The International Criminal Court and the Indictment of President Omar al-Bashir

Implications for Sudan and Africa

Korwa Gombe Adar

This policy brief provides a synopsis of the Darfur crisis; analyses the implications of the indictment of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir on peace, security and stability in Sudan, and Darfur in particular; and addresses the impact of the indictment of Bashir on Africa’s continental and regional interests. It concludes by offering broad-based recommendations on the future role of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Introduction

Pursuant to the directive of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1593 (2005) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 60/251 of March 2006, which established the Human Rights Council (HRC), a High-Level Mission (HLM) was dispatched to Sudan to carry out investigations on the situation in Darfur. Paragraph 1 of resolution 1593 explicitly provided that the UNSC should “refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court” for investigation. The President of the HRC appointed a five-member team of experts, comprising Prof. Jody Williams (Head of the Mission), Prof. Bertrand Ramcharan, Hon. Mart Nutt, H. E. Ambassador Makarim Wibisono, H. E. Ambassador Patrice Tonda, and Dr. Sima Samar (Special Rapporteur), to conduct its work in and out of Sudan between 5 February and 15 March 2007.

The HLM was preceded by a UNSC Commission of Inquiry led by Antonio Cassese to investigate reports of crimes against humanity committed by the belligerent parties in Darfur. The Commission of Inquiry, or the Cassese Commission as it is also known, concluded in the report that “the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.” The report of the HLM was presented by the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber on 14 July 2008, in which he indicated that Bashir was responsible for, directly or otherwise, war crimes in Darfur.

The ICC, through its Pre-Trial Chamber, on 4 March 2009, indicted Bashir for his failure to exercise his sovereign responsibility to protect the
**Table 1** Dates of Signature and Ratification of Rome Statute by African Countries at the end of 18 July 2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Signature</th>
<th>Ratification/Accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>28 December 2000</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>7 October 1998</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>24 September 1999</td>
<td>22 January 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>8 September 2000</td>
<td>8 September 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>30 November 1998</td>
<td>16 April 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>13 January 1999</td>
<td>21 September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>17 July 1998</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>28 December 2000</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>7 December 1999</td>
<td>3 October 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>20 October 1999</td>
<td>1 November 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>22 September 2000</td>
<td>18 August 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>17 July 1998</td>
<td>3 May 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>30 November 1998</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>8 September 2000</td>
<td>11 April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>7 October 1998</td>
<td>5 November 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>26 December 2000</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>7 October 1998</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>22 December 1998</td>
<td>20 September 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>4 December 1998</td>
<td>28 June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>18 July 1998</td>
<td>20 December 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginea</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>14 July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>12 September 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>11 August 1999</td>
<td>5 March 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>30 November 1998</td>
<td>6 September 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>17 July 1998</td>
<td>22 September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2 March 1999</td>
<td>19 September 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>17 July 1998</td>
<td>16 August 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>11 November 1998</td>
<td>5 March 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>8 September 2000</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>28 December 2000</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>27 October 1998</td>
<td>25 June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>17 July 1998</td>
<td>11 April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1 June 2000</td>
<td>27 September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
<td>28 December 2000</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>18 July 1998</td>
<td>2 February 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>28 December 2000</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>17 October 1998</td>
<td>15 September 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>17 July 1998</td>
<td>27 November 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>8 September 1998</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>29 December 2000</td>
<td>20 August 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>17 March 1999</td>
<td>14 June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>17 July 1998</td>
<td>13 November 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>17 July 1998</td>
<td>Has not ratified the statute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total ratification by Africa 30

* The African countries not listed in the table have neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute.

This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or Parliament, an elected representative or a Government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

Conflict in Darfur: A Synopsis

Conflict in Darfur has historically been based on disputes over resources, particularly land, water and livestock, as well as on what the Darfurians consider to be deliberate and consistent policies of marginalisation and discrimination imposed on them by the successive governments in Khartoum. The current conflict which led to the indictment of Bashir began in 2002 and escalated in 2003, following the attacks on police and military installations by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur, mainly in Gulu, El Fashir and Mellit, and which, since then, has spread to other areas.

The demands of the rebel movements, SLM/A and JEM include, among others, greater autonomy and socio-economic and political rights for the people of Darfur. The government of Sudan responded by deploying the Popular Defence Force (PDF), the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Janjaweed (meaning, an armed man on horse or camel), a militia group trained and equipped by Sudan.

Since it began in 2002, the conflict has claimed the lives of over 400,000 people, caused nearly 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and over 200,000 refugees, with both sides of the conflict divide, particularly some high ranking Sudan officials - Bashir included - accused of masterminding and implementing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The IDPs are concentrated in southern (Nyala, Kass, Shareia, Ed Daen, Adilla, Edd Al Fursan, Buran, Rehed Al Berdi and Tulus), western (Jebel Marra, Zalingei, Mukjar, Wadi Salih, Habila, El Geneina and Kulbus), and northern (in Kutum and Mellit) areas of Darfur which, by 2008, accounted for over 1.5 million, 800,000, and 500,000 IDPs respectively. The crimes have mainly been targeted against the Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa, the ethnic groups that support the SLM/A and JEM.

Indictment of Bashir and its Impact on Sudan

Before analysing the implications of the indictment of Bashir on Sudan, it is necessary to provide a general assessment of the level of involvement and commitment in conflict resolution initiatives in Darfur by the GoS. More specifically, I regard the involvement by the GoS in external and internal peace initiatives as tactical strategies put in place by the Bashir administration to brush aside and delay what is inevitable, that is, being held accountable through due process of the law for the actions taken by him, directly or indirectly, in Darfur.

A: External Initiatives

The first mediation effort involving the GoS and the SLM/A was held in September 2003, in Abeche, Chad, following the diplomatic initiative of the President of Chad, Idriss Deby. His mediation culminated in the Ceasefire Agreement, which provided for the following:

- A 45 day cessation of hostilities;
- Control of irregular groups, such as the Janjaweed;
- Division of the SLM/A forces at specific locations to be determined by the parties; and
- Recognition and adherence to long lasting and comprehensive peace in Darfur.

Secondly, negotiations were held in December 2003 in Ndjamena, Chad, between the GoS and the SLM/A and JEM, but collapsed without any tangible outcome. The escalation of military efforts by the GoS and Janjaweed stalled the negotiation, with rebel movements and the GoS blaming each other for lack of commitment to the peace process. Thirdly, President Deby and the African Union (AU) negotiated another agreement, which led to the signing of N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HFCA) of 8 April 2004 in Ndjamena, Chad, between the GoS, the SLM/A and JEM. 

Fourthly, the Ndjamena round was followed by the Addis Ababa and Abuja, Nigeria, round of negotiations in 2005.
between the belligerent parties. However, due to the intra-SLM/A factional split, the unwillingness of the GoS to compromise on the Janjaweed issue, and JEM’s dissatisfaction with the negotiations in general, only the SLM/A faction, led by Minni Arkon Minnawi (or SLM/MM), signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006.

The DPA incorporated a number of human rights provisions akin to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2005 between the GoS and the SPLM/A, which established the Government of Southern Sudan (GoS) in Juba, Southern Sudan, and the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum, Sudan. By the time the DPA was signed in 2006, the UNSC had already authorised the ICC to investigate the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. Lastly, the GoS and JEM engaged in direct talks in Doha, Qatar, in February 2009, with the aim of finding a solution to the crisis in Darfur. These negotiations are yet to yield tangible benefits in the ongoing peace process.

B: Internal Initiatives

With the failure of the external diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Darfur crisis, and the pressure of indictment hanging on his head, in July 2008 Bashir launched what he called the ‘People of Sudan Initiative’ (PSI). The objective of the strategy was to demonstrate the level of commitment of his administration on the issues that addressed, among other things, broad based development in the marginalised areas in Sudan, and the resolution of the Darfur crisis in particular. However, due to the unwillingness of the SLM/A and JEM to join the initiative, Bashir’s strategy had limited impact in the country. In addition, the GoS assured the Sudanese and the world that Ali Mohammed Ali Abdel-Rahman, the militia leader indicted by the ICC, had been put in custody and was waiting trial by the government. Further, between 2004 and 2006, the GoS established the National Commission of Inquiry (NCI) and what it called the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (SCCED), and opened offices in El Fasher, Nyala and El Genaina to deal with, inter alia, human rights abuses in Darfur.

The SCCED was established after a decree was issued by the Chief Justice of Sudan. The other institutional structures established under the SCCED included the Committees Against Rape (CAR) and the Unit for Combating Violence against Women and Children (UCVAWC). The SCCED had jurisdictional powers over crimes provided for in the Sudanese Penal Code. However, the external and internal conflict resolution initiatives have not yielded any tangible dividends for the people of Darfur, with the lives of millions of IDP still clouded with uncertainty.

The indictment of Bashir has many complex and interrelated implications, perceived or otherwise, on Sudan. As the first sitting sovereign Head of State to be indicted, the situation sparked debate between the advocates of absolute theory of sovereign immunity vis-a-vis restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. This policy brief is not concerned with the latter issue, but instead focuses on the implications of the warrant of arrest of Bashir on Sudan.

First, the Bashir administration reacted to the indictment by expelling a number of humanitarian aid agencies operating in Darfur, such as Action Conre la Faim (ACF), AECOM International Development, Care International, CHF International, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Medicins Sans Frontieres-France (MSF-France), Medicins Sans Frontieres-Holland (MSF-Holland), Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Oxfam, Save the Children-UK, Save the Children-US, and Solidarities. Suffice to say, the departure of the agencies is going to have negative implications on the IDP, the main recipients of humanitarian aid. For example, the IRC, Care International, ACF, Oxfam, Mercy Corps, MSF, and Save the Children provide humanitarian services to 1.75 million, 1.5 million, 1.2 million, 600 000, 200 000, 200 000, and 50 000 IDP in the marginalised areas in Sudan (including Darfur) respectively.

Secondly, the indictment risks plunged the country into an unstable politico-military situation, particularly between the rebel movements in Darfur and the GoS on the one hand, and the National Congress Party (NCP), led by Bashir, and the SPLM/A, led by First Vice-President of the GNU and President of the GoS, Salva Kiir Mayardit, on the other. However, it should be noted that, prior to the indictment of Bashir, Salva Kiir, through the SPLM/A, had expressed the view that Sudan, that is, Bashir, should co-operate fully with the decision of the ICC.

Thirdly, the Darfur rebel movements may seize the opportunity to escalate their war efforts in the region.

Fourthly, the indictment of Bashir is an explicit recognition that extrajudicial acts were committed in Darfur. In fact, even the AU’s request for the deferral of the ICC decision (Article 16 of the Rome Statute) is, in itself, an admission that crimes were committed in Darfur. The SCCED had jurisdictional powers over crimes provided for in the Sudanese Penal Code. However, the external and internal conflict resolution initiatives have not yielded any tangible dividends for the people of Darfur, with the lives of millions of IDP still clouded with uncertainty.

The indictment of Bashir has many complex and interrelated implications, perceived or otherwise, on Sudan. As the first sitting sovereign Head of State to be indicted, the situation sparked debate between the advocates of absolute theory of sovereign immunity vis-a-vis restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. This policy brief is not concerned with the latter issue, but instead focuses on the implications of the warrant of arrest of Bashir on Sudan.

First, the Bashir administration reacted to the indictment by expelling a number of humanitarian aid agencies operating in Darfur, such as Action Conre la Faim (ACF), AECOM International Development, Care International, CHF International, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Medicins Sans Frontieres-France (MSF-France), Medicins Sans Frontieres-Holland (MSF-Holland), Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Oxfam, Save the Children-UK, Save the Children-US, and Solidarities. Suffice to say, the departure of the agencies is going to have negative implications on the IDP, the main recipients of humanitarian aid. For example, the IRC, Care International, ACF, Oxfam, Mercy Corps, MSF, and Save the Children provide humanitarian services to 1.75 million, 1.5 million, 1.2 million, 600 000, 200 000, 200 000, and 50 000 IDP in the marginalised areas in Sudan (including Darfur) respectively.

Secondly, the indictment risks plunged the country into an unstable politico-military situation, particularly between the rebel movements in Darfur and the GoS on the one hand, and the National Congress Party (NCP), led by Bashir, and the National Congress Party (NCP), led by Bashir, and the SPLM/A, led by First Vice-President of the GNU and President of the GoS, Salva Kiir Mayardit, on the other. However, it should be noted that, prior to the indictment of Bashir, Salva Kiir, through the SPLM/A, had expressed the view that Sudan, that is, Bashir, should co-operate fully with the decision of the ICC.

Thirdly, the Darfur rebel movements may seize the opportunity to escalate their war efforts in the region.
Sixthly, the arrest warrant on Bashir has exposed and put into question the policies of marginalisation, assimilation, oppression and discrimination against the people of the marginalised areas in Sudan by the successive governments in Khartoum. Sudan has been at war with its own citizens since its independence in 1956. Seventhly, the indictment is likely to persuade the Bashir administration to ensure that stability in Sudan, particularly between the NCP and the SPLM, is maintained. Lastly, the indictment is likely to lead to sympathetic support within Sudan for Bashir. For example, the Umma Party, one of the old and main political parties in Sudan and led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, has expressed its support for Bashir, arguing against the violation of sovereign immunity. This can be interpreted to mean that the Umma Party values stability over the lives of Darfurians which, in many respects, is in contravention of the protocol of the Responsibility to Protect. 15

**Indictment of Bashir and its Impact on Africa**

This section provides a brief analysis of the involvement of the international community in Sudan, with a special focus on the AU’s role in the Darfur crisis, and concludes by assessing the impact of the indictment of Bashir on Africa. The current AU Chairman, Maumur Gaddafi, has castigated the ICC for issuing an arrest warrant for a sitting president, terming it a biased Western agenda, an institution that takes no cognisance of the age old sovereign immunity. The AU’s proactive participation in the Darfur crisis began with its conflict resolution initiatives in 2004. This was followed with the deployment of 600 peacekeeping personnel, mainly from Nigeria and Rwanda, as part of its AU Mission in Sudan I (AMIS I), and expanded in 2005 to AMIS II, with a larger force of 7 000 troops and more mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, Sudan’s intransigence and inconsistency, as well as lack of commitment on the part of the UN member states to contribute peacekeeping personnel, remained the main challenge for the hybrid force. By 2008, only 40% of the personnel, mainly from the AU member states, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa, authorised under the UNSC resolution 1769, had been deployed in Darfur. 17 The other UN member states that contributed peacekeeping personnel included Bangladesh, China and Indonesia. The operational challenges for the UNAMID were made more complex and delicate with the decision by the UNSC to authorise an investigation of the war crimes in Sudan, a decision which was not welcomed by a number of the UN member states, including African countries.

The AU, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic States (OIS), of which Sudan is a member, are some of the International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) that are opposed to the indictment of Bashir. The AU, in particular, calls for the deferral of the indictment on the grounds that the ICC decision has the potential of destabilising and creating a leadership vacuum in the country, which would undermine the peace process in Darfur and the volatile CPA. Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides: 18

> No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.

A number of potential scenarios, perceived or otherwise, associated with the ICC indictment of Bashir and its potential impact on Africa, are worth appraisal.
Potential Positive and Negative Scenarios

- The leaders in Sudan and Africa in general are likely to tread with caution on human rights issues in future. The Rwanda genocide trials and the trial of the former Liberian President, Charles Taylor, serve as good examples. The African countries are replete with cases of human rights violations, genocide and war crimes, which may warrant investigations by the ICC.

- The request by Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Uganda for the ICC to investigate human rights violations and war crimes in their own countries also serve as a positive step towards the recognition of the legitimacy and authority of the legal regime established by the Rome Statute, as well as the moralistic values and legal prescriptions enshrined in the responsibility to protect the document.

- The indictment of Bashir by the ICC is likely to force Sudan, and Bashir in particular, to ensure that the CPA and peace process in Darfur are consolidated. Bashir may realise that confrontation with the ICC would not serve his long term interests, both at home and abroad.

- President Bashir’s support by the AU and the Arab League is likely to strengthen his resolve not to yield to the decision by the ICC, viewed by his administration as a neo-imperialist institution.

- The role and operational functions of UNAMID are likely to be affected due to the potential disagreements between the AU, the Arab League and the OIS vis-a-vis the UNSC’s endorsement of Bashir’s indictment question.

- The ICC indictment is likely to harden the resolve of the hardliners within the ranks of, among others, the AU, Arab League and the OIS. More specifically, it is likely to unify the position of the member states over issues considered to be driven largely by the West against the weaker states. In its press release issued at the end of the 21st Summit in Qatar, 30 March 2009, the Arab League not only supported Bashir against the ICC indictment, but also rejected the view that international principles and norms can be invoked and implemented without due recognition of the sanctity of the immunity of sovereign heads of state.

- The indictment is likely to marginalise Bashir at home and abroad in the long run, thus undermining his political credibility and potential removal from power.

- Due to the volatility of the situation caused by Bashir’s negative reaction to the indictment, the humanitarian agencies which are still in Sudan, and Darfur in particular, may be forced to reduce their operations in Darfur for security reasons, a decision which may have adverse effects on the IDP, the main beneficiaries of the support given by the agencies.

Recommendations

The authority and legitimacy of the international legal regime being established by the ICC require adherence and recognition by the UN member states, irrespective of their global status or whether or not they have ratified the Rome Statute. China, Russia and the USA are among the permanent members of the UNSC that have not ratified the Rome statute. The international community is watching keenly whether President Barack Obama will reverse the decision by George W. Bush not to ratify the Statute. For the ICC to consolidate its global legal standing, as well as operational and structural functions, it needs to take cognisance of the following:

- Its decisions should be employed equally without due regard to the global status of an individual, as enshrined in Article 27 of the Rome Statute.

- Taking cognisance of Article 24 (1) of the Rome Statute, which exonerates individuals from being criminally responsible for acts committed prior to entry into force of the Statute, the military operations of the so-called coalition of the willing in Iraq, the Israeli military involvement in Gaza, Palestine, in February 2009, and the concomitant killings of civilians and destruction of properties thereof, as well as the post 27 December 2007 elections violence in Kenya, for example, require investigations by the ICC, according the suspects opportunities to exercise their individual rights in the courts of law. In fact, the ICC should have investigated the US military imbroglio and déjà vu against Iraq and its people prior to instituting investigations in Darfur.

Notes and References

The SLM/A and JEM have been weakened by internal differences and have split into various factions. The new factions which have emerged out of the SLM/A include the Zaghawa, dominated SLA and led by Minni Arkou Minnawi; the Fur controlled SLA and led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed el-Nur; and the SLA-Unity faction, led by Suleiman Janu and Sherif Harir and composed mainly of Zaghawas. The United Resistance Movement (URM), led by Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, split from JEM in 2008 allied itself with SLA-Unity.


3 The Rome Statute of the ICC was signed by state parties in January 2005, p 3.

4 See, UN, UNSC, UNSCR 1593 (2005). The other African countries that have not ratified the Rome Statute include Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Morocco, Mozambique, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. There are other AU member states that have neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute.


8 The SLM/A and JEM have been weakened by internal differences and have split into various factions. The new factions which have emerged out of the SLM/A include the Zaghawa, dominated SLA and led by Minni Arkou Minnawi;
Africa Fast Facts
Compiled by GIS and Cartography (AISA)
Price R 100,00

Africa In Focus
Compiled by GIS and Cartography (AISA)
ISBN 978-0-620-426-24-4
Price R 100,00

Towards Africa-oriented Risk Analysis Models
A Contextual and Methodological Approach
Edited by Korwa G. Adar, Richard O. Iroanya, and Francis Nwonwu
Price R 120,00

Africa Insight
ISBN 977-025-628-000-6
Price R 35,00

A-Z: Continental and country profiles, Second edition
Edited by Pieter Esterhysen
Price R 250,00

African Political Elites
The Search for Democracy and Good Governance
Edited by Francis Nwonwu and Dirk Kotze
ISBN 978-0-7983-0184-8
Price R 120,00

Scholarly Publishing in South Africa
Opportunities & Impediments
Edited by Solani Ngobeni
Price R 120,00

The Search for Democracy
Toward Africa-oriented Risk Analysis Models
Edited by Korwa G. Adar, Richard O. Iroanya, and Francis Nwonwu
A contextual and methodological approach
Analysis Models

Towards Africa-oriented Risk Analysis Models
A Contextual and Methodological Approach
Edited by Korwa G. Adar, Richard O. Iroanya, and Francis Nwonwu
Price R 120,00

A-Z: Continental and country profiles, Second edition
Edited by Pieter Esterhysen
Price R 250,00

African Political Elites
The Search for Democracy and Good Governance
Edited by Francis Nwonwu and Dirk Kotze
ISBN 978-0-7983-0184-8
Price R 120,00

Scholarly Publishing in South Africa
Opportunities & Impediments
Edited by Solani Ngobeni
Price R 120,00

Africa Institute of South Africa
PO Box 630
Pretoria
0001
South Africa

No 1 Embassy House
Bailey Lane
Arcadia
Pretoria

Tel: +27 (0)12 304 9700
Fax: +27 (0)12 323 8153
E-mail: ai@ai.org.za,
Website: www.ai.org.za

AISA is a statutory research body focusing on contemporary African affairs in its research, publications, library and documentation. AISA is dedicated to knowledge production, education, training and the promotion of awareness on Africa, for Africans and the international community. This is achieved through independent policy analysis, and the collection, processing and interpretation, and dissemination of information.