U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
SOUTHERN AFRICA:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

by

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This paper by Mr. Seiler (as explained in footnote a.) is drawn from a larger body of research on the formulation of U.S. policy towards Southern Africa. Mr. Seiler is now doing research on the formulation of South African foreign policy.

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Has there been continuity and coherency in U.S. policy toward Southern Africa in the past fifteen years? Or are the critics of the Nixon Administration right in charging it has changed policy radically?²

Africa has been, and remains still, the area of lowest priority for U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Robert Good, who served in Zambia in the mid-1960s, suggested, only partly in jest, that only Antarctica was less important. In general, Presidential attention to Africa, and in particular to Southern Africa, has been the crucial test of the area's insignificance; even after making allowances for variations in Presidential style of foreign policy formulation. But to note Presidential indifference, or at most fitful interest, is not to say there has been no interest at lower levels of the vast policy-making system. To the contrary, like other policy areas of secondary national interest, the basic characteristic of Southern African policy formulation has been intense and knowledgeable interaction among a number of lower-level officials. In the absence of sustained Presidential interest, these men have taken steps in policy implementation which were often out of line with formal policy rhetoric. Sometimes the divergency reflected the traditional problems of bureaucratic inertia and control. At other times, officials intentionally moved implementation away from the general intent of stated policy.

The Eisenhower Administration

While the U.S. had diplomatic representation in South Africa long before it did in most of Black Africa,¹ that country never came into clear focus for top policy-makers - the President, the Secretary of State, and their immediate advisors - until sometime in the 1960s. The Eisenhower White House never focused on the area at all. Only the Congo took up the President's direct attention. Southern African matters were routinely directed to the State Department for handling by Eisenhower's operations coordinator, now General Andrew Goodpaster.² The President's attitude is conveyed in two instances: his naive belief that bringing Black African Ambassadors to the White House for dinner in October 1960 was a significant
policy step; and his note (facetious, one hopes) to Douglas Dillon, then
Under Secretary of State, on Dillon's birthday: "Perhaps the day will
not even be distinguished by the independence of an additional African
state (which will be a relief since my mental map of Africa is experien-
cing great confusion)." Secretary Dulles's concern by the mid 1950s
about the threat of Soviet involvement in the developing nations never
focused on sub-Saharan Africa, although in 1957 he did send Julius Holmes,
his special assistant, on an extended African survey which included a
Rhodesian stop. Holmes notes that Dulles had "finally begun to worry
a good bit about what was going to happen in Africa...because we really
knew relatively little about what was going on." On his return, Holmes
"made certain recommendations of what we might do, and he (Dulles) agreed
that they ought to be done. But for some curious reason, I could never
get him to do them. He was preoccupied with other things. Possibly by
this time his vigor had diminished. But he did agree with me."5

The Eisenhower Administration's stiff public criticism of South
Africa after Sharpeville might seem to mark a point of thoughtful policy
change. In fact, the sketchy evidence available suggests that the action
was prompted by United Nations pressures and might not even have involved
the President or his immediate advisors at all.6 Only three months
after Sharpeville, no more than cursory attention was given to the tra-
ditional Presidential message congratulating South Africa on the anniver-
sary of Union Day.7 In the same period, President Eisenhower maintained
affable relationships with the Portuguese government. He made a brief
stop-over visit to Portugal en route home from a NATO conference and was
received warmly. Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter put it well
in a memo to the President suggesting suitable language for a congratu-
latory message to Rear Admiral Thomas on his inauguration as Portugal's
President: "In view of the close and friendly relations which have ex-
isted between our two countries for many years and of our mutual partici-
pation in the NATO, as well as our joint use of the Azores Islands bases..."8
Unofficial contacts with South Africans were also affable. Eisenhower
exchanged letters with his wartime acquaintance, Major General Sir Francis
de Guingand, who had become a key figure in the South Africa Foundation.9
And in October 1960 he met briefly with Harry Oppenheimer, who was in the
U.S. to help retrieve South Africa's declining investments.10 U.S. space
and atomic energy research ties with South Africa were initiated in the Eisenhower Administration, and despite the legal requirement that the contractual agreements involved be signed by the President himself, there are no signs of substantive consideration of their larger policy implications by the President or his senior staff.11.

The Kennedy Administration

The Southern African policy of the Kennedy Administration has been represented by Arthur Schlesinger as a triumph for liberal American impulses.12. It was far from that. It is true that American liberals expected a great deal of the new President's African policy, because of his earlier support for Algerian nationalism and his quiet invitation for other African nationalists to visit the staff office of his Senate Foreign Relations Committee African subcommittee.13. His appointment of Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs before he had decided on his Secretary of State was accurately interpreted as a sign of commitment to African policy. In turn, Williams, after considerable lobbying from liberal organizations, selected Wayne Fredericks, a liberal foundation and business executive, as his own deputy. But the hopes for liberalization of U.S. policy never materialized. There were three basic reasons: the President had been advised early of the intractability of Southern African problems; the Congo took up more and more of the time and energy of Williams, Fredericks, and their staffs; and the President, while taking a lively personal interest in the Congo situation, only involved himself three times in Southern African policy.

In 1960, Kennedy's campaign advisory committee, despite its preponderantly liberal composition, cautioned him about prospects for Southern Africa. Writing in the months after Sharpeville, when strong governmental pressure might have been assessed as most effective, the Africa Task Force counselled instead continuing private pressure against both the South African and Portuguese governments. Its report concluded that the Union was:

"...not easily vulnerable to economic pressure. It remains questionable whether economic sanctions could be made universal enough to become crippling. The key to any effort to exert economic pressure is Great Britain... If Great Britain were officially to participate in an economic boycott - which at present seems unlikely - it could have a tremendous impact."14.
There are no signs that these discouraging views were even given serious consideration by the Kennedy Administration. To the contrary, there is the strong suggestion that Williams (and State's African Bureau) knew nothing of the crucial economic commitments made in 1960 and 1961 by an American banking consortium and by Charles Engelhard and others.\(^{15}\)

Partly because of its own preoccupation with Congo problems, the African Bureau was not involved in three U.S. programs with South Africa: space research, atomic energy research and development, and the subsidy of sugar purchases. The NASA space tracking station had been contracted to a private South African firm by the Eisenhower Administration, thus frustrating Chester Bowles (then Under Secretary of State) and Williams in their efforts to secure employment access for Black Americans.\(^{16}\) The Atomic Energy Commission dealt directly with the White House to secure Presidential approval for the 1962 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in order to permit additional plutonium transfers to South Africa and Portugal, at a time when U.S. rhetoric at the United Nations and elsewhere was strongly critical of both countries.\(^{17}\) The most glaring bypassing of the African Bureau was the unilateral decision (of the Agriculture Department) at the end of 1962 to give South Africa a share of the reallocated Cuban sugar quota. The Bureau's first knowledge of the decision came two months afterward, in a critical letter to Williams from Theodore E. Brown, director of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLC). Williams was away in Africa, so John Abernethy, his special assistant, replied to Brown, and then sent a plaintive memo to Wayne Fredericks:

"Is it too early for AF (African Bureau) to at least assert to the rest of the Executive Branch that we in AF have a stake in all policy dealings with Africa, and would like to be consulted before the fact on any major decision such as the one involving sugar importation from the Republic of South Africa?"\(^{18}\)

The African Bureau's preoccupation with the Congo and the lack of White House involvement to prompt co-ordination of policy implementation best explain the Bureau's frustration in these operational aspects of Southern
African policy. But it is possible, although not proven, that NASA, the
AEC, Commerce, and Agriculture—knowing the Bureau’s likely response—
did all they could to keep these matters from the Bureau’s attention.
The least likely explanation is a White House-led conspiracy against the
Bureau. There are no signs of White House involvement beyond *pro forma*
and procedural attention.

President Kennedy took a leading role in Southern African policy
at least three times: March 1961; July 1961; and July 1963. In the
first instance, just after the start of the Angolan fighting, he took the
occasion of a Security Council resolution criticizing Portuguese African
policy to "intimate a change in American policy" toward Portugal. 19.
Adlai Stevenson had recommended U.S. support for the African-drafted
resolution. Bowles and Williams were supportive. But the crucial point
remains that the Presidential decision was reactive, *ad hoc* and intuitive.
No policy-planning process preceded it, and little thought was given to
its longer-term implications. Schlesinger’s use of the verb, "intimate",
is curiously revealing; for it suggests the shared confidence that just
this step might be enough to begin quick remedial change in Portuguese
Africa. While not thoughtful about its policy implications, the Presi-
dent was alert to the possible domestic political repercussions. To
alleviate these he issued an extraordinary invitation to Dean Acheson (the
former Secretary of State who still held wide Congressional respect) to
take part in the March 1961 National Security Council meeting which de-
cided on the U.S. response to the United Nations resolution. Although
then a private citizen, Acheson took an uninhibited part in unsuccessful
opposition to support of the resolution. Later, in the fall of 1961,
President Kennedy asked him to take on the task of negotiating with the
Portuguese for an extension of U.S. base rights in the Azores. Acheson
was reluctant to do so, because he believed that the U.S. position on
the Angolan resolution had made a formal extension unacceptable to the
Portuguese government. The President put no pressure on Acheson to ac-
cept the assignment; but after his refusal, he did not again bring him
into White House discussions on this policy area. 20.

Between the first and second Presidential initiatives, conside-
rable exploratory activity took place, but U.S. policy remained indefinite
and unfocused. In early April, Williams and his staff met with the few American academic experts on Angola. In May there were repeated meetings involving the African Bureau with increasingly wider circles of State and USIA staff. In that same month, Williams also met with Eduardo Mondlane, who had been introduced by a staff member of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations (USUN) as a "moderate African nationalist" whose survival as a leader rested "on the support... (received) from the United States." In early June, the Bureau's analysis and planning accelerated. Williams sent two memos to Wayne Fredericks: one required a report on existing U.S. activities in respect to Angola and an outline of recommended future action; the second focused on the "necessity to recognize revolutionary movements." On 14 June Williams reported to Bowles that a pending report on "Union of South Africa Policy" would have to be deferred in order to meet the 19 June deadline for submission of the Angolan policy paper to the White House. In the same period, and apparently separately from the normally slow upward flow of African Bureau proposals, State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) proposed U.S. aid to Angolan student refugees. CU staff submitted a proposal on 2 June; on 20 June CU's executive director rejected the proposal. By 6 July, at the latest, the Angolan policy paper had been worked over enough by NSC staff, including McGeorge Bundy, the President's principal national security advisor, so that Williams felt confident agreement was near on at least first steps. He delegated Fredericks to prepare discussion material for an impending NSC meeting and made efforts to reduce differences between his Bureau and the European Affairs Bureau in advance of that meeting.

The President's second involvement came on 10 July 1961, when he read Cable 31 from the U.S. Embassy in Geneva. It was not customary for cables to go directly to the President, and I have no evidence of what brought this one to his direct attention. Cable 31 reported with concern rumors that a number of Angolan students, having fled Portuguese universities at the start of the March fighting, were about to leave France, West Germany and Switzerland for the Soviet Bloc. The President ordered immediate action. After preliminary staff investigation, National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 60 (NSAM 60) was sent from the White House on 14 July to the State Department and other agencies. The action mandated...
was to ascertain the actual state of the refugee students in western Europe, to take such immediate action as seemed necessary to keep them from going to the Bloc (including on the spot offers of scholarships and other financial aid), and to report back to the White House promptly. 27.

Following quickly on NSAM 60, an interdepartmental task force with participants from State, Defense, AID, USIA, and CIA, was set up to examine the whole range of potential U.S. action vis-à-vis Portuguese Africa and its implications for U.S. relations with Portugal, including sales of U.S. arms and access to the Azores bases. By 21 July Maxwell Taylor, as Presidential coordinator for NSAM 60, reported to Kennedy that action was imminent, although the task force was still engaged in working out detailed implementation plans. By 27 July the task force decided to set controls on arms shipments to Portugal. An immediate moratorium on shipments was begun, despite the strong protests of the Defense Department representative. 28. The Angolan task force gave direction to policy in a way lacking in the March 1961 decision on the United Nations resolution. In its relatively brief life it functioned with the same high level of effectiveness demonstrated by the longer-lived Congo task force, headed by George McGhee, Under Secretary of State for political affairs. The key factor in both cases was Presidential involvement and direct Presidential authority given to the task force chairmen. In both instances, not only was major action taken in remarkably short time, but traditional interdepartmental differences were bridged, if not reconciled. Finally, a high degree of mutual respect and rapport developed, much like that shown by participants in Kennedy's ExCom during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 29.

President Kennedy's final involvement in Southern African policy took place on 18 July 1963. A White House meeting on that day (it is not clear from Schlesinger's report whether it was a full NSC session or an ad hoc meeting of the sort more common in the Kennedy Administration) decided to shift gears vis-à-vis Portugal and South Africa. Public criticism of Salazar's African policy was to be muted; and, at the same time, the existing partial arms embargo toward South Africa was to be enlarged into a full embargo. Kennedy was concerned about the Congressional progress of his nuclear arms ban treaty. If Salazar reacted to continued
U.S. pressure by cutting off access to the Azores, then a conservative Congress might decide to vote down the treaty, on the grounds that the U.S. could not afford its passage "in a time of American weakness". But, according to Schlesinger, the President was concerned that this necessary gesture toward Congress not be seen as a weakening of the U.S. commitment to anti-colonialism in Africa; and he presented the idea of a United Nations announcement of a U.S. arms embargo extension toward South Africa as a "creative" counter-gesture.30.

Others suggest the full arms embargo was more thoroughly cynical: agreement had already been reached on the establishment of a military space tracking facility, in which the Defense Department had been very interested; in return, contracts had been let for the sale to South Africa of various types of weapons it wanted; so that by late 1962, the U.S. could argue in the United Nations that no further UN sanctions were necessary, because of its own unilateral action; but, as UN pressure for mandatory sanctions mounted, it became necessary to make another rhetorical gesture via Stevenson's 1963 announcement of a full arms embargo.31.

The softening of rhetoric vis-à-vis Portugal was quickly followed by the assignment of George Ball (then Under Secretary of State) to discuss relations with Salazar in Lisbon in the summer of 1963. Ball's central gambit was to raise the prospect of substantial U.S. economic and diplomatic support for a Portuguese bid to enter the European Economic Community. The quid pro quo was to be substantial self-determination for Africans in the three Portuguese African territories and guaranteed continuation of U.S. access to the Azores. Ball's mission was essentially a failure. Access to the Azores was to continue, but without a formal agreement; but Salazar rejected out of hand the basic U.S. bargain even suggesting that it amounted to a bribe intended to weaken Portuguese integrity.32. While the Ball mission was kept secret, there were hints of policy change at the UN and in the sudden reserve of U.S. officials toward Portuguese African nationalist leaders at the UN, in Washington, and in the Congo.33.
The Johnson Administration

While President Johnson's only active involvement in Southern African policy was in discussions with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson about Rhodesian UDI, it would be misleading to accept at face value his own insistence (in the widely-repeated story) that he kept confusing Nigeria and Algeria because (he said) they both ended in "geria". This patently self-mocking comment was his way of telling his staff that African policy was generally trivial and that he was not to be bothered by its details. Indeed, his Rhodesian involvement was taken in order to give support to a European ally; and critics have suggested the President's supportive attitude resulted in the failure to consider alternative U.S. positions to simple support of Wilson. 34.

Given the President's attitude, and his growing involvement and preoccupation with the detailed implementation of Vietnam military policy, it is surprising that Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave considerable time to discussion with the South African Ambassador, with the hope of generating some movement by that government. Although Ambassador Naudé requested the initial interview, it was Rusk who insisted on continuing discussion; even though Wayne Fredericks (and possibly other lower-level officials) preferred to keep the Secretary out of the policy area, fearing his influence to be too conservative. Rusk may have been equally worried about Fredericks' inclinations. 35. Rusk believed his Georgian background and his distance from the anti-apartheid liberals, both in and out of government, lent greater credence to his criticisms of apartheid. Among other topics, he broached the possibility of partition and conveyed his dismay at South African political trials. 36.

But despite the Secretary's involvement, U.S. policy remained ambiguous. On the one hand, a diminution of rhetoric took place. On the other hand, with a minimum of public fanfare, support for Southern African refugee students was extended. The ad hoc grants of 1961 had been transmitted into two substantial programs: the first provided pre-university schooling in Africa; the second provided university and professional training in the U.S. Both programs were administered by the African-American Institute, whose president, Waldemar Nielsen, was close to Fredericks. The AAI was instructed by the State Department and AID...
to profess that its funding came from private sources, in order to avoid alienating more-radical participants and the governments of Tanzania and Zambia, where the pre-university programs were based. 37

Obviously, the logic of the 1963 policy shift had not touched these programs. In fact, the Zambian student centre was put into operation after the policy shift, largely because of the endorsement of Ambassador Averell Harriman, then serving as President Johnson's coordinator of African policy. Harriman's commitment was typical of his diplomatic style in other policy areas: it was accomplished with a minimum of formal review and memorandizing, and it appears that he felt the direct educational and humanitarian benefits outweighed certain criticism from the Portuguese and South African governments. 38

Symptomatic of the failure to agree on policy goals for Southern Africa was the prolonged and eventually-aborted policy review which did begin in early 1963. At first, this review involved only two experienced officials who devoted their full time to it for most of that year. When Walt Rostow came to the White House as President Johnson's principal national security advisor, he brought the original study into the formal framework of national policy papers (NPPs). The study moved slowly within the bureaucracy, subject to the crippling impact of amendment and reservation by the various interested departments and bureaus. The one innovative aspect, at least in early drafts, was expanded U.S. developmental aid to the High Commission territories. This was put forth by the African Bureau, but paradoxically resisted by the International Organization Bureau, which feared bilateral aid would undercut UN interests in the territories. 39

In the area of military contacts, the policy review process and the pattern of actual decisions were seldom consonant. After considerable interdepartmental discussion, it was agreed to permit unpublicized use of South African facilities by smaller naval vessels passing the Cape to or from Vietnam. Carriers and any other large vessels would be excluded. But while this solution was acceptable to the Defense Department and most State Department officials, it was unacceptable to Wayne Fredericks, who revised the draft to exclude all American ships. 40. The continued dis-
agreement was evident in discussion of carrier visits as well, but until
the 1967 FDR incident, the South African government had always demanded
that its apartheid laws govern shore leaves of American Black personnel.
For that proposed stop Prime Minister Vorster made clear that he would
tacitly accept U.S. conditions. Even Fredericks agreed, although he
was upset at the coincidence of the visit and a Washington meeting of
the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa. Apparently, no one
in the higher echelons of the State Department instigated Roy Wilkins’
passionate speech at that meeting; which, in turn, led to liberal Con-
gressional pressure on the State Department and to Under Secretary Nicholas
Katzenbach’s decision to halt the Cape Town landing. The Defense De-
partment and most career officials in State were very unhappy with the
decision.41.

Although the policy review was never formally approved, and Sec-
retary Rusk saw it as no more than a useful heuristic exercise,42 it
was manifested at length in Mennen Williams’ valedictory testimony before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee African subcommittee on 1 March 1966.
Williams spoke with eloquence of the complex human difficulties of Southern
Africa. He stressed the continued American commitment to nondiscriminatory
practices and the difficulty of American adherence to these principles in
the South African context. At the same time, he made a case for continued
communication against the alternatives of sanctions or disengagement.43.

But this reluctant acceptance of South African (and to a lesser
extend, Portuguese) staying power, did not carry over into policy toward
South West Africa and Rhodesia. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg took the lead
in the General Assembly resolution calling for the end of the South African
mandate. His influence with President Johnson carried the proposal over
State Department reservations about its implications.44. And U.S. support
of sanctions against Rhodesia remained strong through the remainder of the
Johnson Administration and into the Nixon Administration. A corollary to
the frustration expressed in Williams’ testimony was this growing incon-
sistency in working out the implications of policy for the entire area:
supporting sanctions against Rhodesia while stressing the prospective
utility of communication with South Africa was one obvious paradox.
The Nixon Administration

The Nixon Administration had both political and intellectual motives for the massive program of formal policy review launched by Henry Kissinger and his NSC staff in January 1969 with a massive assessment of Vietnam policy. While Southern Africa was a minor element in the overall review procedure, the Nixon-Kissinger penchant for thoroughness dictated its inclusion and its completion. Begun in April 1969, National Security Council Study Memorandum No. 39 (NSSM 39) was completed by December that same year. The logic of policy review meant that no important steps be taken until final approval was given. One politically awkward matter deferred was the request made directly to the President by Union Carbide that it be exempted from the Rhodesian sanctions. The final decision, a year later, in the context of NSSM 39, permitted Union Carbide and Foote Chemicals to import chrome for which they had paid before the date sanctions were applied.45.

The central premise of NSSM 39 saw previous policy as fitful, inconsistent, misleading of both U.S. intentions and capabilities in the area; but, most basically, as having failed to generate any substantial change toward its aims by the governments involved. Williams had suggested much the same conclusion, but the new Nixon team saw the situation momentarily freed of the ambiguity characteristic of its predecessors.

The new Nixon policy was to be based on communication. UN rhetoric and voting patterns which detracted from communication with the South African and Portuguese governments were to be minimized. Without sacrificing underlying American commitments to equal opportunity and growing political participation by the majority of people, the new policy was to acknowledge that the preponderance of power lay in the hands of these two governments. Their goodwill was the crucial determinant for change in the foreseeable future.46.

By mid-1970 enough bits and pieces of American governmental activity had accumulated so that observers could begin to write of a policy change. The Administration had kept secret its review processes, not because it considered the area important, but because it hoped to minimize
the criticism from liberal and Black political circles. This hope was short-lived. Congressman Charles Diggs, a Black representative from Detroit, became chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee African sub-committee the month of Nixon's inauguration, setting the stage for a symbolic clash over Southern Africa policy whose dimensions have since expanded substantially. There were severe momentary successes in obfuscation. The American visit of Dr. Connie Mulder, the South African Minister of Information (now also Interior Minister and probably next Prime Minister), culminated in an interview with Vice President Agnew. Although this was the first South African Cabinet-White House contact since before Sharpeville, it was kept out of the American press, despite receiving considerable attention in South African media. Not all changes were kept intentionally secret: the State Department announced openly in November 1970 its intention to negotiate a series of developmental programs with the Portuguese government, presumably as a quid pro quo for a formalization of Azores access; but liberal critics seemed surprised and even shocked when the final agreement was announced in January 1972.47.

By late 1971, critics began to focus on the implications of the new policy. Both in Congressman Diggs's sub-committee hearings and in academic journals, the central question became: What ought we to expect of a policy of communication and how do we determine when the testing period for that policy ought to end? The Diggs hearings have increasingly focused on specific details of US governmental and corporate involvement in Southern Africa, forcing these institutions to jibe their general rhetoric about equal treatment with existing disparities in pay, opportunities, and social and political treatment.48. Activist critics have turned from the ephemeral fantasies of total blockades of Southern Africa to more painful calculations of the relative gains and losses in various degrees of continued involvement, disengagement, and boycott.

The establishment of this several-sided American debate has been healthy and productive, but it leaves unsettled the underlying questions posed above. The institutionalization of domestic criticism on a partisan basis (at least for the remaining four years of the Nixon Administration) will make it more difficult for the Nixon Administration to concede publicly
(if it becomes necessary) that its test has failed and a reversion to a more restrictive policy stance is in order. It may be necessary to wait for a new Administration in 1977 before such an evaluation and redirection can take place. But, paradoxically, if that new Administration is a Kennedy Administration (or one of similar attitude towards Southern Africa), the likelihood is high of a reversion to a posture somewhat like that of the previous Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and equally unable to come to grips with Southern Africa.

There is no easy answer to this dilemma. Governments and media in Southern Africa must come to realize that American antipathy for racial discrimination is substantial and growing. It has never been the exclusive domain of a few fervent liberals. Dean Rusk's personal involvement is symbolic of this. It is not so much that he, or any other reasonable and informed American, insists on transposing American institutional and societal patterns onto Southern Africa. If nothing else, it is at least the ingrained American ability to recognize self-deception about racial matters in others, having manifested so much of it in the U.S.

The same circles must understand also that no guarantee of support in large scale conflict is inherent in the often-stated (and sincerely held) American preference for non-violent change in Southern Africa. As one prominent Johnson advisor has pointed out, in a crisis requiring direct Presidential consideration and decision, U.S. economic involvement would probably be a minor factor in the complex calculation of U.S. national interests. A divergent factor is the growing American realization that there has been considerable economic improvement for non-whites in the past few years; and that (however this improvement lags behind white income increases) a withdrawal of U.S. economic activities would hurt non-whites. Chiefs Buthelezi and Matanzima have emphatically posed this message during their American visits. While it is an awkward message - especially for Congressmen and Senators with large Black constituencies - it is the right message.

Looking back as an American at the past fifteen years of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa, it is possible to conclude with modest hope. For the first time policy is being made with its impact on the
areas as the primary, rather than a marginal, consideration. The gap between naive, well-intended preference and available knowledge about likely developments is being narrowed. For the first time, critics of policy have a Congressional focal point for articulation of their concern. But the hope is not for massive restructuring of Southern African institutional life, particularly not in South Africa. The continual steady application of American principles (too often confined to UN rhetoric) will leave little room for dramatic gestures; nor does it promise success. But it is the only sensible course.
a. I want to thank Mr. John Barratt, Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, for making available the facilities of Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg, for a discussion of an earlier version of this paper. Comments by Mr. Barratt and Mr. John Burns, of the U.S. Information Service, were stimulants to changes in the paper and to the inclusion of the following explanatory paragraph.

This paper is drawn from a larger body of research dealing with the formulation of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa since 1957. Herein I concentrate on the question of policy direction and coherence. Within the overall study, it becomes clear that the interaction between Presidents and bureaucratic organizations has been (with still unclear modifications since 1969) the primary explanation of the policy-making pattern. In making this argument, the larger study discusses and puts aside the other major possibility: that Congress and/or business and/or private liberal organizations were instrumental influences. It also examines some interesting questions this paper can only hint at: the degree of reliance on informed diplomats in the field; the assumptions and attitudes underlying U.S. support for refugee students; and the overall views of Southern Africa held by policy-makers.

1. See, for example, "Dear Franklin: Letters to President Roosevelt from Lincoln MacVeagh, U.S. Minister to South Africa, 1942 - 1943", Munger Africana Library, Issue No. 12, March 1972.

2. Goodpaster's crucial role becomes clear from examination of papers in the Eisenhower Presidential Library. It deserves more attention than it gets in the standard work about NSC staffing patterns -- Keith C. Clark and Lawrence J. Legere, The President and the Management of National Security, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1969 -- which accepts as fact the Eisenhower Administration's formal separation of policy and operations. Pages 60 - 70, especially 60, 61.

3. Eisenhower Library, Official File 8, State Department, July - December 1960 (1).


5. Holmes interview.

6. The central evidence lies in Goodpaster's handling of cables and letters to the President calling for additional action. Although most came from prestigious American leaders, without exception they were referred to the State Department for a standard noncommittal reply to be drafted for the eventual signature of the President.

Eisenhower Library, General File 122, Union of South Africa: entries of 23 March, 25 March, 4 April, 7 April, and 12 April 1960.

10. Eisenhower Library, Official File 183V, Union of South Africa: 10 October 1960, staff memos; and 19 October 1960, Eisenhower letter to Oppenheimer, "enjoyed our chat".
17. Kennedy Library, White House Central files, Boxes 68 and 70.
18. Williams Papers, Box A25: Abernethy papers; Williams interview.
21. Williams Papers, Box A22, Staff Assignments, April and May 1961; Box A35, Schedule Book, 1961.
27. Stephens interview.
28. Stephens interview.
29. Williams interview;
Williams Papers, Box A21: 12 September 1963, Bronson Tweedy (CIA?)
letter to Williams, re his induction into Congo Club (a post-crisis
group formed by Williams on model ExCom), "I consider the collabora-
tion between our two organizations to represent a first-class example
of what can be accomplished."

30. Schlesinger, page 582.

pages 292, 296, 297.
Schlesinger, page 581;
Waldemar Campbell, interview, 20 October 1971.

32. Dean Rusk, interview, 17 April 1972.
Williams interview;
Patricia Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United
Nations", International Conciliation, No. 545, November 1963,
page 18.

33. Wayne Fredericks, interview, 20 April 1972;

34. Ulric Haynes, Jr., interview, 30 September 1971; Edward K. Hamilton,
interview, 21 September 1971; Nielsen, pages 311, 312.

35. Rusk, interviews;
Campbell interview.

36. Rusk interview;
Williams interview.

37. Harry Stein, interview, 18 May 1971;
"Refugee Educational Programs and Basic Facts on Refugee Programs",
African-American Institute, no date (1964?).

January 1964;
"East Africa Training Program: Chronology of Events", African-
American Institute, no date (1965?);
Williams interview.

39. Campbell interview;
Jesse MacKnight, interview, 22 October 1971.

40. Campbell interview.

41. Fredericks interview;
Campbell interview;
Hamilton interview;
Lynford Lardner, interview, 9 September 1970.

42. Rusk interview.


