Trans-boundary natural resources management in southern Africa: Local historical and livelihood realities within the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area

Webster Whande
Trans-boundary natural resources management in southern Africa: Local historical and livelihood realities within the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area

Webster Whande
# Contents

List of tables and figures ii
Abstract iii
Acronyms and abbreviations iv
Acknowledgements iv

Chapter 1: Introduction 1
  Reflections on history, livelihoods, security and terminology 2
  Research methodology 5
  Introduction to the case study area 7
  Structure of the report 10

Chapter 2: The politics of protected areas and conservation 11
  The establishment of protected areas 11
  The advent of community-based conservation 12
  TBNRM: new approaches to protected areas and/or community-based conservation? 14

Chapter 3: Bantustans, protected areas and national security: an alliance of interests in land dispossession along the Madimbo corridor and Pafuri triangle? 18
  The impact of forced removals on local people 19
  Protected areas, homeland consolidation and security concerns 20
  Conclusion 25

Chapter 4: Land reform, conservation and security at the Pafuri triangle and the Madimbo corridor 26
  Restitution and conservation: the Makuleke land claim 26
  Restitution and military presence: the Gumbu-Mutele claim for Madimbo land 28
  Conclusion 31

Chapter 5: The complexity of livelihoods – the case of Bennde Mutale village 32
  Local understandings of sources of stratification 32
  Household typologies and livelihood strategies 33

Chapter 6: Land-use conflicts in a time of TBNRM 39
  Mining as a livelihood strategy 39
  Conservation-driven eco-tourism development 40
  Grazing as a form of land use 41
  Settlement and irrigated agriculture as an option 42
  Conclusion 43

Chapter 7: TBNRM, local livelihoods and security – towards a new framework? 44
  Conclusion 47

References 49
List of tables and figures

Tables

Table 1: Expanded security scenarios  3
Table 2: Household categories and livelihood strategies  34
Table 3: Economic compositions or livelihood clusters along the Madimbo corridor  39

Figures

Figure 1: Buying and selling on grants-payment day  6
Figure 2: The Madimbo corridor/Matshakatini Nature Reserve  9
Figure 3: The Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park and Conservation Area  16
Figure 4: Removals along the Madimbo corridor  19
Figure 5: Household categories and livestock possession by percentage  33
Figure 6: The village of Bennde Mutale  35
Abstract

The end of apartheid rule in South Africa, together with the termination of the civil war in Mozambique and the occupation of Namibia by South Africa in the early 1990s, seemed to herald profound changes in international relations within the southern African region. These changes saw not only the end of frontline states' hostility towards the apartheid regime but also new approaches to co-operation, witnessed by increased focus on regional development issues through regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Conservation emerged as one area that could foster co-operation between countries of the region. By the mid-1990s, trans-boundary natural resources management, trans-frontier conservation, trans-boundary protected areas and ‘peace parks’ had taken root as vehicles for regional economic integration, peaceful resolution of conflict and conservation of biodiversity.

This report examines the impacts of local historical experiences with conservation and current livelihood complexities on efforts to implement the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park (GLTP) and the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA). It stresses the contested nature of land and natural resource rights by exploring local conflicts over land use, authority and territorial boundaries, as well as the peripheral attention accorded to these issues in planning and implementing trans-boundary approaches to conservation. Using the example of the GLTFCA, specifically the experience of some of the villages along the Madimbo corridor in South Africa, the report highlights the complexities involved in attempting trans-frontier conservation in an area with a history of dispossession and where livelihoods are perceived to be threatened by outside interventions. The report concludes by proposing a human and environmental security approach towards implementing TFCAs.
## Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHEAD</td>
<td>Animal Health for the Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>community-based conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>community-based natural resources management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNP</td>
<td>contractual national park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Communal Property Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLTFCA</td>
<td>Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLTP</td>
<td>Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN-ROSA</td>
<td>IUCN Regional Office for Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMB</td>
<td>Joint Management Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Peace Parks Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBNRM</td>
<td>trans-boundary natural resources management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBPA</td>
<td>trans-boundary protected area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFCA</td>
<td>trans-frontier conservation area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The demise of apartheid rule in South Africa, and the end of the Mozambican civil war and occupation of Namibia by South Africa, ushered in new opportunities and possibilities for regional co-operation. Apartheid South Africa and independent countries in southern Africa provided the site for one of the most intense contestations of the Cold War (Buzan 1991). As a result, security approaches in the region were highly militaristic, with apartheid funding rebel movements in Mozambique and Angola while using natural resources in these countries to fund the supply of arms (Ellis 1994). South Africa’s boundaries became fortified, especially where they were shared with countries hostile to the apartheid regime. In the post-apartheid and post-Cold War era, countries in southern Africa are engaged in a co-operative enterprise in which the environment, specifically along national borders, plays or is supposed to play a role in regional peace, security, integration and conservation.

Since the mid-1990s, various forms of trans-boundary natural resources management (TBNRM), which involves any type of collaboration across boundaries for ecosystem-wide management and conservation of biodiversity, have gained a high and controversial level of attention in southern Africa. For instance, the focus on state-led processes for conservation has been viewed as reversing the social and equity goals and gains of community-based conservation (CBC) and sustainable natural resources management (Hutton, Adams & Murombedzi 2005). Widely implemented in the 1980s, CBC emphasised decentralised natural resources management and an increased role for local people in decision-making over natural resources management. Coming after a century in which the main focus was on protected areas (emphasising the exclusion of people from certain landscapes), CBC addressed conflicts between conservation agents and local agrarian people. The term ‘conservation’ itself highlighted a shift of focus away from the strict protection and state-funded, centralised preservation of landscapes. Conservation areas could contribute towards the protection of certain landscapes through the sustainable use of natural resources. The various forms of TBNRM include trans-boundary protected areas (TBPAs) or peace parks, trans-frontier conservation areas (TFCAs) and spatial development initiatives (see Katerere, Hill & Moyo 2001). TBNRM’s focus on state-led processes has been seen as reinventing ‘fortress’ or protectionist approaches to biodiversity, even as such approaches have largely alienated resource-dependent local people from the resource base (Hutton et al. 2005). Additionally, the branding of TBNRM initiatives as peace parks has attracted increased attention and resources from international funding agencies and NGOs (Van Ameron 2002), sparking concerns that they are Western-driven initiatives (Hughes 2002).

On the other hand, TBNRM is regarded as offering an opportunity to achieve the multiple goals of conserving globally significant biodiversity through ecosystem-wide planning, and the regional integration and reuniting of local people estranged by colonial boundaries (see Griffin et al. 1999). Most TBNRM initiatives in southern Africa are marketed on the basis of conservation-driven eco-tourism, which, it is argued, will have positive spin-offs for local people (see Peace Parks Foundation 2006). While there is widespread interest from the private sector to invest in TBNRM areas, it is not clear how local people will benefit from such developments (see Dzingirai 2004; Hughes 2002).

Empirical evidence from ongoing research conducted for this report indicates that local people along the Madimbo corridor in South Africa and within the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA) are wary of protected-areas management and biodiversity conservation approaches. They remain hostile to any form of conservation interventions, whether it emphasises strict protection or sustainable use of resources. This report argues that taking an ahistorical approach to agrarian issues and to the complexity and diversity of local livelihoods in formulating TBNRM initiatives jeopardises the success of its implementation and, instead, generates local resistance.
Reflections on history, livelihoods, security and terminology

Various scholars have written on the history of protected areas and changes in natural resources governance and their linkages to social and political trends (see Murombedzi 2003; Carruthers 1995). Most have explored the colonial impacts on African ways of social and political organisation and production relations. A generally agreed inference in environmental history scholarship is that reciprocal human-environment relations characterised pre-colonial African societies, and that this was facilitated by low human populations that could migrate to other regions in the face of localised environmental damage.

This report uses the impact of historical events and protected-areas intervention to examine current relations between conservation efforts, on the one hand, and local people and their livelihoods along the Madimbo corridor in South Africa, on the other. It places emphasis on the recent history of the apartheid state's interventions along the Madimbo corridor. Specifically, the report shows how interventions in the late 1960s, such as the extension of the Kruger National Park into the Pafuri triangle, homeland/bantustan consolidations and militarised state security approaches, impacted on local African residents. These interventions generated specific perceptions of protected areas and biodiversity. This is not, however, to discount the structural limitations imposed by early colonial domination, which have been covered extensively in the growing analysis of environmental history in South Africa (Carruthers 1995). Rather, a focus on the recent history of the corridor allows for an analysis of current perceptions and accounts of the lived experiences of the older generation.

While this report is limited in historical time, it is approached on the basis that localised histories can be used to examine current perceptions, in this case of state interventions, which have both local and broader dimensions. In their study of natural resources conservation and management, Walker and Peters (2001) show that localised historical attempts at privatisation and/or enclosure of common property resources in Malawi by the urban elites and the government now generate specific responses, representations and reactions to outside interventions. Their study shows that land and natural resources form a crucial link between local and not so local interests and how historical experiences lead to certain outcomes. This report focuses on local historical experiences in relation to outside interventions. It does so by exploring discourses of local land rights in relation to discourses of conservation and protected-areas management, national state security and the bantustan approach of separating people along ethnic and racial lines in the period from the 1960s to the present.

It remains important for the report to show that the localised historical experiences of the residents of Madimbo have led to their current views on conservation. While showing a clear cause-and-effect relationship between the two might be problematic, interviews conducted with residents indicate that certain images and views of conservation and militarised state security can be attributed to people's specific historical experiences. For local people along the Madimbo corridor, these experiences are approached from the perspective of their impacts on land and resource rights and, thus, how they affect local livelihoods.

A second and important aspect of the report is that of livelihoods. Rural people rely on multiple resources and sources to sustain a living (Shackleton, Shackleton & Cousins 2000). Agriculture, including crop farming and livestock keeping, is an important aspect of rural livelihoods but is never practiced by and on its own (Ashley 2000). It is complemented by a number of strategies, including harvesting natural resources, and wage employment, remittances and other means of obtaining income. Therefore, livelihoods are determined by the assets that households can draw on to match specific needs (Shackleton et al. 2000). Shackleton et al. further note that access to assets is a key determinant of the vulnerability or sustainability of a livelihoods strategy.

To cope with the uncertainties of livelihoods sources, rural households often engage in a range of activities that are aimed at enhancing household income. These activities support basic household needs and contribute towards food security. Thus, rural livelihoods are complex and diverse. Natural resources act as safety nets for the poorest households or to prop up households if they lose certain sources of income. Their role, since it is not monetised, is often not captured or considered in rural development, land
Research Report

3

reform and agricultural policies or interventions (Shackleton et al. 2000).

By highlighting the complexity of livelihoods, it is not proposed here that every local need be accommodated through conservation plans or any other outside intervention. Instead, as noted by Ashley (2000: 7), interventions need to understand how ‘livelihoods can be enhanced by adjusting decisions on what is developed and how, in ways that reflect people’s livelihood priorities’. Ashley further notes, in relation to tourism, that the conventional views of its contribution to macro sector competitiveness and conservation are not premised on the interests of the poor. As will be discussed in this report, protected areas and militarised state security have impacted on local livelihoods. Past interventions in the Madimbo corridor and Pafuri triangle are discussed in terms of how local people view them as potential threats to their livelihoods.

The third aspect of this study relates to issues of security. Increasingly, security is referred to in terms broader than just militarised state-centred security (see Dabelko, Lonergan & Mathew n.d.; UNU-EHS 2005; Naidoo 2001). The decreased incidence and likelihood of inter-state wars after the end of the Cold War has led to shifts in how state resources are allocated (see Duffield 2005; Buzan 1991). Thus, as Brauch (2005: 10) notes, ‘the change of the international order and the security agenda’ was triggered by the fall of the Berlin Wall. Buzan (1991) further observes that the intense rivalry of the Cold War, characterised by a bipolarity of power, the danger of real war and security issues dominated by political and military concerns, has been supplanted by a multi-polar power structure. A consequence of this has been a decrease in the transmission of warfare technologies and arms to developing countries. Southern Africa is specifically noted as having been an intense site for the pursuit of ideological rivalry (Buzan 1991; Vale 2003). The strategic position of regions such as southern Africa has somehow diminished with the end of the Cold War.1

The declining role of (or perceived reduction in) military threats has resulted in other forms of security becoming more prominent. Yet, the broadening of security poses questions, specifically about what exactly has to be secured and what the referent of security should be – the state, or a diversity of actors from individuals to regional bodies to the international community (see Naidoo 2001; Brauch 2005). In short, the end of the Cold War led to a change in how security is conceptualised, as well as an increased questioning of the state as an effective provider of security. Table 1 summarises the different scenarios of reference, noting the active threats if an expanded security concept is adopted.

Apart from the state acting as a referent of security, Table 1 shows that with the new conceptualisation of security, the state can also be the source of a threat. Other sources of insecurity result from the increased and rapid movement of goods, services and people across boundaries. Duffield (2005: 143) notes that the present security threat is perceived to be ‘decentralized shadow economies, trans-border migratory flows, and non-state global insurgent networks that, in an independent world, are able to threaten international stability’. Brauch (2005) summarises discussions about the potential roles

Table 1: Expanded security scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference object (security of)</th>
<th>Value at risk (security of)</th>
<th>Source(s) of threat (security from)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National security (political, military dimension)</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>National sovereignty, territorial integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal security</td>
<td>Nations, societal groups</td>
<td>National unity, identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human security</td>
<td>Individuals, humankind</td>
<td>Survival, quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Ecosystem</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brauch (2005)

1 It should be noted, however, that other regions such as the Middle East have increased in strategic value for the West, partly as a result of natural resources, as seen in current conflicts and two wars involving the world ‘superpowers’ in the space of 15 years.
of the state as including the provision of security in order that individuals may pursue their lives without much hindrance. Threats to such security are particularly present in countries where the Cold War was contested intensely.

The effect of years of Cold War arms supply is revisiting developing countries through loose networks of criminals who operate predominantly within these states. In southern Africa, for instance, the proliferation of small arms, now in the hands of various actors who use these weapons (or provide them for others), is said to be a threat to the consolidation of democracy and sustainable development (Cock 1996). In short, neighbouring states do not pose the biggest security threats; various factors and actors, both internal and moving more freely across international boundaries, threaten the national goals of protecting citizens and national security. As a result of the diffuse nature of these threats, questions about the referents of security, as posed by Naidoo (2001), assume an important role.

Dabelko et al. (n.d.) advance a number of areas prominent in security terms since the conceptual shift away from militarised national security. Security is linked increasingly to other issues such as the environment (specifically, how environmental change or degradation can lead to social conflict). This can be traced to the 1970s and the rising to prominence of global environmental change and political efforts to deal with these changes as security issues. Development interventions, it is noted, should be viewed in terms of their contribution to human security. Different agencies of the United Nations have delineated various security themes or aspects ranging from food to environmental, livelihood, energy and global health security (UNU-EHS 2005), which all have to do with compromising livelihood strategies by limiting freedom of movement, increasing state surveillance and reducing security of tenure over land and natural resources.

There are different understandings of human security, including freedom from want and violence (see Khagram & Ali 2006), people-centred security and improved quality of life. It is also seen as providing a voice for the politically marginalised (Brauch, 2005).

The ongoing presence of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) along the Madimbo corridor underlines the continued role of militarised security. This is in spite of the rhetoric around TBNRM in relation to security issues. However, it is not surprising, since parties to TBNRM agreements have national and strategic objectives to pursue along international boundaries that might not be complementary to the objectives of environmental co-operation (Van Ameron 2002). Given that national sovereignty remains a high-priority area, it is necessary to understand the role and potential of TBNRM in the realm of peace and security. As a platform for negotiation, TBNRM might offer options for resolving conflicts peacefully.

However, the pursuit of multiple objectives by multiple interests in these regions means that there are potential conflict areas. Others view the presence of multiple actors and objectives within TBNRM in a more positive light (see Hanks 2001).

TBNRM has remained focused on a coalition of state-based actors, development and environment NGOs and the private sector to guide policy evolution and implementation. To the extent that security is now broadly understood, the minimal participation of local communities is a limiting factor. From an institutional and political perspective, TBNRM has not done much to address the multiple understandings of security. Instead, state delimitation of areas across boundaries for conservation (and negotiations towards this end) can be viewed as a form of institutionalised threat to human security at a local level, in terms of compromising livelihoods strategies by limiting freedom of movement, increasing state surveillance and reducing security of tenure over land and natural resources.

This can be seen in the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies that have acted as a driver for the evolution and implementation of TBNRM. Ramutsindela (2004) notes that the adoption of such policies in Mozambique and South Africa occurred in post-conflict situations where...
the state was confronted with contradictory demands for economic development, poverty alleviation, conservation and restoration of land and resource rights. Thus, it remains unclear how TBNRM will fulfil these competing and often conflicting demands. Certainly, as a result of the neo-liberal emphasis, some see TBNRM as perpetuating colonial-era land and resource tenure regimes and reproducing global inequities in access to and use of natural resources, which inherently produces certain insecurities (see Hughes 2002; Dzingirai 2004). As will be discussed in this report, threats to local livelihoods continue to be defined along the lines of exclusion from certain landscapes, the conservation of which can be achieved through tourism investment and economic development.

TBNRM is a prominent model for biodiversity conservation. It is understood to mean any form of collaboration across boundaries that contributes to the objectives of biodiversity conservation (see Griffin et al. 1999; Van der Linde et al. 2001). Various initiatives and activities characterise TBNRM. These include TBPAs, also referred to as peace parks (see Van Ameron 2002), the main objective of which is the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems across boundaries. They are often surrounded by TFCAs, whose objectives include contributing to biodiversity conservation through sustainable management of natural resources. TFCAs are often referred to as multiple-use areas and seek to support local livelihoods through a range of natural resources approaches, which may include CBC.

While TBNRM is defined as encompassing all forms of collaboration, some confusion has arisen regarding how this term is used. For instance, in southern Africa, TBNRM has been taken to mean the up-scaling of community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) approaches across international boundaries (see Jones & Chonguica 2001). In reality, though, up-scaling of CBNRM has not received any attention, and it is questionable whether governments have the resources and willingness to pursue devolved natural resources management, a central aspect of CBNRM, across political boundaries. A key challenge, for instance, is how trans-boundary devolved natural resources management will impact on notions of national security. In this respect, Duffy (1997) notes that the Zimbabwean military delayed negotiations around the establishment of the GLTP, raising questions concerning national security and sovereignty.

In addition, countries in southern Africa differ as to whether or not (or to what extent) to decentralise responsibilities or devolve power and authority to local people for the management of natural resources. This presents a challenge to any attempts to up-scale CBNRM across boundaries. Instead, most TBNRM initiatives have been organised around TBPAs and TFCAs. The lack of emphasis on up-scaling CBNRM, and the increased focus on TBPAs, has met with scepticism, leading some scholars to label it a form of ‘return to the barriers’ of strictly protected areas with the exclusion of people dependent on local resources (see Hutton et al. 2005).

Buzzard (2001) argues that the different policy frameworks on and approaches to the use of natural resources act as a hindrance to joint natural resources management. This raises questions about the place of local people and their interests in TBNRM. In this report, TBNRM is used to refer to the different approaches to trans-boundary co-operation for managing environmental resources. Due to the absence of a CBNRM focus, this report uses TBNRM to mean any form of agreement across boundaries for environmental management. Therefore, it is limited to TBPAs and TFCAs, with TBPAs referring to the core GLTP and TFCAs referring to the broader area under agreement, including communal areas and privately owned land (see Figure 3).

Research methodology

This report is based on ongoing primary research within the GLTFCA, specifically some of the villages along the Madimbo corridor where the author is conducting field research. It further draws from secondary data sources. Primary data were collected through a variety of methods; these included semi-structured formal interviews, informal discussions, focus-group discussions, participant observation, and attendance at local, municipal and provincial meetings and workshops, including those organised by the SANDF, Land Claims Commission, Mutale Municipality and Limpopo Parks and Tourism Board. Secondary data sources consulted include published and unpublished materials on the Madimbo and Pafuri regions. Most of these documents were located in provincial and national government departments.

Primary and secondary data sources were also accessed on TBNRM policy, mostly in relation
to TFCA and TBPA issues. Recent literature on the process, potential and actual impacts of TBNRM was consulted, and the author has compiled an annotated bibliography on CBNRM in southern Africa (Whande 2007a). Attendance and presentations at southern African regional workshops dealing with the issues of local people or communities and protected areas has been an important way of tracking developments in the conceptual and practical terrain of TBNRM. The first workshop in this regard was organised by the Trans-boundary Protected Areas Research Initiative (TBPARI) on best practices in engaging communities and conservation practitioners within the GLTFCA. The second, held in November 2005, was a World Conservation Union Regional Office for Southern Africa (IUCN-ROSA) workshop on indigenous peoples and protected areas in the southern African region. In March 2006, the author attended a workshop organised by Animal Health for the Environment and Development within the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area (AHEAD-GLTFCA). In March 2007, the author presented part of this research report to the AHEAD-GLTFCA annual workshop in Mozambique. Additionally, the researcher subscribes to electronic discussion forums dedicated to TBNRM research, analysis, networking and communications.

At a local level, livelihoods data were collected in the village of Bennde Mutale to provide a contextual basis for examining the place of land and natural resources in people’s everyday activities. Of the villages along the Madimbo corridor, Bennde Mutale was chosen for detailed research because of its proximity to a network of protected areas including the Kruger National Park, the provincial Makuya Park and the Matshakatini Nature Reserve, as well as to the borders of South Africa and Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Other villages were engaged through attendance at the Vhembe Communal Property Association (CPA) meetings, consultations with local leaders, including headmen of several villages and the chief, and attendance at monthly gatherings such as grants-payment day and cattle markets.

The research in Bennde Mutale, while not constituting a statistically representative sample, provides an in-depth understanding of the place of ecological resources in sustaining local livelihoods. Given the history of land dispossession (and consequent displacement of local people) and the area’s livelihoods opportunities (as determined by environmental and climatic conditions), the situation in Bennde Mutale provides a general picture of human-

---

1 Of the villages along the Madimbo corridor, Bennde Mutale is closest to Kruger/Makuleke Contractual Park, at about 500m from the gate, and to the intersection of the borders of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

4 CPAs have their origins in the changing political landscape, which sought to replace tribal authorities (largely seen as having collaborated with colonial and apartheid systems) with democratically elected structures that would hold land on behalf of local people.
environment relations along the Madimbo corridor. Informal discussions with people from other villages were conducted whenever possible, and attendance at various meetings related to land and natural resources provided a basis to conclude that the livelihoods situation and constraints faced were similar in all the villages.

In Bennde Mutale, local understandings of wealth and households were used to generate household typologies based on livelihoods strategies, income generation and the dependence of each of the household categories on land and natural resources. Three different focus-group discussions were convened for this purpose, and the typologies that resulted differed only in detail. A random sample of households from each of the categories was selected for in-depth research, which covered matters including understandings of the history of the area and local perceptions of various government interventions. While the sample was random, in some cases selection was influenced by focus-group participants’ commentaries on different households; these included statements such as: ‘now that’s a suffering somebody, totally poor’; ‘without the river for fishing that family would not survive’; ‘that is a wealthy family’; and ‘even with two salaries they are not wealthy, just rich maybe’. Some of the households were chosen because they were led by women. The selected households were then involved in a long-term research process of interviews and participant observation.

Checking for accuracy, or triangulation, of the data was done through informal discussions with people from Bennde Mutale and other villages, and attendance at local meetings for all the villages along the corridor. Two report-back sessions, both in October 2006, were held for data verification. The first included all the villages involved in the land claim. It was held at the old Madimbo site along the Limpopo River as part of the celebrations organised by the Vhembe CPA. The second report-back workshop was held with the residents of Bennde Mutale. At both events, invaluable comments were made on the emerging research results, thereby assisting in cross-checking data obtained from individual interviews or through participant observation. Further triangulation was through secondary data sources. Previous research conducted along the corridor and the Pafuri triangle was consulted (Poonan 1996; Linden 2004; Steenkamp 2001; Ralushai 1979, 1982), and discussions were held with some of these researchers to gain an understanding of long-term changes in the area.\footnote{Professor Victor Ralushai provided important data, some of it unpublished manuscripts, based on his research at HaMutele spanning four decades.}

Given the critical importance of land and natural resources, as evidenced by the many conflicts over these resources, the research assessed the impact of outside interventions on local livelihoods strategies. This report focuses on how various past government interventions, through the expansion of the Kruger National Park and the presence of the military in the area, led to the dispossession of local people. This history generated certain perceptions that underline the fact that local people are suspicious of militarised security and conservation interventions.

The research involved an analysis of various actors and their interests: the local resource-dependent people, local leadership, municipal governance, military personnel and specialist government units, such as veterinary officials, protected areas management at local park level, and provincial and national policy-oriented units. Analysis of actors and their interests fits in with a growing body of literature on political ecology (Singh & Van Houtum 2002).

Political ecology offers diverse perspectives on how meso and macro factors shape and affect local access to, use of and control over natural resources (see Wilshusen 2003). Most political ecology writings can be summarised as focusing on three issues: time, scale and power. In terms of time, emphasis is put on understanding past events and processes and how they affect ongoing conditions of resource access and use. Scale relates to location-specific dynamics affecting decisions on issues such as land use and their relation to processes generated at other levels. Political ecology is concerned also with the outcomes of environmental management that result from political interactions, directing attention to struggles among diverse actors over natural resources access and control (Wilshusen 2003: 42). This report uses the concept of political ecology to focus on local contestations over land and natural resources and how they are linked to broader policy and political interventions.

**Introduction to the case study area**

In 1969, local villages along the Limpopo River were forcibly moved to make way for the military occupation of a strip of land in the
northernmost part of South Africa. The area, referred to as the Madimbo corridor (deriving its name from one of the villages forcibly moved) was occupied by the military in the early 1970s. The villages were incorporated into the Venda homeland, also in the far north of South Africa. The military occupying the corridor spearheaded the formation of the Matshakatini Nature Reserve (see Figure 2), the boundaries of which are contiguous with the corridor (see Poonan 1996). With the official end of apartheid, all homeland territories, including the villages that had been forcibly moved from the Madimbo corridor, were incorporated into the new South Africa. The process of re-incorporation involved a wide-ranging demarcation of boundaries to coincide with new forms of local government. After the demarcation of municipal boundaries in 2000, villages along the Madimbo corridor were included in Ward 9 of the Mutale Local Municipality in the Vhembe District Municipality (DC34). However, ward and municipal boundaries do not coincide with territorial claims by tribal authorities or traditional leaders.\(^6\)

Mutale Municipality is regarded as having a competitive advantage in agriculture, mining and tourism (PIMS 2006). Located in the far north-east of Limpopo Province in the Vhembe District Municipality, the Mutale Municipality borders the Kruger National and Makuya Parks to the east. To the north is the Madimbo corridor (or Matshakatini Nature Reserve), the return of which has been claimed by the villages that were forcibly moved.\(^7\) It is because of Mutale Municipality’s proximity to the network of state-protected areas to the east and north, as well as private game ranches to the west, that the municipality is viewed favourably in terms of tourism possibilities. However, the development of the area’s tourism potential is marred by its remoteness from main cities such as Johannesburg. In addition, tourism operators in the area note that development is hindered by the military presence along the Madimbo corridor and by high malaria prevalence (interview with Glynn Taylor, former manager Pafuri River Camp). Tourism, however, remains a target area for development by the municipality, with the observation that ‘tourism opportunities...are almost unlimited. Reserves such as Madimbo-Matshakatini can attract a large number of tourists’ (Gaffney’s 2006).

It is also within this local municipality that the Tshikondeni Coal Mine is located. In the past, there have been other mining operations within the Madimbo corridor, specifically for graphite. Exploration for diamonds in the mid-1990s continues to be viewed as evidence that there are mineral deposits along the Limpopo River. Probably due to operations at Tshikondeni, mining is quoted as being the largest employment provider in the Mutale Municipality (Gaffney’s 2006).

To the west of the Madimbo corridor is a cluster of irrigated large-scale commercial farms drawing water from the Limpopo and Nwanedi Rivers. Historically, the rivers supported African subsistence farmers. The river valley is regarded as having rich sedimentary deposits, which provide important farming possibilities (Ashton et al. 2001). Water from the Mutale River has supported irrigation projects within some of the villages falling under the Mutale Municipality (Lahiff 1997). While the municipality has identified cattle and crop farming as a potential area for contributing to local development (Gaffney’s 2006), this remains under-represented in local Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) (Mutale Municipality, 2005/06). As in most African communities in the southern African region, the actual contribution of household crop and livestock farming remains little understood and, as a result, undervalued (see Shackleton et al. 2000).

The Madimbo corridor and the villages along it are characterised by high temperatures and a low annual average rainfall of 450 mm (Zambatis 2000). The climate is influenced by the Indian Ocean tropical cyclones and south-easterly winds (Ashton et al. 2001). A ten-year drought cycle characterises the area. The middle (where the Madimbo corridor is located) and lower (in Mozambique) reaches of the Limpopo River do not have any surface water run-off in periods of drought, due to poor drainage and a broad sandy channel in these reaches (Ashton et al. 2001). These climatic conditions are often cited as evidence that the area is marginally useful for agriculture and is better suited to wildlife.

Approximately 98 per cent of the population of Mutale Municipality (estimated at 78,922) is located in rural areas (Gaffney’s 2006). Deprivation is high in terms of unmet needs for food, land and housing, health and education (HSRC 2001); with high levels of unemployment, Mutale is regarded as the poorest municipality in Vhembe District (Lahiff 1997; Hall et al. 2004).

---

\(^{6}\) For instance, villages in Ward 9 are divided in location between Chief’s Mutule and Tshikundamalema.

\(^{7}\) The land claim was instituted by seven villages: Beninde Mutule, Gumbo, Madimbo, Masisi, Sigonde, Tshenzhelani and Tshikuyu (commonly referred to as the Gumbu-Mutule claimants).
After the 1969 forced removals, some villages were relocated in areas with dry and poorly drained soils to the south of the corridor. The village of Bennde Mutale sits on the ‘shoulder’ of the Mutale River, where its flow turns sharply from a north-eastwards direction to the south-east, and adjacent to the Kruger National/Makuleke Contractual Park and Makuya Park to the east (see Figure 2).

The northernmost section of the municipality comprises the Madimbo corridor (or Matshakatini Nature Reserve), incorporating approximately 45,000 hectares of land. To the east, the corridor is bordered by the Kruger/Makuleke Contractual Park or the Pafuri triangle, and to the north by the Limpopo River, which constitutes the international boundary with Zimbabwe. To the west, approximately 45 km as the crow flies from Kruger/Makuleke, it is bounded by commercial farms clustered on the confluence of the Nwanedi and Limpopo Rivers. The area is referred to as a ‘corridor’ because it formed a security zone, patrolled by the South African Defence Force (SADF), between the Venda homeland and Zimbabwe. The corridor varies in width from 6–10 km between the Limpopo River and the road that runs from the N1 highway in the west through the Kruger National Park to the east (see Figure 2). Apart from the military presence, the corridor has been used as a quarantine and disease-monitoring area for livestock moving from Zimbabwe. Two fences run along the corridor, reflecting these uses. The first fence is electrified and patrolled by the SANDF. The second fence, the veterinary red line, is no longer functional but serves as an important reference point for local people in their struggles for the restoration of land and resource rights. It forms the southern boundary of both the Madimbo corridor and the Matshakatini Nature Reserve (which was proclaimed as such in 1992). Apart from the land occupied by the military and forming the Matshakatini Nature Reserve, the Vhembe CPA land claim included part of the land that has since been restored to the Makuleke people. This piece of land, about 5,000 hectares (see Steenkamp 2001; De Villiers 1999a), to the east of the Madimbo corridor and now included in the Makuleke Contractual Park, formed part of the Madimbo corridor until the

---

Figure 2: The Madimbo corridor/Matshakatini Nature Reserve

Source: Anita Allen, The Star, 17 August 1995

---

1 It should be noted, however, that removals within the Madimbo corridor had been happening from about 1940, firstly from along the banks of the Limpopo River, but these did not result in relocation outside the corridor. Removals from the corridor were effected after the formation of the Venda homeland, to where the people were moved; thereafter, the corridor acted as a buffer zone between the then Rhodesia and Venda (see Figure 4; Langefeld 2000).

2 In line with the transformation of South African institutions in the post-apartheid period, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was renamed the South Africa National Defence Force (SANDF) to reflect the re-incorporation of former homelands or bantustans.

---

Administrator’s Notice 4 (Provincial Gazette 4799, 1 January 1992).
land restitution of 1998 in which the Makuleke regained land rights to the Pafuri triangle. Directly south of this land is the Makuya Nature Reserve, also known as the Makuya Park (see Figure 2). Makuya Park forms the western boundary of the Kruger National Park, north of Punda Maria Gate. The village of Bennde Mutale lies about 500 metres from the Pafuri Gate.

Structure of the report

This report is divided into seven chapters, each exploring different subject areas. Chapter 1 has provided the context by exploring the conceptual issues of livelihoods, history and security. The chapter also provides a discussion of the methodology used in this research as well as an introduction to the field site.

Chapter 2 considers the history of conservation, specifically with regard to protected areas, community-based conservation and trans-boundary approaches. The changing attitudes towards conservation are discussed.

Chapter 3 discusses historical measures aimed at alienating local people along the Madimbo corridor and Pafuri triangle from their land. These included the consolidation of banutstans or homelands, conservation and national security, which are explored from the perspective of achieving the apartheid government’s broader security objectives.

Chapter 4 explores post-apartheid attempts to redress historical injustices in relation to land and natural resources in the Madimbo corridor and Pafuri triangle. The specific outcomes of land claims are discussed with a view to the strategic perspective offered by the area for trans-boundary conservation approaches.

Chapter 5 examines aspects of local livelihoods in the area. It uses the village of Bennde Mutale for a detailed discussion of the complexity of rural livelihoods. The qualitative role of land and natural resources is explored in relation to different household typologies, ranging from those considered very poor to those regarded as wealthy. Research methods used in understanding local livelihoods are also discussed, with emphasis on local understandings of households, social mapping and the generation of household typologies. The variety of approaches employed in sustaining livelihoods is considered from an economic-compositions or livelihood-clusters point of view.

Chapter 6 discusses the ongoing local conflict surrounding land uses along the Madimbo corridor, in the light of approaches suggested by NGOs, conservation agencies, the private sector and the government. The four approaches, mining, conservation-driven eco-tourism, grazing and human settlement, are used to focus on the complexity of local processes.

Chapter 7 offers conclusions and provides an argument for the broadening of security approaches along geo-political boundaries to reflect conceptual shifts in this regard. Specifically, it discusses human and environmental security concerns in relation to TBNRM.
2: The politics of protected areas and conservation

Nature, biodiversity protection and conservation are contested issues globally. Protected areas (or ‘fortress conservation’, as it is commonly known) dominated what was regarded as nature preservation or protection for much of the twentieth century, and they have come to symbolise different things to different people (see Brechin et al. 2003; Hutton et al. 2005; Jeanrenaud 2003). In part, the controversies around protected areas lie in the way they were set up and their negative impact on people dependent on local resources.

The establishment of protected areas

The creation of protected areas was often, but not exclusively, at the behest of colonial and authoritarian rule, which sought to control who gained access to natural resources (Brechin et al. 2003). They also specifically reflect the subjugation of local and indigenous forms of environmental knowledge by science and Western understandings of nature (Singh & Van Houtum 2002; Murombedzi 2003), which, as pointed out by Duffy (1997: 441), are presented in policies as ‘incontestable scientific management principles’, despite being ‘based on politically and ideologically informed decisions’.

The state, frequently in pursuit of colonial expansion and control over local resources, became the interpreter and mediator of scientific knowledge, in the process administering restrictions on access to and use of local resources. For much of the twentieth century, protected areas, especially in the southern and east African regions, became sites of contestation between local people and protected areas management and law enforcers (see Hutton et al. 2005; Brockington 2004). It is this history, associated with dispossession and restricted use of resources, that continues to fuel the negative perceptions of agrarian people who are fearful of losing their rights to land and natural resources (Brechin et al. 2003).

Protected areas in South Africa

In South Africa, protected areas were established from the early 1900s, with the realisation that subsistence, commercial and sport hunting in the previous century had led to a substantial decline in wildlife (DEAT 2003). Carruthers (1989, 1995) notes that the creation of protected areas also coincided with a period of rapid industrialisation of the economy. Thus, their place in history should be examined from a political economy angle, which takes into account the interests served by the development of protected areas. The coalescing of Afrikaner and British settler economic interests, in particular, led to African people being forced into wage and migrant labour through the systematic undermining of their land and resource rights. According to Carruthers, the development of protected areas such as the Kruger National Park, while purporting to pursue the protection of nature, reflects how control over access to land and natural resources was used to push Africans into wage labour on the emerging white commercial farms and mines.

From the outset, the issue of local people who had been resident in these regions and the demands for land for commercial agriculture and mineral prospecting by the settler communities assumed important dimensions. As Carruthers (1993) notes, the residents within the Sabi Game Reserve initially were supposed to be moved to make room for protected zones within which human habitation, agricultural activities and the hunting of game were not allowed. However, the complex linkages between cheap African labour and effective control of illegal hunting activities meant that Africans were used increasingly in policing roles. In addition to labour, Africans provided rent for tenancy in exchange for being allowed to pursue livelihoods strategies such as agriculture and pastoralism. Other sources of labour for the game reserve included prisoners on their way to the Transvaal mines (Carruthers 1993).

Therefore, the operation of protected areas as exclusive fenced-off zones did not occur overnight, but mirrored the continued institutionalisation of the colonial state, with resultant impacts on local people’s access to and use of natural resources. The exclusion of African people from protected areas such as the
Sabi Game Reserve happened concurrently with the extension of privileges to settlers in terms of land on which they vigorously pursued anti-trespass policies. Continued pressure for land by Africans, and the growing perception that they were responsible for wildlife decimation, further hastened the expulsion of people from protected lands and increased the concentration of Africans in reserves. This was not limited to South Africa (in the then Transvaal) but was common in many colonial territories (Adams & Hulme 2001).

In 1926, the formation of the Kruger National Park effectively saw the official institutionalisation of protected areas through an Act of Parliament. Tensions between local Africans and the park's officials continued as the park expanded northwards towards the Limpopo River. This northwards expansion over different periods of time, but specifically in the late 1960s and early 1970s, also indicates changing political imperatives, partly related to the apartheid government’s security concerns (see Steenkamp 2001; Poonan 1996). More broadly, however, it reflects the colonial and apartheid regimes’ systematically inequitable distribution of resources, with protected areas created for the benefit of the minority settler population at the expense of the majority African people. This was effected largely through the invention of ‘tribes and making sense of African identities’, which enabled colonial and apartheid authorities ‘to move entire populations of indigenous Africans into communal areas’ and bantustans, ‘whilst enclosing resource rich regions in the form of parks’ (Singh & Van Houtum 2002: 257). The growing inequities in access to land and natural resources were at the centre of struggles against colonial and apartheid rule, and are a compelling factor in the evolution of conservation thinking in the post-independence phase.

The advent of community-based conservation

From the 1960s, efforts in Africa to change the face and reputation of exclusive protected areas were premised on finding solutions to long-standing conflicts resulting from dispossession and denied access to natural resources. This happened in the context of a political landscape rapidly changing from colonial to independent rule (Hutton et al. 2005), and often meant that the privileges that had been enjoyed on privately owned land were extended to communal areas (Jones & Murphree 2001). Globally, questions of social justice featured prominently and gave added impetus to dealing with historical injustices for any meaningful change to happen (Wilshusen 2003).

By the 1980s, ‘sustainable development’ had become the dominant catch-phrase, especially after the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. It found expression through efforts to contribute to conservation while also addressing social and equity issues. Community conservation espoused images of change from exclusionary conservation approaches to the involvement of local people and an embracing of sustainable development principles. Adams & Hulme (2001), for instance, note that the equating of community conservation with sustainable development coincided with an upwelling of related policy developments. Community conservation, viewed in contrast against a ‘fortress or fences and fines approach’, promised a wide-ranging reordering of relations between state and local level, and their respective roles in conservation.

Various configurations of state-local relations premised on consultation and local participation, and at times involving the private sector, have evolved in relation to community conservation. Barrow & Murphree (2001) identify three approaches to community conservation: protected areas outreach; collaborative management; and community-based conservation (CBC). CBC has been implemented predominantly in southern Africa, with an emphasis on sustainable use of natural resources (see Barrow & Murphree 2001; Jones & Murphree 2001), while in East Africa protected outreach initiatives have dominated (Barrow, Gichohi & Infield 2001). The latter has placed emphasis on the state and NGOs providing education and extension services in relation to protected areas, while the promise of devolved natural resources management has been the main characteristic of CBC.

In Zimbabwe and Namibia, for instance, community-based approaches aimed to change the nature of land tenure and rights to natural resources, while simultaneously introducing institutional structures that would deal with natural resources management (Murombedzi 2001; Jones & Murphree 2001). In both countries, colonial-era legislation, aimed at accruing wildlife benefits to private landowners, was amended to extended such benefits to the communal areas. Through institutional changes,
local communities were able to act as authorities responsible for making decisions on wildlife resources and the benefits thereof. In later years, however, some scholars have noted that the extent of devolution has not been adequate and that CBC has not addressed the skewed land tenure systems in southern Africa (Murombedzi 2006). In spite of this, CBC is a strong feature of conservation policy in southern Africa.

As noted by Hulme & Murphree (2001), CBC has not replaced other forms of conservation, as it continues to be influenced and affected by wider frameworks in which national, regional and international institutions and processes play a role (Büscher & Whande 2007). It should be seen, however, as having provided an impetus for different relations between the state and local people, as well as a shift away from local people incurring only costs as a result of conservation towards their deriving some benefits. It remains to be seen how issues of tenure in communal areas will be addressed through CBC. Some of the tension inherent in this approach is evident in South Africa’s post-apartheid attempts to restore rights to land and resources and to balance this with the constitutional obligation to protect the environment (see Kepe, Ellis & Wynberg 2003).

Community-based conservation in South Africa

In South Africa, contractual national parks (CNPs) emerged as a model of CBC, bringing together former enemies in the form of conservation agencies and local communities in attempts to achieve conservation goals, but also to redress historical injustices and alleviate poverty (Reid et al. 2004; Grossman & Holden n.d.). After the official end of apartheid in 1994, legislative and policy changes aimed at reaching some form of consensus between conservation needs and developmental pressures were passed (DEAT 2003; Kepe et al. 2003; Turner 2004). At the same time, dealing with historical injustices in relation to land and natural resources was squarely an area of priority for the newly elected government. The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 was passed in this regard to grant displaced and dispossessed communities the opportunity to claim land, including within protected areas, from which they had been removed during colonial and apartheid rule.

The Makuleke land restitution has achieved global status as an example of how a win-win situation between the needs for biodiversity conservation and those of local resource-dependent people can be met (see Steenkamp 2001; Fay 2007). However, it is pointed out by Friedman (2005) that, in this supposedly win-win case, the Makuleke lost a certain way of life that they had been accustomed to at Pafuri. At the time of the negotiations, various conservation actors such as the Wildlife Society identified the global significance of biodiversity within the Pafuri triangle and highlighted why it should stay under conservation. The area was also strategically located for emerging conservation approaches based on ecosystem-wide and bioregional planning.

The negotiations over the Pafuri triangle were indicative of the tensions between conservation and land restitution (see Fay 2007; Wynberg & Kepe 1999). In South Africa, CNPs are now popular in relation to reclaimed conservation land (for instance, with the Makuleke, Richtersveld and Dwesa-Cwebe land claims, and others involving privately owned land like the Marekele National Park), and are seen as a solution to competing conservation and development needs, especially where the new landowners are previously disadvantaged people. However, as noted by Reid (2002), problems with the implementation of CNPs have meant that often conservation objectives are not met, and social and economic sustainability issues are addressed inadequately. In short, while CNPs are portrayed as win-win outcomes to land claims involving protected areas, they are hotly contested at the local level, and their long-term sustainability is questioned.

Along international boundaries such as those of the Makuleke/Kruger CNP and the Madimbo corridor, trans-boundary collaboration in managing environmental resources is evolving in the context of contestations over land and natural resources as well as questions about the sustainability of CNPs.

This section has illustrated the changes in conservation approaches over time, particularly regarding local people who are reliant on natural resources for their livelihoods. Over the last decade, TBNRM has risen to prominence in conservation and development circles as a way of achieving the goals of biodiversity conservation, regional integration, peace and security. It is in this context that the next section discusses the emergence of TBNRM and the Great Limpopo TFCA. This will be followed by a consideration of empirical data on local people’s experiences
of protected areas, state militarised security and homeland consolidation along the Madimbo corridor.

**TBNRM: new approaches to protected areas and/or community-based conservation?**

TBNRM rose to prominence in southern Africa at the same time that CBC was waning. The fortunes of CBC were determined largely by the perceived slow pace of delivery on the objectives of biodiversity conservation and local development (see Hutton et al. 2005). Globally, a strong lobby for the return to stricter forms of protection gained prominence, with some scholars questioning the conservation benefits of approaches that were premised on sustainable use (Oates 1999; Terbough 1999). The accelerated ‘demise’ of CBC was facilitated by donors in southern Africa shifting resources to the emerging TBNRM approaches. Some commentators have associated the increased focus and concentration of resources on TBNRM with a ‘return to the barriers’ and ‘fortress’ approaches to protecting biodiversity (Hutton et al. 2005). This is despite assertions that TBNRM aims to contribute to biodiversity conservation through a range of activities including the promotion of sustainable natural resources management (see Griffin et al. 1999). Because of different understandings of what TBNRM is intended to achieve and how it is going to achieve such objectives, it has come to mean many things, with most of these meanings tending to highlight the competing and conflicting interests informing them.

**The multiple actors, meanings and functions of TBNRM**

The proponents of TBNRM are a mixed bag of deep-green bioregionalists, conservation biologists and neo-liberal advocates (Wolmer 2003). They base the development of TBNRM on an equally complex set of issues including ecosystem-wide and bioregional planning, regional economic integration, peace and security issues, and sustainable use of natural resources by local people. While TBNRM agreements are not new, the pace and extent of their implementation, covering vast geographical spaces, especially in southern Africa since the mid-1990s, has been unprecedented (Katerere et al. 2001; Ramutsindela & Tsheola 2002). These have included both the expansion of formal protected areas across geopolitical boundaries (see Peace Parks Foundation 2006) and attempts at institutionalising various forms of resource control and use in the inhabited frontier zones (Dzingirai 2004).

The World Bank (quoted in Ramutsindela & Tsheola 2002) refers to TBNRM as TFCAs that are ‘relatively large areas which straddle frontiers between…countries and cover large-scale natural systems encompassing one or more protected areas’. Griffin et al. (1999) note that TBNRM ‘could incorporate the overall concept of natural resource management (NRM) required across all sorts of boundaries in support of bioregional, biosphere, or ecosystem management’. They argue that this can happen at a local level, where collaborative management of ecological systems is co-ordinated by local authorities across boundaries and is facilitated by the removal of bureaucratic constraints and the harmonisation of national policies and legislation. While this approach provides some flexibility of application due to its broadness, in practical terms TBNRM has been applied only in relation to international geopolitical boundaries. Across national boundaries, TBNRM’s focus thus far has been more on how to contribute towards biodiversity conservation than on local livelihoods realities. However, TBNRM is a new field that is still experimental; the next phase of implementation will be about understanding how to include local people in a more meaningful role.

In line with ecosystem-wide and bioregional planning, the main objective for most TBNRM initiatives is the conservation of biodiversity across international geopolitical boundaries. While not explicitly pronounced in policy documents and treaties to establish TBNRM, much of the public discourse on these initiatives recognises their basis as zones to re-establish migratory routes for wildlife. Reuniting local communities that were estranged by colonial boundaries also forms an objective of many TBNRM initiatives, but it is not apparent how this will happen, given the reluctance of countries to re-open borders and the importance accorded to national sovereignty (see Van Ameron 2002). Apart from physical planning and institutional co-operation to achieve the objectives of biodiversity conservation, it is unclear how TBNRM parties will approach harmonisation of legislative and policy measures, especially in relation to local people (see Buzzard 2001). This
has made TBNRM implementation an essentially ‘technicist’ initiative relying on state, NGO and donor intervention with little, if any, input from local people (Simon 2003).

A further aspect of TBNRM initiatives is that of regional economic integration through conservation-driven tourism development. Linked to this objective is enhancing peace and security in post-conflict regions, hence the term ‘peace parks’. In southern Africa, this is seen as offering an opportunity for resolving conflicts through dialogue instead of turning to military and forceful means (see Katerere et al. 2001). The private sector has taken the opportunities presented by the new approaches and often portrays itself as the engine of success, as witnessed by the many tourism establishments within initiatives such as the GLTFCA (see Spenceley 2005). Thus, TBNRM borrows the concept of the centrality of the market, to which the earlier successes of CBC were attributed (see Malasha 2005). However, it does so without addressing the inherent contradictions between an increased emphasis on the involvement of the state and neo-liberal arguments for diminished state involvement. Such uncritical linking and de-linking of contradictory approaches within TBNRM perhaps reflects what Simon (2003) argues represents a merging of military, political, economic, environmental and societal security concerns. As a result, the implementation of TBNRM initiatives is often driven by co-operation between development and environment NGOs, state agencies and the private sector, as if they constitute a homogenous grouping with shared interests (see Spierenburg, Wels & Steenkamp 2006). These alliances often argue that local communities stand to benefit through investment in conservation (see Ramutsindela 2004), and thus environmental security, which generates economic development. The execution of these issues at a state level, however, means that other actors’ concerns, specifically those of local communities in the boundary regions, remain peripheral to negotiations for TBNRM. The interpretation of what these security issues mean continues to favour the perspective of state and other non-local actors.

**Ambivalences about TBNRM and its impact on who benefits**

For proponents of community conservation, TBNRM espouses the extension of the principles of decentralised natural resources management to trans-boundary scenarios (see Jones & Chonguica 2001). However, thus far, it remains unclear how decentralised natural resources management would be extended across geopolitical boundaries, where different legal and policy regimes are in operation (Buzzard 2001; De Villiers 1999b). Additionally, most areas targeted for TBNRM are politically and economically marginal (Katerere et al. 2001). The paradox of the increased focus on these areas that accompany TBNRM is that it is viewed in negative terms. It is seen as the beginning of new constraints on local people’s access to and use of natural resources as a result of increased state presence (Dzingirai 2004; Hughes 2002).

Further, the increased emphasis on private sector investment as a basis for the success of TBNRM where resource rights are insecure has solicited calls for clarity on how communities fit into the jigsaw puzzle of TBNRM (Katerere et al. 2001). Currently, TBNRM areas, specifically TFCAs surrounding core protected areas, are regarded as multiple land-use zones; but, in real and practical terms, conservation-driven eco-tourism is the organising dynamic for success. These ambivalences towards local systems of accessing and using resources means that the anticipated ‘trickle-down’ of benefits from TBNRM, in general, and TFCAs, in particular, is based on the imposition of certain land uses over diverse and complex livelihoods strategies, some of which are regarded as competing and conflicting with tourism.

Clearly, despite its grand political and economic objectives, TBNRM has fallen short in articulating how benefits would flow equitably to local communities within frontier zones and be shared fairly between the signatory countries. Specifically, where stated objectives have envisaged an equal flow of benefits between the countries involved, voices of discontent at domination by powerful neighbours have raised questions about the initiatives. This is the case in southern Africa, where South Africa is involved in many of the initiatives and such voices of dissatisfaction have been raised (Van Ameron & Büscher 2005).

**The Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area**

In 2002, the presidents of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe descended on the coastal town of Xai-Xai in Mozambique to sign a tripartite agreement on the establishment of
the GLTP. The GLTP aims to ‘foster trans-national collaboration and cooperation among the parties to facilitate effective ecosystem management in the area comprising the park’ (Governments of Mozambique, South Africa & Zimbabwe 2002: Article 4a). To foster trans-national co-operation, the three countries will join the Kruger National Park in South Africa, the recently established Limpopo National Park in Mozambique and the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe to constitute the GLTP. The total area of the GLTP is estimated at 35,000 km², making it one of the largest protected areas globally. The GLTP adheres to conventional understandings of protected areas in that neither resource harvesting nor residence is permitted inside the park. Human habitation and resource use is allowed in the much bigger peripheral area surrounding the GLTP known as the GLTFCA (see Figure 3). To date, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have demarcated the larger conservation area. Although the Madimbo corridor has not been incorporated officially into the GLTFCA, interviews with government officials confirmed that the area is so close to the core GLTP that it will definitely be part of the conservation area. An analysis of private sector advertisements and the operations of NGOs and researchers...
reveals that most areas in South Africa that are close to the Kruger National Park are referred to in terms of the GLTP. Additionally, a tourism-planning document produced by the Peace Parks Foundation (2006) shows the Madimbo corridor as a potential protected-area linkage between the Kruger National Park and another TFCA involving Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the Limpopo Shashe TFCA.

The GLTFCA constitutes a most complex set of potential land uses; and the diversity of actors with divergent, overlapping and competing interests in the area is a potential source of conflict (see Munthali & Soto 2002). These actors represent a variety of land and natural resources interests, ranging from those of the state to private landowners and communal land users. The Madimbo corridor highlights some of the conflicts over authority and natural resources that can result where multiple interests converge to pursue competing and overlapping objectives.

The history of the Madimbo corridor, specifically the interactions between its residents and protected areas’ management, raises some of the complexities and considerations that the planners of the GLTFCA have to deal with. Chapter 3 describes the recent history of Madimbo corridor residents, particularly in relation to land and conservation issues.
3: Bantustans, protected areas and national security: an alliance of interests in land dispossession along the Madimbo corridor and Pafuri triangle?

In the late 1960s, widespread land dispossession perpetrated by the apartheid government were effected along the Limpopo River to create what are now referred to as the Madimbo corridor and Pafuri triangle. Most villages within the present-day Madimbo corridor were designated for betterment planning, the outcome of which ironically often meant forced removals and resettlement in ‘planned villages’, in the late 1950s.

Forced removal was the final step in a systematic process of alienating the Limpopo River from the local African people. Effectively, a river that had been a resource and point of reference for communities in South Africa and Zimbabwe was turned into a barrier through the establishment of geopolitical boundaries (see Ralushai 1982). Along the Madimbo corridor, the boundary was patrolled by the military, and in the Pafuri triangle, it was policed by Kruger National Park game rangers.

Prior to the removals, Venda people occupied the corridor from the western boundaries of the Kruger National Park to the area where commercial farms began, about 45 km to the west. To the east and directly north of the Kruger National Park, land was occupied by a Tsonga clan, the Makuleke. A small portion of land (about 5 000 ha) joined the two areas and was occupied by both the Venda and Tsonga people (see De Villiers 1999a). This portion, at first appearing to be of little significance, highlights the overlapping nature of social and production relations among the two groups of people. In post-apartheid South Africa, it is increasingly the site of struggles over land and resource rights between the two groups.

The forced removals of the 1960s served three purposes for the apartheid government, the first two being the consolidation of the bantustans and the expansion of the Kruger National Park. Both of these, however, were in pursuit of a third objective, national security for the apartheid state, which was pursued through military presence and/or the absence of human settlement.

Impact on local resource use forms the basis of local perceptions of conservation and militarised state security. Specifically, it fuels certain popular stories and representations among local people of conservation and military intervention. The history of the area and the resultant narratives about state and other forms of authority over land and natural resources are considered below.

In line with the apartheid policy of creating ethnic bantustans for African communities (see Harris 1989), the Madimbo removals sought to separate people of Venda descent from those of Tsonga descent. Along the Madimbo corridor and at the Pafuri triangle, widely dispersed and sparsely populated settlements were destroyed and their inhabitants grouped together in emerging ‘planned’ villages either in Venda or Gazankulu, depending on the ethnicity of the families.

As part of the implementation of various pieces of legislation, forced removals promoted the alienation of Africans from their land. The formation of homelands led to the confinement of Africans in areas that were inadequate for either residential or farming purposes (De Wet 1995). This had an impact not only on how people made a living but also on how access to and use of resources was governed.
The impact of forced removals on local people

The removals resulted in people losing access to land and natural resources along the Limpopo River. Interviews with local people indicated that the most important resource was the river itself. People settled along the river depended on it for a variety of purposes, including fishing when the river was flowing, water for households and livestock, and its floodplains for cultivation. From local accounts of cross-border social and production relations, the river never presented a permanent obstacle to human movement; instead, it was a resource for those settled on the Zimbabwean or the South African side. The forced removals, therefore, impacted on local resource use by restricting the movement of people.

Groups of people from the Pafuri triangle and Madimbo corridor ended up in marginal rainfall areas with poor agricultural soils (see Steenkamp 2001). While the Limpopo valley, where they were originally settled, was not any better in terms of rainfall and soil, it offered a range of other livelihood possibilities in the form of access to water, wildlife, fish and wild fruits, and the floodplains for cultivation. Additionally, the low and widely dispersed populations meant that people had access to resources over extensive areas. Income-generating activities of a trans-boundary nature, which included the buying and selling of livestock, also secured local people’s livelihoods.

Venda families from the Madimbo corridor, mostly those located close to the Kruger National Park in the villages of Bennde Mutale and Tshikuyu (see Figure 4), note that restrictive controls over resources were extended to areas outside the Kruger National Park through officialdom and informal control. These controls have generated images and stories of protected areas management that continue to fuel the reluctance of local people to accept that ‘park people’ can support the sustainable use of resources. In part, these experiences of control over resource use are being deployed to challenge the restitution of the lands at Pafuri, and the interlocking wedge between Pafuri and Madimbo, to the Makuleke clan.

As noted above, ‘betterment planning’ was often pursued along ethnic lines. Some families were separated from their leaders and moved

Figure 4: Removals along the Madimbo corridor

![Gumbo/Mutele Land Claim](image)

Source: Map produced by the Vhembe CPA and Nkuzi Development Association in support of the Gumbo-Mutele land claim, 1999
to completely new jurisdictions. The Venda and Tsonga people were separated from the land that connects the Madimbo corridor to the Pafuri triangle. The Tsonga people were settled in Gazankulu, while the Venda people were moved to areas under the authority of Venda chiefs. The only Tsonga people who remained within the Venda groups were women married into Venda families. Muhlavha Munzhelele (nee Baloyi) notes that she ‘was married here and I could not leave my children to go to Makuleke, so I came and settled here in Bennde Mutale with my family’ (Bennde Mutale, October 2005).

The remainder of her family, including brothers and unmarried sisters, moved with the rest of the Tsonga people to Makuleke. Other Venda people to the west, who were settled along the Limpopo River, were removed to the Venda homeland. The apartheid government retained political and military control over the corridor along the river. Thus, the separation of people of Tsonga and Venda descent was completed with the express objective of consolidating the homelands.

The villages that were created along the Madimbo corridor fell under two main chieftainships: the Mutele and Tshikundamalema. Often, the original village leaders were replaced by those of the territories into which they were resettled. This was the situation with the families that were moved to the village of Bennde Mutale; because they were resettled in a pre-existing village, their original village leader could not claim any authority over the territory. Thus, forced removals impacted on local leadership and, in most cases, led to the imposition of new leaders. Ntsebeza (1999) makes the point that consolidation of the homelands was based partly on the appointment of chiefs who then acted as ‘decentralised despots’ in carrying out the functions of the apartheid system. The apartheid system aimed to elevate tribal authorities to the status of local government responsible for a number of functions including cohesion of communities, land administration, collection of taxes and development (see Harris 1989). Ongoing contests for authority over land and natural resources between the Vhembe CPA and Chief Mutele are linked to the history of how chiefs were appointed by the apartheid system. Some chiefs were politically discredited as a result of their close ties with the apartheid system.

Protected areas, homeland consolidation and security concerns

The fact that forced removals at Pafuri were used to aid the extension of the Kruger National Park has been used to refute the idea of ‘betterment planning’ or homeland consolidation. Mouton (quoted in Steenkamp 2001) argues that the Makuleke were removed for the creation and extension of a public good, the Kruger National Park. Claims of achieving a public good, however, ignore the racialised form of privilege and disadvantage that characterised South Africa during apartheid. For white people, who had access to resources and privilege, the expansion of a protected area would have been a legitimate reason for the forced removals. However, such a view ignores the interconnectedness between the politics of apartheid and various strategies deployed to frustrate any form of political organisation and resistance; and the extension of the Kruger National Park inevitably led to loss of access to land and natural resources for the Makuleke clan and furthered the consolidation of the homelands.

The impact of the extension of the Kruger National Park can be divided into two strands. The first relates to the Makuleke, whose access to the Pafuri triangle was completely cut off; they were moved 70 km to the south-west of the Kruger National Park from Punda Maria. The second relates to the Venda families who were moved a shorter distance; they continued to have some access to the river and some of the areas included in the Kruger National Park, even though this was illegal. Nevertheless, the extension of the Kruger National Park to include the Pafuri triangle had achieved the apartheid objective of separating people of Venda and Tsonga descent into ‘ethnic compartments’, with the Tsonga Makuleke clan being settled in the Gazankulu homeland, while the Venda families were incorporated into the Venda homeland.

Thus, the Pafuri triangle was incorporated into the Kruger National Park, and, to the west of the Park, stretching for about 45 km along the Limpopo River, the 28 000 hectares of the Madimbo corridor were occupied by the military. In 1972, military occupation was made official through the issuing of a Permission to Occupy (PTO) certificate by the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development (Langefeld 2000). In the light of regional developments

---

4 The Makuleke land claim involved further conflict, because Chief Mhinga, into whose area the Makuleke were supposedly settled in 1965, claimed that he was the rightful custodian over Pafuri.
in southern Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is plausible that the removals served to address the further goal of satisfying national security concerns on the part of the apartheid government.

Security fears reflected apartheid South Africa’s concerns about a region undergoing rapid political change through armed struggles for independence. The 1960s heralded strong African nationalist movements, which were aligned with the major global polities of the Cold War (see Cock 1996). Effectively, South Africa was surrounded by countries whose guerrilla movements advocated the adoption of some form of socialism and were, hence, aligned with the Soviet Union. Vale (2003) further notes that the schism was not limited to the situation between South Africa and its neighbours, but embraced internal dynamics between the white minority and the majority Africans involved in struggles for freedom. Thus, the Soviet and Western alliances and contestations were also an internal feature of South Africa. The neighbouring countries with their guerrilla movements acted as a threat to apartheid South Africa. One reaction of the apartheid state was a tightening of its international boundaries (Poonan 1996) through increased military presence along the borders with Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola where infiltration was likely. In the case of Mozambique, the Kruger National Park formed an effective barrier against human movement into South Africa. It was in this context that the Madimbo and Pafuri communities were forcibly moved, effectively creating a security buffer zone to thwart the threat of Maoist-type guerrillas moving into the country through the border villages of Pafuri and Madimbo.

Local trans-boundary relations

South Africa was particularly concerned about security, given the unpredictable human movement in the areas bordering Mozambique and Zimbabwe. People within Madimbo and Pafuri had intricate and intimate relationships with people across the geopolitical boundaries of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Marriages across boundaries were common and, in some cases, polygamist families were hosted on either side of the boundaries, with the husband located in one country, while the second wife and children lived in another (see Connor 2003). As discussed in Box 1 below, people often moved across the Limpopo River to visit their relatives. Marriages and human movement across the geopolitical boundaries constituted a threat to the apartheid government in the form of possible ‘terrorist’ movement. Some local people have explained that when they were moved from the Madimbo corridor, the reason given was that the apartheid government feared they would trample on ‘terrorist’ footpaths, making it difficult to track them as they entered the country (Masikhwa 1997). Increased boundary controls impacted on trans-boundary movement as people chose rather to settle in specific areas (see Box 1).

The migration routes from Mozambique and Zimbabwe are well known and continue to be part of the social and economic relations between the people of these countries (see Hennop 2001). These routes developed as a result of the fact that the river was a shared resource for the sustenance of livelihoods of local people. For instance, it was common in the past for people from Zimbabwe and South Africa to gather at the Manzhedza pans during flood times to perform rituals before fishing was allowed.

However, human movement across the Limpopo River was not limited to local resource-dependent people. The apartheid government was aware that the area had long been used as a crossing point for migrant labourers recruited to work in the mines of the Witwatersrand. With the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in the late nineteenth century, a need for cheap labour saw the establishment of a labour camp within the Pafuri triangle where people from other African countries would be recruited (Bulpin 1954). The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) was established on both sides of the Limpopo River in present-day Mozambique and South Africa between 1901 and 1902 (Connor 2003). While this fitted well with apartheid designs for separate development and reserves of cheap labour, by the 1960s and 1970s, increased agitation for independence and the intensification of the Cold War and threats of cross-border infiltration meant that such freedom of movement became a liability for the apartheid state.

Various records show that while these official recruitment sites were used, a proliferation of illegal recruiters operated along the borders (Murray 1995). A commercial farmer whose family acquired a farm on the confluence of the Nwanedi and Limpopo Rivers in 1942 indicated that his family’s shop acted as an unofficial

---

1 At the time, Namibia was occupied by South Africa and, therefore, presented less likelihood of acting as a source of destabilisation in South Africa, while Angola had attained independence from the Portuguese, and its government had links with the Soviet Union and Cuba.
Conservation Area recruitment site. Before and after his appointment in 1966, Chief Mutele (the father of the current chief) is said to have acted as a recruitment agent (see Ralushai 1979). This made the actual movement of people in and out of South Africa unpredictable. The TEBA recruitment camp was closed in 1975. Thus, the Madimbo corridor and Pafuri triangle were cleared of people, with Pafuri incorporated into the Kruger National Park and the corridor occupied by the SADF.

Militarised state security approaches

The SADF took control of the Madimbo corridor in 1968, and in 1972 obtained a PTO. Reinforcements were added in the early 1980s after the political independence of Zimbabwe. The SADF built an airstrip, the Scorpion, within the corridor. Part of the military base would be used for military flights into the southern African region. The military also declared a nature reserve, the Matshakatini Nature Reserve. The establishment of the reserve in 1992 saw the last family to be evicted from the Madimbo corridor settled in present-day Madimbo village.

Currently, the Matshakatini Nature Reserve is part of the land that has been restored to the Gumbu/Mutele people represented by the Vhembe CPA. Since the official agreement by the Department of Land Affairs in 2004 to return the land, the Vhembe CPA has been involved in efforts to have the nature reserve de-gazetted. In these attempts, the CPA has argued that the area had not seen any dedicated conservation efforts and, therefore, is of little significance to nature conservation. In February 2007, the MEC for Economic Affairs and the Environment in Limpopo province recommended the creation of

---

Box 1: Cross-border relations and human movement across the Limpopo River – Petrus Maphukumele’s story

Petrus Maphukumele was born across the Limpopo River in present-day Zimbabwe, but he is not clear about the exact location or name of his birthplace. As a young man, he hunted wild animals along the Limpopo River and further north into Zimbabwe. Wild animals formed an important dietary supplement for many families during that time. Additionally, Petrus noted that people depended on wild fruits for a living. As there were no border controls between South Africa and Zimbabwe, hunting wildlife was not restricted and often happened across boundaries. As his family had relatives across the Limpopo River in South Africa, he was always moving between the two countries.

When eventually border controls were instituted, he used to travel at night to visit relatives. With increased control of human movement across the Limpopo River, Petrus moved to settle in South Africa at Ha Mutele where his grandmother was. To stay at Ha Mutele, he had to ask for permission from the chief, Mr Daniel K Mutele. Petrus must have moved permanently to South Africa between 1966 and 1979 when Mr Mutele died and was succeeded by his son, the current chief. Petrus notes that his family at Ha Mutele made a living through hunting, predominantly along the Levhuvhu River.

The vegetation then was still dense, and households were sparsely spread, as opposed to the present situation. The dense vegetation provided fruit, firewood and wildlife, which have diminished as the vegetation has thinned and households have settled closer together.

His family also had cattle and goats, which frequently were killed by lions and other predators. They did not mind this as they could hunt the wild animals and had enough to eat. This is different from the present day where domestic animals are killed by wild ones and the people who lose livestock cannot substitute them with wild animals.

Petros also remembers when people were moved from what is referred to now as the Madimbo corridor. Most people who were moved were settled in the Mutele area. At the same time, the chief started campaigning for people to stay in closer proximity to each other, saying that it was safer for them to be together. Petrus’ descriptions are in line with the ‘betterment planning’ along the Madimbo corridor that resulted in the forced removals of 1969. He notes that there was resistance against moving closer together as people feared it would promote witchcraft.

Petros notes that he still has many relatives in Zimbabwe and that his nephew comes to visit every now and then. His brother also used to visit a lot, but now there are stricter controls, including the military, so he does not come as frequently.
a committee to discuss the issue of land along the Madimbo corridor and to seek consensus in terms of what the land should be used for.

It is not clear why the military spearheaded the formation of the reserve, but the effect has been a blurring of the roles of the military and conservation in the area, with local people arguing that both serve the same interests, are disposessive in the pursuit of their goals, and rely on force to exclude local people. In the eyes of local people, therefore, the establishment of the reserve within the exclusive military zone serves to highlight the confluences and divergences of conservation ideas, forced removals of people and security issues across geopolitical boundaries.

Security in protected areas

After the Pafuri triangle was incorporated into the Kruger National Park, patrolling was delegated to game rangers whose mandate, although directly related to protecting the area and controlling the illegal harvesting of resources, was primarily about the control of human movement. An added security concern was the wild animals, which had been known to kill migrant labourers walking through the reserve to Johannesburg or the TEBA recruitment point.

Thus, the Pafuri triangle served two purposes as a protected area. Firstly, its incorporation into the Kruger National Park was a step closer to the fulfilment of a long-held colonial dream of combining parks in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Draper, Spierenburg & Wels 2004). The second function of the Kruger National Park’s extension into the Pafuri triangle is related to curbing the illegal cross-border activities that had been undertaken there since the early twentieth century, specifically in the area referred to as Crooks’ Corner (see Bulpin 1954; Murray 1995), by increasing law enforcement.

It is highly significant that at the time of the extension of the Kruger National Park into the Pafuri triangle, there was increased activity of armed liberation movements in the southern African region, especially in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Viewed from this angle, the park was strategically located to allay security fears of the white population in South Africa or, at least, to monitor the borders around South Africa more closely.

It should be noted that there had been earlier attempts to proclaim a Pafuri Game Reserve (or to extend the Kruger National Park into Pafuri), notably in 1933, but these were never followed through until 1969, when it appeared that the extension would serve security concerns and further homeland consolidation. Where extension of conservation areas was deemed unfeasible, other means, military in particular, were used to control human movement and safeguard the security of the citizens of South Africa.

Other forms to secure the boundaries

That the forced removals from Madimbo were for security reasons is further supported by the fact that the area had been designated initially for settlement by African people, in terms of a schedule of the Development and Land Act 18 of 1936, which included it in Released Area 26.7 The systematic dispossessions and forced removals between 1940 and 1982, therefore, were in line with the tightening of South Africa’s international borders and responding to continuously emerging and evolving threats to minority rule. They also reflect the increased consolidation of the colonial and apartheid state, which entailed a re-emphasis of the security of boundary regions (see Whande 2007b). Further evidence of the apartheid government’s security concerns can be found in the measures adopted on commercial farms in the region.

Security through commercial farms

The commercial farms along the Limpopo River, stretching from the confluence of the Nwanedi and Limpopo Rivers to the town of Musina, received the same treatment as the Kruger National Park in terms of the military not occupying these farms. Essentially, however, they would act to enhance patrolling by the military. Parcelling out of large tracts of land had long been a strategy of the colonial administration in establishing authority by undermining land and natural resource rights of Africans and forcing them into wage labour (see Milton 1997). In a country where access to land has been so contentious, the presence of white commercial farmers was a source of grievance among local people. For commercial farmers to safeguard their interests, they had to co-operate with the authorities.

Farmers and the colonial or apartheid state were natural allies, establishing a coalition of interests.

6 National Archives, JUS/1595/33.
7 Classification as a ‘released area’ allowed African people to continue to stay in an area, as this meant it was demarcated for ‘black’ occupation.
Thus, there was no need for the military to occupy the farms along the Limpopo River. To the west of Musina, security was provided by a regularly patrolled electric fence. These measures acted as security buffers for the apartheid state. Further buffers were created through indirect rule via appointed chiefs.

**Indirect rule as security for the apartheid state**

While the Madimbo and Pafuri removals might have served to provide security zones for South Africa, another role in security issues was played by chiefs. Through forced removals, homeland consolidation functioned to disrupt the organisation of political protests and resistance to the apartheid state. They also resulted in settlements in planned villages that were easier to control. Chiefs enhanced these control mechanisms of the state by acting as localised centres of indirect rule, which ‘represented a radical break with the militarized, indeed often genocidal, direct rule that was common during the so-called New Imperialism of the closing decades of the nineteenth century’ (Duffield 2005: 148).

Some chiefs owed their allegiance to those who appointed them, namely the apartheid authorities. Consequently, they would report any security concerns to the authorities. During an interview with Chief Mutele, his younger brother brazenly pointed out that ‘all chiefs along the corridor had collaborated with the apartheid state’. Having security ‘foot soldiers’ in the form of chiefs meant that any resistance would first be directed at the chiefs, giving the apartheid authorities ample time to respond and quell such resistance. There were several incentives for chiefs to act on behalf of the state, including administrative power over land and natural resources. In the homelands, all land that was regarded as communal was de jure state land and under the administrative power of chiefs. In certain instances, chiefly status came with financial rewards.

Another sinister act of chiefs in the area was the formation of the Makuya Nature Reserve in the late 1980s. The reserve was set up after three chiefs, Mutele, Makuya and Mphaphuli, ‘donated’ land to the former Venda homeland government. In return, the chiefs were paid an annual land rental of R2 per hectare. The chiefs relied on the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act to make unilateral decisions about donating the land for conservation. In effect, however, they justified the apartheid regime’s cause, as it could be argued that ‘independent’ territories had their own recreational facilities. The effect on local livelihoods was severe, and local people blamed the chiefs rather than the entirety of the political system. Current institutional conflicts remain fuelled by the belief that chiefs sold land in order for it to be designated as protected areas.

The impact of restrictions on resource use in the area was felt most severely by local residents. One resident noted that the expansion of nature reserves has resulted in confinement and diminished opportunities to sustain livelihoods:

*It's like we are in an island. To the east you have the Kruger and Makuya Parks, to the north you now have the Makuleke Park and to the west the military and Matshakatini Nature Reserve. We have nowhere to turn for our livelihoods.* (Florence Tshivhambu, Bennde Mutale Village, April 2006)

These negative impacts on the use of local resources have further shaped local perceptions of protected areas and conservation, and have contributed to the negative portrayal of chiefs as ‘greedy’ and able to ‘sell’ land without regard for local needs.

These arguments are advanced locally in relation to the Makuya Park or Nature Reserve. The land comprising the reserve, measuring approximately 18 000 hectares, had previously been used for grazing, collecting thatching grass, hunting and fishing along the Levhuvhu and Mutale Rivers (Koale Investments 2004). The village of Nkotswi, under Chief Makuya, was moved in the 1980s to make way for the reserve; a land claim has since been instituted by the village concerning the area where the Levhuvhu and Mutale Rivers meet, a highly controversial site given private sector investment within the Makuleke Contractual Park across the Levhuvhu River. In addition, the village’s claim is seen locally as a challenge to the chief under whose jurisdiction the village falls. This is especially in relation to the fact that the chief was involved in the ‘donation’ of the land for the designation of the nature reserve.

**Conclusion**

The forced removals of the 1960s have shaped local access to land and natural resources and, as will be shown in the next chapter, are the basis for negative perceptions of government
interventions. Specifically, they have led to a blurring of roles between conservation and security agents in the area. It is the historically and politically located negative perceptions of the military and protected areas that fuel negative sentiments towards the successful resolution of the Makuleke land claim.

While legislation and policies have changed to allow for communities to reclaim lands they were dispossessed of, the presence of the military along the Madimbo corridor has delayed the Gumbu-Mutele land claim. Instead, as discussed in the pages that follow, the location of the Madimbo corridor along an international border has resulted in a lot of interest, both nationally and internationally. The corridor was (and to a certain extent still is) subject to speculative behaviour by private sector interests and the conservation lobby in relation to the TBNRM approaches that gained prominence in the mid-1990s. The following chapter discusses the Madimbo corridor land claim and the ensuing conflicts over land use among local resource-dependent people, local authority structures and a broad range of actors from NGOs to state agencies.
4: Land reform, conservation and security at the Pafuri triangle and the Madimbo corridor

The communities that were forcibly removed from the Madimbo corridor and Pafuri triangle lodged their land claims in the mid-1990s. The strategic location of the land subject to the two claims, in terms of trans-boundary approaches, meant that South African environmental NGOs (and subsequent international attention) were focused on the process and ultimate resolution of the claims. Apart from the geographical location, conservation experts, led by the Wildlife Society, argued that the areas contained endemic species, which would be lost to the world if local communities were allowed to settle back onto the land or to use it for agricultural or mining purposes (see Steenkamp 2001). This discourse still prevails, especially in relation to the resolved Makuleke land claim for the Pafuri triangle:

*Imagine if this beauty was to be lost to agriculture? We believe it’s possible to combine conservation, tourism development and community development on this land.* (Colleen, Makuleke Contractual Park concessionaire, April 2006)

The neighbouring Madimbo corridor has not met with similar interest, in terms of environmental concerns. This is probably because of the military presence in the area, which means that the negotiation for land restitution has involved the military rather than conservation agencies (as was the case with the Pafuri triangle). The involvement of different agencies in the negotiations has resulted in slightly different outcomes, with the Pafuri triangle being retained for conservation purposes, while one of the current proposals for the Madimbo corridor is that the military continues to use a portion of the land for military training purposes.

Restitution and conservation: the Makuleke land claim

The Tsonga people (of the Makuleke clan) have successfully claimed the lands from which they were forcibly moved, including the wedge of approximately 5,000 hectares that they shared with those of Venda descent. At the beginning of their land restitution application, they invited the village of Bennde Mutale to join with them. This was clearly in recognition of the fact that some of the land they were claiming had been shared between people of Venda and Tsonga descent. However, the people of Bennde Mutale decided to go with the other Venda applicants for the restitution of the Madimbo corridor, resulting in competing claims for the land. The Makuleke land, including that which they had shared with the Venda families, was restored to them in 1998. They chose to use it for conservation, incorporating the land into the Kruger National Park (for detailed discussion, see Steenkamp 2001). This has triggered unhappiness among the Venda families who lived with the Makuleke. At the centre of the grumbling is the historical role of protected areas in closing off certain areas from local use, and perceived unfairness in the restitution of a disputed piece of land. Thus, the resolution of the land claim has generated a dispute, which is predominantly about boundaries but is fuelled largely by ethnic differences and contested land-use options.

The Venda families who shared land and natural resources with the Makuleke expressed surprise when the Makuleke clan elected to continue with conservation. The Venda families had intended their land claims to restore access and use of natural resources. The choice by the Makuleke to use the land for conservation meant continued restriction on local access to and use of natural resources. The Makuleke are now regarded in the same light as the military and protected-areas officials who effected the removals and resource-use restrictions in the late 1960s. One elder who lived in the same area as the Makuleke summarised the local unhappiness with the restitution and the decision to devote the area to conservation:
On top of Makuleke taking part of our land, there is now the Makuleke police who can arrest you if they find you in the area. (Joseph Tshifamadi Endani, Tshikuyu Village, April 2006, referring to rangers of the Makuleke/Kruger Contractual Park)

Therefore, the Makuleke land restitution is seen as a continuation of restrictive protected areas authority. This has resulted in particular stories and representations being deployed as part of land and resource struggles. The local, predominantly Venda, people wanting to access resources in areas where they used to live have been involved in conflicts with the Makuleke game rangers. A recent attempt to visit ancestral graves and perform rituals illustrates the level of stand-off between rangers and the military, on the one hand, and villagers along the Madimbo corridor, on the other:

The CPA made arrangements with the military to pick up the keys to the fence so we can go and visit our ancestral graves. But on the day, we were told the keys are with Jack Greef, the senior ranger at Makuleke. He then claimed he didn’t have the key and that we should collect it from the military. (Frank Guvhane, Tshavhasikana, October 2006)

Led mostly by four families now resident in the villages of Bennde Mutale and Tshikuyu and through the Vhembe CPA, the Madimbo corridor villagers have since engaged lawyers to challenge the Makuleke land restitution in relation to the piece of land that was shared by both ethnic groups. Due to its proximity to the Kruger/Makuleke Contractual Park, the village of Bennde Mutale has taken the lead in this challenge. In February 2004, the village headman and the four families that shared the land with the Makuleke prior to 1969 wrote a letter to the government requesting intervention to resolve the dispute. The Vhembe CPA, while voicing support for the challenge, has remained largely on the periphery, noting that this is a dispute between the village of Bennde Mutale and the Makuleke.

The Makuleke have dismissed the challenge, noting that during their land claim, they engaged with the people of Bennde Mutale. They have asserted that they were in constant discussion and negotiation with Chief Mutele, and that the lands included in the Makuleke claim were agreed upon. The land swap was necessitated by the fact that some families from Makuleke lived within the Bennde Mutale village; and the nature of the claim was to avoid a process that involved little pockets of land in the village. The Makuleke further argue that when they instituted their land claim, they invited the village of Bennde Mutale to be part of it, but when the headman who had agreed to this died in 1996, his son who replaced him reversed the decision, opting to institute a claim with ‘the other Vendas’ (as Nelson Siphuga, the headman of Bennde Mutale, put it during an interview).

After the collapse of the joint claim initiative, the Makuleke negotiated with Chief Mutele for a land swap. This has played into the dispute between Chief Mutele and the Vhembe CPA, with the latter citing it as an example of Chief Mutele’s propensity to make unilateral decisions without consulting the families that lived on the disputed land. Chief Mutele has admitted that he signed a document with the Makuleke, but was not aware of its purpose. His supporters even claim that he was tricked into signing it. Thus, it remains to be seen what impact the court case will have on the Makuleke land restitution settlement.

The challenge is rooted in historical claims to land and natural resources and is fuelled by old ethnic divisions that were amplified by the apartheid system. The forced removals of the 1960s appear to have achieved the apartheid state’s divide-and-rule goal, which has lasted even beyond its own demise.

**Makuleke lands and TBNRM: a strategic location?**

The continued use of the Pafuri triangle for conservation purposes fitted in with the emerging TBPA approaches in southern Africa (see Steenkamp 2001; De Villiers 1999b), specifically with regard to the GLTP, which was referred to as the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou (GKG) Park at the time. In effect, the Pafuri triangle allowed for the linking of the Kruger National Park in South Africa to the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe. This link has taken longer than anticipated to be realised, partly because of the people residing directly between the Kruger and Gonarezhou National Parks, but also as a result of land invasions into Gonarezhou in 2000.

Additionally, the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe is a constraint on the development of the TFCA. In interviews, officials from
Zimbabwe noted that Zimbabwean NGOs that would have facilitated the development of the GLTFCA were threatened with closure as a result of lack of funding.¹ Donor flight from the country has led to many planned projects remaining unfunded. In 2006, the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) was funding only a veterinary monitoring study and the post of the international co-ordinator based in Harare. The strategic location of the Pafuri triangle for the GLTFCA can be assessed properly only under conditions that are conducive for linking the land to the Gonarezhou National Park.

Linking the Kruger National Park to Gonarezhou is premised on establishing a wildlife corridor through the Sengwe communal lands (Daconto 2003). A major inhibiting factor has been the potential spread of bovine tuberculosis to livestock on the Zimbabwean side. Additionally, there are concerns that the difference in approach to natural resources management between South Africa and Zimbabwe could result in conflict over the sustainable use of wildlife. Specifically, there are unconfirmed allegations that hunting concession-holders in Sengwe occasionally use helicopters to drive wildlife from the Pafuri triangle, and the hunting and snaring of animals by Zimbabweans is reported to be happening within the Kruger/Makuleke Contractual Park. Poaching control is recognised as a major security issue within the GLTP, and it is recommended that communities be involved in park security activities (GLTP Joint Management Board 2002).

The concession-holders and managers within the Makuleke/Kruger Contractual Park have now hired a private security company to deal with illegal resource harvesting, supposedly by Zimbabweans crossing the Limpopo River into South Africa. In reality, the control of resources has impacted on local, mostly Venda, villagers to the west of the park. As discussed in the section above, this has set the new but distant owners of the land, the Makuleke of Tsonga descent, and their immediate neighbours of Venda descent against each other.² In seeking to resolve historical injustices, the land claim has opened new ethnically based conflicts that play into ideas of apartheid design. This calls into question the assertion that the land is strategically located for TBNRM if, firstly, it is under pressure from poaching and, secondly, rangers are seen to be enforcing resource control measures outside the boundaries of the territory they are responsible for.

Given the lack of clarity in Zimbabwe regarding the Sengwe corridor,³ and continued local conflict over part of the Pafuri triangle, it is clear that conservation efforts have not concentrated sufficiently on the threats posed by local conditions to the implementation of the GLTP and the wider GLTFCA. A complete strategic assessment of the area should address local political and social constraints specifically.

Restitution and military presence: the Gumbu-Mutele claim for Madimbo land

The Madimbo corridor claim took a different direction, compared with the Makuleke claim. This was partly as a result of use rights the military held (and still holds) and the strategic location of the land in terms of national security. Also, rather ironically, the Matshakatini Nature Reserve did not command the same resources or status (domestically and internationally) as the Kruger National Park. Because of the strong presence of the military and the low status of the Matshakatini Nature Reserve, conservation officials never really put in much effort to have the area incorporated into the Kruger National Park.

What the Madimbo corridor lacked in strategic conservation terms, it compensated for in terms of cross-border security issues. As pointed out above, during apartheid these two issues often overlapped, with the Kruger National Park fulfilling a security role by aiding control over human movement. It would appear that the Madimbo land claim has been affected by the need to maintain a low level of human movement through the area, especially given the economic and political situation in Zimbabwe. As a result, the Gumbu-Mutele land claim negotiations included an argument by the military that it should be allowed to stay in the area, not only for military training purposes but also to fulfil the role of border control (LRLCC 2004). Border control is mentioned as a critical security factor within the GLTFCA (GLTP Joint Management Plan 2002). Specific recommendations in this regard include the definition of border access, securing the entire periphery of the GLTP, and limiting or not allowing commercial traffic.⁴

Fanfare amid uncertainties along the Madimbo corridor

The Madimbo corridor land claim was ‘officially’ finalised in 2004 when the Minister of Land...
Affairs, acting on the recommendations of the Land Claims Commission, handed over the land to the Gumbu-Mutele claimants. The Gumbu-Mutele claimants are a collection of seven villages under the leadership of Chiefs Mutele and Tshikundamalema, and represented by the Vhembe CPA. The official number of claimants is about 900 households. However, the actual number of claimants is a source of dispute, as some households allege that although they paid lawyers’ fees for the land claim, they are now surprised that their names are not on the official list of claimants.

The leadership of the Vhembe CPA are predominantly well-off cattle farmers, some of whom have jobs in the city. This composition is reflected in the CPA’s constitution, which mentions only grazing as a form of land use within the corridor, noting that:

> grazing of livestock constitutes an important economic activity, and it is recognized that the land-related resources of the association, and especially the demarcated grazing land, must be used and managed in a manner that is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable. (Vhembe Communal Property Association 2004: Section 8)

During the ‘handover’ ceremony, talk of a return to the land and a restoration of land and resource rights dominated. However, whereas the Makuleke land claim was conditional on the area being used for conservation-related activities (see Steenkamp 2001), the Madimbo corridor claim contained a condition that the military could continue using an un-demarcated eastern part of the corridor for training purposes (LRLCC 2004). After two years of delay in finalising the plans for the Madimbo corridor, the military officially requested the use of half of the land returned to the Gumbu-Mutele people.

The military’s request has sparked conflicts among the local leadership over how such an agreement could have been reached in the first place. According to Chief Mutele, it was an oversight on the part of the CPA that the most fertile part of the corridor was surrendered for military training purposes. The CPA has not responded, instead imploring people to prepare for a possible re-application for restitution, one in which they would not agree to any preconditions. In essence, the conflicts are over land use within the area and who, the CPA or the chief, ultimately decides on the issues. The tension between the chief and the CPA creates a situation of uncertainty for local people whose land rights have supposedly been settled. The Land Claims Commission has noted that if the Gumbu-Mutele CPA goes ahead with a new application, it should be prepared for the possibility of the land not being restored, as the current conditions were specifically negotiated between the Departments of Defence and Agriculture. An application premised on removing the military might see the Department of Defence digging in its heels and refusing to move.

Delayed restitution along the Madimbo corridor: in whose interests?

The continued presence of the military calls into question the view that the land has been given back to the Gumbu-Mutele people. The ambiguous situation, however, serves other interests in the area, specifically those related to trans-boundary security. While these issues are never explicitly pronounced by the military, their patrols point to the issue of security. Additionally, in the military’s arguments for continued presence in the area, the importance of fulfilling the mandate of border protection and control is stressed (LRLCC 2000). Although the National Intelligence Agency does not view Zimbabwean immigrants as a national security issue (Rapitso, City Press, 18 September 2005), the reality on the ground points to a growing concern, especially in relation to perceived criminal activities by Zimbabweans. This is particularly visible in terms of increased military operations for intercepting and controlling illegal Zimbabwean immigrants. For instance, there are strategic locations for the military along the corridor, which, in most cases, lead to the interception of illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe. The finalisation of the land claim could lead to people returning to the Madimbo corridor, making patrolling for illegal immigrants more difficult for South African authorities. Thus, historical concerns are dovetailing in many interesting ways with current issues in this international boundary area.

A seemingly unrelated issue that benefits from the continued presence of the military is conservation. The prospect of free movement from Zimbabwe of people in search of economic opportunities in South Africa continues to be seen as a threat to the realisation of the GLTFCA

---

1. A signing ceremony for the handover of the land to the claimants was held in August 2004, but discussions continue as to what land the military should continue using.
2. Mr. Shilote, Limpopo Land Claims Commission, at a meeting with the CPA, the military and Limpopo Parks and Tourism, 20 April 2006.
The Madimbo corridor is divided by an electric fence that runs parallel to the Limpopo River. The often-repeated veterinary argument that livestock should not mix with wildlife is being challenged by local people who see it as a further delaying tactic in the settlement of the land claim. The CPA is now proposing to move the fence closer to the Limpopo River so that the pastures within the corridor can be accessed.

At a meeting in March 2006 of the Animal Health for Environment and Development-Great Limpopo Trans-Frontier Conservation Area (AHEAD-GLTFCA), it was reported that Zimbabwean veterinary officials were in favour of a fence on the Zimbabwean side as a control measure against the spread of diseases between wildlife and livestock (Marabini & Dutlow 2006). However, other reasons for erecting the fence include using the north bank of the Limpopo River as a direct link to the Kruger National Park (Peace Parks Foundation 2006), making the area accessible to high-quality tourism investment. In the event that two fences, one on either side of the Limpopo River, are erected, the real losers will be local resource users, including the Gumbu-Mutele who will not have access to the Limpopo River for their livestock. The Zimbabwean proposal is supposedly aimed at attracting tourism investors to build waterfront lodges on the banks of the Limpopo (Peace Parks Foundation 2006).

For the Gumbu-Mutele people, apart from their livestock being unable to access grazing, the presence of the military means that they cannot use the fertile floodplains, water, firewood and wild fruit resources within the Madimbo corridor. People (particularly the older generation) who had lived within the Madimbo corridor before, point out that what they really want is to return and live there again. However, as with the situation in Mozambique, the issue of local people and their relationship with the GLTFCA is both unclear and unresolved.

Thus, there is confusion as to how a meaningful engagement with local people within the GLTFCA can be achieved. Community issues have been excluded from the joint GLTP agenda (see Daconto 2003). At the same time, agreements regarding the GLTP are not legally binding, and the area is managed according to national legislation (GLTP Joint Management Board 2002). This raises the question of what role local people are to play in the implementation of the GLTFCA. It follows that the presence of the military along the Madimbo corridor serves to delay engaging with these issues.
Conclusion

In summary, the stalemate regarding the land claim at Madimbo is contributing towards negative perceptions of the military and of conservation. Local people view the military presence, veterinary arguments for not mixing cattle and wildlife, and informal resource-use controls by ‘Makuleke rangers’ as reflecting an alliance aimed at denying them access to land and natural resources. These perceptions are linked to historical events along the corridor and developments within the Pafuri region.

While these matters remain unresolved, anticipatory and speculative moves on the part of the private sector, state agencies and NGOs have sown seeds of conflict among resource-dependent local people. The options explored since the mid-1990s highlight the continued contestations between conservation and development. They also highlight some of the issues that the GLTFCA would have to deal with in advocating for specific forms of land use in the area. The following chapter discusses a detailed livelihoods study based on one of the villages along the Madimbo corridor. This is followed by a discussion of the various land-use options proposed for the area to highlight the conflicts that emerge when attempts are made to limit multiple and complex livelihood strategies to a single source. It further highlights how support for or opposition to the different land-use options is influenced by historical experiences.
5: The complexity of livelihoods – the case of Bennde Mutale village

Bennde Mutale village is in the far eastern section of the Madimbo corridor and borders the Makuya Park and the Makuleke Contractual Park. To the south, it is bounded by the Mutale River, and to the north by the Madimbo corridor fence. In a detailed study of livelihoods in the village, it emerged that local livelihoods depend on a range of resources. The village of Bennde Mutale was chosen for this study partly because of its location close to the Kruger National Park and Makuya Park. Additionally, some residents of the village had undergone a similar process of forced removal from along the Limpopo River. While Bennde Mutale’s plight might not be exactly the same as that of the other villages, it is clear that, because of historical interventions, prevailing climatic conditions, vegetation and soil types along the corridor, livelihood strategies follow similar trajectories.

The study shows that the local livelihood realities are much more complex than the proposals for potential land use discussed here and in Chapter 6. The study was undertaken, firstly, to understand the range of activities that local people engage in to sustain their livelihoods; secondly, it was undertaken to address what Ashley (2000) notes about interventions often not reflecting local livelihood realities. In part, the study aimed to assess whether the livelihood strategies proposed under the GLTFCA reflect the current approaches.

These livelihood strategies were explored first by understanding the socio-economic differences in the village. Such differences have an impact on the range of assets that people can rely on to generate income, and on the activities they can tap into. Zachrisson (2004), in a study of the south-west of Zimbabwe, which has similar climatic conditions to Bennde Mutale, found that drought was a major source of stratification. In Bennde Mutale, however, while drought plays a significant role in creating conditions for stratification, interventions from the outside, mostly by the state, emerged as the dominant source. A combination of these factors was regarded by the poor to be the major cause of stratification and, hence, as having an impact on local people’s abilities to generate income and sustain livelihoods. The unit for understanding stratification and livelihood strategies was the household.

Local understandings of sources of stratification

As discussed above, state intervention in Bennde Mutale involved the forced removal of some residents, especially those located along the Limpopo River. By their nature, forced removals entail the loss of assets, sources of livelihoods, power and authority. In the case of the residents of Bennde Mutale, those forcibly moved also had access to social and exchange relations with people from across the river disrupted.

Further interventions included the creation of the Makuya Park and expansion of the Kruger National Park northwards. Also, the actions of tribal authorities, as the recognised form of local government under apartheid, saw the arbitrary adoption of resource-control measures even in areas where people were resident. Where access to resources had been sanctioned by locally defined rules, traditional leaders introduced restrictions on resource collection, especially of timber for construction poles, irrespective of a person’s socio-economic status.

Continued resource-use controls outside of protected areas are clearly impacting on residents with limited livelihood sources. In other words, those residents regarded as the poorest in the village are affected the most by resource-use controls that are implemented without any alternatives being presented. With limited options, natural resources play a critical role in sustaining the poor’s livelihoods. As noted by Zachrisson (2004), ability to generate money through a variety of means becomes important in understanding the socio-economic differences between people. In Bennde Mutale, local understandings of wealth are linked
predominantly to assets such as cattle, shops, buses and taxis, but also to the ability to irrigate one’s crops. Local people regard land and the ability to work it as the most important assets.

**Household typologies and livelihood strategies**

Various methods were employed to generate household typologies and ascertain livelihood strategies in the village of Bennde Mutale. Firstly, three different focus-group discussions were convened to address local understandings of a ‘household’ and to undertake social mapping. Each group saw a household as having a head, either a man or a woman, who takes care of the family in terms of providing food and shelter. A household was also linked to a homestead (muta) and the occupation of a specific site within the village. For instance, a man with two wives, and providing for two homesteads, was regarded as heading two households, while a man with two wives living in the same homestead was regarded as heading one household. Women household heads were regarded if their husbands were dead or had been absent for a long time without returning to provide support. The women had taken over maintaining the homestead and providing for the family. Thus, households are as much about having a head as they are about maintaining a homestead.

The notion of a household was linked also to having certain assets such as fields for growing crops or vegetables and livestock. Some households possessed assets such as boreholes, shops and taxis. Possession of such assets and the ability to generate an income were regarded as important to a household. Assets were used to determine the socio-economic status of a household, and those with boreholes, livestock and cars were regarded as wealthy. In particular, livestock ownership and the ability and means to work or till the land were regarded as signs of wealth, with focus-group members noting that ‘to be wealthy comes from the soil’. In this regard, they noted that even if a person had a stable job (such as teaching or nursing) and regular income, he or she would not necessarily be considered wealthy. However, no vernacular words were used in differentiating these variations of wealth, and upfumi was used universally in regard to those considered rich or wealthy. Distinctions were drawn by participants only with prompting. Generally, the words ‘rich’ and ‘wealthy’ were used synonymously. Similar broad categorisations were used for the households considered to be impoverished, referred to as tshishayi.

Having established local understandings of wealth, the focus-group participants were consulted on what criteria they would use

---

**Figure 5: Household categories and livestock possession by percentage**

![Graph showing household categories and livestock possession](image)

Note: tpg = totally poor, pg = poor, mg = middle group, rg = rich, wg = wealthy

---

1 The focus-group discussions were held on 23 July 2005, 26 July 2005 and 27 July 2005 with different participants.
to determine a household’s socio-economic status. They noted that wealth is related to possession of a range of assets and the ability to secure a livelihood independently. Focus-group participants relied predominantly on assets to determine whether a household was wealthy or impoverished. Possession of livestock, especially cattle, was highly regarded; and this is reflected in Figure 5, which illustrates that those categorised as wealthy owned the majority of cattle in the village.

Assets, or lack thereof, were used to determine how households sustained their livelihoods, the poor being highly dependent on natural resources and the wealthy having a range of sources of income. Listing the assets a household possessed, the participants provided information on how each of the households in the village made a living. This information was used to determine the relative wealth status of each of the households, resulting in household typologies.

The households were also ranked according to local understandings of wealth (upfumi), with five categories generated through the focus-group discussions (see Table 2). Out of the five household categories, three to five households were randomly chosen from each category for detailed interviews. Informal interviews were conducted to assess the nature of livelihoods in the village of Bennde Mutale. Observations were made of the households’ day-to-day activities in securing livelihoods, chiefly by way of accompanying household members to the fields, where they collected various natural resources such as mopane worms and marula fruit.

Having come to some understanding of what a household is and having ranked the households according to their socio-economic standing, the three focus groups were consulted in order to generate social and natural resource maps of the village. In total, they noted the existence of 120 households and drew the geographical location of the households or homesteads (see Figure 6) in relation to certain features of the village such as the cemetery, schools, shops, water points, Makuya and Kruger National Parks and the Mutale River. The positions of the homesteads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household categories</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Livelihood sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totally poor</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>No regular and dependable sources of income, sometimes without any food, reliant on others. Households in this category had no livestock, except for three households with chickens, and relied on natural resources through fishing, collection of mopane worms, and brewing ilala palm wine and marula liqueur. Eleven households chopped firewood, and some had small pieces of land for summer crop cultivation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Self-employed, skilled in activities such as thatching, income not regular and or secure. Thirty-three households depended on old-age pensions or disability and child support grants, some had gardens for vegetables in winter and fields for crop farming after the summer rains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle group</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Thirty households in this category had jobs either in Johannesburg or locally at the Kruger National Park, the Working for Water Programme or the Pafuri River Camp and Veterinary Department. Eleven households were involved in crop farming in summer and growing vegetables in winter. Some of the households also received grants, especially child support grants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Secure jobs, usually two salaries, as both husband and wife were employed, and possessing a variety of livestock including chicken, pigs and cattle. They also farmed in the rainy season, and collected natural resources such as mopane worms for personal consumption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Diverse sources of income, but predominantly cattle farmers. Nine households in this category settled in the area during the 1980s and live in the city.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on the map, while not drawn to scale, reflect their relative locations on the ground.

It was noted that the village is divided into three main areas. Madala, where the residence of the headman is located, is supposedly the oldest part of the village. Homesteads in this area are denoted with the letter A on the map. Indicated by the letter B, Madangani (meaning cattle kraals), is where the highest concentration of cattle farmers is to be found. Sedzazwau, denoted by the letter C, is where most of the young people have settled. The three sections of the village can be regarded as the site of authority, in the case of Madala, the site of the wealthy, in the case of Madangani, and the youthful area, in the case of Sedzazwau. In reality, however, the divisions between these three sections were not so obvious, with 'wealthy' cattle owners and the newly married living in various parts of the village.

Households that are regarded as totally poor (the first category) constitute approximately 19 per cent of the village population. They have virtually no assets (some not even a chicken) or money to buy basic necessities such as food. Fourteen of these households are led by women, with ten of them dependent either on child support grants or their parents' pensions. An increasing number of female household heads engage in prostitution with soldiers along the Madimbo corridor to make ends meet. Those with no income at all depend mostly on borrowing from other people or on family networks for support.

Natural resources play an important role in supporting households in this category. At some point, most have depended on harvesting natural resources, such as chopping firewood to sell or seasonal fishing in the Mutale and Limpopo Rivers. However, both of these options are becoming more and more insecure as a result of increased control over access to and use of natural resources in the area. For instance, fishing comes with the risk of being 'arrested' by soldiers or Makuleke Contractual Park rangers along the Limpopo River or by Makuya Park rangers along the Mutale River.

Other options available to these households include brewing and selling marula beer or ilala palm wine. As indicated in Box 2, brewing ilala palm wine is subject to changes in land use in the area. Environmental factors can also affect the trees and, consequently, livelihoods. A wind and hail storm in November 2005 totally destroyed the marula fruit, so that no marula beer was brewed in 2006, severely limiting the ability of poor households to generate cash.
Conservation Area

The predicament of the poorest households is aggravated by the fact that they do not have the means to cultivate their own land. At times, they do not have money even to buy seeds for planting. They stand to be affected the most by interventions that limit access to and use of natural resources. As a result of a lack of means, most poor households in the village do not even have a piece of land they can claim for cultivation, leaving the richer households with more land. Collection and use of natural resources, therefore, represents the most widely used livelihood approach for the poorest households. It should be noted, however, that these activities are not limited to the poorest people. Even those considered to be well off in the village occasionally engage in such activities, which act as a safety net.

The second category, households regarded as poor, constitutes about 39 per cent of the households in the village. Households in this category do not have a regular and secure income but are able to get occasional jobs in addition to relying on a range of natural resources such as marula, ilala palm, fish and land. Their income is not secure and cannot be guaranteed on a daily basis. As shown in Table 2, the majority of these households depend on child and disability grants and pensions. These grants, however, usually support large families and are clearly inadequate, and generally are supplemented by the use of natural resources and crop farming. It is possible that some of these families would fall into the poorest category should their grants be stopped. For instance, Emily Nengudza and her six children stay with her mother, whose pension they rely on to sustain a living. She supplements this meagre source of income with chopping and selling firewood, but she noted that this was getting more and more difficult as they had to travel longer distances to obtain dry wood. Any changes in external conditions that affect how such households sustain their livelihoods can easily leave them in the poorest category.

The third category is the middle group, implying somewhere between rich and poor. They form about 23 per cent of the households, and are regarded as having money to feed their families and sometimes being able to afford to send their children to secondary school. They are semi-skilled and can fix other people’s homes (building and thatching). Households in this category have

---

**Box 2: Sustaining livelihoods for the poorest in Bennde Mutale**

Florence Tshivhambu grew up in a family that depended on making ilala palm wine for a living. She learnt the trade from her grandfather and father. She is now one of the three recognised ilala palm wine makers in the village, the other two being men who also learnt their trade from their parents and inherited the grounds on which the ilala palms grow. Florence notes that once a family has access to a certain piece of land with ilala palms, and the family is known to the headman and chief as making wine in that area, then this land can be passed down the generations, as is clearly her case.

However, through a series of changes in the village that saw part of ‘her land’ being incorporated into nature reserves, she has had to move around in search of other pieces of land with ilala palms from which she can make the wine. In the late 1980s, the demarcation of the Makuya Park incorporated some of the land that Florence’s family had used for making ilala palm wine. They were left with a piece of land adjacent to the Kruger National Park. With the settlement of the Makuleke land claim, however, this piece of land was incorporated into the Makuleke Contractual Park, leaving Florence without access to the land and ilala palms her family had used for at least three generations. She says that, even outside the Makuleke Contractual Park, game rangers harass her, at times, accusing her of using resources on land that is supposed to be part of the park. She argues that accusations of ilala palm wine makers destroying the environment diminish the role they have played in facilitating the regeneration of the ilala palms.

She is part of a group of people who are unsettled by the prospect of conservation going trans-boundary, as she sees this as a front for increasing control of local resource use and expanding protected areas. She notes that her own experience with the establishment of Makuya Park was of people being employed, ironically, to erect the fence separating the village from the park. Conservation, she notes, ‘comes with promises of jobs and other benefits, but we have not seen that here except that people are employed from other far-away places right here on our doorstep’. With increased control over the resources she requires for making ilala palm wine, it is clear how easily people here can slip into poverty as a result of state intervention.
a source of regular income. Most are employed at the nearby Tshikondeni coal mine, or in the city, predominantly as security guards, or at the Working for Water Programme,\(^2\) the veterinary department to monitor the movement of livestock, or the malaria control centre. The category includes professionals such as teachers, nurses and policemen. They own goats, pigs and chickens, but only two of them have cattle, accounting for less than 10 per cent of the cattle numbers in Bennde Mutale (see Figure 5).

They also rely on a range of natural resources in the area. For example, the local headmaster owns a pellet gun and goes out hunting for birds on weekends. Approximately half of the households in this category are involved in crop farming during summer and have gardens to grow vegetables in winter. The other half do not have land, partly because they have moved with their families to the city where they are working or they have recently married and are still in the process of settling down.

Households with at least two sources of income were regarded as rich, and constitute about 9.5 per cent of the total. They have livestock, including some cattle that they can sell if required to supplement their income. However, the cattle are used mainly for draught power either in their own fields or those of other residents, who pay for the service. Milk is an important product, which they sell to other villagers. Respondents in a group discussion noted that this category could not be merged with or regarded as the same as the wealthy, since ‘people who work are not wealthy, they have to wait for the end of the month to display their money, so working doesn’t mean anything, to be rich comes from the earth, from the soil’.\(^3\)

The final category, those considered to be wealthy, comprises 14 households (10 per cent of the households in the village). They own 318 head of cattle, which is more than 90 per cent of the total number in the village (see Figure 5). The numbers of cattle owned by each family range from about 15 to 100, so there are wide discrepancies within the group. It is important to recognise that out of the 14 households considered to be wealthy, only five are resident in Bennde Mutale, with the remainder living in the cities. The non-residents are represented locally by their herd-boys, who build single huts for their stay in the village. The cattle farmers occasionally come to the village to check on the condition of, or to sell, their livestock. Of the five that are resident in the village, one owns tractors. They also have water pumps or boreholes for personal water supply, which usually is for household consumption and livestock. In this area, where water is a scarce resource, access to sources of water is regarded as critical. One of the cattle farmers who recently settled in the area was allocated a piece of land for a homestead where a communal borehole existed. The area has since been fenced off and people who want to access water now have to pay for it.

Most of the wealthy group’s assets are in the form of livestock, especially cattle. Other assets are held in the city or the original home areas where the wealthy people came from or are based. They can afford to hire labour to work their fields and look after their livestock. They have multiple sources of income, including the selling of milk in summer, employment in the city, livestock sales, and crop and vegetable sales. They can afford to send their children to secondary school and university. They greatly depend on the grazing pastures to maintain their wealth, which is regarded as being threatened by interventions that restrict access to certain areas of the village, especially for grazing purposes. As shown in Table 3, which highlights economic compositions (see Turner 2004) or livelihood clusters (see Kepe 1997), the threats include the fencing off of grazing areas for conservation purposes.

The Bennde Mutale case study shows that communities within the GLTFC have diverse livelihood strategies. However, just before the land restitution claim for the Makuleke and Madimbo lands was instituted, prospecting for diamonds in the area raised the ire of the conservation lobby. The resultant conflicts between development and conservation have spilled over to the local level and fuel ongoing tensions among the Gumbu-Mutele people. The following chapter discusses some of the proposed livelihood strategies along the Madimbo corridor and the conflicts they might generate, and includes a discussion of who supports or opposes specific proposals.

\(^{2}\) A national programme for clearing alien vegetation to improve the flow and availability of water resources.

\(^{3}\) Focus-group discussion on wealth ranking, 23 July 2005.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic compositions or livelihood clusters</th>
<th>Specific approaches</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Constraints and threats to livelihood strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land and natural resource-based livelihoods</td>
<td>Livestock, crop agriculture, collection and use of natural resources, marketing of resources by herbalists and sangomas, illegal hunting, fishing, chopping and selling firewood, and employment at tourist camps.</td>
<td>Rangelands, wild fruits, land, water, wood for fuel, mopane worms, marula fruit and fish.</td>
<td>Military presence, limiting grazing ranges and areas for resource collection and use, and control of human movement. Local authority conflicts. Fencing off of grazing pastures and resources such as ilala palms. Informal resource control along the Limpopo and Mutale Rivers by conservation officials. Crop raiding by wild animals. Seasonality of resource use such as mopane worms. Uncertain weather patterns impacting on crop and livestock approaches. Resource depletion with increased demands from the cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban and migrant labour</td>
<td>Remittances from the city and farms to the west of the Madimbo corridor and in Tzaneen.</td>
<td>Jobs in the city, on the mines or on farms.</td>
<td>Low levels of education, hence poorly paid jobs, with general unemployment in the country contributing to job insecurity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural income generation</td>
<td>Beer brewing, prostitution, petty trading in the villages (mostly during pension pay-outs and soccer matches) and stokvels.</td>
<td>Start-up cash</td>
<td>Not all people buy beer for cash; some buy on credit, which impacts on the immediate livelihood of the brewer. Traders are mushrooming everywhere, resulting in diminished incomes. Possibilities for HIV/AIDS infection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State pensions and grants</td>
<td>Old-age pensions, child-support and disability grants.</td>
<td>Government grants</td>
<td>Linked to the older people, and once they pass away payments are stopped. No guaranteed continued source of income.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6: Land-use conflicts in a time of TBNRM

You can go and tell them that the Madimbo corridor will never be used for conservation or to expand Kruger National Park. The people here don’t want to hear that, we are just waiting for the military to leave, for MEC Chabane to de-proclaim the Matshakatini Nature Reserve so we can move on with our lives. (Interview with Mr. Nelson Masikhwa and Mr. Mahwasane Muzweda, Chair and Vice Chair respectively, CPA Committee, Tshenzhelani Village, October 2005)

The consistently combative mood adopted by the CPA towards protected areas serves to highlight the mistrust between conservation and local people. This statement is based on local people’s historical experiences with protected areas, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 above. Even research in the area is viewed with suspicion, often attracting close scrutiny and questions around whether it is meant to serve the interests of conservation. The sentiments about conservation are repeated at meetings with the SANDF and Parks and Tourism Board to discuss the land restitution case, de-proclamation of the Matshakatini Nature Reserve and conditions for the continued presence of the military.

The CPA’s view often contrasts with that of Chief Mutele, who is in favour of conservation-driven eco-tourism. These differences serve as a background to the land-use conflicts discussed in this chapter, with the CPA and the chief as the main protagonists. The local conflicts, however, mirror discussions by policy- and decision-makers on conservation and development issues in relation to areas considered to be of importance in terms of biodiversity (see, for instance, Phillips 2001). The differences between the CPA and Chief Mutele mirror contestations among policy- and decision-makers on appropriate land uses in the Madimbo corridor and the Pafuri triangle.

By the time the Gumbu-Mutele land claim was ‘settled’, different outside interests had tried to influence the direction of future land use in the area (see Linden 2004). They variously engaged the traditional authorities and the CPA. At the beginning of the land claim, two major land uses had emerged as the only options among competing and conflicting outside interests. These were mining and eco-tourism development. However, towards the end of the 1990s, local voices started being articulated around land use. Two fundamental concerns emerged as being vital for local resource-dependent people – grazing and human settlement within the corridor. Since then, the chief and the CPA, together with their respective supporters, have been engaged in discursive struggles to legitimate their preferred land uses within the Madimbo corridor. The following sections discuss the options being considered by local people. Their relevance to the TBNRM debate is also discussed.

Mining as a livelihood strategy

In the mid-1990s, a licence for diamond prospecting within the Madimbo corridor was issued to Duo Corporate Developers CC (Poonan 1996). At the time, the issuing of the licence created controversy, predominantly within conservation lobby groups that feared a debacle similar to the St Lucia Wetlands claim.1 The Wildlife Society, the biggest opponent of the prospecting, argued that part of the Madimbo corridor was a nature reserve, which would act as an important component of the trans-boundary park in linking Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Thus, even before the land restitution claim was instituted, potential land uses in the corridor had attracted national and global attention.

The prospecting, however, did not yield any tangible results for mining operations to begin and, after the outcry over potential impacts on the environment and the St. Lucia ruling against mining, it appears that no further operations were guaranteed for Duo. The issue fizzled away as the land claim progressed and different actors lobbied local authority structures to choose certain land uses in the Madimbo corridor and the Pafuri triangle.

By the time the Gumbu-Mutele land claim was ‘settled’, different outside interests had tried to influence the direction of future land use in the area (see Linden 2004). They variously engaged the traditional authorities and the CPA. At the beginning of the land claim, two major land uses had emerged as the only options among competing and conflicting outside interests. These were mining and eco-tourism development. However, towards the end of the 1990s, local voices started being articulated around land use. Two fundamental concerns emerged as being vital for local resource-dependent people – grazing and human settlement within the corridor. Since then, the chief and the CPA, together with their respective supporters, have been engaged in discursive struggles to legitimate their preferred land uses within the Madimbo corridor. The following sections discuss the options being considered by local people. Their relevance to the TBNRM debate is also discussed.

Mining as a livelihood strategy

In the mid-1990s, a licence for diamond prospecting within the Madimbo corridor was issued to Duo Corporate Developers CC (Poonan 1996). At the time, the issuing of the licence created controversy, predominantly within conservation lobby groups that feared a debacle similar to the St Lucia Wetlands claim.1 The Wildlife Society, the biggest opponent of the prospecting, argued that part of the Madimbo corridor was a nature reserve, which would act as an important component of the trans-boundary park in linking Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Thus, even before the land restitution claim was instituted, potential land uses in the corridor had attracted national and global attention.

The prospecting, however, did not yield any tangible results for mining operations to begin and, after the outcry over potential impacts on the environment and the St. Lucia ruling against mining, it appears that no further operations were guaranteed for Duo. The issue fizzled away as the land claim progressed and different actors lobbied local authority structures to choose certain land uses. However, mining remained firmly in the minds of local people as a possibility once the restitution claim was settled. The idea of local people owning and running their own mining enterprise, in which they

---

1 Proposals for the mining of heavy minerals in the sand dunes of St Lucia drew a public outcry from environmental NGOs, which preferred other forms of land use such as tourism. After battles between those in support of mining and those against it, the government decided that mining would be detrimental to the environment.
would determine who to employ, has remained a common rallying point, especially for the CPA.

Local mining aspirations: a solution to local poverty?

The short-lived prospecting episode is still the subject of local discussions on what land uses the corridor should be put to. Local people, with raised hopes of mineral rights and opportunities for both running an enterprise and employment creation, continue to argue for the use of the area for mining purposes. The possibility of mining is made synonymous with local wealth and not just employment creation. The CPA argues in its local meetings that mining means the local people own the mineral rights. However, experiences at the Richtersveld indicate that the granting of mining rights to claimant communities is not guaranteed and draws contestation from the government.7

Those calling for mining believe that it will address the high levels of poverty in the area. They see mining, through direct involvement or employment in the enterprise, as a possible solution to the local poverty situation. In addition, they argue that mining will not stop them from accessing the area and pursuing other livelihood strategies. The idea of income generation combined with continued access to resources for other means of sustaining a living is regarded as important. They also argue that more people stand to be employed through the mine compared to the other proposed land uses discussed in the pages that follow. The Tshikondeni coal mine is cited as an example of the employment of far more people than could be achieved by a protected area or eco-tourism development. Such arguments are advanced to discredit conservation as a form of land use.

The Makuya and Matshakatini Nature Reserves are used to indicate how protected areas are a form of land-grabbing with little in the way of livelihood benefits for local people. Proponents of mining base their opposition to protected areas and conservation-led tourism development on local historical experiences of denied access to land and natural resources and low levels of employment creation. They also note that when employment is created, it is often reserved for people from other areas, who do not incur the costs of living with wildlife such as elephants. They discredit the Makuleke model on the basis of ‘rumours’ that the only ones benefiting are those close to the project leaders. As a result, conservation is seen as creating very few employment opportunities. Where employment is created, it is claimed that this benefits only a few locals.

Nevertheless, sectors within the villages, specifically under Chief Mutele, openly support conservation and eco-tourism. The village headmen in Chief Mutele’s jurisdiction give conflicting messages, often supporting either the chief or the CPA when the other party is not present. The youth who have been employed at the nearby Pafuri River Camp are in favour of conservation-driven eco-tourism, partly because they question whether there are indeed any minerals within the Madimbo corridor. The contestations between mining and conservation can best be described as a waiting game, with most people in Bennde Mutale feeling that whatever can create employment is welcome. For instance, some who had been opposed to conservation-driven tourism started supporting it when their children were given temporary employment at a youth tourism project.

Conservation-driven eco-tourism development

Since the Makuleke land restitution to the east of the Madimbo corridor, some people in the Gumbu-Mutele area, most notably Chief Mutele, aspire to use the land for similar purposes. At about the same time that the Makuleke land claim was settled, Koale Investments, a private sector company, entered into discussions with Chiefs Makuya and Mutele, on whose lands a 17 000-hectare provincial nature reserve was established in the late 1980s. NGOs such as the Wildlife Society actively opposed any mineral prospecting in the area (Allen 1996). Koale Investments’ proposal was to extend the Makuya Nature Reserve northwards to the Limpopo River and westwards along the river to encompass the Madimbo corridor, forming a new nature reserve called Makutele. The specific plan was to create a network of contractual parks linked to the Kruger National Park. Effectively, what the plan would have yielded is a huge park incorporating land from the Makuleke, Makuya and Mutele chieftainships. This was also of strategic importance, given the direct link it would provide to Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou National Park. It made direct and perfect sense in the context of developing the GLTP. In turn, the plan would produce employment for game rangers and at safari lodges. However, the ad
hoc nature of the proposals and plans meant that they were vague on issues of equity. At the time of the proposals, South Africa was still grappling with issues of community-based conservation, the form it was going to take and what resources it should protect.

Lack of a clear policy on community-based conservation initiatives in South Africa led to the proposals being conceptualised and discussed with local chiefs, whose historical role in facilitating land dispossession was controversial in any case. The authority of chiefs over land and natural resources has been compromised after the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 and the subsequent Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, which clearly placed land claims under the authority of CPAs. With regard to the Madimbo corridor, part of the land claimed by the CPA was included in the plan for the new Makutele Nature Reserve, about which Chief Mutele had been consulted and was in favour. However, the CPA rattled the chief by claiming that it, and not the chief, would be in charge of all land. The chief contradicted the CPA, noting the historical role of chiefs in relation to land:

> How can you be a chief without territory? When the CPA first wanted to claim the land, I allowed them to do so on the understanding that I would be in charge of the land. (Chief Mutele, Mutele Tribal Council offices, October 2005)

These early controversies meant that the proposed Makutele reserve was doomed before it got off the ground. The CPA has turned again to local experiences of protected areas and the low volume of tourists in the Makuya Park to build resistance to the chief's position. Specifically, they have invoked the experience of forced removals in the area to highlight the disposessive nature of protected areas and to argue that land rights are not guaranteed if they allow for any form of conservation. They have also tapped into popular anger at the inclusion of the land in the Makuleke restitution claim, pointing out that conservation is:

> like a thief in the middle of the night. It tiptoes silently, but once inside, it rouses the place to get what it wants. (Mahwasane Muzweda, Vice Chair of the CPA, 14 October 2006)

Chief Mutele was clearly and is still in favour of eco-tourism development either in the form proposed in the Makutele document or in other forms that might involve hunting as an option for income generation. There is a clear fault line between the CPA and the chief, with the CPA clearly in favour of using the land as grazing pastures.

### Grazing as a form of land use

From the mid-1980s, cattle farmers from places such as Thohoyandou started moving into villages along the Madimbo corridor. As discussed in Chapter 5, some of the cattle farmers settled in the area, but the majority merely built cattle kraals and huts for their herd-boys. The main attraction of the area was its pastures, which until then had low levels of stock grazing on them.

The movement of cattle farmers into the area continues. To settle in the area or build a hut, people apply to the chief and headman of the specific village they want to settle in. The process of approving the application is supposed to entail an announcement at a village meeting at which residents discuss and reach consensus on whether to allow the settlement or not. However, in the village of Bennde Mutale, where extensive field research was undertaken, this process is not followed at all. The headman, in consultation with the chief and assistant headman, decides whether someone can settle in the area. Local people recognise that this has the potential for abuse, and in October 2005 confronted the headman. They argued that he should stop settling more cattle farmers in the area, or otherwise follow a process that everyone understood, but the headman dismissed these calls, saying that he had the authority and did not need permission to settle people in 'his country'. This assertion also contradicts the authority of the Vhembe CPA. Despite the majority of the CPA being cattle farmers, its chairperson has called for a stop to new cattle farmers being allowed to move into the area, on the grounds of recurrent droughts and increased pressure on pastures.

The Vhembe CPA led the application for the restoration of land rights within the Madimbo corridor. The majority of CPA members, including some without cattle, are in favour of using the land as grazing pastures. Their preferred use clearly clashes with the chief's preference, and campaigns to win support have started from both sides. The CPA has noted that it wants to introduce grazing camps, which would be used on a rotational basis. The main obstacle to
using the area for grazing is the presence of the military, which ironically has allowed cattle from Zimbabwe to graze on the land that has been claimed by the Vhembe CPA. The CPA seems to have committed itself to a conditional transfer of land, which is an additional hindrance to using the land for grazing. The condition, allowing the military to use part of the land, is fuelling conflict between the chief and the CPA, with both claiming to better serve the people’s interests. The chief is challenging how and why the CPA agreed to such a conditional transfer, while the CPA refers to the history of supposed collusion by chiefs in land dispossession.

**Local conflicts: constraints and opportunities for grazing as a land use**

The CPA’s point of departure is the perspective of having to explain how and why it signed a precondition allowing the military to lease the eastern section of the corridor. The chief has tried to exploit this, but has had to allay fears based on historical experiences of chiefly authority over land and natural resources, which often involved making unilateral decisions and threats of issuing a ‘trek pass’ to dissenters. Some members of the CPA argue that Chief Mutele ‘donated’ land for the establishment of Makuya Park, but that there have been no benefits for the majority of local people; instead, widespread restrictions on resource use have been imposed. Most people in the villages support the CPA, believing that they cannot trust the chief to make decisions that will be to their benefit. However, this support is not for the issue of grazing per se, as the majority of people in the area have no cattle.

Part of the TBNRM discourse has centred on the potential and dangers of the spread of animal diseases between livestock and wildlife. The current political and economic situation in Zimbabwe is also regarded as conducive to the spread of animal disease. The use of the area for grazing purposes, therefore, would mean a greater chance of wildlife and livestock interacting. Fear of the spread of animal disease has emerged as perhaps the biggest ally of local conservation proponents, and it is deployed or rebuffed by both sides in their attempts to garner local support.

Possibly, what has compelled people to support cattle farming is the farmers’ links to political office. In the past, because of the tribal authorities established under the Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951, decisions by the chiefs would have prevailed. However, since 1994 and the new democratic dispensation, an erosion of the chiefs’ authority has weakened their power base. Thus, it is no coincidence that the Vhembe CPA has emerged as very vocal and oppositional to the chief.

**Settlement and irrigated agriculture as an option**

The main actors in the contestations discussed above are the chief, on the one hand, and the CPA, on the other. Given that cattle ownership is the main measure of wealth, it is clear that the disagreements are predominantly between two local elite groups. It is questionable whether the proposals advanced by the two conflicting parties will lead to the benefit of the majority of local people. As shown in the case of Bennde Mutale, the wealthy cattle owners account for a small proportion of the village. Ultimately, opting for grazing will benefit the wealthy cattle farmers. On the other hand, Chief Mutele is a beneficiary of conservation by way of receiving rental for land on which Makuya Park is located. It can be argued that the positions adopted by the two camps are influenced by the individual benefits that accrue from the specific land-use approaches. If conservation-driven eco-tourism hinges on the authority of the chief, as was proposed in the Makutele document, then it will benefit the chief and those involved in decision-making. Grazing, on the other hand, stands to benefit the cattle farmers. It is not clear how mining would benefit the majority of the people but, given its high demand for skilled labour, it is likely that it would rely on skilled people from elsewhere. In an area where livelihood strategies are highly dependent on natural resources, access to and use of the available resources by the majority of people becomes an attractive idea. Yet the conflicting local leadership rarely voices support for settlement within the Madimbo corridor.

To the west of the Madimbo corridor, large-scale commercial irrigation for tomato farming appears to be succeeding. This is in apparent contradiction to official rhetoric that the area is agriculturally marginal. In an area where rainfall is low, the possibility of local people implementing irrigated agriculture is overwhelming, especially for the older generation of people who still have memories of how their lives, with access to land and natural resources, were before the forced

---

1 A ‘trek pass’ is ‘issued’ when the chief decides to expel someone from his territory with no option of return.

2 Potential threats were noted during deliberations at a workshop organised by Animal Health for Environment and Development in the GLFCA, 8–10 March 2006.
removals. They also remember working on the tomato farms along the Limpopo River to the west of the corridor; hence, their aspirations to go back to their lands are connected to the possibility of finally participating in irrigated agriculture. They generally invoke the good times they had along the river, where they accessed fish without any restrictions. The idea of moving is enhanced further by the fact that fishing along the Mutale River has been stopped by rangers from the Makuya Park. Access to the Limpopo River is also controlled, albeit arbitrarily, by rangers from the Makuleke Contractual Park and the soldiers in the area.

Resource use and access control outside the protected area has greater significance for conservation efforts in the region. Firstly, it has created animosity between local people and conservation officials, to such an extent that the CPA leaders openly declare that the enemies of land reform are conservation and military people. There is a high degree of suspicion that conservation efforts are slowly encroaching into the area with the express purpose of dispossession and the ultimate aim of establishing protected areas, denying local access to and use of land and natural resources. This has implications for the trans-boundary initiative, and even for the sustainable use of resources being proposed by conservation agents.

Nevertheless, some of the older people in favour of settlement and agriculture view the trans-boundary initiative positively, in terms of mobility and sustaining livelihoods. Some of their reasons are trans-boundary in nature, in the sense that when the South African and Zimbabwean currencies were of equivalent value, they could go to Zimbabwe for social occasions or to buy certain goods. Settling along the Limpopo River once again would provide them with free access to Zimbabwe, where they could buy agricultural produce at a cheaper price, due to currency fluctuations.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the various land-use options for the Madimbo corridor. It has been shown that the main actors in determining land use at a local level are the leaders, with the chief or traditional structure representing one group, and the elected CPA leaders the other. Thus, the different land-use options are aligned to the leadership structures of the villages along the corridor. While these possible land uses can function to support local livelihoods, the reality is that, pursued individually, they are too limited to offer secure livelihoods for the majority of people, and would serve only to perpetuate the socio-economic differences in the area and enhance the status of the rich and powerful. The following chapter weighs some of the challenges faced in advocating a single-focus land use, in the context of conservation driven eco-tourism. It then proposes a human and environmental security dimension to ensure local livelihoods and address some of the (real and perceived) peace and security challenges along international boundaries.
7: TBNRM, local livelihoods and security – towards a new framework?

Trans-boundary approaches are deemed to address a number of objectives, including the conservation of biodiversity across geopolitical boundaries, enhancing peace and security at a regional level, predominantly through tourism development, and contributing to local economic development (Griffin et al. 1999; Van der Linde et al. 2001). Thus far, the approach to achieving these objectives has been focused on protected areas, TBPAs or peace parks. It is assumed that simply having such structures in place will facilitate the achievement of local development and foster peace and security for the countries involved. However, the current focus on state-level processes means that local dynamics over land and natural resources have been largely peripheral. The Madimbo and Pafuri cases provide useful insights into some of the complexities that implementing TBNRM will encounter beyond the core protected areas.

Based on lessons from the case study, the local challenges for TBNRM relate to overcoming different understandings of the role that state intervention, specifically in conservation and tourism, can play in local people’s lives. Among these challenges is the issue of how single land-use strategies can substitute what are often multiple and complex livelihood strategies pursued by different socio-economic groups, overcoming historically based resistance to conservation, negotiating land uses that are complimentary to the objectives of TBNRM, and dealing with territorial disputes within areas earmarked for TBNRM. Conflicts over land and natural resources involve different sets of actors, ranging from local people to national and even regional interests.

Local contestations over land use highlight some of the policy dynamics in TBNRM zones between environmental or conservation needs and local livelihood strategies or development aspirations. Often, local decisions are based on who benefits from specific land uses. Choosing a single land-use strategy might result in certain groups of local people foregoing certain livelihood approaches that they had pursued previously. As a result, land use that is regarded as contributing to conservation objectives, such as tourism, might be resisted because of its impact on local livelihoods. Because conservation-driven tourism requires foregoing certain resource uses or access to certain areas, it can result in increased vulnerability for groups of people, and insecurities around food, property and livelihoods. For instance, the Makuya Park has excluded people from using resources such as thatching grass and collecting mopane worms or fishing within the boundaries of the park. Research at Bennde Mutale village highlighted that those affected by this are mainly old women who are unable to travel long distances to gather resources.

The tensions over conservation-led tourism as a land-use option highlight the political history of South Africa and post-apartheid efforts to reform rural governance. On the one hand, institutions that were involved in the consolidation of colonial and apartheid rule still lay claim to authority over territory. On the other hand, new institutions are meant to resolve long-standing issues relating to the lack of democratic practices in traditional structures. Along the Madimbo corridor, the clash of authority between the old and the new is expressed in different views about the best use of land. As a result, land-use conflicts should be approached from an institutional perspective at a local level. Such an institutional perspective should address local concerns about the role traditional leaders are accused of playing in the past – collaborating with colonial and apartheid systems in the process of depriving local people of access to and use of land and natural resources. As noted above, traditional leaders were engaged by the colonial and apartheid regimes in proxy security structures at a local level (Duffield 2005), which increased local insecurities, especially in terms of land tenure and natural resources as livelihood sources.
Conflicts over land are indicative also of the diversity of livelihood strategies along the Madimbo corridor and different understandings of the value of natural resources in sustaining local livelihoods. The role rural resources play in local people's lives is often undervalued. Interventions to improve local livelihoods have been premised on single resources or specific forms of land use. As demonstrated in this study, choosing a single form of land use is clearly not adequate in dealing with the diversity of livelihood strategies, and can be a source of local conflict. The diversity of livelihoods approach is pursued across different socio-economic groups, with varying levels of emphasis and importance for each group. Unless a single land use can be demonstrated to have a comparative advantage over a multiple livelihoods approach, it is bound to create conflict, as a result of the inevitable creation of losers and winners across the different socio-economic groups emanating from the household typologies discussed in Chapter 5. While policy pronouncements on TBNRM indicate that land falling outside of protected areas will be treated as zones in which a variety of land uses can be pursued (see GLTP Treaty 2002; AHEAD GLTFCA 2007), in reality this is not the case. Tourism remains the only form of land use that is receiving attention from donors and implementing institutions, but this raises questions in terms of sustainability in the face of competing and conflicting claims to land and natural resources.

Experiences along the Madimbo corridor indicate that tourism is a contested land use, in the light of historical experiences with conservation and the need to restore land and resource rights. The ongoing land claims and disputes over land use along the Madimbo corridor make it questionable that tourism is the best approach for the area. Even in cases where local people agree on conservation-driven tourism as a land-use activity, such as happened with the Makauleke over the Pafuri triangle, different understandings of the kind of tourism to pursue can be a source of conflict (see Spierenburg et al. 2006). The assertion by the Makauleke that they used to obtain more revenue from hunting, as opposed to the current non-consumptive tourism being pursued, is a case in point. This is specifically relevant in boundary areas, where countries might have different policies regarding hunting (Buzzard 2001). Thus, tourism can be prone to uncertainties as a result of land claims and as a result of conflicting ideas and approaches as to the nature of tourism activities to be pursued. Apart from the local contestations, conflicting land uses often overlap with boundary disputes, making local issues critical in considering any form of investment.

The Madimbo and Makauleke cases point to the fact that, in attempting to redress historical injustices, the post-apartheid government cannot avoid contestations over boundaries. In addition to conflicts over authority between the chief and the CPA, there are disputes over the boundary separating the Kruger National Park/Makauleke Contractual Park and the Madimbo corridor. These contestations impact negatively on local development plans and livelihood strategies. For instance, contested land rights and land claims are regarded as impacting negatively on tourism development, specifically as investors are unwilling to risk pursuing opportunities in situations where tenure is not clearly defined (Viljoen & Naicker 2000). While the boundary dispute does not appear to threaten tourism investments within the Makauleke area, it does indicate the contested nature of land rights there. Additionally, it shows that TBNRM initiatives have not engaged with territorial claims and counter-claims that might affect the successful implementation of cross-border cooperation, in contrast to the attention paid to political problems at the national level.

Tourism remains highly dependent on political and social stability. As has been shown in studies elsewhere within the GLTFCA, political instability can negatively impact on the benefits of tourism (Wolmer 2003; Ferreira 2004). Political and social instability also has the effect of scaring off investors, as indicated by a former tourist camp manager operating on the edge of the Kruger National Park/Makauleke Contractual Park:

*The Limpopo River definitely forms an ideal investment spot for building a lodge that overlooks the river, but with the current situation in Zimbabwe, no investor will risk having a lodge there.* (Glynn Taylor, Pafuri River Camp)

Thus, political instability is regarded as a big threat to nature-based tourism. The kind of attention afforded political crises such as those in Zimbabwe, and that extended to social and political problems like boundary disputes are clearly different. It is uncertain whether the implementation of the GLTFCA will assist in the resolution of localised boundary problems or perpetuate conflicting claims to the territory.
This is in spite of the strong TBNRM focus on boundaries at a national level. One of the main proponents and sponsors of trans-boundary approaches, the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) notes that it does not interfere in national problems over land and natural resources. Ironically, one of the PPF’s objectives is the ‘securing of space’ for TFCAs, and this space is often occupied by local people. It is contradictory to aim to secure space for TFCAs while simultaneously not wanting to deal with the resulting social and political conflicts.

The level of political canvassing involved in trans-boundary approaches highlights what some NGO proponents regard as important for success. For instance, the reluctance of the PPF to get involved in national conflicts over land and natural resources is inversely proportional to its seeking of political support in pursuit of trans-boundary objectives. Nine presidents from southern Africa are honorary patrons of the PPF. Simon (2003) argues that the involvement of presidents as PPF patrons indicates a high level of canvassing to portray peace parks and TFCAs as a home-grown and politically correct approach to regional integration and conservation. The involvement of presidents suggests that local and isolated grievances over land and natural resources will be dealt with by each country and with little involvement of the organisations that drive some of these processes. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the state is capable of being a source of human insecurity within its own boundaries by affecting or limiting the resources necessary to satisfy basic human needs.

While some NGOs claim to support local livelihood strategies, the reality is that local insecurities about land tenure and natural resources have increased, resulting in local contestations and resistance towards TFCAs (Spierenburg et al. 2006). As discussed in Chapter 4, local conflicts over territorial boundaries have been amplified within the GLTFCAs. Trans-boundary approaches do not seem to be able to resolve the local disputes in the way it is claimed they have succeeded at the national level. This is partly due to a strong emphasis on national processes, with little understanding of what is happening on the ground.

Trans-boundary approaches can be seen as an overlapping of environmental and national security, with little focus on human security issues. For instance, the ecosystem approaches in conservation highlight the preferred unit of management for achieving environmental security or minimising potential and actual degradation. However, as noted by Van Ameron (2002), issues of national sovereignty continue to be important for countries involved in implementing trans-boundary agreements, highlighting a continuation of the emphasis on national security in spite of agreements on cooperation in managing continuous ecosystems. In terms of human security, given the conflicts discussed above and the potential impacts of trans-boundary approaches on access to and use of natural resources, there are negative aspects to TBNRM. While claiming the central role of local communities in TBNRM, the actual processes have been exclusionary. As a result, two aspects of human security, namely satisfying basic needs and giving a voice to the politically marginalised, face further compromise in the light of TBNRM. As noted by Katerere et al. (2001), these areas are already marginal in that they are located along international boundaries that have not received any form of state attention and support. However, the increased attention of the state, through TBNRM, should not be seen as redressing this marginality, as it promotes the use of resources by the rich and introduces new forms of control over local use of the same resources (see Dzingirai 2004). Thus far, TBNRM approaches have served mainly national and environmental security interests.

The long-term sustainability of this approach is questionable, especially in relation to preferred land uses within TBNRM zones. Despite the recognition that political instability is problematic for the service industry, tourism continues to be perceived as offering sustainability in TFCAs. Thus, the PPF, one of the main proponents of TFCAs, asserts that by using conservation as a form of land use, TFCAs or peace parks will address poverty caused by massive unemployment (www.peaceparks.org). However, based on historical experiences, local people question whether conservation-driven tourism is the solution for creating jobs and sustaining livelihoods. The rationale behind pursuing conservation-driven tourism as a strategy is based on concerns that local people living in and around peace parks often have few alternatives but to exhaust the resource base. Thus, in terms of security, this view fits neatly with an appreciation that degradation can lead to social and political conflict. However, in the light of local concerns about a lack of job creation within tourism, it is
not clear how a focus on conservation can lead to enhanced human security.

These issues suggest that the concerns of nature-driven tourism in TFCAs should not be focused narrowly on national political problems and the risks they pose to tourists travelling to unstable areas. Such a constricted view reflects the failure of TFCAs to deliver on one of their core objectives. Although it is argued that TFCAs advocate managing ‘nature according to its units – populations and ecosystems – rather than according to politically determined boundaries’ (Ferreira 2004: 303), they are clearly unable to resolve political problems that impede their successful implementation. In addition, as a consequence of focusing only on national processes, they are unable to deal with local conflicts within the ‘units, populations and ecosystems’ on which their implementation is based. Thus, as opposed to these units being continuous and devoid of people, they are occupied by a variety of groups of people, whose access to land and natural resources is central to their livelihoods. Consequently, there are multiple political problems as far as land and natural resources are concerned. An appreciation of potential local impacts on the sustainable implementation of tourism needs to be factored into any proposition that tourism is the best form of land use in these regions. This should include a framework for addressing local grievances over land and natural resources, contrary to the PPF’s claim that these issues should be resolved at the national level.

Conservation-driven eco-tourism, or nature tourism, is potentially threatened by local livelihood insecurities. As shown by the case of the Madimbo corridor, land uses are contested. In that case, conservation-driven tourism is not the locally preferred type of land use. Given the diverse nature of local livelihoods and the conflicts involved if one of them is threatened, proponents of TBNRM should be engaging in greater discussion to find ways in which interventions can enhance rather than threaten local livelihood security. As a first step, understandings of security need to reflect the conceptual shift that has happened since the end of the Cold War from state-level security to one that is defined more broadly. That the new understandings of security are both broad and vague, creating ambiguity as to how they should be dealt with in reality, should be seen as an opportunity rather than a hindrance in structuring TFCAs according to local contexts.

Security needs to be defined widely to include human security. Necessarily, this calls for an understanding of environmental threats and threats to the ‘the survival and dignity of human beings’ (Khagram & Ali 2006: 14.13). Khagram and Ali further point out that a narrow view of security in terms of national security can have little direct impact on human beings and the environment. Similarly, TBNRM has to deal with issues of human security. As noted above, historically and politically located insecurities on the part of local agrarian people can act as a threat to the successful implementation of TFCAs, in the same way that the national political and economic climate can deter investment in environmental resources and their conservation. An approach that defines human security as giving the politically marginalised a voice would involve the creation of structures and institutions that act as a platform for local participation in the TFCA process. After the initial inclusion of local community representatives on the inter-country Joint Management Board (JMB), their involvement was discontinued ‘because it was felt that governments are the representatives of the people’ (interview with a JMB member, March 2007).

Given the preceding discussion on conflicts over land and natural resources within the GLTFCA, it appears that local people are in need of more direct representation on the JMB. Additionally, as noted by Brauch (2005), the state’s role of acting as a representative of local people might not take into consideration the concern that the state can also act as a source of repression within its own boundaries. In this regard, threats to human security in terms of political marginalisation stand little chance of being addressed.

Conclusion

This report has attempted to show the effect of historical experiences on how local people along the Madimbo corridor perceive conservation and other forms of state intervention.

By emphasising the colonial nature of political boundaries and arguing for their undoing through conservation-led initiatives, TBNRM has been promoted as a socially and politically legitimate approach representing a ‘decolonising’ project. Both conservation and local resource-dependent people have been victims of the historically designated geopolitical boundaries. However, despite the
breaking down of boundaries, local people living along the borders continue to experience control over their movements. The perceived historical linkages between conservation and state militarised security continue to generate negative local views of conservation.

The ongoing claims to territory along the Madimbo corridor and conflicts over land use highlight the challenges post-apartheid South Africa has to deal with in pursuing the objectives of conserving biodiversity and meeting social and economic demands. While conservation emphasises the undoing of political boundaries for the benefit of natural ecosystems, it has not dealt with the historical issues that specifically link its own development to colonial consolidation. The evolution and implementation of conservation at Pafuri and along the Madimbo corridor are linked to state militarised security and the consolidation of the South African border. Plans for conservation through the extension of the Kruger National Park into the Pafuri triangle and the military occupation of the Madimbo corridor have resulted in the forced removal of local people. It is through this historical link that conservation continues to be viewed as a dispossessing and inherently colonial project, operating by way of a virtual ‘securing of space’ before entering into negotiations with local resource users and communal land owners.

Conservation, therefore, needs to enter into conversation not only with the history of TFCA zones but also with current claims to territory. This history is about the disruption not just of ecosystems but of societies and their economic and social linkages across geopolitical boundaries.

The continuing conflict over land use and territorial boundaries along the Madimbo corridor indicate a mismatch between local reality and the national geopolitical boundaries pursued in TBNRM. These conflicts have been fuelled by the intensified spotlight on the boundary regions, as a result trans-boundary agreements and efforts. While aiming to act as a vehicle for inter-state peace and security, trans-boundary approaches have not yet proved that they can resolve local conflicts in the areas where they are being implemented. This is irrespective of the fact that some of these local conflicts might result from ongoing conservation interests and preferred forms of generating income.

This report has indicated that there has been a conceptual shift in security from the state militarised approaches of the Cold War period to forms such as human and environmental security. Understandings of security need to include concerns about livelihood continuities for local people and how these can be meaningfully combined with care of the environment.
References


Harris, P. 1989. Exclusion, classification and internal colonialism: The emergence of ethnicity among the Tsonga-speakers of South Africa. In Leroy, V (ed.). The creation


Mutale Municipality. 2005/06. Integrated Development Plan review for 2005/06 financial year.


Newspaper articles


