education programmes as they have such groupings as science education, technical education, commercial education and social studies.

Moreover, cooperation among the Southern African nations has increased tremendously with the independence of South Africa. It is therefore not too early for Swaziland to start making available Afrikaans and/or Sesotho in the country's school system.
Afrikaans and/or Sesotho in the country's school system.

CONCLUSION

The fore-mentioned views and suggestions are hopefully going to stimulate debate and discussion on the issues raised. This debate and discussion amongst all the stakeholders from the country's educational institutions, the Ministry of Education, government policy-making formations, the private sector and all interest groups will in turn inspire proactive inputs from all the interested parties in Swaziland. The University of Swaziland and other educational institutions in the country should take the lead in undertaking research on the impact of the language policy on national development and social change in Swaziland. Government, industry and the University of Swaziland's Department of Communication should collaborate in efforts to establish siSwati media for disseminating a variety of information to the people of Swaziland. This is empowerment through language, if indeed "information is power". This way the people of Swaziland could establish an implementable language policy based on the national educational and social aspirations of all the people of Swaziland regardless of their socio-economic, political and educational standing.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER EIGHT

CHRISTIANITY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL BASE OF THE SWAZI MONARCHY

Martin H.Y. Kaniki

INTRODUCTION

Swaziland is a predominantly Christian country (H.L. Ndlovu and F. Gillies. 17.03.97 The Swazi Weekend Observer, 29.03.97). This reality could mislead the present generation to believe that things have always been like that. Nothing could be further from the truth. Christianity is a relatively late arrival in Swaziland, though its impact has been profound. The religion entered the country in the 1840s but its spread, which could be seen as a remarkable cultural conquest, was a colonial phenomenon. Though Swazi rulers, among others, successfully resisted conversion to Christianity, they allowed their subjects and relatives to embrace the new religion. By the time of independence the majority of the Swazi had embraced Christianity, no doubt at the expense of Swazi Traditional Religion. Christian influence and western values had come to affect even those who had resisted conversion.

The purpose of this essay is to trace and analyse how, and to what extent, Christianity came to be an important part of the ideological base of the Swazi monarchy. For our purpose here, ideology should be understood as a set or sets of ideas, myths, beliefs, fears, taboos, and values which are held by a wide section of the population in a polity. It is through the manipulation of such factors that rulers can maintain and retain their following with the minimum application of coercion. The ideological base of a polity is not constant, and ideological apparatuses are sometimes in conflict with each other. As for the Swazi monarchy, its unrivalled element of the ideological base during the pre-Christian era was Swazi Traditional Religion. During the formative years of the Swazi state this religion 'played a key role in the process of state building' and enhanced the power of the Dlamini clan. (P. Kasenene, 1993: 92) As Kasenene has observed: "The political institution of monarchy, under which the country is governed has foundation on Swazi Traditional Religion and promotes it. But during the last ten decades the relative (if not absolute) significance of this religion has declined with the spread of Christianity and related developments. The emergence and entrenchment of this new religion into the Swazi value system must be regarded as one of the most dramatic achievements of missionary enterprise in the twentieth century."

Swaziland has a long tradition of religious peace. For many decades, different religions co-existed peacefully. This tradition was broken in 1996 when Christians, through their priests, requested His Majesty King Mswati III to banish other religions from Swaziland (Times of Swaziland. 7 April 1996). The incident took place on Saturday 6 April, 1996. at Lozitha Royal Residence where Christians were celebrating Easter with the King, the Ndlovukazi and other members of the royal family. About 200 priests of the League of African Churches, which is one of the three national church bodies in the country, had a discussion with the King on relations between Christianity and other religions. The religions targeted for 'banishment' were Islam, Buddhism and the Bahai faith. Significantly Swazi Traditional Religion was not included, even implicitly. The exact motive for such a request is yet to be established, though the priests argued that if the other religions were allowed to operate freely they would mislead the Swazi nation. To Mzizi, the popular opinion' was that Swaziland, as a Christian country would be compromising the dream of 'King Somhlolo if she allowed freedom to other religions. 'This view was expressed even by the closest of those close to the King. I mean Prince Tfohlomwane himself(Times of Swaziland Sunday 14 April 1996). As one speculates over the exact motive for the request, two possibilities come to mind. First, could it be fear of increasing influence of other 'foreign' religions? No doubt by 1996 Christianity was no longer seen as a "foreign religion. Second, could it be sheer intolerance for minority rights and interests? By 1996 Islam was a very
Islam was a very minority religion with a following of only about 3000, a substantial proportion of whom were foreigners (S. Bati. 17 April 1996). The Bahai faith had, perhaps, an even smaller following. Whatever the exact motive, the priests were acting from a point of confidence, and, most likely, their sentiments were shared by a large section of the Swazi nation and notables in the Swazi polity. According to a participant at the Lozitha meeting, during the discussion the priests adopted an uncompromising stance, denouncing the founders of these religions as unworthy individuals. (Times of Swaziland. 14 April 1996). One priest, a Rev. Mavuso, insisted that Christianity must be the only religion allowed in the country as even God brought it through a Swazi king. King Somhlolo' (Times of Swaziland. 7 April 1996). He emphasised amidst loud applause:

It is only Jesus Christ who died for us. All these other leaders never died for any person. In fact Mohammed was just a murderer. Bahai a criminal and Buddha died on his own. He never died for us. He was killed by disease. (Times of Swaziland. 7 April 1996).

To discredit the other religions further, the Rev. Cain Khumalo denounced them as being a little less than political parties. (Times of Swaziland: 7 April 1996). This was a serious accusation in a land where political parties were banned!

The King's response was brief and judicious. He told the priest to go and preach the bible, at the same time pray for the religions they did not like. He concluded with a seemingly powerful caution. 'Do not think your religion makes you better acceptable to God than others. You still have your own faults, then where do you get the courage to castigate others?' (Times of Swaziland, 7 April 1996).

Apart from the King's refusal to grant the priests' request, no widespread condemnation was evident. Two media columnists denounced the request as irresponsible, (Times of Swaziland. 14 April 1996) but one wonders whether they were expressing points of principle or feeding their readership with stimulation on what seemed a controversial issue. Ben Dlamini went to the extent of disputing the status of Christianity in the country. Who said Swaziland is a Christian country? This is a land for everyone to practice the religion of his choice. (Times of Swaziland. 27 April 1996). He aptly concluded: 'If there is any religion that claim to be indigenous to Swaziland it is the Swazi religion. Christianity is a foreign religion.' The Muslim fraternity also protested strongly through the media.

For some time it looked as if the issue had gone to rest. But within three weeks of the priests' request an influential Senator, Walter Bennett, asked in Parliament why Islam should be tolerated in Swaziland while other religions were not tolerated in some Muslim countries. Senator Bennett expressed concern at the spread of Islam in schools through religious instruction. Without naming the source, he informed Parliament that Muslims in the country had funds to promote their faith.

While he appreciated religious freedom existing in Swaziland, he retorted: "A cow has the right to cat. but will you let it cat your maize?"

The exact impact of the religious developments of April 1996 may not become evident for many years to come, but they are telling in one important respect, namely that Christianity is a force to be reckoned with in the Swazi monarchy. There is no evidence that the priests have withdrawn their request or shifted their stand vis-a-vis other religions. But for our purpose we have now to examine the ascendance of Christianity to such an influential position, and how it came to affect the ideological base of the Swazi monarchy.

A FALSE START

Christianity first entered Swaziland in 1844 at the invitation of King Sobhuza I (Somhlolo) and Mswati II. and then during the early 1880s at the invitation of King Mbandzeni. The spread of Christianity in Swaziland has benefited from an alleged 'vision' by King Sobhuza I. The King, it is widely held, had a vision one night shortly before he died in 1939. He saw a white man entering Swaziland, holding umculu in his right hand and indilinga in his left hand. According to tradition, a voice directed Somhlolo to choose umculu and reject indilinga. Umculu is a siSwati word which means, among other things, something which has been rolled up. Indilinga means a round: disc-like object. On the following day the king revealed his
the nation to accept *umculu* and reject *indilinga*. *Umculu* has ever since been translated to mean book, especially a Bible. It has been associated with education. *Indilinga* was understood as money.

Apparently Sobhuza I was aware of the presence of whites in the region. Whatever misgivings could be raised regarding the validity of Somhlolo's 'vision', the Swazi have believed and acted accordingly. The "vision", the Swazi have believed and acted accordingly. The "vision" has to be held as social fact. Godthorpe once observed Beliefs, whether true or false, are social facts. They are facts about people who believe them, and they require to be treated with the same objectivity as other facts.

The "vision" has been rationalised by many writers. To Matsibula: Sobhuza's people listened carefully to his words and have tried ever since to observe the advice of listening to those who brought the Bible, even though they have found it impossible to avoid the *indilinga.* (1972: 13). In recent times the "vision" has been compared with the great prophecies of the Old Testament 'Knowing the needs of the Swazi nation. God spoke in a similar vision to King Somhlolo the founder of the nation (Somhlolo Festival of Praise, 1994: 2). The 150th anniversary celebrations of the arrival of Christianity held in 1994 were named "Somhlolo Festival of Praise. 1994". The six-day festival (July 20 - 25) was. above all else, 'a celebration to give thanks to God. . It is to recognise with thanksgiving what our King and leaders have done to bring the message of The Book and to remind us as Nation to follow its teachings." According to the church leaders in Swaziland, the Bible message had to be praised because it had been responsible for 'the peace and stability we enjoy'. (Somhlolo Festival of Praise. 1994).

The first white missionaries, the Rev. James Allison and the Rev. Richard Giddy. belong to the Wesleyan mission. They arrived from Basutholand in July 1844. With them were two Sotho evangelists, J.Z. Nkambule and B.M. Mthembu. The latter two were particularly effective during the first two years of mission work in Swaziland. Allison and Giddy were received with great enthusiasm by the Swazi rulers, as it was hoped that they would strengthen the Swazi state against its enemies, especially the aggressive Zulu to the south. The young king, Mswati II. was present, but did not address the missionaries formally as this was prior to his circumcision. (P. Bonner. 1983:51). But both his regents expressed great optimism at the missionaries' arrival. Malambule, Mswati's older brother and senior *Umnqwenkhosi* sounded optimistic that 'the much wished for day has at last dawned upon us. We have long sought the teachers... We greatly rejoice at what is our eyes this day behold We have many enemies who are too strong for us. For many years we have been like lizards under a stone which the teachers have conic today to remove, and shall come forth into the rays of the sun.' (F.J. Perkins, 1975:79).

The *indlovukazi*, Thandile. sounded equally optimistic. '... The teachers have at length arrived... Our enemies have long oppressed us... The teachers are our hope Through them we may yet, be preserved from destruction.' (Perkins) 1975: 80). Significantly neither Malambule nor Thandile expressed a wish to have the Swazi converted to Christianity. They acknowledged the existence of a weakness within the Swazi state, but that the weakness was not religious or ideological. Their warmth towards these strangers was not based on a wish to invite religious competitors, leave alone conquerors. It is here that the aspirations of the Swazi rulers and those of the missionaries were contradictory, indeed antagonistic, to each other. But this negative potential could not be detected at the initial contact.

The missionaries were given land to settle at the extreme southern border of the Kingdom, around Mahamba in the hope that they might form a buffer zone between the Swazi and their aggressive neighbours to the south. (H.M. Jones. 1993: 12). Work started without delay. Within weeks a dwelling house and chapel had been erected with assistance of the local population. Through teaching and preaching the first seeds of Christianity in Swaziland were sown. But the optimism expressed by Mswati's regents in 1844 proved premature. Within two years of its arrival. Christianity had encouraged and perhaps even caused. division within Swazi society. First. Allison had remonstrated against killing, thereby bringing into disrepute Swazi sense of justice and morals. Second. his explanation of the theology of resurrection 'caused commotion among the custodians of Swazi culture and tradition. Third. his preaching caused laughter because it sounded unconvincing among the notables. Naturally, Allison did not take this kindly. With months passing by it became clear that the missionaries were, after all. not the asset Swazi rulers had expected to received.

To crown it all, the missionaries were implicated in local political rivalry whereby Malambule was
expected to receive.

To crown it all, the missionaries were implicated in local political rivalry whereby Malambule was campaigning to overthrow the inexperienced but determined young King. When Malambule's party took refuge at the mission, Mswati's forces, helped by some Boers, treated the mission as a hostile zone. Allison's attempts to mediate between the two warring parties only succeeded to portray him as an accomplice of the rebels. In a fight lasting three days, many homesteads were destroyed and about sixty people were killed. In September 1846 the missionaries withdrew from Swaziland, taking with them about 1000 Swazis. men, women and children. They finally settled in Natal near Pietermaritzburg.

The experience of these formative years of Christianity tended to bring, or at least encourage, disunity within the Swazi state. When the German Lutheran missionaries, A. A. B. Merensky and C. H. T. Grutzner, visited Mswati at Hhohho in 1860, the king expressed his indignation with Allison's preaching against killing human beings, and his giving sanctuary to sorcerers who were unforgivable criminals according to Swazi sense of justice. Mswati concluded: 'Finally my own brother fled to him and I had to kill the whole heap.' (Jones, 1993: 14). However peripheral. Allison's motive for involvement in the Swazi civil war was the rulers of Swaziland were hurl to see a foreign force abusing hospitality. Such feelings were still lingering in the minds of Senior Councillors during the early 1880's. But to greater consequence was the ideological destabilisation which Christianity brought. Through teaching, preaching and conversion of new faith divided the Swazi nation along religious and cultural lines. A new nation was emerging within a nation. An increasing number of Swazi's had adopted new identity and developed new allegiances. It is not without significance that when the missionaries were compelled to flee the country they took with them such a large number of His Majesty's subjects. Naturally, the Swazi rulers did not take kindly to such developments. As, late as the 1880's. King Mbandzeni 'still regarded missionaries with extreme suspicion'. (Jones, 1993: 14). Perhaps such attitude among Swazi rulers might help to explain why Swazi kings have not embraced Christianity.

CHRISTIANITY TAKES ROOT

Despite the unfortunate experience of the 1840's, missionaries were invited to Swaziland again in 1881 mainly to spread literacy among King Mbandzeni's children. Among the five who answered the call and re-established the Mahamba mission in 1882 were some pioneer converts who had fled the country in 1846. The early converts were people of humble background, including orphans and neglected widows, mainly because prior to 1887 Mbandzeni did not bless the idea of his subjects embracing Christianity. Subsequent to that date, more and more people, including important members of the Swazi nation, embraced the new faith. The church grew slowly but surely in the level of missionary activity and numbers of converts. When missionary activity resumed in 1881 the Methodists were joined by the Anglicans, then followed the German Lutherans (1884), the South African General Mission and the Scandinavian Alliance (1904), the church of the Nazarene (1909), the Norwegian Free Evangelical Mission (1910) and the Roman Catholics (1914). Other smaller missions followed in later years. The Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion arrived in 1912 under the leadership of the Rev. Daniel Nkonyane, a descendant of Swazis who had settled in South Africa.

In 1900 it was estimated that 99 percent of that country's population were observers of Swazi Traditional Religion. By 1918 this figure had dropped to 96 percent. At the end of the missionary pioneer period in 1910 there were about 1400 baptised members. 450 of whom were Wesleyan and 445 Anglicans. (M. Froise. 1994:2). During the 1910's a number of missionary societies, among them the Nazarenes and Catholics, established themselves more effectively in the country, and proselytising was expanded. At the end of Labotsibeni's regency (1921) there were eleven missionary denominations and three indigenous churches, all fighting for royal favours. (C. C. Watts. 1992:41). From the 1930s the tempo of evangelism was raised as more and more Swazis took over the task from the white missionaries. According to the 1936 census. 88.81 percent of the population (i.e. 105.472 people) still adhered to Swazi Traditional Religion. By 1965, this figure had dropped to only 43 percent. Two decades later this figure had fallen to a mere 21
values and practices. Even some dances and rituals which accompanied one's admission into a senior age group were declared 'heathen' and treated as if contaminating to the Christians. To become a Christian meant, in essence, to alienate oneself from one's society. The missionaries were particularly pleased to witness their success in this cultural "conquest". Their pre-conceived attitudes about African culture have been cogently sounded by the Rev. J. Wills:

The ripe fruits of Christian character do not grow from pagan roots, and the missionary must not be surprised if he finds in the heathen African untruthfulness and dishonesty, ingratitude, deceit, a want of stability and perseverance, and almost total lack of any sense of sin, a gross unblushing immorality. The very raison-d'etre of the presence of the presence of the physician is the illness of the people. (R.J. Cazziol, 1989: 173).

Hand-in-hand with proselytisation was the introduction of social services, especially western education and medical work. The missionaries did not only pioneer these two fields, they also dominated them, especially during the colonial period when the colonial state lacked both the will and the capacity to develop them. As Cazziol has observed. The History of education in pre-independence Swaziland is essentially the history of mission schools in that country." (Cazziol, 1989: 223). Mission schools, clinics and hospitals were effectively used as centres of conversion. Missionaries believed strongly that education was a powerful weapon against indigenous cultures. Such belief was aptly sounded by Rev. J.R. Fell of the Methodist Missionary Society at the end of the last century:

... as a civilising force, education has no equal. It will make rational thinking men who perceive cause and effect instead of those believing the silly notions arising from generations of paganism. It is a valuable adjunct to Christianising. Indeed, the spread of Christianity is largely dependent on education. (W.G.G. Mears. 1955: 8).

Missionaries also believed that education could play a fundamental role in character formation, thereby influencing the whole man. As Bishop Tucker, one of the pioneer missionaries in Uganda, observed in 1898: "The course of my story now turns to education, or, as it has been fitly described, character making. For what, after all, is education but the moulding of character in high and noble ideals? (A.K. Tiberondwa. 1978: 59).

Most missionary societies knew many youths attended schools for essentially materialist motives, but they would not reject such potential converts. Rev. W.A. Dawson of the Scandinavian Alliance appreciated this reality during the 1930s.

We fully recognise that the increasing desire for education is not at all generally prompted by a desire for spiritual things. But when those people ask to be taught to read, what a wonderful opportunity we have of teaching them and placing the word of God in their hands. (Cazziol. 1989: 222).

The dominance of mission education meant that most of those empowered by new skills acquired through western education were followers of Christianity.

**SWAZI RULERS' RESPONSE TO CHRISTIANITY**

How did the Swazi rulers respond to the new religion at a personal level? Basing her evaluation on the experience of the period between the 1880s and the 1940s, Kuper made the following observation. "Despite close and friendly cooperation with various individual missionaries. Swazi rulers have not been converted to Christianity." (H. Kuper. 1947: 109). This observation remained valid during the late 1990s. This was a striking feature of Swazi Christianity, bearing in mind the experience of others in the region. In both Bachuanaland and Basulholand, the conversion of rulers facilitated the process among the masses. Many reasons could be advanced for the experience of Swaziland in this respect. First, it should be born in mind that the original purpose of the rulers inviting "the teachers" to Swaziland was not to promote religious
Bachuanaland and Basutholand. the conversion of rulers facilitated the process among the masses. Many reasons could be advanced for the experience of Swaziland in this respect. First, it should be born in mind that the original purpose of the rulers inviting "the teachers" to Swaziland was not to promote religious conquest or to make up for religious deficiency. As we noted earlier, neither Malambule nor Thandile expressed the wish to have the Swazi converted to Christianity. Their warmth towards the pioneer missionaries was not based on a wish to invite religious competition, leave alone conquest. It was here that the aspirations of the Swazi rulers and those of the pioneer missionaries were contradictory, indeed somewhat antagonistic, to each other.

Second, the ideas and principles advanced by Christian missionaries attacked the very ideological foundations of the Swazi monarchy. As we noted earlier, it did not take long before the message carried by the agents of Christianity fomented seeds of discontentment and antagonised the ruling class. Missionary image remained negative in the minds of Swazi rulers for many years. Though Thandile, Mswati's mother, had received Allison and Giddy warmly, after their flight in 1846, she became one of the strongest opponents of conversion. She did not only resist conversion of her own person, she also wished to retain the religious identity of the nation at large. Contemporary European observers, especially missionaries, detested her for her uncompromising stand against cultural aggression. The Rev. J. Jackson at one time described her as the most difficult person he had to deal with and the most bigoted superstitious, tenacious of old customs. Following her death and that of Malunge in 1874 - 75. some whites in the region exalted and Jackson expressed hope that Christianity might be allowed re-entry into Swaziland. (P. Bonner. 1983. 161. 276)

As for King Mbandzeni. he had openly opposed missionary influence during the early years of his reign. This is not surprising he had been under the unyielding influence of formidable upholders of the councillor traditions like Thandile, Malunge and others. It was years after the departure of these two personalities, in early 1880s that Mbandzeni invited Jackson to open a school for the education of royal children, including late King Bhunu. He maintained a friendly disposition towards a few missionaries and used them in his dealings with lawless Europeans, but there was not wish for conversion. And the children were never allowed to enter the school, partly because of opposition from queen Labotsiben. It was feared that the children might be converted to Christianity. As Queen Regent. Labotsiben was intensely interested, but suspicious. She even sent the heir to the Swazi throne. Mona. to study at Lovedale, the Presbyterian school in South Africa. Nevertheless, she refused to become a Christian and remained impervious to any attempt to convert her. (Watts, 1992:41,98). Bhunu was just not interested. Lomawa, as Indlovukati, wished to be baptised. and Jackson expressed hope that Christianity might be allowed re-entry into Swaziland. (P. Bonner. 1983. 161. 276)

IMPACT OF CHRISTIANITY ON SWAZI CULTURE AND POLITICS

At this stage two questions could be asked. First, what was the significance of these developments vis-a-vis the ideological base of the Swazi monarchy? Second, would the Ngwenyamas subjects remain loyal to their rulers even after embracing a new faith and acquiring new values and new identity? As for the colonial state, the missionary church was a dependable ideological apparatus. Church education and general teaching tended to soften the population for easier control. On the occasion of opening a small church in 1933, the British High Commissioner observed, perhaps with some exaggeration: 'The administration of
there. Their relationship was symbiotic. While the colonial state provided conducive conditions for
proselytisation the missions promoted Christian' ethics and a value system which the colonial administra-
tors shared. The missions provided and largely controlled social services which the colonial state only
subsidiised lightly. Moreover, the missions were part and representatives of an ideological arm of
imperialism to which the colonial state was an agent. The colonial state also promoted Christian' ethics
through legislation, especially on marriage and family matters. (Kuper. 1947: 121). It should also be noted
that different activities (e.g. wage employment and labour migration) which tended to promote social
transformation under colonialism were seen by missionaries as allies against the Swazi way of life. One
Anglican missionary summarised such sentiments as follows: Christianity is making a serious attempt to
convert the nation. The attack may not always be well-directed, but it is an attack, and it is being pressed at

But the effectiveness of this cultural "conquest" remained questionable for many years. After working
among the Swazi from 1925 to the late 1950s Dr. David Hynd, the influential Nazarene missionary,
complained bitterly about the stubbornness, and. perhaps, the durability of Swazi culture. His strong
prejudice is not hard to detect.

... Can the seemingly degraded type of humanity represented in the savage, sometimes
cannibalistic, ignorant, witchcraft ridden, polygamous, drunken and idle African be trans-
formed into an individual whose life is replete with all the Christian graces and virtues? (D.
Hynd: 1959, 47)

While the colonial state saw the missions as allies, the Swazi rulers during the twenties had a different
experience with increasing Christian influence. As was the case during the 1840s. missionaries and their
followers tended to challenge the Ngwenyama's authority in cultural matters. Missionaries, for example,
were instrumental in the passing of the witchcraft ordinance (1904) which adversely affected the powers of
the traditional rulers. In 1935. Sobhuza used his royal prerogative to inaugurate the Locus Regiment at a
public meeting. This was alter a lapse of fifteen years instead of five to seven years.

It happened that many of those in "bachelor set' had already taken wives or given their lovers children
without the Ngwenyama's permission. Sobhuza later sent his messenger to collect a fine from these men
"for breaking the law. but the Christian Swazi backed by missionaries successfully objected to 'interference'
by a polygamous King in their private lives. (H. Kuper. 1963: 53). This was one of the many instances where
Swazi political and religious culture was effectively contradicted, indeed challenged, by what could be
called cultural imperialism Christianity has also been accused of having undermined traditional values of
the Swazi. Together with wage employment and urbanisation. Christian influence enhanced the rate of
social change and intensified the breakdown of traditional values. Such developments threatened patriarchal
hegemony which was a central feature of Swazi culture. Women and youths took wage employment far from
the home without the permission of their guardians. Such a trend was encouraged by the possession of skills
acquired through education, skills which elders and male guardians could not effectively control. By the late
1940s the problem had assumed disturbing proportions in the minds of the custodians of Swazi culture and
tradition. In 1948 the Swazi National Council, with the approval of the colonial administration, appointed
the Decline of Tribal and Parental Control Committee to find ways of arresting the trend The committee
was to deal with numerous aspects of culture including the impact of Christianity on tribal customs. (SNA.
File 1444. 1948). During the opening of the first meeting of the committee. Sobhuza. as Paramount Chief,
expressed strong dissatisfaction with Christian influence in the country. He strongly disapproved different
techniques used to prevent pregnancy. He viewed Christian attitude against premarital sex to be unrealistic
and self-defeating. 'There is also the devastating practice of the Christian people who think they can stand
on the way of the nature and prohibit love. This is building castles in the air. 'The Christian strategy.
Sobhuza argued, was contrary to Swazi practice whereby a girl had to declare her love publicly. Thus, 'with
the present system', girls never keep chaste and thus the 'cream' of our family life fall into debauchery'.

How did the Swazi leaders attempt to contain the impact of Christianity? Instead of confronting the new
religion to the very bitter end. the Swazi rulers made a determined effort to harness the dynamism and
had to declare her love publicly. Thus, 'with the present system', girls never keep chaste and thus the cream of our family life fall into debauchery'.

How did the Swazi leaders attempt to contain the impact of Christianity? Instead of confronting the new religion to the very bitter end, the Swazi rulers made a determined effort to harness the dynamism and energy generated by religious conversion. Aware of the fact that the Swazi were a religious people, Sobhuza took maximum advantage of this characteristic and used Christianity to strengthen the institution of monarchy. For example, instead of opposing the mission-dominated education system, whose utility he had learned to appreciate, he chose to enrich it with traditional values. By the early 1930s the Swazi rulers had come to a firm conviction that Western values, which were especially promoted through Christian education, put the Swazis at 'very grave disadvantages' by uprooting them from their own indigenous culture without offering adequate substitutes. Sobhuza saw the system of colonial education then as designed' to develop the African as a European, arousing in him special leanings which, being a non-European, he cannot realise. Ultimately, this system of education only succeeded to estrange the African from Native Society', and leave him 'with a feeling of intense frustration". It was out of such conviction that Sobhuza proposed to include the amabutho (regiment) system into the education system in order to remedy matters*'. In this proposed he counted on the support of the more conservative of my people, who view with very grave and well justified alarm the breaking-up of Swazi culture and nationality'. To Sobhuza, the proper education for the Swazis was that they should use their own culture as a foundation, and erect the superstructure of European education upon it'. (SNA. RCS 328/33). He was emphatic regarding the relevance of the regimental system in the development of humankind. It aims. .. at making the individual a useful member of society, both as a defender of his country. and as a bulwark of the civil and social welfare of the state. (SNA. RCS 328/33).

The ideas contained in Sobhuza's memorandum were discussed extensively by educators both within and outside Swaziland. The majority of the observers, mostly Christian missionaries, were quite negative fearing the possible impact of 'pagan values in the education system. But the amabutho system was eventually introduced at the 'National School' at Matsapha. (J.S.M. Matschula, 1983: 14-34).

Another way in which the Swazi rulers used the dynamism of Christianity was to encourage disunity among Christians. When Swazi Christians rebelled against missionary Christianity and formed separatist 'Zionist churches in the 1930s. Sobhuza gave them enthusiastic support as they formed an alternative religious channel 'with a flexible dogma and great tolerance of customs lake polygamy (Kuper. 1963: 68). As elsewhere, on the continent, missionary Christianity in Swaziland came to be perceived by many as an extension of colonialism. Though missionaries had their own identity as messengers of the gospel, and though the majority of them did not originate in Britain or South Africa, they were part of the white community in the country enjoying privileges, prestige and resources arising from their colour” (P Kasenene. 1991: 12). The separatist churches gave their followers a sense of independence and security, thereby negating missionary monopoly of Christ. Thy embraced Christianity without killing' their traditional gods. With this approach they made only a partial departure from the traditional ideological base of the Swazi Nation.

The Zionists were also attractive to many because they were more relevant to the Swazi masses. They were able to contextualise the preaching of the gospel without disrupting the unity of the Swazi Culture". (R.J. Cazziol. 1987: 182). They also put emphasis on the material well-being of human beings while still on earth. Some of the social institutions attacked by missionaries, like polygamy, were seen as essential and inseparable aspects of life itself. Polygamy was extensively practised by chiefs and other notables in society, with the Ngwenyama taking the lead

For the Ngwenyama. polygamy served both political and social functions. The ritual which periodically legitimised and consolidated the institution of monarchy demanded the participation of two queens apart from the Ngwenyama's main wife. (Kuper. 1947: 110). It was also through unlimited polygamy that he extended his political influence to all corners of the land. Traditionally, it was not unusual for some fathers to give two daughters to the Ngwenyama to live as co-wives. The Ngwenyama's numerous sons and daughters extended his influence further through marriages. Furthermore, the power and prestige of the
Polygamy was based on economic and social realities of Swazi way of life. These realities included high child mortality and labour demands of an agrarian economy. The ability to add wife to wife also enhanced a man's social standing, and women were, as most are today, quite happy to marry successful men even if they were polygamists. Unfortunately the missionaries attacked this popular practice without proving the moral superiority of Western values and Christianity. The Swazi members of independent churches could easily agree with their Nigerian counterparts as this 'syllogism' put it.

The celibate is selfish and lives for himself The monogamist is better, he serves the other although to the exclusion of all others. The polygamist is the best because he lives a life of sacrifice for providing the homes for others, more or less comfort, they say. for himself. (E.A. Ayandele. 1966: 336).

As for the Swazi royal family, there was something tangible attracting them to the Zionists. In 1914 Queen Regent Labotsibeni was healed by a Zionist of a temporary blindness. In appreciation she pledged never to abandon the Zionist cause. (R.J. Cazziol, 1987: 177). Her grandson followed her footsteps, and. it would appear, ever her great-grandson.

One significant feature of Christianity in Swaziland is the large number of indigenous (independent) church groups. Indeed the expansion of Christian 'conquest' was accompanied by religious fragmentation. The earliest independent church - the independent Methodist church was established in 1906. Like many later independent churches, it had its roots in South Africa. The 1936 census recorded 20 indigenous churches accounting for 13 percent of the Christian population. By 1940 this figure was estimated to have reached 50 percent. The 1994 estimate put this figure at 75 percent or 60 percent of the total population in the country (M. Froise. 1994: 22). This trend was of great significance to the survival of the Swazi monarchy. The independent churches emerged essentially as a revolt against missionary domination. There was domination in religious matters, cultural matters and political issues. Missionaries presented Christianity to Africans rigidly as if western culture and Christianity were an inseparable package. They were intolerant of African culture which they hated and despised openly. Furthermore, they obstinately clung to positions of leadership which, they believed Africans were not qualified to occupy. To many Africans, missionary Christianity was only an ideological arm of the oppressive colonial state opposed to African initiative and ambition to lead. Contradictions in mission churches intensified with the rising tempo of anti-colonial struggles on the continent. By the late 1950s' separatism' had become a fashion. In Southern Africa one could logically ask the question: 'Why and on what terms is that African minister still linked with the mission church?' (B.G.M. Sundkler. 1961:203).

In 1936 Sobhuza II defended independent churches against possible banning by the Resident Commissioner 'Although lie was not himself a Christian', lie was also instrumental, during the following year, in the formation of the League of African Churches in Swaziland (LACS), as an association of Swazi-founded and Swazi-led churches' (P. Kasenene. 1991: 137). Most of the affiliated churches were Zionist. Since then the Zionists have grown both in numbers and influence, with Swazi notables among their ranks. By the 1980s Zionists comprised about 30 percent of the Swazi population (about 50 percent of all members of independent churches) making them the largest religious organisation in the country. (R.J. Cazziol. 1987 175-176). Zionist bishops and other leaders have become isifuba se nkosi 'the heart of the king', i.e. his closest religious advisors. Sobhuza then donated land at Nkanini where the National Cathedral was built. The foundation stone was laid in 1953 but the prestigious cathedral was opened in 1975. This structure, as a ritual centre, gives the believers a sense of belonging and identity. The LACS headquarters have remained at the Lobamba royal palace, enjoying strong support from the royal family. Through his moral and material support to the Zionist. Sobhuza ultimately emerged ritually entrenched, both as head of the traditional ancestral cult and as priest-king of a new faith'. (Kuper. 1963: 68). Every year Easter Services have been held at the Lobamba royal residence conducted by the LACS as a pilgrimage to 'New Zion' in recognition of the Ngwenyama's contribution to their survival during their infant stage. 'When Swaziland became independent the Zionists finally realised their own 'Zion' with the King Sobhuza II as their Solomon. "(RJ-Cazziol. 1987: 17) The Easter Services have been elevated to the status of 'royal Easter ritual' at which the
year Easter Services have been held at the Lobamba royal residence conducted by the LACS as a pilgrimage to 'New Zion' in recognition of the Ngwenyamas contribution to their survival during their infant stage. When Swaziland became independent the Zionists finally realised their own 'Zion' with the King Sobhuza II as their Solomon. (R.J. Cazziol. 1987: 17) The Easter Services have been elevated to the status of 'royal Easter ritual' at which the monarch is not only glorified but also legitimised through different forms of symbolism. (H.L. Ndlovu. 1993: 57-203). Ritual activities at the ceremony 'centre around' the Ndlovukazi and the King. They include prayer sessions at the Ndlovukazi's residence, preaching, singing and dancing on Good Friday and on Easter Sunday in the presence of the dual monarchs, senior members of the royal house and senior government officials. In recent years the active participation of the King and the Ndlovukazi has added warmth and weight to the ritual. (Ndlovu observed that:

> during the entire Easter ritual, the active participation of the Swazi royalty makes the climax of each days performance Invariably the King or the queen mother -the dual Heads of State - make a speech in which particular religion political values arc commended and these speeches are broadcast on the local radio station and television.

The Easter ritual provided a forum at which the king, as a patron of the church, exchanged views with church leaders. It was during one of such meetings that Christian priests requested the King to banish other religions. It was at a similar meeting in 1997 that church leaders pronounced a strong condemnation of homosexuality, as unpardonable sin which can never be tolerated in Swaziland. (Times of Swaziland. 30 March 1997). The King took a much softer position on the issue, describing homosexuality as a sickness. "The royal Easter ritual could also be perceived as a platform where the Swazi dual monarchs are depicted 'as patrons of the Christian faith - and hence the sacredness of the Swazi kingship is re-affirmed." (H.L. Ndlovu, 1993:2). This observation had already become quite evident by the 1970s. (B. Sundkler. 1976: 206-243).

Sobhuza's assumption of the headship of the Zionist church amounted to a great ideological innovation by the Swazi rulers. Through the church leaders, the Ngwenyama exerted his influence and control over his subjects. In 1967. Kuper observed that among participants at Incwala, the most important national ritual of the Swazi, were seven priests of the Swazi National Church. Priests have continued to be active participants. The bishops and priests, through the pulpit and elsewhere, have always emphasised the biblical prescription of power relations on earth. It is stated in Romans 3: 1-3.

> Everyone must obey the state authorities, because no authority exists without God's permission, and the existing authorities have been put there by God. Whoever opposes the existing authority opposes what God has ordered, and anyone who does so will bring judgement on himself.

In his capacity as head of the Swazi National Church, the Ngwenyama had the right to intervene in church matters: theological, financial and general policy. Sobhuza II is known to have intervened a number of times.

But the Ngwenyama's headship of the Swazi National Church begs a fundamental question: How could Sobhuza II secure such an important religious elevation without going through the very basic Christian ritual of baptism? Sobhuza is known to have fared well with Christians generally. He was known to be a very good friend of the late Catholic Bishop. Attilio Constantino Barneschi (died 1965). He took oath of office as King of Swaziland in 1967 with a bible in his hand, with the seemingly emphatic expression 'help me God'. This symbolic gesture has been taken by Zionists to have confirmed that the newly found independence should be built on the teachings of the Bible". (Somhlolo Festival of Praise, 1994:2). Furthermore, Sobhuza is known to have 'constantly reminded Christians to look for the 'footsteps of Jesus'.' But it is common knowledge that he was not baptised. Yet it is the Christian baptismal ritual, perhaps above all others, which binds the believers together. Among the Zionists of Swaziland, baptism distinguishes believers from non-believers. This symbol has been accorded special significance by the African indigenous/independent churches in the region. (G.C. Oosthuizen. 1985). Though to the Zionists
introduced has survived, and, perhaps, even thrived, after his departure.

How can one explain this reality? How could the Zionists allow this state of affairs to be deeply entrenched in their church? Did it come about, at least in part, as a result of the lack of educated leadership, and the inadequacies of their Christian message during their years of infancy? (R.J. Cazziol. 1987: 182). Or could it be said that Sobhuza II bought off early Zionist leaders with political influence, moral support and material assistance? If that were the case, how could the Zionists, as a church, retain and maintain their moral authority vis-a-vis the state? But we need not lose sight of similar developments in history. A striking example is that of the Roman Emperor, Constantine, who, despite being unbaptised, promoted and defended Christianity. He had conferred great material benefits, providing bibles and building great basilicas... '(H. Chadwick. 1993: 67). He also exerted great influence on the church. One of Sobhuza's great admirers, Kuper, has indirectly discarded the relevance of baptism to the religious leadership of Sobhuza II. Commenting on Sobhuza's success in silencing Christians who criticised the practise of mixing Christianity with some traditional customs (e.g. umewasha) Kuper made the following observation

The term likholwa (believer) was no longer restricted to orthodox Christians, and now most churchmen praised Sobhuza as "a true Christian", a likholwa of excellence while he continued to tolerate and respect different denominations, and at the same time to perform the ancient rites of his people.

Despite this lame rationalisation, Sobhuza's assumption of headship of the Swazi National Church remains a puzzling anomaly. One explanation for this anomaly is that had he accepted baptism through any denomination, his position as father of the entire nation was likely to lose its embracing capacity. But this argument is hardly convincing. If he held such fears, one might ask, why in the first place he struggled to become head of one branch of Christianity. It would appear that a more convincing argument would have to do with the Ngwenyama's role and place in the Swazi Traditional Religion. Being the chief factor there, with the responsibility to unite the 'living dead' (J.S. Mbithi. 1969: 75) with the rest of the nation, he would appear a sell-out before his people if he were to be baptised. It is also important to note that leading members of the Swazi nation have resisted Christianity or any other foreign religion. Furthermore, Sobhuza knew quite well where the real ideological base of the monarchy lay. As Kasenene put it, 'The political institution of monarch under which the country is governed has its foundation on Swazi Traditional Religion and promotes it'. (P. Kasenene. 1993: 135) What must be noted here is the fact that the Ngwenyama's expansion into Christian territory enabled him to retain within the 'fold' those subjects who were apparently deserting him ideologically. At the same time Sobhuza's gesture here gave this foreign religion additional legitimacy, thereby minimising the divisive influence which often comes with religious fragmentation. It would also appear that the Ngwenyama's apparently active participation in the promotion of Christianity facilitated the spread of this new religion after the 1930s. But Sobhuza appears to have been unconcerned about the type of Christianity practised by his subjects. He had a pragmatic approach to religious matters. He knew religion was a powerful force in society, and he handled religious matters cautiously. His address to the Emakholwana (believers) on Good Friday. 1972. which could hardly be acceptable to rigid monotheists, is illustrative. He remarked

When I listened to the news last night, there was fighting between Ireland and England over religion. Even where religion comes from the issue of religion is still hot Therefore it is each one's duty to search for the truth - the basis of truth is in your heart. (H. Kuper. 1978: 139).

While it is important to appreciate the innovative power of the Swazi ruling class, we should not lose sight of the accommodating capacity of the Swazi Traditional Religion in which the Ngwenyama was the chief actor. The religion has not only allowed peaceful co-existence with other religions, it has also allowed thousands of its adherers to embrace Christianity without recanting the traditional beliefs and values. Furthermore, Swazi Traditional Religion also permitted its chief actor to head another (indeed foreign) religion. This remarkable accommodating capacity seems to arise, at least in part, from the absence of a central deity binding all Swazis. Since the ancestral spirits are based on Kingship, the religion allows a high
chief actor. The religion has not only allowed peaceful co-existence with other religions, it has also allowed thousands of its adherers to embrace Christianity without recanting the traditional beliefs and values. Furthermore, Swazi Traditional Religion also permitted its chief actor to head another (indeed foreign) religion. This remarkable accommodating capacity seems to arise, at least in part, from the absence of a central deity binding all Swazis. Since the ancestral spirits are based on Kingship, the religion allows a high degree of tolerance without feeling threatened. Though it did not grow from a tradition which included a prophetic element of social criticism, as was the case with Christianity and Islam. Swazi Traditional Religion has proved to be quite dynamic. There has been no talk of expulsion of those who have embraced Christianity. Indeed one striking feature of Swazi religious life is the widespread mixing of Christianity with Swazi Traditional Religion. (P. Kasenene, 1993: 130-137)

This trend had strong defenders and promotors among the informed members of the nation as late as the mid-1990s. In an article title 'Worship of ancestors complements Christianity'. Dr. Ben Dlamini strongly expounded the relevance of mixing the two religions. As many other writers do. he strengthened his argument with reference to the most revered of the Swazi Kings. King Sobhuza II always asked councillors to consult ancestors on difficult issues." (Times of Swaziland. 10 November. 1996).

Christianity was given another interesting but confusing test on the eve of Swaziland's independence. On 25th April, 1967, Sobhuza II was crowned King of Swaziland as the country attained internal self-government and assumed the status of a Protected State. Sobhuza took the following oath:

I. Sobhuza the Second of Swaziland, King. Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, do swear that I. in the office of the King of Swaziland, will under the constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland, preserve, protect and defend the said constitution that I will, as King, govern the people of Swaziland according to the said constitution and the other laws of Swaziland and that I will, as King and so far as lies within my power, cause law and justice to be administered in mercy to the people of Swaziland. (J.S.M. Matsebula. 1987: 244).

Then, holding the Bible in one hand, he added: 'So help me God". The ritual of swearing with the Bible is fashionable in western (Christian?) countries, and it fitted British designs in Swaziland quite well, but one wonders what deference it might have made to Sobhuza who had persistently declined to accept the message of the Bible. After all. the Constitution which Sobhuza swore to 'preserve, promote and defend' had been imposed by the British. (J. Kuper. 1978: 223-245). Under the circumstances, the oath should be seen essentially as a strategic device of convenience.

To enable the Swazi to cross the "promised land". Indeed, it is not surprising that when Sobhuza. through the Imbokodvo National Movement, had effectively established his authority, he did not hesitate to abrogate the very constitution which was to enjoy protection with the help of God!

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, six observations can be made from our discussion. First, the past ten decades have witnessed a fundamental change in the ideological base of the Swazi monarchy. Significantly, the spread of Christianity has strongly challenged the position of Swazi Traditional Religion, but no open conflict between the two religions has so far been evident. Indeed, a striking complimentarity seems to have been established. Before independent churches received effective political backing and gained widespread acceptance in the country, missionaries would not allow Christians to participate in the national traditional rituals where the Ngwenyama was number one actor. Until the 1950s, many Christians had to hide their identity while attending the Newala because their missionary leaders were uncompromising on this issue. From the early 1960s, however, especially after decolonisation politics become dominant, more and more Christians, including priests of the independent churches, openly and actively participated in the Newala. Sobhuza. as the pivot of both political and religious power in traditional politics, made full use of such occasions to consolidate his hold on his followers, thereby undermining the base of his political opponents.
and state did not exist. To that extent, Christianity would appear to have promoted national integration. But things have not been as smooth as they may appear at a distance. While the independent churches have evidently cooperated with and accommodated Swazi Traditional Religion, the main stream of mission) churches have remained aloof and uncompromising. They have insisted that their members maintain a distance from traditional beliefs and religious rituals. Even the royal Easter ritual, which commands great royal support, has tended to divide Christians in the country. The ritual 'has been consistently resisted by most mission Christians through symbolic, covert social actions which include non-participation in the ceremony, and political discourses'. (H.L. Ndlovu. 1993: 2). It has also been argued that the ritual 'reinforces the continuing conflict between the monarchy and many urban commoners in post-colonial Swaziland'.

Third, the Christian influence in Swaziland has not been as effective as it could have been had the kings not been bound by Swazi Traditional Religion. But indications are that such influence is on the ascendance. When a force of about 300 priests unanimously condemned homosexuality before the King during the royal Easter ritual on 29 March 1997. they argued that this was a terrible sin which, according to the Bible, was punishable by death. (Times of Swaziland. 30 March 1997). To strengthen their case, the president of the League of Churches. Isaac Dlamini. invoked the authority of the Bible. He stated.

Your Majesty, when you swore to serve the country you were using the Bible. Even parliamentarians use the Bible when they are sworn in So we cannot allow such a thing which the Bible is against.

Significantly. Christian ideology is used by protagonists to achieve their own ends. In response to those who condemned homosexuality as 'satanic', the president of the Gay-Lesbian Association of Swaziland (GALESWA). Mangosuthu Dlamini. asked whether really anybody had a say in what God created'. (Times of Swaziland. 15 April 1997). But bearing in mind the widespread condemnation of this practice, one wonders whether the priests based their judgement on the Bible or were essentially championing Swazi traditional values. The Bible verse referred to when the priests presented their case to the King mentioned a number of sins, yet the priests felt justified to single out homosexuality. The verse runs thus:

Do you not know that the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived. Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor homosexuals, nor sodomists, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor reviles, nor extortioners will inherit the kingdom of God. (New King James version. Thomas Nelson. 1982. I Corinthians 6:9-10)

And. it should be noted, the Bible does not even have reference to lesbianism. Nor did homosexuality in the contemporary context exist during the time when the Bible was handed down to mankind. The subtle response King Mswati III gave the priests more appropriately represents the position of Swazi traditional values rather than Christianity. "Those people are sick . . . They need you. Help them by praying with the whole country'. (Times of Swaziland 30 March 1997).

Fourth, the impact of the priests' request for the King to banish other religions from Swaziland is yet to be realised, but it was a gesture which could draw the country into religious strife. The experience of other countries in the continent has shown how religious polarisation could frustrate efforts to build a peaceful nation where people are free to believe what they please. Uganda is a case in point. A nineteenth century tradition of religious strife has come to poison national integration in modern times. (J. A. Rowe, 1988: 265-276). The conflict there was essentially between foreign' religions, namely Islam. Catholicism and Protestantism. Two factors seem to have worked against religious polarisation in Swaziland. The first is the King's central role in more than one religion. The second is the division among Christians. That mission Christians and members of the independent churches cannot speak with one voice on many issues might be a blessing in disguise.

Fifth, the mixing of Swazi Traditional Religion and Christianity has promoted some scholars to question the validity of some who claim to be Christians. But it has not been the concern of this essay to evaluate the quality of Christianity practised in Swaziland. The position taken by this author is that belief in any religion
Christians and members of the independent churches cannot speak with one voice on many issues might be a blessing in disguise.

Fifth, the mixing of Swazi Traditional Religion and Christianity has promoted some scholars to question the validity of some who claim to be Christians. But it has not been the concern of this essay to evaluate the quality of Christianity practised in Swaziland. The position taken by this author is that belief in any religion is essentially an individual commitment, and sin does not amount to disbelief. But any critical observer of the ideological scene in Swaziland is most likely to be struck by the strength of pre-Christian culture. The media carries stories of ritual murders from time to time. Witchcraft is widely and strongly believed even by those who are apparently active Christians. A shocking incident which took place on 15 March 1997 at Mashobeni is quite telling. A faction of the Mashobeni Zionist Church who were breaking away from the main church, accused their priest, Mandlenkhosi Shongwe and his wife of having killed one of their influential members with witchcraft. A group of about sixteen Christians hacked the couple to death using different weapons. Among the murderers was pastor Sibusiso Shongwe, leader of a breakaway church called (New Heaven). (Times of Swaziland, 18 March 1997. The group then set fire to an ancestral hut and destroyed everything inside. The horror took place in front of the seven children left behind by the victims. After destroying property in the homestead, the mob finally presented themselves to the police, apparently with a feeling of satisfaction that they had punished evildoers. The voice of the priests was still to be heard by 10 April 1997. They were accused of religious hypocrisy. One courageous voice placed this message on record.

People who murder, burn homesteads and terrorise innocent children are not Christians, no matter how much they give themselves this name. They are anti Christ, whose actions shame the nation. The Zionists priests ... should be reminded that the Bible is consistent in its call for capital punishment against murderers and religious hypocrites. (Times of Swaziland. 6 April 1997).

Finally, the ideological base of the Swazi monarchy during the twentieth century has also been affected by social differentiation whereby the Swazi society was divided in relation to property ownership and income levels. Social differentiation had led to the rise of social groups whose thinking and behaviour patterns are greatly influenced by their material conditions. The aspiration of the working class, for instance, are different from those of the peasantry who live and depend on land controlled by chiefs. Social differentiation cuts across religious bounds and vice versa. This reality complicates ideological issues in a country like Swaziland. (J. Vaane. 1986: 126-141).

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FROM CHRISTIAN EXCLUSION TO RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

C.A.B. Zigira

INTRODUCTION
A story is told of a King of Benares, who gathered a number of beggars that were born blind, and offered a prize to the one who would give him the best description of an elephant. (It is implicit in the story that an elephant was brought into their presence and they felt it). The beggar who had chanced to hold on a leg reported that an elephant was like a tree-trunk. The second who had laid his hands on the tail was convinced that an elephant was like a rope. Yet another, who had seized an ear, insisted that an elephant was like a palm-leaf. And so on. There was no agreement. The beggars began quarrelling amongst themselves, and the King was greatly amused (Thomas, 1969: 193-194). While each beggar accurately described some aspects of the elephant, none of them had managed to describe it fully, for they had never seen an elephant: each description contains some truth but not the whole truth.

DEFINITION OF PLURALISM
The relevance of the story of the blind men of Benares is that the human society has since time immemorial been characterised by religious pluralism. This is because there were many divergent religious beliefs, practices and interpretations, for religion was and has been "an attempt to find meaning and value in life, in spite of the suffering that flesh is heir to" (Armstrong, 1993: 3). The contingent needs of humanity made it necessary for them to seek meaning beyond the ordinary realm of sense and sensibility, logic and nature, and travelling different paths arrived at the one Ultimate Reality. All the great religions of the world, it can therefore be argued, believe in one Supreme Being, though they predictably ascribe diverse attributes to the Supreme Being. That the Supreme Being has been given different names and attributes is however culturally-specific. Therefore religious pluralism as "diversity in religious practice" (Netland, 1991: 4) is nothing new in our world. What is new is the growing awareness of the diversity which is as much a product of rapid means of communication, travel and contact with people of other faiths as it is a result of education and knowledge. In our global village, contact with people of other religions and exposure through print and electronic media have meant that one is constantly in touch and confronted with divergent, competing religious claims and ideologies. Among these claims has been the claim by missionary religions to be the sole possessors of truth and to be the only way to salvation. This claim to exclusivism has particularly been characteristic of Christianity and Islam. While Mahayana Buddhism and African traditional religions may spread, they have not (as far as I know) claimed to be the exclusive way to salvation.

This paper discusses the changing perspectives within Christianity, from the claim to exclusivism to religious pluralism, and the various approaches to people of other faiths. One caveat is however necessary at this stage: exclusivism has not been peculiar to Christianity; exclusivism applies equally to Islam and Theravada Buddhism, for example.

CHRISTIAN EXCLUSIVISM
In the recent past, an assembly of religious leaders in Swaziland in one annual Easter ritual -claimed that Swaziland was a Christian country and that all other religions and their adherents should be proscribed. What the honourable gentlemen said caused consternation and no doubt ill feeling among members of the minority groups that had been singled out for the attack. Regrettable as the claim was, the claim to exclusivism is not a new phenomenon. Christian exclusivism states in no uncertain terms that Jesus Christ
Christian exclusivism has been the dominant position of the Church for fifteen hundred years (Hick. 1973: 120) and goes back to the apostolic times (Acts 4:12). Although, the nascent Christian community was initially perceived as a faction within Judaism, the Christians rejected other religions of the time (including Judaism) as either false or having failed to heed the prophets of God and killing the Messiah, in case of the latter. It is important to realise that Christianity was born in a plural world, and at the time even the Roman imperial attitude to alien religious beliefs and practices was largely one of tolerance and accommodation, provided that they did not undermine the Roman state. It was for that reason that Judaism had been accorded official recognition, and many Christians for a considerable time traversed much of the Empire without hindrance since the Roman authorities could not initially distinguish between Christianity and the various sects of Judaism. Due to the Christian claim to exclusive revelation, the finality of Christ, and that there was no salvation outside the church which were gradually evolving into dogma, the Christians in the Roman Empire were intolerant of the imperial cult and non-accommodating, thereby lending themselves to being accused of heretical beliefs by orthodox Jews, and of sedition by the Romans. Nonetheless, Christians were ready to lay down their lives in defence of their faith. With Constantine's rise to power, the Christian triumphal march was secured, and (heir mission was low in all the non-Christians. The encounter with Islam in the seventh to the thirteenth century did very little to encourage mutual recognition and tolerance hence conflict and wars over the Holy Land.

By thirteenth century, exclusivism was formally stated: there was "no salvation outside the church" (Netland. 1991:13). This position was re-stated in a bull - Unam Sanctam - issued by Pope Boniface VIII. in 1302. The bull in part taught that:

We are required by faith to believe and hold that there is one, holy, catholic and apostolic church. We firmly believe it and unreservedly profess that outside it there is neither salvation nor remission of sins (Quoted in Hick. 1973: 120).

The Council of Florence (1435 - 45) was more precise, in its statement (issued in 1442) when it concluded that:

... those not living within the Catholic church, not only pagans but also Jews and heretics and schismatics, cannot participate in eternal life, but will depart into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels, unless before the end of life the same have been added to the flock (Netland. 1991: 13).

The same attitude remained through the middle ages until the nineteenth century, and it had great impact on the Christian missionary work in Africa. Coupled with the Darwinian theory of evolution which put the Africans at the bottom of the evolution tree, the pioneer Christian missionaries to Africa had negative, if uninformed, ideas and attitudes to African religious beliefs and practices. African ways of life were variously described as "primitive, savage, barbaric, satanic, superstitious, ancestor - worship or idolatry. Put more bluntly. Africans were thought to be ignorant of God. In the famous words of Emil Ludwig, "How can the untutored mind of the African conceive the philosophical concept of God?" (Smith. 1966: 1). The missionary drive can in part be seen to have been part of the white man's burden to civilise the Africans. Hence, the effective use of formal education to undermine African cultures and to persuade the Africans to forget their roots.

**TRANSITION**

After a long period dominated by Christian exclusivism, there was a transitional period (Netland, 1991 Eliade, 1987). This transitional period has been referred to as inclusivism. It is regarded as a feature of the twentieth century in both the Roman Catholic and Reformed traditions. It is a positive step forward and more accommodating. Applied to Christian faith, inclusivism means that while God has revealed himself in a unique and definitive way, in Jesus Christ. Christians were willing to allow that God could not be confined
in a unique and definitive way. in Jesus Christ. Christians were willing to allow that God could not be
confined in a theological box. Hence, a gradual though hesitant acceptance that salvation is available
through non-Christian religions (cf Netland. op.cit: 17). We note that while holding firmly on to the
uniqueness of the Christ-event, there is a significant degree of opening up and recognition that God's
presence and activity have not been limited to Christianity.

Pope Pius IX. in 1854, began the process when he taught that:

It must of course be held as a matter of faith that outside the apostolic Roman church, no one can be
saved, that the church is the only ark of salvation, and that whoever does not enter it shall perish in the
flood... It must likewise be held as certain that those who are affected by ignorance of the true religion, if it
is invincible ignorance, are not subject to any guilt in this matter before the eyes of the Lord (Quoted in

The second Vatican Council was. more than a hundred years later, more charitable when it stated that
the Christian church:

' looks with sincere respect upon those ways of conduct and of life, those rules and teachings which,
though differing in many particulars from what she holds and sets forth, nevertheless often reflect a ray of
that Truth which enlightens all men” (Hick. 1973: 126).

After hesitant steps, it gradually had dawned upon the Christian churches that the variety of religious
expressions, beliefs and practices is a positive and enriching rather than simply a divisive fact for as the
Hindu Sage put it There are many paths but one destiny. Hence, the talk of implicit faith and baptism of
desire, and anonymous Christians. Nonetheless, the most important feature of the transitional period was
the realisation that men and women are saved by God through other religions, besides Christianity In the
area of Christian missions, the new realism paid some dividends in form of inter-denominational
cooperation in the mission field, attempts at dialogue with non-Christians, and missionary initiatives in
inculturation. Emphasis was gradually changing from witnessing, mission and conversion to Christian
encounter and dialogue with people of other faiths (see Netland. 1991: 20).

Therefore the transitional period of inclusivism witnessed a tentative opening up by Christians to people
of other religions, with the primary emphasis on Christ as the unique embodiment of God's revelation
undiminished.

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

Far beyond the attitude that one religion is superior to others, and beyond the claim that "there is no
salvation outside the Christian church", religious pluralism is a radical position. There is an acceptance
that each religion has its unique features, tenets and practices Above all, there is an understanding that
there are many religions but one Ultimate Reality. As Netland puts it:

All religions are in their own way complex historically and culturally conditioned human
responses to the one divine reality (1991: 26).

Religious pluralism is perhaps best illustrated by Mahatma Gandhi when he said:

I believe in the Bible as I believe in the Gita. I regard all the great faiths of the world as
equally true with my own. It hurts me to see any one of them caricatured as they are today.
(Radhakrishnan, 1940: 313).

The reasons behind the gradual change of the Christian attitude to other religions are various, but one
can suggest a few.

a. Increased exposure through contact with people of other religions. This contact led to knowledge
and personal relationship with the people. Emphasis is on people rather than religions coming into
contact. As Wolfe has put it: People of other faiths do not live in books, but in houses or flats... We
do not meet Islam or Buddhism, we only meet a Muslim or a Buddhist. It is when people meet, not
systems, that dialogue begins (1993: 200).
claim to absolute truth gradually declined. There was also scepticism and decline in religious zeal and fervour, and a growing acceptance that God works in mysterious ways and of the concept of universal revelation and salvation for God shows no partiality,
c. Critical internal reflection especially with regard to value judgements. Questions like: "What right do we have to judge other people's beliefs?" and "what is the standard?" came up with increased regularity. This humble yet critical reflection gradually led to Christian recognition that other religions would not simply disappear in the triumphal march of the church. There was a reluctant but welcome appreciation of other people's values and beliefs, and there was humility in place of religious arrogance. It is relevant to recall that even further back in the age of Church Fathers, Augustine of Hippo had talked of the visible and invisible church. The members of the invisible church were only known to God, and some of them did not belong to the visible church,
d. In course of human history, there was a decline of religion as a dominant fact and norm of public life. The impact of the physical sciences, especially the Copernican concept that it is the sun, not the earth, that is at the centre of the universe had important implications for theology. In theological terms, it means that God is at the centre: all religions revolve around him (Hick. 1973: 131). Besides, the impact of the physical sciences and growth of secularisation has been the relegation of religion to the "private world of values and preferences" (Netland. 1991: 31). Hence, the privatisation of religion. Religion has now become a matter of personal choice, taste and preference, just as a person selects from the hotel menu. Family members select from the hotel menu what they will eat without fighting over the choice, and without having to stick to one choice,
e. The other two factors are (i) the plural nature of the societies in which we live, which makes it imperative upon the faithful to rethink many of the inherited stereotypes and images that we had previously subconsciously absorbed, and the assumptions built over the years and (ii) the growing demand for basic human rights, including the freedom of religion which in effect means that one has freedom to choose his/her own religion without coercion, and that no religion can be suppressed or discriminated against by the State. In brief one has the right to practise religion freely, without state interference, or discrimination.

In spite of the convergence of opinions on the diversity of religions, however, we need to accept that there are peculiar features of religion(s) which constitute differences. But the followers of these religions need not go to war to prove it. For ultimate reality is like light passing through a glass-prism to give the kaleidoscope of colours. Each colour is unique, but the source is one. So are the diverse religions. Hence, the story of the blind men of Benares.

WHAT THEN?

What then shall we do with this knowledge and awareness of the plurality of religious traditions? My humble submission is that since religious pluralism is a basic fact of the contemporary society, we need to respond to this fact.

The first response, though not in the sense of ranking, is that of tolerance, mutual respect and appreciation of people who hold religious beliefs and values different from our own. It is for instance instructive to learn that the major religious traditions in South Africa worked together in their struggle against apartheid (de Gruchy & Villa-Vicencio. 1994: 223). It is also important that believers take a leaf from the international political scene where the cold-war and mutual suspicion between the East and West are a thing of the past. In place of cold-war, there is cooperation in space exploration, sharing of resources, and there is a growing climate of mutual trust.

Secondly, there has to be dialogue (both intra- and inter-religious dialogue), without exclusion and domination of the minority. This call to dialogue demands that all religions and denominations within a religion have to "give up the claim to be universal" (Petersen, in Gruchy, 1994: 226) and sole dispensers of salvation. The aim of dialogue should be to work towards mutual understanding. As Petersen puts it, should be realised that:
should be realised that:

All religions are limited embodiments of the many-sided Ultimate Reality; in dialogue, therefore, each religion in its specificity is enriched by the insights of the other (Gruchy, Lococit).

Or as the World Council of Churches explains:

The essence of dialogue is the meeting between people in mutual respect, frankness and sincerity. Dialogue can never be an encounter of systems or religions in abstract (WCC, 1977: ‘Foreword’).

One small step that can be and has been, taken by some countries in which diversity of religions is an accepted fact has been the introduction of a multi-faith religious education curriculum for primary, secondary and high school students. The long term aim of introducing students to the various religions is that the young people should grow up to know and appreciate that these are people - who are their neighbours, friends and class-mates - who nonetheless have their own different religious beliefs, practices and observances (e.g. Dhiwali, Ramadan, Ash Wednesday, Christmas) which have to be respected. It is often said that young persons are more open to change; hence the early exposure (which should be gradual) is expected to help them grow to accept, appreciate and respect other people as they are, without expecting them to convert to one’s way of life. Such an initiative to cultivate a culture of religious tolerance and mutual respect, through formal education, often meets resistance from the evangelical wing of Christianity - who still hold on to the exclusive uniqueness of Christian faith and the finality of Christ hence a Christocentric model.

Resistance to multi-faith syllabus is however not peculiar to Christianity. For there have been instances of Muslims (for instance in East Africa) who were opposed to teaching anything other than Islam in their schools. But time heals because the same schools have of late allowed the teaching of Christian Religious Education to students who opt for it, which in a way is an acceptance of the diversity of religions.

It must be emphasised that the most significant value of multi-faith education curriculum is to cultivate an understanding and awareness that there are many religions but one Ultimate Reality. The aim can never be a unification of religions. For as Hans Kung has warned, there is no need for: a single unified religion transcending all existing religions, nor a mixture of all religions. Humanity is weary of unified ideologies, and in any case the religions of the world are so different in their views of faith and dogmas, their symbols and rites, that a unification of them would be meaningless, a distasteful syncretistic cocktail (1993: 7).

In the Swazi context, plans are under way to introduce a multi-faith religious education syllabus at the Junior Certificate level. One hopes that a reform in secondary school curriculum will be a welcome development which will foster religious tolerance and mutual respect. To achieve this objective, the subject has to be taught by well-trained teachers who are open and sensitive to other religions, lest it degenerates into indoctrination of students against people of other religions. Any one who has watched the Dedat - Jimmy Swaggart debates on video will no doubt be wary of the futility of such an enterprise if the aim is to enable an "outsider" to use knowledge about other religions to undermine them.

**Conclusion**

It is essential that we conclude this paper by reference to the story of the blind men of Benares. After a moment of amused silence, the King is said to have concluded that: He who does reverence to his own religion while disparaging the religions of others wholly from attachment to his own, with intent to enhance the splendour of his own religion, in reality, by such conduct inflicts the severest injury on his own religion (slightly adapted from Thomas, 1969: 194). The epistle of John resonates with similar, if stronger, message when it states in no uncertain terms that:

Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God. and he who loves is born of God and knows God. He who does not love does not know God; for God is love... If any one says, "I
Let us remember that the command to love one's neighbour includes respect, charity, service, tolerance, patience, compassion and justice for all because everyone has been created in the image of God.

**Bibliography**


CHAPTER TEN

DEMOCRATISATION IN THE SADC REGION: FROM ONE PARTY STATE TO MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA AND LESSONS FOR SWAZILAND

Sitwala Mutonga

INTRODUCTION

Zambia like any other country in Africa, was a creation of European imperialism that began in the 1880s and lasted until the 1960s. This European imperialism manifested itself in political domination and economic exploitation of the African people and resources. However, the imposition of colonialism was challenged in some parts of Africa. From the 1950s, Africans began to demand for the lost freedom and democracy so that they could have a say in the affairs of their countries. They formed nationalist political parties that articulated African grievances and mobilised the masses to challenge the colonial establishment.

Zambia’s first political party was the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (hereafter N.R.A.C.). It was formed in 1948 to oppose the formation of the then Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. However, to the disappointment of the Africans, the Federation was imposed in October 1951. In the same year, the party changed leadership and name to become the African National Congress thereafter A.N.C.). The objective of ANC from 1953 was to oppose the Federation and demand the right of the Africans to participate in the affairs of their country.

In 1958, a split occurred in the ranks of the ANC leadership. It occurred as a result of an unsatisfactory constitution which Britain planned to impose on the country. The young educated leaders in the names of Kenneth Kaunda, Munu Sipalo, Simon Kapwepwe and Reuben Kamanga to anme a fewe chose to leave the party when the old leaders decided to accept the constitution and wanted to try it. Those who left the ANC went on to form the Zambia African National Congress (hereafter ZANC). ZANC had a short life as it was banned in March 1959 following disturbances in Nyasaland (now Malawi). In 1960, the surviving leaders of the banned ZANC regrouped and formed the United National Independence Party (hereafter UNIP). UNIP demanded the end of the federation, and self-government with the African majority for Northern Rhodesia. It managed to mobilise the Africans and went on to win the 1962 and 1964 elections which gave Africans the majority rule they wanted. In October 1964, UNIP led Zambia to independence (Pettman. 1974: 18). It formed the first government and the ANC assumed the role of an opposition. Thus the country could be said to have been born democratically, true to what the Africans had demanded from the colonial set up. They had wanted a democratic system in which everyone would take part in the affairs of their country.

SWAZILAND BACKGROUND

Similarly, Swaziland also achieved its independence through organised political parties and elections. The main parties were the Imbokodvo National Movement (hereafter I.N.M) which was formed to protect the monarchy and the Ngwane National Liberator Congress (hereafter N.N.L.C.) which advocated for a constitutional monarchy (Kuper. 1978 :254). The Imbokodvo won the 1967 and 1968 elections, and led Swaziland to independence. It also secured the transfer of power to the traditional aristocracy, a rare occurrence in the history of decolonisation in Africa. The NNLC remained in opposition, making Swaziland a liberal democratic country.
a political system could be defined as democratic if its most powerful collective decision makers were
selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely competed for votes and in
which virtually all the adult population was eligible to vote (Mushingeh, 1994:118). If the above definition
of democracy stands, then democracy entails contestation and participation. Not only that, but also involved
the existence of the basic civil and political rights of thought, assembly, expression, press, association or
formation of political parties (Huntington. 1991:6). In a similar vein, a system is undemocratic or is a
dictatorship if no opposition is allowed in elections or that the opposition is harassed and denied all the

This paper sets out to discuss how democracy was destroyed in Africa, Zambia in particular. In this
paper the argument that follows should not be misconstrued to mean that the one party state had no merits
and achievements. My stand in this argument is to show how democracy was nabbed at its infancy stage. I
will argue that after the one parly state was imposed, it operated through fear to frighten its opponents and
control the nation. Furthermore. I will show how and why the one party system was challenging leading to
the introduction of multi-party politics. The last part of the discussion will try to suggest lessons Swaziland
can learn from Zambia's transition. For clarity, the paper will time and again give briefs on Swaziland to
balance the argument.

DEATH OF MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA AND SWAZILAND

ZAMBIA

Zambia’s multi-party democracy was forcefully destroyed in 1972 by the UNIP government. The real
reasons for the introduction of one party state in 1972 are best known to those who brought it. We the
outsiders can only speculate, possibly correctly that it was lust for power and fear of the opposition. In
February 1972, President Kenneth Kaunda announced that:

the government has decided that Zambia shall become a one party participatory democracy
and that practical steps should be taken to implement this decision. (Times of Zambia, Oct.
24, 1991)

Subsequently, existing political parties were banned. A constitutional commission of enquiry was
appointed to find out and draft a one party constitution (Times of Zambia, Oct. 24. 1991). The commission
came up with a report which more or less wanted to maintain the democratic environment that existed. But
the government reacted to the report and recommendations of the Commission by throwing out the essential
democratic elements, namely the limitation of presidential tenure of office (Petition. 1974:240). On the
13th December. 1972. President Kaunda signed a Presidential order turning Zambia into a one party state
without consulting the electorate or their representatives in parliament. The opposition, in this case the
ANC. was automatically put to death - and its leaders and members were invited to join UNIP. and the lucky
ones were given posts.

This act by UNIP and its government, as it had become popularly known in the seventeen years it
monopolised power, brought liberal multi-party democracy to an end. Open competition for leadership of
the country ceased, and there began a one man leadership. Debate on issues of national importance was
curtailed as every citizen was rightly or wrongly assumed to be a member of the party. The. citizens were
expected to openly conform with the party line or silently agree with whatever the top party leadership came
up with.

Those who first questioned the idea of a one party state were called ‘idiots and agents of foreign forces’,
the forces which any ordinary Zambian in the street did not know or were not in touch with (Times of
Zambia. June 27. 1972). The ambitious politicians who disagreed with UNIP or had alternative views of
how the country must be governed, became known as dissidents and malcontents. They were portrayed as
enemies of the country, and were out to destroy it. This group suffered harassment as it was frequently
detained under the notorious preservation of public security regulations and the state of emergency. Thus
the political climate of openness and tolerance. the two preconditions of democracy, ceased to exist.
detained under the notorious preservation of public security regulations and the state of emergency. Thus the political climate of openness and tolerance, the two preconditions of democracy, ceased to exist.

Therefore under one party: the Zambian political leadership became intolerant towards the people they ruled in general and especially to those who held different political views from them. The ruled were denied a chance to articulate their views (Odhimbo, 1987:186). That is why one party state in Zambia and elsewhere in Africa was undemocratic. It only glorified one man rule, whom it praised to the extent of immortality and infallibility.

**Swaziland**

In Swaziland, like in Zambia and elsewhere in Africa, democracy was equally destroyed. From the time of the struggle for independence, some politicians did not favour the existence of political parties in the country. Hilda Kuper made an observation that when 'His Majesty King Sobhuza II entered politics, he likened political parties to nations, each fighting a battle to be in power, each wanting to rule the other. This is what a political party is, wanting to rule...' (Kuper, 1978:319).

Despite this view, the INM moved into power after it won the elections of 1967. However, in 1973 the INM lost three of its seats in the Lubombo region. It was this loss of seats to the NNLC candidates that led or contributed to the suspension of the independence constitution. The government tried to prevent the NNLC candidate from taking his seat and attempted to deport him. The deportation was however challenged and overturned by the courts of law. The court ruling did not go down well with the traditional authorities. They saw it as a challenge to the power of the monarchy. This made the government to be convinced that the constitution of the country could not work and that it was alien to Swazi society (Wanda, 1991:152).

In reaction to the court's decision, parliament made a resolution to persuade the King to agree that the constitution of the country could not work. Thus on 12th April 1973, the King scrapped the constitution of the country and replaced it with the infamous 1973 King's proclamation (Daniels, 1992:137).

The King made the announcement in the cattle byre (sibaya) in the presence of a number of people and the army (Daniels, 1992: 137). The decree made by the King included, among other things, that:

the constitution has indeed failed to provide the machinery for good government and maintenance of law and order and that the constitution is indeed a cause of growing unrest, insecurity and dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the country (Kuper, 1978:335).

On that basis the King assumed supreme powers in the country and suspended the constitution. All legislative, executive and judicial powers were vested in the King (Kuper. 1978:336). This act on its own was a big blow to a young democracy.

In anticipation of a possible public reaction, the King announced that the army and police had been posted in all strategic places and buildings to maintain law and order. Furthermore, a state of emergency was put in place and detention without trial was introduced: possibly to intimidate those who would feel aggrieved by the move taken by the King. The King went further to prohibit all democratic civil and political freedoms of assembly, association and expression (Kuper, 1978:336).

Then one is left to ponder over a question, why did the King make the announcement in the presence of the armed forces if it was done with the support of the nation? Moreover, was a state of emergency and detention without trial necessary when the actions were done in the best interest of the country? These are questions subject to debate.

However, one or two dissimilarities can be made between Zambia and Swaziland before we show how the one party state operated. First in Zambia the leadership in government coerced and tricked the opposition to agree to the idea of one party while in Swaziland the traditional aristocracy kicked out the politicians from the political game. Second, in Zambia the political leadership continued with a 'special constitutional' rule slowly turned into a dictatorship while in Swaziland the aristocracy did away with a constitution and reverted to traditional rule that entrenched the monarchical dictatorship.
democracy, were replaced with single parties or no party. This act was enforced through detention laws and
state of emergencies, first begun by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, after he rebelled against the western
modelled liberal democracy (Adhimbo. 1987: 190). The whole object of detention without trial and state of
emergency were to frighten political opponents and stifle political debate.

In place of 'noise polities', a culture of silence developed, which in Africa has been mistaken for the
much sought unity and stability. This silence had been seen in one party parliaments where members spent
several sittings without any contribution to debates. They chose to be silent not because they had nothing in
their heads but somehow feared to show their dissenting views. For instance in Kenya, an MP, Martin
Shikuku and the speaker of parliament were detained in 1975 after the former made allegations in the house
that some powerful individuals sought to emasculate parliament along the same lines that had virtually
destroyed the Kenya African National Union (KANU) (Makinda. 1996:560). This type of intimidation
rendered the one party state inactive to the extent that a visitor would think there were no politics and
politicians in the country.

One Party Rule as an Instrument of Control

One party rule in Zambia and elsewhere in Africa was imposed by the leaders not because 'the ruled' wanted
it but because the leaders wanted to stay permanently in power. The first generation of African leaders
feared liberal democracy. Therefore they acted swiftly to remove political choice, contestation and
participation. They went further to erode the importance of parliament and judiciary (Mushingeh. 1994:120

Through suspicions and mistrust, the ruling single party which had previously represented partisan
interests, began to claim to be a national party (Goulbourne. 1990: 46). It became a coercive instrument that
whipped everyone to submit to the philosophy of the leaders. It imposed tight control on all aspects of life.

Open opposition, a culture that had evolved during decolonisation and used to convince the colonialists
that Africa needed democracy, was suppressed. The basic freedoms of speech, assembly without a permit
from anyone, thought, right to publish and receive information were all suppressed. The media was tightly
controlled. It only published and showed what leaders said, did and what they wanted to hear. Suggesting
alternative political strategies or views was termed as subversive. Thus one party rule failed to uphold the
basic fundamental human rights that they had championed at the time of decolonisation. Instead, harsh
measures like intimidation, detention without trial and state of emergency were used to silence the people.
The security forces instilled fear into the populace. That fear made the one-party state survive the period it
did.

The leaders saw and believed that the state of emergency was a necessary tool that could be used to
control the nation. This could be confirmed from president Kenneth Kaunda's argument in 1991 that "the
state of emergency is not against Zambians... though abused by the security forces, but when you measure
that against stability that the state of emergency had provided Zambia, you will agree with me that we need
to keep the state of emergency... the demand to lift the state of emergency was a negative outcry from the
few people... what would happen if we lost control of the situation?" (Zambia Daily Mail. May 4. 1991).

Thus, it could be seen why Zambia under UNIP kept the state of emergency for twenty-seven years. It
was an instrument of control used to intimidate and frighten the people. The government intimidated its
opponents into total silence, thus reducing politics to leader praising and worshipping. As if the state of
emergency was not enough, the single party went further to minimise people's participation in the political
affairs of the country. The state became highly centralised and restrictive in its operations. State power was
concentrated in the executive arm of government which was dominated by the authoritarian character of the

Furthermore, the single party government made constitutional amendments that denied the grassroots
the opportunity to choose their own parliamentary candidates. Instead candidates were imposed on the
people from 1983. During a debate on the above amendment, some members of parliament cautioned the
August house of a likelihood of a potential dictatorship showing its ugly head somewhere. Another
amendment that was made allowed the central committee of the party to decide who should contest elections
the opportunity to choose their own parliamentary candidates. Instead candidates were imposed on the people from 1983. During a debate on the above amendment, some members of parliament cautioned the August house of a likelihood of a potential dictatorship showing its ugly head somewhere. Another amendment that was made allowed the central committee of the party to decide who should contest elections to parliament. That amendment was equally criticised as it further excluded people from the political affairs of the country (Zambia Daily Mail. April 5. 1990). The leaders did whatever they deemed would keep them in power. The supremacy of the party, the tag it was given between 1973 and 1991 was abused by the leaders.

Critics of the one party state who were normally university students, lecturers, trade unions, lawyers, church leaders and business people were either harassed or detained for expressing dissenting views from those held by the political leadership. More often than not the state had used much force when dealing with student boycotts and demonstrations by the people (Daniels. 1992:142). All the above were done to maintain what the leaders believed was law and order. But the real lawlessness and disorder caused by criminals was on the upswing as unemployment and the economic climate of the one party state moved from bad to worse. The criminals normally took over the urban areas after sunset, a situation which increased fear and eroded the little freedom of movement that citizens had enjoyed.

It may be my conjecture is unfair as crime is everywhere. However, I would like to argue that the upswing in crime could be attributed to dissatisfaction as the state failed to deliver goods and services. Moreover, there was a rise in unemployment and economic decline, mainly because of unsatisfactory policies. Because people had no forum from which they could question the leadership, they resorted to any means available. For instance, there were food riots in 1986 after an arbitrary increase of maize meal prices. Though the riots were spontaneous, they showed the leaders that change was inevitable and should prepare for it.

At the time of the food riots in 1986 and 1990, the economic situation in the country had reached alarming levels. There was high inflation which came mainly as a result of borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with its tough conditionalities of devaluation of local currency and withdrawal of subsidies on consumption. The inflation reduced the purchasing power of the ordinary citizen. Coupled with inflation were shortages of essential commodities, which in the main was caused by shortage of foreign exchange with which to import inputs for manufacturing or import finished products. Thus the living conditions of an average citizen, especially the workers, became worse than it were before the introduction of the one party state. The riots of 1986 and 1990 must therefore be seen partly as a result of economic dissatisfaction and partly as political protest, that we shall show later in the discussion.


By 1990, Zambia's one party state was tired and saturated and possibly with very little to offer the people, if any. What actually remained was a spark to ignite political reforms. Arguing the case of Mozambique. Louis Brito observed that:

In some cases the need for change is expressed by means of popular demonstrations and marches, mobilisation mainly the urban masses, whereas in other situations democracy is taken up by the very leaders of single parties, in certain cases the transition to democracy is marked by holding of national conferences. (Brito. 1994:62)

The Zambian road to multi-party democracy does not fit into the first two situations described by Brito. First, it was very difficult if not impossible to obtain a police permit to demonstrate against the government and second, the UNIP leadership was not ready to abandon the one party state. The reason they normally gave from time to time was that multi-party politics would accentuate ethnic and tribal divisions. In defence from one party state President Kaunda put it that the one party participatory democracy is itself a free evolution of a multi-party democracy. (Times of Zambia. March 5. 1990). Thus, reverting to plural politics was seen as retrogressive. Therefore the transition in Zambia must be seen from Brito's third observation, that of a national conference and the subsequent crisis that followed.
come up with tangible results disillusioned the pro-reform group (Sichone, Chikuio, 1996:1). They then decided on the multi-party option as a way out of the country's economic and political malaise.

While the multi-party option group composed of University Lecturers. Students. Lawyers. Trade Union leaders and businessmen still pondered on a possible conference to chart the way out. there were food riots. The riots were instigated by University students and joined by the unemployed youth after another arbitrary increase of maize meal price in June 1990. The riots in Lusaka were followed by an attempted army coup on 30 June 1990. The announcement of the army take over cheered many Zambians, who probably were tired of UNIP rule. Many who learned about the coup in the early hours of June 30 1990, celebrated in the streets. The celebrations showed the unpopularity of UNIP (Mushingeh. 1994: 137). But the coup and celebrations lasted for a few hours as the government regained control.

After the coup attempt and food riots, the multi-party option group organised the Lusaka Garden House conference from July 20-21, 1990. The movement for multi-party democracy (MMD) was born at that conference with its catch phrase slogan "The Hour Has Come " It was a pressure group to campaign for a referendum which UNIP had suggested to decide whether or not Zambia should revert to multi-party politics. The conference also made a demand to the government to have all political prisoners released unconditionally so that they could participate in the affairs of the country (Sichone. 1996:116). This led to the release of Edward Shamwana and group imprisoned for the 1980 coup attempt and halting of prosecution for the 1988 coup plotters.

UNIP agreed to the referendum because of pressure from within and outside. Pressure from outside mainly came from the World Bank. IMF and the donor countries who demanded economic and political liberalisation before they could give out their money. Within the country, large crowds of people attended the opposition MMD rallies in Kabwe and Lusaka. The large rallies, addressed by the unofficial opposition, sent a clear message to the ruling party that change was imminent. The remarkable attendance at rallies might have forced the ruling UNIP to cancel the referendum. Instead the party's national council decided to go straight into multi-party politics (Sichone. 1996:116).

UNIP's strategy of going straight into multi-party politics might have been to surprise the opposition before it could organise itself. The party's national council, which was the highest policy making body agreed to amend the Republican constitution and to allow the formation of other political parties other than UNIP). On 4 December 1990, parliament passed the constitution of Zambia (amendment) bill and the president assented to it on 17 December 1990. (Sichone. 1946. p. 116).

Thus from 17 December 1990, Zambia was once again a multi-party state. The MMD as a pressure group transformed itself into a political party to continue with the struggle. The theme of the struggle shifted from multi-party to change of political leadership, specifically to send President Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP into retirement. To achieve this important goal, the MMD chose to remain united to ensure that change came. The united front provided by the MMD unlike the fragmented opposition of Kenya in 1991. secured for the people the change they clamoured for. In Kenya, the opposition had frustrated people who wanted change as KANU and Daniel Arap Moi emerged as victors. (Chege, 1993:36).

**Elections October 31,1991**

The road to (he multi-party elections was however smooth with normal politicking. Several small political parties with different agendas were formed, but UNIP and the MMD remained the only major contenders. The MMD gained more support as people abandoned UNIP. It was abandoned mainly because of the old leadership that firstly delayed reforms and secondly never gave way to the younger generation.

Although the opposition was becoming popular everyday, it was still worried about the manipulative capability of the party in power and also whether it would hand over power if it lost elections. When President Kaunda was questioned on this, he affirmatively maintained that he would readily hand over and stated: I will only go by the order of the Zambian people and hand over power to the MMD. if it comes to power I am a true democrat and will stand by what the people decide on October 31. (Times of Zambia, Oct. 22. 1991).

This assurance by the president gave hope of a peaceful transition. It was also a moral booster to the
stated: I will only go by the order of the Zambian people and hand over power to the MMD. if it comes to power. I am a true democrat and will stand by what the people decide on October 31. (Times of Zambia, Oct. 22, 1991).

This assurance by the president gave hope of a peaceful transition. It was also a moral booster to the opposition especially the MMD which was by then tipped to win the elections. The MMD membership held on to their unity of purpose though they held diverse views on the best way the country was to be governed. At the end of elections. President Kaunda stood by his promise, a rare quality and act in Africa. It is rare in the sense that two years later, the army in Nigeria refused to hand over power to the winners of elections. In another instance, Angola in 1992. elections led to resumption of a civil war (Makinda. 1996:561). In Africa some political leaders have worked hard, through manipulation, to prevent democracy and elected governments. Those in power, for reasons best known to themselves, fear democracy. For instance. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda favours a no party representative system, based on consensus, and looks at plural politics to be confrontational and divisive (Makinda, 1996:557). But how divided is a country like Botswana which has lived under plural politics since 1966?

Divisive, as some opponents of democracy preached on the run up to elections. Zambia remained united and geared for eventual change of leadership. The elections on October 31. saw a large turn out of voters The election results gave MMD about 84% votes with 125 seats out of a new 150 sealer parliament. The MMD leader Mr. Frederick Chiluba beat Dr. Kenneth Kaunda with a landslide victory and brought UNIP rule to an end On conceding defeat. President Kaunda praised the nation on the way the elections were conducted. He noted that:

I have admiration for the people of Zambia for the manner in which they behaved during the general elections. This is to our credit and the international community must have been impressed with the way we conducted our elections (Zambia. Sunday Express. Nov. 3, 1991).

Assuming that Swaziland as a member of the international community, and particularly the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was equally impressed with The manner in which Zambia conducted her elections, the case of Zambia has lessons for Swaziland. If that is the case. I then believe that Swaziland can learn something from that transition. But before we can suggest lessons for the democratic process in Swaziland, it is imperative to acknowledge the fact that people desire democratic change. The people in Swaziland have previously expressed the desire for change in the last two Vusela Commission reports. Some went to the extent of suggesting that they desire multi-party politics (Vusela II Report, 1992:59). In addition, with the absence of a forum from where the proponents of change could air their views, people have resorted to writing to newspapers where letters like these have occasionally appeared:

the Swazi nation has been in the doldrums ever since the constitution of the country was disposed into the dustbin in 1973 (Times of Swaziland, Jan 9(1995).

A similar one appeared which argued that:

if the door to the negotiated settlement remains closed again this year (1995), the only choice remains to force it down.... it is high time we speak in the language that will be understood by the state... (Sunday Times of Swaziland. Jam 22. 1995)

With the above protests by the populace and a number of strikes that happened in urban areas between 1994 and 2003, the government has taken steps to initiate political reforms. But what lessons can Swaziland learn from Zambia's transition?

**Lessons for Swaziland**

Swaziland can learn from the Zambian experience. First, when those in leadership resist or delay change that people want, then change is likely to be forced on the country. Not only that but also the more the leadership delays, the more the supporters become disillusioned and subsequently abandon the system.
which not only they supported but had fed them for a number of years. For instance. President Kaunda and UNIP were finally abandoned by colleagues and members through mass resignations.

Second, the proponents of change must learn that the only weapon they possess to bring about change is the numerous numbers of supporters and sympathisers who clamour for change. These people can only be held together by a united front with a common political agenda, to usher in democracy. The experience of Zambia's MMD is a good example compared to the fragmented opposition that challenged KANU in Kenya. The leaders of the opposition should not delude themselves that an individual is more popular such that he could triumph over the rest.

Third, history has shown that the one party system in Zambia and elsewhere in Africa lacked accountability. They ran down economies while the leaders used the machinery of the party to coerce people into total silence.

Fourth, the transition in Zambia was conducted peacefully without violence especially from the state apparatus. The state, though well armed and capable of unleashing any force, took it upon itself to ensure that the road to democracy was smooth. This peaceful conduct of a democratic process was echoed by the president when he accepted defeat.

Fifth, the people who demanded change in Zambia were those who were excluded from the political life of the country. As citizens, they did not see any reason why they could not participate in the political affairs of their country. The final lesson and possibly the most important one, is that since democracy is about encouraging diversity, the roads to democratisation must, logically be several. Thus, all the available avenues were left open for the people to explore.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to show how democracy evolved in Africa. Zambia and Swaziland in particular, and how it was later shot down in its infancy. Thereafter, we have argued on how the one party state operated to keep itself in power and why it was challenged, leading to the introduction of multi-party democracy. The last part of the paper attempted to suggest lessons that Swaziland may learn, if it chooses to, in its attempt to bring about political reforms.

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CHAPTER 11

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND SWAZILAND: WHICH OPTION?

G. Peter

WHY THE NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

After independence, the new states of the sub-Saharan region embarked on a strategy of import substitution. Unfortunately, as noted by Weeks (1996) it was not possible to foster import-replacement industries and promote exports because protection through tariffs or quantitative controls are a tax on exports. As a result of this anti-export bias, the economics of the region suffered from a range of maladies inherent in the strategy of inwardly-focused development. Exports were discouraged, resulting into continuous and growing balance of trade pressures which had to be relieved by official development assistance. As a result of this protectionist syndrome, by mid-1980s countries of sub-Saharan region had, with few exceptions, slipped into disastrous conditions. Stagnant or declining per capita incomes, unsustainable balance of payments positions, and uncontrolled inflation (Weeks. 1996).

The solution to the import substitution disaster was to undo what had previously been done through "policy reforms" prescribed and implemented under the watchful eye of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The measures included exchange rate devaluation, elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade and tariff reduction deregulation of the external capital flows, dismantling of marketing boards and other forms of government price intervention: cancelling of subsidies, especially to agriculture and consumer products, privatisation or closure of state enterprises, reduction of fiscal deficits and strong intervention in domestic capital markets to raise nominal interest rates (Weeks. 1996). The main goal of all these reforms was to stimulate growth and reduce poverty. However, as noted by the critics of the World Bank (Woodward. 1992 and Weeks 1993 Mosley. Subasat and Weeks. 1995). the WB adjustment programmes had failed (Weeks. 1996). What was left for the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries was to look for other alternatives to bring about the desired development.

Among the other alternatives sought by the sub-Saharan countries to bring about development was through regional cooperation. Divergent views prevailed since the inception of regional cooperation in the 1930s. The critics of regional cooperation (mostly the neo-classics) conclude that cooperation among countries is about trade, and as such, generalised free trade as optimal, and limited membership common markets as second-best. On the other hand, the advocates of cooperation concede that generalised free trade would be optional, but various forms of "marketing" failure provide a justification for it as second best, leaving regional free trade as optimal (Weeks. 1996). Based on these divergent views as well as due to some selected empirical evidence of limited possibilities for creating trade between the member states, the regional co-operations are not likely to be very popular, in particularly with the donor agencies. As a result it is expected that regional co-operations in particular those in more dependent economics are more likely to suffer from domination and even derailment of their goals.

An example of this is demonstrated by the world bank’s position as given by Foroutan (1992) who maintains that regional trade integration be "pursued as a complement rather than as a substitute for global trade liberalisation". Such an approach where regional cooperation is "pursued as a complement" is no regional integration policy at all. since it makes cross-border trade merely derivative from general trade liberalisation (Weeks. 1996). Based on its policy, the World Bank’s responses to cooperation activities in Eastern and Southern Africa has been characterised from opposition in the beginning to endorsement in the end (World Bank. European Commission and African Development Bank. 1995). However, it has been noted that the endorsement was purely formal, in which case integration is treated as a vehicle to extend the
neo-liberal agenda or structural adjustment at a regional level (Weeks. 1996). Such a stand by the World Bank and other donors should be considered when evaluating the regional cooperation attempts in SSA. The possibility that such bodies can influence the operations of regional groups to match with their convictions, cannot be under-estimated.

There have been many attempts by the African countries to attain development through regional cooperation. These include the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Preferential Trade Areas (PTA), the Central African Federation (CAF), the Lusophone Union, constituting Angola and Mozambique, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) to mention a few. Among all these co-operations, SADC provides a good case study. It is considered a functioning example of how regional cooperation in Africa might work. Also, SADC is very unique as it is not only more recent (originated in 1980) but composed of a very divergent membership. Most of these members have once belonged to one or more of the earlier regional groups which have been unsuccessful because they were dominated by one member (Tanzania - in the EAC was dominated by Kenya). Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) had been members of the Central African Federation, which was dominated by the now Zimbabwe. Angola and Mozambique were all members of the Lusophone Union which was dominated by Portugal and Botswana. Lesotho, Swaziland and RSA as members of SACU all being dominated by RSA. Based on such a background we expect more dynamism and success in SADC as it is expected to have benefitted from the experiences of the earlier attempts at regional cooperation both as observers and active participants.

The fact that many countries have tried to come together and pursue economic goals as groupings is one of the indication that regional cooperation remains as one of the measures to attain and sustain development of the member states. This is particularly so for the Southern African States, which experience both internal as well as external problems in attaining their development. Regional integration is not promoted only to attain trading benefits. As emphasised by the Organisation of African States, regional cooperation is envisaged to go further than trading, to act as a vehicle for reducing economic and political dependence upon industrial countries. Regional integration is considered as an appropriate development strategy especially now as major world socio-economic and political changes occur. These changes have also resulted to changes in the attitudes of the developed countries and their financial institutions towards the developing countries individually as well as collectively.

In this context, the regional groupings provide perhaps the only viable vehicle by which developing country governments can exert a bargaining influence in multilateral organisations and with respect to specific developed countries and international corporations (Weeks, 1996). As an example, Southern African countries under coordination can be able to raise their bargaining power in three major policy issues: the role of foreign direct investment, influence within multilateral organisations and the influence of donors on development policy. As observed by Weeks (1996), in the absence of multilateral cooperation in Southern Africa, foreign investors have been free to play one government against another to extract concessions on taxes, labour regulations, even implicit subsidies that reduce the possible contribution of their operations to national development. Such a practice will in the long run undermine the ability of all governments to regulate foreign investors.

Weeks (1996) analysis indicates that for all the major multilateral, the WB, the GATT and The World Trade Organisation (WTO), decisions are dominated by the governments of the major industrialised countries. For the developing countries to be able to influence their policies it is only through coalitions and regional organisations, as demonstrated by the successful experience of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The same would apply to Southern Africa. If they want to have any influence at all in such bodies, it can only be attained through collective action. As an example, currently, the multilateral (WB and IMF) are implementing the structural adjustment programmes in the individual Southern African countries. For these programmes to yield good results to these countries, there is immediate need for the Southern African countries to jointly impose coordination of these programmes.
Collective intervention in the activities of WB and IFM such as the structural adjustment programmes is considered very crucial for the development of the region. These concerns stem from the fact that these multilateral organisations, through such programmes, demand fundamental re-organisation of the state, the economy and civil society which will enable private capital to achieve a hegemonic position in the society vis-a-vis workers, poor peasants and other vulnerable groups in society. Tsie (1996:75) summarises the whole situation as a “further integration of Southern Africa into the world economy through the revamping of existing regimes of accumulation under the auspices and for the benefit of private capital with the support of the state”. Tsie (1996) further observes that under structural adjustment, this revamping essentially means that the existing production structures inherited from the colonial period are to be retained and adjusted to the prevailing conditions in the world market. It also entails the reconstruction of civil society so that it becomes strong in terms of protecting and articulating the interests and concerns of business organisations rather than those of the masses. This is why the Southern African region must coordinate the structural adjustment programmes to make sure that they are not directed into establishing such undesired ends.

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in developing country governments including those in Southern Africa facing what Weeks (1996) call a "donor community" less tolerant of heterodox development strategies. The end of the cold war removed the possibility of using developing countries in geo-political conflict and this meant the end of some of the benefits which were accrued from geo-politics such as the presence and assistance from the World super powers. The absence of non-capitalist world powers resulted in a growing hegemony of free market ideology. In this new context, individual developing countries, except for the largest, found themselves with little bargaining power (Weeks. 1996) The more recent blow which sent the message home for the need to embrace regional cooperation as a strategy for development came from the Uruguay GATT settlement and the resultant World Trade Organisation.

The end of the cold war have also impinged on the developing countries, several constraints whose solutions increasingly call for the countries to work cooperatively. The end of the cold war means that there is no longer an alternative source of aid to that provided by the Western Industrialised nations and multilateral donor agencies. Previously there was at least an option of seeking development assistance, however limited it might have been, from the former Soviet Block. This option which was a derivative of the East-West strategic competition, is no longer available. This means that developing countries seeking foreign aid cannot seriously resist the new political conditionalities which have been increasingly attached to loans offered by Western governments. As observed (Tsie. 1996). International Financial Institutions (IFI) now insist on "good governance." This is a fundamental pre-requisite for economic recovery and development. Developing countries, especially in SSA where the economic crisis is severe, are therefore far more vulnerable to policy dictates emanating from the North than ever.

The SSA can reduce the magnitude of this domination in two possible ways, both of which necessitate integration first. Jointly, the SSA countries can pull together all their resources and the meagre capital they have and develop them jointly for the benefit of the region. This will reduce the current dependence on external aid and loans and the conditionalities attached to these. As total delinking with the developed capitalist countries may not only be unsuitable but also not possible, the Southern African countries need to work together and coordinate the activities of these multilateral and to prevent them from playing them against each other and eventually making development impossible for all.

Finally the end of the cold war has left the soviet block disintegrated, with the individual countries seeking for international private capital. This increases competition for international capital for the African countries. The countries of the former Soviet Block arc likely to be more attractive towards this capital than the Southern African countries because of their better social and physical infrastructure, bigger markets individually or collectively and their relative proximity to one of the three poles of accumulation in the post-war period, the European Union (EU). Many of them have already entered into various kinds of trade agreements with the EU and the Nordic countries (Tsie. 1996). This means increased need for the Southern African countries to come together and search for the resources for their development within their own countries rather than from outside.
It has also been argued that the SSA countries increasingly need to come together in block now than ever before due to the global socio-economic and political changes. The Globalisation of the world has left the SSA countries as Fourth World poverty stricken nations. Globalisation refers to the process by which a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system have been forged (Allen and Thomas. 1992). It also entails increasing penetration of National economies brought about by internationalisation of production, finance and markets chiefly under the auspices of Multi National Corporations (MNCs). As observed by Tsie (1996). the scope and effects of globalisation have been uneven. It promoted rapid capitalist industrialisation in some parts of the world such as the Pacific Rim. Other parts of the world such as Africa (excluding Mauritius, South Africa and the Maghreb) have been greatly by-passed by globalisation and have therefore become marginalised in World trade, especially manufactures. To reduce further marginalisation. the affected Southern Africa countries need now, more than ever to come together to raise their bargaining powers on these developed industrialised countries. To do this effectively, they need to coordinate their activities, especially in production and trade. This is only possible under a strong cooperating block of countries.

The “Third Industrial Revolution” based on automation technologies is largely under the control of MNCs. Again, most of the SSA countries are not likely to be able to participate in this industrial revolution. This is partly because they lack the skilled manpower. It is also due to the fact that historically they have been associated with the weakest pole of capital accumulation in the post-war period, namely: Western Europe. MNCs generally prefer to invest in South-East Asia and Latin America rather than the politically unstable and debt - distress SSA. Thus, the paucity of high - tech skills, political instability and repeated currency devaluations demanded by the IFIs have deterred foreign direct investment in most of SSA. apart from mineral export enclaves. The absence or reduced foreign investments in SSA necessitate a need again for these countries to seek internally, resources and capital for investment. Given the meagre resources and prevalence of poverty in these countries, none of these states can do it alone. This necessitates cooperation among the countries so as to be able to pool together the little resources scattered in the individual states and make them viable for economic exploitation and investment.

The changed global economic and political conditions have increasingly necessitated for the formation of trading blocks as exemplified by the European Union (EU). North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN). The states participating in these trading blocks are seeking to stimulate economic growth, reduce unemployment and control inflation in their respective economies through inter alia trade liberalisation to enlarge markets, greater efficiency and productivity gains arising out of economies of scale and competition and. harmonisation of fiscal, monetary and labour policies (Tsie. 1996). The formation of the world into trading blocks has a number of implications for the SSA. Tsie (1996) observed that SSA can ill-afford to delink from the world economy, particularly in the context of the recently concluded Uruguay Round Tabic of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Uruguay Round was to further reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. But there is no doubt that it will also expose African primary export commodities like beef, coffee and cocoa to stiff competition from South American countries. Besides this, for the first time, agricultural products and textiles and clothing will be brought under the GATT rules. Basing on the logic of the theory of comparative advantage, one would expect SSA to benefit from such trade liberalisations of agricultural trade because its exports are predominantly agricultural products. In reality there is little prospect for such gains for SSA. The USA and the EU have, over years been using subsidies to displace agricultural exports like beef, coarse grains, maize and sugar from developing countries from regional and international markets. Thus. Botswana. Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Southern African countries with membership in SADC) which have benefited from beef and sugar protocols before under the Lome Convention, have also found themselves now contending with dumping of the same products by the USA and the EU in their regional markets. To make matters worse, agricultural production levels in the USA and EU will continue to rise thereby depressing world market prices for sugar, dairy products, coarse grains and maize (Walker. 1994 and Watkins. 1994). These observations suggest that agricultural export-led growth alone will not provide a firm foundation for Africa's long term development even under the new GATT treaty. For that to
fundamental changes in SSA’s export structure are required. Among these necessary changes include economic diversification, export deepening, resources based, efficient and competitive import substitution industrialisation and, above all, the democratisation of the International economic order (Tsie. 1996). However, as observed by Tsie (1996), no single African state can achieve these inter-related goals on its own. They require economic and political cooperation because domestic markets are generally too small to allow investors to reap economies of scale and reduce cost per unit of output. The formation of regional integration schemes like SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS and COMESA are among the attempts to create a favourable economic and political environment in the form of expanded regional markets. All these regional grouping should also be seen as building blocks towards an African Economic Community as outlined in the Abuja Treaty of June 1991 (Tsie. 1996).

**Why Swaziland Embraces Regional Cooperation like SADCC and now SADC?**

Regional cooperation has been seen as the only way through which countries can forge forward their developments. The factors necessitating the need for regional cooperation especially for the SSA countries have been discussed in length. The need for regional cooperation is supported by both multilateral bodies, the UN general assembly and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). All these see regional cooperation as a way in which problems nurtured by "smallness" can be solved and as a way to bring about economic development and growth in Africa. It was under such a spirit that the Southern African States like Swaziland got interested and formed SADCC in 1980.

Swaziland is one of the former three High Commission territories of Southern Africa. It is among the micro-states of Africa, small in terms of size (17,164 km²), population numbers (about a million) and in economic output. Swaziland as observed by Funnel (1991) is a country struggling to retain an identity in a region dominated by its powerful neighbours. In Southern Africa, the historical evolution of individual states, in particular their links with European capital and white settlement has produced strong inter-territorial links. Above all, it is the relationship with South Africa that sets the scene not only for Swaziland with its immediate geographical proximity but also for other states in the region (Funnel 1991:4). Two relationships have been crucial in the history of Swaziland’s economic development. One is its dependent political status in relation to Great Britain including the issue of incorporation with South Africa during the years 1910-1960. The other one is its economic relationships with its neighbours, Mozambique and especially South Africa. The economic relationships with South Africa involved Swaziland’s membership in the South Africa Customs Union (SACU). The use of South African currency and the current pegging of the Lilangeni at par with the South African Rand, the employment of Swazi Labour in South African mines, industries and agriculture, a considerable South African investment capital and skills in Swaziland’s enterprises and a substantial inter-territorial trade (Fair 1969).

Fair (1969) further observes that with independence, the observed relationships had a particular impact on Swaziland, especially in view of her small size in relation to her economically more powerful neighbours. A major disadvantage of small size do arise out of the smallness of its domestic market. This is turn create difficulties in establishing economics of scale in Swaziland. This hampers the production of many agricultural commodities and consumer goods. With the retardation of manufacturing, the structural transformation of the economy so necessary for self-sustaining growth is delayed, possibly indefinitely. Based on these observed conditions, Swaziland’s continued economic growth greatly depends upon a series of external supporting relations (Fair. 1969).

Among the recommended external relationships include integrated market arrangements with developed countries. These are viewed as economically desired and beneficial for small countries (Vakail and Brahmananda. 1960). It is also argued that the fullest degree of self-sustaining growth is possible only in “a very large continental - type economy" with rich and diverse resources and a large population. Therefore, “economic regionalism" involving multi-state regional economic relationships, offers “one important avenue for many small underdeveloped countries to achieve the possibility of a fully self-sustained pattern of growth” (Demas. 1965). Swaziland’s relationship with South Africa and Mozambique in this sense was seen as a critical factor in achieving its own future economic viability as part of a wider and more viable
and more viable economic region (Fair. 1969). The same can be said to be true for Swaziland's interrelationships and cooperation with the broader Southern African regional countries today.

Fair (1969) also observed that the economic implications of such relationships are complex and have difficult political repercussions. They also involve the question of greater human mobility between countries, closer physical connection by road, rail and telecommunications, and the integration of power and water supplies and of transport systems. All those have already materialised between Swaziland and its neighbours, especially with South Africa.

An assessment on the character and strength of the economic linkages in Swaziland indicates the fact that: Swaziland's economic linkages are primarily external. Of the total value of production in 1966 of R44,500.00, no less than 87% (38,600.00) was exported. The greater proportion of the country's internal requirements was imported, the value of 1967 imports exceeding R35,000.00. In 1967 out of R41,620.00 worth of exports, 3/4 went to three countries, the United Kingdom (33%) Japan (29%) and South Africa, and there is much uncounted traffic across the border (Fair. 1969).

Swaziland's efforts to increase the range of manufactured goods have been hampered for a long time by the size of her domestic market on the one hand, and the geographic and economic accessibility to Swaziland by South Africa manufactured goods, on the other. As an example, in 1966, about 75% of building materials required were imported, mainly from South Africa (Fair. 1969). For further development, it is important for Swaziland to maintain its existing markets and search for new ones in Africa and overseas. Particularly important is its future relationship with the Southern Africa economic region by virtue of its geographic location and its already substantial ties with the RSA through customs union, currency arrangements, common marketing boards and trade agreements, interchange of goods and people, the inflows of South African capital and skills and the transport and communication links, (Fair. 1969).

There are also some disadvantages of Swaziland's association with its powerful neighbours like RSA. There are known common problems likely to arise when partners of unequal economic standing cooperate in a common market. In this context, the customs union's fiscal and monetary policy has been governed largely by South Africa's particular economic interests, not Swaziland's. Easily available and comparatively cheap South African manufactures, tertiary services and even primary products, partly inhibits their more widespread growth in Swaziland. The R.S.A. is now driving towards economic maturity. To attain and stabilise in economic growth R.S.A. is struggling to reach out more widely for raw materials of industry, as well as markets for her products. Swaziland by virtue of its location and size provides their unique and large market for R.S.A. raw materials and processed commodities. It also offers R.S.A. the least competition. The R.S.A. in fact provides an easy access to a large and cheap market for manufactured goods and services for Swaziland. It is more expensive to try to provide these itself or import from overseas.

It has been noted that since apartheid. South Africa dominated Swaziland's economy. Swaziland could not promote its industrial expansion due to suffocation of cheaper products from the R.S.A. Besides this. Swaziland's trade with other outside partners was limited by SACU. as the case with imports outside (the SACU tax has to be paid). Also, due to the economic dependency of Swaziland on the R.S.A. it also necessitates its political domination. In this regard. Swaziland could not be so satisfied with such a powerful and dominating neighbour and had to seek ways out to at least reduce this domination. Regional cooperation offered one of the possibilities to lessen Swaziland's dependence and domination from the R.S.A. As noted by Matsebula (1987:13) benefits under trade creations within SADCC was expected to be realised at two levels. There would be higher production for export to the wider SADCC markets. Also, it was expected to generate higher consumer surplus as a result of the fall of price of commodities which will then be produced on a larger scale to supply the wider SADCC markets. The advantages of Swaziland in regional cooperation like SADCC are well summarised by Matsebula (1987: 13-14).

"Swaziland industrial production had been restricted on the one hand by South Africa's protectionist tendencies and by various trade barriers in foreign markets. SADCC will help in the relaxation of these constraints, e.g. production of specific commodities on the
Swaziland's need and interest in regional cooperation was reiterated by the then Minister of Finance, Barnabas S. Dlamini in 1990. He noted that the fact that SADCC attempted to increase the flow of free trade of goods and factors through its member states, was a very important aspect of small countries like Swaziland whose economy is highly concentrated, with almost all its imports coming from or through South Africa. He further noted that, similarly, Swaziland's exports which have a large commodity content are almost directed to traditional trading partners, hence extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the economy deriving from cost increases in South Africa and the variations in International commodity markets. In this aspect, it was expected that SADCC could at least extenuate the economic concentration and add to the diversification of the industrial base. Swaziland was also attracted to SADCC, in particular to its transport programme which opens its access to Maputo port reducing transport costs significantly as compared to the long routes via South African ports. This came out clearly from the Minister's speech saying:

"Importance of trade links in facilitating Intra-SADCC trade and overcoming isolation explains the emphasis given to transport programme - help small countries - Landlocked as Swaziland which derive much of their national income from exports - to reduce transport costs -using Maputo port - instead of the long South African routes". (Honourable Minister Barnabas S. Dlamini. April 1990).

The Minister also noted other advantages of countries like Swaziland belonging to a regional group like SADCC. Among these include support for projects, citing the example where Swaziland obtained 40% of total appropriated capital expenditure for the financial year through SADCC. Also, small countries can achieve better liaison with potential donor through their membership of a group than as small nation operating in isolation. Besides this, cooperation has made it possible for Swaziland to better market its resources like mining as noted by the commissioner of Geological surveys and mines who noted that "Swaziland's membership of the SADC has enabled it to better market its mining sector internationally. This is amongst the reasons the country has been able to draw international companies to explore for gold simultaneously in the country (The Times of Swaziland. Thursday. October 10th 1996 p. 12).

Other reasons that explain why Swaziland should go for regional cooperation include the fact that Swaziland is predominantly an agricultural country, with both the traditional and commercial sectors side by side. Most of the production, especially for export is produced within the commercial sector. Among the commercial products produced and exported include sugar, woodpulp and beef. By 1970s sugar had come to dominate the economy. Sugar is a crop which can be produced in a wide range of environmental conditions. Between 1951 and 1971 there were nine new beet producers and 14 new cane producers, one of which was Swaziland. In that period total sugar production rose from 36.9 million tonnes to 67.9 million tonnes (Grissa. 1976). More of these countries, even in Africa are now producing and exporting sugar. By 1988 total world production was estimated to be about 107 million tones and consumption at 106 million tones. The last decade has been marked by a major drive towards self-sufficiency on the part of several countries which previously constituted major markets, e.g. U.K. (Funnel. 1971). The domestic market for Swaziland absorbs only about 13% of the total output. Modern cultivation techniques demand high levels of fertiliser and irrigation input. Swaziland has so far managed to survive in this production as some of the inputs like fertilisers are available from the R.S.A. at relatively low cost both because of proximity and the fact that subsidies for South African farmers are also applied to those in Swaziland. There is also the problem of escalating freight charges. These put producers in pressure to seek cost saving strategies in order to prevent problems. All these factors place the production of sugar in Swaziland into question (Funnel. 1991). Again in the past, Swaziland benefitted a lot from EC support under the sugar protocol to fetch better prices for its sugar. But these same multilateral trade blocks are seen to be competing in the same South African regional market for the same products they used to buy from some of these countries. As an example, according to European Commission Research, it was noted that nearly half of Swaziland's sugar was exported to South
same South African regional market for the same products they used to buy from some of these countries. As an example, according to European Commission Research, it was noted that nearly half of Swaziland's sugar was exported to South Africa. Sugar accounts for 67% of Swaziland's agricultural production, 23% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 57% of foreign exchange earnings. For the EU to secure an early elimination of import duties and non tariff barriers on sugar and chocolate confectionery (from South Africa) without addressing EU export and producer subsidies on those products would seriously affect the price of sugar and confectionery products (Times of Swaziland. Tuesday October 29th 1996 p. 13). This signals a strong need for Swaziland to think of looking for other markets for its sugar and confectionary products, an opportunity which can be availed through SADCC markets and other African markets. So far we have seen why Swaziland opted for regional cooperation, and in particular for SADCC. It will be more interesting to see how Swaziland is likely to fair in this regional cooperation, especially after the collapse of the apartheid regime and South Africa's membership in the cooperation under the new SADCC. and The Southern African Development Community (SADC).

**From SADCC to SADC**

The end of apartheid regime and the extension of SADC’s membership to RSA. has a number of implications to Africa as a whole, the Southern African region as well as to the individual SADC states. However, these implications are likely to be more pronounced to small states like Swaziland with higher proximity to the RSA and with well established economic links with South Africa than those distant states which did not have direct links with apartheid South Africa. To assess the implications of this cooperation necessitates going back to the socio-economic and political developments and linkages between Swaziland and apartheid South Africa.

Since apartheid time, Swaziland has been tied to RSA economically. There is significant income from SACU. As early as 1980, income from SACU made up nearly 70% of the total, the highest recorded from this form of tax is sub-Sahara Africa (Funnel, 1991). The problem with this is that the revenue collecting procedures and duties under SACU are mainly determined by South African requirements and Swaziland has very limited capability to adjust this source of revenue.

As seen, the economy is highly dependent upon agriculture and especially the output of large commercial estates producing sugar, citrus and woodpulp. While these provide significant number of jobs and are important sources of revenue, they are associated with foreign ownership (mostly from the RSA.) and markets. Besides this, Swaziland is not only integrated into the migrant labour system, its position within SACU has meant that many macro economic decisions are not within its control. Questions ranging from maize pricing policy to the location of industry within SACU are all dominated by the RSA.

The economy of Swaziland remains heavily dependent upon agriculture, and in particular, the capitalist sector. Since independence, the changes in the structure of political power have been accompanied by an intensification of foreign capital involvement in all sectors. Funnel (1991) points out that whilst Swaziland may have some of the attractions of a "small is beautiful" economy, it is extremely vulnerable. Its economic openness, where between 60% and 70% of GDP is accounted for by exports, mainly of agricultural products, is compounded by the geography of trade. Inevitably a larger proportion of imports (in 1983, 84%) originate or pass through the RSA and exports were increasingly dependent upon the use of South African ports (Funnel. 1991). Since 1984, there was an upsurge of interest in Swaziland as a location for firms seeking to avoid South Africa. The move of the coca-cola plant from the RSA was thus taken as a symptomatic of future trends. This was considered to be a very likely outcome particularly when political agitation in RSA was at its peak.

In the early post independence years Selwyn (1975) examined the locational opportunities in Swaziland. It was noted that there would have been scope for limited industrial investments aimed at regional markets. However, things changed after several developments. SADCC and PTA offered new linkages within the continent and the expansion of the EC (and access under the Lome Convention) provided Swaziland with potentially interesting opportunities. As a member of SACU and with access to SADCC/PTA and EC markets, it was expected that Swaziland would have offered an ideal location, both
continue to have a number of negative impacts on Swazi economy, as most investment is held by foreign companies.

There is a significant dependence on electricity from RSA, especially when river flow is low. Although the service sector showed considerable growth, it was and still is equally prone to excessive fluctuations in the fight of recessions in South Africa. This is because much of retail and wholesale trade is dependent upon the RSA for supplies. In actual sense, what operates in Swaziland are mainly branch plants of South African companies. The tourist sector, in a similar manner, developed to service mainly South African visitors. Many of the major hotels were originally financed by South African funds, now in partnership with Swazi capital. The flow of tourist showed decline in the late 1970s as competition from the homelands' facilities increased (Funnel. 1991).

Wage employment has received a critical role in the economy. Most males sought and still seek work in RSA. Internal wage employment has expanded but mostly on private estates, agro-industry and government services (Funnel, 1991). Since the 1980s trade has shifted. Although the major primary commodities are still exported outside the region, but, currently, between 20-30% of exports are directed to South Africa, which has recently suppled the UK as the single most important export destination (Funnel. 1991).

Foreign exchange value of exports fluctuates widely in a situation in which Swaziland has little control. As noted by Funnel (1991), few countries are able to manipulate export prices. But Swaziland effectively leaves foreign exchange management to the RSA. As a result, the exchange conditions reflect more the state of RSA political economy than that of Swaziland. The drastic devaluation of the rand since 1980s not only lowered the price of exports but also raised the price of imports. This situation contributes to the increasing proportion of trade with the RSA as no foreign currency transactions are involved. The import situation for Swaziland has a more serious repercussions because besides the normal import patterns of most LDCs, with a concentration on machinery products and fuels, there is also a long standing import of maize and other cereal products used to supplement domestic food supply. The fact that many retail and wholesale companies in Swaziland are subsidiaries of South African firms, many supplies are obtained from RSA. Funnel (1991) also observed that in many cases, goods could be imported from outside the region for a lower price. However, the SACU tariffs would have to be paid, and in this way protects RSA producers.

Swaziland enjoyed a privileged position under apartheid regime in South Africa as well as a member of SADCC due to its geographical location and political stand. A lot of South African investment was attracted to Swaziland not only for its attractive investment climate (economic and political stability) but also to avoid the trade embargo in the "made in South Africa" labels and sell outside. Besides this, Swaziland as a member of both SACU and PTA (through its SADCC membership) enjoyed a wide range of markets compared to the rest of the Southern African countries. Within the region, the RSA goods were limited to the BLS countries only or through them, as the RSA suffered from the trade embargo from the rest of SADC member states. For Swaziland this meant lesser competition for the RSA's capital investment and trade.

The collapse of the apartheid regime in RSA and the membership of RSA in SADC totally throws things up-side-down for Swaziland. Suddenly, and almost automatically, Swaziland is not necessarily the pet of the RSA, as the need for this in no longer there. There is correct investment climate in RSA especially in terms of peace. Hence no need to locate their investments outside RSA for either security purposes or for fear of trade embargos. Besides this, there is totally a new regime in Pretoria under the ANC who may not be in a position to honour their previous regime's relationships with Swaziland, especially due to its stand during the apartheid struggle. Although Swaziland had little options in this. Due to the strong pressures from Pretoria and the agreements signed under SACU among others. Swaziland could not stage its support for the ANC against Pretoria during apartheid.

Besides this, as the RSA has now direct access with the rest of SADC countries as well as other African and outside markets means wider markets for RSA in terms of their export of manufactured products as well as imports of industrial raw materials. Swaziland is now likely to suffer stiff competition from South African exports, imports and capital investments, especially from the other Southern African states which are bigger, especially in population in terms of size of markets offered for South African exports and investments in these countries. South Africa is likely to be making more business now in countries with
well as imports of industrial raw materials. Swaziland is now likely to suffer stiff competition from South African exports, imports and capital investments, especially from the other Southern African states which are bigger, especially in population in terms of size of markets offered for South African exports and investments in these countries. South Africa is likely to be making more business now in countries with bigger populations and with higher consumption patterns. The problem now for Swaziland in not only the competition of attracting new investments from RSA but the danger of even losing what has already been located in Swaziland back to the RSA or to other Southern African states. This is particularly likely to happen to those types of investments which were located in Swaziland due to the need to avoid the sanctions imposed on RSA goods earlier or due to the political instability in R.S.A. by then. Such moves by the RSA investors are likely to be triggered by indications of economic and political instability, as these were the main attractions for those investors. For the Kingdom to continue enjoying its attraction power to potential investors it has to continuously guarantee a conducive investment climate in the country.

Under SADC Swaziland is also likely to lose in its export and import trade. As observed by Matsebula (1987:10) Swaziland enjoyed trading in South Africa due to its wide range of primary intermediate and Final products, not obtained anywhere else within SADC as a whole. Also these products were obtained at generally lower prices or at least competitive. Now, the RSA with a broadened market and increased demand for these same goods, following the laws of supply and demand, one would expect in the short term, the South African goods are likely to raise their value and become relatively more expensive for countries like Swaziland. This is likely with the improvement of transport and communication networks between the RSA and the rest of SADC states. With the other countries closer to RSA like Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia only need the strengthening of the existing networks. Even for distant countries like Angola and Tanzania, these are more easily and cheaply reached by sea. In the wake of these new events Swaziland may need now to restructure its trade relations. However, as noted by Matsebula (1987:10) restructuring trade relations would entail higher costs for Swaziland, especially as a land locked country. This will result into higher import prices. Also, in terms of exports it might entail higher transport costs reducing the profits significantly. Worst still, export prices as noted by Matsebula (1987) might need to be lowered significantly in order to penetrate SADC and other African markets.

The RSA's desire to penetrate and expand its economic investments and control in the Southern African region has always been there, even during the apartheid period and before joining SADC. South Africa for many years have been recruiting labour especially for their mines as far as Swaziland. Mozambique and Malawi as already noted. Besides this, it had invested heavily in these countries especially in the mining sector. Also in terms of trade. South Africa dominated the region. Also, the construction of the rail line to Maputo in the last decade as noted by Funnel (1991) added to the rail network which had important consequences for the geography of regional trade. The Maputo link represents the shortest distance to a port and the only route out of Swaziland that does not pass through the RSA. However, at the same time the RSA had materially assisted Swaziland to integrate their system with the South African services. These include links to Golal, Komatiport, Natal, part of Richard's Bay and Maputo through a better road to the north As a result it is now possible to route traffic from Zimbabwe and Zambia to Richard's Bay. It has also been noted that these new links serve as a foundation for increased orientation towards the black states to the north.

Currently the RSA and Mozambique are constructing the Maputo corridor. This is expected to link the two big countries and former enemies surrounding Swaziland more efficiently. Some fears have been expressed in newspapers that this corridor might challenge Swaziland's economic interests. The construction of the corridor represents an investment in a future that sees increasing tics and economic growth between two large and powerful countries at the possible expense of Swaziland. The post-war Mozambique with an improved infrastructure and an investor-friendly government, would attract business. The corridor makes this easier, and also sends the message that the country to the east is open for business and is the place to go.

It has also been noted that tourism in Swaziland will suffer directly. For years, South Africans have preferred Swaziland because it was safe and because it was close. The end of the guerrilla warfare along
South Africa. As commented by Jo Kentgens, the area manager of Sun International Swaziland (The Swazi Observer, Tuesday, October 19th p.13), many traditional clients to Swazi casinos will not be visiting Swaziland as they have their own doorstep. Earlier the country had no casino opposition on her borders. Now, 40 gambling licences were being issued in South Africa. Things are made worse by the fact that the casino Industry in S.Africa is expanding on a regionalised basis. Two casino licences were already awarded in Mozambique. On the South African border, four casino licences were issued in Mpumalanga and six at Kwa-Zulu Natal, very close to Swaziland. The possibility of prospect clients crossing to Swaziland are greatly reduced by the inconvenience of crossing borders, especially border hours which as observed are not conducive to casino business.

South African economic links has now widened and increased with other SADC members as well as other foreign countries. Many examples demonstrated this. In October 1996, South Africa and Zambia signed a bilateral agreement on road freight and passenger transport between the two countries. The main thrust in this agreement was to promote and facilitate the efficient movement of goods and persons by road between the two countries. This agreement is expected to result in major time and cost savings and to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive for cross-border trade between the two countries (Times of Swaziland, Wednesday, October 9th 1996. P.9).

South African Brewers is also pushing deep in both SADC and other international markets. The brewing giant. South African Brewers (SAB) has spread across the continent. The SAB chief noted that the expansion has been swift, especially since the collapse of apartheid. SAB moved into a new country every few months on average. SAB sees Africa as its natural market place. It already had controlling shares in state breweries in Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique (The Swazi Observer. Monday October 7th, 1996. p.13).

It has also been noted that trade with China is growing. Taiwan is South Africa's seventh biggest trading partner, with trade between the two totalling 1.74 billion dollars in 1995. and more than 350 Taiwanese companies, employing 45,000 people, have fixed investments in the country. South African trade with mainland China has been growing from 14 million in 1994 to 1.33 billion dollars in 1995 (The Times of Swaziland. Friday, November 29th 1996, p.4). China was among the countries which the RSA did not have relations with until recently, and the South African business liaisons links with China. On the other hand, Taiwan has vowed to strengthen their economic ties with the RSA.

As seen, there is a lot of evidence which show that since the end of apartheid regime, the RSA has been very attractive to many international countries as a place to invest and trade with. The RSA has also been pushing hard to extend its investment and trade relations to other continents, and in particular with the African states, especially the neighbouring ones under SADC. This has a number of implications on SADC states and in particular to small states like Swaziland which used to enjoy strong economic links with the RSA when the other states boycotted them. The other SADC states are likely to suffer in this as RSA is more attractive for business investment than the rest of SADC members as well as Swaziland. This is likely to strengthen further the economic power of the RSA as well as its economic domination over the other member states. This is likely to be so as the investors coming to the RSA are likely to flood the SADC market and suffocate further the individual state's efforts to expand their production and industries. So countries like Swaziland which were already suffering from this are expected to suffer more, making their development almost impossible.

The desire of the new RSA investors to expand to the SADC and African market has already been demonstrated. As an example, Wang Weichun, Director of the foreign ministry's International Cooperation Department for Taiwan declared that Taiwan considered South Africa, not only as a country, but also an important regional economic entity, the springboard on which to expand business and invest activities in Africa (The Times of Swaziland. Friday, November 29th 1996, p.14). There is already evidence of this in terms of the number of flight connections between the RSA and Taiwan and the flood of fast moving Taiwanese goods like clothes, shoes and electronics in many SADC states now passing through the RSA.

Which options for Swaziland?

Regional cooperation has been seen to be very important in bringing about development for African
of this in terms of the number of flight connections between the RSA and Taiwan and the flood of fast moving Taiwanese goods like clothes, shoes and electronics in many SADC states now passing through the RSA.

**Which options for Swaziland?**

Regional cooperation has been seen to be very important in bringing about development for African countries, especially now in the wake of globalisation and the changed international socio-economic and political conditions and relationships. The need for regional cooperation is particularly more important for small states like Swaziland which are landlocked and surrounded by powerful neighbours. Earlier experiences with regional cooperation in Africa and the region suffered a lot of problems which resulted into the collapse of the group, e.g. the EAC. The main problems are those associated with difficulties of grouping heterogeneous countries. The big and powerful end up dominating the smaller and weaker ones. This problem affects the SADC states like Swaziland.

Regional cooperation through SADC is expected to act as a vehicle to reduce economic and political dependence upon industrial states and powerful neighbours like the RSA. It is also expected to raise the bargaining powers of small states. Besides this, SADC is expected to bring about equitable development for the region. The current trend of events within SADC indicates doubts as to whether the aspirations of member states like Swaziland will ever be met. To succeed, SADC had to do a number of things. It had to coordinate its projects in a way that facilitates their development and reduce external leakage. It is true that SADC is trying to coordinate its projects, especially the transport links externally, a factor which will further strengthen external export trade rather than within the region. It is also necessary for SADC to change its export structure from the currently export led. This has not changed and the member states are still emphasising the production of the same export crops. This not only make trade impossible between the member states but also increases competition in external markets. This is also true for Swaziland in its sugar industry. Also, as noted by Tsie (1996) there is little reorganisation of the state within SADC, and instead, it is integrating its member states further into the world economy. Instead of pulling together their own internal resources and developing them jointly, the member states, especially the big and attractive ones like the RSA are pulling international capital and in this process linking further than de-linking the region into the world economy. Unless care is taken, the RSA will continue to function its traditional role of opening and linking the member states to international capitalism. The question which we ask ourselves now is whether Swaziland has really any options to forge ahead with its development. Docs Swaziland really benefit under SADC? Can Swaziland do it alone today and get away from the interference and domination from powerful member states like RSA next door?

History shows that Swaziland has always suffered from its powerful neighbours and has survived through skilful manoeuvres. During SADCC, Swaziland managed to utilise the situation provided by apartheid RSA where it needed and utilised Swaziland as a way to escape from the trade embargos imposed on it, as well as other markets accessed through SADCC. These markets made it more attractive for RSA investment and trade. Besides this, Swaziland used SADCC to reduce RSA’s dominance on it as well as to attract investments from it. These advantages for Swaziland under SADCC are summarised by Bischoff as:

> The kingdom made some gains (possible only short term) from the sanctions campaign against South Africa because it has been able to remain as a credible member of the OAU and SADCC as well as being a signatory to its associated PTA while declining to support an anti-apartheid strategy (Bischoff, 1988: 463).

The benefit enjoyed by Swaziland under SADCC are now over after the collapse of the apartheid regime, the removal of the economic sanctions on the RSA and the embrace of the RSA into SADC membership. In spite of all these changes we see Swaziland needing SADC even more.

Although apartheid has ended, RSA is still too powerful and dominates Swaziland through its earlier relations like SACU. So they need this cooperation to reduce RSA’s domination and possible threat. This is likely to be so when one considers the earlier relationship with Pretoria regime against the ANC. They need
SADC.

Although Swaziland's membership to SADC is seen as inevitable, besides the few gains expected the kingdom is also likely to suffer possibly more from these relationships. As seen, under SADC, Swaziland is likely to suffer not only from the RSA, but also from the other member states which are bigger and more attractive to investment from the RSA and other international sources. As noted, trade between RSA and Swaziland has increased, reducing its trade with other outside countries. Although the BLS states and RSA are now members of the SADC, they continue to retain SACU. This reduces further the chances for the BLS states to trade with outside countries. Also, as noted, the opening of the RSA to international capital is already suffocating SADC's markets and industry. The result of this is likely to be felt more by the smaller member states and with high proximity to the RSA like Swaziland.

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that Swaziland does not have many options. It needs regional cooperation for the reasons explained, in spite of the problems it is also likely to suffer under it. Maybe the next question should be on how can small states like Swaziland forge ahead with regional co-operations like SADC. Enhancing the possible gains while reducing the possible problems of belonging to such group with big and powerful members. It is not intended to provide a full answer to this in the paper due to limitations of space and time. However, among the important tips need to be addressed urgently by Swaziland include: the re-organisation of its production, especially in terms of being able to meet internally some of the products which they can produce but still continues to import. This is particularly possible in a range of food crops, in particular vegetables and maize. Also is has to try to diversify its export production and concentrate more in areas with higher comparative advantage and with less competition from other members. All these measures calls for increased domestic production, which can be realised only when all the resources for production are utilised efficiently and sustainability. This is particularly so for Swaziland with little resources in terms of arable land and internal market.

This will in turn necessitate progressive land reforms and other policy measures to promote equitable income distribution. Land reforms if implemented properly will not only increase production through increased efficiency use of land, but will also create a larger market for goods and services produced in the manufacturing and services sectors. The new landless or farmers with too small plots can gain more income from the sale of their crops or animals with which to purchase other consumer goods. This will in turn increase demand for goods and services. increase incentive for the production industry to expand by making more profit from increased sale of goods. This process eventually will forge strong forward and backward linkages within the country and promote the overall development of the country.

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Dr. Suffian H. Bukurura. At the time of writing this paper he was a Lecturer. Department of Law, Faculty of Social Science, University of Swaziland.

Prof Ackson M. Kanduza, Associate Professor, Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, University of Swaziland.

Prof Martin H.Y. Kaniki. At the time of whiting this paper, the late Kaniki was an Associate Professor in the Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, University of Swaziland.

Mr. Rajan Mathew, Lecturer. Department of Sociology. Faculty of Social Science, University of Swaziland.

Dr. Miranda Miles. At the time of writing this paper she was a Lecturer. Department of Geography, Faculty of Science, University of Swaziland.

Dr. Sarah Mkhonza, Lecturer, Department of English and Literature, Faculty of Humanities, University of Swaziland.

Mr. Sitwala Mutonga. holds a B.A. Ed. and M.A. (History ) from the University of Zambia. Teacher at Inyanza High School in Swaziland.

Prof. John K. Ngwisha, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology , Faculty of Social Science, University of Swaziland. He was also Dean in the Faculty of Social Science at the time of the workshop.

Ms. Mamane Nxumalo. Lecturer. Department of Sociology. Faculty of Social Science. University of Swaziland.

Dr. Grace Peter, Lecturer in the Department of Geography, Faculty of Science. University of Swaziland.

Dr. Bonginkosi A.B. Sikhondze. Senior Lecturer. Department of History. Faculty of Humanities. University of Swaziland.

Dr. Christopher B. Zigira. Senior Lecturer. Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Swaziland.

Dr. Sihle Zwane, Lecturer, Department of Curriculum and Teaching, Faculty of Education, University of Swaziland.